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The so-called "Darwinian model" of free will
See http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction
The above link introduces the "Darwinian model", which purports to show how indeterminacy can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with free will.
I prefer to call this model the Accidental model, rather than the Darwinian model (for reasons that will become clear later). With all due respect, I feel that calling it the Darwinian model is insulting to Darwin (imho I do not believe Charles Darwin would have wanted to be associated with this model).
The main problem with most “indeterminacy” models of “free will” decision-making is that introducing indeterminacy arbitrarily into the decision-making process leads not to “free will”, but to capricious (irrational) behaviour. In the Accidental model, an attempt is made to remove the capriciousness without destroying the indeterminacy. This is done by having a 2-stage decision-making process. In the first stage a “random idea generator” (hereafter RIG) creates multiple alternate ideas according to an indeterministic process (this is the source of indeterminacy); in the second stage a “sensible idea selector” (hereafter SIS) examines the various alternate ideas created by the prior indeterministic stage, and rationally (and deterministically) selects one of the ideas for action.
This model may seem superficially to provide a means of generating “free will”. There is a random element (the RIG) combined with a deterministic element (the SIS). The model is thus claimed to be both indeterministic and yet not capricious (it makes, up to a point, rational choices). But does it endow “free will”?
Firstly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated the capriciousness. If the RIG generates too FEW alternate ideas as input to the SIS, then the system will still appear to behave capriciously (the SIS will have insufficient choices for rational action because of the limited number of ideas generated by the RIG, hence overall behaviour will be dictated by the RIG). Therefore the RIG needs to generate a reasonable number of alternate ideas for each decision.
Secondly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated determinism. If the RIG generates too MANY alternatives as input to the SIS, then the system’s behaviour will start to be dominated by the SIS, which operates deterministically. Therefore the RIG needs to generate not too many alternate ideas for each decision.
Can we say whether this model actually endows “free will”?
I cannot answer that question definitively without making an assumption on the definition of “free will”, and that is a notoriously difficult thing to do (I do not agree that the definition provided in the above link is rigorous enough).
In the absence of an agreed definition of free will, what I CAN do is both (1) to show how this model applies to “machines” and (2) to examine some of the strange consequences (which I have chosen to call flaws) of the Accidental model.
1 – Applying the Accidental model to machines
Imagine that we have a deterministic computer-based decision making machine (this should not be difficult, our present-day lives are surrounded by such machines, I am typing on one now).
We now add to this machine a “random idea generator” which generates random ideas based on a truly indeterministic process (possibly powered by some quantum-based device). The RIG generates alternate ideas for action, inputs these ideas to the computer, and the computer then decides which of these ideas to turn into action. The computer in this case is performing the role of the SIS.
Now, IF it is true that the Accidental model endows “free will”, THEN it also follows that the machine we have just created has “free will”.
Would you agree that this simple machine has “free will”?
If not, why not?
2 – Flaws in the Accidental model
Some may consider the implication that “free will” is endowed upon the simple machine described above a “flaw” in the Accidental model. I certainly do.
Let us take a closer look at some other fundamental flaws in this model.
Applying the Accidental model to a human subject, let us take a very simple “free will” decision process as an example, and work through exactly how the Accidental model is supposed to operate.
The precise nature of the decision is not important, but let us assume that seen from a totally objective perspective the human agent has a total of 5 (and no more than 5) different alternate courses of action for this particular decision. We can label these 5 different courses of action as A, B, C, D and E.
We need a benchmark against which to measure the Accidental model. Let us define the “Ideal Deterministic model” (ID model) as a world where ALL possible courses of action (and not just a selected number of the possible courses of action) are offered up to the SIS for consideration, and the SIS operates in the same manner as before, ie it selects the most rational course of action. The SIS is deterministic, therefore clearly each time we run the ID model we will get the same results from the same starting point. In each case, the ID model will select the most rational course of action from ALL possible courses of action (and not just a select few possible courses of action).
Let us also suppose that we can “interrogate” the agent after each decision, to ask it questions relating to that decision. Now we take our simplistic scenario, where we have a total of 5 possible courses of action.
Applying the ID model to our scenario, we find (let us say) that the SIS ranks these alternate courses in terms of rationality in the order E>D>C>B>A (where the SIS determines that E is the most rational course of action, and A the least). In this case, the model will always (deterministically) select E as the chosen course of action. Advocates of the Accidental model would clearly claim that the ID model does not exhibit any free will.
