Quantum Mechanics and Determinism?

[moving finger]

To be UR or Not to be UR, that is the question

In the below explanation, we refer to the attached figures.

Each state (of the agent) is either causally related to one or more antecedent states (such as states N, N-2, N-5, N-9 in figure 1 attached), or it has no causal relationship whatsoever with any antecedent states (such as state N-14 in figure 1 attached).

If there is no causally antecedent state for any given state X, the agent cannot be held ultimately responsible (UR) for that particular state X. In figure 1, for example, the agent cannot be held ultimately responsible for state N-14, because to be ultimately responsible for state N-14 the agent would also need to be (at least partially) ultimately responsible for at least one of the causally antecedent states to N-14, and there are none.

It is easy to see that this leads to infinite regress for UR. The only way that the agent can possesses UR for state N is if there is a never-ending string of causally-related antecedent states to N, each of which the agent possesses at least partial UR for.

Now, Tournesol claims that his RIG/SIS model creates UR from absence of UR. We can see from figure 2, also attached, why Tournesol’s model does not (cannot) work.

Referring to figure 2, here the RIG provides an indeterministic input (ie the RIG has no causally antecedent states) to the SIS. The RIG cannot therefore be a source of UR. The only way that UR can arise in the RIG/SIS combination is therefore if the agent possesses UR for the SIS; but this would entail a never-ending string of UR for each of the causally antecedent states of the SIS. Again, we are forced into infinite regress.

Tournesol insists either that his model creates UR (but he does not show exactly how), or that UR somehow mysteriously "fades in" from nothing. He is in fact unable to show that UR is present in his model at all - we are asked simply to believe that the UR is in there somewhere (an article of faith).

But it should be quite clear that there is in fact no naturalistic escape from this infinite regress. The only solutions are therefore as follows :

Either (1) UR arises within an agent via some mysterious, inexplicable, supernaturalistic process
Or (2) UR is present in a never-ending string of causally antecedent states, right back to the Big Bang
Or (3) UR does not exist

There does not seem to be any alternative to the three options above.

(1) is unacceptable both to Tournesol and myself (though in practice Tournesol's defence of UR basically amounts to a supernaturalistic defence, since he is unable to give a rational account of how and why UR would be created in his model).
(2) is unacceptable at least to me, and I doubt if Tournesol would defend (2)
Logically therefore we are left with (3).

Best Regards

 

[selfAdjoint]

If there is no causally antecedent state for any given state X, the agent cannot be held ultimately responsible (UR) for that particular state X. In figure 1, for example, the agent cannot be held ultimately responsible for state N-14, because to be ultimately responsible for state N-14 the agent would also need to be (at least partially) ultimately responsible for at least one of the causally antecedent states to N-14, and there are none.

This is the "step" part of the mathematical induction I suggested brfore. But you do not seem to have motivated it, much less shown it. Why cannot the agent be UR for N14 directly? In your model, N14 is an uncaused state; fine. If there are such states accessible to the agent then it why can it not be responsible for them? Indeed this is the core of some accounts of free will I have seen, that they are, as one might say, in themselves primary causes.

 

[Tournesol]

Agents are responsible if they are under no external constraint,
and able to refrain from acting on impulses -- whether those
impulses are generated determinsitically or indeterminstically.

 

[moving finger]

Why cannot the agent be UR for N14 directly? In your model, N14 is an uncaused state; fine. If there are such states accessible to the agent then it why can it not be responsible for them? Indeed this is the core of some accounts of free will I have seen, that they are, as one might say, in themselves primary causes.

Why can't the agent possesses UR for an uncaused state? Simply because this directly contradicts the meaning of responsibility! Not even Tournesol goes so far as to claim that an agent possesses responsibility for all of the random states generated by his RIG (otherwise he would not need to insert the SIS, he could simply use the naked random state as his source of ultimate responsibility). See Tournesol's post #73 - he is not claiming that responsibility arises simply from arbitrary indeterministic events per se, he is instead (quite rightly) claiming that responsibility arises instead through exercising causal control over the consequent events arising from those indeterministic events, but what he fails to see is that this causal explanation (which is indeed quite correct) leads to infinite causal regress for UR.

You would seem to be arguing here for my suggested solution (1) :

UR arises within an agent via some mysterious, inexplicable, supernaturalistic process

In effect, this is also the solution proposed by both Tournesol and Kane. Both would deny that each of their explanations is supernatural, but I disagree. Neither Kane nor Tournesol have shown how their explanations can give rise to UR where no UR is present in the first place - they simply claim it as an article of faith. Hence, supernatural.

