Is time just an illusion?

~~Doctordick~~ · May20-07, 11:10 PM

Originally Posted by AnssiH

For serious sculpting, you definitely want to check out ZBrush;
http://www.pixologic.com/home.php

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Hmmm... That way you put that; "the probability of having the set B(t) is a function of that B(t)" was so odd that I first suspected a typo... But reading back to the older posts and scratching my head a bit, perhaps you are saying essentially that it is possible to build a function which yields the probability that a given "present" (or portion of?) exists somewhere in an "incomplete past" which we are representing as an x,tau,t-table?

This is an excellent example of over complicating things. The set, "B(t)", is absolutely nothing more than the set of indices (numbers: the numeric labels given to the ontological elements acquired at the "present" referred to as "t"). B(t) is a representation of a specific present in that "what is", is "what is" table. These are "numbers". That table is an exact representation of a "what is", is "what is" explanation and it "IS" the representation of a mathematical function which yields exactly your expectations under the "what is", is "what is" explanation.

That is to say, for any possible collections of indices (i.e., any conceivable specific present; absolutely any B(t) you can come up with) the probability of that particular set of indices is a function of what those indices are! It is a simple tabular function: i.e., you want to know the probability a a specific set of indices, you merely look at the table. If that set of indices is in the table, the probability is one; if that set is not there, the probability is zero.

As I have said several times, the problem with the "what is", is "what is" explanation is it yields utterly no hypotheses on either the future or on any possibilities (unknown to you) lying between the indices which represent what you know (or think you know). All it yields is "what you think you know". As an aside, the answer, "it could be anything", immediately yields a probability of zero for any specific set of indices. That should be clear to you; but I will explain it anyway. Since the number of possibilities in, "it could be anything" is infinite and one (the number of specific sets being asked about) divided by infinity (the number of possibilities) is zero, the probability of that specific set is zero.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

...that it is possible to build a function...

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is" table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

Originally Posted by AnssiH

It is possible I am getting something topsy turvy, but it is very difficult to think of meaningful questions since my idea about this is still rather shaky... Perhaps partially because I am not sure where this is heading.

Please don't worry about "where this is heading"; you will know exactly where this is heading the moment we get there and not before because you have never been there before. And believe me, it's not complex at all; it is in fact quite simple. The real problem is that no one ever looks.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

You said earlier this is somewhat similar to newtonian mechanics, so I must assume that once we have built an "x,tay,t"-table, we have not only assumed what ontological elements existed at given moments, but also how they behave?

At this point, you are getting way out ahead of the issues at hand. I didn't say "this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics". What I tried to say was that the (x, tau, t) table was very similar to representations of dynamic phenomena used in Newtonian mechanics. B(t) (that set of indices representing a specific set of ontological elements) can be seen as a set of points in a two dimensional plane at a fixed t (where t is an axis orthogonal to that plane). Think of it as a snapshot of a two dimensional universe you are aware of at time t.

What I am trying to present to you is a representation of the problem you are trying to solve. A representation capable of representing the information upon which any solution to that problem must be based (how to make a general representation of "what you think you know" without defining "what you think you know"). And all I get from you is an overwhelming urge to define "what you think you know". Forget about it! It is only by maintaining that lack of definition that we can maintain an objective representation of the problem confronting us.

Your solution to any problem must be based on what you think you know: i.e., on "what is" as you see it. That means that, in order to examine the ontology behind that explanation, we need to have a method of representing the information: we need a way of representing "what you think you know" without making any presumptions about what that is. Every explanation of anything must begin from a "what is", is "what is" explanation. That is why I start from that point; so I can define exactly how I am going to handle that information – not so I can define the information.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The text I emphasized in italics is clearly and important bit since you specifically said I must understand it... ...which is unfortunate because I don't :)

All I am saying is that, since the "what is", is "what is" table constitutes "what you think you know" (i.e., the exact data which any flaw free explanation must explain), these invalid elements added to the table become ontological elements presumed to exist: i.e., their existence thereafter is a presumed fact. (To my analysis, it amounts to no more than an intellectual convenience, but to subsequent explanations based upon that "what is", is "what is" table, it is presumed fact.)

