Analysis of Hartshorne's (1962) Proof of the Existence of God

[honestrosewater]

AKG:
You are indulging yourself in the fantasy:
Suppose there exists a being which necessarily exists. Hence it exists.
As Evo said, this is just pointless.

I don't think that's what they're saying, and I don't think (p -> []p, .: p) is valid. Is it?
What does ".->" stand for- logical implication?

 

[DaveC426913]

My proof that god does not exist:
God is perfect,
Nothing that exists is perfect. (This could be seen as a result of HUP)
Therefore God Does not exist.

You jest, of course.

Neither of your premises can be taken as given.

 

[DaveC426913]

I ask this: If religion requires faith, that is believing in parts of it without physical proof, then why are people trying to justify it logically?

If it was completely provable, that would be using knowledge, not faith. So to those of us who are religious/spiritual/anything else that falls on faith, do you try to rationalize it to explain your view to others or to tell yourself you're right?

...

I have nothing against faith, I just wonder why people try to mix the categories of faith and logical/rational justification. To put these things together seems quite like a paradox.

This is the most sound argument I've heard so far, and very close to my owns beliefs. By definition, faith occurs without proof.

I also agree with cronxeh. We are technically all born as atheists. I don't see how you could argue we are born with a belief in God.

We are technically born not being able to conceive of oxygen, but it sure turns out to be an important thing to have in existence.


Eventually, we all come to realize we need air, whether told or not. Even of we are raised by wolves, and don't understand what oxygen is, we still need it.

 

[Integral]

We are all born ignorant. Does this imply a belief in god?

 

[hypnagogue]

I also agree with cronxeh. We are technically all born as atheists. I don't see how you could argue we are born with a belief in God.

We are not born with a belief in God, but evidence suggests that we are born with neural hardwire that is wired to create spiritual experiences, which are arguably the foundation of all religious frameworks. See for example the book Why God Won't Go Away.

There is the question of whether religious ideology is a high level human construct or whether its basis is, at some basic level, 'hard wired' into our brains. I think the evidence points to the latter. For instance, some epileptic seizures induce intense spiritual experiences. To me, this is rather strongly suggestive that the spiritual experience is not something we cogitate, but rather a fundamental kind of experience built into our brains, somewhat like vision. Of course, it is not as ubiquitously or as obviously active as vision. And, of course, religious ideologies and frameworks are largely the result of higher-order mental faculties. But the seeds of such frameworks seem to be found in something the brain is naturally built to do.

I found an interesting link relating to this subject, a transcript of a BBC program interviewing the authors of the book mentioned above. I haven't read over the whole thing, but it should come to bear directly on this topic. Here's the link.

 

[Evo]

We are not born with a belief in God, but evidence suggests that we are born with neural hardwire that is wired to create spiritual experiences, which are arguably the foundation of all religious frameworks. See for example the book Why God Won't Go Away.

The need in a belief system is so prevalent throughout human history I would tend to agree.

There is the question of whether religious ideology is a high level human construct or whether its basis is, at some basic level, 'hard wired' into our brains. I think the evidence points to the latter. For instance, some epileptic seizures induce intense spiritual experiences. To me, this is rather strongly suggestive that the spiritual experience is not something we cogitate, but rather a fundamental kind of experience built into our brains, somewhat like vision. Of course, it is not as ubiquitously or as obviously active as vision. And, of course, religious ideologies and frameworks are largely the result of higher-order mental faculties. But the seeds of such frameworks seem to be found in something the brain is naturally built to do.

I found an interesting link relating to this subject, a transcript of a BBC program interviewing the authors of the book mentioned above. I haven't read over the whole thing, but it should come to bear directly on this topic. Here's the link.

I saw a different show on tv about temporal lobe epilepsy, and all of the people thought they had spoken to God, or had some unique deeply religious episodes brought on by the epilepsy. It was very interesting.

 

[learningphysics]

As I suggested, God (in the context of this argument) refers to the greatest possible being, therefore, it is a necessary being. Unicorns aren't necessary beings, so clearly, they aren't the same.

How about a "necessarily existing unicorn"?

 

[saltydog]

There is the question of whether religious ideology is a high level human construct or whether its basis is, at some basic level, 'hard wired' into our brains. I think the evidence points to the latter.

Can it not be hard-wired because of selective favor through Darwinian evolution? I've read where some think, as do I, that religion is an advantage to survival and reproduction (See, "The Biology of Religion" by V. Reynolds). Thus those who entertained such would be favored and in so doing, would contribute to "general neural architecture" that would exhibit the symptoms you speak of.

 

[hypnagogue]

Can it not be hard-wired because of selective favor through Darwinian evolution? I've read where some think, as do I, that religion is an advantage to survival and reproduction (See, "The Biology of Religion" by V. Reynolds). Thus those who entertained such would be favored and in so doing, would contribute to "general neural architecture" that would exhibit the symptoms you speak of.

