View Full Version : Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail
hypnagogue
Dec15-03, 04:23 PM
"At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.
Purely physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents; and it provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions, accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because a physical account can entail the facts about structures and functions: once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical.
The moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods - methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes - work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kind of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.
This might seem reminiscent of the vitalist claim that no physical account could explain life, but the cases are disanalogous. What drove vitalist skepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms could perform the many remarkable functions associated with life, such as complex adaptive behavior and reproduction. The conceptual claim that explanation of functions is what is needed was implicitly accepted, but lacking detailed knowledge of biochemical mechanisms, vitalists doubted whether any physical process could do the job and put forward the hypothesis of the vital spirit as an alternative explanation. Once it turned out that physical processes could perform the relevant functions, vitalist doubts melted away.
With experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. This basic conceptual point is not something that further neuroscientific investigation will affect. In a similar way, experience is disanalogous to the élan vital. The vital spirit was put forward as an explanatory posit, in order to explain the relevant functions, and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right, and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.
It is tempting to note that all sorts of puzzling phenomena have eventually turned out to be explainable in physical terms. But each of these were problems about the observable behavior of physical objects, coming down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of thing that a physical account might explain, even if at some points there have been good reasons to suspect that no such explanation would be forthcoming. The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions. The problem of consciousness is puzzling in an entirely different way. An analysis of the problem shows us that conscious experience is just not the kind of thing that a wholly reductive account could succeed in explaining."
- excerpted from "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)," by David Chalmers
"Consciousness appears to be an extremely mysterious phenomenon. It is not clear how a collection of molecules whose chemical composition is not unlike that of a cheese omelet could be aware of anything, to feel pain, or see red, or dream about the future. Quantum mechanics also seems to be very mysterious -- particles going traversing two paths at the same time, for example. So perhaps they are the same mystery. Nobody phrases it that way, of course, but this seems to be a line of intuition that motivates many people. It is often argued that mere neurons could not be conscious or aware, and this seems to be because one can imagine all the working of of a neuron, or even a large group of neurons, without seeing how consciousness could be implicated. But because the mechanisms underlying quantum mechanical phenomena are less viaualizable, or comprehensible, or whatever, it seems not to be as clear that something as mysterious as consciousness couldn't work its way into the machine somehow. Clearly, this intuition survives only as long as the mechanisms of quantum mechanics are mysterious to the person making the argument."
---Rick Grush
Chalmers once said: The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
-the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
-the integration of information by a cognitive system;
-the reportability of mental states;
-the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
-the focus of attention;
-the deliberate control of behavior;
-the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
I just have one question. How would this correlate with the undeniable existance that some organisms are subjects of experience and that cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, while qualia and other emotions avoid ambiguity of the "consciousness" of an organism?
I know Chalmers discussed this before but I can't remember where or when. The only thing I could think of was Chalmers discussing "the subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities..."
Can you help? Or speak for him?
hypnagogue
Dec15-03, 05:22 PM
Originally posted by Jeebus
I just have one question. How would this correlate with the undeniable existance that some organisms are subjects of experience and that cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, while qualia and other emotions avoid ambiguity of the "consciousness" of an organism?
I'm afraid I don't quite understand the question. Rephrase?
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I'm afraid I don't quite understand the question. Rephrase?
Let me try again.
Chalmers once said: The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
-the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
-the integration of information by a cognitive system;
-the reportability of mental states;
-the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
-the focus of attention;
-the deliberate control of behavior;
-the difference between wakefulness and sleep.
The initial question is basically: How would these seven problems correlate to, let's say, an organism. Since organisms aren't really cognitive systems and don't really 'hold' in visual and auditory informational processing -- how would organisms fit into these simple concepts of consciousness?
hypnagogue
Dec15-03, 10:12 PM
Originally posted by Jeebus
The initial question is basically: How would these seven problems correlate to, let's say, an organism. Since organisms aren't really cognitive systems and don't really 'hold' in visual and auditory informational processing -- how would organisms fit into these simple concepts of consciousness?
[?] Why aren't organisms cognitive systems? The term does not need to refer exclusively to organisms (it can refer to, say, a robot as well), but for the most part, when we talk about cognitive systems we mean organisms or functional cognitive principles exhibited by organisms. Easily the paradigmatic case of a cognitive system is the common human being. Humans exhibit all of the cognitive qualities in the list you provide by Chalmers-- that's the only reason they've been nominated at various points as possible 'essences' of consciousness in the first place.
First off, Chalmers is indeed doing what the vitalist skeptics did before. He's saying that we can just reduce it to more and more physical processes, and never get to the experience part. Well, Daniel Dennett's intentional stance of heterophenomenology allows for those physical processes to be the experience and many scientists are coming up with hypotheses that work just as he predicted (William Calvin and Gerald Edleman are just two examples...they've each written a few very good books, and I highly recommend them, btw).
Secondly, in the case of the vitalists, which Chalmer's himself denounces (while, IMO, basically doing exactly the same thing they did), it was discovered that the physical processes really were life. There is no more to life than the things that biology has uncovered. However, before they uncovered it, it was assumed that there must be some non-physical (spiritual) aspect that accounted for the "life" part of the being, since physical explanations had not yet yielded a satisfactory understanding. Why so many philosophers of the mind fall for this same trap is beyond me, but he himself (Chalmers, that is) exposed it as fallacious, and I say he's doing the same thing.
Lastly, are there any books by Chalmers that I might read to further understand his views?
hypnagogue
Dec17-03, 11:59 AM
Mentat, I get the idea that either you didn't read the excerpt very closely, or you just don't like what it has to say. Either way, I expected better from you. [6)] All of your counterpoints are anticipated and explicitly rebutted in the original post, so rather than make bald assertions, you will need to counter the already detailed counter arguments to make any progress.
Originally posted by Mentat
First off, Chalmers is indeed doing what the vitalist skeptics did before. He's saying that we can just reduce it to more and more physical processes, and never get to the experience part. Well, Daniel Dennett's intentional stance of heterophenomenology allows for those physical processes to be the experience and many scientists are coming up with hypotheses that work just as he predicted (William Calvin and Gerald Edleman are just two examples...they've each written a few very good books, and I highly recommend them, btw).
From the excerpt:
For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.
How is it that activity in the visual cortex accounts for the experience of the color red? There is an explanatory gap here, and it won't go away by simply ignoring it, as it seems is the strategy of Dennett.
Secondly, in the case of the vitalists, which Chalmer's himself denounces (while, IMO, basically doing exactly the same thing they did), it was discovered that the physical processes really were life. There is no more to life than the things that biology has uncovered. However, before they uncovered it, it was assumed that there must be some non-physical (spiritual) aspect that accounted for the "life" part of the being, since physical explanations had not yet yielded a satisfactory understanding. Why so many philosophers of the mind fall for this same trap is beyond me, but he himself (Chalmers, that is) exposed it as fallacious, and I say he's doing the same thing.
I'm surprised that this is your position, since the last 3 paragraphs of the excerpt explicitly rebuts every one of your objections, and you have done nothing here to analyze or critique the actual rebuttal. Get back to me on this one.
Lastly, are there any books by Chalmers that I might read to further understand his views?
I am still familiarizing myself with Chalmers, but I highly recommend two papers of his I have read:
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)
His homepage, with many more materials, is at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/
For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.
Why shouldn't it? In other words, by what method have we eliminated the idea that any such complex physical patterns are indeed conscious? It looks like consciousness, it acts like consciousness, what more is there?
In short, a circular argument. We assume experience as a property that is outside of the physical, and lo and behold! We find experience as a property that is outside of the physical!
The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.
Why not?
Originally posted by hypnagogue
From the excerpt:
For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.
How is it that activity in the visual cortex accounts for the experience of the color red? There is an explanatory gap here, and it won't go away by simply ignoring it, as it seems is the strategy of Dennett.
But Dennett's intentional stance does not "ignore" the issue, it provides a way out from the seeming problem, by showing that it needn't be a problem at all. Basically, Dennett said what any scientist would say to the vitalists if any still exist: There is no explanatory gap, there is simply a process, and this process is life, it does not "produce" this mysterious phenomenon.
I'm surprised that this is your position, since the last 3 paragraphs of the excerpt explicitly rebuts every one of your objections...
No, it attempts to. I read that part very carefully, and all I saw was vitalism re-visited. He says:
...each of these were problems about the observable behavior of physical objects, coming down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of thing that a physical account might explain, even if at some points there have been good reasons to suspect that no such explanation would be forthcoming. The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.
Can you not see the ridiculousness of this last claim? Does he honestly believe that the vitalists believed that "life" was just a physical phenomenon and would remain a mystery simply because we'd never be able to explain all of its functions?!? Not at all, they probably made statements exactly like his last one, but were proven wrong anyway.
I am still familiarizing myself with Chalmers, but I highly recommend two papers of his I have read:
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)
His homepage, with many more materials, is at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/
I'll check 'em out when I have time [:)]. Thanks.
hypnagogue
Dec29-03, 02:52 PM
Originally posted by FZ+
Why shouldn't it? In other words, by what method have we eliminated the idea that any such complex physical patterns are indeed conscious? It looks like consciousness, it acts like consciousness, what more is there?
The "more" is the subjective experience (or lack thereof) on the part of the system in question. Objective observation of behavior can give us clues as to underlying subjective experience, but in the end it is all speculation fueled by analogy to one's own direct experience of consciousness.
False positives and false negatives (is that the term I'm looking for?) are not hard to come by. People with blindsight might objectively appear to have complete subjective visual experience, but in some areas of their visual fields, they in fact do not even though they can interact coherently with objects in their blind spots. Likewise, someone in a coma may appear to be unconscious but may in fact have some conscious experience. So behavioral analyses are insufficient to get a true grasp on the presence or absence of consciousness, not to mention the quality of consciousness, even if they serve as a useful heuristic for most 'normal' cases.
The only reason behavioral analyses of consciousness work in the first place is because we can juxtapose someone else's behavior (including, importantly, verbal reports) with the behavior we ourselves associate with our own conscious experiences. One might call this method of understanding consciousness "objective judgement by way of comparison to subjective experience." If you erase the "by way of comparison to subjective experience" from the equation, as would be done in a purely physical explanation in terms of structures and functions, you have erased the entirety of your understanding of the relevant phenomenon-- you know all about heads but nothing about tails, so your knowledge of the coin is incomplete. This is especially problematic when the phenomenon you want to investigate is tails.
The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.
Why not?
Because you can explain physical structures and functions all you want and you still have not explained the whole picture. Take the typical argument: imagine a colorblind neuroscientist N in the far future who has complete knowledge of the structures and functions of the human brain. In spite of his complete objective knowledge, he still does not have the whole account: he does not know what it is like to see the color red. Now imagine that N has an operation that cures his colorblindess-- he learns something new about consciousness, above and beyond the objective facts about the structures and functions of the brain.
edit: Stated more generally and eloquently by Chalmers--
"Recall the main conceptual distinction between the easy and hard problems. The easy problems - explaining discrimination, integration, accessibility, internal monitoring, reportability, and so on - all concern the performance of various functions. For these phenomena, once we have explained how the relevant functions are performed, we have explained what needs to be explained. The hard problem, by contrast, is not a problem about how functions are performed. For any given function that we explain, it remains a nontrivial further question: why is the performance of this function associated with conscious experience? The sort of functional explanation that is suited to answering the easy problems is therefore not automatically suited to answering the hard problem."
from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/moving.html
hypnagogue
Dec29-03, 03:04 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
But Dennett's intentional stance does not "ignore" the issue, it provides a way out from the seeming problem, by showing that it needn't be a problem at all. Basically, Dennett said what any scientist would say to the vitalists if any still exist: There is no explanatory gap, there is simply a process, and this process is life, it does not "produce" this mysterious phenomenon.
If there is no explanatory gap, try to explain to a colorblind person what the color red looks like by telling him all about the visual processing centers in the brain.
Can you not see the ridiculousness of this last claim? Does he honestly believe that the vitalists believed that "life" was just a physical phenomenon and would remain a mystery simply because we'd never be able to explain all of its functions?!? Not at all, they probably made statements exactly like his last one, but were proven wrong anyway.
There is a key distinction to be made in the two cases. Explaining life involves explaining objectively observable phenomena; explaining consciousness involves explaining subjective experience, which is not objectively observable.
In the case of vitalism, the explanandum is one of structure and function: how is it that organisms can move about, grow, reproduce, etc? Vitalists could not see how physical explanations could account for these objectively observable structures and functions, so they posited the existence of the non-physical spirit. Once the structures and functions of life were shown to be explainable in physical terms, the explanatory posit of the spirit was no longer needed and was discarded.
In the case of consciousness, the explanandum itself is not one of structure and function (if it were, a colorblind person could learn all about the color red simply by reading up on neuroscience). We cannot readily discard the part that is not about structure and function in this case, since it is not an explanitory posit, but rather the thing to be explained. So explaining consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions of the brain is not an amenable step in the right direction, it is an outright denial of the issue at hand.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
If there is no explanatory gap, try to explain to a colorblind person what the color red looks like by telling him all about the visual processing centers in the brain.
You can't, because no man can be made to experience something simply by having it explained to them, and the intentional stance doesn't require that. The intentional stance simply dictates that, when one does experience the color red, the experience is completely explainable as processes of the brain (and, if you were capable of reaching into the brain with a probe that could excite just the right neurons, in just the right fashion, you would produce the very same experience).
There is a key distinction to be made in the two cases. Explaining life involves explaining objectively observable phenomena; explaining consciousness involves explaining subjective experience, which is not objectively observable.
Unless the intentional stance is correct, in which case subjective experience is objectively observable, you just have to know what to look for.
In the case of vitalism, the explanandum is one of structure and function: how is it that organisms can move about, grow, reproduce, etc? Vitalists could not see how physical explanations could account for these objectively observable structures and functions, so they posited the existence of the non-physical spirit. Once the structures and functions of life were shown to be explainable in physical terms, the explanatory posit of the spirit was no longer needed and was discarded.
In the case of consciousness, the explanandum itself is not one of structure and function (if it were, a colorblind person could learn all about the color red simply by reading up on neuroscience).
But a person who isn't colorblind can't know anything more about it than a person who is...the only difference is that one has experienced it, and the other hasn't (and if you could excite the other's brain just right, that other would experience it).
We cannot readily discard the part that is not about structure and function in this case, since it is not an explanitory posit, but rather the thing to be explained. So explaining consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions of the brain is not an amenable step in the right direction, it is an outright denial of the issue at hand.
This seems to me to be a mystic denial of science's abilities. If the intentional stance turns out to be the way to go, then science will indeed be able to explain consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions.
Just to be clear: The intentional stance doesn't dictate that the neurologist should be able to detect some part of the subject's brain that is shaded red, for that particular experience; instead it shows that the subject couldn't see such a shading either, and the experience must thus be an illusion of belief (belief also being a function of the brain).
Originally posted by Mentat
You can't, because no man can be made to experience something simply by having it explained to them, and the intentional stance doesn't require that. The intentional stance simply dictates that, when one does experience the color red, the experience is completely explainable as processes of the brain (and, if you were capable of reaching into the brain with a probe that could excite just the right neurons, in just the right fashion, you would produce the very same experience).
This does not address Hypnogogue's (or Chalmer's) point. You say that the experience of red is explainable as a brain process. But if you look closely at what is being explained, which is a subjective experience, that makes no sense. Physical reductionism does not cross the explanatory gap, as Hypno says. Nor does 'hetero-phenomenology'.
Unless the intentional stance is correct, in which case subjective experience is objectively observable, you just have to know what to look for.
First person experience is not objectively observable. This is why it is called first person experience. All that can be observed is physical behaviour. As someone said, forgotten who, digging into the brain to look for consciousness is just as useful as digging into the Earth to look for gravity. It's making a category error.
But a person who isn't colorblind can't know anything more about it than a person who is...the only difference is that one has experienced it, and the other hasn't.
You acknowledge that there is a difference then?
This seems to me to be a mystic denial of science's abilities. If the intentional stance turns out to be the way to go, then science will indeed be able to explain consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions. [/B]
Ifs and buts. Are you sure you've understood the 'intentional stance'? It's not an explanation of consciousness. Could you outline what you mean by it.
selfAdjoint
Dec31-03, 09:29 AM
I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.
The Chalmers wing don't think they have to prove consciousness is more than what is explained, they just want to demand that scientists prove that it isn't.
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.
That was pretty much my point, about how this mystic viewpoint is the enemy of scientific discovery...it was in the days of the vitalists, and it is now.
Originally posted by Canute
This does not address Hypnogogue's (or Chalmer's) point. You say that the experience of red is explainable as a brain process. But if you look closely at what is being explained, which is a subjective experience, that makes no sense. Physical reductionism does not cross the explanatory gap, as Hypno says. Nor does 'hetero-phenomenology'.
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?
First person experience is not objectively observable. This is why it is called first person experience. All that can be observed is physical behaviour. As someone said, forgotten who, digging into the brain to look for consciousness is just as useful as digging into the Earth to look for gravity. It's making a category error.
But subjective experience cannot exist seperate of the physical processes of the brain...in the first place, if it wasn't physical, then it couldn't interact with the physical; also, if exists seperately of the functions of the brain, in any way, then there must be something inside the head that observes these phenomena...that's asking for a homunculus.
You acknowledge that there is a difference then?
A difference between explaining it and experiencing it? Of course. There's a difference between explaining life and experiencing it too.
Ifs and buts. Are you sure you've understood the 'intentional stance'? It's not an explanation of consciousness. Could you outline what you mean by it.
The "intentional stance" is basically a scientific principle, stated in philosophical terms, it is the anti-mysticism. Basically, if something meets all of the physical qualifications for a particular phenomenon, then the phenomenon is occuring. If something meets all of the physical qualifications for life, then it is alive, and there is nothing metaphysical to add to it. If something meets all of the physical qualifications of being conscious, then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it.
This is the gist that I've gotten from Dennett's explanations of the intentional stance.
Because you can explain physical structures and functions all you want and you still have not explained the whole picture. Take the typical argument: imagine a colorblind neuroscientist N in the far future who has complete knowledge of the structures and functions of the human brain. In spite of his complete objective knowledge, he still does not have the whole account: he does not know what it is like to see the color red. Now imagine that N has an operation that cures his colorblindess-- he learns something new about consciousness, above and beyond the objective facts about the structures and functions of the brain.
But by that argument, how can you justify the way you take for granted that anyone else is conscious? When the colorblind man is healed, how can you say that he is in fact healed at all, without using structures and so on? And so, without understanding of the idea of red, how can you say that the man knows what the colour red feels like?
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.
The Chalmers wing don't think they have to prove consciousness is more than what is explained, they just want to demand that scientists prove that it isn't.
I think you've got it bang on. Those who think that consciousness involves first person experience want to see first person experience explained, and not just swept under the carpet by science in the way it was for most of the the 20th century. It's perfectly obvious that an experience of red is a different thing to a bunch of neurons, we should accept that and move on.
Originally posted by Mentat
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?
If one could redefine 'subjective experience' as a physical process then you'd be right. Unfortunately you can't. That's why they're called subjective experiences. Some diehards are still trying but nobody has succeeded, and they never will. They are different categories of things. Science attempted to do what you have suggested for most of the 20th century. Yet here we no further on than William James was 100 years ago.
But subjective experience cannot exist seperate of the physical processes of the brain...
Can you prove that?
in the first place, if it wasn't physical, then it couldn't interact with the physical; also, if exists seperately of the functions of the brain, in any way, then there must be something inside the head that observes these phenomena...that's asking for a homunculus.
Yes, these are some of the difficult problems to be solved.
The "intentional stance" is basically a scientific principle, stated in philosophical terms, it is the anti-mysticism.
This is not correct. The intentional stance is a perspective on behaviour, a way of predicting it and interpreting its causes. It can be applied to the behaviour of people, thermostats or lightening bolts. Fundamentally it is much the same stance as that taken by Watson and Skinner and other behaviorists, jazzed up a bit. It says that beliefs and representations are real only to the extent that they can be infered from an agents behaviour by a third-person. It is a 'black box' approach to mind, an approach now largely discarded by science.
Basically, if something meets all of the physical qualifications for a particular phenomenon, then the phenomenon is occuring. If something meets all of the physical qualifications for life, then it is alive, and there is nothing metaphysical to add to it. If something meets all of the physical qualifications of being conscious, then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it.
What are the 'physical qualifications' for being conscious? As far as I know nobody knows what these are.
This is the gist that I've gotten from Dennett's explanations of the intentional stance. [/B]
This is not what Dennett says as far as I can tell. He says that if one assumes that an agent is conscious, and also that the agent is rational, and also that the agent has beliefs which affect its behaviour, and then finds that, by taking the intentional stance, one can predict the agent's behaviour, then one can assume that beliefs and representations are physical. If that sounds daft it isn't my fault.
It is tempting to think that anyone as clever as Dan Dennett must have a good point when they write books about a topic. However you can't take this for granted. Academia is a funny place. Dennett covers his tracks well when he's writing, but if you strip away the complexity and get down to basics his ideas are not new and don't make much sense. This conclusion is not just mine, it is widely held. Do you know of any philosophers who agree with him? I haven't found any, but then there's lots I haven't read.
Originally posted by FZ+
But by that argument, how can you justify the way you take for granted that anyone else is conscious? When the colorblind man is healed, how can you say that he is in fact healed at all, without using structures and so on? And so, without understanding of the idea of red, how can you say that the man knows what the colour red feels like?
Good point. This is why science cannot prove that consciousness exists. It's known as the 'other minds' problem. There is no way of knowing that any mind exists except your own.
pelastration
Jan1-04, 01:26 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?
Mentat, it isn't just a process of the brain. Every personal experience has effect on the whole body, and is a multi-dimensional action of the whole body (Brain-dimension, cell-dimension, DNA-dimension, Genes-dimension, etc.). They ALL contain memories, I repeat MEMORIES. Some are more profound, some more dynamic. They are all the time interacting. Don't look to this as a simplistic action.
pelastration
Jan1-04, 01:39 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Good point. This is why science cannot prove that consciousness exists. It's known as the 'other minds' problem. There is no way of knowing that any mind exists except your own.
Canute ... we learn from experiences of others like written in the Sutra's, in books, scripts and memories of human knowledge. We find information in them that is new to our information storage and may use it or not. The fact that our level of reality shows them as different information is already an 'indication' that also others had consciousness.
FZ+'s red color is of course a convention between observers to 'label' a certain vibration of photon's.
Originally posted by pelastration
Canute ... we learn from experiences of others like written in the Sutra's, in books, scripts and memories of human knowledge. We find information in them that is new to our information storage and may use it or not. The fact that our level of reality shows them as different information is already an 'indication' that also others had consciousness.
FZ+'s red color is of course a convention between observers to 'label' a certain vibration of photon's.
Fair enough. But first-person reports are not sufficient to scientifically prove the presence of consciousness. There is quite a debate going on as to whether first-person reports of any kind can be considered as scientific data, even in psychology. This is one of the many paradoxes of science's current approach to consciousness.
pelastration
Jan1-04, 02:50 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Fair enough. But first-person reports are not sufficient to scientifically prove the presence of consciousness. There is quite a debate going on as to whether first-person reports of any kind can be considered as scientific data, even in psychology. This is one of the many paradoxes of science's current approach to consciousness.
Thanks Canute,
but (1) we can not speak about it and - in fact - deny it making us just automatics or computers, (2) accept that personal experciences have a certain 'relative' value that can have statistic significance (on a population of about 6 billion people), or (3) look to blind spots in our understanding what this consciousness means;
Number 3 is my way. What can logic and ratio bring us? What have we missed?
Mentat wants to put all his Monopoly chips on the brain (Mentat please correct me [6)]). Life however is a complexity of multi-dimensions. The solution is to connect some of the basic principles: Dynamics, Isolation and Interconnectivity. Analyses everything ... and you will find out that these three concepts cover 'everything'. It's deeper than Yin-Yang. Try to join them in one concept. I gave some solutions but I am open when you give me better ones. ;-)
Dirk
Pelastration
I'm afraid I didn't really understand that. I checked out your second link but didn't go very far.
It says (is it you that says it?) that some sort of tube is the only axiom in the theory. However presumably spacetime has to exist in order for the tube to exist, which seems to imply more than one axiom.
In fact, now I come to think of it, why is the idea of a tube being axiomatic to existence any better than God being axiomatic? Both seem to share the same logical problems relating to their origins.
pelastration
Jan1-04, 05:15 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Pelastration
I'm afraid I didn't really understand that. I checked out your second link but didn't go very far.
