Wave-Particle Duality (explained?)

[nshrikhande]

Hi All,

I'm nk and new to your forum!
Pl., excuse my editing skills just this post. I'll catch on fast-promise!

It is known that "In physics and chemistry,
wave–particle duality is the concept that all matter exhibits
both wave-like and particle-like properties."-Reference,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave–particle_duality

However, I have not seen a math expression relating both
aspects of EM wave-particles. So, I deviced the following:

Let a photon be discrete represented by an ON-OFF beahaviour.
This is our typical periodic step function or even the Dirac-
delta function expressed periodically. Physically it means that
the photons energy OR sheer existence is periodic in this
fashion.

From the Fourier series (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourier_series)
we know also that:

f(x) = A0 + Sum[n:0 to infinity] { An*cos(n*X) + Bn*sin(n*x) }

Erwin Kreyszig, Fourier series, Integrals and Transforms
Chapter 10, Edition 8th.

where, f(x) (photon) is a peicewise continuous function which is discrete in
it's totality.

Thus LHS = discrete entity and RHS = continuous enity !

LHS = RHS simultaneously, ontologically speaking.

Any opinions on this approach to quantify, with assumptions, the QM problem
of wave-particle duality?

NK.

 

[filegraphy]

a good example of a wavicle is an electron. It has the properties of a wave and a particle. An experiment that will be amazing to you is the double slit experiment. Sorry I could not help that much, but it is the best I can do.

 

[glengarry]

Any opinions on this approach to quantify, with assumptions, the QM problem
of wave-particle duality?

There are no particles in quantum mechanics. Only wavefunctions, Hermitian operators, and vectors in state space. No duality, no problem.

 

[tom.stoer]

Please correct your sentence: "there are no classical particles in the formalism of quantum mechanics".

Of course there are effects in nature (e.g. the famous photoelectric effect) which cannot be explained by continuous wavelike processes. In that specific case it's the phton that must be described as a quantum particle, not as an electromagnetic wave.

Of course we are leaving the realm of quantum mechanics here since photons must be described by quantum electrodynamics. But if we do that we see that the above mentioned states in an Hilbert space are exactly the entities carrying something like particle properties (e.g. momentum, spin).

 

[glengarry]

Please correct your sentence: "there are no classical particles in the formalism of quantum mechanics".

Here's the way that I would describe the "intuitionistic" aspects of QM such as you are describing.

As little children, when we learn how to count, we typically do so by way of quantifying "real things" like apples or pennies. But, the purely abstract quantification procedure is the only thing that is meant by the "theory of counting." The apples and pennies are just heuristic devices that allow the actual theory to be learned.

Likewise, all of the talk about phenomena that are experienced that "seem" to have a so-called "localistic" causes are nothing other than convenient metaphors that allows one to learn how to successfully manipulate the symbolic machinery of a theory that describes the necessarily statistical nature of all experimentation.

This is why I advocate renaming quantum mechanics to something like, "the probabilistic theory of experimental measurement" and relocating it from physics departments into mathematics departments. If this happens, then all of the confusion that results from "interpretations" of quantum mechanics will come to an end.

 

[tom.stoer]

Not really. I agree that on a formal level you are absolutely right. I tend to agree that some difficulties disappear if you restrict yourself to a probabilistic interpretation. And you can try to get rid of a realistic interpretation (whatever this means).

But what you are talking about is only formalism and interpretation. The problem is that if you look at the famous double slit experiment with only one single electron sent though the slits you will observe one single black spot on the screen. This is a strong hint that there is something like a particle, not necessarily in your formalism but in the experimental setup. I think you can't deny in general that you observe particle-like phenomena. That's why it's a blind spot of any interpretation of quantum mechanics if it omits to talk about particles.

 

[Dmitry67]

This is why I advocate renaming quantum mechanics to something like, "the probabilistic theory of experimental measurement" and relocating it from physics departments into mathematics departments. If this happens, then all of the confusion that results from "interpretations" of quantum mechanics will come to an end.

What you are describing is stochastic interpretation of QM, which is one of the remaining 3 interpretations: SM, BM and MWI (after the death of CI and TI)

 

[tom.stoer]

what are SM, BM and MWI, CI and TI?

MWI = many-worlds interpretation?
CI = Copenhagen interpretation?
...

 

[unusualname]

SM = Statistical Mechanics ("Ensemble Interpretation", Too boring)
BM = Bohmian Mehanics (After De Broglie )
MWI = Many Worlds Interpretation (Too crazy)

CI = Copenhagen Interpretation (Too lazy)
TI = Transactional Interpretation (Even crazier than MWI)

 

[glengarry]

Not really. I agree that on a formal level you are absolutely right. I tend to agree that some difficulties disappear if you restrict yourself to a probabilistic interpretation. And you can try to get rid of a realistic interpretation (whatever this means).