I don't see how that's very different from what I suggested.

As far as evolutionary concerns go, there's something interesting to consider here. I would generally agree that the kinds of social institutions enforced by religious frameworks are evolutionarily advantageous; however, I also think it's highly likely that the vast majority of religious believers throughout history and across the globe have never had a true 'spiritual experience' as described variously by e.g. epileptics, users of psychedelics, and dedicated practioners of meditative techniques. If that's the case, it would seem to undermine a straightforward evolutionary explanation, or at least complicate things.

One way to compensate for this might be to note that spiritual experiences seem to be triggered by rather extreme physiological conditions-- starvation, very high or low levels of CNS/brain stimulation, and in the case of out of body experiences, trauma and near death. Perhaps the experience arose directly as an evolutionary coping mechanism to comfort people in times of extreme biological stress, where it might otherwise be easy to just give up and die, and the establishment of religious institutions and the like was just an indirect (and also beneficial) side effect that this experience had when it happened to certain charismatic individuals (Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, etc).

It's also possible that something like spiritual experience is at work in most religious believers, but just at a much less intense level than in the extreme cases. However, I tend to think that most religious believers turn out that way primarily because of high level social factors. It's the extreme and surprising experiences of the people who are variously viewed as blessed, prophetic, or insane that I think find a strong basis in 'hard wired' neural architecture.

 

[AKG]

You say "Unicorns aren't necessary beings, so clearly, they aren't the same" Ok, prove it. Prove Unicorns aren't the most necessary beings. You can't and it's silly of me to ask you to do so.

What does the term "God" mean? Many people will say that, "by definition," it would refer to some being that would be the greatest possible or conceivable being, and it can be argued that this entails that if it exists, it exists necessarily, i.e. it is not contingent on any other being or thing. It's not a matter of proving that unicorns aren't necessary, it is, at this stage, just a matter of definition. That God is a necessary (non-contingent) being is something that follows from definition in the context of this argument. What does the term "unicorn" mean? Does any part of its definition suggest that it is non-contingent? I don't think so.

All you have done is attack me for admitting I see no merit in it. I already said why I think it's pointless in a previous post, if you disagree, then you need to say why. I do not see the formula as a basis for a meaningful philosophical discussion.

No, I have attacked you for wasting space in a philosophical thread with pointless little comments, and some comments that had points but no justification.

Surely, you see natural language as the basis of a meaningful philosophical discussion. If someone explained the argument to you in plain English, would it suddenly become more meaningful? When the argument is simple enough that it can be clearly expressed symbollically in modal logic, then the fact that one does so doesn't make the argument less meaningful. Indeed, logic is just a way to clearly express the reasoning that would go in natural language if it had to. So all though you have something against these symbols, your claim that a symbolic argument for God is meaningless, is wrong.

I will go further and say that I think any discussion of if there is one god or one hundred or none or whose god is better is pointless. Hey, if you think there is a point, you're free to post your opinion.

Yes, you've claimed that no one can either prove or disprove. Nobody cares to read just your claims. Back that assertion.

AKG:
You are indulging yourself in the fantasy:
Suppose there exists a being which necessarily exists. Hence it exists.
As Evo said, this is just pointless.

I think you missed the entire point. There is no premise in the argument which states the being exists. It only says that if it exists, then it exists necessarily, that is, this being called "God" is defined as one that is not contingent on anything else. Any being that you find which exists contingently is not God. But, is there some being which is not contingent on any other thing? Well, the proof asserts as a premise that God possibly exists. It follows from these two premises that God does exist. It is not a circular, tautologous argument as you seem to think it is. It defines God such that if G = "God exists" then G -> []G (which is just a definition, so it can't really be disagreed with), and it assumes <>G, or that God possible exists, and concludes G, that God exists. The deduction is valid, and no more meaningless than an argument in natural language. The main point of contention is whether God, as it is defined, is in fact possible.

There is also the point that this argument shows (assuming <>G) only that a being with the property that it would have to exist non-contingently if it were to exist at all, does exist, but this "being" is not necessarily the Christian God, or any other God, but simply a being with the property that it has necessary existence, and that's all. It is in fact a largely vacuous proof, and I do indeed believe it has serious problems, but that it is tautologous (simply stating that an existing being exists), or meaningless just because it is symbolic, or that it applies to unicorns (nothing about our definition of unicorns says anything about them being necessary), or that it is pointless just because it talks about God, are all not problems with the argument.

 

[AKG]

How about a "necessarily existing unicorn"?

This unicorn would have to have a totally non-contingent existence. It must not be contingent, on, for example, space, so this being must exist even if there were no space. Since that doesn't make sense, any unicorn would be contingent, and thus a necessarily existing unicorn is not possible, and the argument fails, since the premise <>"necessarily existing unicorn exists" is false.

