Refutation of reductionism (excerpt from The Fabric of Reality, by David Deutsch)

[hypnagogue]

Refutation of reductionism (excerpt from "The Fabric of Reality," by David Deutsch)

The whole title of this thread should read "Refutation of reductionism as a fundamental explanatory framework (excerpt from The Fabric of Reality, by David Deutsch)" but there wasn't enough room for that.

Anyway, I'm posting this as a general topic of discussion as well as to directly address arguments that hold that, for instance, an emotion like love is best, or most scientifically, viewed as "merely" the result of chemical reactions in the brain. With further ado:

A reductionist thinks that science is about analyzing
things into components. An instrumentalist thinks that it is
about predicting things. To either of them, the existence of
high-level sciences is merely a matter of convenience.
Complexity prevents us from using fundamental physics to make
high-level predictions, so instead we guess what those
predictions would be if we could make them-- emergence gives us
a chance of doing that successfully-- and supposedly that is
what the higher-level sciences are about. Thus to reductionists
and instrumentalists, who disregard both the real structure and
the real purpose of scientific knowlege, the base of the
predictive hiearchy of physics is by definition the 'theory of
everything.' But to everyone else scientific knowledge consists
of explanations, and the structure of scientific explnations
does not reflect the reductionist hierarchy. There are
explanations at every level of hierarchy. Many of them are
autonomous, referring only to concepts at that particular level
(for instance, 'the bear ate the honey because it was hungry').
Many involve deductions in the opposite direction to that of
reductive explanation. That is, they explain things not by
analyzing them into smaller, simpler things but by regarding
them as components of larger, more complex things-- about which
we nevertheless have explanatory theories. For example, consider
one particular copper atom at the tip of the nose of the statue
of Sir Winston Churchill that stands in Parliament Square in
London. Let me try to explain why that copper atom is there. It
is because Churchill served as prime minister in the House of
Commons nearby; and because his ideas and leadership contributed
to the Allied victory in the Second World War; and because it is
customary to honor such people by putting up statues of them;
and because bronze, a traditional material for such statues,
contains copper, an so on. Thus we explain a low-level physical
observation-- the presence of a copper atom at a particular
location-- through extremely high-level theories about emergent
phenomena such as ideas, leadership, war and tradition.

There is no reason why there should exist, even in
principle, any lower-level explanation of the presence of
that copper atom than the one I have just given. Presumably a
reductive 'theory of everything' would in principle make a
low-level prediction of the probability that such a
statue will exist, given the condition of (say) the solar system
at some earlier date. It would also in principle describe how
the statue probably got there. But such descriptions and
predictions (wildly infeasible, of course) would explain
nothing. They would merely describe the trajectory that each
copper atom followed from the copper mine, through the smelter
and the sculptor's studio, and so on. They could also state how
those trajectories were influenced by forces exerted on
surrounding atoms, such as those compromising the miners' and
the sculptor's bodies, and so predict the existence and shape of
the statue. In fact such a prediction would have to refer to
atoms all over the planet, engaged in the complex motion we call
the Second World War, among other things. But even if you had
the superhuman capacity to follow such lengthy predictions of
the copper atom's being there, you would still not be able to
say, 'Ah yes, now I understand why it is there.' You would
merely know that its arrival there in that way was inevitable
(or likely, or whatever), given all the atoms' initial
configurations and the laws of physics. If you wanted to
understand why, you would still have no option but to take a
further step. You would have to inquire into what it is about
that configuration of atoms, and those trajectories, that gave
them the propensity to deposit a copper atom at this location.
Pursuing this inquiry would be a creative task, as discovering
new explanations always is. You would have to discover that
certain atomic configurations support emergent phenomena such as
leadership and war, which are related to one another by
high-level explanatory theories. Only when you knew those
theories could you understand fully (emphasis mine) why that copper atom is where it is.

In the reductionist world-view, the laws governing
subatomic particle interactions are of paramount importance, as
they are the base of the hierarchy of all knowledge. But in the
real structure of scientific knowledge, and in the structure of
our knowledge generally, such laws have a much more humble role.

 

[RageSk8]

I agree pretty much with everything that is said here. Good piece.