The entire post-Born formal apparatus of QM is based upon the probability that a given result will ensue after an infinite number of trials. There is nothing interpretive about this. The entire significance of "interpretation" as regards QM is the all-too-human desire for certain statements that are classified under the heading of "physics" to have some kind of ontological significance.

I think you can't deny in general that you observe particle-like phenomena.

It is important to realize that tremendous difference between the term "particle-like", as it is used in verbal discussions about empirical phenomena and the term "particle", as it is used as a purely heuristic aid when learning how the formal machinery of QM works.

In the first case, there is necessarily a definite volume of three-dimensional space whose constitution has somehow been altered as a result of some spatio-temporal chain of events. Our only concept of integral volumes of space is called a "field" (or "continuum"), and the concept of the "wave" is simply that of a modulation of a field.

The term "particle", however, is one and the same with the Newtonian center of mass, which is a [purely non-dimensional] point. Such an object cannot possibly have any material significance in a three-dimensional universe like ours. Points are simply geometric idealizations that allow mathematical formulations to attain trivial (i.e. analytic) solutions.

The discipline of mathematics, however, is continuing to evolve even as theoretical physics seems to remain stagnant. For instance, there is currently tremendous excitement in mathematical circles about Grigori Perelman's recent proof of the Poincare conjecture. This proof deals in the idea of the Ricci flow, which is a way to explicitly understand how n-dimensional manifolds evolve through time.

And once we realize that this kind of mathematics is nothing but a dynamical version of general relativity, we can start to appreciate that there truly is cutting-edge physical thought going on, but that the logic that is used to express it is far more rigorous than those people who we typically call "physicists" are able to handle.

My own ideas about how the universe "really" works are precisely in line with the thought that we must necessarily think of elemental physical bodies in terms of being modifications of a continuous, three-dimensional manifold. There is nothing new about this idea; perhaps the first "official" explication of it was William Kingdon Clifford's 1870 communication to the Cambridge Philosophical Society called, "On the Space-Theory of Matter." And this was, of course, inspired by the investigations of Lobachevsky and Riemann earlier in the century. Of course, leave it to Einstein to come along much later and receive all the credit for having "completely revolutionized" our understanding of how space can be understood to be structured.

 

[tom.stoer]

The entire post-Born formal apparatus of QM is based upon the probability that a given result will ensue after an infinite number a trials. There is nothing interpretive about this. The entire significance of "interpretation" as regards QM is the all-too-human desire for certain statements that are classified under the heading of "physics" to have some kind of ontological significance.

I agree. The answers depend on the question you are asking. You question (and therefore your answers) remains on the formal level. Fine.

But the question of this thread was for an "explanation of wave-particle dualism". You can simply say that questions regarding explanation are forbidden, but this is your choice, not mine.

Btw.: I think we agree that "particle" is a no-no. I prefer quantum object as it should be free of prejudices according to classical physics.That's why I don't like "wave-particle dualism" either.

The discipline of mathematics, however, is continuing to evolve

yes

even as theoretical physics seems to remains stagnant.

no - why?

Physical progress was often inspired by ontological reasoning. In rare case the result was ontological progress - simply because philosophy was not able to follow what happens in physics and therefore stagnated - but nevertheless it was physical progress. Look at Newton, Leibniz, Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg - they all had their own "philosophy" or "ontology". Maybe these were wrong, ill-defined, etc., but they helped to develop new physical theories. That's why I think that ontological questions are still helpful in science.

In addition I still believe that there is some ontological "reality" behind pure empirism, even if it is different from what we are used to call "reality".

 

[glengarry]

I feel that it is vital for people to realize that a statistical theory of measurement is nothing other than "statistics," and that the addendum, "of measurement" is simply an unnecessary appendage that adds nothing of value to the main concept in question. That is, what kind of statistical theory could it be that does not deal in some kind of quantification procedure (i.e. "measurement")?

Furthermore, the sense in which I use the phrase, "formal quantum mechanics" is the same sense in which I would use the phrase, "dog-like dogs." QM can only rightly be understood as a rigorous mathematical system, and to say that it has anything whatever to do with intuitive descriptions of reality is equivalent to uttering the phrase, "cat-like dogs."

And the only reason why I say this is so we can get beyond the neverending cycle of interpretating that which is necessarily uninterpretable, and we can start developing new and interesting mathematical models such as I linked to in my previous post.

