Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[metacristi]

What to explain?i don't think that the accepted knowedge of an alien culture on the other part of the galaxy,situated at roghly our level of development,is too different...I think finding one would settle things clearer.

 

[Canute]

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.

Yes, I've never understood why M thinks science has 'e-priviledge'. I've asked on a few threads with no answer yet.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I was considering two things. Firstly that all knowledge begins in experience, and secondly that certain knowledge lies in a unity of knower and known (as per Aristotle and Popper and other notables). If all experiences are theory-laden then neither of these two things would be true, knowledge would begin in theory and certain knowledge would be impossible. Also introspection suggests to me that if not all then most experiences are direct and 'pure'.

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid. However you raise a good point here, namely that experience and subject are denied by some.

I cannot see how to deny experience. However I would agree that ultimately 'self' is an epiphenomenon which can be transcended. In this state experiences occur, but those experiences are un-owned, there is no 'self' having them. This is precisely the knower and known becoming one. But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view. because of this he missed the fact that meditative practitioners assert that 'points of view' and 'forms of perception' are exactly what are to be avoided in pursuing knowledge through experience.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though:

Is it? It seems exactly the point to me.

what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

Good points. I don't think the views of Churchland or Bohr are correct, partly for the reasons you give. There's a chicken and egg problem (as there is with all scientific explanations).

What do you think?

Ah, my favourite question. I think that exclusive use of the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge produces a horribly warped idea of reality. According to science consciousness, the thing that allows us to know anything in the first place, cannot be shown to exist, cannot be causally or reductively explained, has no reason for existing, has no purpose or function, did not evolve, cannot be studied except in the third-person (even though third-persons cannot be shown to be conscious) and consists of no more than matter self-referencing. To me Heidegger was spot on, science confuses Being with beings.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth. Science denies the possibility of certain knowledge so can only come in second at best. Combining them seems the best way forward, not dismissing either but accepting each for what they can tell us and what they can't.

To waffle on - if we want to understand the world it must be inevitable that we combine science, metaphysics and what we know from personal experience. Whatever we call this combination it is not science, ergo the practice of science alone isn't ever going to give us a true understanding of the world. The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

 

[olde drunk]

i confess that i haven't read all the posts on this thread, however, i wonder why bother?

if you do not accept that you exist then nothing can be discussed or 'proved'. to me, this shows a complete lack of selfconfidence.

in order to move forward, we MUST believe that we are our own individual authority( not egotistically but confidently).

once i have faith in self, i am free to accept experience and determine it's value.

it seems a fruitless waste of time debating whether or not there is a reality. all i know is that i am experiencing something and i want to understand it by discussing and/or sharing what has been learned. perhaps, the real problem is that we all experience reality in a slightly different way.

when i experience pain i have pain, same for pleasure, etc, etc --let's not debate whether it's an illusion or photons or a dream. let's discuss what is learned and how to apply the lesson for a better society, etc.

it all begins with self awareness. that's my reality.

love and peace,

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view.

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth.

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?

 

[Canute]

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I can't see a way of denying that, on the other hand I can't see how it can be demonstrated either. All I can do is go back to the chicken and egg problem here. Even if we do interpret experiences before having them it would seem odd to argue that in an evolutionary or a 'morphogenical' sense we develop the means of interpreting experiences before we develop the means of having them.

I'm convinced that we have experiences directly when we focus on what they are). However perhaps it's true that much of the time we do not focus on what they are, and thus 'colour' them with our discriminations, preferences and habitual reactions. Underneath these, however, is the original experience, the one we had which led to their subsequent processing.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Ok

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

I suppose I meant 'the scientific way of thinking', rather than meaning to imply Bohr didn't think for himself. (I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

I do respect Bohr as a thinker, particularly for his explorations of what the findings of QM research might mean. However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa). Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object? (I'm no physicist but complementarity and the C-interpretation appear to be on their way out. Not that this is in any way a criticism of him).

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

That's very even-handed of you. In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain. All other forms of it are not. Hence, for instance, idealism is unfalsifiable and always will be however much scientific research we do. All knowledge gained through proofs or through our sensory apparatus is uncertain, relative, dependent on assumptions or premises, and as such has limits.

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued. To add some weight I'll also cite Spinoza as saying that "nothing exists external to God, and certainly not man's understanding of him". I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?