Indeed, solution (1) is probably the only solution open to the libertarian (since neither infinite regress nor denial of the existence of UR would be acceptable under libertarian beliefs). That some libertarians deny supernaturalism is not enough however - they need to present a rational account of how their magic works if we are to accept the account as being naturalistic.

Perhaps we need to start again with some simple definitions.

Responsibility simpliciter : An agent can be said to possesses responsibility simpliciter for some event X if the agent possesses some degree of causal control related to event X, ie the agent possesses the ability either to cause X, or to prevent X from coming about. It follows from this that an agent who possesses neither the ability to cause X, nor to prevent X from coming about, cannot be said to possesses responsibility simpliciter for event X. An agent who does not possesses responsibility simpliciter for an event X cannot be held ultimately responsible for event X.

Uncaused state : A state which has no antecedent causal states, a state which has neither deterministic nor probabilistic relationships with any other antecedent states, for example a genuinely indeterministic event.

An uncaused state is thus by definition a state over which I have absolutely no causal control. If I have no causal control over X, I cannot by definition possesses responsibility for X.

With respect, the onus is on the person claiming that such a mechanism (whereby I can be held responsible for an uncaused state) is coherent, to actually demonstrate the coherency - because logically one cannot be held responsible for an event over which one has absolutely no causal control. Even Kane agrees with this, and even Tournesol implicitly agrees with this (otherwise he could claim UR arises directly and explicitly from every random idea generated from his RIG, and he would not need to insert his SIS in an attempt to generate UR).

Are you perhaps claiming that one can be held responsible for an event over which one has absolutely no causal control?

There is no naturalistic mechanism whereby the agent can possesses UR for state N-14 directly - we need to appeal to the supernatural. If you believe there is a valid naturalistic mechanism then please do explain how you think it works? Tournesol's suggested RIG/SIS mechanism does not work in this respect (if he would simply argue that UR arises from an initial uncaused state, a la Kane with his SFAs, then we could move on with the argument, but that is not the basis of his argument - he is instead suggesting that UR mysteriously "fades in").

How can an uncaused state arise in the first place except via either an indeterministic or a supernatural mechanism? If indeterministic, how can I logically be held responsible for a state which arises via an indeterministic mechanism over which I have absolutely no control?

If you could explain this we would be making progress! If this cannot be explained then the notion that I can be held reponsible for an uncaused state (as demonstrated above by analysing the meanings of responsibility and uncaused state respectively) is incoherent.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Agents are responsible if they are under no external constraint,
and able to refrain from acting on impulses -- whether those
impulses are generated determinsitically or indeterminstically.

A genuinely indeterministic event by definition has no causal antecedents, in other words there is no causal relationship (either strictly deterministic, or probabilistic) between an indeterministic event and any antecedent events.

An agent cannot be held responsible for an event X over which that agent cannot exercise at least some form of (deterministic or probabilistic) causal control (to either bring X about, or to prevent X from happening). Since an indeterministic event is, by definition, an event which has no causal antecedents, no agent can exercise any form of causal control over such an event. Thus no agent can be held responsible for a genuinely indeterministic event. Thus indeterministic events cannot be the "source" of the chain of responsibility.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

So, projecting backwards:-
N is 90% intentionally brought about by N-1
N is 81% intentionally brought about by N-2
N is 73% intentionally brought about by N-3
N is 59% intentionally brought about by N-4
N is 47% intentionally brought about by N-5
N is 43% intentionally brought about by N-6
N is 33% intentionally brought about by N-7
N is 31% intentionally brought about by N-8
N is 28% intentionally brought about by N-9
N is 25% intentionally brought about by N-10
N is 23% intentionally brought about by N-11
N is 20% intentionally brought about by N-12
N is 18% intentionally brought about by N-13
N is 17% intentionally brought about by N-14
N is 14% intentionally brought about by N-15
N is 12% intentionally brought about by N-16
N is 10% intentionally brought about by N-17

etc etc.

It tapers off

If I am only 10% responsible for state N-17, and state N-17 is the single causal antecedent of state N-16, how does it come about (ie what is the mechanism whereby) I can be MORE responsible for state N-16 than I am for state N-17? Can you provide a logically coherent explanation (ie a rational explanatory mechanism) as to why my degree of responsibility should increase within a simple linear sequence of directly causally related states?

