How we think is a question for science, but it's also relevant for philosophy of mind. In this thread I want to see how science reflects certain ideas of the philosophy of Kant. That's why I put it in the science forum, I think this is the most appropriate place; if it is not, I apologize. Kant states that all sensory experiences reach us as a multitude of impressions, which are then synthesized into representations. Now Kant says that in order to unite representations it is required to have unity of consciousness in the synthesis of these representations. If consciousness didn't have synthetic unity, then the multitude of experiences couldn't be united in this consciousness. So, I'm wondering if this is supported by science or not. In split-brain experiments, there is no unity of consciousness: does this mean that experiences can't be united. In normal consciousness, are there occurences where experiences can't be united as well? If so, what is the cause of this? Conversely too of course: is there any evidence that speaks against the condition of synthetic unity?