# The possible vs the actual

1. Oct 24, 2009

### apeiron

Many of the debates on this forum boil down to the relation between the possible and the actual. Are they the same size or is the realm of the possible larger than the realm of the actual?

We see this in arguments over whether maths (taken as a map of all possible worlds) is larger than all actual worlds. So does math = reality or is math > reality?

The same fundamental question arises with the many world interpretations of quantum theory, with multiverse approaches to cosmology, and with information theoretic approaches generally (as in Turing and Tegmark).

1) So is anything that is possible, also going to be actual? Why?

2) Or is there always going to be more that is possible than can be actual? Why.

3) The third choice of course is more things are actual than are possible. That at least seems a safe one to reject.

2. Oct 24, 2009

### vectorcube

You need to be more clear:

Definitions:

Actual things := things that exist. Examples are tables, cars, plants etc.

Possible things := Things that are logically possible: Examples are "golden mountain", tables, chairs, plants etc.

Observations:
Note that actual things actually form a subset of all possible things.

Non-actualist: The claim is that there are non-actual, possible things.

actualist : The claim is that there are only actual things. There are no possible things.

David Lewis on the classical debate:

Any many others( robert nozick, tagmark, lewis) say the following: All possible things are actual.

Last edited: Oct 24, 2009
3. Oct 24, 2009

### vectorcube

1) you are asking if lewis  s thesis is right( see post 2). Lewis gave the reason that it is more fruthful to accept his thesis becuase of the reduction of modal notions( necessities, and possibilities).

2) This is just the non-actualist view( see post 2). It is completely not relevent to lewis  s thesis.

3) sure.

Last edited: Oct 24, 2009
4. Oct 24, 2009

### apeiron

So possible > actual according to this view.

And possibility then seems to be aligned with the idea of generality. The familiar dichotomy of particulars and universals. The universal harbours more possibility.

Agreed this feels the right way to go. But then we get into the difficulty of what is the set of all possible *general things*? Or Plato's realm of form in which there is one perfect example of every possible thing.

So is a particular table a subset of the general notion of tableness? And is tableness really a "general entity" or instead a "general organisation"? Is it in fact really a particular example of the even more abstract category of "furniture". And if we can keep on generalising our generals to move ever further up this chain, where will we arrive? Some single all encompassing form? If not, why not?

So your attempts here to define the question in terms of a process of generalisation, and being about thingness, are already running into serious problems.

You need now to define what you mean by things and by the process of generalisation.

Thanks for the link but was there some particular position you want to draw attention to here? Which variety of actualism for a start?

Anyway, the general actualist position would be possible = actual. And it founded on the (mis)assumption that the actual is all about substance. Only that which is concrete and material can claim existence. So aliens in other possible worlds are non-concrete particulars and so not actually possible. The immaterial idea does not qualify as being part of what gets counted.

Again this raises the status of forms and generalisations. Aliens are a generalisation (a generalised notion of lifeforms). So why would we not keep generalising further? How can we resolve this debate using aliens in other worlds as our substantive argument?

In fact, even "possible worlds" is smuggling in a substance based ontology. It appeals to material existence rather than formal.

The actualist camp is attempting to define possibilia in terms of particular objects (or lightly generalised objects). But have we yet ruled out form - organisation, relationships, pattern, purpose, meanings - as what is at least also potential, also a content of possibilia.

This connects with the INUS approach and others that stress the role of context in causality. Could Winston Churchill have been a german? Well, his parents could have moved there and given birth. But would he really have been "Winston Churchill"? Clearly, much of what we think of as the human that exists is really the locus of a particular historical context, a context with particular constraints.

So we do then have to be able to generalise the notion of context to answer questions about what is part of the possible. Is the space of possible contexts > or = to the space of actual contexts?

Difficulties proliferate. And the actualist vs non-actualist reference frame of discussion does not properly define the process of generalisation (how it is done, where it leads), nor does it pay enough attention to the issue of contexts (global constraints) or the putative actual existence of form.

5. Oct 24, 2009

### apeiron

If your choice is to defend Lewis, then you will have to supply arguments about how contexts and forms can also be reduced.

