There is an emergent property

In summary, the speaker discusses the changes in the forum since their last visit and explains an emergent property related to consciousness that may explain why it is not perfectly reducible. They mention that this property has been recognized by scientists and philosophers and argue against the concept of "subjective experience" as it has a circular definition and does not have any real meaning. They also mention their own theories on consciousness and how they satisfy certain conditions, but do not explain the concept of "subjective experience".
  • #1
Mentat
3,960
3
Wow, this forum's changed a lot since the last time I logged-on...

Anyway, since I may not be able to get back on the Forums again, I wanted to make sure that I explained something which I only sort of glossed over in previous threads, and which probably would have been useful in those threads, had it been further developed.

You see, while I spent so much time showing that the supposed emergent property of "subjective experience" doesn't exist (indeed, it's only definition is blatantly circular, and so any argument built from it will inevitably be a straw-man), I forgot to emphasize that there is an emergent property related to consciousness, which might (just maybe) explain why it does not appear to be perfectly reducible. The emergent property, btw, is nothing more than a master algorithm.

An algorithm describes a relationship of many parts in terms of one master "plan" of sorts, that the many parts are following (though, usually, the parts are not so much obeying a "plan" as the "plan" is being deduced from the behavior of the parts). Anyway, there are billions (perhaps trillions) of individual processes occurring between the individual units of thought, in the neocortex, and so it would be impossible to comprehend each individual action. Instead, the entire process is looked at, and the emergent algorithm is quantified as it's own entity (going by such names as "subjective experience" and simply "consciousness").

Because the algorithm describes the behavior of all or many of the parts, in a pattern that they form together, it is not a property of any of the individual parts, giving the sense of irreducibility.

Anyway, I figured I should state plainly what I had already implied sporadically. You see, this emergent (and irreducible) property has indeed been recognized by the scientists that I so often quote (Edelman, Tononi, Calvin, Dennett, etc). Dennett was referring to it when he created the intentional stance. Calvin and Edelman (along with all the other "Selectionist" scientists) are reducing the algorithm to more fundamental patterns, by relating it to a Darwinian process.

The recognition that algorithmic structures are often treated as emergent, separate, properties, is also helpful in other areas of philosophy, btw. For example: life. A thing is alive if it performs the functions of a living thing, but none of those function (alone) is "living" only the collection thereof, and the subsequent algorithm describing their behavior.
 
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  • #2
Apparently you are not coming back, but I'd really like to see you explain how you can deny the existence of subjective experience, and still be able to account for the existence of illusions and hallucinations. That would be interesting.
 
  • #3
confutatis said:
Apparently you are not coming back...

As much as I'd like to, it's becoming increasingly difficult. Perhaps I will be able to resolve it, though, as I've found a new approach to the problem. Anyway, inspite of my typical absence, know that I am trying to come back.

...but I'd really like to see you explain how you can deny the existence of subjective experience, and still be able to account for the existence of illusions and hallucinations. That would be interesting.

Did you happen to look through some of the older threads that I started (in which hypnagogue, Fliption, and Canute argued for a more Chalmerean approach ("Chalmerean" is my word for the philosophy of Chalmers), while I was trying to expound on a more Dennetian approach (philosophy of Dan Dennett). Anyway, if you haven't looked through those, I suggest that you do, but I will try to explain the basics here:

My problem with the typical approach is that, no matter how good a job a scientist or philosopher does at explaining all the mechanisms of consciousness, Chalmers and his followers can always reintroduce this concept of "subjective experience" and say that they are not accounting for it. Well, I showed (perhaps not satisfactorily, but exhaustively) that "subjective experience" has no real definition. Rather, it does have a definition, but its definition is plainly circular, and thus has no substance (meaning that any argument built on the assumption that it even exists will inevitably be a straw-man).

Instead of invoking this emergent property of "subjective experience" - which has no meaning, to my mind - I like the scientific, reductionist, approach, which explains all that needs explaining within the confines of the Scientific Method.

A scientific theory of consciousness should include:
1) The most discreet unit of consciousness.
2) The specific behaviors required for computation of external stimuli.
3) The specific behaviors required for memorization and recall of said stimuli.
4) The behaviors which allow for creativity and innovation.
5) The behaviors which allow for the compactification of this discreet, separate, information (for the purpose of easy recall) such that the illusion of a coherent, singular, thought may be processed.

The theories that I've proposed (not of my own originality, but that of respected scientists and philosophers of the mind, put together into a singular understanding (by myself) which, at least, makes it clear that consciousness is explainable, if not explained) do indeed satisfy these conditions. The only condition I know of that they do not satisfy is that of explaining "subjective experience", but I don't think they should have to since "subjective experience" (defined as it is) has no more meaning than the letters that compose it.
 
  • #4
Mentat said:
My problem with the typical approach is that, no matter how good a job a scientist or philosopher does at explaining all the mechanisms of consciousness, Chalmers and his followers can always reintroduce this concept of "subjective experience" and say that they are not accounting for it.

But you don't solve that problem by denying that subjective experience exists. That would make people think you are a zombie.

Well, I showed (perhaps not satisfactorily, but exhaustively) that "subjective experience" has no real definition. Rather, it does have a definition, but its definition is plainly circular, and thus has no substance (meaning that any argument built on the assumption that it even exists will inevitably be a straw-man).

But that is simply Chalmers' argument in disguise. You may not recognize the similarity but it is there. What Chalmers says is that it's perfectly possible to account for conscious behaviour without invoking subjective experience. The only difference between Chalmers and Dennett is whether experience exists or not. Both agree that it can't be explained.

Instead of invoking this emergent property of "subjective experience" - which has no meaning, to my mind [...]

When you say "subjective experience" has no meaning, you are saying it's impossible to make true statements about it. I definitely don't think that is the case. It is true that hallucinations exist. How can you define hallucinations without invoking the concept of subjective experience?

A scientific theory of consciousness should include:
1) The most discreet unit of consciousness.
2) The specific behaviors required for computation of external stimuli.
3) The specific behaviors required for memorization and recall of said stimuli.
4) The behaviors which allow for creativity and innovation.
5) The behaviors which allow for the compactification of this discreet, separate, information (for the purpose of easy recall) such that the illusion of a coherent, singular, thought may be processed.

I agree with that, but the truth is that doing so amounts to nothing but a redefinition of what consciousness is. Explaining subjective experience is a completely different story, except that you need to understand consciousness - in a scientific manner - before you can understand what experience is.

The theories that I've proposed (not of my own originality, but that of respected scientists and philosophers of the mind, put together into a singular understanding (by myself) which, at least, makes it clear that consciousness is explainable, if not explained) do indeed satisfy these conditions. The only condition I know of that they do not satisfy is that of explaining "subjective experience", but I don't think they should have to since "subjective experience" (defined as it is) has no more meaning than the letters that compose it.

I don't disagree that the definition of 'subjective experience' is meaningless if it is strongly associated with consciousness. But I don't agree that you can get rid of the problem of explaining subjective experience by denying it exists.
 
  • #5
Wow confutatsis. Sometimes you amaze me. Nice posts.

Mentat,

I liked reading your first post. You say you left this out of your past discussions but honestly I remember you denying the existence of emergent properties completely. Even when I tried to say that it was simply useful to refer to these properties with a single word and there wasn't necessarily any real "thing" existing, you insisted that assigning a word to it implied it existed as a separate thing. This post of yours was all I was trying to acknowledge. So I was glad to read this post from you. I agree with this and it only makes sense that the view that consciousness, subjective experience, life etc is the result of millions of complex parts should be a focal point for science.

As I'm sure you know, I don't agree with your comments from there. I understand your point of view but the only way it stands up is if we assume you're a zombie. As Confutatis has astutely pointed out. This is simply another example of a reductionist trying to use the very hard problem of consciousness to undermine itself. The only way this can work is if your conclusion is built into your premises. You assume because science can't define it, then it doesn't exists. When the whole issue is that we know it exists and we can't scientifically define it. To deny the existence of something, as if you are a zombie, when you likely are not a zombie, just doesn't seem to be in the spirit of scientific inquiry. Even though it may be against the scientific method.
 
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  • #6
master algorithm

Hey Mentat, where you have you been besides, the middle of nowhere? :smile:

I like your master algorithm, it sound like SAS. You have never mentioned this before, or have I missed one of your posts. You seem to be evolving. Is it my perception or are you prerparing to change your worldview.
 
  • #7
confutatis said:
But you don't solve that problem by denying that subjective experience exists. That would make people think you are a zombie.

That's exactly what everyone else has said here, and (no offense) it really makes me wonder if they're really listening to what I'm saying.

You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman).

But that is simply Chalmers' argument in disguise. You may not recognize the similarity but it is there. What Chalmers says is that it's perfectly possible to account for conscious behaviour without invoking subjective experience. The only difference between Chalmers and Dennett is whether experience exists or not. Both agree that it can't be explained.