All the undecidable questions of metaphysics, plus Zeno's paradoxes of motion, Russell's paradox, Goedel's proofs, the impossibility of certain proof, the problem of infinities and infinitessimals, the undetectability of consciousness, wavicles, the 'something-nothing' problem entailed by materialism, etc. These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways. (BTW I'd say the same of religion for similar reasons - in case you think I'm arguing for God).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

... no cognitive activity takes place save as the input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synaptic connections, that theory. Theory-ladenness thus emerges not as an unwelcome and accidental blight on what would otherwise be a neutral cognitive achievement, but rather as that which makes processing activity genuinely cognitive in the first place.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

(I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

You didn't; i brought it up to counter your remarks on Bohr.

However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa).

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object?

Bohr thought that it was impossible to maintain a sharp separation of observer and observed. He talked often in metaphors and i recall a story in which the observer peered closer and closer at reality until he finally saw himself peering back, but i can't remember where at the moment; it may be a paraphrasing of one of his parables. Maybe i'll remember in the morning?

In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways.

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?

 

[RageSk8]

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/05/out_of_the_matrix?mode=PF

Davidson would reply that Cartesian skeptics are misusing the expression "really real." It makes sense to say that the people I encounter in my dreams, or the things I see after taking hallucinogens, are not really real. For denying them reality is just a way of saying that we cannot make beliefs about these people or things cohere with the rest of our beliefs -- specifically, with our beliefs about other people and things. The expression "not really real" is, in such contexts, given its meaning by contrasting cases in which we are prepared to say that those other people or things are really real.

Davidson's point is that retail skepticism makes sense, but wholesale skepticism does not. We have to know a great deal about what is real before we can call something an illusion, just as we have to have a great many true beliefs before we can have any false ones. The proper reply to the suggestion that beavers might be illusory is this: Illusory by comparison to what?

Even a mind-bending movie like "The Matrix" supports this insight. If you see the film after having read Davidson, you will be struck by the fact that the hero has mostly the same beliefs after he is ripped out of his artificial environment as he did before. He still believes millions of the same commonplaces -- the commonplaces that make it possible for him to use the same language outside the Matrix that he used inside it. He had been fooled about what was going on around him, but had never been fooled about what sorts of things the world contains, what is good and what evil, the color of the sky, the warmth of the sun, or the salient features of beavers.

 

[Canute]

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

The trouble is that all the Churchlands' theorising is based on the same presumption, what Gold & Stoljar call the 'neuron hypothesis', which states that all reference to mental events are simply 'folk-psychological' and that all such events will eventually be reduced to neuroscience or 'psychopharmacology'. I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

It seems fair enough to say that all experiences derived from sensory data are theory-laden, (if one calls a set of connections in the brain a 'theory' as seems do be done in your quoted extract).

However we know this already from philosphers (Plato again). The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose, which suggests that certain knowledge is impossible and that mind is an illusion reducible to brain computation and 'connectionism', begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

I wasn't drifting off into Kuhn country, but was using 'paradigm' in its everyday sense, in which as individuals we all have one. My impression is that Bohr stuck with looking at the issue from the 'western' 'third-person' point of view (unlike Shroedinger for instance). However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known. Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us.

“Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.”
(Critique of Pure Reason) Hawking also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place -

“What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?

Ok - same difference.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this? (Just so I know where we are likely to agree and disagree).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose ... begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

No problem. I don't mind ad hoc or quotes, in any case.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this?

No.

 

[Canute]

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The same as the writers mentioned, the 'hard' problem and all that. I fail to see how science can explain something it cannot prove to exist.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

What consciousness is, how (or if) it is caused, and how we can know (experience) anything.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

They are distinct categories of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be certain for reasons given earlier. By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

If you're not sure then I'll stick to my opinion, which I still think is correct. I don't believe that what I said was contentious.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?) I don't have a quick answer on 'truth', but briefly I take a truth to be what is the case. It's a bit more complicated because if we are to know that something is the truth then it must be the sort of thing we can know. (E.g. 2+2=4 we can know is the case because it's a tautology. The existence of self-awareness we can know, because we know directly).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Thanks for your additional remarks.

Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?)

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.

 

[Canute]

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

Sorry - I didn't mean he wasn't interesting - I just couldn't remember how he connected with the topic.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

I wasn't saying I couldn't be bothered. I have quite a few threads here and elsewhere on the go and get confused which is which sometimes. My apologies.