In other words, I feel that it is necessary for theoretical physicists to finally take the "mathematical leap," and stop spending so much time and energy worrying over what any particular experimental results seem to indicate. This just means that theoreticians should start becoming unapologetic Platonists; that is, getting over the thought that empirical results can somehow "prove" perfectly well established mathematical theorems.

Plato's idea was that there are two different "worlds" that should be understood as existing completely apart from one another. The one world is "ideal." It is the realm of geometric forms, and it is here that the most compelling "thought experiments" of today are being conducted. The other world is that which is immediately sensed, and keeping one's thoughts anchored within it only degrades one's ability to construct mathematical models that genuinely offer hope for the creation of an ontological system of thought that all humans can eventually come to agree with.

 

[tom.stoer]

Again: I do not question that your perspictive is logically valid, but I question that
a) it is shared by the mainstream of physicists
b) it is the only position which is logically viable
c) not sharing it is problematic regarding scientific progress

For me quantum mechanics and especially mathematics are "only formal" in the sense that there is some "reality" or some "link to reality" which means that the formal system itself is not ontologically identically with reality; this link is still to be discovered. (I know that as soon as you identify reality with its formalization in a mathematical system all "dualities" disappear; but this is not my belief).

The problem why I think you position is problematic is that it forces one to stop about the interpretation of qm. But there is no logical reason why I should just stop here in qm, and why I should stop exactly now. The same idea of stopping regarding a formal system in physics applies to other systems as well and would therefore bring scientific progress to an end. Why should I stop thinking about the interpretation of qm but continue with the quest for an explanation of the special symmetry group U(1)*SU(2)*SU(3)? It's matter of taste. It's your personal focus of your research program.

Last but not least I think your interpretation of Plato's philosophy is not correct. If you read πολιτεία and Άπολογία you will find out that his philosophy is not regarding two worlds "existing completely apart from one another", but that he continuously links the idea with the phenomenon; he tries to understand the phenomenon based on the ideas. Platon's world of phenomena is ontologigally subordinated, but nevertheless present in his philosophy.

Restricting Plato's philosophy to the world of ideas and surpressing the phenomena is like cutting the strings of a marionette and limiting the whole scenario to the puppet player. For certain questions this is a rather useful approach, but it is not the whole approach.

 

[nshrikhande]

Not really. I agree that on a formal level you are absolutely right. I tend to agree that some difficulties disappear if you restrict yourself to a probabilistic interpretation. And you can try to get rid of a realistic interpretation (whatever this means).

But what you are talking about is only formalism and interpretation. The problem is that if you look at the famous double slit experiment with only one single electron sent though the slits you will observe one single black spot on the screen. This is a strong hint that there is something like a particle, not necessarily in your formalism but in the experimental setup. I think you can't deny in general that you observe particle-like phenomena. That's why it's a blind spot of any interpretation of quantum mechanics if it omits to talk about particles.

Tom, thanks for your observation. But maybe I did not sufficiently clarify my main points.
What was meant, when it was mentioned that when LHS = RHS, (i.e., discrete photon = continuous wave, in energy/existence) is that both particle and wave are simultaneously existing; mathematically a natural consequence of Fourier series etc. So in the double slit experiment (D.S. Experiment) one shall get a single spot on the screen (discrete) as well as a wave distribution. What I predict is that there must be waves of all "colors" diminishing from the 1st brightest one quite fast. This really needs doing a fine experiment to check out.

Thus "my" reasoning says that in the D.S. Experiment both must manifest.

 

[nshrikhande]

a good example of a wavicle is an electron. It has the properties of a wave and a particle. An experiment that will be amazing to you is the double slit experiment. Sorry I could not help that much, but it is the best I can do.

You have been helpful actually. You say "it has the properties of a wave and a particle." The and is fantastic! Can anyone think on this AND business? Logically and/or Ontologically? This is not mere formalism. It is the sheer physicality of this and aspect that is to be pondered upon.

Thanks much!

 

[filegraphy]

Thanks. The experiment took me awhile to take in. If you can look up the two slit experiment. It changed my thinking.

 

[nshrikhande]

Thanks. The experiment took me awhile to take in. If you can look up the two slit experiment. It changed my thinking.

I've read on double slit exp mainly from the three Roger Penrose's books and honestly that is not very enlightening. I need data from a modern perspective and time to verify my very theoretical results. Then there is R. Feynman's version of many paths from source to double slit target...I find that hugely artificial. Math is always correct in it's paradigm. But is the underlying reality continuous. If not how do we use differential Calculus? I have pondered much on these topics starting from Zeno's paradox to B. Russell. For example, Cantor's ""resolution" by redefining classes of sets, or was it done by B.R? seems non-physical.