 

[RageSk8]

Some Rorty to Elaborate on the Issue

I think it is important, when discussing the achievements of the scientific revolution, to make a distinction... between particle physics, together with those microstructural parts of natural science that can be easily linked to particle physics, and all of the rest of natural science. Particle physics, unfortunately, fascinates many contemporary philosophers... Quine once said that the reason the indeterminacy of translation was distinct from the indeterminacy of theory was that the differences in psychological explanations, unlike those in biological explanations, made no difference to the motion of elementary particles. David Lewis thinks that all objects in the universe are gerrymandered artifacts except those elementary particles. Sellers himself was all too inclined to describe nature in Democritean terms as "atoms and void" and to invert pseudo-problems about how to reconcile the "scientific" with the "manifest" image of human beings.

To guard against this simpleminded and reductionistic way of thinking of nonhuman nature, it is useful to remember the form of intelligibility shared by Newton's primitive corpulscluarianism and contemporary particle physics has no counterpart in, for example, the geology of plate tectonics or in Darwin's and Mendal's accounts of heredity and evolution. What we get in those areas of natural science are narratives, natural histories, rather than the subsumption of events under laws...

If we are trying to give philosophy Wittgensteinian peace, we should do what Dewey did: try to make all the traditional philosophical "dichotmoies" look like overdramatizations of the banal fact that different tools serve different purposes. We should treat the fact that you cannot use intentional talk and particle talk simultaneously as just as philosophically sterile as the fact that you cannot play baseball and jai alai simultaneously...

Richard Rorty, "John Mcdowell's Version of Empericism"

 

[Hurkyl]

There is one problem with any argument such as this;

If you don't yet completely understand something, how do you know how a complete understanding should look?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
. . . I'm posting this as a general topic of discussion as well as to directly address arguments that hold that, for instance, an emotion like love is best, or most scientifically, viewed as "merely" the result of chemical reactions in the brain.

I'd like to hear more about how you see the article as relevant to what I assume you are pointing at -- the gap between structure and emergent phenomenon.

Without hearing your opinion, I could say that I think Deutsch makes good points, but I don't know how far the he takes his reasoning.

If he is critiquing "-ists" in general, whether it be reductionists, or creationists, or logical positivists or, my favorite, pragmatists, then I like it. But if he is singling out one "-ist" as inferior to other "-ists" then I think more needs to be said.

Reductionism works perfectly well for getting at component parts, and understanding the base structure of things. But if one comes to believe that all understanding can be derived from this single mental process, that is when it becomes a problem. In that sense, any sort of "'ist" is bound to be lacking in those mental disciplines he is ignoring in order to exclusively apply what he has chosen as his own.

So why single out reductionists? I'd rather see him point the finger at all "-ists." But maybe he is doing that . . . it's just that I can't tell from your excerpt.

 

[Iacchus32]

So what's the point in breaking things down to their basic component level without having a higher capacity of intelligence to do so? Does it even begin to convey the nature of that higher intelligence?

What's the difference between building a radio receiver and listening to the music that it broadcasts?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
So what's the point in breaking things down to their basic component level without having a higher capacity of intelligence to do so? Does it even begin to convey the nature of that higher intelligence?

What's the difference between building a radio receiver and listening to the music that it broadcasts?

I don't know who you are asking, but I would answer you that there is no competition between understanding components and the abilities of intelligence overall. The first gives us the ability to create, and the second gives the ability to appreciate what's been created.

So there is a big difference between building that radio and listening. If not for what reduction reveals, there would be no radio to listen to; if not for the ability to appreciate music, no one would try to build a radio!

 

[drag]

Greetings !

hypnagogue, what exactly is your point ?
You did not as I see it, fortunately - 'cause this would just
require this thread to be moved into God and Religion,
directly refute what you call reductionism. So what is
it that you're saying ?

There are many different scientific ways of viewing things.
However, science's primary tool is mathematics and what
we call today - logic, to discribe a phenomenon in FULL one
has to start from its most basic known components known.
To deny this basic way of scientific discription and explanation
and to say that science can just deal with the Universe on
different levels WITHOUT making the abvious connections WHEN
it is technicly possible is just a bunch of crap - probably
religion inpired crap. No offense.

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."
Leonardo Da Vinci

Live long and prosper.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I don't know who you are asking, but I would answer you that there is no competition between understanding components and the abilities of intelligence overall. The first gives us the ability to create, and the second gives the ability to appreciate what's been created.

So there is a big difference between building that radio and listening. If not for what reduction reveals, there would be no radio to listen to; if not for the ability to appreciate music, no one would try to build a radio!