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers. I'll stick to 'glib and not very rigorous' for now.

Edit: Aha - just read some of your essay on truth. (I thought it was very good). It illustrates what I meant earlier by saying that I took a naive approach to truth. I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute. This gives me just four kinds of truth, or equivalently four kinds of knowledge. (Bear with me, I'm having to figure out what I think as I go).

These are relative truths that I do or do not know, and absolute truths that I do or do not know. I exclude all truths or true knowledge that I cannot know from this system, since it can't possibly ever be true as far as I'm concerned. This is a sort of mixed subjective/objective way of coming at it, and it seems functional (even if rather folk-epistemilogical).

This has the strange consequence that a certain truth is one which I am certain is true. But then what else can a certain truth be? One has to trust ones own rationality somewhere along the line and if one doesn't know a truth is certain then it isn't, if you see what I mean.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.
. . . . Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean
. . . . that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not.
. . . Quine's remark . . . was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods.
. . . . That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view (hey, you told me to attack . . . just kidding! ). However, I am serious when I say I believe the reason for all your objections above are not because of a problem with experience, but they are inherent to the epistemological approach of rationalization. I define rationalization for this little critique as the attempt to justify, prove, or formulate statements of “verisimilitude” (to rely on Popper) without reference to experience.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to. Recently I had to revisit his thinking to figure out what Ragesk8 meant when he referred to himself as a “holist,” so my interpretation of your point might be influenced by that.

I do see a way to interpret Quine’s idea of a man-made “fabric of knowledge and belief” as you suggest. In this holist view, he suggests there is no statement which can be considered completely immune to revision. Quoting from his Two Dogmas of Empiricism he says, “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . . A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth-values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. . . . . Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. . . . Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.”

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended. I say it is because rationalization cannot be anything but circular. That’s why I quoted the statements you made above. Every statement can be said to be self-justifying, and every premise can be questioned with “how do we know what __________ [fill in the blank] is.”

The rationalists had a couple of millennia to show us they could get out of their endless circular traps, and they never could. It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt) and everyone else into rationalizing were/are nonetheless dinosaurs, still trying to figure out too much in their heads. It’s amazing what a little experience adds to any subject being thought about. Talk about a major adjustment to one’s thinking!

Do you want to argue if a wall is there? We’ll never decide because how do we define what a wall is? How do we know if the eyes accurately convey the image of a real wall? Just the very statement, “is there a wall,” assumes we can know (or not) and so is circular. So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain. Of course, no doubt (if you are a die-hard rationalist) you can say “how do I know if what just flattened my face was a wall, or if I am just imagining it?” Me, looking at another bloody face, accepts that the wall is there (until new evidence suggests otherwise) and can see no more need for discussion about that issue.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended.

Alternatively, he could be pointing out the necessity of boundary conditions for methodologies.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt)

I'm afraid i do doubt and am quite surprised by the reverence shown to Popper by several members here.

So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

EXPERIENCE AND KNOW! (although that's your decision since I am also an individualist)

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience and your remarks do no better, other than to give me pause and wonder if i am wasting my time here. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to be more charitable than you; thus:

It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

How does this process work?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers.

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.

 

[Theothanatologist]

Bunghole philosophy has infected the physicsforums...

I've been following this thread since i registered for this board. Being a philosophisticator myself, i couldn't help but zero on your musings of a philosophical nature.

I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd. This is manifestly false, because first of all it would be a sweeping generalization that marginalizes the difference under a mischaracterization. Anaximander pushed a dualist view while Heraclitus was comfortable with a non-essentialist take of Being as Becoming, a ceaseless fluctuation, constantly changing state of affairs. Parmenides dealt a deathblow to material monism with his privileging of the intelligible over the sensible, and his philosophy in turn spawned a school of puralists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Leucippus and Democritus intended to replace monism with their atomism. The only true monist among the Greeks would be Xenophanes, who thought that God was identical with the entire universe.

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century. And even then, empiricism bloomed only in England, where Bishop George Berkeley and David Hume took the principles of empiricism to new heights. However, thanks to Hume the philosophy of empiricism found itself at a dead end, stuck in the abyss of skepticism. The logical positivists exhumed Hume and resurrected his Fork of Knowledge (a posteriori and a priori), but they didn't last beyond the first half of the 20th century. Wittgenstein instigated a linguistic revolution in the mid 20th century and after Wilfred Sellars published his book on empiricism, it's safe to say that empiricism is no longer in vogue. :)

Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (Critique of Pure Reason)

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place - “What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.