Hey, I'm really digressing.

Will take on your suggestion and Google it the night now!

 

[Dmitry67]

I don't see any difference between
(particles+sum over histories) and waves.

 

[tom.stoer]

I understand perfectly what you mean; but unfortunately there is one comment in order: the electron is not both a particle and a wave, neither mathematical nor physically. It is neither a particle nor a wave. By this I mean that thinking about a quantum object as a particle can be shown to lead to contrradictions (classical particles do not interfere); the same applies to waves.

So I prefer to think about a quantum object as neither particle not wave instead of both particle or wave.

 

[filegraphy]

Yes, I agree with you completely. Would you refer to this object as a wavicle? That is what I refer to an electron as.

 

[tom.stoer]

I prefer quantum object, but I do not know if there is a widely used term in the English literature. In German "Wellikel" never made it.

 

[filegraphy]

Oh okay, I thought wavicle was a widely used term.

 

[DJsTeLF]

Waves, particles, collapse of a wavefunction upon measurement (admitted not agreed upon in all interpretations), excitations of relativistic quantum fields or even strings vibrating in 11D space..

My opinion is they are all true. And false, depending on the situation at hand.

Are they not all just our best efforts to explain nature using whatever tools we have to hand? None are perfect, we don't have a GUT, can't quantify gravity without running into (currently) intractable problems and string theory hasn't really made any testable predictions. For me none of that takes away from the beauty of all of them in their own right, or from marvelling at the genius that first conceived them. I say let's keep looking for a bigger and better model, and start by attempting to fully appreciate the reasons for the successes of the ones we currently have.

 

[filegraphy]

Yeah I agree with that statement also. Well put.

 

[glengarry]

It's matter of taste. It's your personal focus of your research program.

The way that I am able to overcome arguments that try to link my ideas together with the rest of the ideas of mainstream theoretical physics is that there is simply currently no attempt to try to comprehend the essential nature of reality, such that the "problem of force" finds a resolution.

In other words, Newton realized that his insistence on reducing space filling bodies to their centers of mass would introduce the "occult" quality of "force", which just means that there is a hidden agency that bridges the empty gaps in between "mass points", causing the points in question to change their momenta.

So, any time there is a void that separates physical entities, then the model in question can be understood to be empirically predictive rather than ontologically descriptive. QM is the epitome of empirical predictivity while GR offers an ontological description of the [continuous] spatial manifold.

Unless you can fully appreciate the idea that QM is not meant to be taken as a "physical theory" (in the sense of a model that offers the possibility of ontological description), but only a meditation on the necessarily statistical nature of any possible "real world" measurement, then it will be very hard to break free into the kind of creative mindset that is necessary for pushing the envelope of theoretical physics.

I am trying my best to get the following statement taken as an axiom of any possible theoretical description of physical reality:

"There must not be any void space separating elemental physical bodies within a given universal context; there must only rather be pure mutual inclusivity."

Last but not least I think your interpretation of Plato's philosophy is not correct.

As regards my "interpretation" of Plato's philosophy, I don't think that this forum is the correct place to get into such a fine-grained discussion about his notion of the nature of the connection between the worlds of idea and sense. The fact that there are two worlds that are essentially different is the only point that I was trying to make.

 

[Dmitry67]

Fundamentally, if superstring theory is true, there very notion of particle will be gone: there will be no point-sized objects. And strings - they are vibration or loops of... waves.

 

[tom.stoer]

I disagree for various reasons.

It is often claimed that string theory is based on one-dim. objects whereas ordinary QFT is based on zero-dim. points. The latter is wrong! It is based on quantized field equations. There is no one-dim. trajectory of a zero-dim. object in QFT. In addition if one quantizes te theories many difference disappear as both can be formulated based on standard canonical creation and annihiliation operators.

But this is only formal. Already in ordinary QM there is no notion of a particle; it appears only in discussions about the philosophy of QM. In QFT is has disappeared; its only trace are the creation and annihiliation operators. In addition string theory does not change anything regarding the basic formalism of QFT. It deals with operators, states and possibly path integrals.

I agree that string theory (if true - which I doubt) may change the formalism of physics, but it is unclear whether, why and how it may change its interpretation.

 

[Dmitry67]

Tom, I said the same. As far as I know superstring theory does not postulate axiomatically the existence of any N-dim objects, they rather come as solutions to field equations.

 

[tom.stoer]

OK, sorry for the confusion