It says (is it you that says it?) that some sort of tube is the only axiom in the theory. However presumably spacetime has to exist in order for the tube to exist, which seems to imply more than one axiom.
In fact, now I come to think of it, why is the idea of a tube being axiomatic to existence any better than God being axiomatic? Both seem to share the same logical problems relating to their origins.
Canute, this tube - a spheric membrane - is - in your Buddhist expression - the Tathagata womb (cf. the Lankavatara Sutra) which is indestructible. That's the postulate.
If spacetime (the Tathagata membrane) is non-breakable then just a simple penetration creates a new zone (which contains: structure).
There energy and matter starts. Two layers of Tathagata are joined LOCALLY.
In QM terms: the QM package or QM basket.
From that moment duality start: the Rounds of Rebirth start (Interdependent causality). Then Sunyata (emptiness) became - just LOCALLY - matter and energy ... thus: stress-friction is created locally (and this friction causes: local suffering in matter and in consciousness).
At that moment our observation (ruled by dual sensors - the 6 senses with are aflamed/excited) will take over control. They will influence and control us ... all the time. Then the five clinging aggregates - sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair will win. The Key is ... do we allow this Yes or No?
Therefor the real understanding of this mechanism - how this stress-friction rules over dual matter and mind - will give you the power and insight to apply the 12 permutations of the Dhamma wheel and the eight 'right' views.
The real freedom is to understand the Stress. In our daily life we call this "Stress" (mental stress), but equally there is the same stress in 'matter', and that's what scientists call 'gravity' (like we are attracted mentally to 'easy' thoughts). Duality is a little BIG 'devil'! ;-).
It always will appear when we believe to have conquered him. That's the Round of Rebirth. It's SO seductive.
Originally posted by pelastration
[B]Canute, this tube - a spheric membrane - is - in your Buddhist expression - the Tathagata womb (cf. the Lankavatara Sutra) which is indestructible. That's the postulate. ETC...
I'm afraid I don't know anything about Tathagata and so forth, or the sutras.
But I have some questions if you don't mind. What's the relationship between emptiness and the membrane? Doesn't the idea of a physical membrane being fundamental to existence contradict Buddhist ontology completely? How does this theory account for the existence of the membrane in the first place? What is the membrane made of?
Originally posted by Canute
If one could redefine 'subjective experience' as a physical process then you'd be right. Unfortunately you can't. That's why they're called subjective experiences. Some diehards are still trying but nobody has succeeded, and they never will. They are different categories of things. Science attempted to do what you have suggested for most of the 20th century. Yet here we no further on than William James was 100 years ago.
Wrong. I'm not saying that someone has done it, but there are theories that have yet to be refuted, which do not link subjective experience to the physical processes, but show that the physical processes are the subjective experience.
Yes, these are some of the difficult problems to be solved.
And, until they are, one should assume that subjective experience cannot exist seperate of the physical processes, right?
This is not correct. The intentional stance is a perspective on behaviour, a way of predicting it and interpreting its causes. It can be applied to the behaviour of people, thermostats or lightening bolts. Fundamentally it is much the same stance as that taken by Watson and Skinner and other behaviorists, jazzed up a bit. It says that beliefs and representations are real only to the extent that they can be infered from an agents behaviour by a third-person. It is a 'black box' approach to mind, an approach now largely discarded by science.
Well, first of all, after having re-read Dennett's own definition of the intentional stance, it appears that all it does is put content before consciousness. He proposes that any action contains the content of that action...if I were to tell you that I'm hungry, you (as the scientist) would have to believe that this is true (this is the heterophenomenological approach, which deals with subjective experience - as stated by the subject - in the same manner we naturally deal with fictitious stories: Whatever the author says is true about this world is true, whatever he never mentions is not true about that world). So, if one first takes into account the content of the statements of the subject, then one removes such problems as "zombies", and one can move on toward a third-party understanding of the subject's consciousness...ideally anyway.
Secondly, scientists have not largely discarded the view, so far as I can tell. William Calvin mentioned the book favorably, as did (IIRC) Joseph LeDoux, in one of his books.
What are the 'physical qualifications' for being conscious? As far as I know nobody knows what these are.
No, but there are theories. Note: Theories, not hypotheses (though there are many more of these).
It is tempting to think that anyone as clever as Dan Dennett must have a good point when they write books about a topic. However you can't take this for granted. Academia is a funny place. Dennett covers his tracks well when he's writing, but if you strip away the complexity and get down to basics his ideas are not new and don't make much sense. This conclusion is not just mine, it is widely held. Do you know of any philosophers who agree with him? I haven't found any, but then there's lots I haven't read.
Didn't Rorty agree with him, for the most part? I suppose its true that I can name more scientists who agree with him than philosophers, now that I come to think of it.
Originally posted by Mentat
Wrong. I'm not saying that someone has done it, but there are theories that have yet to be refuted, which do not link subjective experience to the physical processes, but show that the physical processes are the subjective experience.
I honestly have never come across one, although of course many people believe one is possible.
And, until they are, one should assume that subjective experience cannot exist seperate of the physical processes, right?
Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.
Well, first of all, after having re-read Dennett's own definition of the intentional stance, it appears that all it does is put content before consciousness. He proposes that any action contains the content of that action...if I were to tell you that I'm hungry, you (as the scientist) would have to believe that this is true
Not quite. The scientist doesn't have to assume that your words are true.
(this is the heterophenomenological approach, which deals with subjective experience - as stated by the subject - in the same manner we naturally deal with fictitious stories: Whatever the author says is true about this world is true, whatever he never mentions is not true about that world). So, if one first takes into account the content of the statements of the subject, then one removes such problems as "zombies", and one can move on toward a third-party understanding of the subject's consciousness...ideally anyway.
I don't quite see it like that, but I roughly agree.
Secondly, scientists have not largely discarded the view, so far as I can tell. William Calvin mentioned the book favorably, as did (IIRC) Joseph LeDoux, in one of his books.
Perhaps you're right. What is true is that there has been remarkably little proper analysis published of 'hetero-phenomenology' outside of philosophy.
No, but there are theories. Note: Theories, not hypotheses (though there are many more of these).
Again, I don't know of any. Can you give an example?
Didn't Rorty agree with him, for the most part? I suppose its true that I can name more scientists who agree with him than philosophers, now that I come to think of it. [/B]
It's honest of you to acknowledge this. His theory appeals to scientists for obvious reasons, but is less appealing to people with no axe to grind.
“None of this stuff about heterophenomenology helps one bit with answering that hard question. It only concerns easy questions, such as how good experimenters/theoreticians can be at mind-reading, how good subjects can be at mind-describing -- and I'm ready to grant that both experimenters and subjects can be as good as you like, as good as any cognitive science could need, right down to the last JND!
But that still won't tell you how/why JNDs feel like something -- though, given that they do, mysteriously, feel like something, it will explain why they feel like this rather than like that. But that's an easy question again; it presupposes, or "brackets" [to use your Husserlian phrase] the answer to the hard question of how/why any of these excellent functional correlates/substrates of behaving feel like anything at all (rather than just functioning, i.e., doing, zombily).
Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/dennett-chalmers.htm
(This link is worth checking for some of the obvious counter-arguments to Dennett. I'd be interested to know whether you think Harnard's objections can be answered. I can't see how they can be. Dennett doesn't seem to answer them anywhere).
Originally posted by Canute
I honestly have never come across one, although of course many people believe one is possible.
Might I suggest a few books?
A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.
Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.
Agnosticism is almost always the best way.
Not quite. The scientist doesn't have to assume that your words are true.
Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.
It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun [:)]) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.
We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.
I don't quite see it like that, but I roughly agree.
What exactly do you disagree with?
Perhaps you're right. What is true is that there has been remarkably little proper analysis published of 'hetero-phenomenology' outside of philosophy.
Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.
Again, I don't know of any. Can you give an example?
Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".
It's honest of you to acknowledge this. His theory appeals to scientists for obvious reasons, but is less appealing to people with no axe to grind.
Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?
“None of this stuff about heterophenomenology helps one bit with answering that hard question. It only concerns easy questions, such as how good experimenters/theoreticians can be at mind-reading, how good subjects can be at mind-describing -- and I'm ready to grant that both experimenters and subjects can be as good as you like, as good as any cognitive science could need, right down to the last JND!
But that still won't tell you how/why JNDs feel like something -- though, given that they do, mysteriously, feel like something, it will explain why they feel like this rather than like that. But that's an easy question again; it presupposes, or "brackets" [to use your Husserlian phrase] the answer to the hard question of how/why any of these excellent functional correlates/substrates of behaving feel like anything at all (rather than just functioning, i.e., doing, zombily).
Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/dennett-chalmers.htm
(This link is worth checking for some of the obvious counter-arguments to Dennett. I'd be interested to know whether you think Harnard's objections can be answered. I can't see how they can be. Dennett doesn't seem to answer them anywhere).
I'll check it out.
Fliption
Jan2-04, 11:27 AM
Originally posted by Canute
Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.
Canute the following is a link to a thread by hypnagogue where this interaction question is addressed. I personally found it to be a compelling argument and didn't see a rebuttal that came close to killing it. You might want to take a look at it if you haven't already.
http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=6793
hypnagogue
Jan3-04, 12:01 AM
Just to reiterate the basic argument, perhaps more simply this time, and once again inspired by (and for the most part paraphrasing) Chalmers:
For any purely physical explanation of consciousness, we will always have the following further question: how is it that this set of physical processes is associated with consciousness? Thus, even the complete physical account leaves something out; there is something extra, above and beyond physical phenomena, needed to explain consciousness. For instance, if one explains to me the exact processing of every neuron in the visual cortex, it is still not clear to me why this set of neurons should somehow entail the conscious experience of vision. Why should these neurons be associated with consciousness in the first place? Why should they be associated with the experience of vision, instead of the experience of hearing? And so on. This is, of course, the explanatory gap.
Physical explanations do nothing to address the explanatory gap. The best a committed materialist can do without disregarding the problem altogether is to identify consciousness with the associated physical processes: s/he says, "the neurons just are consciousness, the same way as water just is H2O."
The latter is a successful reductionist argument: given the complete physical account of H2O, it is a conceptual necessity that the structural and functional properties of H2O combine to form the structural and functional properties of water. It is not even sensible that, having grasped the explanation fully, I ask, "why don't H2O molecules combine to form rocks?" Unfortunately, the case of consciousness is disanalogous. Even if we accept the identification of neuronal processing with consciousness, it is not by any means a conceptual necessity that the structural and functional properties of neurons combine to form the qualitative experience of consciousness. It is entirely sensible that, having fully grasped a physical explanation of consciousness, I still ask, "well, why is it that this particular set of neuronal processing is associated with visual consciousness and not auditory consciousness?"
This explanitory deficit persists since the identification of consciousness with neuronal processing is conceptually contingent upon observation of a brute fact of nature that cannot be explained in simpler or more basic terms. Thus, we say that the identity is episetmically primitive; it cannot be deduced a priori from the physical facts about neurons in brains, but must be taken as an inscrutible given observed in nature ("it just is!").
But no other identity in nature is epistemically primitive. For epistemically primitive phenomena, we reserve terms such as fundamental laws. The form and existence of such laws cannot be deduced from simpler principles, but rather are accepted to exist as contingent brute facts observed in nature. And if conscious exeprience falls under this same rubric, why should it not also be granted the same sort of fundamental, non-reducible place in our ontology?
hypnagogue
Jan3-04, 12:15 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
That was pretty much my point, about how this mystic viewpoint is the enemy of scientific discovery...it was in the days of the vitalists, and it is now.
Again, disanalogous cases. The vitalists had only to explain those physical processes directly observable to them; they never had to ask, "why is it that reproduction, growth, etc. are accompanied with life?" On the other hand, when we analyze the brain we are compelled to ask "why is it that brain processing is accompanied with consciousness?"
The "mystification" of consciousness is not a human invention; it is built into the problem itself. That is why the problem is so hard.
hypnagogue
Jan3-04, 12:25 AM
For what it's worth, here is what Chalmers has to say of Dennett.
(taken from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/moving.html)
-----
To have any chance of making the case, a type-A materialist needs to argue that for consciousness, as for life, the functions are all that need explaining. Perhaps some strong, subtle, and substantive argument can be given, establishing that once we have explained the functions, we have automatically explained everything. If a sound argument could be given for this surprising conclusion, it would provide as valid a resolution of the hard problem as any.
Is there any compelling, non-question-begging argument for this conclusion? The key word, of course, is "non-question-begging". Often, a proponent will simply assert that functions are all that need explaining, or will argue in a way that subtly assumes this position at some point. But that is clearly unsatisfactory. Prima facie, there is very good reason to believe that the phenomena a theory of consciousness must account for include not just discrimination, integration, report, and such functions, but also experience, and prima facie, there is good reason to believe that the question of explaining experience is distinct from the questions about explaining the various functions. Such prima facie intuitions can be overturned, but to do so requires very solid and substantial argument. Otherwise, the problem is being "resolved" simply by placing one's head in the sand.
Upon examing the materialist papers in this symposium, such arguments are surprisingly hard to find. Indeed, despite their use of various analogies, very few of the contributors seem willing to come right out and say that in the case of consciousness, the functions are all that need explaining. Only Dennett embraces this position explicitly, and even he does not spend much time arguing for it. But he does spend about a paragraph making the case: presumably this paragraph bears the weight of his piece, once the trimmings are stripped away. So it is this paragraph that we should examine.
Dennett's argument here, interestingly enough, is an appeal to phenomenology. He examines his own phenomenology, and tells us that he finds nothing other than functions that need explaining. The manifest phenomena that need explaining are his reactions and his abilities; nothing else even presents itself as needing to be explained.
This is daringly close to a simple denial - one is tempted to agree that it might be a good account of Dennett's phenomenology - and it raises immediate questions. For a start, it is far from obvious that even all the items on Dennett's list - "feelings of foreboding", "fantasies", "delight and dismay" - are purely functional matters. To assert without argument that all that needs to be explained about such things are the associated functions seems to beg the crucial question at issue. And if we leave these controversial cases aside, Dennett's list seems to be a systematically incomplete list of what needs to be explained in explaining consciousness. One's "ability to be moved to tears" and "blithe disregard of perceptual details" are striking phenomena, but they are far from the most obvious phenomena that I (at least) find when I introspect. Much more obvious are the experience of emotion and the phenomenal visual field themselves; and nothing Dennett says gives us reason to believe that these do not need to be explained, or that explaining the associated functions will explain them.
What might be going on here? Perhaps the key lies in what Dennett has elsewhere described as the foundation of his philosophy: "third-person absolutism". If one takes the third-person perspective on oneself -- viewing oneself from the outside, so to speak - these reactions and abilities are no doubt the main focus of what one sees. But the hard problem is about explaining the view from the first-person perspective. So to shift perspectives like this - even to shift to a third-person perspective on one's first-person perspective, which is one of Dennett's favorite moves - is again to assume that what needs explaining are such functional matters as reactions and reports, and so is again to argue in a circle.
Dennett suggests "subtract the functions and nothing is left". Again, I can see no reason to accept this, but in any case the argument seems to have the wrong form. An analogy suggested by Gregg Rosenberg is useful here. Color has properties of hue, saturation, and brightness. It is plausible that if one "subtracts" hue from a color, nothing phenomenologically significant is left, but this certainly doesn't imply that color is nothing but hue. So even if Dennett could argue that function was somehow required for experience (in the same way that hue is required for color), this would fall a long way short of showing that function is all that has to be explained.
A slight flavor of non-circular argument is hinted at by Dennett's suggestion: "I wouldn't know what I was thinking about if I couldn't identify them by their functional differentia". This tantalizing sentence suggests various reconstructions, but all the reconstructions that I can find fall short of making the case. If the idea is that functional role is essential to the (subpersonal) process of identification, this falls short of establishing that functioning is essential to the experiences themselves, let alone that functioning is all there is to the experiences. If the idea is rather than function is all we have access to at the personal level, this seems false, and seems to beg the question against the intuitive view that we have knowledge of intrinsic features of experience. But if Dennett can elaborate this into a substantial argument, that would be a very useful service.
In his paper, Dennett challenges me to provide "independent" evidence (presumably behavioral or functional evidence) for the "postulation" of experience. But this is to miss the point: conscious experience is not "postulated" to explain other phenomena in turn; rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. And if it turns out that it cannot be explained in terms of more basic entities, then it must be taken as irreducible, just as happens with such categories as space and time. Again, Dennett's "challenge" presupposes that the only explananda that count are functions.
*[[[Tangentially: I would be interested to see Dennett's version of the "independent" evidence that leads physicists to "introduce" the fundamental categories of space and time. It seems to me that the relevant evidence is spatiotemporal through and through, just as the evidence for experience is experiential through and through.]]]
Dennett might respond that I, equally, do not give arguments for the position that something more than functions needs to be explained. And there would be some justice here: while I do argue at length for my conclusions, all these arguments take the existence of consciousness for granted, where the relevant concept of consciousness is explicitly distinguished from functional concepts such as discrimination, integration, reaction, and report. Dennett presumably disputes this starting point: he thinks that the only sense in which people are conscious is a sense in which consciousness is defined as reportability, as a reactive disposition, or as some other functional concept.
But let us be clear on the dialectic. It is prima facie obvious to most people that there is a further phenomenon here: in informal surveys, the large majority of respondents (even at Tufts!) indicate that they think something more than functions needs explaining. Dennett himself - faced with the results of such a survey, perhaps intending to deflate it - has accepted that there is at least a prima facie case that something more than functions need to be explained; and he has often stated how "radical" and "counterintuitive" his position is. So it is clear that the default assumption is that there is a further problem of explanation; to establish otherwise requires significant and substantial argument.
I would welcome such arguments, in the ongoing attempt to clarify the lay of the land. The challenge for those such as Dennett is to make the nature of these arguments truly clear. I do not think it a worthless project - the hard problem is so hard that we should welcome all attempts at a resolution - but it is clear that anyone trying to make such an argument is facing an uphill battle.
*[[[One might look to Dennett's book Consciousness Explained for non-circular arguments, but even here such arguments for the relevant conclusion are hard to find. The plausible attacks on a "place in a brain where it all comes together" do nothing to remove the hard problem. The book's reliance on "heterophenomenology" (verbal reports) as the central source of data occasionally slips into an unargued assumption that such reports are all that need explaining, especially in the discussion of "real seeming", which in effect assumes that the only "seemings" that need explaining are dispositions to react and report. I think there may be a substantial argument implicit in the "Orwell/Stalin" discussion - essentially taking materialism as a premise and arguing that if materialism is true then the functional facts exhaust all the facts - but even this is equivalent to "if something more than functions needs explaining, then materialism cannot explain it", and I would not disagree. At best, Dennett's arguments rule out a middle-ground "Cartesian materialism"; the hard problem remains as hard as ever.]]]
Originally posted by Mentat
[B]Might I suggest a few books?
A Universe of Consciousness, Gerald Edelmann
Bright air, Brillian Fire, Gerald Edelmann
The Emotional Brain, Joseph LeDoux
Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux
The Cerebral Code: thinking a though in the mosaics of the mind, William Calvin.
I asked for an example of a plausible theory showing that consciousness is brain. Which one of these is your proposed example? (The truth is that there is no example. There are conjectures and hypotheses, some of them, like Dennett's, quite elaborate. But nothing deserving to be called a theory).
Agnosticism is almost always the best way.
I agree that not making assumptions is always the best way. But there's no inherent virtue in agnosticism.
Actually, to take a third-party approach, and remain rational, he must indeed assume that my statements about my own phenomenological experience are true.
Not in my opinion, but it's a small point.
It's like an anthropologist who goes off to study the rituals and culture of a tribe that worships the god, Feenoman. Let's say that there are two tribes that worship Feenoman, but there are slightly different ideas of what Feenoman is really like, differing between the two tribes (one might say that He has blue eyes, while the other says He has black ones; one might say He has long hair, another might say He's bald; etc). Now, an anthropologist would surely take the objective approach, and never contradict the beliefs of one tribe, simply because the previous tribe said something different about Feenoman. And, if one of the tribesmen should start to appreciate the anthropologist's objective approach, this one too might become a Feenomanologist (I love that pun [:)]) and begin to view his previous god as a fictious character, subject to the interpretations and varying preferences of different tribes.
We are the Feenoman-woshipers, in Dennett's view, and an objective (anthropologist-like) approach needs to be taken before we will ever understand the true nature of phenomenology.
Imo that is an incorrext use of the Feenoman example, and not Dennett's argument.
What exactly do you disagree with?
You said that the heterophenomenological approach deals with subjective experience. But that is precisely what it doesn't deal with. Dennett's argument, stripped to the basics, is functionalist, not much different to the arguments of Watson and Skinner, It is a 'black box, approach in which consciousness is reduced to the behavioural signs of consciousness. Subjective feelings are left out of his theory entirely.
Very true. However, it's my opinion that the reason scientists don't ever mention the heterophenomenological approach is because objectivism is taken for granted by the Scientific Method.
I think you're probably right. This is my complaint.
Well, I gave a brief summary of the "hexagon" theory of William Calvin, in the thread "Correlates of Consciousness".
There is no self-consistent and plausible physicalist theory of consciousness. I'll risk stating that as a bald fact to make it easy for you to find a single exception. (I'll check the thread and respond there to 'hexagon' theory).
Yeah, I can see that. Of course, when looking for a scientific theory of consciousness, one does wish to appeal to the scientists conducting the study, right?
Very true. But there's no point in a theory that appeals to scientists but doesn't stand up to logical analysis.
pelastration
Jan3-04, 08:50 AM
Originally posted by Canute
I'm afraid I don't know anything about Tathagata and so forth, or the sutras.
To me the indestructible Tathagata Womb is the conceptual essence of Buddhism. You find the Womb in the: http://www.buddhistinformation.com/Lankavatara_sutra.htm .
This link might be useful. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/khuddaka/iti/iti4.html#112 .
The essence of the Universal Womb as explained in the Anuradha Sutta . Buddha: "Very good, Anuradha. Very good. Both formerly & now, it is only stress that I describe, and the cessation of stress."
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-086.html ( Samyutta Nikaya XXII.86 - the Anuradha Sutta)
Please note that Buddha himself is also called the Tathagata.
Originally posted by Canute
But I have some questions if you don't mind. What's the relationship between emptiness and the membrane?
The Tathagata Womb is stress (Elasticity that gives in the dual worlds interconnectivity and attraction: gravity). We can use the 'image' membrane as a human concept to present that 'stress'.
The Womb represents Sunyata (emptiness).
This emptiness is transformed (restructured) in local events.
The local events contain basic duality (like photons) or very complex combinations of duality (like we human are).
The local events have a lifetime ... so 'time' comes in.
Between the local events we see Tratityasamutpada (interdependent causality - the Karmatic wheel). That causes suffering (stress on a local level), which is a local (human) attraction to other dual structures. If you want to overcome Samsara you have to reduce the stress in yourself (being attracted to dual forms).
Originally posted by Canute
Doesn't the idea of a physical membrane being fundamental to existence contradict Buddhist ontology completely?
No. What is 'physical' in Buddhism? Where does it stops? Does it exists? When I say a 'real' membrane I mean a basic boundary that has dynamics (the property of stress). That indestructible membrane will always be embedded in the localities (holons) once the infolding begins.
Matter and energy are just different 'appearances' of the membrane.
Originally posted by Canute
How does this theory account for the existence of the membrane in the first place? What is the membrane made of? .
Seen from the human world the membrane can be represented as singularity. We can use the image of a single basic 'string' which is hollow or a hollow membrane-sphere, which are in fact both the same.
The 'material/energy' of the membrane? You want me to give the answer that Siddartha Gautama didn't gave himself? He gave us 'stress' and 'indestructible'. ;-).
Based on this two elements I offer an engineering concept of how their combination gives locally zones in which duality is joined, and where the coupling creates super-stress.
I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.
pelastration
Jan3-04, 11:49 AM
Originally posted by Canute
I must admit that I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm not saying that means you're wrong, but it seems a very strange interpretation of the concepts involved.
Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Again, disanalogous cases. The vitalists had only to explain those physical processes directly observable to them; they never had to ask, "why is it that reproduction, growth, etc. are accompanied with life?" On the other hand, when we analyze the brain we are compelled to ask "why is it that brain processing is accompanied with consciousness?"
The "mystification" of consciousness is not a human invention; it is built into the problem itself. That is why the problem is so hard.