The central issue here is that, if an explanation is perfectly consistent with what you think you know and the explanation is based upon some invalid ontological elements (in among those critical "valid ontological elements"; which I have defined to be "reality") then the explanation still explains all those "valid ontological elements" as, by definition, it explains everything you think you know: i.e., the "what is", is "what is" table. If you think there exist any explanations of reality which contain no such invalid ontological concepts, you are, without a doubt, dealing in thoughtless gullibility.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known. It is a fact that, given a flaw free explanation, there exists no way of defending the validity of any ontological element underlying that explanation. It is the opinion of the scientific community that only failure of the explanation itself bears on the question. It is the common (and overtly gullible) assumption that a "flaw free explanation" is a logical guarantee of the validity of the ontology. I am afraid that, that is a logically undefendable assertion.

The only handle we have on the problem is that there exists a very simple logical difference between "valid ontological elements" and "fabricated ontological elements". That difference consists of the fact that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements" while the "fabricated ontological elements are free to be anything that epistemological construct needs them to be. That is to say, the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It is exactly the freedom to create these invalid ontological elements which makes it possible to explain things, The idea that a successful theory constitutes a defense of the reality of those ontological elements it is the single most overt flaw in the modern scientific paradigm.

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion. Yes, it is an opinion based on thousands of years of experience with the defense of epistemological constructs but it has no bearing at all on the defense of ontological validity. This is a fundamentally flawed perspective when it comes to analyzing ontological issues.

Every scientist blocks his mind to the idea that he is creating "fabricated ontological elements" anytime he says "suppose ...".

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I understand you end up adding invalid (arbitrary?) elements on purpose so to make the mathematical functions easier to handle, but I don't understand why their existence is a presumed fact after you have specifically said they are invalid elements? Since this is so blatantly odd, I don't think you have made an error, but I must be getting some idea rather topsy turvy... :I

They are a presumed fact in that every flaw free explanation must explain them. What is blatantly odd is the fact that I present them as "invalid ontological elements" and not as "suppose these elements are valid...". That is an honest objective paradigm and does not make any assumption of truth: i.e., these invalid elements will be handled in a manner logically different from "valid ontological elements".

Originally Posted by AnssiH

This stuff about obtaining the t-index was something I was confused about earlier too, but thought it would get clarified further down the road.

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I'm wondering what does it mean that there is an "appropriate index t" to be attached to some set. The t is just an arbitrary number isn't, it, since t was introduced just to be able to express a set of presents.

Absolutely, "t", the number placed upon a specific present, has no basis in reality. But the "t" associated with an explanation has to be appropriate to that explanation: i.e., the specific value of that t (or, to be exact, an interpretation of the time being referenced) must be recoverable from the data which constitutes the explanation. Essentially it has to be an implicit parameter of the explanation or the explanation cannot have it as a parameter.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Hmm, does this have to do with the "surrounding circumstances" that you were talking about before? I'm wondering how the information about one missing index can be embedded to the other indices of that present... Especially when some of those elements are invalid elements we added on purpose (and thus arbitrary?)

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical. Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is" explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is" explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Again, I am looking forward to your response -- Dick
PS:

Originally Posted by AnssiH

This stuff gets really hairy when you get deeper into it, mainly because classifying reality (or any system) into things remains to be your only way to comprehend anything at all. That's the way we work.

Classifying reality is essentially identifying patterns in the "what is", is "what is" table which can be seen as "the same thing", using whatever data transformation which makes that result reasonable and/or acceptable.