Logically if I am only 10% responsible for state N-17, and state N-17 is the only causally antecedent state to state N-16 (ie there is a direct causal relationship between N-17 and N-16), then I also cannot be any more than 10% responsible for state N-16. Unless you can provide a logical explanation as to why my responsibility increases in this step?

Best Regards

 

[metacristi]

Is quantum mechanics deterministic? It argues that probabilistic events occur, does it not? However, if these events occur, couldn't one say that the result of a probabilistic event was not caused? If it was caused, it would be determined and not probabilistic, would it not? Given this assumption, does quantum mechanics believe in randomness? If randomness is the absence of causation, how can one argue logically that something can happen without giving a causation?

Thanks,

Very Confused

I don't think we can argue [from existing evidence] against some sort of causation and the existence of clear laws at quantum level. As Paul C. W. Davies argues well the atomic level is not completely anarchic many reactions and transformations, perfectly possible at the conceptual level otherwise, never happen there (no one has ever seen for example protons transforming into positrons or electrons into neutrinos) there are some clear laws then.

Further the claim that no better description of the state vector exist because there are no hidden variables is too strong, at most we can argue that some quantum events are without cause (this without rejecting hidden variables or the possibility of exact laws at quantum level - no matter whether we are able to find them or not).

Karl Popper argues exactly in this direction, without claiming however that he solved the problem (strict determinism, meaning here that all events have causes, is basically non falsifiable indeed). In his view there are some uncaused events (important for conscious experience, accounting for the spontaneity of human thought) but this does not mean for example that we have to reject the possible existence of clear laws ‘governing’ the two slit experiment (even if these laws will remain forever God’s secret to use a cliche used by some copenhagenists). In other words we can defend [from what we know today] at most a weak form of indeterminism (some events at quantum level are uncaused) but we cannot ignore causality and the possible existence of strict laws at quantum level.

[To be more exact Popper denies the total and exact determination of future events by present events; in this view we can even avoid saying that there are really uncaused events, all that is required for indeterminism is the existence of some events, no matter how small, without a strict predetermination. But, in my view, I don't think we can really avoid talking of uncaused events as much as some of the attributes in the effect do not depend on the cause(s)].

Finally given that we deal with a genuine underdetermination in the case of the interpretation of the mathematical formalism of QM we cannot exclude from the equation strict determinism (all effects have causes). The so called hidden variables interpretations of QM (Bohm’s version for example is strictly deterministic) are far from being falsified (in spite of some dogmatics, even among scientists) and strict determinism (in the sense that all events have causes) is still with us be it linked with contextualism. The determinism vs indeterminism debate still rage (determinism is fully compatible even with Bell's theorem and Aspect's experiment) maybe time will settle things.

PS: By the way probabilistic descriptions are compatible with both strict determinism (it is different from the capacity of making accurate, non probabilistic, predictions) and indeterminism (at least one event in the universe is uncaused).

PPS: I used the construction 'strict determinism' (meaning only that all effects have causes) to make the difference from 'strong determinism' (all events have necessary causes; if we could somehow 'run' the Universe from the beginning exactly the same things would happen) and Mill's 'weak determinism' (events are caused but things could have been otherwise). But personally I don't see how 'things could have been otherwise' without resorting to indeterminism, no matter how insignifiantly [from the acepted scientific knowledge at least]...

 

[Tournesol]

Why not? Nothing has intrinsically unique properties under physicalism, just complex combinations of a few basic properties like mass and charge.

Every physical object has properties which emerge from the detailed configuration of component parts. The height of a chair is a property of that chair, but it is not simply related to the mass and charge of it’s constituent molecules – it depends critically on how those constituents are put together. Consciousness is such an emergent property, but unlike the height of a chair, each consciousness is unique because each consciousness emerges from the detailed internal configuration of the brain.

And the detailed integral configuration is physically determinable in principle,
so consiocusness is not beyond physical investifation (in principle).

But even if possible (which from the above looks unlikely), perfect replication does not entail predicting my experience of the colour red from a 3rd person perspective.

Of course it is possible to replicate the experiencing agent, and if this is what you mean by algorithmic prediction then of course this is possible - but it's no longer a mathematical model or description, it's a carbon copy. But even a carbon copy would not perfectly replicate my conscious experience, because that carbon copy occupies a different position in spacetime to the position that I occupy (hence a different perspective on the world), and from the moment of creation its conscious experience and mine would begin to diverge.

In ways which are predictable, in principle, if physicalism is true.