Ok, what of Edelman and Giulio, quoted here. (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=11986)
Originally posted by Fliption
Canute the following is a link to a thread by hypnagogue where this interaction question is addressed. I personally found it to be a compelling argument and didn't see a rebuttal that came close to killing it. You might want to take a look at it if you haven't already.
http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=6793
For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.
hypnagogue
Jan3-04, 03:25 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
For what it's worth, I also think the argument is very interesting. I don't think I've countered it well enough to disqualify the possibility. However, it has done nothing to explain the consciousness of an individual not connected to the matrix. If the person is "unplugged" from the matrix (as in the movies), that person would still be conscious, but there would be no duality involved (unless you want to go for infinite regress), and this justification of a certain "duality" doesn't solve any of the problems of consciousness.
I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.
Originally posted by pelastration
Canute ... I had to use semantics and show images but that seems not enough. Your non-understanding is because you look to them with eyes and spectacles of duality. But that OK. My message will work in your unconsciousness because that remembers. I was talking about an universal system that is present in yourself. That emptiness is present in all of us. I wish you success in your path which surely has the right intention. I will stop here, there is no more to say on this.
Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.
pelastration
Jan4-04, 07:36 AM
Originally posted by Canute
Well, I agree that reality is ultimately non-dual, and that emptiness is at the heart of all things, including me. But I don't agree with tubes and stuff. You seem to be assigning attributes to emptiness, and that seems to be a conceptual error. But perhaps I've misunderstood you.
Our level of reality in life and science is Dual. The friction of that local duality causes tension (= suffering).
I suggest you think for ourself if duality is possible without ISOLATION, a boundary. What happens with two different energies (ie. + and -) when they are meeting but are not isolated?
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I agree-- the purpose of that thread is only to show that dualism is not logically impossible by showing one case where it seems to hold. In the bigger picture, this should prevent categorical denial of dualism from the logical impossiblity argument, and force people to seriously consider specific claims about dualism on a case by case basis.
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.
hypnagogue
Jan5-04, 02:10 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious?
Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.
Originally posted by Mentat
But, on the subject of philosophies of the mind, is not the very purpose of Dualism to explain how one is conscious? The Materialistic approach is that the whole conscious process is physical. The idealistic approach is that it is all mental. The Dualistic approach is that it is both, and this approach doesn't get us any closer to understanding consciousness - even if there is a logically feasible way for us to have a sort of dualism going on in our minds.
Just to disagree with Hypnogogue for once - monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism and idealism are related in much more complicated ways than this. Mind-body dualism may help explain consciousness, and may not. We don't know yet. Many, including Dan Dennett, think dualism is illogical (so do I, but I haven't read the thread hypno refered to as showing an exception).
One can be either a materialist or an idealist and still be a dualist (or not). There are all sorts of variations.
Hypno - where was your argument for dualism - I missed it.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes-- but of course, this end cannot even be approached if we reject dualism on grounds of logical impossibility.
Well, we should remain open-minded. However, if Materialism makes no claims that are illogical or that lead to infinite regress, and provides a possible explanation of consciousness, then I would suggest that we drop Dualism in favor of Materialism. Yet, it remains to be seen if Materialism really can do all of those things.
But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.
Originally posted by Canute
But materialism and dualism are not incompatable. They are not opposites. The definition of materialism is horribly vague. Some materialists also espouse epiphenomenalism. Also dualism may be substance dualism or aspect dualism. They are quite different. It's all a bit of a mess.
But, according to this dictionary of Philosophy, Materialism should never refer to anything non-physical. Any reference to such things would put it in the realm of Dualism. Perhaps many things that have been considered "Materialistic" in the past, are not really so?
It's confusing. The modern term is 'physicalism', which says quite simply that nothing non-physical exists.
However consciousness is a problem in this view. Some physicalists get around this by saying that there is a physical basis for every mental phenomonon, and that feelings, concepts, etc are 'epiphenomenal', non-causal and no more than the steam from a train whistle.
The problem with this is that it is essentially dualism in disguise. Also it ignores the fact that Huxley, who coined the train analogy, was refering to a train that was driven very causally by exactly the same sort of steam. It is also strange that there is no other known case of something being physically caused but not physically causal.
As I see it strict physicalism must assume that feelings, concepts etc. are physical, not an easy position to defend.
olde drunk
Jan11-04, 11:03 AM
if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron??
imho, condciousness creates the physical and it's attributes. why would the same electron or same chemical reaction create two different behaviors?? even identical twins, with so much in common, are separate and distinct individuals.
peace,
Originally posted by olde drunk
[B]if materialists believe that thoughts, feelings and emotions et al are the result of a chemical reaction or a shooting electron, WHAT triggers the reaction or electron?
Strictly speaking physicalism is stronger than that. It claims feelings ARE physical, not just physically caused.
metacristi
Jan17-04, 04:18 AM
Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail
I think we should be much more careful here.Maybe we will never have sufficient reasons to think that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of physics and chemistry indeed.But this does not mean automatically that consciousness,at least qualia,are fundamental features of reality.
The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes (implying very faint interactions in the neural network) which creates conscious experience (for example the lack of sufficiently precise measurement devices) or a too high complexity (after all human brain is one of the most complex things in the universe).Moreover there could be implied final limitations,for example if consciousness is a chaotic phenomenon,given also its huge complexity,I am not so sure we will ever be able to prove that conscious experience can be reduced at the laws of physics.The simple fact that reductionism,possible,cannot be proved with sufficient reasons does not entail also the conclusion that consciousness do not reduce in reality at physical laws.
Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach (which by the way is not reductionist though it lets the door open to find further that consciousness can be reduced at the laws of nature).Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.
Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory...
Originally posted by metacristi
The possible incapacity to explain some features of consciousness could also be attributed to our inability to detect all sufficient causes
Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.
Moreover since science has still epistemological privilege,
What is 'epistemilogical privelege'? (I keep asking this)
rationality is based only on observed facts studied with the best existing empirical method,
Not in the opinion of most people.
the best existing scientific theory will be considered the standard of knowledge in spite of the existence of some phenomena that cannot (still) be 'reduced' to the theory.
Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.
We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach
So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.
Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.
It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.
The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.
That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.
Only if the computational emergentist theory will become theoretically and empirically stagnant,for a very long period of time,with a lot of unsolved puzzles piling up in time,in spite of the sustained efforts of the brightest minds on Earth would we have the right to suspect that there could be something extra,possible non amenable to scientific research.
I rest my case.
But of course even in this case scientists will continue to prefer the best existing theory... [/B]
But of course.
metacristi
Jan17-04, 01:17 PM
Canute
Not so I'm afraid. There are in principle objections to a purely physical explanation that are nothing to do with our ability to observe or measure the brain.
Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.Not yet at least.Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.They can only base a rational skepticism.Nothing more.As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena .This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.In other words it has epistemological privilege.To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.
Not in the opinion of most people.
This is not at all relevant.The fact that many people believe something does not make it rational.The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts.That's why for example the majority of the so called 'common truths' (which people agree about based on very superficial observations) are not reliable unlike scientific statements which are accepted only after carefully observing facts,inferring also from experiments their sufficient causes.Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.
Of course scientists will do this. The question is whether they are right to do it.
You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer for all practical purposes but it does not imply final claims.Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.The existence of few puzzles (facts that cannot be accommodated within a theory) and even some anomalies do not really put a pressure on a scientific theory which is theoretically and experimentally evolving.In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.Basically scientists prefer the best approach as the standard of knowledge for the moment,they do not NOT RELY however on the actual theory (which imply a high degree of confidence in its truth,empirically based) for we do not have yet sufficient reasons for that (it's clear we are rather at the beginning of our quest).
We would need an alternative scientific hypothesis which to challenge the best existing view in order to claim that consciousness cannot be explained by the neurological approach
So, if consciousnes is not scientifically explicable then we must have a scientific theory that explains it before we should accept that science can't explain it. Hmm.
Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness (the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific but nothing impedes one day to find such an alternative,based on empirical facts also [superior or at least equal with the actual approach],implicitly proving [or at least casting a doubt in the previous conclusions] that neurology is not enough.Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument (for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).
Moreover if we will manage to build an android,based on the current technologies in AI,whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,this would constitute a sufficient argument (based on all we can observe,this is the base of rationality) that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) correct.
It's not that easy. According to science human-like behaviour does not entail consciousness.
Canute there is no claim here that behaviorism is correct (as a matter of fact it is dead from a long time as a serious scientific hypothesis) but only that from all empirical evidence available there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?Those who make blatantly the positive claim that it is not conscious should provide such empirical evidence.But it is entirely rational (based on the philosophical arguments pointing the difficulties of the existing approach) to be skeptical or to say that 'my philosophical opinion is that such an android is not conscious'.
The philosophical arguments of zombies or Chinese Room only entitle some people to be skeptical that the existing approach can really account for all features of consciousness as we know it NOT a base for the positive claim that science cannot explain the remaining puzzles.
That suggests that we cannot be certain that 2 things + 2 things always equals 5 things, since we can only be sure by experiment, not by logic.
Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.Here we go directly from axioms to theorems,truths derived from axioms,whilst in science experiment is the highest authority and we must begin from there in constructing backward our theories.Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).Anyway in the vast majority of cases we cannot assign a very high degree of confidence (which to entitle us to rely on them) to all the premises so we must always be open to accept they are fallible.Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.
I rest my case.
If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes (for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).Of course it would be only a [strictly personal] belief,you would have no base to make the positive claim in exterior (implying epistemological primacy also over the knowledge provided by the scientific method) that a soul does exist if you cannot prove it inter subjectively based on the best method existent,the scientific method (at most you can say you have strong subjective evidence to believe,without any claim of epistemical privilege,that a soul does exist).
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute
Those are purely philosophical objections Canute,I've explained you this many times in our previous encounters.
I don't need it explaining. I know already.
We need hard facts to have sufficient reasons to think there are such 'principle objections' or,for the moment at least,we do not have them.
You have a very strange idea of the relationship between deduction and induction. These 'philosophical objections' are no more or less than logical objections. You can't just ignore them. The hypothesis that consciousness can be reduced to matter is a philosophical conjecture. It's got nothing to do with observations. There has never been a single scientific observation that suggests it is true.
After all human beings are part of nature and in the absence of any known final limitations there are no good reasons to claim that science cannot understand consciousness.
It is claimed by many people, including me, that the way science defines itself precludes it from explaining consciousness. Nobody is claiming that consciousness is not part of nature.
Anyway even assuming there are such limitations the burden of proof is on the claimant (who make a positive claim) to provide sufficient reasons based on observed facts,the base of rationality.
So where are the facts supporting science's positive claims that it can explain consciousness?
I think you know what a positive claim means.It is a claim of priority in knowledge,I'm afraid philosophical objections are not enough to base them.
There is no 'priority', there is just what can be proved or disproved by whatever method happens to work. Do you really think that science can be conducted without philosophising?
As I've told you many times before the best existing methodology to establishing the truth about natural facts is the actual variant of the scientific method which is entirely based on observed phenomena.
And I've told you before that I think you're wrong.
This is why scientific truth has privilege over knowledge,it is the standard of knowledge.
What?
In other words it has epistemological privilege.
I you use this term again without defining I'll just give up responding. I'm worn out from asking you what you mean by it.
To base a positive claim as yours you must either provide a sufficient reason,based on empirical facts,that science cannot understand consciousness
You mean like lots of thinkers have already done? Do you imagine that philosophy is not based on empirical facts?
or if you reject the empiricism of science you must provide an alternative method of establishing the truth about natural facts proved superior to the scientific method.
Why does it have to be superior? It just needs to be a way of doing it. Are you allergic to philosophy or something? If you are you won't be able to do any science.
The criterion of rationality about nature remain the systematic observation of facts... snip...Do you have another criterion for rationality?Besides I really doubt that 'most people' will disagree with what I said.
Well I'll disagree. Rationality consists in thinking rationally. It's not the exclusive preserve of any particular sub-discipline of academic study. Also 'facts' may be observed or deduced.
You lack some basic knowledge of how scientific method works (sorry to say this...again).
Very funny.
Scientific truth is openly accepted as fallible,we can only have different degrees of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a theory.
Yes, this is where it differs from philosophical deduction.
The best existing successful hypothesis (the most confirmed so far) is the theory scientists prefer but it does not imply final claims. Scientists simply prefer it over all other explanations instead of relying on its (approximative) truth especially in cases where we do not have sufficient empirical reasons to assign a high degree of confidence in it.
Perhaps you shopuld bear this in mind when you're claiming that science can overcome the logical arguments of many philosophers and explain consciousness.
In the case of consciousness we are far from having a relevant number of the sufficient causes which produce the conscious experience,that's why we do not have yet a holistic hypothesis.Still from the known causes we have the right to propose a conjecture making predictions.And it turns out that now that all new experimental evidence regarding the necessary,at least,causes fit very well with the computationalist approach (including the evolutions in AI).
Sorry but that's nonsense.
Thus the theory is theoretically and empirically progressive.There is no reason for the moment,especially in the absence of any serious scientific quantum or dualist alternatives experimentally backed,to believe into or prefer other (unscientific for the moment) alternative as standard knowledge.
What do you mean 'alternative to standard knowledge'. What standard knowledge? We don't know, that's the whole point. I think you mean standard assumptions.
Who said that if the computational emergentist approach is disproved then science cannot explain consciousness
I don't know. Generally people generalise their objection, and simply say that science cannot explain consciousness. This is sometimes for the simple reason that science can't even define it, and can hardly start explaining it before it's done even this.
{QUOTE](the emrgentist approach postulates that consciousness is entirely due to macroscopic interactions between neurons,findings in neurology being enough to base a high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct)?[/QUOTE]
There is not one shred of evidence that it is correct.
Canute are you able to make the difference between the neurological approach and the so called 'quantum consciousness' alternatives or even the 'interactionist dualism' alternatives?
Yes.
The snag with the second and third proposals is that currently they cannot be considered scientific
I agree. The question remains whether they are right or wrong.
Still till we will provide such a serious alternative there is no good reason to renounce at the computational approach (while openly accepting it is fallible).
In the opinion of many there are some very good reasons.
Those who claim that science cannot explain consciousness must provide an empirically based argument
That's exactly what they do, which is why those objections are taken seriously.
(for even if the assumption '[consciousness] cannot be explained by science' is a prediction of a very successful otherwise scientific theory we are entitled to believe in its truth only after having sufficient reasons that we confirmed it empirically).
You can't confirm scientifically that something cannot be explained by science. The idea is irrational.
there is no good reason to think that such an android is not conscious.Though it is indeed possible that it is not conscious (in spite of the fact that when you ask her the response would be that she is conscious) we need further empirical,sound,evidence to think they are not conscious.
There is no such empirical evidence. It cannot be proved either way, or so science asserts. There is no scientific test for the presence or absence of consciousness. Science has not yet managed to prove that consciousness exists.
The scientific truth is provisional in the vast majority of practical cases so we are open to new facts.Empirical facts.Do you understand what I mean?
I understand exactly what you mean, and agree. Fortunately philosophically deduced conclusions are not provisional.
Purely logical problems have no relevance to empirical facts.
So pigs might fly?
Since we have no proof that logical implications have relevance to natural facts we must always confirm the predictions empirically before assigning a high degree of confidence in their truth even if the premises were absolutely true (empirically based).
Of course.
Returning at our problem,purely philosophical objections never constitute sufficient reasons,as I've already said experiments remain the highest authority.
You're drawing a line between science and philosophy that doesn't exist.
If you define yourself as a rational person you have [NOT!] to do so.There is no rational base to sustain the positive claims you made.
Yes there is.
At most they are rational as entirely subjective,philosophical,views.If you had additionally some relevant first hand subjective evidence,not amenable for the moment to scientific scrutiny,you would be even entitled to believe (not only to be skeptical) that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain processes
That's what I've been saying. Of course I have first hand subjective evidence not amenable to scientific scrutiny, it's called experience. It's all any of us have when it comes to consciousness (or anything else come to that). You've said this yourself by arguing that one can't tell whether an android is conscious or not.
(for example subjective evidence that a soul does exist).
I don't think souls exist.
Fliption
Jan18-04, 02:13 PM
Well I agree with Canute. Completely. Science is a tool of philosophy. Not the other way around. Nor are they competing approaches to knowlegde. SO I'm pretty sure scientists haven't dropped a pig out of an airplane to see if it can fly.
It seems to me that if you have no emperical evidence either way, then philosophical implications would certainly influence the focus of experiments and scientific theories. It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.
I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infintely reducable?
Originally posted by Fliption
It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.
That's it exactly.
I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infintely reducable? [/B]
Well, we know that the BB is unreducable. Some assert that spacetime is likewise, and that there are fundamental quanta of time and space. Some argue that consciousness is.
All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.
Fliption
Jan18-04, 04:45 PM
Originally posted by Canute
All in all it seems that a thing becomes scientifically irreducable when reducing it further would involve departing science and appearances for metaphysics and reality.
Right, but I want to hear one of the people with an opposing view answer it.
pelastration
Jan18-04, 07:15 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
It seems to me that if you have no emperical evidence either way, then philosophical implications would certainly influence the focus of experiments and scientific theories. It seems absurd to ignore logical contradictions as if you can actually prove in a lab that 2+2 equals 5.
I've asked the question before, how does science ever conclude when something can no longer be reduced? How long does it try before it concludes that something is fundamental to nature? Does it just assume that existence is infintely reducable?
You can ask yourself if reducing 'events' to mathematical points isn't oversimplifying and brings wrong conclusions. Just think about non-commutative math; (a sock over a shoe is not the same a shoe over the sock).
In a specific spacetime geometric approach it can be proven that adding 1 to 2 is not the same as adding 2 to 1, you get another result.
metacristi
Jan19-04, 07:22 AM
Canute
You have a very strange idea of the relationship between deduction and induction. These 'philosophical objections' are no more or less than logical objections. You can't just ignore them. The hypothesis that consciousness can be reduced to matter is a philosophical conjecture. It's got nothing to do with observations. There has never been a single scientific observation that suggests it is true.
If you have not yet understood that science does not make final claims there is nothing to add.I refrain to add more...I don't have the time (or patience) to teach you some basic notions of pure philosophy or philosophy of science.No one claim that philosophy is not involved in science,on the contrary,the roots of science lie deep in philosophy.But not all philosophical ideas are science or,even more important,automatically true.
Sometimes mental experiments are useful to show that a certain assumption implies a contradiction with the already accepted knowledge.But this coherentist approach is not always relevant,for example some quantum mechanics ideas are not coherent with the classical approach (the existence of quantas of energy and so on).
Anyway I do not think we have to use the above argument in this case,simply the philosophical arguments against the emergent computational conjecture do not involve such final contradictions.On the contrary there are very good physicalist philosophical answers at the objections put forward by the 'qualia' sustainers.I'm afraid only the experiment can settle things in a sound way.
Till then we have a conjecture,the best we could achieve so far,that works well in the case of all evidence we have though,in my opinion,is far away from giving us sufficient reasons to consider it (approximatively) correct.I even doubt that neurology alone is enough.But I cannot deny that the actual approach is the best possible approach of the moment,derived from all experimental evidence we have now.
Science tries to find the causes,necessary and/or sufficient,that produce the conscious experience.Based on them an explanation is proposed,a tentative theory which make also new predictions apart from accomodating the already observed facts.From all empirical evidence we have so far it was proposed such a conjecture,an attempt to explain consciousness,successful for the moment,but which we must test further.A fallible conjecture,we do not even have a holistic hypothesis to test further (as I said we do not know all relevant necessary or sufficient causes that produce conscious experience,based on which to propose a detailed hypothesis).Representing the best we could do as of know,in the light of all evidence we have.No final claims are involved here.
The fact that some physicalists pretend,from observed facts,that science can surely explain consciousness is no better than your positive assertion for we are far away from having a holistic hypothesis extensively tested practically (or at least an android I talked about previously).Such considerations can count at most as philosophical assumptions.It is possible to be so indeed but for the moment we do not have sufficient reasons,derived from evidence,to think it will really be so.All unbiased scientists will recognize there is still a lot of work to do.
It is true now that science has as an axiom the assumption that nature can be understood but the introduction of this axiom was absolutely necessary for the internal coherence of the scientific method.We do not have sufficient reasons to believe it is true in absolute (axioms do not automatically entail belief in them).Indeed the existence of sufficient experimental arguments against would lead inevitably to its demise.But certainly neither have we the right to make the positive claim that consciousness,for example,cannot be understood by science,from all knowledge we have so far.
Fliption
Jan19-04, 08:22 AM
Metacrista, I could be wrong but I don't believe that anyone has made the claim that science cannot understand nature. I don't think anyone is disputing this assumption. I think the philosophical position being discussed here is whether consciousness can be reductively explained or is it a fundamental aspect of reality. So I'll ask my question again...
"When does science consider something as fundamental?" "How long does it attempt to reduce before it concedes?" I'm sure there is an answer to this but no one has answered it yet.
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute
If you have not yet understood that science does not make final claims there is nothing to add.I refrain to add more...I don't have the time (or patience) to teach you some basic notions of pure philosophy or philosophy of science.
No you're right, I don't think that there's much chance of you doing that. You miss the point that it doesn't whether science makes final claims or not. It's completely irrelevant.
No one claim that philosophy is not involved in science,on the contrary,the roots of science lie deep in philosophy.
Well then we're all agreed.
Anyway I do not think we have to use the above argument in this case,simply the philosophical arguments against the emergent computational conjecture do not involve such final contradictions.
Unfortunately some of them do.
On the contrary there are very good physicalist philosophical answers at the objections put forward by the 'qualia' sustainers.
Please name one then we can discuss it.
I'm afraid only the experiment can settle things in a sound way.
Nobody has yet managed to think of one that might settle the matter. I suppose that could be just coincidence.
Till then we have a conjecture,the best we could achieve so far,that works well in the case of all evidence we have though,in my opinion,is far away from giving us sufficient reasons to consider it (approximatively) correct.I even doubt that neurology alone is enough.But I cannot deny that the actual approach is the best possible approach of the moment, derived from all experimental evidence we have now.[quote]
Well I deny it, and so do many others, on logical grounds.
[QUOTE]All unbiased scientists will recognize there is still a lot of work to do.
Unbiased scientists are something of a rarity. They tend to take the axioms of science as their starting point.
It is true now that science has as an axiom the assumption that nature can be understood but the introduction of this axiom was absolutely necessary for the internal coherence of the scientific method.
Very true, and a good point. Unfortunately it may be internally consistent but wrong.
But certainly neither have we the right to make the positive claim that consciousness,for example,cannot be understood by science,from all knowledge we have so far.
How so? What's the difference between a final claim, which you say science cannot make, and a positive claim?
Anyway, let's leave this. How would you answer Fliptions question.
selfAdjoint
Jan19-04, 10:09 AM
The definition of elemental changes with the development of science. For example obviously the chemical "elements" were once thought to be elemental; they were made of "atoms" from the Greek for indivisible. Later isotopes were discovered which showed the chemical elements weren't truly elemental, and the subatomic particles were discovered which showed the atoms weren't truly indivisible.
About all that modern science treats as philosophically elemental is constants of nature, and if you follow the posts up in physics, you'll see discussions of them varying (speed of light, fine structure constant, etc.).
You have to distinguish from a conscious decision not to question a given thing for the present, from an out and out statement that it is elemental. For example we have "elementary" particles in quantum physics, but according to string physics they are made of something else. Strings currently occupy the role where they are not inquired into, but that doesn't mean they are truly regarded as elemental in a way a philosopher would understand the word.
metacristi
Jan19-04, 11:17 AM
Fliption
I do not think I understand.Science itself does not make any assumptions about the ultimate nature of consciousness.Not yet.We have a conjecture that works for all our practical purposes,now at least.Some people,scientists or not,are over optimistic.Based on the current state of affairs and especially due to some philosophical arguments they inferred that physicalism is enough.For example many use Daniel Dennett's arguments pro physicalism (brilliant otherwise,strictly philosophically speaking)...to claim the end of dualism.Due to some contradictions with some accepted knowledge now.Or it is clear that Dennet's arguments,though strong against the Cartesian type of dualism,fail to account for all types of dualism.It is a possibility and nothing more.
Science's primary goal is to find all relevant necessary and sufficient causes of physical phenomena that can be possible inferred from known facts.There might be more but since we cannot put all of them in evidence we must content with what we have,based only on observed facts.But we will never postulate the existence of theoretical constructs that are superfluous to explain all observed facts.Especially at this stage of research when there is no need to postulate that 'qualia' is something fundamental since the actual approach is theoretically and empirically evolving (if you understand what I mean).Basically there is no good reason for that,experimentally derived.To be accepted the qualia approach should also make some new,testable predictions,in order to qualify as a scientific hypothesis.
