I have brought this discussion over from the thread discussing Chapter 7 of "A Place for Consciousness". I think it would. First of all, we aren't really sure how we act naturally in the world. I happen to think that we act the way we do because we are vehicles being driven by a consciousness that is not seated in the brain. This is similar to the way in which cars act. When they are driven, they behave in ways completely unpredictable by the laws of physics. Intentions of the driver (which is literally seated in the car but is not part of the car) are expressed by relatively small and infrequent forces on the various controls. These "cause" the car to stay on the road and move from point A to point B. The overwhelming majority of causes involved, of course, are the forces produced by converting chemical energy in the gasoline to mechanical forces applied to the wheels. These cause the car to go from A to B but only in a crude, unintentional way. Without the driver's relatively small interventions, the car would not behave as it does. I think this "driver" model is a sensible interpretation of what you call incarnation. Otherwise, how can we make sense of the mind influencing the body at all? It may be contrary to popular opinion, but I don't agree that it is contrary to the evidence. I think the "evidence" for multiple consciousness is analogous to the "evidence" for multiple TV programs on a single channel at one time. It looks as if each TV set has its own unique program, when in fact there is only a single program being transmitted to all the TV sets. I have recently been given some additional confidence in my conclusion that there is only one consciousness by Canute. He told me that Erwin Schroedinger, among others, held the same opinion. Evidently the evidence for multiple consciousnesses was not compelling for him either. I don't think you can produce such evidence. First, I claim that consciousness does have physical vehicles in the form of biological organisms. But in addition, I think that consciousness can act directly in some circumstances outside of those vehicles. In particular in the establishment of the laws of physics and in the establishment of the initial conditions for the physical universe. Whether we should append the adverb 'miraculously' to these actions I think would simply be an inconsequential semantic choice. It's not a question of whether the single consciousness needs the vehicles but a question of whether it uses the vehicles. If vehicles weren't used, then it wouldn't seem that there were multiple consciousnesses at all. If vehicles are used, however, then it would seem, from the points of view of the vehicles themselves, that there were multiples. Keep in mind that if there is only one consciousness, then that is the only thing to which "seeming" can even happen. If there is only one consciousness, then it is obvious that from the point of view of any particular vehicle (i.e. human brain), knowledge that is accessible to the consciousness is limited to local information related to that particular body. Thus it would seem to the consciousness, while driving a particular body, that consciousness is seated in that body's brain and that no other body is conscious. That's exactly the way it appears to each of us. We are directly aware of consciousness in our body but we have no access whatsoever to the consciousness, if it exists, in others. They only seem conscious to us because they behave sort of like us. But I don't think it is nearly as hard. Instead of the self-referential problem of brain states causing consciousness and in turn consciousness causing brain states, we would have an agent outside the brain causing (or more accurately, triggering) brain states. That's much easier. I think analogous problems would be the problem of designing a robot which could pass the Turing test and which in addition really did achieve consciousness, versus the problem of designing a vehicle such as a car which could be driven by a conscious driver. The first problem is much harder. It's harder than the single consciousness case as I described above, but in addition you have the problem of explaining the emergence of consciousness from non-conscious physical systems. I think that makes it twice as hard. I think it adds a great amount of simplicity, as I described above. What other problems do you have in mind? In my view, you don't have to attribute to the universal consciousness anything we don't experience in everyday consciousness, except longevity. I think rather that the single consciousness was extremely primitive and limited at the very beginning. I think it has been evolving and growing ever since, just like everything else. I don't think we need ask that awkward question because I think it would be a mistake to associate the single consciousness with the notion of God. The notion of God, as held by virtually everyone who uses that term, connotes perfection, omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, and infinity. I think none of these pertains to the one consciousness. As for the question "Who created the universal Consciousness?" it is no more difficult for me than the corresponding question is for any philosopher, scientist, theologian, or magician who claims that X is ontologically fundamental:"Who created X?" At least in my case the starting point is as simple as it can get, whereas other points of view must start with something "infinite" or otherwise very complex.