**AnssiH** · May21-07, 07:01 PM

Originally Posted by Doctordick

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

Heh, yeah, Maya is alright. All these programs have their own little quirks. And actually ZBrush may have little bit steep learning curve for fun and play. There's this other capable sculpting software called "Mudbox", but I don't think it's available for Mac yet.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Could be that too, but I feel bigger obstacle is that it's hard for me to remember everything about your terminology (which has been quite familiar to you for some decades :), and so interpreting some sentences in any meaningful way becomes very difficult :P (i.e. I find my self going back to old posts a lot :) But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

This confusion about the "probability of B(t)" is a good example. I was just thinking if I have a set of numbers "X", how is "probability of X a function of that same X" :D You know, cause I had already forgotten what was meant with probability etc...

Given your latest response, this seems rather clear now. If I make up a set of numbers and want to find out if a particular "present" (1) is that set of numbers, then quite simply I can look at the table and find out; in the hypothetical fully filled table, the probability of finding that set of numbers from a present "1", is a function of the present "1" that has actually been laid down on the table.

In other words we could say; "the probability of having a presumed set X at particlar B(t) is a function of that B(t)" (Which is in my opinion a clearer way to say this simple fact; IF I now interpreted you correctly.

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is" table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?)

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)? I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known.

Well it's true that most people don't really grasp that because they never think about it (seems like it doesn't much interest them... and of course in daily life it just makes one's head hurt :), but then there are few philosophers who have expressed this issue in different ways. (For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

Also, I would go so far as to express it as, what we think reality is, is not just a mix of objective aspects and mental fabrications, but rather all mental fabrications whose correlation with objective reality is unknown... but that's just semantics! :D (And up to what is meant with "objective")

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion.

Yeah, and I think few philosophers and philosophically aligned physicists have expressed a more objective opinion saying "physical models are models dammit!" :) It is surprising to me how hard it is for some people to accept this. (One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

Ahha, of course! (Why didn't you say so

)

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical.

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is" explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is" explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Well, I'm just trying to express how I understand what you are saying, with the hopes that you can figure out what I'm getting wrong. I hope it makes your task easier. Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

-Anssi

~~Doctordick~~ · May22-07, 12:12 AM

Originally Posted by AnssiH

But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?

Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table. Back when I was young (that’s prior to computers and “slide rules” were usually only good to three digits) we quite often used things like log tables, trigonometric tables, etc. Prior to Newton, gunners used “range tables” to fire their guns. These “range tables” were constructed through experiment. Now days, gunnery is all done on computers (thanks to Newton for the most part). As a matter of fact, computers were originally invented to create gunnery tables in WWII from mathematical relations since the mathematicians often made errors. Any table of information can be seen as a “tabular function”. When one says something is a function of something else, all it means is that, if you are given the second item (that something else) and you know the “functional relationship” you also know what the answer is: “the function”.

For example, what one looks like is a pretty strong function of how old they are. Just because mathematicians have done a lot with the idea don’t think they have a patent on the concept.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)?

That isn’t an important issue at all since your solution to the epistemological problem cannot depend upon facts you have forgotten. The solution is based on what you think you know. Now that may be a very large table, but it is not infinite nor is it all incompassing.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS an objective perspective; at least you think it is. My only concern is that I can represent that perspective, no matter what it is: i.e., that it can be represented as a table of ontological elements you think are valid. The important issue here is that the symbols you use to represent those entries is a free parameter; a parameter, the meaning of which I have to deduce from the table you present to me.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

(For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

(One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

I am of the opinion that the issue of “ontology” has never been examined “scientifically”; the scientist simply have never conceived of a way of handling it. And they never will so long as they hold the necessity of definition as primary.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Aha, of course! (Why didn't you say so )

I thought I had!

Originally Posted by AnssiH

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is” table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”. This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

The meaningful association with quantum mechanics is the “uncertainty of the outcome”.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

That’s nice to know! At least someone out there thinks some of what I say makes sense.