 

[Canute]

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd.

Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century.

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did? I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

I know.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.

 

[Canute]

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

I wasn't saying it was satisfactory, just that there is no other way forward. Are you saying that you know how we know?

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.

But of course not everyone agrees. This is the problem, and why one has to make ones own mind up based on pragmatic considerations (or remain forever on the spot trapped in philosophical debate). 'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case). That doesn't mean throwing philosophical considerations out of the window, just acknowledging that they are not a final guide to what is true.

"There is one great question," he writes in 1911. "Can human beings know anything, and if so, what and how? This question is really the most essentially philosophical of all questions." (Bertrand Russell in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell 1911,)

Analytic philosophers have not yet answered this question. I don't intend to wait through another two millenia of philosophical anlaysis before deciding what I think is the best way to know what is true. I haven't got time. If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

BTW when I said my approach was 'naive' I didn't mean simpleminded. It might be wrong of course, but you'll have to show that. It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

To be clear - I think it is possible to know certain truths, but not by the senses or by reason alone. There are a few reasons for this, some of which you give in your essay. I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

 

[Theothanatologist]

Do not misunderestimate my powers of misunderstanding misrepresentations!

Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did?

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.

I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known. The faculty of reason does encourage the intellect to posit objects without a corresponding form of intuition, which lies outside of experience, but this is not a "certain knowledge" by any stretch of the imagination.

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

Passing the buck...

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.

C'est la vie.

 

[Canute]

You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

Non-dual means literally 'not-two', it does not mean 'one'. If I could explain what it means I'd be cleverer than Chuang-Tsu. Roughly it's the view that all dualisms are ultimately false, in the sense that ultimate reality and ultimate states of consciousness (roughly same thing in this view) are non-dual, beyond truth/falsity, one/many etc. Mathematically speaking it's the view from the meta-system.

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I'll change it to 'most philosophers who conclude that certain knowledge is possible agree that it is only achievable by a 'oneness' of knower and known'. (I suppose a Christian mystic or gnostic would say becoming one with God, but personally I don't hold with God). Others (like Popper) do not take this final step but conclude certain knowledge is impossible. I take this conclusion as consistent with the first, but less well considered.

I have problems with the word 'empiricism' because people take it to mean various different things. For that reason I'm not arguing for it.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.

Ok - see above for my amendment assertion. Who is it that disagrees?

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known.

Quite agree. I didn't suggest otherwise.

Passing the buck...

It's you that's passing it. Try typing 'Hawking End of Phsyics' into your search engine. Or do want me to do it? Have I offended you in some way?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Are you saying that you know how we know?

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

But of course not everyone agrees.

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.

 

[Canute]

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

Do you read what I write?

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.

I think I agree. If you doubt something then you can conceive of it being false. However if you cannot conceive of it being false it is not necessarily true.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism. . . . wonder if i am wasting my time here.

Hugo, I really don't think your view is "wrong." I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack." I was in a playful mood last night, and that accounts for some of my comments. I've been enjoying your comments so far. I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

My comments below mix up the order of your post, I hope you don't mind.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

That's what I was took my interpretation from. His point about experience infringing only on the edges of any system of thought, and that within any system of thought we can revise components to still get the answer we want I think is pretty good. If that is what you are referring to, then I don't think Quine is saying there cannot be an epistomological privilege established in some area of investigation, but rather he demonstrates what believing something a priori can do to one's objectivity.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience . . .

I haven't purposely mischaracterized you, but obviously I might have done so anyway (purposefully or not). I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism. But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made? Of course, that doesn't excuse me from making my case, so here is what I was referring to.

I chose a number of your quotes of which I claim two types characterize the overly-rationalistic debate. For example, you said, ". . . we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way." You also said, ". . . it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what 'successful' or 'useful' are supposed to mean." And then a combination of both! "That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place?"

What I find to be a problem with those types of arguments is that there is no way to propose anything without first stating assumptions (premises), and also unless we accept (even if temporarily) certain definitions. I realize either can be used improperly, and in fact often are. But the problem, I claim, is that even if one is perfectly logical there is no way to state anything and prove the truthfulness of it with pure reason alone (other than tautologies). So when you say we cannot state what is real can be tested because we've already assumed what's to be proven, what is the way out of that dilemma? I say there is no logical way out, we are stuck going in circles unless . . .

