The Role of Consciousness in the Evolution of Interpretation

[moving finger]

Hi Paul

I started to prepare a response to all of the points in your post, then realized that most of our disagreement comes down to definitions, and a detailed point-by-point reply is simply a waste of time if we don’t agree on the definition of the single word on which this entire thread is based – “self”.

The meaning of words is derived from their usage in language, not dictated by fiat (except possibly in French ). In the English language, “self” is often used in contexts where there is no consciousness involved (as in a “self-priming pump”, or “self-sufficient economy”, or even "self-fulfilling prophecy", and in IT/AI contexts such as “self-organising”, “self-configuring” and “self-defending” networks and systems). Whether you think such a concept of self devoid of consciousness is “interesting” or not is your personal value judgement, but to be honest I don’t see why self must be defined simply so that it is interesting from your point of view? To insist that self must defined in terms of consciousness seems an artificially and unnecessarily parochial view intended simply to prove what the definition already assumes.

Best Regards

 

[PIT2]

whether you choose to use a "scientific" approach to try to explain the universe, or choose to use some other approach preferable to you, you will at some stage need to fit explanation and observation. Thus we should ask the question : where is the evidence that single-celled organisms exhibit consciousness?

Thats a good question of course. I happen to believe that any intelligence (AI or not) requires subjective experience, and that this subjective experience is what allows organisms to respond to their environment in the selfish manner that is needed for survival. If this is so then we would need to know if bacteria are intelligent. When looking closely at the behaviour of bacteria, one can see signs that this is the case.

Just as ur question was valid, i would ask what evidence there is that phenomenal consciousness arose somewhere on the evolutionary timeline (perhaps at the beginning of the first brain?).

 

[moving finger]

Thats a good question of course. I happen to believe that any intelligence (AI or not) requires subjective experience, and that this subjective experience is what allows organisms to respond to their environment in the selfish manner that is needed for survival. If this is so then we would need to know if bacteria are intelligent. When looking closely at the behaviour of bacteria, one can see signs that this is the case.

One can? Such as?

How do you define intelligence? Are all intelligent systems necessarily conscious? Are all conscious systems necessarily intelligent?

Just as ur question was valid, i would ask what evidence there is that phenomenal consciousness arose somewhere on the evolutionary timeline (perhaps at the beginning of the first brain?).

Are you asking for empirical evidence? Consciousness is not fossilised, and we have no direct access to the past in order to acquire such evidence. The only access we have to evidence on whether consciousness emerged (or has always existed) is via the development of rational explanatory models of consciousness, and then to construct a model of if and how such consciousness could have arisen (if it did) in the past.

Best Regards

 

[PIT2]

One can? Such as?

How do you define intelligence? Are all intelligent systems necessarily conscious? Are all conscious systems necessarily intelligent?

A possible definition is very simple and abstract:
"to understand and profit from experience".
From this definition (which i agree with) it follows that intelligence requires consciousness.

Looking at bacteria and other cells, several researchers have suggested that their behaviour may classify as intelligent:

The molecular properties of the sum of the two-component systems in a typical bacterium, such as E. coli, can therefore be summarized as follows: (i) multiple (branched) systems operate in parallel; (ii) key components carry out logical operations; (iii) the basic elements of this network are subject to auto-amplification; and (iv) crosstalk does occur between the pathways. The extent, to which this latter process occurs, however, remains to be characterized in more detail (Figure 2). Strikingly, the characteristics of such a network are identical to the properties that have been assigned as the prerequisites to make any network perform as a ‘neural’ network [31]. This leads to the idea, as formulated earlier [32], that the combined activity of all two-component systems in a single bacterium, because of their biochemical properties, could bestow bacteria with properties associated with intelligent cellular behaviour, such as associative memory and learning, and thus with a minimal form of intelligence.
http://star.tau.ac.il/~eshel/Bio_co...elligence.pdf#search="bacterial intelligence"

http://star.tau.ac.il/~eshel/bacterial_linguistic.html

Some of the observed behaviours of mammalian cells:

The results suggest that mammalian cells, indeed, posess intelligence. The experimental basis for this conclusion is presented in the following web pages. The most significant experimental results are:

• 1. The motile machinery of cells contains subdomains ('microplasts') that can be isolated from the cell and then are capable of autonomous movements. Yet, inside the cell they do not exercise their ability. The situation is comparable to a person's muscles that are capable of contraction outside a person's body, but do not contract at will once they are part of the person, suggesting that they are subject to a control center.
• 2. The cell as a whole is capable of immensely complex migration patterns for which their genome cannot contain a detailed program as they are responses to unforseeable encounters ( Cell movement is not random.. ).
• 3. Cells can 'see', i.e. they can map the directions of near-infrared light sources in their environment and direct their movements toward them. No such 'vision' is possible without a very sophisticated signal processing system ('cell brain') that is linked to the movement control of the cell. (The larger their light scattering, the larger the distance from which aggregating cells came together. )