Finally,to address your question we can only establish degrees of confidence in the truth of some scientific assumptions.There is indeed a problem with induction so that,technically speaking,science cannot give us certitudes in many cases (though obviously it give us even certitudes).However when we have relevant test samples,we are entitled to have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of a certain statement,to believe that it is very close to the actual truth.
For example if we will build androids whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being,in the absence of any serious scientific alternative approach,there are sufficient reasons to believe that the computational emergentist approach is (approximatively) true.Practically we are still open to new data but in its absence there is no good reason,empirically based,to think that subjective experiences imply something extra.
It would be more or less the same if we could first extensively test successfully a holistic theory of consciousness.We would be entitled to use 'qualia' as a further scientific construct only if it made further predictions which we could test empirically.In their absence there is no good reason to think that the best existing approach is not able to explain the remaining puzzles later.The possible existence of final limitations cannot change things.
A problem would be if,in the absence of any evident limitations or serious scientific alternatives,the actual conjecture will become theoretically and empirically stagant for a long time.As I said this could be a hint that the best existing approach fail to take in account something more fundamental.This might be exactly the case with the computational approach.But as I've already said it would always exist the possibility to postulate that this 'something more fundamental' is a final physical limitiation we are not aware yet (for example that some interactions in the complex neural network of the brain are chaotic) or that quantum mechanics is involved in a way not understood yet.Or,much more simply,to invoke the emergent phenomena argument,they are more than the simple sum of the constituents.Basically such a failure of the computational approach does not constitute a sufficient reason to think qualia is fundamental.
Finally we can see Chalmers' pan protopsychism as a form of physicalism too since it involves the interaction between brain and some fundamental features of reality.So eventually physicalism might still be right though,possible,due to some final limitations (for example HUP),we will never have sufficient reasons to believe that.
metacristi
Jan19-04, 12:14 PM
Canute
Unfortunately some of them do.
If you had read more carefully the literature on Mary's chamber argument you would have known that there is no edge for the qualia argument,practically it fails to prove the internal inconsistence of the actual approach,being not sound.Basically we can talk of the same things using different terminologies.For example take the sentences 'Cicero was an orator' and 'Tully was an orator'.They seem two different concepts having the same referent but Cicero is in fact Tully.Likewise there is no good reason to think that the scientific approach cannot explain subjective experience.Not yet at least.
As for some other arguments (zombies or Chinese Room) they can qualify only as mere possibilities.Even Chalmers for example admits that he talks of the logical possibility of zombies (which does not mean automatically physical possibility).He uses the argument to suggest 'that there is no logical entailment from physical facts to facts about consciousness, whereas there is such an entailment in most other domains.'
Unfortunately,though philosophically acceptable,it is not scientifically acceptable for we must have first sufficient reasons to think they can exist practically.
I'm afraid,we never have the right to argue that one logical possibility is (automatically) empirically possible before testing it practically.I've already explained to you that not even predictions about natural facts (logical deductions from the premises) of a very successful scientific theory otherwise (many other predictions confirmed practically) are not considered true before soundly confirming them practically first.Not even in the extreme case that all premises are empirically derived (additionally having a high degree of confidence in their truth) and the prediction is unique and inevitable logically.
Fliption
Jan19-04, 01:11 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
[B]Fliption
I do not think I understand.Science itself does not make any assumptions about the ultimate nature of consciousness.
Well, maybe not officially. I haven't seen a theory yet that doesn't involve consciousness being an effect of the brain. I'd say that all this research is based on the assumption that consciousness comes from brains. I realize that science is defined in such a way that this assumption should be denounced once it is found to be incorrect. My question is asking "at what point does this happen?" What would have to happen for this assumption to be dropped?
Especially at this stage of research when there is no need to postulate that 'qualia' is something fundamental since the actual approach is theoretically and empirically evolving (if you understand what I mean).Basically there is no good reason for that,experimentally derived.To be accepted the qualia approach should also make some new,testable predictions,in order to qualify as a scientific hypothesis.
Are you suggesting that current theories actually make testable predictions on subjective experience? I'd like to hear more about this.
And I wouldn't know if such a theory of "qualia" would be useful or not because I haven't seen one. Has there ever been a theory that stepped outside of the assumption mentioned above to see what a different approach would warrant? If you know of such work that entertains consciousness being fundamental then let us know what it is and where information can be found.
Practically we are still open to new data but in its absence there is no good reason,empirically based,to think that subjective experiences imply something extra.
Doesn't the idea that you cannot ever know for certain imply that there is a piece that you don't understand? That there may be something extra? How can you reductively have no uncertainty when it comes to how an airplane burns fuel and flies but yet you cannot know for certain whether that airplane is having subjective experience unless subjective experience is somehow different?
A problem would be if,in the absence of any evident limitations or serious scientific alternatives,the actual conjecture will become theoretically and empirically stagant for a long time.As I said this could be a hint that the best existing approach fail to take in account something more fundamental.This might be exactly the case with the computational approach.But as I've already said it would always exist the possibility to postulate that this 'something more fundamental' is a final physical limitiation we are not aware yet
This seems like the scientists answer to the "god of the gaps" phenomenon. Many people here accuse others of trying to insert god wherever there are knowledge gaps. This is simply the reverse. "If we do not know it, it is because we haven't learned it yet."
I see no assurance from your response that there really is an answer to my question. Which I fear means that this debate will continue to go on and on, regardless of how obvious the answer really is.
metacristi
Jan19-04, 02:43 PM
New testable predictions? What if it makes the same predictions and also illiminates the philosophical problems? Though I do think if it were an accurate theory, new predictions would likely result.
But how do you know that this avenue would not be fruitful? Has it been tried?
I wouldn't know if such a theory would be useful or not because I haven't seen one. Has there ever been a theory that stepped outside of the assumption mentioned above to see what a different approach would warrant? If you know of such work that entertains consciousness being fundamental then let us know what it is and where information can be found
It must not only 'resolve the philosophical problems' (anyway the fundamental qualia would be a tautology in this case) and accomodate all reliable experiments made so far.It must also make new testable predictions where the fundamental qualia to be an absolutely necessary theoretical construct.Otherwise it is of no scientific use,there is absolutely no reason to think that the usual approach is not enough to explain subjective experience.
Anyway even it makes new predictions is not enough to think that qualia is indeed fundamental (as I argue below we must prove this practically).No,I do not know of any such theory apart from philosophy.Which for the moment is of no use for science.There is even a joke on this made by scientists about the utility of philosophy in cognitive sciences: 'Science tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber whilst philosophy tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber where there is no black cat'...
Well, maybe not officially. I haven't seen a theory yet that doesn't involve consciousness being an effect of the brain. I'd say that all this research is based on the assumption that consciousness comes from brains. I realize that science is defined in such a way that this assumption should be denounced once it is found to be incorrect. My question is asking "at what point does this happen?" What would have to happen for this assumption to be dropped?
Science is based on observed facts only.And all we observe form empirical evidence so far is that mind is a product of the brain.This is not assumed true,this is the only conclusion which can be drawn from facts,a fallible truth.We cannot postulate the existence of new theoretical constructs if they do not have power of explanation and do not make new predictions, testable predictions.Besides there is no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental even if such a theory would be successful.Scientists have reasons to believe only in confirmed facts (even if only indirectly).So we still have to prove empirically that qualia is fundamental.
Doesn't the idea that you cannot ever know for certain imply that there is a piece that you don't understand? That there may be something extra? How can you reductively have no uncertainty when it comes to how an airplane works but yet you cannot know for certain whether something is having subjective experience?
Sometimes might be important.Sometimes not,since they involve very small effects that could not be detectable practically.But these situations are not linked,we have different degree of confidence in their truth upon their merits,experimentally certified.That's why we have a high degree of confidence that a plane built using the best scientific approach will fly but a much lower one for the assumption that the computational approach is approximatively correct (we do not even have a holistic hypothesis).Still this does not imply science cannot attain certitudes or quasi certitudes on some domain of definitions (for example water will always remain H2O even if superstrings are at the base of our universe or that the inverse square law of gravitation is approximatively correct at the macro level).Especially when talking about facts that do not imply generalizations.But since science never permit the assignation of a high degree of confidence in a statement about the natural world without extended research in all relevant situations there is no danger.Besides even in those cases we are always open to new data.
This seems like the scientists answer to the "god of the gaps" phenomenon. Many people here accuse others of trying to insert god wherever there are knowledge gaps. This is simply the reverse. "If we do not know it, it is because we haven't learned it yet."
Actually it has nothing to do with that argument,I haven't used the appropriate words,mea culpa.That means simply 'we do not know for the moment,but there is no good reason to believe that qualia is fundamental,there are plenty of other acceptable possibilities we are aware of'.On the contrary positing that qualia is fundamental would be not only unscientific but illogical.
I see no assurance from your response that there really is an answer to my question. Which I fear means that this debate will continue to go on and on, regardless of how obvious the answer really is.
Neither do I,or science,try to offer certitudes.All that science tries to find are sufficient reasons which explain the observed facts.And very often it succeeds.Still this does not imply that 'flat earthers' have disappeared...
But we do not have yet such sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness.So that you are fully entitled to be skeptical.Or me.But if you make the positive claim that the actual hypothesis is wrong you must back this with sufficient arguments,experimentally verifiable.Or,if you do not accept the empiricism of the scientific method,you must provide another method,proved superior,on empirical grounds.
Metacristi
Fliption has seen your argument off but one more point. You say that science deals only in observations. This isn't quite the case. Science deals in third-person observations.
Experiences are not third-person observable. It therefore follows that if experiences exist then science cannot explain them. However if you argue, as you do, that experiences don't exist then you are still not right to assert that science can explain them, since in this case there is nothing to explain. Science cannot explain something that doesn't exist. The fact is that science is defined in such a way that it cannot explain experiences.
Whether experiences do or do not exist is also not a matter for science, it is a matter for personal judgement. However obviously they do, otherwise there would be no consciousness debate.
metacristi
Jan19-04, 03:44 PM
Canute
Experiences are not third-person observable. It therefore follows that if experiences exist then science cannot explain them.
You made a totally unsupported assumption.No,the actual approach argues that consciousness does exist.The whole point is that there is no reason now to think that science cannot explain 'qualia' as being an emergent phenomena of the brain.I offered you an example of why Mary's chamber or other arguments fails to prove soundly that science cannot explain subjective feelings.The fact that we do not have now a detailed view,if possible certitudes,as you and fliption seem to request,is irrelevant.Of course you must also have some basic knowledge in the philosophy of science otherwise if you'll continue to accuse that science make final claims we arrive nowhere of course.
I notice that you completely ignore the issue I raised in my last post. We're not going to get very far with this discussion if you don't even acknowledge the arguments against your view and just assert that there aren't any.
Fliption
Jan19-04, 10:51 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
It must not only 'resolve the philosophical problems' (anyway the fundamental qualia would be a tautology in this case) and accomodate all reliable experiments made so far.It must also make new [B]testable predictions where the fundamental qualia to be an absolutely necessary theoretical construct.Otherwise it is of no scientific use,there is absolutely no reason to think that the usual approach is not enough to explain subjective experience.
Ever heard of String theory? It makes no testable predictions yet I'm sure it gets more time then your arguing it should deserve.
Anyway even it makes new predictions is not enough to think that qualia is indeed fundamental (as I argue below we must prove this practically).
This is my question. Same question, different words. How exactly is it possible to prove that something is fundamental? At what point does science lean in the direction that something is fundamental? You're insisting that it be proven but yet when I ask the question of how such things are determined, there is no objective answer. So it seems it cannot be proven. Surely, we aren't going to make certain theories impossible when we still have so much to learn are we?
No,I do not know of any such theory apart from philosophy.Which for the moment is of no use for science.There is even a joke on this made by scientists about the utility of philosophy in cognitive sciences: 'Science tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber whilst philosophy tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber where there is no black cat'...
LOL, there were also many philosophers in college that made jokes about the shallowness of physicists. I couldn't say either way, you understand? But I do remember them doing it. I've learned that everyone is a bit biased and I need to think for myself.
Science is based on observed facts only.And all we observe form empirical evidence so far is that mind is a product of the brain.
How? What is an example of something that you could witness that would tell you that mind comes from brain?
Besides there is no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental even if such a theory would be successful.Scientists have reasons to believe only in confirmed facts (even if only indirectly).So we still have to prove empirically that qualia is fundamental.
Why is it that you must prove that qualia is fundamental in order to entertain a theory and you don't have to prove anything with regard to the "mind from brain" theory? With this theory, stating fallible truths seems to be enough.
It seems as if you are saying one requires more evidence than the other because of some sort of evidence we have today that makes one case stronger than the other. I'm not clear on what this evidence is. If you can answer my question above asking for examples that would be good.
Actually it has nothing to do with that argument,I haven't used the appropriate words,mea culpa.That means simply 'we do not know for the moment,but there is no good reason to believe that qualia is fundamental,there are plenty of other acceptable possibilities we are aware of'.On the contrary positing that qualia is fundamental would be not only unscientific but illogical.
It's saying the same thing from my point of view. The result is that there is no clear line. Someone can always claim that we just need to learn more. As I feared, this is a purely subjective determination. The irony is that this requires someone at some point to exercise a philosophical thought.
Also, you are claiming that qualia as fundamental is not only unscientific but illogical. Now THIS is what we're discussing in this thread. Surely you don't need a laboratory to show why it's illogical so explain here why this is so. No one else has been able to do it. Perhaps you can.
So that you are fully entitled to be skeptical.Or me.But if you make the positive claim that the actual hypothesis is wrong you must back this with sufficient arguments,experimentally verifiable.Or,if you do not accept the empiricism of the scientific method,you must provide another method,proved superior,on empirical grounds.
Unfortunately, the scientific method apparently cannot say when it has reached it's limit. Even if it has. We have left that up to a subjective call. A subjective call that it doesn't seem you want to acknowledge. If you don't acknowledge it then we must have a more objective and clear answer to my original question.
To sum it all up, I find it interesting that we're willing to accept uncertainties in our pet theories so that we don't have to deal with the philosophical questions. But other theories must be proven before they are even accepted as a theory. I don't even think this is what a theory is but I'll stop now [:)].
Fliption
Jan19-04, 11:02 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
You made a totally unsupported assumption.No,the actual approach argues that consciousness does exist.The whole point is that there is no reason now to think that science cannot explain 'qualia' as being an emergent phenomena of the brain.I offered you an example of why Mary's chamber or other arguments fails to prove soundly that science cannot explain subjective feelings.The fact that we do not have now a detailed view,if possible certitudes,as you and fliption seem to request,is irrelevant.Of course you must also have some basic knowledge in the philosophy of science otherwise if you'll continue to accuse that science make final claims we arrive nowhere of course.
I hope I haven't mis-understood but I will clarify just in case. I'm not claiming that lack of a detailed view means that the theory is wrong. Any reasonable person understands that it takes time to learn and gain knowledge. I simply asked for some guidelines on when a major assumption change becomes warranted. The answer we have so far is that there are no such guidelines.
Also, perhaps this hasn't been communicated well but I don't think anyone else sees any more merit to the current scientific theories over the one being suggested here. You seem to think that it is on higher ground but I don't think anyone else sees it that way. If you answer some of the questions in previous posts you may be able to communicate how current theories actually explain things and make predictions. That would clear alot of things up.
metacristi
Jan20-04, 03:21 AM
Canute
I notice that you completely ignore the issue I raised in my last post. We're not going to get very far with this discussion if you don't even acknowledge the arguments against your view and just assert that there aren't any.
What arguments Canute?Your proclamation that,by definition,science cannot explain consciousness because subjective experiences are totally private?Let's be rational.In this case we would not even have sufficient reasons to think that other persons outside ourselves are conscious.You see we must reside in the majority of cases,here included,on some sufficient experimental reasons to think that something is approximatively correct.Science only need sufficient arguments.Certitudes are very rare.How do we decide that other persons are conscious?Simply by using the analogy argument,given also the existence of extended research that other people's brains have approximatively the same structure,and by observing their behaviour or asking them what they feel.We do not have to measure subjective feelings to decide that other people are conscious instead of being zombies.That's why the construction of an android of the type mentioned in my previous posts is a sufficient reason that they are not zombies,the analogy argument+strong experimental evidence [offer us sufficient reasons],coherent also with all previous accepted knowledge.Those who claim they are zombies must prove that experimentally.
I think we must review the state of affairs before going further.It's clear that now we have only a simple conjecture,we are far away from having any sufficient reason to believe it is approximatively correct (anyway no final claims are made).However the actual conjecture is theoretically and empirically evolving and there is no good reason now,logical or experimental,to consider it wrong or that an improved version,including all actual knowledge derived from experiments, cannot explain consciousness eventually.You and others object that subjective experiences cannot be 'measured' by science therefore science cannot explain consciousness no matter how detailed a scientific successful theory can we obtain.This is a pseudo problem for it is no reason to think that there are not physical states behind,approximatively the same,which create approximatively similar mental states in different persons.Anyway as I've argued before in case we will have detailed theory or an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being there are sufficient empirical and logical grounds to consider it approximatively correct.
Imagine that we will obtain sometime a detailed computational emergentist hypothesis (it is totally possible there are not good reasons to think otherwise) which makes also clear predictions of how conscious experience arise from brain working (how 'qualia' arise from brain's working included,though not confirmed for the moment).If it is capable to explain how brain works at the neural network level,with many confirmed predictions,being not falsified yet,in the absence of any credible scientific alternative there are sufficient grounds to have a high degree of confidence in it.Additionally the discoveries in AI could strengthen the conclusions.Maybe we will never be able to confirm the predictions about subjective experiences directly (but who can be sure of that?).Even so there would still exist sufficient empirical and logical reasons (not to say overwhelming evidence) backing the existing hypothesis and practically no empirical or sound logical evidence against.There would be more than sufficient empirical and logical reasons to think it is approximatively correct.
Simply postulating that 'you cannot confirm the predictions about how subjective feeling arise therefore science cannot explain conscious experience' cannot count as an argument against.Bascally there are no good reasons to think it is correct.First science is still open to new data,we accept our knowledge is still fallible though assigning a high degree of confidence in its approximative truth (we have sufficient reasons for that),secondly how can you back rationally that we will not be able to do that?By definition?Maybe consciousness can be simulated (many supporters of 'weak' AI hypothesis believe that it can) or who knows maybe we will be able to put in evidence thoughts if they are physically based,that is interact with usual matter.Basically it is conceivable that we can test those predictions.And it would be far from being a miracle to confirm the predictions made by our hypothesis of how subjective experiences arise...
Even assuming that we decide not to have a high degree of confidence in such a detailed hypothesis of consciousness (in this case we are entitled to doubt in the majority of cases,we base our knowledge mainly on sufficient reasons derived from all observed facts) the hard fact remain: it would still remain the best we managed,basically with no alternative,if no competing scientific approach (at least respecting the requirements of the scientific method,though inferior for the moment) does not exist.With scientists entitled to prefer the best empirically based hypothesis to all other explanations,for all our practical purposes.This does not imply also a high degree of confidence in its approximative truth.But it would be hard enough to explain it's remarkable empirical success at least at the levels we can measure directly,especially if we could build,based on it,an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being.
In all cases we would have no experimental grounds to claim that science cannot explain consciousness and surely no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental.Simply putting again and again the old cliche 'you cannot account for the subjective experiences' neither falsify the best existing scientific hypothesis (maybe true in absolute though possible we will never know that) nor strengthen the credibility of 'fundamental qualia' (un)scientific (at that moment at least) hypothesis.
Dark Wing
Jan20-04, 04:51 AM
Hey Hypnogouge, this is a little reply to the 1st post you put up... I have read the other 2 pages, but I want to bypass most of those arguments and explain Chalmers problem (and Dennett’s) in a new way...
A Defense of Materialism:
The real problem with all of this explaining consciousness through a reductive style is the explanation paradigm they use. The call it "reduction", claiming to "reduce" consciousness to a physical process of the brain.
But this is very misleading. It is in fact backwards. In presuming a mind, a consciousness, a subjective experience to exist, you are running into trouble. By trying to understand and explain this mind, consciousness or experience and then attempt to put it into little categories that will entirely explain it in order for it to be reducible, you are also running into problems. How in all hell are you meant to categories a subjective experience accurately and wholly? all kinds of problems, such as the problems of other minds, and presuming they do exist, if the they exist in the same manner of yours comes up. there is no way to do a top down reduction of mind. It leads to dualism, confusion, and ultimately the functionalist fallacy. (for, if mind is something reducible, if it is even possible to talk of it outside physical boundaries and talk and categories it as a cognitive [not neurobiological] process, then we must be able to write a program that imitates it and call a computer a mind, no?)[o)]
THE SOLUTION
We are looking at this backwards. Instead of trying to reduce the un-catergorisable into a physical state, we should start at the bottom and work up. Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.
Now, if you get every lobe and section of your brain simply doing what it does: receiving information and then passing on the new information: we experience our world. why? cause our brain is taking in physical stimulus from the physical world and physically processing it. "the mind" is simply the result of this process. in fact, the mind does not even need to have a physical effect on the body at all in order for us to think that it has. We justify our minds to ourselves as it seems to us that we have control over our thoughts, and it seems that what we are doing is a result of personal want feelings and motivations. take a bottom up approach, and all you are doing is reacting on a higher level to a causation pattern that was determined by the moving of an atom in the realm of physics below biology.
Does a cell in the arm know that it is a cell in the arm? no. I just receive its information, does what it does to it, and then send out new signals to those cells around them. yet we have a unified feeling of body. I would argue the mind is the same. we have a unified experience of mind, but what it really is billions of neurons doing its things and passing the information on to the next one. the bi product is consciousness. and it has no causation at all.
This is an eliminative materialist approach supported by the likes of the churchlands. do not be deceived by the top down approach. the mind as we think of it does not exist and is not reducible simply because it is not there like that. a bottom up process takes care of the gap and takes care of dualism. I can try to explain this a little better if you are interested in hearing more about it. I am in a bit of a hurry, I might have rushed through the explanation a bit. :) sorry.
Another God
Jan20-04, 05:11 AM
I think it explains things perfectly, but I am eager to hear a reasonable atttempt to find fault with it. It is so easy to accept a theory as unchallengable when no one challenges it....
Bring on the criticisms!!!!
Fliption
Jan20-04, 09:23 AM
That's interesting because I don't think it explains anything heh. But perhaps I didn't fully understand it.
How do we explain the "sense of body and mind" that you spoke of?
If there is nothing to reductively explain, then how do we explain that we have a sense of something needing an explaination?
It's seems similar to Dennett in that it doesn't solve the problem. It merely defines it away by claiming it doesn't exists. But if it doesn't exist then we have at the very least an illusion with no reductive explanation.
olde drunk
Jan20-04, 10:18 AM
honestly, how can we get so caught up in this minutia?
take a recently deceased brain, bombard it with chemicals and particles and prayers. what happens? nada!
take a plant, stimulate it with a charge and you can measure a reaction to the stimulant. break off a piece, apply another charge. what happens? nada!
the missing ingredient? life force! who da hell knows EXACTLY what it is? but, it is there! for easy of communication, i like to call it, consciousness.
lets not waste time on debating its existence, lets invest time and energy trying to understand it and its properties.
i withdraw from discussing this further.
peace,
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute
What arguments Canute?
Ok I give up. You need to read the literature. The whole of the current issue of the international 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' is given over to the debate on whether first-person data can be considered scientific. There is a reason for this. It's not as simple an issue as you think.
Dark Wing
Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.
I think that this is where your argument goes wrong. You assume here that the existence of states of experience is strictly dependent on brain states before you actually present your argument for the idea.
Also by saying this you are suggesting that conscious experience is something different to matter, and this seems to be dualism of some sort, which is a tricky position to take.
It isn't unreasonable to say that that states of experience are affected by brain states, the anecdotal (non-observed) evidence is overwhelming. But there is no evidence that consciousness is ontologically dependent on brain. (Although the day to day human experience of it clearly is for the most part).
It's a topic full of traps.
Canute
metacristi
Jan20-04, 11:05 AM
Canute
Make first the difference between a purely philosophical argument and the truth about natural facts first and only after accuse me of being ignorant.By the way it's very useful,in situations like this,to read from time to time what have to say the alternative views.Otherwise there is a great danger to end in dogmatism.
metacristi
Jan20-04, 11:41 AM
Bring on the criticisms!!!!
