Art,Could you explain to a moron why if the optics and chips were going to be vaporised on re-entry why the rest of the satellite wasn't?
Cycovenom,Hahaha, hey bro!. I am following this discussion, too.
I think Morbius should get out of the Nuclear Engineering forum more often.
This is symptomatic of the attitude of the West. Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment temporarily while negotiations with the EU-3 were going on. Iran made it clear numerous times during that period that they would never agree to a permanent suspension of enrichement. They were negotiating about measures to reassure the West that their nuclear program was not for weapons. The suspension was a temporary confidence building measure....under which Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, but which Iran now is breaching.
CLearly this illogical statement was meant for to mislead the US and British public who mostly don't follow this issue closely. The message they remember is that their government is saying that "Iran is in breach of some treaty regarding nuclear matters". And "nuclear" sounds scary. Then we all know about Ahmadinejad who said that the Israeli state will crumble which is deliberately mistranslated as "Iran wants to wipe Israel off the map"....under which Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, but which Iran now is breaching.
Dr Strangelove err Greenman - Are you really so daft you thought I meant someone would just pick them up, plug them in and use them :rofl:Art,
Because MORON - I NEVER SAID that the chips and optics were going to be "vaporized"
Both heat and impact would make the chips and optics useless.
They were going to be heated to a level in which the chips would not retain their information;
and the ultra-fine polished lenses would NOT retain their ultra-fine polish. Therefore, the
recovery of coding from the chips or highly polished lenses was not at issue.
But I did NOT say "vaporized". They would be damaged - and hence useless - but NOT
vaporized. We would still have TONS of mass raining down on to the surface.
If there had been people and homes under Skylab - they could have been killed or injured.
This is the typical "strawman" argument. I said the chips and optics "would not survive"
and you infer this means "vaporized". Just as you misread the NPT Treaty - you MISREAD
my postings and "spin" them to your own uses.
I abhor such intellectual DISHONESTY and STUPIDITY
Deal with my words as I have written them - NOT as you would have liked them to be written.
Dr. Gregory Greenman
The IAEA's impartiality has been seriously compromised through pressure from the US both indirectly through general political pressure on it's trading partners and directly by threatening to take action against Iran itself if the IAEA didn't do it's bidding. The US even tried to have IAEA Director Mohammad El Baradei fired since which he's been very supportive of whatever he is told to support.Art,
Iran's LACK of transparency was one of the key reasons cited by the IAEA when it REPORTED
Iran to the Security Council for VIOLATION of the NPT:
The Honourable Peter Hoekstra
U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
H-405 The Caitol
Washington, DC 20515
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, date 23 August 2006, entitled “Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States”, contains some erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated information.
The caption under the photograph of the Natanz site on page 9 of the report states that “ Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade using a 164-machine centrifuge cascade”. In this regard, please be informed that information about the uranium enrichment work being carried out at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP_ at Natanz, including the 3.6% enrichment level that had been achieved by Iran, was provided to the IAEA Board of Governors by the Director General in April 2006 (see GOV/2006/27. paragraph 31). The description of this enrichment level as “weapons grade” is incorrect, since the term “weapons-grade” is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to the order of 60% or more in the isotope of uranium-235. The Director General’s April 2006 report, as well as all of his other reports on the implementation of the safeguards in Ira, are posted on the IAEA’s website at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran [Broken].
The first bullet on page 10 states that “ Iran had covertly produced the short-lived radioactive element polonium-210 (Po-210), a substance with two known uses; a neutron source for a nuclear weapon and satellite batteries”. The use of the phrase “covertly produced” is misleading because the production of Po-210 is not required to be reported by Iran to the IAEA under the NPT safeguards agreement concluded between Iran and the IAEA (published in IAEA document INFCIRC/214). (Regarding the production of Po-210, please refer to the report provided to the Board of Governors by the Director General in November 2004 (GOV/2004/83, paragraph 80)).
Furthermore, the IAEA Secretariat takes strong exception to the incorrect and misleading assertion in the Staff Report’s second full paragraph of page 13 that the Director General of the IAEA decided to “remove” Mr. Charlier, a senior safeguards inspector of the IAEA, for “allegedly raising concerns about Iranian deception regarding its nuclear program and concluding that the purposed of Iran’s nuclear programme is to construct weapons”. In addition, the report contains an outrageous and dishonest suggestion that such removal might have been for “not having adhered to an unstated IAEA policy baring IAEA officials from telling the whole truth about the Iranian nuclear program”.
In this regard, please be advised that all safeguards agreements concluded between a State and the IAEA in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons require the IAEA to secure acceptance by the State of the designation of IAEA safeguards inspectors, before such inspectors may be sent to the State on inspection (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), paragraphs 9 and 85). Under such agreements, each State has the right to object to the designation of any safeguards inspector, and to request the withdrawal of the designation of an inspector, at any time, for that State (http:www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs). Accordingly, Iran’s request to the Director General to withdraw the designation of Mr. Charlier authorizing him to carry out safeguards inspection in Iran, was based on paragraph (a)(i) of Article 9 and paragraph (d) of Article 85 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. I should also like to note here that Iran has accepted the designation of more than 200 Agency safeguards inspectors, which number is similar to that accepted by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that have concluded safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT.
Finally, it is regrettable that the Staff Report did not take into account the views of the United Nations Security Council, as expressed in resolution 1996 (2006), which inter alia, “commends and encourages the Director General fo the IAEA and its secretariat for the ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the Agency”.
While it is unfortunate that the authors of the Staff Report did not consult with the IAEA Secretariat to verify the correctness of the above referenced information, the IAEA Secretariat stands ready to assist your Committee in correcting the erroneous and misleading information contained in the report.
Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination
... and it's failure to dismantle it's nuclear arsenal...
The US has indeed been dismantling its nuclear arsenal, declining now to less than a 1/3 of the cold war peak. The Bush administration has continued the process with further reduction plans, announcing unilaterally that the 2004 levels would be cut in half by 2012.A good article by Britain's former foreign secretary Robin Cook
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/05/estimates_of_us_nuclear_weapon.phpFAS said:The 2012 stockpile of 5,000+ warheads represent a significant reduction from the 24,000 warhead stockpile of the 1980s (and the all-time high of 32,000 warheads in 1966)