Right. I like Dennett's approach better simply because he doesn't invoke the use of any terms that are not logically definable.

When you say "subjective experience" has no meaning, you are saying it's impossible to make true statements about it. I definitely don't think that is the case. It is true that hallucinations exist. How can you define hallucinations without invoking the concept of subjective experience?

Dennett devoted the first chapter (or, rather, the chapter before the first) of his book, Consciousness Explained, to explaining how hallucinations can exist. His basic explanation is the re-stimulation of the areas that are usually stimulated by external stimulus. William Calvin goes further, explaining exactly how such re-stimulations occur (it's two do with the actual structure of the pyramidal neurons of the neocortex).

Note, however, that a hallucination is never as potent as the actual experience. You cannot imagine being kicked in the stomache and actually feel pain because of having imagined it. This is, to put it simply, a variance in the algorithm.

I agree with that, but the truth is that doing so amounts to nothing but a redefinition of what consciousness is. Explaining subjective experience is a completely different story, except that you need to understand consciousness - in a scientific manner - before you can understand what experience is.

And, of course, you need to define what "experience" is in the first place, before I can see any reason for explaining it.

As I've told some of the other members before (they've had much the same objections that you have, though I do compliment you on your manner of presenting them), you cannot "re-define" consciousness if you never coherently defined it in the first place. And, if "subjective experience" (a logically undefined (perhaps undefinable) term) is invoked in the current definition, then consciousness was never really defined in the first place.

I don't disagree that the definition of 'subjective experience' is meaningless if it is strongly associated with consciousness. But I don't agree that you can get rid of the problem of explaining subjective experience by denying it exists.

I ask you this then: How can there be a problem explaining something which is meaningless? Is it not better to discard the term that we clearly had no good use for in the first place, and move on without it?

That is why I deny that "it" exists; because that is the logical thing to do when a meaningless term serves no purpose in the discussion...you discard it.
 
  • #8
Fliption said:
Wow confutatsis. Sometimes you amaze me. Nice posts.

Actually, s/he reminded me of you alot. Same argument, with the same eloquence of presentation.

Mentat,

I liked reading your first post. You say you left this out of your past discussions but honestly I remember you denying the existence of emergent properties completely. Even when I tried to say that it was simply useful to refer to these properties with a single word and there wasn't necessarily any real "thing" existing, you insisted that assigning a word to it implied it existed as a separate thing. This post of yours was all I was trying to acknowledge. So I was glad to read this post from you.

I continue to learn, and re-evaluate my thoughts and opinions. As it is, I stress that the only emergent property of the computation of the brain is the resulting algorithm. I also hold (as does Dennett) that the irreducibility of this algorithm (resultant from the fact that none of the parts contain the pattern, only the whole) is what confuses some in their search for an explanation of consciousness.

I agree with this and it only makes sense that the view that consciousness, subjective experience, life etc is the result of millions of complex parts should be a focal point for science.

Yes, that's true. The only real problem I have is the term "subjective experience". It's meaningless (so far as I've seen), and it's constant invocation just blurs the topic.

I mean, seriously, if we were trying to explain some other phenomenon (any other phenomenon) and I kept interjecting that you still didn't account for "xxxxx" (which was a term I couldn't define, relating to a phenomenon I couldn't even prove existed), it would not only be stifling, but frustrating.

As I'm sure you know, I don't agree with your comments from there. I understand your point of view but the only way it stands up is if we assume you're a zombie.

Confutatis mentioned this, as have hypnagogue and Canute in the past. Well, if "zombie" means that I don't have "xxxx", then by all means let me be a zombie. I have no problem with that. In showing that "subjective experience" has no meaning, I should assume we would all arrive at the same conclusion: everyone is a zombie, since no one can display a non-existant quality.

This is simply another example of a reductionist trying to use the very hard problem of consciousness to undermine itself. The only way this can work is if your conclusion is built into your premises. You assume because science can't define it, then it doesn't exists.

Not at all. I assume that since you ("you" refers to you specifically, along with anyone else subscribing to the Chalmerean view) can't define it, it doesn't exist.

When the whole issue is that we know it exists and we can't scientifically define it.

That kind of reasoning, to me, is at the heart of many a failed philosophy. One is reminded of the constant debate of what constitutes "life", and what doesn't. In truth, we should never have come up with the term in the first place, if we hadn't yet seen a specific, definable, phenomenon that was distinctly different from other phenomena.

IOW, why come up with a word, that is supposed to serve as a distinction between one being and another, when we can't define the word, we can't explain it, we can't categorize it, we can't even prove that it exists in the first place. I guess we just like the word.

When looked at in this manner, is it not the logical choice to drop such empty distinctions ("empty", as in devoid of meaning and purpose), and thus spare ourselves the trouble of looking for an explanation for a phenomenon that we made up?
 
  • #9
Rader said:
Hey Mentat, where you have you been besides, the middle of nowhere? :smile:

Hey Rader, long time no see :wink:. I've been around, I've just been barred from going on the PFs most of the time. I hope this situation changes, but I can't guarantee anything.

I like your master algorithm, it sound like SAS. You have never mentioned this before, or have I missed one of your posts. You seem to be evolving. Is it my perception or are you prerparing to change your worldview.

No, I'm not really changing my worldview at all. My current assumption is still Materialism, I've just put more emphasis on the resultant patterns than I had previously.
 
  • #10
BTW, I had mentioned it before...

Just wanted to re-iterate that, despite my staunch opposition to the idea of an "emergent property" that had a separate existence to the physical functions of the brain, I had mentioned the emergent algorithms before. Indeed, I think I used that exact term when making reference to Calvin's theory of hexagons (specifically with regard to the "basins of attraction"...it's been a while since I've discussed it at all, but I do recall mentioning this point).

Man I miss the PFs! I've got all these new ideas that I'd like to tell somebody, but (as always) nobody's going to get what I'm saying. And I don't really have time to post them and actually follow up on them here, so I'm still pretty stuck. :frown:
 
  • #11
Mentat said:
Actually, s/he reminded me of you alot. Same argument, with the same eloquence of presentation.

I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, he/she has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.

I continue to learn, and re-evaluate my thoughts and opinions. As it is, I stress that the only emergent property of the computation of the brain is the resulting algorithm. I also hold (as does Dennett) that the irreducibility of this algorithm (resultant from the fact that none of the parts contain the pattern, only the whole) is what confuses some in their search for an explanation of consciousness.

I can accept all this. The use of such "algorithms" will be useful for discussion purposes if nothing else.

Confutatis mentioned this, as have hypnagogue and Canute in the past. Well, if "zombie" means that I don't have "xxxx", then by all means let me be a zombie. I have no problem with that. In showing that "subjective experience" has no meaning, I should assume we would all arrive at the same conclusion: everyone is a zombie, since no one can display a non-existant quality.

I'll try to explain what I mean and the problem I have with what you are saying. You keep saying that it has no meaning. What does it mean when we say something has no meaning? It means that it cannot be described with words or in terms of other things. Is this not correct? So what is the definition of any fundamental thing? There doesn't seem to be a way to define fundamental things.

The reason that people keep saying that you would have to be a zombie is because the only way any of us know about consciousness is through our own personal experience of it. I experience "being". I assume you do to. There is no other reason, other than personal experience, for anyone to suspect that consciousness exists. There is no evidence of it anywhere in the material world. It cannot be objectively studied in any way. The only way it is known is through personal experience. So if you deny consciousness and subjective experiences then you are denying that you have them, therefore you are a zombie. The inability to know consciousness any other way is exactly the same reason it cannot be scientifically defined. A scientific definition requires it to be reductively described in terms of more fundamental things. So to say there is no hard problem because it can't be defined, is using the hard problem to kill itself. It's a view that basically assumes all things must be reductively described in terms of other things to be known or even exists. If this were true than nothing could ever be fundamental; not to mentioned it assumes it's own conclusion.


Not at all. I assume that since you ("you" refers to you specifically, along with anyone else subscribing to the Chalmerean view) can't define it, it doesn't exist.

I can personally define it. I think I remember you having an issue with "what it's like to be" and I remember it not making a lot of sense to me and seeming a bit like a stretch. I think I responded to it at that time.



That kind of reasoning, to me, is at the heart of many a failed philosophy. One is reminded of the constant debate of what constitutes "life", and what doesn't.

When looked at in this manner, is it not the logical choice to drop such empty distinctions ("empty", as in devoid of meaning and purpose), and thus spare ourselves the trouble of looking for an explanation for a phenomenon that we made up?

But life is a holistic term. It is a category label and therefore requires specific boundaries. Consciousness is a term meant to describe a very specific feature that I experience everyday. I personally know what this thing is and know what the word refers to when I use it. The fact that I can't describe it to a zombie doesn't mean it doesn't exists. The fact that it cannot be defined and explained to a zombie and yet I personally know it exists is the hard problem.