Have fun Anssi -- Dick

**AnssiH** · May22-07, 04:06 AM

Originally Posted by Doctordick

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.
Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table.

Heh, I googled "tabular function" and got results that looked pretty complicated :) Anyway, I see what you meant.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS an objective perspective; at least you think it is.

...or at least most people think it is. This way of defining "objective" is a difficult thing for me to remember since it's been my philosophy for so long that any phenomena or thing we can think of is a case of have made a purely subjective categorizing or classification (So I need to do it in order to "think", so to speak, but I cannot claim to "know" the reality of what I'm thinking of).

I think I know how you mean that though, since you defined "intuition" little bit differently than I did, and sure enough, we must work with "what we think we know" when we investigate the world, so I think I can accept this definition too.

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon"). The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized relality!)

In my opinion that concept has been misunderstood many times. Sometimes it seems people take it as an assertion towards some sort of idealism (big surprise, right?).

But if I cut and paste the text from wikipedia entry, I think I can arrive at what I think Kant meant to say (or should have said... keeping in mind this is very old stuff and we have much more information about reality to work with now)

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

Note here that Kant may have been thinking there are "innate categories of understanding" to the mind. I.e. something similar to platonism. I beg to differ at this point. But it doesn't make the concept of noumenons invalid. The way I view it is that it is required for us to break reality into "sensible parts" so to understand it (i.e. it is "innate" to the brain to attempt to build a predictive model of reality this way), but any time you break reality into ANY sensible parts, you are talking about your "mental fabrications" about reality around you, and reality is not actually made of "parts" no matter how much we need to see things that way. (Incidentally, a different isolated culture would probably describe physical things with very different sorts of components than we do)

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

About "things-in-themselves"
"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

About "Noumena"
"But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition".

i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything. (Once again perhaps he thought there are "platonistic innate categories" to mind, but we need not think of something that naive to arrive at the same conclusion)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is” table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Right.

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”.

Yeah I know what is meant with "wave function", and it always amazes me when someone considers it to be a real thing, although these days as there are so many ways to understand QM, it seems more and more people actually think for themselves and realize wave function is just a concept that is useful in thinking about quantum systems.

Incidentally, I was commenting on this apparent violation between wave functions and spacetime here:
http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=130623

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of spacetime" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :), I thought it was relevant to comment that Bell experiments are explainable with the idea of spacetime as well (and as long as you are talking about photons, quite trivially so). Well, that shouldn't be surprising since it is essentially similar to "transactional interpretation". Perhaps you can appreciate that sort of joggling with "ontological elements" (keep in mind I am NOT making assertions about how reality IS... ...but only about how things can be explained to ourselves)

This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

Heh, so I guess that is a sentence that would fit right into that post about spacetime interpretation. But then there must be more invalid things in our ideas about reality, since we need to find an explanation for the correlation in bell experiments. The route I think could be more fruitful than "static spacetime" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

-Anssi

~~Doctordick~~ · May22-07, 06:28 PM

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

That is to say, it is a valid ontological element of reality by definition.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

... i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything.

That is to say, it is a mere entry in my ”what is”, is “what is” table. And you should understand why I insist on leaving the “valid ontological elements” totally undefined: they are there as a basis which the explanation (your world view) was invented to explain.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

And the “phenomenon” we are subjectively aware of are built from those mentally fabricated ontological elements we have invented to allow us to think about the problem of explaining “reality”. The “phenomenon” are categorizations of “what we think we know”. A fabrication; but a fabrication which serves a purpose; the real purpose of that fabrication is to allow our severely limited minds generate expectations consistent with reality. (As I have said before, it's a data compression problem.) As long as that “explanation” explains the past (what we think we know: that ”what is”, is “what is” table) then we think of it as a valid “explanation of reality” (after all, we have utterly no evidence to support the idea that it is wrong as long as it explains everything we think we know). As many philosophers have said, there is no logical defense for the presumption it will be valid tomorrow.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey. The only absolutely flaw free explanation of what you think you know is that ”what is”, is “what is” explanation (all it does is yield “what you think you know”). As I have commented several times, it is nonetheless, a pretty worthless explanation (other than the fact that it will still be valid tomorrow in that it will simply have some more entries). But it certainly can't be used in reality as the volume of information required simply exceeds our ability to consider. (We are confronted with a data compression problem!)