But what if the radio were already there? (i.e., our brain). And we're still trying to figure out how it's put together? Does it really speak about the nature of the intelligence behind what's functional or complete? (i.e., consciousness itself). In fact we can pick up a lot of things over the radio other than that which tells us how the radio goes together. And like I say, we're still uncertain how it goes together.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I'd like to hear more about how you see the article as relevant to what I assume you are pointing at -- the gap between structure and emergent phenomenon.

Without hearing your opinion, I could say that I think Deutsch makes good points, but I don't know how far the he takes his reasoning.

If he is critiquing "-ists" in general, whether it be reductionists, or creationists, or logical positivists or, my favorite, pragmatists, then I like it. But if he is singling out one "-ist" as inferior to other "-ists" then I think more needs to be said.

Reductionism works perfectly well for getting at component parts, and understanding the base structure of things. But if one comes to believe that all understanding can be derived from this single mental process, that is when it becomes a problem. In that sense, any sort of "'ist" is bound to be lacking in those mental disciplines he is ignoring in order to exclusively apply what he has chosen as his own.

So why single out reductionists? I'd rather see him point the finger at all "-ists." But maybe he is doing that . . . it's just that I can't tell from your excerpt.

This passage is excerpted from the first chapter of the book, in which Deutsch is concerned with, among other things, distinguishing between knowledge and understanding. He is concerned in this particular passage with debunking the reductionist attitude that, as you put it, all understanding can be derived from reductionism-- or rather, that the understanding of nature afforded us by reductionism is somehow more fundamental than or (when you get down to it) superior to more higher-level understandings. It goes back to knowledge and understanding. Reductionism-- analysis of the most basic component parts of nature and the simple mathematical laws they follow-- gives us great predictive power (knowledge), in theory enough predictive power to anticipate the existence all the higher-level phenomena that the atomic world underlies. But Deutsch's point is that knowing is not understanding, specifically that simply knowing/being able to predict the behavior of atomic particles is a poor basis for actually understanding many macroscopic phenomena.

So he's not so much singling out reductionists as he is asserting that there is no 'privileged' level of analysis of reality that, for all cases, will give you a fundamentally superior vantage point than any other. In fact, he gives a similar (though much briefer) treatment to holism as he does to reductionism, on the same objection-- it assumes a static and privileged level of analysis (the whole).

This is the sense in which I find the excerpt relevant to many reductionist arguments. For example, speaking in terms of neurotransmitters or evolution is a pretty crummy way to come about a really good understanding of the nature of love. Or rather-- they are only complementary pieces to a much larger puzzle, and they're not even the biggest pieces. Here the appropriate paradigm shift is not from one scale of objective reality to another, but rather the more radical shift of the objective to the subjective.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by drag
Greetings !

hypnagogue, what exactly is your point ?
You did not as I see it, fortunately - 'cause this would just
require this thread to be moved into God and Religion,
directly refute what you call reductionism. So what is
it that you're saying ?

There are many different scientific ways of viewing things.
However, science's primary tool is mathematics and what
we call today - logic, to discribe a phenomenon in FULL one
has to start from its most basic known components known.
To deny this basic way of scientific discription and explanation
and to say that science can just deal with the Universe on
different levels WITHOUT making the abvious connections WHEN
it is technicly possible is just a bunch of crap - probably
religion inpired crap. No offense.

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."
Leonardo Da Vinci

Live long and prosper.

My apologies if the thread title is a little unclear (the text limit for title lengths is pretty restrictive). Hopefully my last post will clarify what I meant to get across.

Again, what Deutsch argues-- and what I agree with-- is not the validity of reductionism as a scientific method. It is only the attitude that, because we can decompose the world into atomic components whose behavior we can predict very well, that that atomic level of analysis is somehow the 'best' or most fundamental for deriving an understanding of nature. To use Deutsch's example, we understand the behavior of the bear eating honey better if we explain that it is hungry than if we try to explain the peculiar motion of billions of molecules in its brain.

 

[drag]

Greetings !

Originally posted by hypnagogue
My apologies if the thread title is a little unclear (the text limit for title lengths is pretty restrictive). Hopefully my last post will clarify what I meant to get across.

It does more or less. Thanks !

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Again, what Deutsch argues-- and what I agree with-- is not the validity of reductionism as a scientific method. It is only the attitude that, because we can decompose the world into atomic components whose behavior we can predict very well, that that atomic level of analysis is somehow the 'best' or most fundamental for deriving an understanding of nature. To use Deutsch's example, we understand the behavior of the bear eating honey better if we explain that it is hungry than if we try to explain the peculiar motion of billions of molecules in its brain.