The simplified formula is like this:

ME:
Personally know consciousness exists + Can't define it = Hard problem

ZOMBIE:
No personal knowledge of consciousness + Can't define it = Doesn't exists

So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.
 
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  • #12
Hi Mentat. Sorry, I didn't see your reply to me, I must have missed it during the weekend. I hope you get a chance to read this.

Mentat said:
That's exactly what everyone else has said here, and (no offense) it really makes me wonder if they're really listening to what I'm saying.

Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.

You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"?

What's left to be solved, in my humble opinion, is the question of how a meaningless concept such as "..." can be used for meaningful communication. People refer to their experiences all the time, and they seem to know what they are talking about.

I suppose what you really think is that "..." lacks, and cannot have, a scientific definition. That would make more sense.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman).

With this I wholeheartedly agree.

Dennett devoted the first chapter (or, rather, the chapter before the first) of his book, Consciousness Explained, to explaining how hallucinations can exist. His basic explanation is the re-stimulation of the areas that are usually stimulated by external stimulus. William Calvin goes further, explaining exactly how such re-stimulations occur (it's two do with the actual structure of the pyramidal neurons of the neocortex).

I wasn't really talking about explaining hallucinations, I was talking about defining it. My understanding is that a hallucination is a special kind of subjective experience. I don't think we can define hallucinations in terms of neurology, even though we can certainly explain it in those terms, as you say Dennett did.

So how would you define (as opposed to explain) "hallucination" without invoking the concept of subjective experience? Or "..." as you call it?

Note, however, that a hallucination is never as potent as the actual experience.

Just playing the devil's advocate here: what do you mean by "the actual experience"? I don't understand it; please define your terms :smile:

You cannot imagine being kicked in the stomache and actually feel pain because of having imagined it.

I'm sure you can, but you would never think you imagined it, you would think it was real. Happens to people with mental disorders all the time.

But this is a side issue anyway.

And, of course, you need to define what "experience" is in the first place, before I can see any reason for explaining it.

I'm not so sure about that. Wouldn't an explanation be a definition in itself?

if "subjective experience" (a logically undefined (perhaps undefinable) term) is invoked in the current definition, then consciousness was never really defined in the first place.

No problem here. Subjective experience can't have anything to do with consciuosness, I've been saying the same things myself.

How can there be a problem explaining something which is meaningless? Is it not better to discard the term that we clearly had no good use for in the first place, and move on without it?

Yes, I agree entirely, but a lot of people will beg to differ. They will say "consciousness is subjective experience", and when you explain consciuosness without explaining subjective experience they will say, "ah, but you have not really explained consciousness".

I think the whole problem is the idea that consciousness needs explaining in the first place. That trips everyone up. Instead of "Consciousness Explained", why didn't Dennett call his book "The Brain Explained", or "Human Behaviour Explained"? That, I just don't get.

That is why I deny that "it" exists; because that is the logical thing to do when a meaningless term serves no purpose in the discussion...you discard it.

You remind me of some book I read a few years ago. At some point the author went on a long rant on why the word 'mind' should be dropped from our vocabulary; since science has proved that the brain and the mind were the same thing, we should just use 'brain' instead. That got me thinking how some sentences would sound funny, such as "I need some peace of brain" or "unicorns only exists inside people's brains". Also, can you imagine people going to the theater to watch a movie called "A Beautiful Brain"?

In the end, this issue of consciousness is just a big battle of words. The issue is not what we know about it, but simply what names we should give to the things we know. Much, much ado about nothing.
 
  • #13
confutatis said:
Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.

I'm sure Mentat won't succomb to this attitude. I think this is just an example of how people extrapolate their own motives and attitudes onto everyone else. I personally have had very engaging and enlightning discussions with people here. Discussions that have caused me to go out and buy literature and change my way of thinking. I'm sure this has happened in the reverse direction too.

In the end, this issue of consciousness is just a big battle of words. The issue is not what we know about it, but simply what names we should give to the things we know. Much, much ado about nothing.


Grrrr. :mad: Railroading in progress.
 
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  • #14
Fliption said:
I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, [confutatis] has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.

Just for the sake of clarification, I'm not interested in the issue of consciousness per se. The issue I'm interested in is far more important, but at the same time it is strictly subjective, meaning it's extremely difficult to talk about.

Even though I can't explain what the issue is, I can point at some things an understanding of the issue would allow me to know. It's all about people:

- why do they claim to know things they cannot possibly know?
- why are they often obsessed with ideas that can't possibly matter to anyone?
- why are they mostly silent about ideas that really matter?
- why do they behave as it death was not a certainty?

Yet none of those things is the issue. The issue has to with the fact that people try very hard to hide what they really have in mind. It's not enough for me to go around asking people what their real thoughts are, because what I really want to understand is why they are always trying to hide their real thoughts.

Consciousness just happens to be one particularly useful clue to understanding the issue. Essentially what is being discussed in those threads here has nothing to do with science or consciousness per se; what people really have in mind when they talk about consciousness is death. You know that, I know that, everyone knows that, yet no one ever mentions the word 'death'. Why?

I hope one day to be able to answer that question.

So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.

Just as a side comment, I'm sure you couldn't care less about what consciousness really is; what you really want is to be convinced that you will continue to be conscious after your body dies. That's all there is to it, nothing more, nothing less. That's why you like the idea of a "hard problem". As I said, I used to like that idea myself.

What is still a bit of a mystery to me is why people like Dennett, or Mentat, do not seem to like the idea that their consciousness may survive physical death. It would seem those people are only too happy to cease to exist, which is of course inconsistent with everything else they say, so there's got to be more to it.
 
  • #15
confutatis said:
Even though I can't explain what the issue is, I can point at some things an understanding of the issue would allow me to know. It's all about people:

Can I assume that you're views are summed up in the Marion thread with the link? Somehow I think it doesn't sum up to your view. If not, then I think you still need to work on presenting a coherent summation of it or providing a link that does. That is if you keep insisting on inserting it into the topics like this.
You know that, I know that, everyone knows that, yet no one ever mentions the word 'death'. Why?

I hope one day to be able to answer that question.

I know how you can get an answer. Ask yourself. It is obvious that you are talking about yourself here and once again extrapolating that to everyone else. I can't blame you here. It takes a lot of work not to be egocentric.

Just as a side comment, I'm sure you couldn't care less about what consciousness really is; what you really want is to be convinced that you will continue to be conscious after your body dies. That's all there is to it, nothing more, nothing less. That's why you like the idea of a "hard problem". As I said, I used to like that idea myself.

Once again you are simply extrapolating your own attitudes onto everyone else. To minimize a view that you disagree with to nothing more than a personal desire as if it doesn't have any intellectual merit is somewhat insulting. I personally don't believe I will exists after I die. Regardless of what we conclude about consciousness. I just can't imagine how my personal identity can be anything but my brain. But I have no doubt that is why you liked it. But I will debate the side that makes the most sense to me. Nothing more.

What is still a bit of a mystery to me is why people like Dennett, or Mentat, do not seem to like the idea that their consciousness may survive physical death. It would seem those people are only too happy to cease to exist, which is of course inconsistent with everything else they say, so there's got to be more to it.

This ought to clue you in that I am right. You are extrapolating your own experiences onto everyone else and so it only makes sense that there is a contradiction like Dennett and Mentat. I used to do this too but I have since learned that there are many people who really are just totally different from me. They don't think like me. They don't act like me. Everything is different. Mentat and Dennett take their views because they see intellectual merit in it or they have some other personal agenda(which may or may not have anything to do with death.) The same goes for me and everyone else here.
 
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  • #16
Fliption said:
Can I assume that you're views are summed up in the Marion thread with the link?

I couldn't possibly have put it better than she does. That's why I posted the link. If you understand her point of view on consciousness, then you understand mine.

I personally don't believe I will exists after I die.

Most people don't believe they will exist after they die, including most who claim they do. That's the whole problem.

I just can't imagine how my personal identity can be anything but my brain...

Reality is not constrained by the limited powers of your imagination.

Mentat and Dennett take their views because they see intellectual merit in it or they have some other personal agenda(which may or may not have anything to do with death.)

It's good for you that you know why Mentat and Dennett take their views. I personally don't have much of an idea. And I don't know where is the intellectual merit in denying that the self exists.
 
  • #17
confutatis said:
I couldn't possibly have put it better than she does. That's why I posted the link. If you understand her point of view on consciousness, then you understand mine.

Ok that's good to know. I just thought it left a lot of stuff out, as it never seems to stress the role of language that much. At least not into the absurdities I've seen you post. Although the guy who was remarking in red did seem to go into this direction and this person seemed to think that he disagreed with Marion. This was why I wasn't sure.

Most people don't believe they will exist after they die, including most who claim they do. That's the whole problem.

Reality is not constrained by the limited powers of your imagination.
So now we're liars? Heh.

None of this is relevant. My main point was that my belief in my existence after death is not contingent on the results of a discussion of consciousness. It seemed you were tying the two together and I've given the reasons why they have nothing to do with one another. For me at least.