In some senses, it is not that simple. What exactly does it mean for a being to be contingent or necessary? If determinism is true, is everything necessary, or can we still speak of contingency, but just in a more relative sense? If contingency is just a relative thing, is it a meaningful term to use in relation to this argument?

 

[AKG]

Some theists have responded to the discovery of the "God module" in our brain as a "sign" of God's design. Whereas atheists use this to write off religious belief as something we just evolved to do, not something we reasonably choose to do, theists suggest that this is evidence that God designed us to believe in him. I wouldn't bet a penny on either hypothesis, at least not until there is scientific evidence presented.

 

[Evo]

What does the term "God" mean?

That's not the topic of the thread and it wasn't even brought up by the thread owner.

Many people will say that, "by definition," it would refer to some being that would be the greatest possible or conceivable being, and it can be argued that this entails that if it exists, it exists necessarily, i.e. it is not contingent on any other being or thing.

YOU are defining god and placing YOUR definition into the formula. There truly is no single definition of "god".

It's not a matter of proving that unicorns aren't necessary, it is, at this stage, just a matter of definition. That God is a necessary (non-contingent) being is something that follows from definition in the context of this argument.

You mean that this formula requires a "christian god" type in order to work? Yes, that's a major flaw. Gods throughout history do not necessarily fall into this definition. There are gods that are weak, that have very limited powers, have human vices, are killed by other gods, killed and wounded by humans.

I have attacked you for wasting space in a philosophical thread with pointless little comments, and some comments that had points but no justification.

Then you are wrong, but perhaps you are truly the Grand Poobah of philosophy and therefore you can decide what is or is not pointless, correct? Just because you can discuss something doesn't mean it has merit or is even worthy of being discussed.

There is also the point that this argument shows (assuming <>G) only that a being with the property that it would have to exist non-contingently if it were to exist at all, does exist, but this "being" is not necessarily the Christian God, or any other God, but simply a being with the property that it has necessary existence, and that's all. It is in fact a largely vacuous proof, and I do indeed believe it has serious problems, but that it is tautologous (simply stating that an existing being exists), or meaningless just because it is symbolic, or that it applies to unicorns (nothing about our definition of unicorns says anything about them being necessary), or that it is pointless just because it talks about God, are all not problems with the argument.

Ah, so you do admit the formula is seriously flawed and therefore it would be pointless to use it in a discussion of if there is a "god" or whatever.

I never said that it was "pointless just because it talks about a god", your mistake.

I asked you to show what merit using this formula would have in a discussion, not the formula itself, and you failed to do so. You have simply regurgitated the formula, inserted your personal opinions of what "god" is, and pointed out the formula is flawed anyway.

 

[Evo]

Hypnagogue, here is the transcript of the program I mentioned. The part that you'd want to read is about John Sharon. If you bring up the edit box, type in "John Sharon has temporal lobe epilepsy." and it will take you right to it.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2812mind.html

John Sharon has temporal lobe epilepsy.

John's epileptic seizures are essentially an electrical storm in his temporal lobes when a group of neurons starts firing at random, out of sync with the rest of his brain.

NARRATOR: John had never been religious, yet the onset of his seizures brought on overwhelming spiritual feelings.

V.S. RAMACHANDRAN: It has been known for a long time that some patients with seizures originating in the temporal lobes have intense religious auras, intense experience of God visiting them. Sometimes it's a personal god, sometimes it's a more diffuse feeling of being one with the cosmos. Everything seems suffused with meaning. The patient will say, "Finally I see what it's really about, Doctor. I really understand God. I understand my place in the universe, in the cosmic scheme." Why does this happen and why does it happen so often in patients with temporal lobe seizures?

V.S. RAMACHANDRAN: Now, why do these patients have intense religious experiences when they have these seizures? And why do they become preoccupied with theological and religious matters even in between seizures?

One possibility is that the seizure activity in the temporal lobes somehow creates all kinds of odd, strange emotions in the person's mind...in the person's brain. And this welling up of bizarre emotions may be interpreted by the patient as visits from another world, or as, "God is visiting me." Maybe that's the only way he can make sense of this welter of strange emotions going on in his brain. Another possibility is that this is something to do with the way in which the temporal lobes are wired up to deal with the world emotionally. As we walk around and interact with the world, you need some way of determining what's important, what's emotionally salient and what's relevant to you versus something trivial and unimportant.

How does this come about? We think what's critical is the connection between the sensory areas in the temporal lobes and the amygdala, which is the gateway to the emotional centers in the brain. The strength of these connections is what determines how emotionally salient something is. And therefore, you could speak of a sort of emotional salience landscape, with hills and valleys corresponding to what's important and what's not important. And each of us has a slightly different emotional salience landscape. Now, consider what happens in temporal lobe epilepsy when you have repeated seizures. What might be going on is an indiscriminate strengthening of all these pathways. It's a bit like water flowing down rivulets along the cliff surface. When it rains repeatedly there's an increasing tendency for the water to make furrows along one pathway and this progressive deepening of the furrows artificially raises the emotional significance of some categories of inputs. So instead of just finding lions and tigers and mothers emotionally salient, he finds everything deeply salient. For example, a grain of sand, a piece of driftwood, seaweed, all of this becomes imbued with deep significance. Now, this tendency to ascribe cosmic significance to everything around you might be akin to what we call a mystical experience or a religious experience.