Les said: It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

Hugo said: How does this process work?

I remember when I first started reading philosophy I was hoping it would make me wise. Several years later I decided that it had made me dizzy because nothing was ever decided until, that is, empiricism came along. With that lots of stuff got decided. Why? The only reason I can see is the addition of experience to reason. That is what did it.

Now, in case you think I believe empiricism is the answer for everything . . . I don't. I've simply stated that experience proved its epistomological advantage very well there. But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

That has been my point to you all along. I can see how relative epistomological privilege might be allowed.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

Do you read what I write?

For my sins, i do indeed.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur. If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another. Thus, when you say:

'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case).

... it makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuff.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack."

You can tease all you like, but principled objection doesn't appear to be welcome here. Oh well.

I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

*shrug* I don't take this stuff personally but I'm not interested in the behaviour I've had directed at me so far, in this thread.

That's what I was took my interpretation from.

Read on a little further. Quine remarks thus:

For my part i do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and i consider it to be a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistemological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Fair enough, but my falling wouldn't prove that.

I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism.

In fact, you do me a great honour: usually my name is mentioned in the same breath as irrationalist (along with "jackass" and some others i won't repeat).

But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made?

You can suggest i walk on all fours if you like; it seems to be the fashion here already.

But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). I also don't believe you that "empiricism relies only on sense experience", not least because sense-datum accounts of knowledge are long-dead.

That has been my point to you all along.

Fair enough, but countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

 

[Canute]

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

I'm not trying to fit you into a box. I can't think what gave you that idea. The question I asked was purposely a non sequitur, that why I asked it. You asked me what 'knowing' was. I was illustrating that there couldn't be an answer to it because The question is a non sequitur. (I haven't characterised you yet, so I can't have mischaracterised you).

For my sins, i do indeed.

I feel that you're reading things into what I'm writing that aren't there. That could be my fault of course.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur.

In what way? It doesn't seem one to me.

[If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another.

I agree, but this is the whole problem with the discussion. My view is that 'truth' can only be known from direct experience. (A view I'd call empiricism if the term didn't seem to be usually interpreted as related only to sensory experience).

In this case how can I define what truth is, since experiences are incommensurable? I'd have the same trouble explaining what I think 'pain' is. I could attempt to define truth it in relative terms, (systems of proof and so on), but much better philosophers than I have done that already. I don't need to do this, since I do not take systematic proofs or even the evidence of my senses as bringing complete certainty so I can bypass all the stuff about correspondence theories and so on. I suspect I'm roughly in agreement with Sleeth on this one.

makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuf.

Usually I'd completely agree with you. But discussions that relate to consciousness (knowing etc) are a bit different. They always have this defintion problem at their heart. As you'll know it crops up all the time in consciousness studies. It leads to strange situations - for instance Francis Crick, in papers claiming to explain consciousness, argues at the same time that we shouldn't try to define it.

The issue of 'knowing' raises all these issues and they can't be avoided. I cannot tell you what 'knowing' is, any more than you can tell me. All we can do is assume that we have the same sort of experiences and are talking about the same thing. We are only having the same discussion as researchers have about whether consciousness should be defined as 'what it is like' or more intra-subjectively. (Perhaps 'knowing' can be defined as 'what it is like to know).

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.

Charitable is certainly not how I'd characterise it, but I expect I don't come across as I think I do either. You sigh and shrug as if it's as if you are bored in the company of mortals.

I have no idea why you called this comment a non sequitur. I pointed out that I'm not changing my opinions just because you think I should, and before you have shown what is wrong with them. What makes that a non-sequitur?

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?

Of course, but this is why I was trying to figure out your angle, there are lots of ways of coming at it. But I'll give up on that since you misinterpret my motives.

In the end I'd go with this from the Kuan Tsu.

"What all people desire to know is that (meaning the external world).

But our means of knowing that is by this" (our self, our mind).

How can we know that?" (the external world)?

Only by perfecting this."