1.There are a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neural network level.No matter the type of physicalism,this or Dennett's type of physicalist functionalism.Nothing to do with qualia.We have only observed that some brain states in the neural network correlate with some mental states but it's clear we are far apart from having sufficient reasons to think that all mental states are correlated with brain states.There is still an afwul lot of work to do.
2.We are far away from having a holistic,successful,theory of consciousness.There is no good reason now to think that the findings in neurology represent more than some necessary conditions for the appearance of conscious experience not sufficient ones.
3.The emergentist approach does not make any predictions about the level of complexity when the emergent phenomenon of consciousness appears.Anyway what good reasons are to believe that a degree of complexity close to those of human beings will really produce conscious experience in androids or at least a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being?
4.Mental states seem to be more than the firing of some neurons in the neural network of the brain (OK a strictly philosophical objection but valuable).
5.All physicalist models proposed so far are only inferences from the (too) incomplete scientific conjecture of today.Neither deduced nor absolutely necessary to account for the known facts.There is no good reason to believe now that the layer model of Dennett or his neural darwinism theory are something more than mere philosophy.
As a conclusion the actual reductionist view (at the neuronal level) and all related doctrines are simple conjectures for which we cannot assign a high degree of confidence now.Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute
Make first the difference between a purely philosophical argument and the truth about natural facts first and only after accuse me of being ignorant.
Why?
Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.
Oh c'mon, you're not being honest in your thinking. You haven't addressed one single objection to your view yet. I'll leave you to your strange notion of science and philosophy which, if you ever bother to check, you'll find no scientist or philosopher shares.
Dark Wing
Jan20-04, 03:47 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
1.There are a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neural network level.No matter the type of physicalism,this or Dennett's type of physicalist functionalism.Nothing to do with qualia.We have only observed that some brain states in the neural network correlate with some mental states but it's clear we are far apart from having sufficient reasons to think that all mental states are correlated with brain states.There is still an afwul lot of work to do.
You jump from "there is a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neuron level" to "there is no qualia". but there are some very distinct correlations. depression is a great example here. Yes, there is a great deal of work to do, but that means nothing. Its not an argument against the idea, and I was wanting to talk of this idea as a poosible way of the contingent world, not as an idea that is already proved.
If we have found very strong links to some, then its worth searching for more. Many reaserchers of perception will argue for the exsistance of the "grandmother cell", where there is a very specific cell in the brain designed only to respond to your grandmothers image. Infact, a lot of the cortex is set out like that: one cell only responding to very very specific information. If that be the case, then is it not at least plausable that one CAN develop a one to one "reduction" to the brain? but in saying they are correlated, then you are still assuming that these states exsist in their own right, and IMO they do not.
2.We are far away from having a holistic,successful,theory of consciousness.There is no good reason now to think that the findings in neurology represent more than some [i]necessary[i/] conditions for the appearance of conscious experience not [i]sufficient[i/] ones.[quote/]
You cant pull the neccesary card here. Mainly because youcannot prove that somthing is neccacary, you can only prove that it is contingent, as this is a contingent universe. Kant tried his whole life to prove somthing to be a neccesary truth, and built a lovley glass cathedral, sure. But just because it is not neccasary does not mean thats the only way it can be done within our own know universe.
Even if they are "sufficiant" and not the only way it can be done within our universe, so what? you want to talk about what "consousness" is... why not start with an explanation of what it could be inside us, and then start to expand the field to include anything you want it to be, including AI if you think immitation is good enough to attribute the real thing to. it all depends on how strictly you moniter your explanation, and what you hope to achieve from such a definition.
[b][quote]3.The emergentist approach does not make any predictions about the level of complexity when the emergent phenomenon of consciousness appears.Anyway what good reasons are to believe that a degree of complexity close to those of human beings will really produce conscious experience in androids or at least a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being?[b/][quote/]
the android approach ignores the biological causation of human consiousness. they can never be consious in the way humans are, simply because if they are consious then they are so by diffrent means. there is no emergant phenomena. we are tricked into thinking there is, as we have a wholistic experience of our world. there is only brain activity, and we think we have a mind. eliminative materialism.
[b][quote]4.Mental states seem to be more than the firing of some neurons in the neural network of the brain (OK a strictly philosophical objection but valuable).[b/][quote/]
seems... but how easily tricked is our experience? how much as we convinced that we are of one mind, and this mind is a thing?
To explain this I will introduce the split brain patient. (if you dont know much about this sort of thing, then read up on it, I know there have been a few threads on this around the place latley so i wont go into extensive detail) They beleiev that they have a unified mind, a unified sence of mind. UNTILL they are put in a test situation where only certian information (say the word "pen") is given to the RH,while nothing is given to the LH. the experimentor will then ask the subject to pick up the object described by the word. while stating "what word?" they will reach out and grab the pen of a tray of objects. Lesson? this so called "emergant phenomena" obviously cannot pass through severed neural passages. thus is closly tied to neural activity. even though the patient seems to believe that he is of one mind, of "unified spirit" it is clear that this is an illusion. why? there is no place in the mind where things come together like that. there is no place where a unified mind that takes all the information recieved and melds it into an experience. infact, such a mind does not exsist. only neurol activity does, and that is incredibly complex.
[b][quote]5.All physicalist models proposed so far are only inferences from the (too) incomplete scientific conjecture of today.Neither deduced nor absolutely necessary to account for the known facts.There is no good reason to believe now that the layer model of Dennett or his neural darwinism theory are something more than mere philosophy.[b/][quote/]
its speculation that leads to fallacy as they all start from the worng end. I do not neccesarily agree with Dennett. Infact, i am more in favor with the Churchlands, as I said before. Dennett has a lot to answer for, especily with Cog now on the loose.
[b][quote]As a conclusion the actual reductionist view (at the neuronal level) and all related doctrines are simple conjectures for which we cannot assign a high degree of confidence now.Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses [B]for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.
well, thats your opinion. To me, its taken from a neurobiological point of view, and I have been studing this for years, and am about to start my thesis. There is a lot of hope in the neuro biological world that this can be the case,and there have been major steps taken to show that its very plausable. all lesion studies, all studies on the visual cortex in particular (especily for a unified theory of mind reaserch) is very pointed towards the brain being the causer and the activator of every step of a consious state, and even the unconsious state. But I wont go down this line if there is no intrest in it.
Another God
Jan20-04, 06:13 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
That's interesting because I don't think it explains anything heh. But perhaps I didn't fully understand it.
How do we explain the "sense of body and mind" that you spoke of?
If there is nothing to reductively explain, then how do we explain that we have a sense of something needing an explaination?
We explain the sense of mind and body on account of it arises from the brain functions. The brain does its thing, as the whole body does, and the sense of mind and body is an emergent property of that process. I don't beleive anyone has been able yet to explain why Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to create 'wetness' yet, it is just sorta accepted that due to the properties of the molecule, wetness is a consequence. And so, we have no idea how the parts of the brain come together to result in this felt experience of unified consciousness, but it most certainly does.... The key to this explanation though, is that this emergent property is the least important thing. It is just a side effect....an after thought. Consciousness itself has no relevence at all. The brain is all that matters.
When u concentrate on the brain, then the experiences assosciated with certain stimuli will start to be explained in terms of "Oh, so that brainstate is what it is like to see red"
But I am half guessing, it is up to dark wing to come back and give you a real reply to this.
hypnagogue
Jan20-04, 06:47 PM
Originally posted by Another God
We explain the sense of mind and body on account of it arises from the brain functions. The brain does its thing, as the whole body does, and the sense of mind and body is an emergent property of that process. I don't beleive anyone has been able yet to explain why Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to create 'wetness' yet, it is just sorta accepted that due to the properties of the molecule, wetness is a consequence.
First let's make very clear what we mean by 'wetness' of water. For your analogy to be successful, you must be talking about the physical consistency (ie fluidity) of water, NOT the subjective experience of wetness-- otherwise you are not talking about something analogous to the mystery of consciousness, but rather you are just talking about the mystery of consciousness itself in disguised form.
So, if our question is just how hydrogen and oxygen combine to form a fluid, we do indeed have a pretty straightforward physical explanation. The physical structure of H2O molecules and the function of their electrostatic attraction, in suitable conditions, creates a bonding structure in a substance that is dense but not rigid. H2O molecules are free to tumble over one another, so to speak, and the macroscopic expression of this is fluidity.
This is an example of reductive explanation at its best. It works because it tells us how structure and function on one level (macroscopic) is entailed by structure and function on another level (microscopic).
However, this approach breaks down with consciousness. Subjective experience is not a structure; it does not occupy space; it is not objectively observable; and so on. The problem is not a mystery of how emergent phenomena in general work-- the emergence of fluidity from bonding structure, for example, is fairly straightforward. The problem is one of ontology-- how can something with the nature that we ascribe to physical objects entail something with the nature that we ascribe to subjective experience? There is good reason for thinking that there is nothing in our currently accepted ontology that entails the existence of consciousness a priori. The simple response is that we need to expand our ontology.
And so, we have no idea how the parts of the brain come together to result in this felt experience of unified consciousness, but it most certainly does.... The key to this explanation though, is that this emergent property is the least important thing. It is just a side effect....an after thought. Consciousness itself has no relevence at all. The brain is all that matters.
Not sure exactly what you're trying to say here.
When u concentrate on the brain, then the experiences assosciated with certain stimuli will start to be explained in terms of "Oh, so that brainstate is what it is like to see red"
That's still not an explanation, it's an identification. The question remains, why or how is it that this brain state entails the experience of the color red? What properties of this brainstate could possibly account for such a thing?
hypnagogue
Jan20-04, 11:48 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
Hey Hypnogouge, this is a little reply to the 1st post you put up... I have read the other 2 pages, but I want to bypass most of those arguments and explain Chalmers problem (and Dennett’s) in a new way...
OK
THE SOLUTION
We are looking at this backwards. Instead of trying to reduce the un-catergorisable into a physical state, we should start at the bottom and work up. Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.
What do you mean by experience here? There are many neurons whose activities don't activate some kind of experience (hence, the unconscious mind).
But more importantly, WHY a subsequent change in experience? Why any experience to begin with?
Now, if you get every lobe and section of your brain simply doing what it does: receiving information and then passing on the new information: we experience our world. why? cause our brain is taking in physical stimulus from the physical world and physically processing it. "the mind" is simply the result of this process.
OK, let me see if I have your argument straight.
Step 1. The physical brain processes information.
Step 2. Then a miracle occurs...
Step 3. "The mind" is simply the result of this process.
I think you need to be more explicit in step 2. [:)]
My argument is not that conscious experience is not causally linked in some way with the brain. My argument is that any explanation invoking only physical processes in the brain is insufficient to solve the problem before us, even though it is still necessary to refer to such brain activity for a theory of human consciousness.
To put it simply, while embracing your bottom-up approach: why should processes in the brain give rise to consciousness at all? Why do these processes not take place like nice materialistic experience-less machines? Why AREN'T we zombies?
I don't believe that the bottom-up approach can answer this question, even in principle, starting from a materialist ontology (see my posts in Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=11986&perpage=12&pagenumber=1)). I agree that bottom-up is really the most useful paradigm to take, precisely because I think it shows more forcefully that materialism can't explain consciousness. (ad hoc tack-ons don't count)
Another God
Jan21-04, 01:05 AM
OK, yep, I'm back where I started on this matter. I do agree completely hypnagogue, and now that I have had a chance to think about this again, I remember why.
Having put some thought into this I came to the conclusion that when you say "Why should it?" you mean what I would prefer to say "How does it [give rise to consciousness]?". Because upon thinking about this problem earlier this year, I came up with a possibly 'why' answer. I considered the problem evolutionarily (as I feel compelled to do), and the answer that I came up with, was it was a better survival strategy to create a mind which believed it existed rather than a mind which went about computing its functions. Sure out mind still does that, but now that we beleive that we exist, we REALLY don't want to die... we are even fearful of dying... etc. The survival game is much more real.
How it went about achieving that phenomenon...well, that is precisely what you are asking.
metacristi
Jan21-04, 02:54 AM
Dark Wing
You cant pull the neccesary card here. Mainly because youcannot prove that somthing is neccacary, you can only prove that it is contingent, as this is a contingent universe. Kant tried his whole life to prove somthing to be a neccesary truth, and built a lovley glass cathedral, sure. But just because it is not neccasary does not mean thats the only way it can be done within our own know universe.
Even if they are "sufficiant" and not the only way it can be done within our universe, so what? you want to talk about what "consousness" is... why not start with an explanation of what it could be inside us, and then start to expand the field to include anything you want it to be, including AI if you think immitation is good enough to attribute the real thing to. it all depends on how strictly you moniter your explanation, and what you hope to achieve from such a definition.
Probably you speak of Hume's problems of induction and causality.Yes strictly speaking we cannot be sure that something is really necessary.But in science there is a well defined notion of determinism and causality.Otherwise there would not exist the notion of scientific knowledge.We can infer,based on all observed facts,in the limit of error of our measurement devices,a number of causes which produce a physical phenomenon using a mixture of the well known methods of agreement,difference,equal variations and rest.There is no need for certitudes,there might be more (whose effect cannot be put in evidence empirically),science is concerned only with necessary and sufficient conditions that can be inferred based on all we are able to observe and measure.For example if in the presence of certain initial conditions (indistinguishable experimentally between tests) we always obtain a certain effect (also indistinguishable experimentally) we can assume we found the necessary and sufficient causes which produce a certain effect and from here to propose a scientific explanation that must be tested further.If after these extensive tests the hypothesis is not falsified and we manage to obtain a relevant experimental sample (successful tests in all relevant sort of conditions on a certain domain of definition) then we can have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of our conjecture (on that domain of definition).
In the case of our problem we cannot say we have all relevant causes that can be inferred from experiments.And this is not because of some measurement limitations,simply the brain is a so complex phenomenon that we have not managed to find all relevant mechanisms which produce conscious experience.All unbiased scientists will recognize this.Hence we cannot propose for the moment a holistic theory of consciousness of the kind of the inverse square law of gravitation (or Coulomb's law) in physics for example.All we can propose is a certain conjecture,which is evolving theoretically and experimentally indeed for the moment (all newly discovered mechanisms fit with the conjecture),but which is far from the needed holistic view in order to have a high degree of confidence in its (approximative) truth,if sustained by a relevant experimental sample of course.
Nothing indicates for the moment that the computational emergentist approach is really (approximatively) true.There is no good reason to think now that neural network is enough to explain conscious experience.Quantum consciousness approaches,even some types of interactionist dualism (see Eccles',a neurologist,proposal-by the way he is a Nobel prize winner),are still feasible,compatible with all research done in the neurological field though for the moment at least we cannot label them scientific (but nothing impede the proposal of such a scientific hypothesis in the future).This does not mean the actual experimental data is not valid,on the contrary,only that it might just not be enough.Maybe QM is involved,maybe much more,the split between these proposals might be at a very subtle level impossible to be put in evidence today.Of course there is also the possibility that eventually we will have sufficinet reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the computationalist approach but now it's not the case.
the android approach ignores the biological causation of human consiousness. they can never be consious in the way humans are, simply because if they are consious then they are so by diffrent means. there is no emergant phenomena. we are tricked into thinking there is, as we have a wholistic experience of our world. there is only brain activity, and we think we have a mind. eliminative materialism.
In case that such an android,with the brain constructed based on microswitches (having a level of complexity similar to that of a human being) will not have a behaviour indistinguishable from a human being there will exist sufficient empirical reasons against the actual computational emergentist approach.In other words will be sufficient reasons to conclude that the actual hypothesis was disproved.Indeed one of its pillars is that human mind is an emergent phenomenon due to complex interactions of the neural network in the brain.We would expect from the actual conjecture (it is a prediction of it in fact) that an android,build using the same pattern as the human brain,based on microswitches,to produce conscious experience whose first external sign to be a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being.Otherwise there are no good reasons to think that a computational emergentist theory in general (not only the actual variant,disproved in case that will happen what I said above) could be really enough.Exactly this is the purpose of the 'zombies' philosophical argument,to show that such androids cannot be conscious as human beings are.The above scenario will be a relevant experimental confirmation of those objections,leading inevitably to the demise of the actual variant of the computational emergentist approach.And I hardly see what alterantive scientific computational emergentist hypothesis could be proposed instead...
well, thats your opinion. To me, its taken from a neurobiological point of view, and I have been studing this for years, and am about to start my thesis. There is a lot of hope in the neuro biological world that this can be the case,and there have been major steps taken to show that its very plausable. all lesion studies, all studies on the visual cortex in particular (especily for a unified theory of mind reaserch) is very pointed towards the brain being the causer and the activator of every step of a consious state, and even the unconsious state. But I wont go down this line if there is no intrest in it.
I do not think it is a question of opinion here.It's about hard facts.We need a holistic hypothesis of consciousness which to make clear predictions about the way the whole mechanism works which to be tested extensivley further.We cannot make generalizations when we know we have only a theory which accounts for parts of a mechanism.I'm afraid hope alone cannot raise the degree of confidence and the probability that the actual conjecture is true.Of course eventually we might have sufficient empirical reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the actual conjecture.But till then we have an awful lot of work to do.Hasty generalizations now are at least non rational.At most some people,this is not obligatory for all would be rational persons,can base from all known empirical facts a rational belief that the actual conjecture is (approximatively) true.Of course belief does not mean we have sufficient empirical reasons now to make the positive claim that it is (approximatively) true...
metacristi
Jan21-04, 06:07 AM
Dark Wing
You jump from "there is a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neuron level" to "there is no qualia". but there are some very distinct correlations. depression is a great example here. Yes, there is a great deal of work to do, but that means nothing. Its not an argument against the idea, and I was wanting to talk of this idea as a poosible way of the contingent world, not as an idea that is already proved.
If we have found very strong links to some, then its worth searching for more. Many reaserchers of perception will argue for the exsistance of the "grandmother cell", where there is a very specific cell in the brain designed only to respond to your grandmothers image. Infact, a lot of the cortex is set out like that: one cell only responding to very very specific information. If that be the case, then is it not at least plausable that one CAN develop a one to one "reduction" to the brain? but in saying they are correlated, then you are still assuming that these states exsist in their own right, and IMO they do not.
I have not intended to say that 'there is no qualia'.I only wanted to stress that we still have a lot of work to do even in the so called 'easy' problem (to use the terminology of Chalmers) without talking of the possible existence of a fudamental qualia irreducible to the functioning of the brain (the 'hard' problem).But from what you say I deduce that you accept the mere conjectural status of the actual hypothesis,without making the claim that it is very close to the actual truth (in absolute).
Neither do I deny the possibility that qualia might appear as an emergent property of the complex functioning of the neural network of the brain (as the actual main view conjectures) without the need to postulate also that qualia needs something more or that consciousness is made of a different,though possible capable to interact with usual matter,'substance' (as epiphenomenalism+interactionist dualism assume).Or that the actual conjecture cannot be improved.The only problem I see now is that we are far away from having the reasons which to entitle us to have a great degree of confidence in the actual view (namely the actual variant of the emergentist approach).I have nothing with the actual view strictly technically speaking.Apart from criticising some of scientists' too optimistic expectations sometimes of course.Indeed it is still an open question whether the actual view will be confirmed with sufficient reasons practically.So far there is no known emergent phenomenon that is conscious or at least proto conscious.
hypnagogue
Jan21-04, 08:07 AM
metacristi, the objection here can be stated very simply.
1. Any purely physical explanations of consciousness will leave us free to rationally imagine a result to the contrary. That is, you can give me any theory T that tells me brainstate X or computation Y leads to conscious aspect Z, but I can still rationally imagine X or Y taking place without Z occuring as well. That is, if I imagine X or Y taking place without Z occuring as well, T cannot explain to me definitively why I am wrong, other than to say simply "that is just not how it is observed to be in nature."
2. Explanations that exhaust the necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon leave us with a conceptual necessity-- that is, having fully understood the explanation, it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise. For instance, having understood the facts about the microscopic bonding structure of H2O molecules, it is impossible for me to rationally imagine that a large collection of H2O molecules in a container at STP could exist without the properties of water being the macroscopic result-- the latter is a conceptual necessity following from the former. (If I do imagine otherwise, the conventional scientific explanation can explain to me step by step how I am wrong, rather than baldly asserting so.)
3. It follows from 1 and 2 that any physical theory of consciousness is does not include some necessary or sufficient causes. We have every reason to believe that explaining brain processes is necessary in explaining the details of human consciousness, so that leaves us to conclude that explaining brain processes (or computational processes) is not sufficient. There is something missing from the physical account.
There is simple but powerful intuition behind this claim. Any successful explanation of a phenomenon P in terms of a set of composite phenomena C must explain the mechanisms whereby the existence of C necessitates that P follows. For this to be possible, there needs to be some sort of combinatory effect in the phenomena C that somehow 'add up' to P. For instance, in the case of water, we have the structure and functions of H2O molecules adding up to the macroscopic structural and functional properties of water.
Now, in the traditional materialist ontology, we have our characters spacetime, matter, energy, and so on, with various associated properties. It is not clear at all that any of these materialist characters, as we traditionally conceive of them, have the right characteristics to somehow 'add up' to consciousness, no matter how they are arranged.
Indulge me in an analogy that is bound to be imperfect, but, I think, useful. In nature we observe two things of a fundamentally different character: material reality and consciousness. Without yet assuming that these two are distinct, we can still notice fundamental differences in our conceptions of these two things. All things in objective material reality have spatial extension; consciousness does not have spatial extension. All things in objective material reality are defined in terms of extrinsic or relational properties (for instance, mass is a relational property defined in terms of an object's resistance to acceleration); at least some elements of consciousness are defined in terms of intrinsic or inherent properties (for instance, the subjective experience of red is defined only in terms of its own redness). And so on.
A simplistic mathematical analogy would involve two sets of numbers with fundamentally different properties; for our purposes, let's say material reality as we conceive of it is represented by the real numbers and that consciousness is represented by the imaginary numbers. If we set out to explain consciousness starting from a materialist ontology alone, it is a bit like we are starting off assuming that only real numbers exist and then trying to show that we can somehow combine some set of reals to yield an imaginary. In the end it is a doomed exercise, because no combination of reals can add up to i. It is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the imaginary component. Likewise, I believe that no combination of physical processes alone can account for consciousness, because the materialist ontology leaves out a critical element. Any attempt to do so is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the 'experience' component. The solution to our mathematical problem is to recognize that we can't derive i from the reals; rather, we just add it in as a fundamental character in our mathematical ontology and proceed. Likewise, the solution to our problem of consciousness is to recognize that we can't derive experience from physical processes; rather, on some level, we just have to add some new fundamental character into our natural ontology and proceed.
Fliption
Jan21-04, 08:37 AM
It looks as if I don't need to respond to your response AG. I was just going to add that if emergent properties can hide mysteries than there would be no need to replace consciousness with an illusion. We could just simply say that consciousness DOES exists and it is an emergent property of physical processes. But I think we're straight on all that now.
metacristi
Jan21-04, 01:11 PM
hypnagogue
The scientific method provides the best methodology known of establishing the truth about natural facts.This is a fact accepted by all serious philosophers and scientists.But it is not considered infallible nor the best methodology ever possible.That's why scientific knowledge is always fallible,it never makes definitive claims,being always provisional.Scientists are always open to make the finding that something is missing.But this finding must be based entirely on experiments.Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge (there is another use,not relevant here,to show that some assumptions still hold even in cases that cannot be experimented for the moment;Heisenbergs mental experiments is one example-though I strongly doubt that we are entitled to conclude from here that HUP can be extended to all singular events).
Secondly we are entitled rationally to assign different degrees of confidence in the approximative truth of a certain assumption about natural facts upon the number of relevant successful experimental confirmations.Providing a systematic observation (done with the best measurement devices) and the existence of a relevant sample of successful tests,on a certain domain of definition and in the limit of what can be observed,we are even entitled to have a very high degree of confidence.This is exactly the rational base of why we are entitled to assign a much higher degree of confidence in the scientific explanations than in the so called 'common truths' (assumptions about facts inferred from very superficial observations).
Since science is entirely concerned with observed facts,if we managed to find all relevant causes for a certain phenomenon that can be put in evidence empirically at a certain moment,based on which to propose a detailed and widely tested theory,not falsified yet,especially in the absence of any other scientific alternative hypothesis,we would be fully entitled to have a very high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct.This does not imply certitudes,technically we are still open to doubt,but the existence of those sufficient causes fully entitle some people to think that it is actually very close to the truth,maybe the best theory possible and so to RELY on the theory not merely to prefer on the ground that it is the best approach at a certain moment.