I assume this is a mistake. Are you suggesting that physicalism entails predictability? In which case (according to you) in an indeterminable (let alone an indeterministic) world physicalism is most definitely not true?

It is not a mistake. You claimed that a copy would diverge from the original as the result
of being in a different location. I said those changes would be predictable.
I did not say divergences due to indeterminism would be unpredictable. You did
not say divergence would occur because of indeterminism.

inability to explain qualia doesn't come from some special status of consciousness, it obviously comes from a deep limitation on language

It has to be a combination of the two, since language can describe some things perfectly well.

I think Tournesol may have (perhaps unintentionally) hit the nail on the head with his earlier reference to the theory-ladenness of observation. Quine argues that everything one observes is interpreted through a prior understanding of other theories and concepts. Whenever we describe observations (whether we are using the English language, or mathematics), we are constantly utilizing terms and measurements that our society has adopted. Therefore, it would be impossible for someone else to understand these observations if they are unfamiliar with, or disagree with, the theories that these terms come from.

And possible if they do. Which, of course, amounts to possibility in principle.
The theory-ladenness of observation is really about instrumentation, not
sensory perception -- you need a certain amount of theory to understand how
a thermometer works. Even if you want to extend the idea
to the communicability of qualia, you run into some strange predictions:
* People who (nearly) agree in theoretical outlook should find their qualia (nearly) communicable -- they don't.
* Naive people with little theoretical understanding of anything should find their qualia (nearly) communicable -- they don't.
* Novel qualia with little theoretical baggage should be easily communicable -- they aren't.
* Theory-ladenness applies to external phenomena too, but doesn't produce the same problems.

Now extend this to the attempted description or interpretation of a 1st person perspective on phenomenal consciousness. There is nowhere to start, because by definition a 1st person perspective on phenomenal consciousness does not share any terms that we might use in such a description with anyone else. In short, there exists (in principle) no common language with which we can describe or interpret phenomenal consciousness.

 

[Tournesol]

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of punishment. It makes no sense to punish anything if all we seek is “revenge” (whether UR exists or not). The only meaningful purpose of punishment is to act deterministically to influence future behaviour. Punishing a “gun” will not affect the future behaviour of the gun, but punishing a person may affect the future behaviour of the person (or of similar people), regardless of UR. Punishment thus has absolutely nothing to do with UR.

There is more than one theory of what "makes sense" with respect to morality,
crime and punishment. You favourite theory is not "just true".

It is only UR if it is something more that causal responsibility.

What more? Randomness?

The existence of Alternative Possibilities (otherwise known as Elbow Room or could-have-done-otherwise) is relevant to responsibility because we do not hold people for their action where alternate courses of actions were not open to them for reasons of duress or incapacity. Whereas the semicompatibilist only holds responsibility to be compatible with determinism the compatibilist holds that AP's are as well. The compatibilist of course can explain the presence or absence of constraint without making any assumptions about determinism -- up to a point. Her problem is to explain why only certain entities are subject to constraint in the first place. There is something about certain entities which makes them constrainable. In the language of the Libertarian, your will cannot be blocked, stifled or frustrated if you have no will. As we have seen, there is something about human agents that compatabilists can appeal to that picks them our objectively as responsible, and that is rationality. But is rationality something that can be constrained? Surely -- for the libertarian anyway -- what is constrained by circumstance is action, not thought. At this point the compatibilist triumphantly produces intention (aim, desire) as something that can be hindered by external circumstances, and which is compatible with determinism. And this works --up to a point. If you did something you intended to do, you are responsible, and if you did something which was not your intention, it was accidental or under duress. But the intention has to have the right sort of causal history. If the intention "flew into your head" shortly before you performed an action based on it, without being based on previous intentional stated, you action was not responsible -- or rather you are not a responsible person. Equally, our intuition is that people, or other entities, are not responsible if they did not originate their intention. We don't hold people who are acting under hypnotic suggestion responsible. If a mad scientist created an intelligent killing-machine, we would hold him ultimately responsible even if the machine was a sophisticated enough AI to be deemed rational.

Naturalist Libertarian responsibility Based on Causal Origination of Action
That is the essence of the libertarian's claim to be able to provide a stronger basis for our intuitions about responsibility than any variety of compatibilist. The missing factor the libertarian can supply is origination. Responsibility lies with human agents (acting intentionally and without duress) -- the "buck" stops with them -- because that is where the (intention behind the0 action originated.

The RIG/SIS does not give rise to UR.

