But what is the basis of this doubt? How can all the known facts of biology, neuroscience and social science be dismissed as entirely inadequate, not even touching the sides of the hard problem, without an examination of those facts?I am sure it is so about the compulsive behavior. I never had doubts that determinism and causality play an important role in reality and human behavior. However, I do have trouble believing that all of human behavior and self-awareness can and will ever be attributed to causal relations. There is nothing compulsive about the thalamus, caudate nucleus and orbitofrontal cortex that required that you perceive, contemplate, understand and relay your acquired knowledge and deep insights to other systems in this particular thread.
You talk as if a glass that is not yet completely full is therefore "completely empty".
Now I happily accept that there is likely to be always some final residue that feels impossible to explain (lacking an adequate model) when it comes to the mind. So for example, the redness of red. We can know all the facts of visual processing but in the end, why red is experience as that hue and not some other hue (gred, rud, etc) becomes inexplicable.
But this is due to a lack of counterfactuals. And that is a problem for any theory. It is a limit on explanations of material reality also - existence itself becomes an irreducible fact because no "other" can be imagined. Facts need other facts to relate to. There must be an explanatory context to have some sense of why (and why not).
So the hard problem only has bite if you can argue a very large part, or some completely critical part, is not explained by known facts, existing theory.
When people say a large part is still missing - the glass is almost completely empty - well that usually means they personally have not filled their glass with the available knowledge. They are misrepresenting how much is actually known by those who study these things.
And if they say a large amount is known, but a critical part is missing, then that is where they need to provide the specifics. What exactly is missing? More than would be missing in any theory once you zoom down to the level where there are no longer any counterfactuals?
Yes, there is clearly something missing in reductionist models of causality because it seems to be a fact of consciousness that it is in control of the body. But reductionism does not believe in downward causation. It provides no model of formal and final cause, just material and efficient cause. That was exactly how Bacon defined it, and how it has been applied.
But what does that mean apart from that we need to consider expanded models of causality again? Models that fix that critical part.
Which is what they do in theoretical biology, and have started to do in neuroscience (though neuroscience, being a branch of medicine for so long, is still very attached to reductionist, and therefore computationalist, causal models).