I agree.

However, I want to understand the basis of the objection
contained here, from your perspective. As I see it the only reason for using the other type of explanations is if they provide a more
precise explanation. For such a perspective the only problem
is technical - if we COULD do this by using the reductionist
way then it would certainly be the most accurate and precise explanation possible and that's the one we should use
in science (IF it's technicly possible) and in general for
best effectivity. What I want to understand is - Is that also
the way you see it or are you implying some other reasons ?

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."
Leonardo Da Vinci

Live long and prosper.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Hurkyl
There is one problem with any argument such as this;

If you don't yet completely understand something, how do you know how a complete understanding should look?

I don't think anyone said anything about a complete understanding in the first place.

But anyway, I'll let Deutsch speak for himself on this one... I'm pulling these a little out of context, but it's not hard to figure out what he considers to be factors that comprise a better understanding, relative to older theories:

"...modern theories are far fewer, and their explanatory power gives them other properties such as beauty, inner logic and connections with other subjects that makes them easier to learn."

and again

"That is, new ideas often do more than just supercede, simply or unify existing ones. They also extend human understanding into areas that were previously not understood at all-- or whose very existence was not guessed at. They may open up new opportunities, new problems, new specializations and even new subjects."

Don't take this as the end-all, I just can't be bothered for now to fish up any excerpts that might be more directly relevant..

There's also the issue of complexity-- the more compact and elegant a theory is (in general) the better the understanding it gives you.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by drag
Greetings !

hypnagogue, what exactly is your point ?
You did not as I see it, fortunately - 'cause this would just
require this thread to be moved into God and Religion,
directly refute what you call reductionism. So what is
it that you're saying ?

There are many different scientific ways of viewing things.
However, science's primary tool is mathematics and what
we call today - logic, to discribe a phenomenon in FULL one
has to start from its most basic known components known.
To deny this basic way of scientific discription and explanation
and to say that science can just deal with the Universe on
different levels WITHOUT making the abvious connections WHEN
it is technicly possible is just a bunch of crap - probably
religion inpired crap. No offense.

"Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication."
Leonardo Da Vinci

Live long and prosper.

Yes, but did we have a brain before science said it was okay to "believe" we had a brain? And how on Earth did people ever get along when they didn't know they had them? Yes, it's because of "our brains" that the wonders of science have opened up to us, and yet before that time (within the past few hundred years), would it be fair to say that our brains were fully dysfunctional? That doesn't make the least bit of sense.

We need to understand one thing, that this miraculous thing we call the human mind has been processing information for thousands of years. And to insist that it hasn't been functioning properly until recently, sounds the epitome of foolishness indeed.

 

[Royce]

I may be reading it wrong but it seems to me to be Aristotlism vs Platoism again but in modern terms.
If nature or the universe were perfectly deterministic and we had the brain or computer power to do it, then reductionism possibly could indeed explain and predict everything physical or objective. However, it would never explain beauty or love or why that statue was built and erected in the first place. Sure given the circumstances and human nature, culture and psychology it might predict that a memorial would be built for Churchill but where and what kind? Why a statue and why bronze. I don't think that we are that predictable or the universe that deterministic.
Objectivity or reductionism is only part of the universe. I don't think we could deduct or predict the universe from studying sub-atomic particles. Nor could we know what a mouse is by studying one of its cells.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by drag
However, I want to understand the basis of the objection
contained here, from your perspective. As I see it the only reason for using the other type of explanations is if they provide a more
precise explanation. For such a perspective the only problem
is technical - if we COULD do this by using the reductionist
way then it would certainly be the most accurate and precise explanation possible and that's the one we should use
in science (IF it's technicly possible) and in general for
best effectivity. What I want to understand is - Is that also
the way you see it or are you implying some other reasons ?

In general, that's not the way I see it. To use Deutsch's example of the atom of copper in the Churchill statue-- I suppose the purely atomic explanation is the most precise (assuming we are able to do it) but it's not the best way of looking at the question posed. The question, even in theory, is better answered using higher level concepts such as war and leadership. You may then inquire as to the nature of war and leadership, and so on, and eventually the best explanation in the chain of questioning might get back down to the atomic level.