Since SFA's are the essence of an individual's free will, they must also be the essence of an individual's responsibility. Yet they are indeterministic -- mere caprice! This is a very important objection which gets to the heart of what people dislike about indeterminism-based free will. Bear in mind that we have accepted Dennett's point about the distributed mind. It is the agent as a whole who is responsible, not the any particular part of the agent, including any "indeterminism" module the agent might possess. The agents actions are not caused by any particular neuron, or any particular subsystem, but by the central nervous system acting in concert. An "indeterminism" module would therefore not cause actions, simpliciter, any more than any other module.

Moreover, in our model we posit another module in addition to the indeterminism module (or Random Idea Generator) whose function is specifically to "filter" the output of the Random Idea Generator. Thus the objection that you cannot control which signal the indeterminism module is going to generate is vitiated by placing the control after the generation of the signal. (Just as Natural Selection rescues Darwinian evolution from being mere caprice by acting on genes after they have mutated). There is no straightforward inference from a lack of causal responsibility for one's indeterminism generator to a lack of moral responsibility an agent

Finally, recall that in our discussion of semicompatibilism and responsibility we agreed that there are forms of moral responsibility which are compatible with determinism. Thus, responsibility does not kick in when and only when the R.I.G or indeterminism module fires; responsibility is not created ex nihilo. 3

The parents of a mammal must be more-or-less mammalian,
and to be a responsible agent, you must be able to more-or-less exert control over your future
state of mind.

The analogy is false.
If I am not UR, at least partially, for the antecedent state N-1 which leads to state N, then I cannot be UR, even partially, for state N (even Kane agrees with this). A little bit of thinking will show you this leads to infinite regress.

Third Objection to Self-Forming Actions
There must have been a first SFA , which itself cannot have been brought about intentionally, freely and responsibly. It's important to understand the difference between a regress and an infinite regress. Earlier, we said:

And this works --up to a point. If you did something you intended to do, you are responsible, and if you did something which was not your intention, it was accidental or under duress. But the intention has to have the right sort of causal history. If the intention "flew into your head" shortly before you performed an action based on it, without being based on previous intentional stated, you action was not responsible -- or rather you are not a responsible person. Equally, our intuition is that people, or other entities, are not responsible if they did not originate their intention. We don't hold people who are acting under hypnotic suggestion responsible. If a mad scientist created an intelligent killing-machine, we would hold him ultimately responsible even if the machine was a sophisticated enough AI to be deemed rational.

Since we must exclude capricious intentional states, states that do not have enough of history of being produced intentionally by previous states. Thus, there must be some kind of a regress to intetional states. Dennett has a parable that can act as a warning of what happens if you think about regresses in a too rigid, absolute way. it also illustrates that this is indeed a structural problem about regresses, not a problem about free will specifically).

"You may think you're a mammal, and that dogs and cows and whales are mammals, but there really aren't any mammals at all -- there can't be! Here's a philosophical argument to prove it.

1) Every mammal has a mammal for a mother
2) If there have been any mammals at all, there have been only a finite number of mammals
3) but if there has been even one mammal, by (1), there has been an infinity of mammals , which contradicts (2), so there can't have been any mammals.

Since we know perfectly well there are mammals, we take this argument only a challenge to discover what fallacy is lurking within it. [..] A gradual transition occurred from clear mammals to clear reptiles, with a lot of hard-to-classify intermediaries filling the gaps "

(Daniel Dennett, "Freedom Evolves", p126)

The absolutist way of thinking about things falls on the "infinite" side of the dichotomy. For the absolutist, and intentional state has to be fully and 1005 brought about by the preceding state...ad infinitum.

Kane's SFA's fall on the other side ...the regress just stops dead.

We favour the kind of solution that is the correct solution to the Prime Mammal problem. The parent of a mammal only needs to be more-or-less mammalian. The mammalhood can fade out as you trace things go back. Likewise the "at least partially" clause in the definition of free will allows us to regard present intentional states as being only more-or-less engendered by previous ones, so that the causal and intentional history of an intentional state peters out rather than going back forever or stopping dead.

Note that we are now equipped with a variety of ways of dealing with the regress problem:-

1. Libertarian responsibility does not arise out of nothing, it arises out of semicompatibilist responsibility.
2. There is no requirement that every intentional state is brought about 100% intentionally by the preceding state.
3. There is no need to identify "you", your "self" with any particular module, including the "indeterminism module".
4. There is no one-to-one correspondence between actions and the output of the "indeterminism module", so actions are not "just random".
5. The fact that you cannot control what your "indeterminism" module will do is vitiated by the fact that you -- the rest of you -- do not have to act on its decisions.
As usual, we are repeating the same things over and over again. It seems we are failing to communicate. I see no point in repeating the same old arguments again and again, hence have abbreviated my response.