It's good for you that you know why Mentat and Dennett take their views. I personally don't have much of an idea. And I don't know where is the intellectual merit in denying that the self exists.

There is no other option. Either they have their views for intellectual reasons or for personal agenda reasons. I don't know which one it is. I suspect it is the later although Mentat will disagree with me of course.
 
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  • #18
Fliption said:
I just thought it left a lot of stuff out, as it never seems to stress the role of language that much.

Yeah, a lot of stuff out... how about these bits:

"I have claimed that what I have to say provides a different perspective on the question of consciousness - one from which we may be able to cut through the confusion that usually surrounds the debate"

When I say philosophers are confused about consciousness, I get treated as a lunatic. Despite the fact that many philosophers, such as this one, think exactly the same.

"The problem with consciousness is not that it is mysterious and heat, say, isn't. Heat is mysterious in exactly the same way that consciousness is. Science is mysterious"

Is it just me, or is she really saying "everything is a hard problem"?

"Are Zombies logically possible? - No. There is no physical universe without consciousness, and no consciousness without the physical universe. The mistake lies in confusing knowledge with reality"

When I said the same thing, you thought it was absurd.

"Is consciousness surprising? - Yes, but it is so not because of some mysterious property. It is surprising because in order to construct meaningful explanations, we have excluded it from science at the very beginning of the scientific enterprise"

How do you create 'meaningful explanations' without using language?

"Is science a means to gather knowledge about reality? - No. Science is systematic knowledge about experience. The step from what we know to what exists in an absolute sense is always a fallacy"

Isn't fallacy just another word for 'lie'? Do you think Marion Gothier is schizophrenic too?

--------------

You have those to go by now. You may want to discuss those ideas in light of Gothier's paper, or not. It's up to you.
 
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  • #19
confutatis said:
Yeah, a lot of stuff out... how about these bits:

"I have claimed that what I have to say provides a different perspective on the question of consciousness - one from which we may be able to cut through the confusion that usually surrounds the debate"

I didn't say it wasn't similar in parts. I said it seemed to leave stuff out.

I'm referring mostly to the comments you made about how there is no subjective experience without language. I don't see this view anywhere in this article. I could have missed it. This is one reason I want to read it several times.

When I say philosophers are confused about consciousness, I get treated as a lunatic. Despite the fact that many philosophers, such as this one, think exactly the same.

As far as I'm concerned your views wouldn't classify you as a lunatic. But the inconsistent presentation of those views is suspect. Note the difference. This is why I'm glad you're presenting a link of someone else explaining it.

"Are Zombies logically possible? - No. There is no physical universe without consciousness, and no consciousness without the physical universe. The mistake lies in confusing knowledge with reality"

When I said the same thing, you thought it was absurd.

Still do. But I'm still looking at the article because I want to understand the reasoning. That makes all the difference.

"Is science a means to gather knowledge about reality? - No. Science is systematic knowledge about experience. The step from what we know to what exists in an absolute sense is always a fallacy"

Isn't fallacy just another word for 'lie'? Do you think Marion Gothier is schizophrenic too?

The schizophrenic reference was directed at the inconsistencies in presentation; not the view itself. Just so we're clear. I am open to the view if I can ever understand it.

And no, the two words are different. A fallacy is a statement or an argument based on a false or invalid inference. A lie is a statement made with the intent to mislead. So to call someone a liar is making a statement about their motives as well as the truth value of their statements.
--------------
You have those to go by now. You may want to discuss those ideas in light of Gothier's paper, or not. It's up to you.

I will discuss them there. This is why I haven't disagreed/agreed with any of the statements from that article yet. This post is just to suggest that you're past comments are not necessarily synonmous with that article. But it doesn't matter. If you say it is then I will concentrate on that and forget the rest of the stuff.
 
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  • #20
Fliption said:
I'm referring mostly to the comments you made about how there is no subjective experience without language. I don't see this view anywhere in this article. I could have missed it. This is one reason I want to read it several times.

Forget about the language stuff. You think it was absurd because you didn't understand it. If you did, you would think it was rather trivial. So just assume it's a triviality and forget about it.

As far as I'm concerned your views wouldn't classify you as a lunatic. But the presentation of those views is suspect.

I notice you do put a lot of emphasis on personal judgements.

A fallacy is a statement or an argument based on a false or invalid inference. A lie is a statement made with the intent to mislead. So to call someone a liar is making a statement about their motives as well as the truth value of their statements.

Whatever. How am I supposed to know what you think a 'lie' means? It's pointless to keep arguing the exact meaning of each word; the point being discussed is a lot more important. My point is that science is not a true description of reality; call it a lie, a fallacy, an illusion, an ontological error - it makes no difference to the argument!
 
  • #21
confutatis said:
Forget about the language stuff. You think it was absurd because you didn't understand it. If you did, you would think it was rather trivial. So just assume it's a triviality and forget about it.
Ok

I notice you do put a lot of emphasis on personal judgements.

I'm emphasizing every point where I think you have mis-understood or are misrepresenting my words.

Whatever. How am I supposed to know what you think a 'lie' means? It's pointless to keep arguing the exact meaning of each word; the point being discussed is a lot more important. My point is that science is not a true description of reality; call it a lie, a fallacy, an illusion, an ontological error - it makes no difference to the argument!

This is funny. :smile: I defined the word lie for you a few days ago just for this reason and you didn't understand why I was doing it. Now you don't know how you're supposed to know what I mean by lie. :biggrin: :biggrin: :biggrin:

I'm trying to be very clear with everything we discuss because I truly am having a hard time understanding much of what you are saying. Rather than assume your statements are inconsistent, I'm defining words , hoping clarifications of definitions will clear up any perceived inconsistencies. Just want you to understand that it might be trivial to the topic but I'm struggling to communicate with you.
 
  • #22
Fliption said:
This is funny

I'm sorry. I've been trying to be polite, and keep the discussion on an intellectual level by ignoring your personal attacks, but you just won't stop them. So I give up. No matter what I say, with you the conversation always ends up on meaningless personal quibbles.

I defined the word lie for you a few days ago just for this reason and you didn't understand why I was doing it. Now you don't know how you're supposed to know what I mean by lie.

Nobody cares about your definitions!

I'm trying to be very clear with everything we discuss because I truly am having a hard time understanding much of what you are saying.

It should be obvious to you by now that my ideas are completely beyond your grasp. You may conclude that I'm a stupid fool looking for ego agrandizement; you may conclude I'm far ahead of you when it comes to this subject; you may conclude I'm just having fun at your expense. Whatever you conclude, just the hell leave me alone!

Rather than assume your statements are inconsistent...

Oh, shut up! Here are some quotes from you:

"You aren't very consistent in your comments."

"One of the biggest advantages of this is the ability to communicate to the other side. I see no evidence of your ability to do this. "

"From this fact and the responses that consistently focus on irrelevant points, I can only believe that you don't have the grasp on things that you think you do."

"Your views can't possibly be internally consistent"

"I don't have to know what's going on in your mind to make a statement about your views. I said your views could not possible be internally consistent. Your views are all over these web pages. I don't need to know anything about your mind to make this assertion."

You are just a foolish young man pretend to be wise. I've been young too. Go learn a few things before engaging in philosophical discussions with people who know a lot better than you (and I'm not even talking about myself here; you seem to run into the same problem with almost everyone you talk to)

Just want you to understand that it might be trivial to the topic but I'm struggling to communicate with you.

You are struggling simply because you don't know as much as you think you do. And congratulations, you are the first person on this forum to be added to my Ignore list. You may continue to reply to my posts, but please be aware that I won't be reading your replies.

I'm not ignoring you because of your abusive manners - I can take that kind of crap anytime, it doesn't touch me. What's really annoying to me is the low intellectual level of your posts. That I can't stand, and I was hoping I was mistaken about you, that you did have something important to say. So far all I got from you is the single repetition of a same idea - consciousness is a hard problem because I say so - coupled with delusional attacks of psychobabble.

Good bye. It's been interesting.
 
  • #23
Wow, you've got issues. I was simply trying to politely communicate that you should be patient with my definition clarifications because I am struggling to communciate with you.

confutatis said:
I'm sorry. I've been trying to be polite, and keep the discussion on an intellectual level by ignoring your personal attacks, but you just won't stop them. So I give up. No matter what I say, with you the conversation always ends up on meaningless personal quibbles.

I have not been focusing on personal attacks of you. I am consistently pointing out to you where what you say either isn't consistent or your definition is different. I don't know which one it is. That's up to you to help me figure out. You may perceive constructive criticism as personal attacks but they aren't. Sorry. I will admit to suffering some frustration to your continued curt responses when it was obvious more was needed to understand what you were saying. But those moments don't affect my ability to analyze your view.

Nobody cares about your definitions!

Judging from your response here it seems you want me to speak intelligently with you on this matter. Yet you don't care about my definitions? Doesn't compute.