In addition there is the supporting theoretical consideration that the hiterto completely unexplained complex structure of centrioles is predicted in every detail if one asks what structure a cellular 'eye' would have. ( The best design for a cellular eye is a pair of centrioles )
http://www.basic.northwestern.edu/g-buehler/cellint0.htm

And some examples of possibly intelligent bacterial behaviour are described in this link:
http://www.world-science.net/exclusives/050418_bactfrm.htm

 

[moving finger]

A possible definition is very simple and abstract:
"to understand and profit from experience".
From this definition (which i agree with) it follows that intelligence requires consciousness.

Ahhh well, I don't. Intelligence (to me) does not entail experience, or understanding. Intelligence (imho) is simply the ability to achieve goals by solving problems. Which does not necessarily require consciousness.

Though the articles you quote suggest that bacteria may exhibit some intelligence in accord with my definition, they are silent on the question of consciousness (they do not even refer to consciousness).

(there is no empirical evidence that the bacteria in question "understand" anything - thus it is debatable whether they qualify as being intelligent according to your definition).

My original question, recall, was :

where is the evidence that single-celled organisms exhibit consciousness?

Best Regards

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

Hi Paul

I started to prepare a response to all of the points in your post, then realized that most of our disagreement comes down to definitions, and a detailed point-by-point reply is simply a waste of time if we don’t agree on the definition of the single word on which this entire thread is based – “self”.

I understand and agree. I think our primary disagreement is over the definition of 'concept'. As I have said, it is inconceivable to me how you can conceive of unconceived concepts. I invite you to join my attempt at defining this term in my thread "Let's start at the beginning". I would dearly love to hear your comments.

The meaning of words is derived from their usage in language, not dictated by fiat (except possibly in French ). In the English language, “self” is often used in contexts where there is no consciousness involved (as in a “self-priming pump”, or “self-sufficient economy”, or even "self-fulfilling prophecy", and in IT/AI contexts such as “self-organising”, “self-configuring” and “self-defending” networks and systems). Whether you think such a concept of self devoid of consciousness is “interesting” or not is your personal value judgement, but to be honest I don’t see why self must be defined simply so that it is interesting from your point of view?

I'm sorry I gave you the impression that I was advocating for, or insisting on, any particular definition of 'self'. I simply pointed out that the term could be defined in several ways and that these definitions led to different answers to PIT2s questions.

To insist that self must defined in terms of consciousness seems an artificially and unnecessarily parochial view intended simply to prove what the definition already assumes.

Those may be the motives of some who insist, but I don't, and haven't, insisted on any definition. I only insist that people do define their terms before they make claims using them.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[PIT2]

Ahhh well, I don't. Intelligence (to me) does not entail experience, or understanding. Intelligence (imho) is simply the ability to achieve goals by solving problems. Which does not necessarily require consciousness.

Doesnt a goal require an intention? And do problems exist without anyone experiencing them as problems?

where is the evidence that single-celled organisms exhibit consciousness?

It could be in the bacteriums mind!

 

[moving finger]

Doesnt a goal require an intention? And do problems exist without anyone experiencing them as problems?

Imho you are to a large extent correct - things like goals, problems, intentions (and hence also intelligence) are interpretations placed on the behaviours and actions of some agents by other agents. But none of this requires consciousness as a necessary condition. We might say that the "goal" of a chess-playing computer is to win games of chess, but that is simply an interpretation that we (as interpreting agents) are placing on the actions and behaviour of the chess-playing computer.

Dennett describes it very well in his "intentional stance".

It could be in the bacteriums mind!

Does the bacterium have a mind?

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Hi MF,
I understand and agree. I think our primary disagreement is over the definition of 'concept'.

In this thread, it seems to be on the definition and meaning of "self"

I simply pointed out that the term could be defined in several ways and that these definitions led to different answers to PIT2s questions.

Precisely - the first thing in any debate is to agree the meanings of the fundamental terms being used in a debate. There is not much point in moving beyond that if agreement cannot be reached on the meanings of terms.

Best Regards

 

[PIT2]

Does the bacterium have a mind?