The fact that you are not in control-of-your-control does not mean
that someone else is. It just means the process of control is a "at a least partial" "more or less"
thing.

Wrong. Your "control" must follow some algorithm. Either you created the algorithm (ie you are in control of your control), or the algorithm was somehow created "for you", outside of your control (ie it was either created by someone else, by something else, or has simply an indeterministic cause).

Or some mixture of the above.

If the algorithm for your control was somehow created "for you" outside of your control then how can you possibly claim to have ultimate control?

Even a compatiblist can claim that a human has a level of control and reponsibility
that a rock does not have, despite being ultimately
determined by outside circumstances. It is not the level that a libertarian would
want, but it is not zero.

The only way you can claim ultimate control over your actions is if indeed you have control over your control over your control ad infinituum. It's exactly the same problem as with UR.

I didn't claim "ultimate" control. You need to refute (semi)compatibilism.

But it would be a very fancy theromometer. AI researchers
have been chasing human-style rationallity for decades.
A simple machine which behaves rationally yet not completely predictably would in fact be very easy to construct.

Hmmm. You and I must understand very different things by "rationally" then.

That machine could operate in the same way as your RIG/SIS. But nobody (apart perhaps from yourself) would claim that such a simple machine possesed UR.

If it did no possesses HUMAN style ratioanlity, we would not attribute
human style responsibility to it. We do not attribute human-style reponsibility to
animals or children. The problems is not that SIS+RIG is the wrong criterion
for reponsibility, the problem is that you have set the bar too low
on the level of rationality.

How can I be held responsible for something which is indeterministic hence not under my control?

It is under your control because you do not have to act on it: that is
what the SIS is for.

To be repsonsible is not the same as being causally responsible.

Direct causal responsibility is not required, I agree, but there must be at least some unbroken indirect chain of cause and effect over which I have control, otherwise I cannot possibly be reasonably held responsible.

You don't need an "unbroken" chain, just an originative ability combined with a level
of absence of caprice.

How can I be responsible for some X unless I have at least some causal influence over whether X occurs or not?

If you don't have originative (libertarian) responsibility, you have intentional
(comaptibilist) reponsibility, and if you don't have that, you have
causal responsibility, because everything does.

Perhaps you could give an example where an agent can reasonably be held responsible for an event X when there is absolutely no possibility of a causal relationship between the agent and the causally antecedent states of event X?

And what is this event X? You have started off thinking about indeterministic events inside you, and drifted in
talking about actions outside you.

Responsibility is a relationsip that holds or fails to
hold between an agent and an action performed externally. You are not responsible
for things like earthquakes: the relationsip fails to hold. You are also
not reponsible for neural firings as such; in this case is is
a category error to say that you are responsible or not for
your neural firings. A different relationship holds: you are
*constituted* by them. So, no, you cannot be held reponsible
for what your RIG does. But you *are* reponsbile for actions
you perform (whether or not your RIG is involved). And there
*is* always a causal relationship between you and your actions
(although things like intentionality may be optional).

Lots of words, but you still have not addressed the fundamental problem : You have not shown how UR can “switch on” within an agent if UR is totally absent at some point in the agent’s antecedent states. The RIG/SIS certainly does not create UR. Your claim to UR is therefore based on unsubstantiated belief – ie faith – and not reason.

Unlike your claim of GoL qualia...Since SFA's are the essence of an individual's free will, they must also be the essence of an individual's responsibility. Yet they are indeterministic -- mere caprice! This is a very important objection which gets to the heart of what people dislike about indeterminism-based free will. Bear in mind that we have accepted Dennett's point about the distributed mind. It is the agent as a whole who is responsible, not the any particular part of the agent, including any "indeterminism" module the agent might possess. The agents actions are not caused by any particular neuron, or any particular subsystem, but by the central nervous system acting in concert. An "indeterminism" module would therefore not cause actions, simpliciter, any more than any other module.