It should be obvious to you by now that my ideas are completely beyond your grasp. You may conclude that I'm a stupid fool looking for ego agrandizement; you may conclude I'm far ahead of you when it comes to this subject; you may conclude I'm just having fun at your expense. Whatever you conclude, just the hell leave me alone!

I have not done anything to you personally. What I have done is exactly what is expected of a participant in the philosophy forum. If you continue to railroad threads with unexplained pronouncements then you can expect to be questioned on it. Sorry but this is a philsophy forum. Not a sunday school class. And as long as I am able, I will challenge any idea that I don't think is supported. So your request is contingent on your own actions.

Oh, shut up! Here are some quotes from you:

Everything you quoted from me was me responding to points where you clearly contradicted yourself. I don't even have to know what the words mean to know a contradiction when I see one.

"I am a ruti"
"I am not a ruti"

This is a contradiction. But what the hell is a ruti?

In some cases, inconsistencies are due to definition problems. But not all. As the above example shows.

You are just a foolish young man pretend to be wise. I've been young too. Go learn a few things before engaging in philosophical discussions with people who know a lot better than you (and I'm not even talking about myself here; you seem to run into the same problem with almost everyone you talk to)

Personal attacks now? I'm young and foolish now? Just because I don't think you're ideas are all you make them out to be? And I seem to run into the same problem with everyone do I? Want to provide an example? There are only a handful of extremists who don't like to see me posting. But for the most part I communicate fine with people here.

You are struggling simply because you don't know as much as you think you do. And congratulations, you are the first person on this forum to be added to my Ignore list. You may continue to reply to my posts, but please be aware that I won't be reading your replies.

And I'm sure I won't be the last with that attitude.

I don't "know" anything. What is there to "know" when it comes to philosophy? I'm just thinking and reasoning about the things that people say. Either they are consistent or they aren't. Either they follow from the assumptions or they do not.

I'm not ignoring you because of your abusive manners - I can take that kind of crap anytime, it doesn't touch me. What's really annoying to me is the low intellectual level of your posts. That I can't stand, and I was hoping I was mistaken about you, that you did have something important to say. So far all I got from you is the single repetition of a same idea - consciousness is a hard problem because I say so - coupled with delusional attacks of psychobabble.

Good bye. It's been interesting.

I'm sorry that you think criticism of your views is considered abusive behavior. Now saying someone's intellectual level is low might qualify as abusive but not criticism of views.

What I find interesting is that I have argued for a view that is held far more widely than yours is and yet you think that I need to make claims like "Consiousness is a hard problem because I said so?" Your arguments thus far haven't even come close to me having to resort to such silliness. Not that I ever would.

Good bye
Translated: Confutatis sticks fingers in ears and says "lalalalalal" :frown:

EDIT: BTW, I've added you to my buddy list :biggrin:
 
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  • #24
Fliption said:
I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, he/she has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.

Oh? Like what?

I'll try to explain what I mean and the problem I have with what you are saying. You keep saying that it has no meaning. What does it mean when we say something has no meaning? It means that it cannot be described with words or in terms of other things. Is this not correct? So what is the definition of any fundamental thing? There doesn't seem to be a way to define fundamental things.

While that is true, to what is "subjective experience" fundamental? Have you reduced some non-elementary phenomenon to the point where all that is left to explain is "subjective experience"? Or did you assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then seek to define it? There is a difference: In the first instance, one would have found a fundamental thing through reduction, which is reasoning bottom-top reasoning, which is good. In the other instance, one would have created a seemingly fundamental phenomenon for the purpose of producing what amounts to a strawman.

The reason that people keep saying that you would have to be a zombie is because the only way any of us know about consciousness is through our own personal experience of it. I experience "being". I assume you do to.

I know all this. The problem becomes that "subjective experience" still seems like something invented, which breeds top-bottom arguments and strawmen, and which must create such labels as "zombie" for those who don't perform this invented action. Of course, if you have a bottom-top way of arriving at subjective experience (foolish as that may sound, given that fact that we already have a hoped-for arrival, which makes it top-bottom from the start), then I suppose this won't be a problem.

There is no other reason, other than personal experience, for anyone to suspect that consciousness exists.

That doesn't seem well-worded, under the circumstances. I do recognize the existence of one's personal experience. What I don't recognize/accept is the existence of a transcendent quality which has elluded investigation.

I know that sounds vague, but that's what happens when one looks too deeply at a strawman. What I end up saying is that I'm sick of the term, itself, and that it doesn't really refer to anything outside of that which the Dennett-ites have already explained.

Basically, what bothers me is that Chalmers and his followers state that there is something missing from our (Dennett-ite) explanations of consciousness, and they label that something "subjective experience". They can't define what it is, really, aside from "what it's like to be", which is as vague and (IMHO) empty as the term itself.

There is no evidence of it anywhere in the material world. It cannot be objectively studied in any way. The only way it is known is through personal experience.

Is it not the goal of science to take an objective approach to all phenomena?

Of course, the true Chalmerean would reply, "That's what's wrong with/missing from the Scientific Method", but that just creates an entirely new debate about the merits of the Method in a world where some wish to assume something exists that they've never seen objectively.

In the end, we're right back where we started, with me denouncing the merits of a term that has no meaningful definition.

So if you deny consciousness and subjective experiences then you are denying that you have them, therefore you are a zombie.

But I don't deny consciousness. I simply define it, without the use of any phantom terms. I define it (basically) as the computing process of any being capable of interacting with the objective world. In humans, there are the added abilities of "self-consciousness" and the like, but those abilities still fall into the category of computation, as I've shown in previous threads. These are the "easy problems", according to Chalmers. The only thing left to explain is the "hard problem of subjective experience"...but, really, without using those terms, what phenomenon is there left to explain?

A scientific definition requires it to be reductively described in terms of more fundamental things.

Not exactly. Without picking at semantics, we still recognize the fact that science has defined quarks and leptons as "fundamental". Scientists have had no problem defining them in terms of structure (though that's being debated, it's basically either a string or a point), activity, and frequency of presence (commonness). All this, inspite of their not being made up of anything else.

I can personally define it. I think I remember you having an issue with "what it's like to be" and I remember it not making a lot of sense to me and seeming a bit like a stretch. I think I responded to it at that time.

Basically, "what it's like to be", uses too many vague terms. And there is no objective of the infinitive "to be" (i.e. to "be" what?). If "be" is left alone, then it means "exist", and what is it like to "exist"? How can anyone know what it's like to exist if you can't ever experience non-existence?

It makes sense to say "what it's like to know that I am", but not just "what it's like to be".

But life is a holistic term. It is a category label and therefore requires specific boundaries. Consciousness is a term meant to describe a very specific feature that I experience everyday.

I don't understand. Consciousness is the only feature that you experience everyday. It's the only thing you experience ever. But it has specific boundaries: Anything you don't experience, is something you are not conscious of...

I just don't see the problem.

I personally know what this thing is and know what the word refers to when I use it. The fact that I can't describe it to a zombie doesn't mean it doesn't exists. The fact that it cannot be defined and explained to a zombie and yet I personally know it exists is the hard problem.

I personally know that God exists. Yet, if I were to rely on clergy-like statements, such as "you have to experience the grace of God, before you can know Him", I would look like a fool whenever I tried to talk about God - at least, to the rational thinker. More importantly, the rational thinker would quickly discover that I had assumed that "God" existed before I even knew what that entailed...ergo, I would have a religious strawman (as do so many in the world today).

So, if you just "know" that something exists, without meaningful definition, and without the most remedial of explanations, are you not commiting the same foolish fallacy as the clergyman? (No offense to any members of the clergy who may post here; my issue is not with the clergy, but with the reasoning typical among them. Also, this should remain an illustration, and nothing more, as specifically religious topics are not discussed on the PFs.)

The simplified formula is like this:

ME:
Personally know consciousness exists + Can't define it = Hard problem

ZOMBIE:
No personal knowledge of consciousness + Can't define it = Doesn't exists

RATIONAL THINKER (IMHO):
No personal knowledge of something = nothing, yet, to define.

So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.

The only thing that separates the views is the assumption that something exists a priori. This is not a practice among the typical zombie :wink:
 
  • #25
confutatis said:
Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.

That has not been my experience. Of course, there have been instances, but usually it was due to one or more problem-causing members, who were eventually removed anyway.

What's left to be solved, in my humble opinion, is the question of how a meaningless concept such as "..." can be used for meaningful communication. People refer to their experiences all the time, and they seem to know what they are talking about.

That's because the concrete references they make refer to existent, defined, phenomena...usually, "subjective experience" is just used to lump it all together.

I suppose what you really think is that "..." lacks, and cannot have, a scientific definition. That would make more sense.

Of course it would, there is no term to define.