And are you thinking that reduction = generalisation? Do you view the terms synonymously?

6. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

what is > mean?

I will not comment about universals, because this outside the topic.

No comment( outside topic).

Nothing i said said here are controversial. They are a list of definitions you can find at the stanford link. I have no idea why you start talking about universal, particular, and "general things". You need to focus, or i cannot talk to you.

No. They are just a list of definitions & classical positions from the stanford link.

How is aliens in other possible world not concrete if those are concrete possible worlds?

Why is aliens a generalization? If tomorrow, people found life on mars, then we would say these life-form are aliens. Why would we called them generalization?

What is your definition of possible worlds? Are they concrete, or abstract?

Give me an example for "meaning".

What is this "INUS approach"?

I have no idea what you mean by " space of possible contexts".

I will say that what is actual is a subset of what is possible, where possible and actual is defined in post 2.
What do you mean by "process of generalization", and "putative actual existence of form"?

7. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

Lewis say that by accepting concrete possible worlds in to are ontology, we can explain "possiblities", and "necessities" in terms of quantifications over possible worlds.

Do you know anything about modal logic?

Reduction, or reductive is just a fancy way of saying " explain away"

8. Oct 25, 2009

### apeiron

Vectorcube, clearly you have no interest in serious discussion so perhaps just leave it to others.

9. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

In fact i am serious all along. I keep technical language to a minimum just so that i can have a decent discussion with a non-specialist.

As you can see. In all my replies to you, I have only asked for you to be clear, focus, and give examples. I am not used to unfocus discussions. Think of how you would write a book in analytic philosophy, or math. That is the amount of rigor i expect from you, or else, you cannot benefit me in anyway.

If i wrong you in anyway, then i apologize.

10. Oct 25, 2009

### apeiron

I forgot to mention the superstring landscape as another possible vs actual issue in physics. So this is a very live problem.

People are polarised as to whether to expect the space of the possible to be immensely larger than the space of the actual, or whether to think all that is possible will actually, somewhere, have to happen.

In QM, this leads to rival interpretations like decoherence vs many worlds. In cosmology. it becomes multiverses vs the big bang as a single creation event.

Modal logic was a recent rather narrow discourse on the dichotomy of possibility~necessity and instructive mainly in its failures.

So, again, does the space of the possible = that of the actual, or is it >? Arguments rather than links please.

(Note the mysterious symbol > stands for "greater than" - as any handy eight-year-old math scholar will be able to tell you).

11. Oct 25, 2009

### Fra

I agree with this characteriztion of most discussions so far. I'll back later with my personal views on this, I have a particular view to this, that introduces a notion of "actual possibility" and this is the tools that should have shave off non-physical possibilities from physical models.

I'll try to explain later.

Like you mention already with string theory, there seems to be something pathological about the situation when we basically drown in the set of possibilities. This also connects to computability, inferrability and representation capacity.

The thing that isn't distinguished between in physics, in particular string theory to take an example is that what's possible is RELATIVE. What possible to imagine for a human is quite different that what's physically inferrable between say two subatomic systems. Once this is acknowledged, I think alot of the mathematical redundancy we have can be reduced, and this makes our navigation in hypothesis space far more rational.

/Fredrik

12. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

There are many errors here that i would not want to comment. Just want to say that the string landscape, QM worlds are not at all non-actual possible worlds. If they are true, then they are part of the actual world.

Well, that is lewis  s thesis, and i gave you one of his reason. Namely, you can have a reductive explanation for primitive modality.

If don t know, then you merely need to ask.

Are you sure it does not mean material implication? :surprised

Last edited: Oct 25, 2009
13. Oct 25, 2009

### Fra

Mmm... I wonder if we are misunderstanding each other here. We are in the philosophy forum, but the philosophy forum in the physicsfourms - so at least I am under the impression that we aren't discussing some pure philosophy or history of philosohpy in general, I thought we were discussing how this can be constructive specifically in the philosophy of science, and physics in particular.

Ie. the fundamental problem is that of learning about our world, a strategy for finding the best predictive engine for inferring the future based on the present, etc.

There are open questions here, this is why to a certain extent the discussion unavoidably are somewhat fuzzy. Different research programs can often be characterized by somewhat different positions on the questions we are discussing here. The string landscape is a good, relevant example IMHO.