(Note the actual number of possible courses of action is not important – it could be 5, 50, 500 or 5,000 – the logic stays the same.)
Now let us take the same scenario, and apply the Accidental model. In this case, the RIG throws up a limited number of possible alternate solutions. Since there are a maximum of 5 possible solutions, the RIG clearly must throw up less than 5 possible solutions. Let us say that we run the model once and it throws up the 3 solutions C, D and E. The SIS works as before, and ranks these as before in the order E>D>C. In this case the agent chooses E as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent and ask it why it chose “E” as the best course of action, it will naturally say “well I considered three possible courses C, D and E, and E seemed the most rational course to me”. Nothing wrong with the logic there at all.
Now run the Accidental model again, and we see that the RIG throws up a different combination of possible solutions, let us say A, B and C. Again the SIS ranks these in order of preference C>B>A, and the agent chooses C as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent this time and ask it why it chose “C” as the best course of action, it will probably say “well I considered three possible courses A, B and C, and C seemed the most rational course to me”. Again nothing wrong with that logic in isolation.
If we now ask it “but in fact there is rationally an even better course of action, which is E. Why did you not choose E as a course of action” it will probably respond “ummmmm, oh well, I just never considered E as a possibility!”
The question I have at this point is : Is this what we consider to be free will? To be able to choose a non-optimum solution simply because such a choice is non-deterministic (which is what the Accidental model boils down to)?
We can run the Accidental model many times, and we will find that it does not behave predictably, since it chooses different courses of action depending upon the random output of the RIG. This is exactly what is supposed to happen, and advocates of this model will claim that it is precisely this type of indeterminism which endows the agent with free will...
Does anyone out there genuinely believe that this (the behaviour of the Accidental model) is what humans mean when they speak of human free will?
The Accidental (or Darwinian) model clearly therefore does not endow free will, and I have yet to see an explanation of how indeterminacy in any form can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with anything that could be called free will... does anyone know of a better model?
MF
See http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html#introduction
The above link introduces the "Darwinian model", which purports to show how indeterminacy can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with free will.
I prefer to call this model the Accidental model, rather than the Darwinian model (for reasons that will become clear later). With all due respect, I feel that calling it the Darwinian model is insulting to Darwin (imho I do not believe Charles Darwin would have wanted to be associated with this model).
The main problem with most “indeterminacy” models of “free will” decision-making is that introducing indeterminacy arbitrarily into the decision-making process leads not to “free will”, but to capricious (irrational) behaviour. In the Accidental model, an attempt is made to remove the capriciousness without destroying the indeterminacy. This is done by having a 2-stage decision-making process. In the first stage a “random idea generator” (hereafter RIG) creates multiple alternate ideas according to an indeterministic process (this is the source of indeterminacy); in the second stage a “sensible idea selector” (hereafter SIS) examines the various alternate ideas created by the prior indeterministic stage, and rationally (and deterministically) selects one of the ideas for action.
This model may seem superficially to provide a means of generating “free will”. There is a random element (the RIG) combined with a deterministic element (the SIS). The model is thus claimed to be both indeterministic and yet not capricious (it makes, up to a point, rational choices). But does it endow “free will”?
Firstly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated the capriciousness. If the RIG generates too FEW alternate ideas as input to the SIS, then the system will still appear to behave capriciously (the SIS will have insufficient choices for rational action because of the limited number of ideas generated by the RIG, hence overall behaviour will be dictated by the RIG). Therefore the RIG needs to generate a reasonable number of alternate ideas for each decision.
Secondly we need to ask whether or not we have eliminated determinism. If the RIG generates too MANY alternatives as input to the SIS, then the system’s behaviour will start to be dominated by the SIS, which operates deterministically. Therefore the RIG needs to generate not too many alternate ideas for each decision.
Can we say whether this model actually endows “free will”?
I cannot answer that question definitively without making an assumption on the definition of “free will”, and that is a notoriously difficult thing to do (I do not agree that the definition provided in the above link is rigorous enough).
In the absence of an agreed definition of free will, what I CAN do is both (1) to show how this model applies to “machines” and (2) to examine some of the strange consequences (which I have chosen to call flaws) of the Accidental model.