I wasn't really talking about explaining hallucinations, I was talking about defining it. My understanding is that a hallucination is a special kind of subjective experience. I don't think we can define hallucinations in terms of neurology, even though we can certainly explain it in those terms, as you say Dennett did.

So how would you define (as opposed to explain) "hallucination" without invoking the concept of subjective experience? Or "..." as you call it?

What's the difference, in this context, between explanation and definition?

Just playing the devil's advocate here: what do you mean by "the actual experience"? I don't understand it; please define your terms :smile:

I mean the actual stimulation, from an outside source, of those spatiotemporal firings, which can later be re-stimulated as a purely spatial (and thus less potent) firing.

I'm not so sure about that. Wouldn't an explanation be a definition in itself?

You didn't seem to think so when it came to hallucinations.

No problem here. Subjective experience can't have anything to do with consciuosness, I've been saying the same things myself.

Then why assume it exists in the first place?

Yes, I agree entirely, but a lot of people will beg to differ. They will say "consciousness is subjective experience", and when you explain consciuosness without explaining subjective experience they will say, "ah, but you have not really explained consciousness".

I think the whole problem is the idea that consciousness needs explaining in the first place. That trips everyone up. Instead of "Consciousness Explained", why didn't Dennett call his book "The Brain Explained", or "Human Behaviour Explained"? That, I just don't get.

Because consciousness does indeed need explanation. The brain is not equivalent to consciousness. Neither is human behavior. Consciousness is a specific behavior of the brain.

You remind me of some book I read a few years ago. At some point the author went on a long rant on why the word 'mind' should be dropped from our vocabulary; since science has proved that the brain and the mind were the same thing, we should just use 'brain' instead. That got me thinking how some sentences would sound funny, such as "I need some peace of brain" or "unicorns only exists inside people's brains". Also, can you imagine people going to the theater to watch a movie called "A Beautiful Brain"?

Clearly the scientist you referred to was wrong. "Brain" does not equal "mind". "Brain" equals computer. "Mind" equals program.
 
  • #26
Mentat said:
I know all this. The problem becomes that "subjective experience" still seems like something invented, which breeds top-bottom arguments and strawmen, and which must create such labels as "zombie" for those who don't perform this invented action. Of course, if you have a bottom-top way of arriving at subjective experience (foolish as that may sound, given that fact that we already have a hoped-for arrival, which makes it top-bottom from the start), then I suppose this won't be a problem.

I don't understand why you keep saying that subjective experience is invented. If you start out with the assumption that a hard problem is not possible then of course you're going to come to such conclusions.

That doesn't seem well-worded, under the circumstances. I do recognize the existence of one's personal experience. What I don't recognize/accept is the existence of a transcendent quality which has elluded investigation.

There is no explanation of the feature I'm referring to. You don't accept a transcendent quality that has eluded investigation, but nothing in any explanation adequately explans why anyone should have such an illusion. No matter how I look at this it doesn't go away.

I know that sounds vague, but that's what happens when one looks too deeply at a strawman. What I end up saying is that I'm sick of the term, itself, and that it doesn't really refer to anything outside of that which the Dennett-ites have already explained.
What they have explained does not connect to what I am referring to when I speak of these things.

Basically, what bothers me is that Chalmers and his followers state that there is something missing from our (Dennett-ite) explanations of consciousness, and they label that something "subjective experience". They can't define what it is, really, aside from "what it's like to be", which is as vague and (IMHO) empty as the term itself.

So you, personally, really don't know what it is they are talking about?
really, without using those terms, what phenomenon is there left to explain?
The only thing to say is to appeal to your own experience. Of course, if you're a zombie then this will do us no good.

Not exactly. Without picking at semantics, we still recognize the fact that science has defined quarks and leptons as "fundamental". Scientists have had no problem defining them in terms of structure (though that's being debated, it's basically either a string or a point), activity, and frequency of presence (commonness). All this, inspite of their not being made up of anything else.

Wel of course. I was approaching this from the angle that science has assumptions about what is fundamental and then proceeds to reductively explain things in terms of those fundamental things. As time goes by, the list of fundamental elements may change. I wonder how anything is ever decided to be fundamental though. I'd be interested to know how long we unsuccessfully try to reductively explain something before we move in that direction. As far as consciousness goes, as long as there are people who pretend they don't know what the hard problem is, we'll probably never get there.

I don't understand. Consciousness is the only feature that you experience everyday. It's the only thing you experience ever. But it has specific boundaries: Anything you don't experience, is something you are not conscious of...

I just don't see the problem.

I'm just saying the two terms are not analagous. Life is an arbitrary category label that is diffucult to place into words. It is by nature difficult to define. As for consciousness, well you pretty much just defined it the only way it can be defined above which illustrates my point that it isn't the same as trying to define "life".

I personally know that God exists. Yet, if I were to rely on clergy-like statements, such as "you have to experience the grace of God, before you can know Him", I would look like a fool whenever I tried to talk about God - at least, to the rational thinker. More importantly, the rational thinker would quickly discover that I had assumed that "God" existed before I even knew what that entailed...ergo, I would have a religious strawman (as do so many in the world today).
Welcome to the hard problem. Your inability to argue for your personal belief in the language of the rational thinker would be analagous to the hard problem. Except that subjective experience should have a whole lot more believers than god does.

So, if you just "know" that something exists, without meaningful definition, and without the most remedial of explanations, are you not commiting the same foolish fallacy as the clergyman?
No. I can easily deny god. I cannot so easily deny my own subjective experiences. The strength of this argument is built on the assumption that people other than myself aren't zombies. So naturally a zombie would have the same issues you're having.

The only thing that separates the views is the assumption that something exists a priori. This is not a practice among the typical zombie :wink:

The difference between the views is exactly what I've stated. You are requesting that the hard problem be defined so that it can be tackled and solved. The problem is that the act of defining it is the same as solving it. The certainty of the problem does not rely on a reductive definition. It is known through experience. I have not assumed the existence of anything. I have a word that I use to refer to an experience of "what's it like". Whenever I read the explanations you refer to, I do not see an explanation for this experience that I have labeled. I'm not suggesting that anything trancendent exists. But an explanation as to how such an illusion can exists is no where to be found either. So one difference could be that you are a zombie. If not, then the difference between us is in our interpretation of what is required of an "explanation".
 
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  • #27
Mentat said:
What's the difference, in this context, between explanation and definition?

There is really no difference. As I suggested a few lines below, an explanation can be a definition. Supposedly I don't have to argue this point with you, you seem to understand it.

I don't think you see the problem as I see it. Maybe the problem doesn't exist; it certainly doesn't seem to exist for some people, which would explain why they don't see it. The problem is, who decides what your explanation is really addressing? Let me give you an example of physics, which is a lot simpler than this consciousness stuff.

To the ordinary man, the principle of relativity of motion doesn't make much sense. When he takes a step, the ordinary man can't possibly think of his movement as anything other than his position changing while the rest of the universe remains in place. No matter how much respect one has for the science of physics, no one can take seriously the notion that the statement "I'm moving while the universe is at rest" is not a true account of his experience of walking. So, it is my impression, the ordinary man comes to think of 'movement' in advanced theoretical physics as somehow disconnected from the ordinary meaning of 'movement'. As a consequence, what physicists have to say about 'movement' doesn't seem to be of much interest to the ordinary man, at least from the ordinary man's perspective.

Back to our discussion of 'subjective experience', I'm quite convinced it's possible to come up with scientific explanations for it. However, as you have pointed out, it's quite difficult to come up with a scientific definition of 'subjective experience' which bears much resemblance to the ordinary meaning of the concept. As a result, ordinary people will feel compelled to dismiss scientific statements about 'subjective experience' much the same way we dismiss scientific statements about 'movement'. It's not that the ordinary man thinks scientists are wrong, but rather he realizes science has borrowed a concept from his language and applied a different meaning to it; therefore whatever scientists may have to say about the borrowed concept, it matters little to him, if at all.

Then why assume [subjective experience] exists in the first place?

Because many rational people insist it exists, and if you can't prove them wrong then you can't be sure you are right.

Because consciousness does indeed need explanation. The brain is not equivalent to consciousness. Neither is human behavior. Consciousness is a specific behavior of the brain.

I strongly disagree with this. To start with, consciousness is not a phenomenon to be directly observed in the world, not even inside brains, it is concept create up to describe something of a rather complex nature. So consciousness must necessarily be whatever it is that the concept has been conjured up to describe. My best guess is "certain patterns of behaviour by humans", which by itself is complex enough. But I can't possibly accept that the word 'consciousness' was created to describe 'specific behaviour of the brain'.

Clearly the scientist you referred to was wrong. "Brain" does not equal "mind". "Brain" equals computer. "Mind" equals program.

Actually, I do think "brain equals mind", I just don't think we can get rid of one of the concepts, as they are used in different contexts. A mind is a brain seen from the inside; a brain is a mind seen from the outside. Only some unimaginable holistic perspective could be capable of expressing the two perspectives as a single concept.