But I think the point, more generally, is this. If we picture a flow chart encompassing all scales of reality, then to explain a phenomenon at any given level, the reductionist assumes that the best understanding is given by what we might call an explanatory arrow that always points downward, deeper and deeper down the chart until it reaches the atomic realm. Deutsch argues-- and I agree-- that the best direction for this explanatory arrow is not always straight down. Sometimes it is lateral, staying within a given scale, and sometimes it also points upward toward higher scales that impose structure on the lower ones.

Another analogy we might want to consider is linear algebra. Sometimes you get the best understanding of a given problem by analyzing the mathematical behavior of the components of the given vectors and matrices; other times, you get a better understanding when you treat the matrices and vectors as variables themselves (for instance, something like Ax = B). Perhaps there is some way in which your understanding is more precise if you always approach linear algebra by analyzing the components of vectors and matrices, but it is easy to think of any number of examples where you simply understand the problem at hand better if you analyze it at a higher level of abstraction; it is easier for you to see why certain relationships should exist, derive new ones, etc.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
But Deutsch's point is that knowing is not understanding, specifically that simply knowing/being able to predict the behavior of atomic particles is a poor basis for actually understanding many macroscopic phenomena.

So he's not so much singling out reductionists as he is asserting that there is no 'privileged' level of analysis of reality that, for all cases, will give you a fundamentally superior vantage point than any other. In fact, he gives a similar (though much briefer) treatment to holism as he does to reductionism, on the same objection-- it assumes a static and privileged level of analysis (the whole).

Yes, we've debated these exact issues here. People do tend to zero in on one particular analytical perspective as the "Way," and when it fails to reveal what another analytical approach does, they say what the other perspective claims must be false (e.g., demostrate love exists empirically; if you can't then most likely doesn't exist). It's like that old bit of wisdom, "if the only tool you have is a hammer, you go around treating everything like a nail."

In this very thread you can see people who only want to look at things holistically, and resist parts analysis at every turn; and reductionists who don't want to rise up out of part complexity to look at the whole thing.

I really think this is one of the most important issues of developing one's consciousness.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Here the appropriate paradigm shift is not from one scale of objective reality to another, but rather the more radical shift of the objective to the subjective.

Yes, another important area of consciousness development. I would add that there are important issues to be decided about what subjective experiences are most developmental. One debate that goes on at PF is the untrustworthiness of subjectivity in the pursuit of knowledge. l've said I think subjectivity has gotten a bad rap because of those who practice it poorly; and, just as there is effective and ineffective objectivity, the same is true for subjectivity.

By the way, welcome to PF . . . it's good to see another thinker has joined the group.

 

[drag]

Greetings !

Originally posted by Royce
If nature or the universe were perfectly deterministic and we had the brain or computer power to do it, then reductionism possibly could indeed explain and predict everything physical or objective. However, it would never explain beauty or love or why that statue was built and erected in the first place. Sure given the circumstances and human nature, culture and psychology it might predict that a memorial would be built for Churchill but where and what kind? Why a statue and why bronze. I don't think that we are that predictable or the universe that deterministic.

In other words you are religious, right ?

Determinism has little to do with this. It doesn't matter whether
there is quantum uncertainty or not - STILL the most basic
scientific discription that's possible is the MOST accurate and
precise (if it is technicly possible). Of course it can explain
love, beauty and bronze statues of Churchill in the most
accurate and basic of ways but would that be required ?
Why would we need to explain such things at all ?
These things are just approximations that we make. If we could
make the most precise and accurate calculations possible
than we would have no need for such approximations at all.
To claim otherwise, again, clearly means that you believe
in "special" Universal laws that have to do with "intellegent"
creatures like soul and all that stuff, and if you do - then
you clearly disagree with modern science which has no
real evidence for these things.

Live long and prosper.

 

[drag]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Yes, but did we have a brain before science said it was okay to "believe" we had a brain? And how on Earth did people ever get along when they didn't know they had them? Yes, it's because of "our brains" that the wonders of science have opened up to us, and yet before that time (within the past few hundred years), would it be fair to say that our brains were fully dysfunctional? That doesn't make the least bit of sense.

We need to understand one thing, that this miraculous thing we call the human mind has been processing information for thousands of years. And to insist that it hasn't been functioning properly until recently, sounds the epitome of foolishness indeed.

What ? I don't get it, what's this got to do with anything ?

Peace and long life.

 

[drag]

Greetings !

Originally posted by hypnagogue
In general, that's not the way I see it. To use Deutsch's example of the atom of copper in the Churchill statue-- I suppose the purely atomic explanation is the most precise (assuming we are able to do it) but it's not the best way of looking at the question posed. The question, even in theory, is better answered using higher level concepts such as war and leadership. You may then inquire as to the nature of war and leadership, and so on, and eventually the best explanation in the chain of questioning might get back down to the atomic level.