 

[Chronos]

Interesting. But God, by definition, is not constrained by human logic. We can argue whether it is logical to believe in God, but not the existence of God. The proposition is neither provable or unprovable.

 

[Evo]

We can argue whether it is logical to believe in God, but not the existence of God. The proposition is neither provable or unprovable.

That's what I said two pages ago. Watch out, you will be criticized by AKG for "wasting space in a philosophical thread with pointless little comments".

trying to justify the existence of "god". I told him I think it's pointless, and it is. No one is going to prove or disprove it.

 

[honestrosewater]

So how does one argue that some object- any object- O possibly exists? If O does exist, O possibly exists, yes? Failing that O is known to exist, how else can one conclude that O possibly exists? Is it enough to show that O could exist without contradiction? Or must it be impossible for O to not exist? Etc.

 

[hypnagogue]

So how does one argue that some object- any object- O possibly exists? If O does exist, O possibly exists, yes? Failing that O is known to exist, how else can one conclude that O possibly exists? Is it enough to show that O could exist without contradiction? Or must it be impossible for O to not exist? Etc.

Showing that O could exist without necessarily entailing logical contradiction would amount to showing that it's logically possible (perhaps 'metaphysically possible' too, though I'm not very clear on what the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility is supposed to be). To show that something is possible in our world (nomologically possible), we'd minimally have to show that it doesn't contradict known physical laws and principles (although this is an imperfect method, as our knowledge of physical law is imperfect-- for instance, prior to the advent of QM some existent physical phenomena would have failed this test).

If we try to show that it is impossible that O does not exist, then we're making a stronger claim-- not that it is possible that O exists, but that it is necessary that O exists.

 

[honestrosewater]

If we try to show that it is impossible that O does not exist, then we're making a stronger claim-- not that it is possible that O exists, but that it is necessary that O exists.

Oh, right, that makes sense. Thanks.

I see no justification for <>G

Why not? I guess you can't show that assuming <>G leads to a contradiction (I imagine you would say so otherwise)? I'm just curious. I haven't learned modal logic yet, and I can't see where you would run into difficulties proving either <>G or <>~G (still assuming G => []G).

 

[AKG]

honestrosewater

It's not a matter of proving <>G or <>~G. <>G is asserted as a premise, it is not a theorem of modal logic. The argument I've seen for <>G is that God is defined as "the greatest possible being" so, prima facie, <>G. However, just putting the word "possible" in a description doesn't mean that it refers to a possible being. Even if we describe a number X as the greatest possible integer, such an X is impossible, i.e. calling it "possible" doesn't make it possible.

Also, it can be said that there is a difference between "logical possibility" and "metaphysical possibility". Just because it is concievable that God exists, that may not mean that it is really possible. Note that the characteristic property of God given here that G -> []G leads to fact that <>G & <>~G is contradictory. Normally, we say things like aliens possibly exist, and possibly they don't, so if A = "aliens exist", then we normally have it that <>A & <>~A. Because of God's necessary existence, this conjunction would be contradictory, so whereas with aliens, we have no problem assuming <>A since we can just take it from <>A & <>~A, we don't have <>G & <>~G, so we can't just assume <>G.

YOU are defining god and placing YOUR definition into the formula. There truly is no single definition of "god".

It may surprise you to learn that Owen didn't make up this argument, it's a rather old, and rather famous argument. This argument was originally put forth by St. Anselm, and an integral part of this argument is the definition of God, which he gives as the one I gave. I didn't just choose that definition, it's the one that goes with the argument. I also think many people might be inclined to agree with the definition.

I never said that it was "pointless just because it talks about a god", your mistake.

You said, specifically: "I will go further and say that I think any discussion of if there is one god or one hundred or none or whose god is better is pointless." You've also said that no person will prove either way whether God exists or not. Of course, you make this strong claim but won't back it up. You have essentially said that any discussion on the existence of God is pointless. You have said that discussions of God and religion from a sociological perspective have merit, but you have said the argument is pointless because it talks about the existence of God, and you have given no reason for anyone to believe this. This is the philosophy section, you are supposed to give arguments for your positions. If, as you claim, and discussion on the ontology of God(s) is pointless, tell us why? If not, please don't post here.

Ah, so you do admit the formula is seriously flawed and therefore it would be pointless to use it in a discussion of if there is a "god" or whatever.