And I don't think brains have anything to do with computers. They clearly don't work according with the same principles. Computers cannot deal with contradictions, paradoxes, ambiguities; brains thrive on those things.
 
  • #28
Fliption said:
I don't understand why you keep saying that subjective experience is invented. If you start out with the assumption that a hard problem is not possible then of course you're going to come to such conclusions.

I'm sorry if I haven't explained my point sufficiently. Let me try again, step-by-step:

1) There is a phenomenon, whereby a being can interact with his/her environment purposefully. This phenomenon breeds intelligence, creativity, and emotion. The phenomenon is (obviously) consciousness.

2) This phenomenon can be scientifically explained in terms of the functions of the brain (specifically, the neocortex), both fundamental and algorithmic.

3) There are philosophers and scientists who have stated point #2, but they have been ridiculed by their peers for leaving something out.

4) Since these philosophers and scientists have actually covered every area (to varying levels of adequacy and accuracy), I've tried to understand what it is that their peers believe they've missed.

5) The best input I've gotten has either been by Chalmers or has sounded very much like him. The reasoning, in a nutshell, is that, while the aforementioned philosophers and scientists have explained all the "easy problems" to do with the functions of the brain, they have not explained the "hard problem" of how those functions are connected to "subjective experience".

6) My problem with this is that Chalmers has not meaningfully defined "subjective experience".

Conclusion: If there is no actual (definable; meaninful) phenomenon left to explain (and thus, no "hard problem"), then why can't Chalmers and his followers just work toward solving the so-called "easy problems", like Dennett and others are already doing?

There is no explanation of the feature I'm referring to. You don't accept a transcendent quality that has eluded investigation, but nothing in any explanation adequately explans why anyone should have such an illusion. No matter how I look at this it doesn't go away.

But do you even know to what you are reffering? If there is a transcendant quality, what is it? What is there left to explain after the work of Dennett, Calvin, Edelman, LeDoux, etc? My problem is not with the idea that we don't understand the whole picture yet. I openly admit that we don't. What I have a problem with is your implying that there is a specific thing that isn't being worked on, and yet not being able to meaningfully define what that "thing" is.

What they have explained does not connect to what I am referring to when I speak of these things.

Ok. Then what are you referring to? Give me an example of "subjective experience" at work, please. Specifically, give me an example of a phenomenon/function that is not explanable without invoking "subjective experience", and then show how that phenomenon is now better explained after having introduced "subjective experience".

So you, personally, really don't know what it is they are talking about?

Not really. I understand the term "subjective". I also understand the term "experience". Indeed, I understand how something can be a part of one's own personal experience, and thus rightly labeled "subjective experience". But I do not understand what Chalmers thinks is unexplained/unexplanable. I see one's personal experience as perfectly explanable in terms of a Dennettian theory, and cannot see what is missing.

The only thing to say is to appeal to your own experience. Of course, if you're a zombie then this will do us no good.

Ok...while I'm rather positive that I am a zombie, let's just say I'm not. Let's say that I can appeal to my own experience to understand what you mean. Ok, so I am experiencing the sensation of the keyboard under my fingertips. I'm experiencing the stream of photons leaving the monitor screen. Indeed, I'm actually experiencing the information that this collection of black characters is supposed to incite...

The problem is, I can replace the word "experiencing" with "computing" or "processing" without altering my meaning in the slightest. And if Chalmers means "computing" or "processing" when he says "experiencing" then there is no hard problem, since "computing" and "processing" are exactly what he refers to as "the easy problem".

I'm just saying the two terms are not analagous. Life is an arbitrary category label that is diffucult to place into words. It is by nature difficult to define.

Life is indeed an arbitrary category label, but that doesn't make it "difficult to define" it makes it meaningless. The start of many fruitless debates, nothing more. "Alive" has not defined boundaries, no real definition, no meaning whatsoever, except as an arbitrarily assigned label to that which "seems" alive.

As for consciousness, well you pretty much just defined it the only way it can be defined above which illustrates my point that it isn't the same as trying to define "life".

You're right. They're not analogous. "Subjective experience" and "life" might be, but "consciousness" and "life" are not. "Subjective experience" fits the exact criteria for an arbitrary category label, which I assigned to "life" (above).

Welcome to the hard problem. Your inability to argue for your personal belief in the language of the rational thinker would be analagous to the hard problem. Except that subjective experience should have a whole lot more believers than god does.

But I can define "God". I can't even begin to define what you mean by "subjective experience" without immediately equating it with "computation", which would eliminate the "hard problem" (because "computation" is part of the "easy problem", according to Chalmers).

No. I can easily deny god. I cannot so easily deny my own subjective experiences. The strength of this argument is built on the assumption that people other than myself aren't zombies. So naturally a zombie would have the same issues you're having.

There's that term again...for the record, I do have my own person experiences. I just know them to be physical computative process, and nothing more.

The difference between the views is exactly what I've stated. You are requesting that the hard problem be defined so that it can be tackled and solved. The problem is that the act of defining it is the same as solving it. The certainty of the problem does not rely on a reductive definition. It is known through experience. I have not assumed the existence of anything. I have a word that I use to refer to an experience of "what's it like". Whenever I read the explanations you refer to, I do not see an explanation for this experience that I have labeled.

The experience of what what's like? You say what "it's like". What is "it"?
 
  • #29
Mentat said:
But do you even know to what you are reffering? If there is a transcendant quality, what is it? What is there left to explain after the work of Dennett, Calvin, Edelman, LeDoux, etc? My problem is not with the idea that we don't understand the whole picture yet. I openly admit that we don't. What I have a problem with is your implying that there is a specific thing that isn't being worked on, and yet not being able to meaningfully define what that "thing" is.

Well I have no idea what is being "worked on". I'm of the opinion that it cannot be solved with the current assumptions regardless of whether it's being worked on or not.

Yes, I do know what I'm referring to. When you ask "what is it?", what is it that you are looking for me to tell you? Are you looking for words that allow you to scientifically approach it? Don't you realize that my knowledge comes from experience and you asking me for words is like trying to explain the color red to a blind man?
I see one's personal experience as perfectly explanable in terms of a Dennettian theory, and cannot see what is missing.

The problem is, I can replace the word "experiencing" with "computing" or "processing" without altering my meaning in the slightest.

Are you suggesting that if you could step into the position of my PC when it is doing math calculations, that you would find it experiencing the act of doing math exactly as you do yourself?

Life is indeed an arbitrary category label, but that doesn't make it "difficult to define" it makes it meaningless. The start of many fruitless debates, nothing more. "Alive" has not defined boundaries, no real definition, no meaning whatsoever, except as an arbitrarily assigned label to that which "seems" alive.

This may be the case today but it does not necessarily have to be the case. Category labels can be useful if they are consistently defined. But this is not relevant to this topic.

You're right. They're not analogous. "Subjective experience" and "life" might be, but "consciousness" and "life" are not. "Subjective experience" fits the exact criteria for an arbitrary category label, which I assigned to "life"
Not to me it doesn't. I know completely what subjective experience is.

But I can define "God". I can't even begin to define what you mean by "subjective experience" without immediately equating it with "computation", which would eliminate the "hard problem" (because "computation" is part of the "easy problem", according to Chalmers).

I think your answer to my question above will be critical to me understanding your point. I see a distinction between measuring the wave length of light and the experience of the color red. I suspect you will say that you do not see this as a distinction. But I think you know full well what is meant by subjective experience. This whole exercise is an attempt to try to get someone to explain the position in a way that doesn't rely on your experiential based knowledge of the situation. It is simply using the hard problem to undermind the hard problem. But this approach only works when you are thinking inside of a box with an established set of assumptions. It is these assumptions that we're now questioning. You cannot comment on the best placement for a box from the inside.

There's that term again...for the record, I do have my own person experiences. I just know them to be physical computative process, and nothing more.
If you are saying that the experience of the color red does not exists then we have nothing else to talk about. You are either a zombie who merely claims to have experiences or you are a troubled person with a lot invested in a particular world view. However, if you are saying that the eye and brain can pick up light and based on wavelength computations present what I am referring to as the experience of red then this is fine. But now you have to explain how it does it. You have to casually connect the two. If you do this well enough, then you should be able to make predictions and test to see if I'm seeing and feeling what you predicted. And you can't just ask me. You have to be able to measure it.

The experience of what what's like? You say what "it's like". What is "it"?

Zombie. What's interesting about this whole thing is that you claim in a serious note that you really do experience things as if you know what it is I am referring to. You say "for the record I do have my own personal experiences" as if you are saying that you know to what I am referring. Yet you still don't see what's missing in dennett's explanation. So maybe you don't really experience what I do? Maybe you really are a zombie?

Just to show you how futile this discussion may be, it is beyond my comprehension that you don't see what's missing in Dennett's explanations. I am more likely to believe that you are a zombie and really don't know what's missing than I would believe that you really believe that a computing machine can see colors.