Possibly, here is an interesting paper from the JCS that deals with the issue (there is plenty talk of bacteria in it too.):

Clearly, the corporeal path by which we can trace the evolution of consciousness can be richly elaborated in terms of the inherent kinetic spontaneity of animate forms. Such elaboration decisively challenges the putative evolutionary notion of an agent as something that ‘does something and then looks to see what moves’. Attention to corporeal matters of fact demonstrates that a bona fide evolutionary account of consciousness begins with surface recognition sensitivity. It thereby acknowledges a meta-corporeal consciousness. It furthermore takes into account the emergence of a diversity of animate forms, showing how surface recognition sensitivity, while mediated by touch, is actually in the service of movement for creatures all the way from bacteria to protists to invertebrate forms to vertebrate ones. It strongly suggests how a form of corporeal consciousness is present in bacteria.36 Indeed, it shows how a bacterium, being an animate form of life, is something first of all that moves and is capable of moving on its own power rather than being always impelled to move from without; it shows further how it is something that feeds, that grows, that changes direction, that, in effect, can stop doing what it is doing and begin doing something else. A bona fide evolutionary account shows how, with the evolution of varied and complex external sensors, a different form of corporeal consciousness is present, and how, with the evolution of internal sensors from external ones, a still different form of corporeal consciousness is present. It shows how each of these forms of corporeal consciousness is coincident with the evolution of varied and complex animate forms themselves, and equally, how each form of proprioception that evolved, from the most rudimentary to the most complex of kinesthetic systems, is coincident with particular forms of life. It shows all this by paying attention to corporeal matters of fact and by presenting concrete sensory-kinetic analyses.
http://www.imprint.co.uk/sheet.htm

As for the chesscomputer being interpreted to have a goal: i think this is the case (that the interpretation is only in our minds). But don't u think that if the chesscomputer were able to interpret goals by itself (as opposed to another agent), it would result in intelligent behaviour? The chess game may be ruined though.

 

[moving finger]

Possibly, here is an interesting paper from the JCS that deals with the issue (there is plenty talk of bacteria in it too.):

sorry, but I couldn't stop laughing at the pretentiously flowery language used in that quote! It reads more like poetry or an art-form than descriptive text. What a load of (imho) BS.

As for the chesscomputer being interpreted to have a goal: i think this is the case (that the interpretation is only in our minds). But don't u think that if the chesscomputer were able to interpret goals by itself (as opposed to another agent), it would result in intelligent behaviour?

Sure - but what does this have to do with consciousness?

Best Regards

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi MF,

I think you may have misunderstood what I have been saying in this thread. When I said that the idea of self, when taken to include such things as self-priming pumps and self-referential statements, is not interesting to me, I did not mean that the discussion in this thread was not interesting. Far from it. I think PIT2 raised an interesting question and I have been interested in all the discussion that followed.

What I meant was that since I think 'self' can be defined in many ways, and different conclusions can be drawn from the different definitions (just as is the case for definitions of any words), I have no problem accepting PIT2's definition. As far as I am concerned, there is no debate here. At least neither you nor PIT2 has said anything concerning self with which I disagree.

However, as I tried to point out, I think the fundamental disagreement between you and me is over the definition, or the very notion of, the term 'concept'. On that issue, I would very much like to have a debate with you. That was the purpose of my introducing a new thread.

I hope to see you over there.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[PIT2]

sorry, but I couldn't stop laughing at the pretentiously flowery language used in that quote! It reads more like poetry or an art-form than descriptive text. What a load of (imho) BS.

Some of the flowery words are remnants of earlier sections, but the thing is funny to read, like the part where he discusses some of dennetts ideas. I agree with the general idea of the paper though.

Sure - but what does this have to do with consciousness?

Well... i thought consciousness would be needed for something to make an interpretation. But apparently not? What role do u think consciousness has in organisms?

 

[moving finger]

Some of the flowery words are remnants of earlier sections, but the thing is funny to read, like the part where he discusses some of dennetts ideas. I agree with the general idea of the paper though.

We'll have to agree to disagree here.

Well... i thought consciousness would be needed for something to make an interpretation. But apparently not? What role do u think consciousness has in organisms?

Role? In the sense of the "purpose" of consciousness (ie why do some agents possesses it and some not)?

I agree that interpretation is one of the roles of consciousness, but it does not follow from this that everything which interprets is therefore conscious. Just as "transporting passengers" is one of the roles of a car, but it does not follow that everything which transports passengers is therefore a car.

I agree with Dennett on this. The development of consciousness may simply be a competitive evolutionary mechanism that enables us to develop and test ideas (hypotheses) about what might be going on in the minds of others. If you are going to think about my thinking, then I need to start thinking about your thinking to stay even. When communication (of any form) arises in a species, pure honesty may not always be the best policy (from a survival perspective) since it will be all too easily exploitable by one’s competitors. In the arms race of “producing future” you have a tremendous advantage if you can produce more and better future about your competitor than he can produce about you, so it is always an advantage to keep one’s own control systems inscrutable. Unpredictability is a fine protective feature, but must be spent wisely. Consciousness enables us to do this very effectively.

Best Regards