If we could propose a detailed successful holistic theory of consciousness,extensively tested,we would be exactly in such a situation.The only requirement is that the theory should also make clear predictions about the mechanisms that create subjective experience.In spite of the fact that for the moment those predictions might not be confirmed empirically because we cannot 'measure' subjective experiences (who can be sure that this will ever be so?) all the above mentioned conditions are present so that scientists would be rationally entitled,backed by sufficient reasons,to rely on that theory.Of course this is not obligatory for all rational persons but it would be a strong base for the conclusion.Not to mention the possible construction of an android whose behaviour is indistinct from that of a human being using it.This does not imply that they (scientists) would not be open to new facts,on the contrary,but for that they would need sufficient reasons to think that there exist something extra.And this sufficient reasons must be based necessarily on empirical facts.Even without accepting that the theory is close to the actual truth,that is without relying on it,merely preffering it to all other hypotheses on pragmatic grounds,we would still need empirical facts to believe that something extra is involved.
So that,even if in absolute maybe subjective experiences involves something 'inbuilt' in the fundamental reality,from all empirical facts known+the low number of puzzles in the theory or no puzzle at all+the existence of an explanation for the subjective experiences inside the existing paradigm (though not confirmed practically for the moment)+the absence of an alternative scientific hypothesis there is no good reason to think that something extra is involved.Indeed the fact that there are some not confirmed yet predictions never constitute a falsification of the existing paradigm.Even if there are final limitations or we will not be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experiences arise for a very long time there are no good reasons to believe that those predictions are wrong if the above presented situation does not change.
Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.
Fliption
Jan21-04, 03:46 PM
metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.
This is not an opinion, or even an irrelevant mathematical truth that you need to observe in order to verify, as I understand it. It is impossible for you to reductively understand consciousness under the current scheme. Let me give an analogy to see if I can help you see the way this dialogue appears to me.
Let's assume that I've told you that once I have painted a white wall the color black, then it is no longer white. We're assuming 2 things:
1) the wall was white
2) I paint it black
therefore the wall is no longer white.
Now you come along and say, "we can only know that the wall is no longer white if we observe it to be true." This makes no sense because by definition it is true. Because if the wall is still white upon emperical study, then assumption 2 would be wrong and I could not have painted it black. So if we know that both assumptions are true, then we don't have to verify that the wall is no longer white. We know it isn't, by definition. Regardless of how long you observe a black wall, it will never be white!
The only way you can ever succeed in finding a wall that is both white and black is if you change the definitions. Or as Hypnagogue says with regards to consciousness, change the natural ontology.
So no matter how hard you look at a black wall, it is always white. Likewise, no matter what you find emperically under the current assumptions, you will never get rid of the hard problem of consciousness. Go ahead and think of all the possible scientific explanations for consciousness you can think of and let all that are participating show you how they don't(cannot) address the real issue of consciousness by definition.
hypnagogue
Jan21-04, 04:01 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
But this finding must be based entirely on experiments. Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge
Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.
Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.
That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.
hypnagogue
Jan21-04, 04:07 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.
Thanks Fliption, that is an eloquent way of saying exactly what I am trying to say.
M. Gaspar
Jan21-04, 04:24 PM
Might any exchange of information be considered a form of consciousness?
Dark Wing
Jan21-04, 06:26 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
What do you mean by experience here? There are many neurons whose activities don't activate some kind of experience (hence, the unconscious mind). But more importantly, WHY a subsequent change in experience? Why any experience to begin with?
without experience, and without sence of self we would not be able to form societies, or live in a way that was benificial to self at all. In short, we would not survive if you did not have a sence of consiousness. And all that has to reflect is an ability to interact with one's environment. anything that has the ability to interact with the environment comes into question here. from simple conditioning of cells to pheromone interaction with insects to our higher level social interaction:we need it to predict and controll our world.
So you ask: why? why is it neccesary for it to be the case that we have consiousness?
Its not. The question ends up chasing a dark end, why?
example. when you strike a match you have fire. Why? because friction on phosphorous happens to cause a spark. Why? its not neccesary. Its just happens to be the case in this contingent world. to try and explain it further and further down becomes meaningless. So the brain: we happen to have an attribute of semantics. we can create and derrive meaning from our world. evolutionary advantage? yes. enables us to live better with in a society and interact with our fellow species. maybe it is the case that there were a few zombie nations out there, and they were wiped out. Its concievable. But not in this contingent universe.
Instead, here, when there is neural activity, you have mind. or at least a heightened ability to interact with the environemtn, an ability that goes beyond just neurol activity, but very basic nervous activity on a celluar level. and thats all the brain is: a highly advanced nervous center.
OK, let me see if I have your argument straight.
Step 1. The physical brain processes information.
Step 2. Then a miracle occurs...
Step 3. "The mind" is simply the result of this process.
I think you need to be more explicit in step 2. [:)]
ha ha, very good. Infact, i am saying that step 2 does not exsist. it is not the result, it is not the emergant property, it is the process itself. eliminative materialism.
example. Ancient civilisations believed that lightning was a result of thors hammer striking down the mountian tops of Valhalla. We have recently learned that it is infact the depolerisation of electricity. that IS lightning. there is no need for the extra explanation. just a description of the system. Just like a brain that is functioing in certian area's will convince some that they must have a mind, some emergant property of a closed physical domain. when in fact, its just the dopamine pathway activating again. Do we know where exacly the feeling of consiousness is caused? most of the litrature is suggesting the fronal cortex, and they can stimulate all kinds of area's of that with regularity to make a subject feel diffrent things. one surgon kept stimulating a section, and the patient kept laughing: when asked what was so funny, he would say it was the picture of a horse on the wall, or the lab coat of the doctor etc. we dont need that extra explanation, but we cant handle the thought that we are just physical beings. There is no emergant property. there is no majical step from consiousness. its just a contingent fact then when we are stimulated in certianways we will feel like thus.
My argument is not that conscious experience is not causally linked in some way with the brain. My argument is that any explanation invoking only physical processes in the brain is insufficient to solve the problem before us, even though it is still necessary to refer to such brain activity for a theory of human consciousness.
thatis because there is no problem of consiousness. it is a battle of words we are dealing with here. i will see if i can find a good Wittgensteign quote to put in here on this exact topic to show you what i mean by that. although its halpful to theorize with words like "mind" and "consiousness" it will often just lead to semantic confusion, and thats the last thing we want here.
To put it simply, while embracing your bottom-up approach: why should processes in the brain give rise to consciousness at all? Why do these processes not take place like nice materialistic experience-less machines? Why AREN'T we zombies?
there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons. who can explain evolution? Just as a match and fire has its explanation limit, so des the mind and consiousness. you have to start withan underlying fact somewhere.
metacristi
Jan22-04, 04:18 AM
hypnagogue
Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.
From all I've read so far no philosophical argument has succeeded,in a sound way,to show that the physicalist approach is indeed incoherent.No one is convincing.This is not only my conclusion it is the conclusion of many serious philosophers.Even Chalmers agree that the logical possibility of zombies does not entail their experimental possibility.I'm afraid we are here in a stalemate,at the logical level,comparable with that regarding the argument pro/con the existence of a personal God.One must first believe in the existence/nonexistence of God in order to accept the arguments pro/con God existence.And of course belief is never a proof.Only hard evidence could make the difference.
That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.
As I've explained numerous times before the mere possibility that we will never be able to confirm experimentally the explanations of a very successful otherwise physicalist theory on how subjective experiences appear is not a proof,per se,that there is something more fundamental.
No respectable scientist will argue that a scientific theory explaining very well all observed facts (being very detailed with respect to what we observe) is indeed the best possible theory.For that we should prove first that there are possible only a finite number of alternative hypotheses,logically coherent,compatible with facts and that only one of them has not been disproved yet.This is quasi impossible to do in practice.That's why scientists are always prepared to find that their theories are incomplete or disproved provided new data,though some of them (or possible all of them) might have a great confidence in their approximative truth.So that we can never assume that we exhausted all necessary and sufficient conditions.Not even in your example with the water.Thus there is no logical necessity to believe that it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise,the actual explanation being simply the best we could achieve so far using the best methodology available in front of all observed facts nothing more.
Besides for a certain set of observed facts could exist,possible,an infinity of logical explanations that can be imagined.For example in the case of water we can postulate that the forces at work which hold atoms of H and O toghether are due partly to some invisible quantum leprichauns.This is fully possible though we cannot observe them now.Of course it is the epistemological privilege of science,based on observed facts only,which makes the difference and entitle us to assign a way higher degree of confidence in the truth of the scientific theory.It is always hard facts which make the difference,still this does not mean the leprichaun hypothesis was disproved.Provided new relevant experimental data...it will become science.Exactly this is the case with qualia.But for the moment there is no good reason to think that qualia is fundamental so what's the point of changing something in the scientific method itself?I'm afraid logic alone is not enough to settle things.
[We would be entitled to change some assumptions in the scientifc method itself only if the best existent theory of mind will become theoretically and empirically stagnant for a long time,in spite of the effort of the best minds on Earth and the existence of generous fundings for research,with a lot of anomalies and puzzles piling up,in the absence of any serious scientific alternative hypotheses.In this case I think it is more rational to assume that there is something extra we cannot put in evidence instead of postulating indefinitely that the actual approach will be able to explain away the puzzles later.But of course not even in this case would we be entitled to claim that qualia is fundamental.]
For science consciousness is a paradigm-shaking problem. Even now, comfortably into 21st century, no logically plausible scientific theory for its existence has yet been proposed. Many researchers remain hopeful that given more time a scientific explanation will be devised. However the longer the problem remains unsolved the more likely it becomes that the logical arguments against the possibility of a devising a scientific explanation hold, and that we cannot explain a strictly first-person phenomena in strictly third-person terms in principle. It seems reasonable to suppose that this is the ause of our inability as yet to conceive of one single scientific experiment that would prove anything at all about it.
My impression is that most of those people who believe that the current scientific model of the universe is correct also tend to believe that recently attempted explanations of consciousness based on low frequency oscillations in the brain, quantum coherence in micro-tubules, supervenience, hetero-phenomenology and so on are so nearly plausible that we must be on the brink of success, and that soon we will make the inevitable breakthrough.
However this view is based on faith rather than evidence of progress. We are no closer to explaining the origins of consciousness than Parmeneides was, and no current scientific theory that claims to explain consciousness, or even claims to explain how it might be explained, stands up to logical scrutiny.
There is no scientific definition of consciousness, no scientific test for its presence or absence, no scientific means of measuring it and no scientific proof of its existence. There is no place for it in the scientific model, no scientific theory requiring it as a postulate, and no scientific description of its properties that does not completely contradict our ‘folk-psychological’ experience of it. If it were not for first-person anecdotes there would be no scientific reason to believe that it exists.
Yet any day now we are expected to succeed in constructing a scientific explanation of it. This is surely ridiculous. The infamous ‘explanatory gap’ is not a crack in the pavement, it is a chasm of Hollywood special effects proportions, and it is no narrower today than it ever was.
metacristi
Jan22-04, 06:50 AM
I think we must settle once and forever some things (I already explained them but it seems no one really understood in spite of some claims here).Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed.However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?And since there is no proof that human mind is above nature the axiom still stands even in this case (it postulates that we can find a holistic,detailed,explanation of consciousness in which to have a high degree of confidence).But it is considered also fallible,the finding of sufficient empirical or logical reasons leading to its demise.I indicated above some necessary conditions when we would be entitled to do that (this is not sufficient of course for an action would depend also on the philosophical views held by the majority in the scientific community).But certainly we cannot do that now,the actual objections are not sound.This fallibilistic scientific approach of why consciousness can be understood is entirely different from the physicalist approach that science can surely have a detailed theory entirely on phisical terms.At most this view can count as a philosophical view in spite of the fact that there are no serious arguments against now.And from what I know the majority of physicalists accept this.
Originally posted by metacristi
Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed. However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?
This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.
hypnagogue
Jan22-04, 07:37 AM
OK Dark Wing, I see where you are coming from, and I think we are now at a critical point in our discussion. I agree that, on some level, consciousness is contingent or is the result of some compository contingent entities; at some point, it cannot be explained any further other than to say that it is just a brute fact of nature.
However, there are distinctions to be made with regards to your match analogy. Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. (Once we have accepted the contingency of the laws of physics, matter/energy etc., the flame of the struck match follows as a necessary consequence.) Accordingly, we can exhaustively explain the process in more basic terms; by that I mean that by using only a physical explanation involving the contingent laws of physics and matter/energy, we will come to see that the process of the match catching fire as a result of being struck is conceptually necessary. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.
We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, spacetime, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match. Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, luidcrously, even that is a relatively new occurence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting admidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.
Another way of saying this is that consciousness cannot be sufficiently explained with a materialistic reductive explanation, whereas a flaming match can. It is impossible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism (the laws of physics, matter/energy etc.), that a match struck under certain conditions could not catch fire. It is quite possible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism, that brain processes could occur without consciousness.
So while we can derive the flaming match from the basic contingent entities granted to us in materialism, we cannot derive the existence of consciousness from these same characters. Anything that a natural theory a) does not regard as a contingent entity and b) cannot derive from those things it does regard as contingent entities, I submit, is inexplicable in terms of that theory. We need more contingencies, more fundamental entities, than materialism is willing to give us.
Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping spacetime? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.
(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)
there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons.
It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.
"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.
metacristi
Jan22-04, 07:58 AM
Canute
This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.
Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.Otherwise we would arrive at [quasi] absurdities.It would imply that [we would have no reason to think that something in nature can be understood and still by pursuing the scientific quest to see that we can understand a lot of things.]By the way there is no claim that we can understand exactly how nature works.The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws.
[edited to make clearer the explanation]
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute
Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.
Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness. Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it). The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.
The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws. [/B]
Our disagreement is not about the certainty of scientific proofs, or the certainty of proofs in general. It is about whether science can explain consciousness in the same way it explains everything else. Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.
metacristi
Jan22-04, 11:25 AM
Canute
Of course I understand that, and of course the scientific assumption is necessary to science. However that doesn't make it true, Science is based on an assumption that doesn't allow it to explain it. (In a sense science is based on the assumption that it cannot explain it).
It is assumed true in order to assure the internal consistence of the scientific method (as I said otherwise why bother to do scientific research) on logical grounds.True in the sense that a detailed explanation of consciousness is possible in which to be entitled to have a great degree of confidence (as in all the other scientific hypotheses/theories here is nothing special). But no one have faith in it,accepting an axiom does not imply also belief in that axiom.Besides the assumption is testable and even fallible (though in a weaker sense) as I've already shown before.
and it is precisely the reason that science cannot explain consciousness.
Frankly I do not understand how did you derived that.I think I've explained enough.In fact the burden of proof is on those who make claims as you keep continuing to do.Why is it so?
The is why Chalmers, McGinn et al (and Hypno and me) argue that the assumption should be dropped.
Really?On what logical grounds?From all experiments done so far results that nature can be understood.Even the actual conjecture regarding consciousness is evolving why should we then make an exception for consciousness alone?There is absolutely no reason now,logical or empirical,for that.Besides I am unaware that Chalmers argue as you say.As far as I know he only argues that neurology alone is not enough by proposing some philosophical arguments against.Not making however the positive claims that it is surely so as you keep continuing to do.For the moment his proposal still holds,the actual data in neurology can be seen only as necessary but not sufficient to produce conscious experience.There are enough logical and experimental grounds to base this now.Still the actual hypothesis is evolving so we have to wait to see what will happen in the future...
Anyway,in any case have we the right,based on the same,to make openly the positive claim that science cannot explain consciousness!
This assumption is too strong and has no empirical and logical base.For the moment at least.Still even if qualia is something fundamental due to the fact that brain is capable to interact with it (at least this propose the pan protopsychism hypothesis of Chalmers) there is no reason now to think that that interaction cannot be put in evidence.
Basically from what I see you cannot make the difference between an philosophical argument and a positive claim.In other words between something which is a mere possibility and an assumption for which we have sufficient reasons to consider it approximatively correct.As I keep telling you have at most the right to say that your philosophical stance is that science cannot produce an acceptable theory of consciousness or that you are skeptical that such a theory will ever be found.The philosophical arguments are enough for that.But not the positive claims you make.
Nobody is asking science to explain it better than it explains anything else.
And there are,still,no sufficient reasons empirical or logical,to think this is impossible.
Fliption
Jan22-04, 01:07 PM
metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal;by definition.
Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.
Metacristi
I appreciate that you think your view is rational and 'scientific' However it is not. You don't seem to realise that you are saying things that even scientists disagree with.
I mentioned before that the scientific status of first-person reports is in quation - within science. If third-person reports are deemed unscientific (as they have been until very recently) then consciousness has no scientific existence. The current issue of 'Journal of Conscious Studies' (out today) is given over to the argument on whether there is any such thing as a 'neural correlate of consciousness' (NCC).
The existence of NCC's is paradigmatic to the to the neuroscientific view of consciousness. However the debate over whether any such exists is not settled. None has yet been identified and there are many who argue that they won't be.
It is therefore not the current scientific view that consciousness exists or that NCC's exist, it is just the view, unsupported by scientific evidence, that they do. Perhaps they are right, but there is orthodoxy of opinion within science on these issues.
Here are some various people who would disgree with your arguments.
“This brings us to…the claim of materialistic science that matter is the only reality and that consciouness is its product. This thesis has often been presented with great authority as a scientific fact that has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. However, when it is subjected to closer scrutiny it becomes obvious that it is not and never was a serious scientific statement, but a metaphysical assertion maquerading as one. It is an assertion that cannot be proved and thus lacks the basic requirements for a scientific hypothesis, namely testability.”
P240 Staislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York
“When we encounter the Void, we feel that it is primordial emptiness of cosmic proportions and relevance. We become pure consciousness aware of this absolute nothingness; however, at the same time, we have a strange paradoxical sense of its essential fullness. This cosmic vacuum is also a plenum, since nothing seems to be missing in it. While it does not contain in a concrete manifest form, it seems to comprise all of existence in a potential form. In this paradoxical way , we can transcend the usual dichotomy between emptiness and form, or existence and non-existence. However, the possibility of such a resolution cannot be adequately conveyed in words; it has to be experienced to be understood.”
Stanislav Grof – The Cosmic Game – 1998 State University of New York
“The view of the new physics suggests: ‘The vacuum is all of physics.’ Everything that ever existed or can exist is already there in the nothingness of space; that nothingness contains all being’
Heinz Pagels – 1990 The Cosmic Code –New York-Bantam Books (quoted in Grof 1998)
“The programme of tracing back all knowledge to its ultimate source in observation is logically impossible to carry through: it leads to an infinite regress.”
Karl Popper – The Problem of Induction (1953)
“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve.”
Max Planck (Karl Ernst Ludwig) (1858-1947)
“It is difficult to decide where science ends and mysticism begins. As soon as we begin to make even the most elementary theories we are open to the charge of indulging in metaphysics. Yet theories, however provisional, are the very lifeblood of scientific progress. We simply cannot escape metaphysics, though we can perhaps over-indulge, as well as have too little.”
Banesh Hoffmann – The Strange Story of the Quantum (Penguin 1968)
"In the standard positivist approach to the philosophy of science, physical theories live rent free in a Platonic heaven of ideal mathematical models. That is, a model can be arbitrarily detailed, and can contain an arbitrary amount of information, without affecting the universes they describe. But we are not angels, who view the universe from the outside. Instead we and our models are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a physical theory is self referencing, like in Goedels theorem."
Stephen Hawking – Goedel and The End of Physics
“ So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain. And so far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”.
Albert Einstein (Applies to all systems of reasoning and proof)
(If the connections are not clear I'll expand.)
You are not arguing for the scientific view, you're arguing for your view of the scientific view.
It is even possible to argue, (as I would) that consciousness lies beyond metaphysics, never mind science. Heidegger outlines the reasons thus:
"Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error."
Dark Wing
Jan22-04, 09:54 PM
Hypnagogue:
Very good, very good, I feel we have come to a point of real discussion now. You understand what I have said; now I must show you why I think it to be so.
Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.
Yes. Understood completely. (and very well put, i must say)
We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, space-time, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match.
This is where we diverge. I believe that it is a conceptual necessity just the same, and in fact is the only case possible with the laws set out inside the system. Agreed, consciousness cannot simply just pop out of nowhere, and cannot just be formed from some higher level of complexity. which means that you have to think at least that consciousness, or at least the building blocks for it are always there, everywhere. This is bordering on pan psychism, I know, and that is a trap that i whish to avoid. So i will try to explain my thoughts on how consciousness might work.
everything on this planet is a configuration of partials. some configurations of those partials make the non-living, and some of those partials create the biological. certain building blocks create certain structures. Now, I believe that the brain is simply a certain configuration of these building blocks that necessarily makes consciousness. Just as H2O is constructed of@ hydrogen one Oxygen, so is the brain a complex structure, the result of which is consciousness. It is a function of biology. there is something about biology, something with in its construction details that makes it necessary. Is this provable? How could you even test such a thing?
I would say that anything that shows an ability to react and interact with its environment would show sufficient conditions for the start of consciousness. I do not take consciousness to be a "you have it or you don’t" thing, it is a matter of complexity, and a matter of how well you are able to interact with your environment. something that could only show signs of conditioning as its environmental interaction would not be as conscious as something who could also deliberate over a reaction to a stimulus. since we witness the ability to condition in every form of biology that i have encountered, i would say that things biological are the basis for consciousness, and it is a necessary thing that it is.
I know that you cant say "just because everything we see does thins, therefore all things must do this", and I am aware that you are arguing that this might just be the observed phenomena that is present and not the necessary: but I believe that the only reason we observe this time and time again is because the configuration of certain thing will make a conscious mind, just while a slightly different configuration creates gold. There is something about biology that does this. What is it exactly? that’s what we are yet to find: we do not have the formula of H2O for the brain yet.
Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, ludicrously, even that is a relatively new occurrence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting amidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.
not a zombie if it is a matter of configuration. Science has only recently had the technology to even consider such things: what needs to be looked at is the point where physics becomes biology: find out what about biology makes it biology, and not just another chunk of jasper on the plain. it is a round peg all right, but that’s because the way it has been thought of and talked about has lead to massive confusion. (not that you are involved in that confusion, your point is very aside from that) It could be that it impossible for a person with the right configuration NOT to have a mind. what we should do, is take a brain, and make a very small change, and see what happens. or disrupt the building blocks a little and see what happens to the brain. My supervisor thought it would be interesting to study the effect of Quantum randomness on synaptic function and neuro-transmitter release. Just to see what an unstable force at the bottom would do to the higher function of biology. Haven’t found anything on it yet though.
So, with that in mind, the match analogy may still stand. It is in virtue of its constituents that it is so. There is no logical reason why it should not be so with the brain, its just not an area that has had a lot of attention till recently, and we are still figuring out what each neuron of the brain does 9the whole 70-80 were devoted to one-one link ups of neuron and response research, they are yet to head lower).
A brain functioning with out there being consciousness under this thought would not be conceivable.
Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping space-time? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.
this is what we have to find. i think it is something about the configuration of biology as i said above. but it could be a combination of any of those things. (except warping of space-time, but that’s another argument)
(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)
This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails.
It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.
Materialism does have a lot of work to do to maintain their position, especially those in the camp of Fodor and Dennett. I think those like Place and Smart and the Churchlands have a lot better start on any of those... identity theory is a better place to start than functionalism on any level. at least then you have somewhere solid to start from.
"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.
I agree here, i think i only put that in to satisfy AG with whom i have been discussing this a lot of late. I will keep thinking of ways to show what i am saying: it might take me a few goes, this is only the beginning of my project. [:D]
metacristi
Jan23-04, 02:38 AM
Canute,
I'm afraid the quotes you present above cannot raise the credibility of your case.Besides some of them were taken out of context,the author had other things in mind.For example Popper only argued against the possibility to deduce knowledge from empirical facts.In other words we can never be sure we found the absolute truth.This is why all scientific knowledge is always fallible (as I argued extensively here).But we can,provided the existence of relevant experimental samples,have a high degree of confidence in a certain theory inferred from observed facts.This is still possible even with consciousness.We do not need certitudes for that,sufficient reasons are enough.