You claim that since it is a formula, or since it talks about God's existence, it is pointless to discuss. Nobody cares if this is what you think if you're not going to bother justifying it. I claim that this argument for God is flawed, and it's definition of God is somewhat vacuous. I claim that the argument has flaws, and I point them out, and justify why I think they are flaws. You don't even understand "the formula" (you mean argument, not formula), as far as I can tell. Perhaps people who argue in Chinese are also just engaging in pointless discussion because I don't understand Chinese.

Assuming that you don't understand the argument, you are in no position to point out flaws with the argument itself, but you might have a case in saying that the whole exercise is futile from the outset. That God, by most common definitions, is something that is unprovable, and so discussing arguments for or against God can't possibly be fruitful. You could present an argument for this, but since you don't, I have to assume you stumbled into the philosophy forum not knowing where you were, not realizing that nobody wants to hear what you have to say if you don't have an argument to support it.

Then you are wrong, but perhaps you are truly the Grand Poobah of philosophy and therefore you can decide what is or is not pointless, correct? Just because you can discuss something doesn't mean it has merit or is even worthy of being discussed.

You missed the point. You don't provide justification for your claims, and so, they're essentially pointless. Unjustified claims are, for the most part, pointless in philosophy. Since you aren't providing justifications, I don't have to be a Grand Poobah to tell you that everything you've said in this thread is pointless. Look, I don't know if this is difficult for you or what, but all you have to do is take on of the points you've made, say, that god's existence can't be either proven or disproven, and justify it. That's the point of philosophy.

You mean that this formula requires a "christian god" type in order to work? Yes, that's a major flaw. Gods throughout history do not necessarily fall into this definition. There are gods that are weak, that have very limited powers, have human vices, are killed by other gods, killed and wounded by humans.

No, when did I say that? The argument requires some definition of God, and obviously, it does not set out to prove the existence of God according to every historical definition of God that ever existed. It may be a reasonable question to ask which God's fit under Anselm's definition. Another question one could ask is if the definition can be made more specific without creating problems elsewhere in the argument, etc.

I asked you to show what merit using this formula would have in a discussion, not the formula itself, and you failed to do so. You have simply regurgitated the formula, inserted your personal opinions of what "god" is, and pointed out the formula is flawed anyway.

I don't know what you're talking about. I have no real personal opinion of what "god" is, and yes, I pointed out the formula is flawed, but I did it with justification. I don't think I've "regurgitated the formula", I've made reference to it, but it's the topic of discussion, so why wouldn't I? What do you mean by "what merit it has in a discussion?" This thread is a discussion, isn't it? The argument presented is an argument for the existence of God. If someone wants to claim that they believe in God, then in a philosophy forum, they are expected to give reasons, and this argument can be one reason. We can discuss whether this argument is a good reason. Perhaps you're familiar with the "first cause" argument for God, or the telelogical argument which says that the design of nature suggests a purpose, and thus intelligent design, or the deontological argument which suggests God is necessary since without him, there is no moral standard, etc. These are various reasons for God, and in a discussion about whether God exists, one could present anyone of these arguments, and we would discuss whether these areguments are good or not. If they are, then they give a good reason to believe in God, and if not, then they don't give a good reason. The ontological argument (the one presented in this thread) is just like another one of these reasons. It, like the other arguments, I believe is flawed, but if the topic of discussion is one (or more) of these arguments, I won't just say it is flawed, I will also say why I think it is flawed. Perhaps you can do the same thing?

Now, you've wasted a lot of space on this thread trying to justify your presence on this thread, i.e. making excuses for why it's okay to post the unjustified assertions you continually post. This is a waste of time and space. Rather than making these excuses, justify your actual claims. Figure out what your claims are, express them clearly, and justify them to the best of your ability. Sure, you're "allowed" to post your opinion on what's pointless, etc. but nobody cares about your opinions. In the philosophy section, people, I hope, would expect to see arguments. If you just want to post your opinion, use your journal or something.

 

[learningphysics]

This unicorn would have to have a totally non-contingent existence. It must not be contingent, on, for example, space, so this being must exist even if there were no space. Since that doesn't make sense, any unicorn would be contingent, and thus a necessarily existing unicorn is not possible, and the argument fails, since the premise <>"necessarily existing unicorn exists" is false.

In some senses, it is not that simple. What exactly does it mean for a being to be contingent or necessary? If determinism is true, is everything necessary, or can we still speak of contingency, but just in a more relative sense? If contingency is just a relative thing, is it a meaningful term to use in relation to this argument?

I see. So it's <>G, and G -> []G, that are the critical parts.

I wonder why everyone jumped on Owen in this thread. He didn't present his argument as a proof for or against god. Everything he said was correct.

 

[honestrosewater]

Because of God's necessary existence, this conjunction would be contradictory, so whereas with aliens, we have no problem assuming <>A since we can just take it from <>A & <>~A, we don't have <>G & <>~G, so we can't just assume <>G.

Thanks, that's quite interesting.

 

[honestrosewater]

I see. So it's <>G, and G -> []G, that are the critical parts.