The issue here is, what kinds of “fabricated ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem (the problem of “explaining reality”) without eliminating any possibilities; while, at the same time, maintaining the flaw free nature of the explanation itself: i.e., continuing to yield exactly the entries in that ”what is”, is “what is” table (including the fabricated ontological elements).

Sorry I get carried away. Meanwhile, back to your post.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

I agree with you one hundred percent.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized reality!)

That is why I insist on working directly with the concept of referencing these things via the ”what is”, is “what is” table: we totally avoid the issue of comprehending any concepts as all I am doing is examining the problem itself.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience.

... in order to make sense of that raw unstructured ”what is”, is “what is” table.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

They can never prove their expectations are correct; all they can really say is, “what they expect”.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

All we can really know is that ”they are”, what “they are” strange how we come back to that same kind of expression isn't it!

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

Originally Posted by AnssiH

About "things-in-themselves"
“...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think [of] them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."[/i]
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

Well, as far as I am concerned, I can conceive of no other way of referring to them which does not require defining them.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of space time" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :)

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school. I think we do think a lot alike.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

The route I think could be more fruitful than "static space time" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

The only problem with this comment is that the concern is with solving the problem of explaining reality. This is an issue I have no interest in attacking; I will simply leave it to the scientists. A correct solution is much like hitting a thirty foot jump shot; you need a lot of practice to develop the intuition required to correlate all the significant issues. My point being that none of these solutions are arrived at by logic; they are only defeated by logic.

These forums are full of people who believe that great solutions come about by accident and that they might be the ones to discover something significant. As I have said several times, the attitude is that, if they stir the pot of what is known enough, maybe something of value will float to the top; it's what I call the “guess and by golly approach”. Let me point out that if the purpose of science is to discover new valuable ways of explaining reality, most all scientists can count themselves as failures. There is no organization to the search at all.

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is” table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possess entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is” table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is” table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is” table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used, would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Are we having fun -- Dick

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

May22-07, 11:33 PM

Originally Posted by AnssiH

... [1]In materialism the subjective experience is thought to be caused by the interaction of smaller entities that are thought to be "metaphysical" or "ontological" elements. -> It is not given that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element...[2]Since you gave "Anssi" as an example of a "metaphysical entity", I believe you are still referring to the fact that our "subjective experience exists"...[3]If on the other hand you regard any thing we have defined, as something that exists ontologically, this kind of defeats the purpose of the concept "ontology", because the whole reason why there is such a field as ontology is to ask what are things that exist even when we are not there to define them as such...

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities-- that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

**AnssiH** · May29-07, 04:40 PM

Originally Posted by Doctordick

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

Cool :) I thought noumenon would be a concept you'd very much appreciate.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey.

Yeah, let me tell you it can be very difficult to figure out how you mean that exactly (has been for me too). Not surprising I guess, since we all naturally think of things by trying to define/conceptualize/classify them into comprehensible chunks. So this includes the case of trying to understand what you are saying.

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

Yeah :) I have no problems with however one defines intuition (and I personally try to keep it away from equation, as it appears to be a mere side-effect of us not being conscious of what is occurring at the low levels of the cortical hierarchy), but I was just warning you that Kant seems to use "intuition" as caused by those "innate categories".

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school.

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is” table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possess entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is” table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is” table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is” table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used, would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

Are we having fun

Busy fun :) I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

Heh, cool :) Yeah, Russia and Finland are still two very different worlds certainly.