Thus I'd say that (certain) truth lies on the inside not the outside, for while 'truth' implies a fact, something that is the case (let's say) 'certainty' implies knowing, and knowing is the task of consciousness, which is not on the outside, not 'lo there or lo here' to quote the apocryphal Jesus.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistomological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No one, I think, is disputing the potential utility to people to employ myths or superstition, or any other device that helps them cope psychologoically. But I thought metacristi's initial point concerning epistomological privilege was about what helps us find proof of reality. In other words, what best contributes to knowing.

That is the problem, how can we "know that we know," as William James put it. We can believe in gods, no problem, but how will the gods help us acquire information about the nature of reality? For that matter, how can we even find the gods to ask them (or however one gets knowledge from god belief) about reality?

So the point never has been awarding epistomological privilege to physical objects over gods, except in the sense of what we actually can study and get to know. Physical reality just happens to be available to experience, gods so far have not been found.

Les said: . . . I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

Hugo responded: I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). . . . countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

I do not see how we can leave "utility" out of what we value epistomologically. I want some reassurance that my methods of knowing are actually giving me knowledge. How do I achieve that?

Well, trying to figure out how reality works by ideas, reason and imagination alone left us perpetually undecided. There were no reassurances to be found in purely rationalistic endeavors. We can say there are gods, but anyone can say "how do you know?". We can say we know because our belief in gods makes us feel better, but then anyone can say "maybe, but you've assumed what we're asking you to demonstrate." Thus, these arguments keep reason alone from ever being able to decide for sure about knowing.

So we add a test, and the test is what "works." Now, the rationalist can also demand justification for why what "works" should be assigned any particular epistomological priviledge. We cannot justify it rationally, just like we cannot justify anything with pure rationality. What we've done, essentially, is decided rationality needs something more to work epistomologically, and so we added two entirely different components to rationality: experience, and, less formally, utility.

The current epistomological paradigm seems to be that we rely on rationality to consider if something is true, we try to observe what we propose, and then (when possible) we try to use what we've observed in some practical application. The feedback particularly from something "working" indicates reality has been perceived correctly. Can we doubt it? Yes, but only with radical skepticism. The evidence is mounted before our eyes.

Of course, just being able to manipulate physical reality doesn't mean we've understood all there is to understand about what exists. I catch thinkers here at PF assuming all the time that because of the successes of empiricism at producing knowledge, that empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge; and that because empiricism only produces physical knowledge, physicalism has been all but proven. But those assumption overlook a huge possibility which is, that the only reason physical aspects are being discovered through empiricism is because physical aspects are all empiricism is capable of revealing!

The interior world of consciousness, though under attack by the physicalist hopefuls, still holds itself aloof from their reductionist efforts. I still think experience is what we need to study the nature of consciousness, just not sense experience.

 

[Canute]

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's. Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

 

[olde drunk]

Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's.

It doesn't really matter to my point if it's anthropomorphic . . . dodo's found what worked for them too. I'll explain more of what I mean as I answer your post. I am going to mix up the order of your statements a bit to help me keep from repeating myself.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data. Meditation is experience, but what one learns from it is not via sense experience. I think you know I am an advocate for the value of that "inner" experience, so I hope you don't think I am discounting it. I am just granting empiricism the standards of its own definition.

Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

I made a mistake when I accepted Hugo's term "utility" without explaining what I meant. I assumed everyone was familiar with philosophical pragmatism, which I can now see was a bit egocentric . . . more below.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

My perspective on "utility" or "usefulness" is pragmatic in the sense that Pierce, James, et al, developed the pragmatic concept. This uniquely American philosophy truly reflects our down-to-earth attitude (later hair splitting disputes notwithstanding). I can't express how much I love it as an unpretentious standard for evaluating if one has accurately perceived or understood reality. However, to use it one cannot evaluate superficially; one must have the wisdom to realize that what first shows up in a situation very often isn't all there is to it.

Let's start with a simple example. If I propose humans will be most likely to survive if they cooperate, I can test that by figuring out how to get people to cooperate, and then seeing how that "works." If we really do thrive when we cooperate, then a principle may have been validated. I emphasize "may" because the cooperative experiment will almost certainly develop aspects down the road that didn't show up in the beginning. So a second part of the test is to do cooperativeness over time.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. But has it really worked?