You look at the explanations and compare it to your experience(or lack thereof) of the world and ask me "what's missing?". Your looking for words or a desciption of what's missing. The best answer I have is to tell you to look at the explanations and then compare it to your experience of the world because that is what's missing! This is the dilemma we have here.
 
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  • #30
I think you cannot apply the same argument to life and conciousness. Life is a definition, while experience is appalling, self-imposing reality. If you tell me you experience life, its just a tag you put on the fact of experiencing. Maybe "conciousness" is just another tag, but when you reduce all the tags, something remains, which is equal to your (mine, ours) existence, and cannot be denied. I think that's the problem with Dennett's et al. argument. Now Denett may be right in telling that the experience can be explained in terms of fundamental language, that is in terms of self-arising entities/interactions constituting the universe, for exemple, mass, energy, logical operations. It may be that we cannot intrinsically grasp the explanation, as Marion Gothier argues. Yet if the conciousness can be dissected in logical operations, how come we can grasp the operations but not their integration?
 
  • #31
Al said:
I think you cannot apply the same argument to life and conciousness. Life is a definition, while experience is appalling, self-imposing reality. If you tell me you experience life, its just a tag you put on the fact of experiencing. Maybe "conciousness" is just another tag, but when you reduce all the tags, something remains, which is equal to your (mine, ours) existence, and cannot be denied. I think that's the problem with Dennett's et al. argument. Now Denett may be right in telling that the experience can be explained in terms of fundamental language, that is in terms of self-arising entities/interactions constituting the universe, for exemple, mass, energy, logical operations. It may be that we cannot intrinsically grasp the explanation, as Marion Gothier argues. Yet if the conciousness can be dissected in logical operations, how come we can grasp the operations but not their integration?

I'm not sure I think much of Marion Gothier's view. I've read the thread that confutatis provided but I haven't responded to it because...well...because Confutatis has me on ignore lol. And he seems to be the only one that cares about this view. I still need to think more about it but my initial impression is that claiming we cannot comprehend consciousness because of our relationship with it seems a bit like a cop out. I understand that an argument was made that we achieve knowledge by "taking the experience out" but this just seems to be an illustration of the hard problem rather than a refutation of it. After spending so much time convincing us that consciousness is unique and then concluding that there is nothing mysterious about it; that it may very well be completely physical seems confused and over reaching in a way that is typical of an aprior attempt to rationalize a complex situation. Afterall,"mysterious" is not an absolute condition. It is a relative statement about our ability to know and explain. So I agree with your question. Exactly where and how does the understood physical laws become the uncomprehendable laws of consciousness? How doe one create an uncomprehendable property from comprehendable parts? All she has done is create a whole new "hard" problem it seems.

As for Dennett's view... it just seems obstinate and off the topic.
 
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  • #32
It might be helpful here to introduce some terms: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (or P-consciousness and A-consciousness for short). Access consciousness, very roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that play a functional role: attention, verbal report, intentionality (about-ness), motoric activity, perceptual discrimination, and so on can be taken to be instances of A-consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness, again roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that are experiential: the redness of an object, the timbre of a musical note, and the felt texture of a smooth tile can be taken to be instances of P-consciousness.

I am not sure if Mentat's position is that P-consciousness does not exist or if it is that P-consciousness is subsumed under A-consciousness (i.e., that it is impossible to have A-consciousness without P-consciousness); I would appreciate a response here from Mentat pinpointing which of these views he holds, as opponents of the hard problem often take positions that do not explicitly differentiate between the two. This will help clarify further discussion.

I would also like to say something about zombies. There is a bit of a fallacy of thought going on here that is easy to slip into, and I have done it myself in the past (even if only half-jokingly). First, to frame zombies in the nomenclature above, a zombie is a being with A-consciousness identical to that of a normally functioning human, but still lacking P-consciousness altogether. Thus a zombie behaves identically to a normally functioning human, even though the first person view of the zombie is non-existent.

The problematic notion I'd like to address is that one who denies the hard problem is acting in a zombie-like way by refuting, in some manner, the problem of P-consciousness. This seems like a natural position to take, since a zombie presumably could not understand the hard problem on the basis of its lack of P-consciousness. However, strictly speaking, this position cannot follow since the zombie behaves identically to a normal human, including verbal reports indicating a belief of P-conscious qualities. Therefore a zombie could be just as much a proponent of the hard problem as an enemy of it. Indeed, if all zombies had systematic difficulties understanding the hard problem, then on average they would not have A-conscious properties identical to the average human, contradicting our intial definition.

This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.
 
  • #33
hypnagogue said:
The problematic notion I'd like to address is that one who denies the hard problem is acting in a zombie-like way by refuting, in some manner, the problem of P-consciousness. This seems like a natural position to take, since a zombie presumably could not understand the hard problem on the basis of its lack of P-consciousness. However, strictly speaking, this position cannot follow since the zombie behaves identically to a normal human, including verbal reports indicating a belief of P-conscious qualities. Therefore a zombie could be just as much a proponent of the hard problem as an enemy of it. Indeed, if all zombies had systematic difficulties understanding the hard problem, then on average they would not have A-conscious properties identical to the average human, contradicting our intial definition.

I'm impressed! The first person here who seems to understand that!

This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

It seems ironic to me that the hard problem is so hard that it can't even be properly stated. It's no surprise there's so much cynicism around it.

There is a hard problem, but it has nothing to do with consciousness in particular. Consciousness just happens to be a good example of a truly hard problem, one that is far more fundamental than anything Chalmers addresses. The issue is language and its ability to represent reality. The truly hard problem is how to explain the relationship between language and reality, or between explanation and explanandum to use a more pompous language. The problem comes from the fact that any description of the explanandum, or the relationship between explanation and explanandum, is also an explanation. No matter how hard you try it, it is impossible to come up with any explanation that transcends the domain of explanation. So one may be tempted to think that explanations are all that exist. This is Dennett's position, by the way.
 
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  • #34
hypnagogue said:
I am not sure if Mentat's position is that P-consciousness does not exist or if it is that P-consciousness is subsumed under A-consciousness (i.e., that it is impossible to have A-consciousness without P-consciousness);

Yes, this is the same question I'm asking I think. Judging from past conversation, I'm thinking the answer will be that they are one and the same thing.

This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

I don't follow this zombie clarification. I understand what you're saying. I just don't understand why you're saying it. The nature of the hard problem is one of explanation. Is this correct? The fact that consciousness cannot be reductively explained using the fundamental elements we currently assume. I can understand this issue because I can compare my experience to the explanation and see that something is missing. I don't understand how a zombie scientist could ever find the explanation of his A-consciousness unsatisfactory. He may believe himself to have some form of p-consciousness, but what characteristics could this P-consciousness have that would not allow it to be reductively explained? What nature could it possibly have that would make the zombie scientist feel that something is missing?

A further question to ask is, if a planet existed that consisted of nothing but zombies and no one was conscious, would there be a hard problem?
 
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  • #35
Fliption said:
The nature of the hard problem is one of explanation. Is this correct? The fact that consciousness cannot be reductively explained using the fundamental elements we currently assume.

I hope hypnagogue replies, but I'd also like to offer my view. According to Chalmers, the hard problem applies to P-consciousness only. A-consciousness is what zombies have and that can be explained; Chalmers calls that the "easy problem".

I can understand this issue because I can compare my experience to the explanation and see that something is missing.

Yes, you see that P-consciousness is missing from an explanation of A-consciousness. That would be correct. But a zombie would think he sees it to. You must keep in mind that, according to Chalmers, there's nothing a zombie may say or do that would reveal his zombieness, because everything a zombie says and does is the result of A-consciousness - including statements about P-consciousness!

I don't understand how a zombie scientist could ever find the explanation of his A-consciousness unsatisfactory.

For the same reason you do: he doesn't see P-consciousness in it. Or, rather, the physical action of a zombie scanning the words of an explanation of A-consciousness causes the zombie to move his mouth and tongue and utter the phrase: "I don't see P-consciousness in it!".

He may believe himself to have some form of p-consciousness, but what characteristics could this P-consciousness have that would not allow it to be reductively explained?

A very simple fact: for the zombie, P-consciousness is an illusion. He thinks he has it but he doesn't. Therefore no explanation of anything real will appear to the zombie as an explanation of his P-consciousness, for the simple fact that no true explanation of anything real can imply that an illusion is real.

Ironically, that's exactly what Dennett and Mentat say about us non-zombies! That we believe in an illusion called P-consciousness, and then complain that their true theories of real phenomena can't account for something that, from their perspective, is not real. That's why Dennett and Mentat do not mind being called zombies - they are just being cynical.

A further question to ask is, if a planet existed that consisted of nothing but zombies and no one was conscious, would there be a hard problem?

I think even Chalmers acknowledges that zombies would also eventually come up with a hard problem, except in their case it would be a pseudo-problem whereas in our case it's a real problem :smile:
 

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