-Anssi

**AnssiH** · May29-07, 04:58 PM

Originally Posted by Rade

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities--

You are referring to "strong emergence"? (Instead of normal everyday emergence; some function as a result of natural interaction between some components)

that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

I would agree with the 3rd point you are making, but I am unable to figure out why do you imply it is given that "self" is a valid ontological element. Isn't it relevant to ask what is the ontology behind our "thoughts" (i.e. what causes conscious experience)? Unless if by "ontological element" you don't mean to refer to fundamental (or "undivisible") elements at all?

-Anssi

~~Doctordick~~ · May30-07, 03:05 PM

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

I think you are right here. Though I have come to the conclusion that very few if any people with really good backgrounds in mathematical physics actually read any of these forums, posting here has nonetheless been very educational for me. I see what I have discovered from quite a different perspective (more of a philosophical perspective) than I did five years ago. I first got on the web at the suggestion of my son-in-law after a conversation we had back in 2002 (he was a national consultant on web page design at the time). While cleaning the attic, I had accidentally run across a copy of something I had tried to publish twenty years before (it had been rejected by several journals as not being physics). My son-in-law suggested the web as a method of reaching people. As I said, it's been a learning experience for me.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

Yes, I think we can; however, I would like to put that off to the next post as there is one other thing I would like to introduce you to. You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation” can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function. Suppose we are given some arbitrary function $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}(B(t))$ , then $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}\\cdot \\vec{\\phi}$ is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number. Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is” table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

$LaTeX Code: A = \\int_{x_1=-\\infty}^{x_1=+\\infty}\\int_{x_2=-\\infty}^{x_2=+\\infty}\\cdots\\int_{x_n=-\\infty}^{x_n=+\\infty}<BR>\\vec{\\phi}\\cdot \\vec{\\phi}dx_1dx_2 \\cdots dx_n$

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}(B(t))\\cdot\\phi}(B(t))$ /A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is” table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

Have fun -- Dick

**Langbein** · May30-07, 04:02 PM

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldnt it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

~~Doctordick~~ · May31-07, 12:42 PM

Originally Posted by Langbein

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldnt it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

I agree with you one hundred percent. This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did. I am in the process of showing what can be deduced from my definition of time. What you mean by the term may be entirely different but, unless you can demonstrate some important usefulness of your perspective, I think mine is superior. Now that is just an opinion you understand; I make no claim that a better explanation of the issue does not exist, I just haven't heard one myself.

Have fun -- Dick

**Langbein** · Jun1-07, 09:45 PM

Originally Posted by Doctordick

This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did.

But if time is defined to be something else than it usualy is wouldn't the answer to the original question be like this:

Question: Is time "just" an illusion ?

Answer: If "time" is defined to be something else than the ordinary and common meaning of the term "time", then it will be an illusion, if the new definition defines it to be an illusion.

If the nature of "time" can be described as a sum of different properties that has some complementary relationships to each other, would it then be wise to remove some of those "complementary properties" ?

If the magnetic component by definition is left out of the term "electro magnetic vaves" will it then have a meaning to ask question about the nature of electro magnetic vaves ?

Is it thinkable that the nature of time might have such compementary properties ?

**AnssiH** · Jun2-07, 06:21 PM

Sorry for late response. I had to find time to read this post properly (had to do some googling while reading it :)

Originally Posted by Doctordick

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Heh, that's probably true :)

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

I'll try to ask the meaningful questions. Although often I can find the answers by some googling. (I messed around with vectors and dot products and what not about a year ago and had already forgotten everything :)

You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation” can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function.

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Suppose we are given some arbitrary function $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}(B(t))$ , then $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}\\cdot \\vec{\\phi}$ is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number.

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

At any rate, obviously I understand it is possible to scale results so they come bounded by 0 and 1. I guess that was the important bit.

Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is” table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

$LaTeX Code: A = \\int_{x_1=-\\infty}^{x_1=+\\infty}\\int_{x_2=-\\infty}^{x_2=+\\infty}\\cdots\\int_{x_n=-\\infty}^{x_n=+\\infty}<BR>\\vec{\\phi}\\cdot \\vec{\\phi}dx_1dx_2 \\cdots dx_n$

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )
Anyway, I can understand what you are saying above the LaTeX.

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function $LaTeX Code: \\vec{\\phi}(B(t))\\cdot\\phi}(B(t))$ /A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is” table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

I'll try to give a more meaningful reply if you try and sort out my confusions :P

-Anssi

~~Tosh~~ · Jun2-07, 09:12 PM

To return to the thread:

Is time an illusion? No comment, but I would ask another question,

Is time relevant to us?
As time passes, we lose a part of ourselves. If we don't use it for good, it is wasted.

**Langbein** · Jun3-07, 08:09 AM

But why not just answer what time is ?

If it can be wasted it will have to be "something" ?

An illusion can not be wasted, can it ?

If we are living in time, and using or wasting time, and doing things like earning money per hour, paying interrest per year, etc, somebody should now what time is ?

~~Doctordick~~ · Jun3-07, 04:22 PM

Hi Anssi, I am sorry I confused you. Sometimes I write a lot without realizing the various ways what I write can be taken; to paraphrase an old cliche, there are more ways to misinterpret what is being said than is dreamt of in your philosophy (which is really the essence of our conversation and I, of all people, should remember that). It is no fault of yours but you have missed intended central point of my ramblings.

The essence of magic is the misdirection of attention and physics has much to do with magic (it makes a lot of sense unless you happen to question something they can not answer). It is often very easy to miss a simple point simply because other issues catch your attention so I perhaps shouldn't have put so many varied issues in a single post; but it does tend to reveal those misunderstandings so I suppose I can be excused. I hadn't intended to send you off on a wild goose chase through google.

I think that the most important comment in my post was, “After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint?” I will try to reassert my point a little differently.

I had proved earlier that expectations could be seen as a mathematical function of what was being asked: i.e., expectations as a probability (a number bounded by zero and one) and the description of the circumstance being asked about (a collection of numerical references to ontological elements). Think of the issue this way: any circumstance may be described by a collection of numbers (think of it as someone typing input into a computer) and what we would like to discover is a computer program which would output the probability that the circumstance being so described is actually a valid description of reality. If such a program existed, it would go a long way towards passing the Turing test (it would certainly “know” when you were lying and when you were telling the truth). If that weren't an intelligent program, it certainly would know how to make intelligent judgments.

Well, let's go back and look at that problem again. If there existed such a program, that program would be a member of the collection of “all possible programs” wouldn't it? If it doesn't exist, so what? That simply means it doesn't exist and that is no more than “tough cookies” so to speak; if it doesn't exist, you can be pretty sure no one will find it: i.e., it is a total waste of time to consider that possibility (we might as well just go drink some beer). The real problem here is that the set of “all possible programs” is a pretty large set to search. Neither you nor I am apt to find it just by looking for it. And neither is anyone else.

And exactly what are scientists doing anyway? Aren't they out there, looking for the truth? Putting forth possibilities and looking for problems in their suggestions? In reality, isn't that almost the definition of “the scientific method”? I would rather sit back and think a little; ask myself, “exactly what am I looking for?”

The only reason I brought up the “quantum mechanics and square root” thing was that there is currently a little fire behind the perspective that “square roots” are important functions with characteristics which might explain some things. As I said, “many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful”.

What I was trying to point out was that absolutely every square root is something which can be squared. In fact, it is possible to define a very specific process which gives universality to the concept: i.e., an operation which always yields a positive definite scalar. A universal concept which can be applied to any conceivable function. Given that we are looking for a function which yields a probability, should one really be surprised to find that the behavior of “square roots” is an important issue?