Moreover, in our model we posit another module in addition to the indeterminism module (or Random Idea Generator) whose function is specifically to "filter" the output of the Random Idea Generator. Thus the objection that you cannot control which signal the indeterminism module is going to generate is vitiated by placing the control after the generation of the signal. (Just as Natural Selection rescues Darwinian evolution from being mere caprice by acting on genes after they have mutated). There is no straightforward inference from a lack of causal responsibility for one's indeterminism generator to a lack of moral responsibility an agent

Finally, recall that in our discussion of semicompatibilism and responsibility we agreed that there are forms of moral responsibility which are compatible with determinism. Thus, responsibility does not kick in when and only when the R.I.G or indeterminism module fires; responsibility is not created ex nihilo.

1. Libertarian responsibility does not arise out of nothing, it arises out of semicompatibilist responsibility.

Semicompatibilist responsibility does not entail UR, but libertarian responsibility does entail UR. You have not shown how we can go from “no UR” to “UR” (you simply claim, or assume, that it can somehow come about, presumably via some supernatural mechanism?)

You are being absolutist again. libertarian responsibility is compatibilist
reponsibility + origination. Adding origination doesn't substract the
aspects of repsonsibility compatible with determinism, thanks to the S.I.S.

2. There is no requirement that every intentional state is brought about 100% intentionally by the preceding state.
But there IS a requirement that I must be at least partially UR for each intentional state in the string of states – UR cannot “switch on” if UR is totally absent in antecedent states.

But the only time in your life when you are lacking in intentionality is in infancy,
when you are not a fully-formed person anyway. There is no point where
you are a fully-formed person , yet lacking responsibly. Personhood,
agenthood, intnetionality, responsibility all develop together.

Note, by the way, that this is all framed in terms of intentionality , and
intentionality is compatible with determinism. The regress "problem" is nothing
essentially to do with indeterminism or libertarianism. You can find
infinite regresses anywhere, providing you look at things in a sufficiently
absolutist way. That is what the Prime Mammal argument illustrates.

 

[Tournesol]

So, projecting backwards:-
N is 90% intentionally brought about by N-1
N is 81% intentionally brought about by N-2
N is 73% intentionally brought about by N-3
N is 59% intentionally brought about by N-4
N is 47% intentionally brought about by N-5
N is 43% intentionally brought about by N-6
N is 33% intentionally brought about by N-7
N is 31% intentionally brought about by N-8
N is 28% intentionally brought about by N-9
N is 25% intentionally brought about by N-10
N is 23% intentionally brought about by N-11
N is 20% intentionally brought about by N-12
N is 18% intentionally brought about by N-13
N is 17% intentionally brought about by N-14
N is 14% intentionally brought about by N-15
N is 12% intentionally brought about by N-16
N is 10% intentionally brought about by N-17

etc etc.

It tapers off

If I am only 10% responsible for state N-17,

You at time T-17 are 10% reponsible for your state at time
T.

and state N-17 is the single causal antecedent of state N-16,

N17 is the deteministic antecedent of n-16. The rest of the
causality is indetermiistic.

 

[Tournesol]

To be UR or Not to be UR, that is the question
In the below explanation, we refer to the attached figures.

Each state (of the agent) is either causally related to one or more antecedent states (such as states N, N-2, N-5, N-9 in figure 1 attached), or it has no causal relationship whatsoever with any antecedent states (such as state N-14 in figure 1 attached).

If there is no causally antecedent state for any given state X, the agent cannot be held ultimately responsible (UR) for that particular state X.

If every state is the result of the SIS and RIG working together, there is always
a casually antecedent component.

Referring to figure 2, here the RIG provides an indeterministic input (ie the RIG has no causally antecedent states) to the SIS. The RIG cannot therefore be a source of UR. The only way that UR can arise in the RIG/SIS combination is therefore if the agent possesses UR for the SIS; but this would entail a never-ending string of UR for each of the causally antecedent states of the SIS. Again, we are forced into infinite regress.

And the same reasoning would apply without any RIG at all. So this has nothing
to do with indeterminism or libertarianism. There are reasons for thinking that
agents are not responsible for actions brought about
by intentional states that have no relationship *at all*
to previous states, but it overstates that requirement
to require infinite chains of inetentional states -- indeed
thit is just the dichotomy -- the false dichotomy -- that
the Prime Mammal story is supposed ot illustrate. And it has
nothing
to do with indeterminism or libertarianism. If the dichotomy
is valid, it no-one is ever repsonisble for anything , even
if libertariansim is completely false and determinism completely
true.Or we could just realize the only time in your life when you are lacking in intentionality is in infancy,
when you are not a fully-formed person anyway. There is no point where
you are a fully-formed person , yet lacking responsibly. Personhood,
agenthood, intnetionality, responsibility all develop together.

