I’ve been thinking that the core of the problem with the Ned Block/David Chalmers breakdown of the problem of consciousness (access vs. phenomenal; “easy” vs. “hard”) is the pushing of subjective experience to epiphenomenal status. Why would we expect people to start accepting the ontological necessity of something epiphenomenal? The burden on those of us who think subjective experience is something fundamental in nature is then to show that P-consciousness must do some kind of work in the world – it must be associated with action and causation. But we know old-fashioned interactionist dualism won’t succeed, so what is this work that p-consciousness does? Where does the causal closure of the physical world fail? Gregg Rosenberg’s book, which will be the topic of a different thread, is thought-provoking on proposing a general link between experience and the fundamental underpinnings of all causality. But let me ask the question here: what specific work might experience do? Alternatively, where are the traces of the impact p-consciousness has on nature? Let me put up 2 candidates. First, the interpretation of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics may necessitate the existence of an experiential element in nature. P-consciousness is necessary to do the work of quantum measurements/interactions in the world. Second, the coordinated activity of components in complex organized systems (including but perhaps not limited to humans or living things) requires a binding element which in our human case is felt as p-consciousness.