http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html My understanding is, that the point of IAEA inspections is to verify inventory, and that underreporting of production is a way of diverting material to weapons production. Of course, that doesn't make much sense here, because this is low-enriched uranium. It is not itself usable for weapons, and must be further enriched - at the same place it is being created. It can't be diverted to a weapons program, unless they have clandestine enrichment facilities. (Iraq tried this, at Tarmiya. It was not discovered.) It can't be further enriched at the disclosed facility, because it would be detected. (see for instance, "Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Export Controls" - Matthew Bunn http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/35D9F2B0-2FCF-4B53-A3EA-64E836F49B59/0/lec16slides.pdf [Broken] from http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/LectureNotes/index.htm [Broken]) So why the disclosure failures?