The issue of meaning has popped up a couple of times recently in the Metaphysics & Epistemology forum, and I think it's substantial enough to merit its own discussion. What is meaning? As a first pass, it seems reasonable to define meaning in terms of representation. In turn, the notion of representation seems to imply a system for which something is represented. Here, then, is a tentative definition: An object or event X has meaning for an agent A just in case A takes X to represent some other object or event Y. The terms "agent" and "takes X to represent" remain somewhat ambiguous. The latter might be specified, for instance, either in terms of belief ('A believes that X represents Y') or action ('A behaves as if X represents Y,' or even 'A behaves as if X is Y.'). I am particularly interested here to investigate the link, if any, between meaning and phenomenality. On the plausible definition given above, phenomenality is not necessary for meaning. A zombie's mental life would feature just as much meaning as ours, even though a zombie is not p-conscious by definition. For instance, a stop sign would have just as much meaning for a zombie as for a human. Just like a human, the zombie would take the stop sign to represent a command to stop a moving vehicle. Of course, a zombie would not have the attendent subjective experience of meaningfulness, but on the definition given above, the qualitative component of meaningfulness is not an essential aspect of meaning.