Minor point: If I understand it's "G => []G" instead of "G -> []G". (From OP: "(p => q) =df [](p -> q)") In propositional logic, "p => q" means that "p -> q" is a tautology. It seems the same is true for modal logic.

I wonder why everyone jumped on Owen in this thread. He didn't present his argument as a proof for or against god. Everything he said was correct.

Yeah, the "G" word usually has that effect.

 

[loseyourname]

On topic, indeed the argument is valid for any P, but the premise G -> []G (or some variant) is not true for all G. God, being defined as the greatest conceivable/possible being, is said to thus have the greatest possible existence, namely necessary existence. Because God is said to have necessary existence, then if he exists, he exists necessarily, hence G -> []G.

It is only medieval scholastic artifact to hold that a being that exists is greater than a being that doesn't exist, or even that a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that exists contingently. This Aristotelian heirarchy of the relative greatness of properties has no basis in what is dictated by logic.

Any ontological argument runs into another problem. If we're going to buy into the scholastic idea that we can assign relative levels of 'greatness' to objects such that object A is greater than object B and so on, then we must accept that there exists some object that is the greatest of all. I don't see any reason at this point to accept that there is only one of these objects, but let us grant that for the sake of argument. So we have one object, Z, that is greater than all other objects. In order to prove that Z exists, we must accept the further scholastic notion that an object that exists is greater than one that does not. Fine, we'll do that. At this point, it has been proven that some object Z exists that is the greatest of all objects. Now I suppose we can arbitrarily call this object "God," if we feel the need to give it a name, but what have we really demonstrated? It is clear what Anselm and Aquinas hoped to demonstrate: that the Christian God exists and that He is Z. But why? What exactly can the proven fact that Z is the greatest of all objects tell us about Z? How many different secondary properties are entailed by the property of being the greatest of all objects? Must Z be able to run the 100M dash in world record time and slam dunk from halfcourt? Must Z have 1000 arms, because if not, then an object with 999 arms would be greater? Or does each of his individual properties not have to be greater than each of another object's individual properties? Is it only that the sum total of his properties must be greater than the sum total of any other object's properties? If we recall, the Christian God was tempted to evil by the devil when incarnated in human form. Would not a being completely incapable of evil - and thus incapable of being tempted to evil - be a greater being? The Christian God is also said to be jealous and vindictive. Would not a being unemcumbered by petty emotions be a greater being?

 

[0TheSwerve0]

If we recall, the Christian God was tempted to evil by the devil when incarnated in human form. Would not a being completely incapable of evil - and thus incapable of being tempted to evil - be a greater being?

-actually, that was the human part

What's your take on polytheism, where each god has his/her own duties and even the ones that have top deities can have more than 1 top deity? (I mean in terms of the "greatest being" framework) Which one is more logistically correct?

 

[loseyourname]

If we recall, the Christian God was tempted to evil by the devil when incarnated in human form. Would not a being completely incapable of evil - and thus incapable of being tempted to evil - be a greater being?

-actually, that was the human part

Doesn't matter. Whatever form it takes, Z remains defined as the greatest of all beings. As such, a being that could not be tempted to evil (no matter the form this being took) would be greater than one who could be tempted. Of course, this completely depends on defining the property of not being capable of evil as greater than the property of being capable of evil. How this heirarchy of the relative worths of properties is not arbitrary is beyond me. Why should a being capable of evil be any less great than a being incapable of evil? This seemed to be the scholastic view, but why?

What's your take on polytheism, where each god has his/her own duties and even the ones that have top deities can have more than 1 top deity? (I mean in terms of the "greatest being" framework) Which one is more logistically correct?

If we accept Anselm's assumption that only one being can be the greatest of all beings, then of course only monotheism is consistent. I don't see why we should accept this assumption, however. Obviously, his framework allows for every other level of greatness to have multiple occupants. Why there can't be two beings greater than all others but each other is beyond me. It seems he just defined "God" that way, as only one being that is greater than all others. An arbitrary definition, but so be it.

If we step outside of scholastic tradition for a moment, though, I think that Hume makes a pretty good argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that our universe shows signs of having many creators if we assume that it must have been created. The universe is known to be rather large and not of a uniform composition. Of course, Hume didn't have the knowledge that we do provided by modern cosmology that the size and heterogeneity of the universe can be explained by the expansion of a singularity according to a small set of basic principles that could easily have been the work of a single creator. He certainly makes a good argument, though, that any honest, objective theist in his day should have been a polytheist. The thing is, the argument he was refuting was Paley's argument from design, saying that the great complexity and heterogeneity of our universe could only be explained by appeal to a creator. Hume pointed out that it was better explained by an appeal to many creators. Presumably Paley's argument fails either way given that we have now demonstrated that the great complexity of the universe can be explained by a singularity and the laws of physics. These alone are not as awe-inspiring and prima facie in need of explanation. As Paley himself points out, no one wonders how the rock came to be.