Secondly,though from what I know Hawking does not exclude the possibility to find a complete theory of everything-in the sense that all what we can possible measure to support it,even if there might indeed exist truths that cannot be derived from the actual axioms of science (I mean a detailed theory in which to have a high degree of confidence not some metaphysical absolute truth),we have no sufficient reasons now to think that consciousness is such a problem.That must be proved first with sufficient reasons.If we were to accept atumatically,by definition,the proposal that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical proposals,logically coherent,are equally entitled to be accepted.No,will say an idealist,qualia are ideas which God send us.I am sure of that.Not so will argue some other person qualia is [name whatever logical possibility that is coherent also with the facts].All would be equally entitled to knowledge primacy.And of course it would be a ridiculous situation.
The rest of the quotes represent personal philosophies,without positive claims involved.I have too a philosophical world view,based also on some personal,strange,experiences.I believe for example that a soul does exist and she survives death and that a creator (defined merely as the formator of the actual order in the universe) does exist.But without any claim of primacy in knowledge (epistemological primacy) or that all rational people should think the same,no,it is a strictly personal belief.I have enough rational base for it.Still this does not mean I have certitudes or that I have automatically the right to change the scientific method to fit with my personal beliefs.Let's be rational,I am open to find out later that my belief is not correct (though for the moment I have enough rational base to believe).
A scientist,though having her own personal beliefs do not have the right to be biased by them.The requirements of the scientific method proved very reliable so far,we have the right to change them only provided solid,sufficient, empirical and logical reasons for that.Which unfortunately lack so far.Even in the case of consciousness.The absence of a detailed (not involving certitudes however) theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.Any student acquainted with the basics of logic will easily recognize a variant of the ad ignorantiam fallacy in case we assume that the above sentence is false.
Metacristi
You do not face facts or think honestly. There is therefore no point in continuing to discuss this.
Another God
Jan23-04, 03:17 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
This is where the analogy gets interesting. two things come together in the match case to make something new, the things that’s it was created from are destroyed in the process. In the brain, however, things come together to make something new, while still maintaining their original form. building blocks. So i guess that’s where the analogy fails. One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 03:42 AM
Canute
I see no point to continue either.Your ignorance is too evident to be able have a rational exchange of ideas.Try to sharp your philosophical skills on some serious philosophy forums or read some books first.I think it's better to end this now before arriving at open contempt.
Another God
Jan23-04, 05:37 AM
Interesting. Admittedly I haven't been reading your posts Canute and Metacristi, I'm glad u both chose to stop before it got too bad, but I am interested now. Perhaps I will read your last few posts and try to comment on them some. Maybe I can help be a neutral mediator....
Fliption
Jan23-04, 08:39 AM
Well good luck with that AG. I've been trying to do it myself and have been ignored. Metacrista has been making the same points over and over again. Most of them are true but unfortunately they aren't relevant. For example, this statement :
The absence of a detailed theory of consciousness now,based on neurology only,does not constitute a proof that it cannot be found.
has been repeated several times. But I am positive that no one posting in this forum disagrees with this. No one actually believes that a lack of knowledge today means we won't have knowledge tomorrow. So why does this keep getting repeated? There is actually a valid philosophical argument regarding the ability of science to reductively explain consciousness being discussed here. I've tried to step in and point when I saw things going into the irrelevant to help out but I haven't received a response or even influenced the discussion in several pages.
I guess some people are drawn to conflict as opposed to resolution.
Fliption
Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realise that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.
To make amends I'll agree completely with this as yet unanswered post.
From Fliption
metacrista, did my analogy not make any sense to you? Do you not see where the certainty comes in? The certainty is not a philosophical prediction of emperical possibilties. It is impossible in principal; by definition.
Your proposal is the same as claiming that one day you are going to figure out how to explain in physical facts to a blind man what it is like to experience the color red.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 10:30 AM
fliption
Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.
From what we know today there is no reason to think that the neurological approach will not be enough or that we should change something in the scientific method itself.The neurological approach suppose also that a third person approach is enough to explain consciousness,so that as much as this hypothesis will be theoretically and empirically evolving we have no sufficient reasons to change something.The working formula is never changed without having very strong,sufficient reasons.
There are some philosophical arguments against the sufficiency of the neurological approach,assuming also that the third person approach is not enough.However all arguments are not sound so far,though possible some of them are valid logically and experimentally possible.The actual approach is still a strong logical possibility.But they are enough to base a rational,purely personal,skepticism only.Exactly this do Chalmers,if you'll read carefully his arguments you'll see that he never claims certitudes or sufficient reasons that it will be so.On the contrary he only mentions that he is skeptical.Though he disagrees with the actual approach or with the physicalist philosophical proposals,providing philosophical counterarguments,he is aware that this does not imply certitudes or sufficient reasons.
The first goal of philosophy is not to strive to find explanations/descriptions as precise as possible,this is the task of science and the scientific method,but to rummage among everything we think we know in order to show which of our 'certitudes' and prejudices must be put first under doubt before hoping to affirm something more precise...What he propose is a possibility which we should take very seriously in account in all our further attempts to explain consciousness.The same is valid for Dennett's proposals by the way.As far as I know Chalmers even propose a way to bridge the gap between the third person approach and the subjective experiences. Still scientists have no reason to change the method,Chalmers proposal is not compelling for the moment,the usual approach is still viable.
Only if the actual approach will run into troubles (the theory become stagnant for a very long time with the existence of numerous puzzles piling up) will we have the needed reasons to change the method itself.But if the actual approach will be very successful by proposing a detailed hypothesis,with very few puzzles (or none),making also predictions about how the subjective experience appears though not empirically confirmed at that moment,in the absence of any alternative scientific approach scientists will have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in that hypothesis.Implying also that there is no need to change the method.Indeed the simple fact that (at that moment in the future when we will have a detailed theory) we cannot test the predictions made of how subjective experience appears is not a proof that those explanations are not correct in fact.
As I've argued before the explanation provided might be correct though we will,possible,never be able to confirm them using the third person approach.Indeed the explanation might very well be an alternative way to describe the same phenomenon equivalent to the subjective experiences itself (this is one of the counterarguments against the Mary's chamber objection).Those who make the positive claim that it is not so should provide sufficient reasons against.Not simple philosophical arguments,which in the vast majority can count as strong possibilities but never as sufficient argument,which science always seeks.
You begin in your argumentation from the false assumption that we have already sufficient reasons to think that the method must be changed or this is simply false.There are no such reasons now.Maybe not even in the future,as I've argued above,though possibly we will never be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experience appears.We only have some philosophical arguments,though very serious,that it might be so.And some alternative methods proposed.But the old approach is still viable and might be so even in the future.That's why there are no good reasons now to adopt the new variants of the scientific method proposed maybe not even in the future.Only time will show whether the actual methodology of science will resist further...
I leave for all unbiased readers the task to establish who is dogmatic and who is not.
Fliption
Jan23-04, 10:45 AM
Originally posted by Canute
Fliption
Sorry about that. I wasn't ignoring you - I was just silently agreeing. What you posted had as little affect as what I posted. I wasn't looking for a fight either. It just took me a while to realise that I was up against dogmatism. I have retired rather than be tempted to start to shouting.
I wasn't really referring to you Canute. None of my posts have been directed at you. I have followed your comments and agree with them. I have mostly been trying to get metacrista to address some specific things. Some of the very things you are saying. It's hard to know what his/her response is when there is so much stuff that doesn't seem relevant included. Makes me wonder if he/she really understands what is being discussed.
Sorry for confusion.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 10:58 AM
Please refrain to make commentary about things you do not understand.Manifest ignorance not conscienced as yours is never an excuse.
Fliption
Jan23-04, 11:06 AM
Originally posted by metacristi
fliption
Thanks for intending to be a mediator but I have not seen any sign of neutrality...Besides you made,as Canute,a lot of unsupported assumptions not to mention that you totally ignored the other points of mine.They are interrelated you cannot take one out of context and attack it supposing it is all I have to say.What you attacked is a strawman (if you know what this means).Here is a last attempt to explain what I really have to say.
If it seems I have focused on single points, it is because I think they are irrelevant points. There is no contextual mis-interpretation of them. When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.
I've read your explanation once again. It's seems to be more of the same. It says over and over that there is no reason to think that current methods cannot reductively explain consciousness and that a mere philosophical argument is not sufficient to suggest otherwise. But there is then no attempt to discuss the actual philosophical argument that Hynagogue has so eloquently presented here. If you look at it, you will see that it is not just some a'priori statement. It can be applied to real emperical things. My analogy of wall colors is an example of how some things are emperically impossible.
Go to the analogy and say where it is wrong. Relating your view to it would be helpful. Any unbiased participants would surely agree and are welcome to jump in.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 11:22 AM
Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 11:36 AM
When you say that having knowledge gaps isn't sufficient to conclude there will always be a gap, you are implying that someone here has claimed the opposite to be true. I can't think of any other way to interpret it. Meanwhile, the main argument never gets addressed.
What main argument?What knowledge gaps?We are always open to find there are knowledge gaps,scientifc knowledge is always provisional.Are you accustomed with the basics of the scientific method?The fact that some predictions have not been yet tested at a certain moment means nothing.We do not have the right for the moment to believe they will also be confirmed but in any case have we the right to conclude they are wrong.You must provide sufficient arguments to show that the predictions made by such a detailed theory of consciousness I talked above,counting as an explanation of the subjective experiences,are wrong or at least not enough to really describe subjective experiences.Scientists are prepared to find it is not enough but only in the front of sufficient reasons either by disproving the conjecture at a whole or by discovering new facts not taken in account initially.
Fliption
Jan23-04, 12:27 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
Have you read my response given to hypnagogue?.His argument is not sound either.Sorry that you do not understand my arguments.But this do not invlidate them.
Yes, I did read it. It was the exact same response as all the others. The additional thing that you did in that post was to say that the philosophical argument was not logical. You said that no one has been able to convince you that it is and that many scientists agree. But there were no words explaining why it is illogical. It just is.
Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
Fliption
Jan23-04, 12:30 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
What main argument?
The one that is in the title of this thread.
What knowledge gaps?
The gap we currently have around consciousness.
The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.
If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 12:37 PM
At limit if the third data confirmations will not be possible for an enough long time I think the first data accounts in direct correlation with the third data observations will be finally accepted.After all if a majority of reliable subjects will report approximatively the same subjective experiences in connection with a certain observed neural state this could be seen at limit as an intersubjective confirmation,anyway a strong reason to believe that there is a correlation between some subjective experiences and brain states.But I am not at all sure the final conclusions will be that we should not reduce subjective experiences at brain's functioning,that qualia involves something more.
metacristi
Jan23-04, 12:42 PM
Here is a link for you to read. It is another source explaining the exact same philosphical issue that Hypnagogue has explained. Since it's so illogical, maybe you can explain that to all the other people that are wrestling with it.
No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.
Fliption
Jan23-04, 12:56 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
No,I said it is not sound.Nothing more.But this is enough to make an idea about your 'vast knowledge'.Thanks for the link but I've already read the article long ago.
Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.
The topic of this article is what this thread is about. If you want to weigh in please do. But you have to engage in philosophy to dispute a philosophical claim. Ignoring the issue and defining the scientific method for us is not sufficient nor relevant.
"Vast knowledge" is only a good thing if it's relevant. So if I don't have what you're looking for, I suspect it doesn't matter with regard to the topic at hand.
olde drunk
Jan23-04, 01:38 PM
you have criticized several posters!! why are you exempt??
quite frankly, i don't have the slightest idea what point you are trying to make. perhaps you can break it down, slowly, for us mortals of poor intellect.
WHAT IS YOUR POINT??[BRIEFLY PLEASE],
peace,
metacristi
Jan23-04, 01:55 PM
fliption
And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.
But the claim is that the reduction is impossible.Again I ask why is it so?The fact that we cannot measure directly subjective experiences now maybe never is not an explanation.It is not about the impossibility to reach certitudes,we are always prepared for that,it is about the claim that there cannot exist a detailed theory of consciousness based on neurology alone in which to have a high degree of confidence,capable to account for subjective experiences also.
Pardon me. You claimed it was unsound(you also mentioned logical stalemate) but did not provide any reasons as to why. That better? This doesn't change anything about my point.
Read again.I only said it not sound.It is logically valid but at least one of the premises is not true.Therefore I cannot conclude that the conclusion is true.Maybe it is but this does not follow from the premises.Hence it fails to prove that the reductive approach is incoherent as it was aimed.Finally I really doubt that a purely logical argument will be able to achieve that.
Fliption
Jan23-04, 03:01 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
fliption
And the topic is that a reductive explanation of qualia at neurology must fail.Why is it so?The whole point of my argumentation is that there is no reason to think we cannot have a reliable,detailed,theory of consciousness based only on neurology which to have also a potentially true explanation of how subjective experiences,qualia,appear.In other words a reduction is still possible to be confirmed conceptually later.Eventually we can use a mixture of first person and third person methods to confirm it.
This is you disagreeing with the conclusion of the philosophical argument. But you don't ever specifically say why you disagree with it. Other than to say it isn't sound.
Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained". It is one thing to give a rational explanation for how something happens and then concede that the explanation could be wrong. This is what science does, so we all agree that it can't be certain about many of it's explanations, as you have repeated many times. In these cases, the explanation goes something like this:
Reductive explanation:
Step 1 happens and necessarily causes
Step 2 to happen which then necessarily causes
Step 3 to happen which allows for the
End Result/Conclusion to happen and therefore be reductively explained
This is an explanation that would cause a rational person to say "ahhh yes I see how this works." If we test this explanation emperically we can test it at each point and conclude that this explanation is emperically verified. But of course it isn't certain.
On the other hand this uncertainty does NOT mean that there is an explanatory gap allowed to exists in the reductive explanation itself. You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%. A real explanation will allow you to measure anything that needs measuring, in principal(Not necessarily in practice). Of course the results could be wrong.
Here is how I perceive consciousness to be as it relates to the example above.
Step 1 brain stuff happens and necessarily leads to
Step 2 Details around neurology happen which could lead to
Step 3 Consciousness
We can test emperically that brain states in step 1 correspond to conscious events in step 3 and assume that the explanation is emperically verified because of the correlation. But the problem is that the link between step 2 and step 3 is not a necessary step and there is nothing you can even postulate that would make it so. This is not even an explanation because it just jumps over where the real gap exists. If a rational person looked at this explanation, they would not say "ahh that's how it works". They still wouldn't know except that somehow neurology magically creates a subjective experience.
So if you are calling this last example a reductive explanation then I agree with you that a reductive explanation of consciousness can be developed by science. But this is not what I and what I think others here are calling a reductive explanation. So perhaps the definition of what it means to be reductively explained is where we need to focus.
Just to be sure all of this is clear, here's another analogy:
A mother gets home from work and finds orange juice on the ceiling of her bedroom. She goes to each of her 2 sons to find out how this happened.
1st Son: Saw son #2 walk in there with a glass of orange juice and the cat jump on his head and he threw the glass up, splashing the juice onto the ceiling.
2nd Son: Saw son #1 walk into the room with a glass of orange juice and close the door behind him.
The first one is a reductive explanation. It could be completely false but it is the better explanation. The second is not a reductive explanation because you still don't know how the juice got on the ceiling. You can even verify that the second story is absolutely true. It still doesn't explain anything. You would then have to go interrogate the first son.(or change the natural ontology with regard to consciousness [:)])
Dark Wing
Jan23-04, 03:34 PM
Originally posted by Another God
One of those things that comes in is energy (ATP) which is 'destroyed' in the process. The brain = The oxygen atmosphere, while the match stick itself = the fuel. Analogy stands.
This does not quite sit right with me yet. I have been thinking all night why not. Mayby its that the fuel is not actually a starter in the brain process, (though you might say that an experience or a stimulus is) or that you have an officialkick off point caused by energy or friction at all. More so the brain just IS, it never starts as such, just when the right configuration appears, then it just is.
That does not make much sence either. I will keep thinking. But i think the annalogy, although showing its point, proberly cant be taken litrally all the way down (if it can, then bring it on! it has to be better than the computer annalogy)
Dark Wing
Jan23-04, 03:40 PM
Flipton:
Nice post. well explained. (i have not heard the orange juice analogy before, but its a good way to describe the diffrences). and good work taking on a mediating position there, looks as if it might start working. There is much philosophy to discuss here, and it gets lost in the throw is everyone turns it into a shamble.
metacristi
I don't think anybody is trying to browbeat you or put you down. But you just repeat your claims over and over like a mantra rather than engage in a debate on the issues. It gets a bit frustrating.
M. Gaspar
Jan23-04, 07:36 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
The one that is in the title of this thread.
The gap we currently have around consciousness.
The rest of your post just makes it sound like you still haven't understood anything being said.
If we are currently unable to reductively explain consciousness, this does not mean that we will never be able to reductively explain consciousness. You have been saying this over and over and we all agree. It doesn't need to be repeated. It is irrelevant to the topic.
Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.
This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.
Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.
Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.
Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"?
metacristi
Jan24-04, 05:04 AM
Fliption
Perhaps we're all starting from a different place. From your comments above it sounds like we all would probably disagree as to what it means for something to be "reductively explained".
By reductionism in general,I understand the usual definition ‘the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.’In the case of consciousness reductionism has usually two meanings: 1.that consciousness can be explained in terms of laws of physics and chemistry. 2.that consciousness can be explained in terms of the complex functioning of the neural network. It is this second approach which is usually favorized by the scientists in the cognitive sciences.
You can't say "since science can't be 100% certain about it's explanations, we are going to allow for explanations that have gaps in them". This is what you seem to be arguing for. The explanation has to be complete and answer the questions 100%.
It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…First there are almost never 100% certitudes.At least in the majority of cases we cannot establish that.That's why the default is that we must always be open to new facts.We accept those as ‘complete explanations’ based on observed facts only.There are sufficient reasons for the moment,experimentally derived,to assume that.It is the best we could achieve so far.We cannot put in evidence finer causes and we assume they do not exist.If put in evidence,we introduce them in the explanation by enlarging the theory.Thus we are always entitled to expect new data.There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.And this is valid for all logical arguments against reductionism so far.The conclusion might be right but it does not follow from the premises therefore there is no obligation for all rational persons to believe it is true.I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts (that’s why we must first confirm the predictions of scientifc theories experimentally in order to have a high confidence in their truth) even if the argument were sound.Namely that there is no reason to believe that unique and inevitable conclusions,derived from a true set of premises empirically inferred,are true before confirming them experimentally.But I’m afraid no one will understand…
Secondly the lack of a more detailed reductionist (at the neuronal network) theory of consciusness now does not entile the conclusion we will not find one later. From what I’ve seen you argee with this possibility.What you failed to notice is that my argument is much stronger than that.Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see) the fact that there is an explanation of how the subjectice experiences appears from the functioning of the brain leaves open the possibility that is is actually true.A fully reductionist scientific approach explaining qualia as being due to the functioning of the brain,as it is usually done in science in general is still possible (no certitudes implied only sufficient experimental reasons to have a high degree in its truth).Moreover,as an irony,maybe exactly using a first person type of research,as Chalmers advocate,will we be able confirm what the reductionist approach postulated.Chalmers went much further (I'm afraid the logical arguments he propose are not sound either;I do not think however that he really believes in the experimental necessity of the conclusion since in his papers he only say it is skeptical about the possibility of reductionism) and proposed that,in spite of the possible existence of such correlations,we should not attempt to reduce qualia at the brain functioning not even in that case,by proposing that it is possible that qualia is fundamental (he is confident we will be able to confirm that later).Unfortunately this is entirely a philosophical,though fully compatible with observed facts,argument,maybe true in absolute.But not accepted by the scientifc method in case that the existing theory happens to be very successful by proving the existence of clear correlations between subjective experiences and the functioning of the brain also+no other scientific alternative exists.In that situation we will not have any reasons to believe qualia is indeed fundamental or implies something more,that there is a gap in knowledge in your sense finally.Scientists will be fully entitled to say that we have sufficient reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the truth of the existing theory-this a fact which happen very often in usual science.Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.Even if first it will be used a first person type of research and only after proposed a detailed theory things will not change in case that clear correlations will be put in evidence.That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.Till then scientists will have the right,based on all observed facts,to consider the reductive explanation as sufficient to explain consciousness exactly how we do in the case of a vast majority of scientific explanations you and other say are able to convince people.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Perhaps the mere exchange of information is enough to constitute "consciousness". Of course, some information-detection systems would be more complex than others.
This, however, makes a case for "consciousness" being a fundamental ingredient/process of the Universe when all that is required is an "exchange of information". An electron, for example, would be "detecting/processing/responding-to" the electrical charge of the proton ...and so, in a very simple way, would be "concscious of the proton" based on the sole parameter of information being exchanged.
Likewise "physical bodies" responding to information about each other's masses ...via gravity.
Meanwhile, brains have evolved as an info-gathering apparatus that senses, processes, receives and sends very complex information.
Would this be considered a "reductive explanation of consciousness"? [/B]
This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.
M. Gaspar
Jan24-04, 10:51 AM
Originally posted by Canute
This is known as 'microphenomenalism', curerently a quite respectable hypothesis, although implausible to most people. Whether it is a reductive explanation of consciouness all depends. Most people who espouse it take consciousness to be axiomatic and irreducible. However I suppose it isn't necessary to do this to be a microphenomenalist.
What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?
Are string theorists microphenomalists?
And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?
Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".
And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend?
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
What do YOU find "implausible" about defining consciouness -- at its very minimum (thereby irreducible) -- as an "exchange of information" ...esp. an "exchange" that CAUSES an EFFECT in a Cause & Effect Universe?
I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common defintion. I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.
Are string theorists microphenomalists?
I would say say so. For them everything is epiphenomenal on strings.
And is "microphenomalist" a four-letter word?
Nope, I just checked and it's still sixteen.
Meanwhile, in my (internal) world, very little is "axiomatic".
Not quite nothing at all though.
And, on what does your acceptance of my "reductive explanation of consciousness" depend? [/B]
Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.
Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.
Fliption
Jan24-04, 10:00 PM
Originally posted by metacristi
It is extremely hard to argue with someone who does not have even the slightest idea of how the scientfic method works.I feel like I speak with the winds…
Yes I understand how this feels. I sympathize. Eliminating the run-on sentences might help. I'd appreciate you taking care of that before you assume your sentences are clear and everyone but you is an ignoramus because they can't understand. Thanks.
And did you think you were arguing? If so then let me know because I don't come here to argue. I don't have time for that. I come here to attempt a progressive discussion. I actually want you to attempt to prove hypnagogue/chalmers wrong. That's the whole point of the forum. But you don't seem to be interested in trying to grasp the issue.
This post is just more of the same. Insulting my intelligence, more descriptions of science that I already completely understand and find irrelevant, and total disregard for and complete silence to my analogies and other desperate attempts to pull you down into the real discussion. Yet again, you have totally ignored what I'm trying to point you to and gone off and simply copied and pasted your standard 5 paragraph response. Only this time without the indentions.
There is no compel to believe,as hypnagogue argues,that we cannot concieve another explanation.His whole argument fail for the conclusion does not follow from the premises.
"There is no compel to believe"? You're right, I just don't undestand.
You say this about hypnagogue's points because you do not understand the premises. If you did you would see that a white wall will never be black, no matter how long and hard you look at it. You are surface reading, looking for key words to trigger your pre-conceived conclusions. It is the only thing that explains these responses.
I could use here another objection given that there is no proof that logic apply with necessity to natural facts
Ok, you keep looking at that white wall to see if it's black. A white wall by definition cannot be black. If our premise is that a wall is white, you do not need to verify emperically that it isn't black. It cannot be by definition. This is very simple. If you disagree with the premise then you have to say why. You cannot just assert it. Unless, of course, you're just arguing.
But I’m afraid no one will understand…
It's because we're all just slow and you're not. It must be hard to be you.
Explained in simple words (I will not write again all those things you are not able to understand as I see)
Try english.
Indeed if we assume automatically in science that qualia is fundamental then all other philosophical arguments compatible with facts,having also power of explanation,are entitled to claim priority.Why not postulate that qualia involves QM events we cannot measure yet or even more radical that a soul does exist?They are equally valid as philosophical arguments.
No not all philosophical arguments are equally valid. The fact that you say this simply re-enforces my belief that you haven't understood what is really being said here.
That’s why you have to prove first there will still be a gap in our knowledge of how qualia and conscious experience appear.In other words you should prove experimentally that qualia involves something more.
Why should something that is not reducable necessarily involve something more? I'm not even sure what this means, let alone why I have to prove it.
M. Gaspar
Jan24-04, 10:14 PM
Originally posted by Canute
[B]I don't think it's implausible, I think it's incorrect. I would define conscious as 'what it is like to be', the most common definition.
"What it is like to be..." ...a frog, a man, an electron?