To put it another way, let's go look at that computer program which yields a yes/no answer to the question, “was what was typed in true description of reality or not?” Now, let us attach to a computer a device which performs a very simple operation. Let the output of the first computer be a collection of n numbers (make n as large as you wish) and let the attached device square each of those numbers and then add them together to generate a final result. The result is clearly a positive definite number. If we “normalize that number” (divide it by the largest number possible given the n you chose with bit width of numbers in the system) then the output will be a number bounded by zero and one. It can certainly be interpreted as a probability.

Now, there are two questions I want to ask about that circumstance. If, the AI program we originally discussed, exists, can it be implemented on the combination I have just described. The answer is of course “yes”. That program is to produce a single number bounded by zero and one and that output can certainly be squared so the added device has not blocked the search for that program in any way (if the original program exists, one can add a simple step which generates the positive square root of that correct answer and the added device will simply square it and give us back the correct answer). The second, more important question, is; has that added device eliminated a single program from the set of “all possible programs” to be examined?. It should be clear to you that the correct answer to that question is a resounding “no”.

To put it another way, any procedure which is to yield a number bounded by zero and one (i.e., a probability) must involve an operation which guarantees the output lies in that range (i.e., an operation which is analogous to squaring) and one should not be surprised that, things that can be “squared” (i.e., square roots) are important functions to examine. If we are to be objective about this, we must eliminate no possibilities.

That is the central issue of my attack; I am being very careful to eliminate no possibilities. Defining the last operation required to develop a probability to be a vector dot product satisfies a required obvious constraint and, at the same time, eliminates no possible procedures (often referred to as methods). I have defined an explanation to be “a method of obtaining expectations” from given known information. The vector phi is the output of some unknown function and the probability that the argument of that function, B(t) is a valid entry in our ”what is”, is “what is” table is defined to be a vector dot product of that vector with itself (essentially, the square of its magnitude). If phi is indeed the function we are looking for then the square of that function is the probability density of seeing B(t). The important fact here is that no possibility has been eliminated by this representation: i.e., if a solution exists, phi exists.

I apologize that I misspoke in my last post: I referred to the vector dot product as the probability when it is not; it is the probability density (this has to do with the fact that the possibilities are infinite and our sum over all possibilities must become an integral). Sorry about that.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Of course we can; but I hope what I have just written above clarifies why we are not interested in looking for such a thing.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Sure; the issue isn't how we do it but rather the fact that it has to be done in order to obtain a probabilistic result. If you come up with a method which is applicable to every possible function and can be laid out as a well defined procedure, it would work just as well as the one I am using.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

Very simple, I was sloppy. I showed the dot product being divided by A when I should have shown each phi divided by the square root of A (exactly the same thing but easy to confuse). One normally presumes that phi is the function being normalized, not the actual probability. Plus that, the magnitude of phi squared is, as I said above, the probability density, not the probability. If that bothers you let me know and I will go into it in more detail (it is actually quite a simple issue).

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )

Could I ask what browser you are using? I am using “FireFox” in its default mode and the font in the LaTex expressions seems to be actually larger than the font in the main text. Maybe you have some preference set strangely. Sorry I can't help as I am quite ignorant of such things but quite surprised to hear of your difficulty. All the windows machines and “the Internet Explorer” seem to yield about the same result.

Originally Posted by AnssiH

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

The only reason I even bring up quantum mechanics is that it is the most successful theory ever proposed and, by the time we finish, it will be quite obvious why it is so successful. What I am presenting to you is actually a logical deduction of quantum mechanics itself. Along with that, I will show you some subtle flaws in modern physics and their perspective on quantum mechanics.

By the way, the single most significant question asked by most scientists is, “where do we go from here?” That question makes the implicit assumption that “where we are” is significant. That is not the question I ask; I simply ask, where should we be going? What is important about the difference is that “where we are” can have no bearing on the answer; the answer must be universal.

Looking to hear from you again -- Dick