 

[0TheSwerve0]

Doesn't matter. Whatever form it takes, Z remains defined as the greatest of all beings. As such, a being that could not be tempted to evil (no matter the form this being took) would be greater than one who could be tempted.

Ok, guess it doesn't matter then. Maybe you just don't understand how to think of Jesus as both human and divine and what consequences that would have. I thought the whole point was that he could be tempted and could overcome it, being God.

 

[0TheSwerve0]

If we step outside of scholastic tradition for a moment, though, I think that Hume makes a pretty good argument in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that our universe shows signs of having many creators if we assume that it must have been created. The universe is known to be rather large and not of a uniform composition. Of course, Hume didn't have the knowledge that we do provided by modern cosmology that the size and heterogeneity of the universe can be explained by the expansion of a singularity according to a small set of basic principles that could easily have been the work of a single creator. He certainly makes a good argument, though, that any honest, objective theist in his day should have been a polytheist. The thing is, the argument he was refuting was Paley's argument from design, saying that the great complexity and heterogeneity of our universe could only be explained by appeal to a creator. Hume pointed out that it was better explained by an appeal to many creators. Presumably Paley's argument fails either way given that we have now demonstrated that the great complexity of the universe can be explained by a singularity and the laws of physics. These alone are not as awe-inspiring and prima facie in need of explanation. As Paley himself points out, no one wonders how the rock came to be.

cool. thanks.

 

[MrMorden]

Doesn't matter. Whatever form it takes, Z remains defined as the greatest of all beings.

you can't think of God as a mathematical equation, it simply doesn't work. but yes. i know what you are talking about, and yes its a valid argument, but i don't think it would work that way

 

[AKG]

Minor point: If I understand it's "G => []G" instead of "G -> []G". (From OP: "(p => q) =df [](p -> q)") In propositional logic, "p => q" means that "p -> q" is a tautology. It seems the same is true for modal logic.

The argument I'm familiar with is perhaps a "leaner" version which does not require a new connective "=>". You can probably find a few versions of the argument as well as lengthy discussions of it over at PhilosophyForums, search for "Modal Ontological Argument," there should be a few threads on it alone. None of the arguments given there, nor other ones I've seen elsewhere on the web say anything about "=>".

 

[AKG]

It is only medieval scholastic artifact to hold that a being that exists is greater than a being that doesn't exist, or even that a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that exists contingently. This Aristotelian heirarchy of the relative greatness of properties has no basis in what is dictated by logic.

The point wasn't that an existing being is greater than a non-existing being (the comparison would be meaningless, like saying 5 > 1/0), but that a necessary being is greater than a contingent one. Both a necessary being and contingent being may exist, but it is "greater" to be necessary, or so says Anselm.

Any ontological argument runs into another problem. If we're going to buy into the scholastic idea that we can assign relative levels of 'greatness' to objects such that object A is greater than object B and so on, then we must accept that there exists some object that is the greatest of all.

This is only true if there are finitely many objects. God is not a physical being, so clearly, we aren't limited to physical objects with respect to this argument. It can be argued that there are finitely many protons in the universe, hence finitely many objects, but, loosely speaking, whatever "substance" God would be made of may be in infinite supply, and so there need not be any greatest being, since there need not be a finite number of them. What is the greatest real number? At the same time, consider the set of all real numbers less than or equal to 12. This set has infinitely many elements and a greatest element. So being finite is a sufficient condition for a set to have a greatest element, but not necessary. However, the nature of the set of all beings (finite, infinite without bound, infinite with bound) is not something immediately obvious, so that there is a greatest actual being is debatable.

I don't see any reason at this point to accept that there is only one of these objects, but let us grant that for the sake of argument. So we have one object, Z, that is greater than all other objects. In order to prove that Z exists, we must accept the further scholastic notion that an object that exists is greater than one that does not. Fine, we'll do that. At this point, it has been proven that some object Z exists that is the greatest of all objects. Now I suppose we can arbitrarily call this object "God," if we feel the need to give it a name, but what have we really demonstrated?

You've missed the point. "God" is not the name given to the greatest actual being, but the greatest possible, or conceivable being. You may be the greatest being that actually exists, but it is possible that there could have been (although there isn't right now, things might have been different) a greater being, i.e. we can conceive of a being greater than you, sorry ;). If God exists, then it would be the greatest actual being, however, the only thing said about God in the argument is that it is the greatest possible being.

It is clear what Anselm and Aquinas hoped to demonstrate: that the Christian God exists and that He is Z. But why? What exactly can the proven fact that Z is the greatest of all objects tell us about Z? How many different secondary properties are entailed by the property of being the greatest of all objects? Must Z be able to run the 100M dash in world record time and slam dunk from halfcourt? Must Z have 1000 arms, because if not, then an object with 999 arms would be greater? Or does each of his individual properties not have to be greater than each of another object's individual properties? Is it only that the sum total of his properties must be greater than the sum total of any other object's properties? If we recall, the Christian God was tempted to evil by the devil when incarnated in human form. Would not a being completely incapable of evil - and thus incapable of being tempted to evil - be a greater being? The Christian God is also said to be jealous and vindictive. Would not a being unemcumbered by petty emotions be a greater being?