/Fredrik

14. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

Well, i made comments for that. The multiverse if true are not possible, non-actual things, but an actual thing.

15. Oct 25, 2009

### apeiron

Statements are not arguments.

16. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

Ok.

1) If multiverse is real, then the multiverse is actual( by definition).

2) If multiverse is real, then it is logically possible, thus Possible( definition).

3) By 1 & 2, if the multiverse is real, then it is possible, and actual.

4) But anything is both actual and possible are part of the actual world.

5) 3 and 4 suggest that the multiverse is part of the actual world.

17. Oct 25, 2009

### apeiron

Now what happens when you run string landscapes in this argument?

18. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

The string landscapes is a multiverse if it is real. It would also part of the actual world. Many people that do not know **** about the matter often confuse multiverse in physics with the possible worlds in modal realism. They think it is the same thing. It is interesting, because if the string landscape is true, then it would only be part of the actual world. Modal realism is a much more general thesis than the multiverse think up by physicists.

19. Oct 25, 2009

Apeiron – I don’t think you’ve gotten to the basic ontological issue here. The problem here isn’t form vs substance – it’s whether possibility should be conceived from the beginning in terms of what’s actual.

“Actual” essentially means, what’s given – i.e. what we can take for granted in the world. And from this we can develop various notions of possibility, i.e. what’s not actually given, in reality, but might in some sense be given... logically, or in the future, or in a realm of pure mathematical form, or an alternative cosmos, etc.

There’s nothing wrong with that, but I don’t think we’ll find much that’s interesting to explore down this well-trodden path... because the key issue is not being considered. It’s already been implicitly resolved in favor of what’s given... whether "givenness" is conceived as form or material substance, etc.

We only get to the real issue of possibility when we ask how things are “given” – where does “what’s actual” come from? As you know, the traditional idea – “causality” in its many forms – is that what’s given comes from something that was given previously (“initial conditions”), and on what’s ultimately given (e.g. “laws of physics” or “principles of logic”). The given actuality is taken as fundamental, and possibility as merely a derivative notion.

Now it’s easy to assume that something must just be “given” at the bottom of things – i.e. there must be something we just have to take for granted. Back to the earliest philosophers, the goal of philosophy and science has always been to identify this ultimately given reality. But going almost as far back, in our tradition, is the sense that there’s something else going on, in the dynamics of how things come into being, that shouldn’t be taken for granted.

I know you are very alive to this undercurrent in the intellectual tradition – at least, that’s how I understand your going back to Anaximander’s apeiron and your description of what’s ultimately given as “vagueness” or “pure potentiality”, in other threads. To me, this kind of language points to a deep challenge that philosophy has yet to meet. Essentially, we want to describe a world in which how things become possible is at least as fundamental as what they actually are, as given fact.

Now we already have, in evolutionary biology, a well-established science that works in these terms. Practically speaking, in biology “causation” has been entirely replaced by the notion of the conditions under which random accident can give rise to complex structure. And there are many indications that a similar approach is needed in physics and cosmology. But IMHO, philosophy has lagged behind. Heidegger made a strong beginning in Being and Time, but since then there’s been little or no progress toward an ontology in which the structure of possibility plays a fundamental role.

You’ve been eloquent in other threads on the “anticipatory” nature of conscious awareness – which was also a central theme in Being and Time. We can be conscious of “what’s actually there” in the world around us, because our brains are constantly projecting “what might be there” in advance. So in a sense, our deepest layer of experience is “made of” possibility – as opposed to the traditional data-processing model of awareness.

I think of existence as a dialectic between possibility and actuality, each with their own distinct structures. Things can only become actual in a context of relationships that makes that actuality possible; and then what they actually become makes new relationship-contexts possible. “Possibility” in this sense is very different from “logical” possibility – it’s a fundamental aspect of the complex concreteness of what happens in this world as it evolves.

20. Oct 25, 2009

### vectorcube

What has this to do with logical possibilities?

Not ture. Something might be a priori, but false, because it is a posteriori necessary true.
If you don` t understand, then you merely need to ask.