But I think the point, more generally, is this. If we picture a flow chart encompassing all scales of reality, then to explain a phenomenon at any given level, the reductionist assumes that the best understanding is given by what we might call an explanatory arrow that always points downward, deeper and deeper down the chart until it reaches the atomic realm. Deutsch argues-- and I agree-- that the best direction for this explanatory arrow is not always straight down. Sometimes it is lateral, staying within a given scale, and sometimes it also points upward toward higher scales that impose structure on the lower ones.

Hmm... possibly I'm beginning to see the problem here.

My question is then:
What does BEST explanation mean to you ?

I interpret it as BEST = MOST PRECISE. In this case it is
abvious why only the explanation using the most basic
scientificly known components will do - because higher
level components are approximations and thus can not in general
with higher statistical probability result in better general
statistical predictions (UNLESS there are other unknown
laws at work).

However, if I were to think of the "best" explanation as, for
example, the shortest one - then it's abvious that approximations
would ussualy be better. This is the direct result of the fact
that approximations are also, ussualy, simplifications because
they are, in the first place, used to explain complex stuff.

Other ways of thinking of the "best" explanations may include
the whole philosophical perspective. That is, if we consider
the whole philosophical perspective of the Universe (that only
some people have, unfortunately ) then we realize of course
that things are not certain. As a conclusion, we can not blindly
totally trust science or anything else for that matter. So,
perhaps the "best" explanation in these terms is then the
"closest to our perception of reality" in which case love, for
example, would indeed be the best way to describe a part of
our perception rather than using science and thus introducing
more assumptions (not that Science has assumptions but it itself
is a philosophical assumption) to the "explanation"
(not that it's much of an explanation but then again any
type of "explanation" we are aware of so far, including scientific, would use some basic and self-referential components, so the
point is that in this case we only have one such component
rather than many - particles, laws etc.).

Live long and prosper.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by drag
What ? I don't get it, what's this got to do with anything ?

Peace and long life.

I was "inspired" by your reference to "religion inspired crap."

I mean no offense.

 

[Royce]

Originally posted by drag
Greetings !

In other words you are religious, right ?

Determinism has little to do with this. It doesn't matter whether
there is quantum uncertainty or not - STILL the most basic
scientific discription that's possible is the MOST accurate and
precise (if it is technicly possible). Of course it can explain
love, beauty and bronze statues of Churchill in the most
accurate and basic of ways but would that be required ?
Why would we need to explain such things at all ?
These things are just approximations that we make. If we could
make the most precise and accurate calculations possible
than we would have no need for such approximations at all.
To claim otherwise, again, clearly means that you believe
in "special" Universal laws that have to do with "intellegent"
creatures like soul and all that stuff, and if you do - then
you clearly disagree with modern science which has no
real evidence for these things.

Live long and prosper.

Determinism and religion have nothing to do with it. We are talking about reductionists or isms. We as human beings are not that predictable. We are not automatons that perform to a set of rules prescribed by every set of circumstances. Nor do I think that scientific discription reguardless of how precise and accurate can discribe all that exists in the universe much less every inanimate physical object of every and any size or scale. There is more to the universe than particlewaves and probabilities.

It may be simplistic to say so but as I said earlier, we cannot know what a mouse is or does by studying one of its living cells much less its component particles. Can you know mountains and their grandure and beauty by looking at a grain of sand. Can you deduce the universe from knowing all there is know about a hydrogen atom. Every once in a while a weatherman needs to look out his window to see what the weather outside is actually doing.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by drag
My question is then:
What does BEST explanation mean to you ?

I interpret it as BEST = MOST PRECISE. In this case it is
abvious why only the explanation using the most basic
scientificly known components will do - because higher
level components are approximations and thus can not in general with higher statistical probability result in better general
statistical predictions (UNLESS there are other unknown
laws at work).

Greetings my friend. With your last couple of responses I am wondering where your usual excellent clarity flew off to. (And why are you asking Hypnagogue if he is religious? Can't he discuss modes of mentality without having to declare his personal beliefs?)

So, you are saying that "the most precise" explanation is best for every, single situation in life? That means, when you are being affectionate with your wife you wouldn't think of saying "I love you dearly sweetheart." Instead you will find it "best" to say, "my evolutive history has produced hormonal capacities in me, which at the moment are urging me to express a sentimental phrase . . . sweetheart."