They have not correctly understood what it is that leads to crop decimation, and so they likely will not focus enough on figuring out how to prepare for the idiosyncrasies of nature. Also, like a child who is beaten while growing up, their brutality desensitizes people, and encourages them to accept that as the norm. Violence as a standard has proven not to be socially beneficial. So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

Along comes the scientist, and he says, "let's not just speculate, let's look at what we can do to prepare for hard times." We study climate and weather patterns, we do statistical studies on past frequencies of conditions, we calculate how much people need to survive desperate times . . . When we have accurately portrayed the way reality is, then our plans should "work." When we haven't, then we get wiped out.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, say, in a solar cell. The model predicts that resident electrons in a semiconductor material will be forced out by sunlight, and then other electrons migrating into vacated positions through an external circuit will create a current. When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk

I hope you read my response to Canute; I believe I've argued well that my evidence isn't merely anecdotal.

However, I think you might be expressing something I believe, which is that our consciousness is not a perfectly-confirming tool of the truth. The situation isn't really, in my opinion, that all "truths" are subjective; but rather, it is that we humans are nothing but subjective and so we have no other avenue to the truth. We cannot possibly escape it because no matter how "objective" we try to be, there is no way to avoid the reality that what we experience and think is taking place inside our consciousness.

I also agree that (I hope this is what you are saying) that looking "outward" confirms what devoted empiricists already believe. I think a great many people have a priori decided that what's "out there" is all there is. If that is all one is looking for, and if that is all one accepts as "truth," then obviously anything else which might exist is going to be missed.

 

[Canute]

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data.

I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. But has it really worked?

I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, snip... When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.

Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Yes, I don't think you have understood it (I will try to answer some of your objections below). I HIGHLY recommend giving pragmatism a look if you haven't ever studied it. I did a thread on it in the old PF, but maybe I'll try another one after the two I have planned already.

I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time. If you look at what has caused a great deal of misinterpretation in the past, it has always been the rush to form conclusions before all the evidence was in.

In the days of Henry Ford, it was believed the way you motivated a worker was to keep him intimidated. If you looked at the new situation of an assembly line, it seemed this theory might be correct. But as people got used to that situation, the downside began to show itself.

Lots of things are like that. Heroin is a great way to relieve stress . . . up front that is. The backside of heroin use reveals itself after one does it for awhile.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.

I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true. We might not have perfect understanding yet of everything involved in the success we had (which often shows up when the cell fails or operates in ways not predicted by the concept), but nonetheless certain things are confirmed.

I am not saying that anything can be taken at face value with pragmatism, it has to be worked with intelligently, thoroughly, and patiently -- just like we must do in any investigative approach. The hurry to reach conclusions is a perennial problem for all interpretative efforts.

Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

Right, that's what I said (or meant). I think happiness is incredibly practical. I can't see any reason to limit practicality to physical stuff.

 

[Canute]

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.

I agree. I'll look out for the thread.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time.

It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?

Have you been talking to her?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.

I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true.

I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

I didn't mean time exactly, I meant to look at any situation with sufficient depth to see its patterns develop -- it just so happens that takes time.

I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

My approach is to do the best I can, see the biggest I can, be as thorough as I can. I only have the conscious tools I have; the issue for me is what helps me understand. No intellectual tool is perfect as far as I can see, but every little bit helps. I can tell you without the slightest exaggeration that I am almost obsessed with the technique of looking for what "works." As I said, one uses it intelligently, realizing its limitations.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective. I agree in can be used as you say, to help us with "what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it." But for me I take it much further.

It is possible that pragmatism works best for someone who believes reality has a "nature." That is, some existential bottom line which cannot change essentially. I do believe that reality in general has an immutable aspect and human nature too. So when something works, whether technology or within the human realm, I suspect that its conformed to that nature. Personally, I have yet to find a better intellectual technique to guide me in contemplating the nature of reality.

I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

You seem in too much of a hurry to understand. If you've seen a pattern, then as far as I'm concerned that has potential value. Later you might observe something else which, when considered with the pattern, will help you understand the overall situation.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

You are now talking about something quite different from pragmatic evaluation. I've never suggested it has much value in speculative or purely theoretical thinking (except possibly for inductive thinking). We can't understand what we can't experience, and so if we can't experience anything that indicates a photon is conscious, there won't be a way to take that idea any further.

You know, pragmatic evaluation isn't meant to replace other mental techniques we make use of. It is another evaluative tool. One has to use it empiricially (in the sense of your meaning of empiricism), carefully, objectively, etc., and even then it is just an "indicator" and not some absolute determining factor.