1 – Applying the Accidental model to machines
Imagine that we have a deterministic computer-based decision making machine (this should not be difficult, our present-day lives are surrounded by such machines, I am typing on one now).
We now add to this machine a “random idea generator” which generates random ideas based on a truly indeterministic process (possibly powered by some quantum-based device). The RIG generates alternate ideas for action, inputs these ideas to the computer, and the computer then decides which of these ideas to turn into action. The computer in this case is performing the role of the SIS.
Now, IF it is true that the Accidental model endows “free will”, THEN it also follows that the machine we have just created has “free will”.
Would you agree that this simple machine has “free will”?
If not, why not?
2 – Flaws in the Accidental model
Some may consider the implication that “free will” is endowed upon the simple machine described above a “flaw” in the Accidental model. I certainly do.
Let us take a closer look at some other fundamental flaws in this model.
Applying the Accidental model to a human subject, let us take a very simple “free will” decision process as an example, and work through exactly how the Accidental model is supposed to operate.
The precise nature of the decision is not important, but let us assume that seen from a totally objective perspective the human agent has a total of 5 (and no more than 5) different alternate courses of action for this particular decision. We can label these 5 different courses of action as A, B, C, D and E.
We need a benchmark against which to measure the Accidental model. Let us define the “Ideal Deterministic model” (ID model) as a world where ALL possible courses of action (and not just a selected number of the possible courses of action) are offered up to the SIS for consideration, and the SIS operates in the same manner as before, ie it selects the most rational course of action. The SIS is deterministic, therefore clearly each time we run the ID model we will get the same results from the same starting point. In each case, the ID model will select the most rational course of action from ALL possible courses of action (and not just a select few possible courses of action).
Let us also suppose that we can “interrogate” the agent after each decision, to ask it questions relating to that decision. Now we take our simplistic scenario, where we have a total of 5 possible courses of action.
Applying the ID model to our scenario, we find (let us say) that the SIS ranks these alternate courses in terms of rationality in the order E>D>C>B>A (where the SIS determines that E is the most rational course of action, and A the least). In this case, the model will always (deterministically) select E as the chosen course of action. Advocates of the Accidental model would clearly claim that the ID model does not exhibit any free will.
(Note the actual number of possible courses of action is not important – it could be 5, 50, 500 or 5,000 – the logic stays the same.)
Now let us take the same scenario, and apply the Accidental model. In this case, the RIG throws up a limited number of possible alternate solutions. Since there are a maximum of 5 possible solutions, the RIG clearly must throw up less than 5 possible solutions. Let us say that we run the model once and it throws up the 3 solutions C, D and E. The SIS works as before, and ranks these as before in the order E>D>C. In this case the agent chooses E as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent and ask it why it chose “E” as the best course of action, it will naturally say “well I considered three possible courses C, D and E, and E seemed the most rational course to me”. Nothing wrong with the logic there at all.
Now run the Accidental model again, and we see that the RIG throws up a different combination of possible solutions, let us say A, B and C. Again the SIS ranks these in order of preference C>B>A, and the agent chooses C as the course of action. When we interrogate the agent this time and ask it why it chose “C” as the best course of action, it will probably say “well I considered three possible courses A, B and C, and C seemed the most rational course to me”. Again nothing wrong with that logic in isolation.
If we now ask it “but in fact there is rationally an even better course of action, which is E. Why did you not choose E as a course of action” it will probably respond “ummmmm, oh well, I just never considered E as a possibility!”
The question I have at this point is : Is this what we consider to be free will? To be able to choose a non-optimum solution simply because such a choice is non-deterministic (which is what the Accidental model boils down to)?
We can run the Accidental model many times, and we will find that it does not behave predictably, since it chooses different courses of action depending upon the random output of the RIG. This is exactly what is supposed to happen, and advocates of this model will claim that it is precisely this type of indeterminism which endows the agent with free will...
Does anyone out there genuinely believe that this (the behaviour of the Accidental model) is what humans mean when they speak of human free will?
The Accidental (or Darwinian) model clearly therefore does not endow free will, and I have yet to see an explanation of how indeterminacy in any form can endow an otherwise deterministic agent with anything that could be called free will... does anyone know of a better model?
MF
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