And when you decide what music you like, will you get the sheet music and analyze every detail of the score and decide on that basis if it is good? Or will you sit and listen and feel it.

Originally posted by drag
To claim otherwise, again, clearly means that you believe
in "special" Universal laws that have to do with "intellegent"
creatures like soul and all that stuff, and if you do - then
you clearly disagree with modern science which has no
real evidence for these things.

Oh come now. You are assuming science is the end-all evaluating tool. That science has no evidence, as we've discussed many times, only means science cannot reveal such things. It doesn't mean you can jump to the conclusion that such things don't exist.

Originally posted by drag
However, if I were to think of the "best" explanation as, for
example, the shortest one - then it's abvious that approximations
would ussualy be better. This is the direct result of the fact
that approximations are also, ussualy, simplifications because
they are, in the first place, used to explain complex stuff.

Why does there need to be a competition here? There is plenty of room in one's life for more than one way of explaining-understanding things. Of course, if you think all there is to life is mechanics, then why not just be a robot and be done with it. But the minute you try to understand, the second you care, the instant you feel . . . you've left the mechanical world and entered the realm of consciousness because no known mechanical set of principles has been shown to exhihit such qualities. ONLY consciousness. And even if consciousness does emerge from a purely physical base (an issue which is far from settled), it is still something completely new and different from that which it emerged.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by drag
Greetings !

Hmm... possibly I'm beginning to see the problem here.

My question is then:
What does BEST explanation mean to you ?

I interpret it as BEST = MOST PRECISE. In this case it is
abvious why only the explanation using the most basic
scientificly known components will do - because higher
level components are approximations and thus can not in general
with higher statistical probability result in better general
statistical predictions (UNLESS there are other unknown
laws at work).

However, if I were to think of the "best" explanation as, for
example, the shortest one - then it's abvious that approximations
would ussualy be better. This is the direct result of the fact
that approximations are also, ussualy, simplifications because
they are, in the first place, used to explain complex stuff.

Understanding does not exist in vacuo. There is an explanatory theory, and there is the mind which attempts to apprehend and employ this theory; the interaction between the two generates the phenomenon that we call "understanding." Therefore, we must consider the nature of both theory and (human) mind when we try to understand the concept of understanding. If theory A is more precise than theory B, but is also many times more complex and so is more confusing to the mind apprehending it, then what good is it when it comes to generating a better understanding? For instance, one criterion of a good understanding is that, from your good understanding, you will be able to derive further understanding. But what if theory A is so much more complex and confusing than B that it ends up making a derivation of a certain logical deduction practically intractable, whereas the very simplicity and conciseness of theory B makes the deduction almost a trivial exercise? This is indeed pretty much what you conceded in your 2nd paragraph above.

But maybe we are getting too far afield here. There is a deeper issue. Higher precision implies better predictive power, essentially better knowledge. But knowledge of a system is not the same thing as understanding the system. Maybe a rigorous reductionist treatment will increase the precision of a given measurement, but will it contribute anything to our understanding of the system? Sometimes, but not always. If it does, it is by virtue of making us say "Ah, now I get it," not by making our measurements accurate to the thousandths instead of the hundredths.

And once again, the wheels fall off the reductionist approach when it comes to understanding subjective phenomena. If someone is describing to you the surreal quality of a dream they had, you can immediately understand what they mean by analogy to similar experiences of your own. But if you discard this understanding and try to approach it from a reductionist viewpoint, you immediately and invariably have a poorer understanding than what you started out with! To convince yourself of this, imagine a scientist who for some strange reason has never had a dream. No matter how good of a scientist he is, will he ever be able to understand the surrealism of a dream better than someone who has actually experienced it? He may come up with ways of approaching the phenomenon from the outside, e.g. determining a correlation between certain EEG patterns and surreal dreams, but he will never get at the core of the experience.

 

[drag]

Greetings !

Frankly dear people, I'm getting the sense that we do not
understand each other, but I'll try to answer what you said.

Originally posted by Royce
It may be simplistic to say so but as I said earlier, we cannot know what a mouse is or does by studying one of its living cells much less its component particles. Can you know mountains and their grandure and beauty by looking at a grain of sand.

If there is perfect (as far as physicly possible) data
about these things than why would these approximations
be required ?

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Greetings my friend. With your last couple of responses I am wondering where your usual excellent clarity flew off to.

