- #1
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- QBism as presented by QBists doesn't make sense (to me), so I reformulate QBism in a way that makes more sense.
I don't like QBism, for the reason it seems self-contradictory to me. There are at least 3 self-contradictions in the QBism literature:
(i) Sometimes it denies the existence of objective reality, but sometimes it accepts the existence of objective reality.
(ii) Even though it sometimes denies the existence of objective reality, it always denies solipsism.
(iii) Even though it sometimes accepts the existence of objective reality, it always denies its nonlocality proved by the Bell theorem.
Is there a way to reformulate QBIsm in a way that is not self-contradictory? I think there is, in a way first suggested to me by @DarMM. Here I want to elaborate this idea in my own terms.
In the spirit of Wigner's unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences, the main thesis is that objective reality exists, but cannot be described mathematically. Mathematics is nothing but a useful human construct. It may help us to think about the nature that surrounds us, but it is not the nature itself. Mathematical description of the laws of physics is a map, not the territory. The nature itself, the reality itself, is non-mathematical. Hence any mathematical theorem on reality (Bell, PBR, ...) is irrelevant and misleading, very much like a mathematical theorem about the existence or non-existence of God would be irrelevant and misleading. The only thing which can be described mathematically is our subjective knowledge, because mathematics is nothing but one of human ways of gaining subjective knowledge.
It's not that I am very happy with the interpretation above, but I cannot think of any better version of QBism that would make at least a little sense to me. If QBism makes sense at all, then it's only this version of QBism. Any thoughts?
(i) Sometimes it denies the existence of objective reality, but sometimes it accepts the existence of objective reality.
(ii) Even though it sometimes denies the existence of objective reality, it always denies solipsism.
(iii) Even though it sometimes accepts the existence of objective reality, it always denies its nonlocality proved by the Bell theorem.
Is there a way to reformulate QBIsm in a way that is not self-contradictory? I think there is, in a way first suggested to me by @DarMM. Here I want to elaborate this idea in my own terms.
In the spirit of Wigner's unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences, the main thesis is that objective reality exists, but cannot be described mathematically. Mathematics is nothing but a useful human construct. It may help us to think about the nature that surrounds us, but it is not the nature itself. Mathematical description of the laws of physics is a map, not the territory. The nature itself, the reality itself, is non-mathematical. Hence any mathematical theorem on reality (Bell, PBR, ...) is irrelevant and misleading, very much like a mathematical theorem about the existence or non-existence of God would be irrelevant and misleading. The only thing which can be described mathematically is our subjective knowledge, because mathematics is nothing but one of human ways of gaining subjective knowledge.
It's not that I am very happy with the interpretation above, but I cannot think of any better version of QBism that would make at least a little sense to me. If QBism makes sense at all, then it's only this version of QBism. Any thoughts?