 

[metacristi]

I am told that the construction 'strict determinism' (used in my previous post above) is usually associated with superdeterminism, strong determinism, so that I should keep its original sense. I think I need to give some explanations here. Yes I know that philosophical determinism implies the absence of events without causes but I'd argue that we can still talk of determinism [be it only in a weaker sense - quasi determinism] even in cases when there exist few uncaused events having a very small impact on reality (and playing no role in human consciousness). This is why I used, mainly, the construction 'strict determinism' for the case when all effects have causes. But I think the objection is pertinent after all so in order to avoid all misunderstandings I have to do the appropriate corrections. Since I can no more edit the original post I will do this here:

Originally Posted by Dooga Blackrazor
Is quantum mechanics deterministic? It argues that probabilistic events occur, does it not? However, if these events occur, couldn't one say that the result of a probabilistic event was not caused? If it was caused, it would be determined and not probabilistic, would it not? Given this assumption, does quantum mechanics believe in randomness? If randomness is the absence of causation, how can one argue logically that something can happen without giving a causation?

Thanks,

Very Confused

I don't think we can argue [from existing evidence] against some sort of causation and the existence of clear laws at quantum level. As Paul C. W. Davies argues well the atomic level is not completely anarchic many reactions and transformations, perfectly possible at the conceptual level otherwise, never happen there (no one has ever seen for example protons transforming into positrons or electrons into neutrinos) there are some clear laws then.

Further the claim that no better description of the state vector exist because there are no hidden variables is too strong, at most we can argue that some quantum events are without cause (this without rejecting hidden variables or the possibility of exact laws at quantum level - no matter whether we are able to find them or not).

Karl Popper argues exactly in this direction, without claiming however that he solved the problem (determinism, all events have causes, is basically non falsifiable indeed). In his view there are some uncaused events (important for conscious experience, accounting for the spontaneity of human thought) but this does not mean for example that we have to reject the possible existence of clear laws ‘governing’ the two slit experiment (even if these laws will remain forever God’s secret to use a cliche used by some Copenhagenists). In other words we can defend [from what we know today] at most a weak form of indeterminism (some events at quantum level are uncaused) but we cannot ignore causality and the possible existence of strict laws at quantum level.

[To be more exact Popper denies the total and exact determination of future events by present events or by the future of those future events; in this view we can even avoid saying that there are really uncaused events, all that is required for indeterminism is the existence of some events, no matter how small, without a strict predetermination. But, in my view, I don't think we can really avoid talking of uncaused events as much as some characteristics of the effect(s) do not depend by the cause(s) - see below].

Finally given that we deal with a genuine underdetermination in the case of the interpretation of the mathematical formalism of QM we cannot exclude from the equation determinism (all effects have causes). The so called hidden variables interpretations of QM (Bohm’s version for example is deterministic) are far from being falsified (in spite of some dogmatics) and determinism is still with us be it linked with contextualism. The determinism vs indeterminism debate still rage (determinism is fully compatible even with Bell's theorem and Aspect's experiment) maybe time will settle things.

PS: By the way probabilistic descriptions are compatible with both determinism (it is different from the capacity of making accurate, non probabilistic, predictions) and indeterminism (at least one event in the universe is uncaused).

PPS: The construction ‘determinism' (meaning that all effects have causes) encompasses both 'strong determinism' (all events have necessary and sufficient causes; if we could somehow 'run' the Universe from the beginning exactly the same things would happen) and Mill's 'weak determinism' (events are caused but things could have been otherwise). But personally I don't see how 'things could have been otherwise' without resorting to events without causes [I don't think we can really avoid talking of uncaused events as much as some characteristics of the effect do not depend by the cause(s)]. For example we can say that weak and strong interactions are responsible to some extent for radioactivity but they do not account for the exact moment of decay in the case of individual atoms, the weak + strong interactions do not appear to be responsible for this – if this is really so ontologically then we still deal with uncaused events (the movement of intra-nuclear particles is random and uncaused, not obeying some strict quantum laws).

 

[Royce]

It is not that any event does not have a cause, but as in radioactive decay, there does not appear to be any cause that determines when it will occur. It is, so far as we can tell, a caused event that occurs randomly, at random times.

If random events occur or a caused event occurs randomly, then hard determinism is refuted, because such occurrences cannot be precisely determined and thus an unknown and unknowable state exists. The cause and effect determination chain is broken.
It cannot be said that state N-1 necessarily follows state N-0.