You flatter me sir ! <blushing smiley> (Greg ?! )
But, actually, I thought I was quite clear while it
is the others' objection that I fail, so far, to comprehend.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
So, you are saying that "the most precise" explanation is best for every, single situation in life? That means, when you are being affectionate with your wife you wouldn't think of saying "I love you dearly sweetheart." Instead you will find it "best" to say, "my evolutive history has produced hormonal capacities in me, which at the moment are urging me to express a sentimental phrase . . . sweetheart."

And when you decide what music you like, will you get the sheet music and analyze every detail of the score and decide on that basis if it is good? Or will you sit and listen and feel it.

O.K. So we are having a problem with definitions. But not
just with the "best explanation" definition but also with
reductionism.

As I understand it you are talking about reductionism as a
way of life or something. In this role it is indeed pathetic.
I, on the other hand, speak of it as just a tool for analisys.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
That science has no evidence, as we've discussed many times, only means science cannot reveal such things. It doesn't mean you can jump to the conclusion that such things don't exist.

I never said the above, some others did and I too said
they were wrong. What I am saying is that science disagrees
with these things because they are not part of it, not
because it disproved them.

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
But the minute you try to understand, the second you care, the instant you feel . . . you've left the mechanical world and entered the realm of consciousness because no known mechanical set of principles has been shown to exhihit such qualities. ONLY consciousness. And even if consciousness does emerge from a purely physical base (an issue which is far from settled), it is still something completely new and different from that which it emerged.

That is a different issue. But, just to say a word or two
on this - part of the problem may be the order - not
consciousness causing physics but physics causing the
appearence of consciousness.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Understanding does not exist in vacuo. There is an explanatory theory, and there is the mind which attempts to apprehend and employ this theory; the interaction between the two generates the phenomenon that we call "understanding." Therefore, we must consider the nature of both theory and (human) mind when we try to understand the concept of understanding. If theory A is more precise than theory B, but is also many times more complex and so is more confusing to the mind apprehending it, then what good is it when it comes to generating a better understanding? For instance, one criterion of a good understanding is that, from your good understanding, you will be able to derive further understanding. But what if theory A is so much more complex and confusing than B that it ends up making a derivation of a certain logical deduction practically intractable, whereas the very simplicity and conciseness of theory B makes the deduction almost a trivial exercise? This is indeed pretty much what you conceded in your 2nd paragraph above.

I agree. However, in my opinion the nature of the entity
that is involved in the understanding process or that process
itself are not important. In other words, what I am talking about
is just the raw pure data and its accuracy and level. That is why I think we are using different definitions of reductionism.
Yours is probably the officialy correct one, but what I am more
intrested in is the basic idea behind the general approach.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
But maybe we are getting too far afield here. There is a deeper issue. Higher precision implies better predictive power, essentially better knowledge. But knowledge of a system is not the same thing as understanding the system. Maybe a rigorous reductionist treatment will increase the precision of a given measurement, but will it contribute anything to our understanding of the system? Sometimes, but not always.

If we assume an ideal entity involved in the understanding
process then certainly the most basic level and complete
analyses of the entire relevant system would be the "best"
one to allow that entity to understand the whole thing.
Can there be exceptions (in the limmits of accepted as valid
reasoning systems and science) ?

Originally posted by hypnagogue
And once again, the wheels fall off the reductionist approach when it comes to understanding subjective phenomena. If someone is describing to you the surreal quality of a dream they had, you can immediately understand what they mean by analogy to similar experiences of your own. But if you discard this understanding and try to approach it from a reductionist viewpoint, you immediately and invariably have a poorer understanding than what you started out with!

That is an incomplete system. I agree with this example
in general, however, without complying to the basic rules
of completion of the information we can have all sorts of
things and examples. Again, I am referring to the basic
idea of reductionism not a relevant way of life or something.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
To convince yourself of this, imagine a scientist who for some strange reason has never had a dream. No matter how good of a scientist he is, will he ever be able to understand the surrealism of a dream better than someone who has actually experienced it? He may come up with ways of approaching the phenomenon from the outside, e.g. determining a correlation between certain EEG patterns and surreal dreams, but he will never get at the core of the experience.

Again, that is an issue of understanding, the entity
that does it and even consciousness. But, not the raw data.
(Unless, one tries to claim that consciousness is capable of
violating QM and lifting the haze of the probabalistic
discriptions of quantum interactions that are otherwise
all that we have to deal with as pure info.)

Live long and prosper.