Agreed. Your questions suggest that "greatest possible being" doesn't really mean a whole lot, and if it is to mean anything, then it certainly isn't the Christian God. In fact, I doubt it really applies to anything anyone calls a God, or even, anything anyone should bother thinking about and praying to.

 

[IntellectIsStrength]

Can You Prove the Existence of God?
(Why philosophers and atheists love this question)
By Gregory E. Ganssle, Ph.D.
Ever since Immanuel Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason, it has been common for thinking people to insist that it is impossible to prove the existence of God. In fact this claim has been elevated to the level of dogma in American intellectual culture. The reason I know this is considered unquestionable dogma is the reaction I get when I call it into question. When someone says "You cannot prove the existence of God," I want to ask, "How do you know? You just met me! How do you know what I can do?"
What do most people mean when they recite this claim? Most people mean that I cannot provide a philosophical argument for the existence of God which will convince all thinking people. It is impossible, so the story goes, to provide an argument which will compel assent. If my argument will not convince the most ardent atheist, they say, I have not proven God's existence. Since I cannot convince such an atheist to believe, my arguments do not count as proof in their eyes. If they do not count as proof, what good are they?
I agree that I cannot provide an argument that will convince all thinking people. But what does this tell me? Does this tell me anything about God? No. This tells me more about the nature of proof than it does about whether God exists. I cannot provide an argument which will convince everyone, without a possibility of doubt, that God exists. That is no problem. You see, I cannot provide an argument for any interesting philosophical conclusion which will be accepted by everyone without possibility of doubt.
I cannot prove beyond the possibility of doubt -- in a way that will convince all philosophers -- that the Rocky Mountains are really here as a mind-independent object. I cannot prove that the entire universe did not pop into existence five minutes ago and that all of our apparent memories are not illusions. I cannot prove that the other people you see on campus have minds. Perhaps they are very clever robots.
There is no interesting philosophical conclusion that can be proven beyond the possibility of doubt. So the fact that arguments for the existence of God do not produce mathematical certainty does not by itself weaken the case for God's existence. It simply places the question of God's existence in the same category as other questions such as that of the existence of the external, mind-independent world and the question of how we know other people have minds.
Does this mean that arguments for the existence of God are useless? Not at all. Sure, I cannot provide an argument which will convince all thinking people but this does not mean I don't have good reason to believe in God. In fact some of my reasons for believing in God may be persuasive to you. Even if you aren't persuaded to believe that God exists, my arguments may not be useless. It is reasonable to believe that the mountains are real and our memories are generally reliable and that other minds exist. It is reasonable to believe these things even though they cannot be proven. Maybe some argument for God's existence will persuade you that belief in God is reasonable.
So how can we know that God exists? Instead of looking for undoubtable conclusions, we weigh evidence and consider alternatives. Which alternative best fits the evidence?

 

[reasonmclucus]

Can You Prove the Existence of God?
(Why philosophers and atheists love this question)
By Gregory E. Ganssle, Ph.D.
...
Does this mean that arguments for the existence of God are useless? Not at all. Sure, I cannot provide an argument which will convince all thinking people but this does not mean I don't have good reason to believe in God. In fact some of my reasons for believing in God may be persuasive to you. Even if you aren't persuaded to believe that God exists, my arguments may not be useless. It is reasonable to believe that the mountains are real and our memories are generally reliable and that other minds exist. It is reasonable to believe these things even though they cannot be proven. Maybe some argument for God's existence will persuade you that belief in God is reasonable.
So how can we know that God exists? Instead of looking for undoubtable conclusions, we weigh evidence and consider alternatives. Which alternative best fits the evidence?

Great post! In reality it is the statement that "God does not exist" that cannot be proved.

 

[Chronos]

What a shock. Shall we next examine the proposition that logic cannot prove logic is irrefutable? I'm really curious, if you substitute the word 'Logic' for 'God' in this thread, would it matter?

 

[moving finger]

I agree that I cannot provide an argument that will convince all thinking people. But what does this tell me? Does this tell me anything about God? No. This tells me more about the nature of proof than it does about whether God exists. ...

...So how can we know that God exists? Instead of looking for undoubtable conclusions, we weigh evidence and consider alternatives. Which alternative best fits the evidence?

I agree 100%. We cannot hope to determine on the basis of pure reason alone whether God exists or not (this is akin to the ancient Greeks trying to decide how many teeth a horse has by debate alone, without going out and counting them!).

Can anyone summarise what they consider to be the "evidence" for the existence of God, that is being referred to above, so we can weigh it up and consider the alternatives?

MF