I'm less clear on how to define 'information'.
Here's how I would define information within the context of what I have proposed: Input -- of whatever quality -- from a source other than self that causes a change -- however minute -- in the self.
I would say so. For them (string theorists) everything is epiphenomenal on strings.
What might "epiphenomenal" mean? Per the American Heritage Dictionary -- henceforth AHD -- it means "besides". Besides what?
Not quite nothing at all though.
Since I did not stop to take inventory of my entire internal world to see if ANYTHING was "axiomatic", I left room for the possibility that something might be.
Whatever it reduces to, how would I know. For most microphenomenalists this is not an issue, since they take consciousness to be irreducible and reduce everything to it instead.
If you say so.
Did you think I was criticising 'microphenominalism'? I think there's a lot of truth in it.
It did sound a bit pejorative but I'm over it now. In any case, in the greater scheme of things, an entire lifetime is a "microphenomenon" ...perhaps an "engram" in the mind of the Universe (should the Universe HAVE a mind). Meanwhile, our cells are "having experiences" and "communicating with" one another (via chemicals and electricity) and may thus be "conscious" of whatever they can sense and respond to. Likewise, particles, stars and galaxies.
You see, Canute, I am more than a microphenomenonalist; I'm a full-on panpsychist who is proposing that the detection of information -- simple or complex -- that alters in any way the behavior of the detecting "entity" -- simple or complex -- is perhaps all the "reducing" we need to be doing with regard to "consciousness" [a)]
Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.
However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.
selfAdjoint
Jan25-04, 10:52 AM
Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."
I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.
Fliption
Jan25-04, 01:27 PM
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here. If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing.
Before I answer this, I guess we're assuming that bats are conscious to begin with? We don't know this for certain but we can reasonably assume it. Having said that then my answer would be this: While observing the AI bat do a lot of the things the same as a real bat, you can point to the specific code/hardware wiring that allows each of those individual things to happen. But if the bat truly does have consciousness, you cannot point to any such thing. It is an unnecessary addon with no way to point to it's cause in your AI design. If someone asked, "how did you achieve it being conscious?".....you're answer would be "I have no idea".
Since we're talking about bats your point has more weight because we don't know for certain what a bat feels. But if the AI were a human, and all of the facts were the same would you claim the exact same thing? Can you claim an AI human is conscious simply from it's behaviour without understanding how it was done in the design?
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Let me just weigh in here on Nagel. If you built a system, an AI, that EXACTLY reproduced all the physical states, interactions and transitions in a bat's body, and put it into an environment that EXACTLY simulated all the physical characteristics of the bat's environment, then that AI system in that environment would experience "What it's like to be a bat."
From which piece of scientific research do you conclude that? From a scientific point of view it might be true, but there's no evidence that it is. There's not even any scientific evidence that bats are conscious (or people come to that).
I want to emphasize that only physical effects are being reproduced/simulated here.
No 'experience' then. Or are you saying that experience is a physical substance?
If you claim my claim is false then specify specifically, and not just with an empty name like "consciousness", what would be missing. [/B]
Feelings, experience and what it is like to be a bat. If you do a search on Harnard + Dennett you may find their email argument on this point, on which Dennett has to give way.
M. Gaspar
Jan25-04, 04:07 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Roughly speaking I'm also a panpsychist. I don't know why you're getting shirty with me, I haven't said a word against panpsychism.
My apologies ..although, technically, I was being "pi**y" (rhymes with "missy") ...my preferred conversational style. It's a bit like Touret's Syndrome, except harder to control. Mostly, I'm playing.
However you can't redefine consciousness at will. You have a theory that it is connected with information flow, fair enough, but it is widely agreed that what it is is what it is like to be, after Nagel's discussion of what it's like to be a bat.
I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.
You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.
What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious?
Dark Wing
Jan26-04, 02:08 AM
... Redefine consciousness? May I ask exactly what definition of consciousness you have that is constant amongst all that talk of it? As far as I know, every author has their own definition in which they work with...
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I'm sure you know that there have been MANY cases in science where definitions that were "widely agreed upon" required modification before getting it right.
As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.
You say you're "roughly" a panpsychist, yet do not grant "consciousness" (at a very simple level) to electrons? Perhaps "what it's like to be an electron" is having the sole capacity of sensing the positive charge of a proton.
Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.
What does it mean to you to be a panpsychist ...and where do you draw the line to what might be conscious and what cannot be conscious? [/B]
I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness. I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.
M. Gaspar
Jan26-04, 07:01 AM
Originally posted by Canute
[B]As Dark Wing says, there is no scientific defintion of consciousness. However in philosophy of mind the one I gave is most common, and not disputed.
I dispute it.
Hmm. I haven't said anything about whether I thought electrons weren't (or were) conscious.
So say.
I'd go along with Buddhism, in which the essence of everything is emptiness.
Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]
I don't think things like thermostats or cricket bats are conscious.
How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious" because, in fact, I think "consciousness" is a matter of DEGREE!!! IOW, it might be on a continuum from VERY SIMPLE to VERY COMPLEX ...based on the complexity of the detection and response system of the entity.
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
I dispute it.
Ok.
So say.
I stated a fact.
Yes, another philosophy that has gotten a few things wrong ...IM"H"O. Although -- in the "physical domain" at both the QM and GR "levels" -- things APPEARS TO BE "empty space" ...we now "know" (always belongs in quote) that "vacuums" are actually SEETHING with virtual energy and in the "non-physical domain" there might -- as an example -- be the "force" of "intention" that fills -- and directs -- the void. [Buddhists also think that life's about escaping suffering by letting go of desires ...when, in fact (should be in quotes as well) life may very well be about how we HANDLE suffering.]
Hmm. I don't think I'm clever enough to unpick this muddle. You seem to be confusing 'emptiness' and 'nothing'.
And of course our life is about how we handle suffering, if you use suffering in the Buddhist sense of the word.
How lovely for you have used "thermostats" as an example of what might NOT be "conscious"
It's a well known example from the literature, not mine.
selfAdjoint
Jan26-04, 10:35 AM
From which piece of scientific research do you conclude that? From a scientific point of view it might be true, but there's no evidence that it is. There's not even any scientific evidence that bats are conscious (or people come to that).
No, no scientific research, this is a PHILOSOPHY thread, and my construction is that familiar philosophical device, the idealized contraption. Here is a device that perfectly simulates all the physical aspects of a bat in its environment. And I say it's not a Zombie, but you apparently say it is. Upon what basis do you claim that?
hypnagogue
Jan26-04, 10:49 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
This is where we diverge. I believe that it is a conceptual necessity just the same, and in fact is the only case possible with the laws set out inside the system. Agreed, consciousness cannot simply just pop out of nowhere, and cannot just be formed from some higher level of complexity. which means that you have to think at least that consciousness, or at least the building blocks for it are always there, everywhere. This is bordering on pan psychism, I know, and that is a trap that i whish to avoid. So i will try to explain my thoughts on how consciousness might work.
I agree that, for a theory of consciousness to make sense, it must make reference to some sort of building blocks for consciousness; either in the form of an irreducible and fundamental entity, or in the form of some 'things' that are not themselves conscious but somehow combine to create consciousness.
Now the question becomes: are these building blocks included in our contemporary materialistic ontology? This is precisely where I believe that contemporary materialism must fail in any attempts to really explain consciousness, because I do not think any of the building blocks given to us in a materialistic ontology can do the job of showing us how to explain or deduce consciousness. We need more building blocks.
I would say that anything that shows an ability to react and interact with its environment would show sufficient conditions for the start of consciousness. I do not take consciousness to be a "you have it or you don’t" thing, it is a matter of complexity, and a matter of how well you are able to interact with your environment. something that could only show signs of conditioning as its environmental interaction would not be as conscious as something who could also deliberate over a reaction to a stimulus. since we witness the ability to condition in every form of biology that i have encountered, i would say that things biological are the basis for consciousness, and it is a necessary thing that it is.
As a side point here: your criterion for judging whether an entity is conscious or not is the degree to which it can interact with and be conditioned by its environment, why should physical constitution matter? I understand that you want to start off on surer footing by starting with safer assumptions, but we could (relatively) easily build a silicon based robot that could do the same things. All I am suggesting is that, if biological constitution is to be the most fundamental factor for consciousness in your hypothesis, then that should your primary assumption. Deriving (as opposed to fundamentally asserting) the necessity of biology for consciousness from an entity's ability to interact with the environment seems to be faulty, since you could just as well derive that a silicon robot should be conscious by the same criterion.
Like you, I have been weary of functionalism as a good starting ground for any hypothesis for consciousness. However, recently I read an argument with a functionalist flavor put forth by Chalmers that gives me pause. If you are interested, it might be appropriate to start another thread on the topic.
I know that you cant say "just because everything we see does thins, therefore all things must do this", and I am aware that you are arguing that this might just be the observed phenomena that is present and not the necessary: but I believe that the only reason we observe this time and time again is because the configuration of certain thing will make a conscious mind, just while a slightly different configuration creates gold. There is something about biology that does this. What is it exactly? that’s what we are yet to find: we do not have the formula of H2O for the brain yet.
OK, back to the building block discussion. Suppose for the sake of argument that we eventually isolate the motion of electrons as the most fundamental necessary and sufficient physical correlate for consciousness: whenever we see electrons moving about in such and such patterns, we are confident that there will be such and such conscious experience on the part of the system.
Now, what in our materialist ontology could account for this? Electron charge? Electron mass? Electron spatiotemporal configuration? What combination of these could you throw together to show a priori that consciousness must be the result? I argue that no combination of these could be thrown together to show that consciousness must result. Rather, at this point, we would have to rework our ontology to grant an entirely new property to electrons, such that we would be able to see a priori that such and such configuration of electrons must result in consciousness. This new property would have to be either a fundamentally irreducible aspect of consciousness on the part of electrons, or it would have to be some kind of microphenomenological property of electrons such that electrons by themselves are not conscious, but when combined in patterns just so, their microphenomenological properties combine to result in consciousness.
This argument applies to any H2O formula we may wish to hypothesize for consciousness. You say we have not found the formula yet; I say that for any formula built solely from materialist building blocks, we will still not be able to show a priori that this formula must necessarily result in consciousness. We just need more building blocks than materialism will give us.
not a zombie if it is a matter of configuration. Science has only recently had the technology to even consider such things: what needs to be looked at is the point where physics becomes biology: find out what about biology makes it biology, and not just another chunk of jasper on the plain. it is a round peg all right, but that’s because the way it has been thought of and talked about has lead to massive confusion. (not that you are involved in that confusion, your point is very aside from that) It could be that it impossible for a person with the right configuration NOT to have a mind.
I don't think anyone will argue that it is impossible for a person with the right configuration in our world not to have a mind. The question is whether or not it is a metaphysical impossibility; if the world were different somehow, would consciousness still be the necessary result of the right brain configuration? For instance, in our world it is impossible for an electron not to be attracted to a proton. In a metaphysical world with different laws of physics, this would not necessarily be the case.
It is a metaphysical impossibility for a world with identical H2O molecules and identical laws of physics to ours that these H2O molecules not combine to form (given suitable circumstances) a macrophysical substance with properties identical to water in our world. A very straightforward argument involving physical structures and functions can be given to support this claim. It is not at all clear, however, that a metaphysical world that is physically identical to ours should necessarily support consciousness. If it is claimed that this metaphysical world must support consciousness, no substantive argument can be given to support this claim, even in principle, for all the familiar reasons. This is another way of getting at the suggestion that there must be something more than just the physical involved in the phenomenon of consciousness.
So, with that in mind, the match analogy may still stand. It is in virtue of its constituents that it is so. There is no logical reason why it should not be so with the brain, its just not an area that has had a lot of attention till recently, and we are still figuring out what each neuron of the brain does 9the whole 70-80 were devoted to one-one link ups of neuron and response research, they are yet to head lower).
A brain functioning with out there being consciousness under this thought would not be conceivable.
I agree that there is no logical reason to say that it is not in virtue of some property of the brain and its constituents that consciousness exists. However, there is much logical reason to say that such a property is not included in our current materialist ontology.
hypnagogue
Jan26-04, 11:07 AM
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
No, no scientific research, this is a PHILOSOPHY thread, and my construction is that familiar philosophical device, the idealized contraption. Here is a device that perfectly simulates all the physical aspects of a bat in its environment. And I say it's not a Zombie, but you apparently say it is. Upon what basis do you claim that?
The idea is not that your artificial bat must be a zombie. The idea is that we can't be certain what effect the different physical constitution has on its purported consciousness. Upon what basis do you claim that the artificial bat must have the exact same experience as the natural bat?
The argument you have put forth so far leaves much room for doubt. In fact, it does little more than beg the question; your argument rests firmly on the assumption that physical transitions and such are all that is responsible for consciousness, whereas this is precisely the issue that is open to question. To advance, you must propose an argument detailing how it must be that the functional constitution of the bat is sufficient for explaining its first person experiences.
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
No, no scientific research, this is a PHILOSOPHY thread, and my construction is that familiar philosophical device, the idealized contraption. Here is a device that perfectly simulates all the physical aspects of a bat in its environment. And I say it's not a Zombie, but you apparently say it is. Upon what basis do you claim that? [/B]
I didn't claim that you were wrong. If you look I wrote that what you said might be true. I was just pointing out that it was pure conjecture unsupported by any evidence.
Edit - Whoops, just noticed Hypnogogue said this for me.
selfAdjoint
Jan27-04, 10:19 AM
The argument you have put forth so far leaves much room for doubt. In fact, it does little more than beg the question; your argument rests firmly on the assumption that physical transitions and such are all that is responsible for consciousness, whereas this is precisely the issue that is open to question. To advance, you must propose an argument detailing how it must be that the functional constitution of the bat is sufficient for explaining its first person experiences.
Exactly. I'm trying to firm up the discussion by pinning down the issues in a case where we don't have all the baggage of human consciousness to contend with. IMHO that's exactly what Nagle did in switching from talking about qualia in people to presumptive qualia in bats. The point is exactly that nobody knows what goes on in a bat's mind so the discussion can remain pure of special pleading.
If you don't like the bat, here's another one. Could an AI be built to sense colors the way people do, with the three receptor bands and intensity differencing and maybe a neural network for identification and memory, and if it could then be run through experiences with colors, some good some bad according to a carefully designed program so it had various associations with various colors, and if it then "discussed" its experience of colors with researchers and showed complex discussion behavior, not programmed in advance, could you then say the device was experiencing color qualia?
hypnagogue
Jan27-04, 01:37 PM
So you are attempting point out the uncertainty of our knowledge of consciousness? I don't think any except the most extreme on either side really dispute that notion. At this stage of our understanding (and possibly forever), we just don't know enough to answer your question with much more than educated speculation. But this is a different matter from the subject of whether or not materialism can explain consciousness in principle.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
So you are attempting point out the uncertainty of our knowledge of consciousness? I don't think any except the most extreme on either side really dispute that notion. [/B]
I would. Did you mean to say 'scientific knowledge of consiousness'.
hypnagogue
Jan27-04, 05:09 PM
Originally posted by Canute
I would. Did you mean to say 'scientific knowledge of consiousness'.
Yes, that's what I meant. Sorry for my lack of clarity.
M. Gaspar
Jan27-04, 05:35 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Hmm. I don't think I'm clever enough to unpick this muddle. You seem to be confusing 'emptiness' and 'nothing'.
Per AHD (American Heritage Dictionary)...
Emptiness: Holding or containing nothing; vacant; meaningless, devoid, lacking force or power.
Nothing: no thing; not anything; insignificance; obscurity; absence of anything perceptable; someone or something of no consequence.
So let's dissect it...
Is a life -- or the Universe -- "holding or containing nothing"? While my life might not be a "big thing" within the cosmic context, it still contains SOMETHING ...which, at the very least -- and, ironically, the very most -- are EXPERIENCES that may or may NOT be being "recorded" in the Memory of the Universe ...and which would comprise the "spiritual plain".
Insignificant? Well, maybe I am -- or maybe I'm not -- but I know for sure that if ANYTHING IS "significant" it is the Universe.
Obsurity? perhaps for me, although I think our existence as a species -- among many others -- makes a "contribution" to the Collective by the way of these Experiences we're having. These "lifetimes" might "live on" in some sort of "information storage system" which, in my estimation, is what the "spiritual plain" of the Universe might be.
Absence of anything perceptable? Well, we seem to perceive a lot. And, there seems to BE a lot to perceive. In fact, there may be MORE than that which can BE "perceived". For instance, I think there might be a "force" that we could call "intention" that operates at the QM level ...in effect, "plucking the strings" -- to "go" this way or that -- in the PROCESSS OF MANIFESTATION!
Someone or something of no consequence? Everything has "consequence": it's a Cause & Effect Universe.
Not anything? Can the Universe be nothing?
Does it "lack meaning"? It may. I don't know ...yet.
Can It be "lacking in power" when it MAY be "all energy all the time"?
...as well as "all INFORMATION all the time" ...which will take me next to a thread on the theory of consciousness which I want to present under Theory Development. Since "consciousness" is "at least" a "part" of the Universe -- thus a part of "cosmology"...I think it would be appropriate to discuss it there.
However, I will have to ask them if a serious discussion about "An Evolving Theory About Information Exchange that Might Explain Consciousness as a Fundamental Ingredient/Process of the Universe and Point to a Possibility about Creation at the QM Level" is "off topic" under Theory Development?
Btw, I think you're "clever enough". [;)]
Sorry, this is my fault, I wasn't clear. When I mentioned 'emptiness' I meant it as a Buddhist would mean it. It doesn't matter what that means, but I didn't mean 'nothing'. As you pointed out 'nothingness' appears to be seething with things.
Dark Wing
Jan31-04, 01:14 AM
Hello again Hypnagogue, Sorry it took so long to reply...
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I agree that, for a theory of consciousness to make sense, it must make reference to some sort of building blocks for consciousness; either in the form of an irreducible and fundamental entity, or in the form of some 'things' that are not themselves conscious but somehow combine to create consciousness.
good. we have a starting point.
Now the question becomes: are these building blocks included in our contemporary materialistic ontology?
Well, it depends. Yes, the materialistic stance is quite shallow, and no doubt it needs to be fleshed out, but the basis for it may still be there. Take a look at Place and Smart's work on identity theory: (I know they are Australian, but hell, we do have some minds all the way down here)It simply states that’s a Mind state IS a Brain state. What they have done is set up a field to explore: what is a brain state? if you can figure out what that is, then you have the next step to the reduction: take it down to biology, and then ultimately physics, and you have your building blocks for consciousness: but I will address that better where you have mentioned it bellow.
As a side point here: your criterion for judging whether an entity is conscious or not is the degree to which it can interact with and be conditioned by its environment, why should physical constitution matter?
I think that we should at least start at a point where we know that consciousness is the case. (i am aware that people will argue that we are not conscious, and that we are all just robots, but i am going to presume consciousness on the basis of Searls "seeming" argument). If it is so that biology is conscious, then we can figure out what the constitution of biology is, and then see what the essential ingredients of the physics/biology boundary are. we can then say that they are the essential building blocks of consciousness, as they make biology, and biology is conscious, as it can react and interact with its environment. We can never argue necessity of biology for consciousness. But we can say "check it out, we have a working example, lets see how that happens"
Deriving (as opposed to fundamentally asserting) the necessity of biology for consciousness from an entity's ability to interact with the environment seems to be faulty, since you could just as well derive that a silicon robot should be conscious by the same criterion.
So, what makes a biological cell that is reacting and interacting with its environment different from a robot that is showing the same behavioral patterns? nothing according to that definition. so the theory has to be expanded to show us how to tell immitation from the real thing (it is called "artificial Intelligence" after all :o)
Besides that my explanation of consciousness is based on biological or at least physical causation, and that programmed robots ignore the causation part of the initial condition for consciousness and just write the consciousness on top to be run on a bunch of silicon mapping, there seems to be a tesable and varifiable way of seeing if a robot is conscious in the same kind of sense that a human is conscious: that it attributed meaning to its environment. It is reacting in a meaningful and productive way TO ITSELF as well as to the environment. I think searle has pretty much covered this one with his Chinese room argument that Dennett (or anyone else for that matter) has yet to reply decently. all i have seen in the literature is personal attacks and insults on searle, demanding that he fall in line with the rest of the functionalist community. All i am saying is that my work on consciousness is an expose' on what we know to be conscious, and would need some work to expand as a proof or disproof of AI, even though AI breaks every rule i set up for a conscious being (as it has no causation) yet will act like one as it is programmed to.
Like you, I have been weary of functionalism as a good starting ground for any hypothesis for consciousness. However, recently I read an argument with a functionalist flavor put forth by Chalmers that gives me pause. If you are interested, it might be appropriate to start another thread on the topic.
Absolutely. That would be great to see. as much as i am not too keen on chalmers work, he is an interesting writer to read.
OK, back to the building block discussion. Suppose for the sake of argument that we eventually isolate the motion of electrons as the most fundamental necessary and sufficient physical correlate for consciousness: whenever we see electrons moving about in such and such patterns, we are confident that there will be such and such conscious experience on the part of the system.
not so much "these atoms moving like such means we will have this conscious experience" more i am saying that a certain formation of atoms will produce consciousness in the system: the nature of the conscious experience will be dictated by the biology: what kind of biology does this thing have in order to experience the environment with? all of that is higher-level stuff that we may or may not predict on an atomic level. all i am interested in is what combinations make consciousness possible: experiencing consciousness is another question all together.
What combination of these could you throw together to show a priori that consciousness must be the result? I argue that no combination of these could be thrown together to show that consciousness must result. Rather, at this point, we would have to rework our ontology to grant an entirely new property to electrons, such that we would be able to see a priori that such and such configuration of electrons must result in consciousness.
Yes, the ontology that i follow in place and smart does not explicitly state this, but it is implied that you can go to the biology and find out what physical constituents made it possible to form. have that, and you have your physical energy level of consciousness.
This new property would have to be either a fundamentally irreducible aspect of consciousness on the part of electrons, or it would have to be some kind of micro phenomenological property of electrons such that electrons by themselves are not conscious, but when combined in patterns just so, their micro phenomenological properties combine to result in consciousness.
exactly what i am saying. It’s the combination that matters. certain combinations make one thing, other combinations make consciousness.
and if you know the combination that makes something biology, then you will know a priori that a certain amount of yay atoms on this combination will make consciousness. It’s like baking a microscopic cake.
The metaphysical question of "even if it might not be so in our universe, but is it possible for consciousness to NOT result by this mix in another universe" is to me a wonderful question to speculate, but essentially one with no answer. how can we ever know whether consciousness of this sort is contingent here or a necessary factor of existence? that sort of thing keeps one awake at night.
even if in another universe something other than the pure physical is needed to support consciousness, it means nothing to us here. I will argue that we have all the ingredients for consciousness right here in front of us, we are just not looking hard enough for them.
Another God
Jan31-04, 06:54 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
It’s the combination that matters. certain combinations make one thing, other combinations make consciousness.
and if you know the combination that makes something biology, then you will know a priori that a certain amount of yay atoms on this combination will make consciousness. It’s like baking a microscopic cake.
So, if it is up to the combination, perhaps there is a critical distinction that needs to be made which I have never seen anyone make: Perhaps there is no such THING as consciousness, perhaps there is a myriad of phenomena that each may be 'conscious experiences'.
So a reductive explanation of 'Consciousness' will fail, because there is no such thing as 'Consciousness', there is instead attributes of consciousness. If you follow me...
I guess this is similar to saying there is no such thing as 'The Biological World', there are only creatures which may be said to be biological.
Does this make sense/Help?
That's not a million miles from the Buddhist view.
M. Gaspar
Jan31-04, 08:23 PM
Is there anything in the physical Universe that doesn't receive and respond to something? Elementary particles receive and respond to the weak and strong forces. Larger systems "sense" and respond via gravity to each other's masses.
Perhaps we are being too narrow when we define consciousness as a process that "emerges" when a (biological) system becomes sufficiently complex. Perhaps consciousness could be said to be the sensing and responsiveness to ANY information, however minimal.
Perhaps we are being "elitist" to confer consciousness only to those biological systems with brains ...brains being "merely" a biological device that has evolved to process (receive and respond to) a LOT of information. Even one-celled creatures who, say, have an affinity to light, are sensing and responding to SOMETHING. This certainly constitutes an "awareness" of sorts, and possibly what could be considered a rudimentary consciousness.
Perhaps consciousness is on a continuum from very simple to very complex, and thus is FUNDAMENTAL to every part and parcel (particle and system) of the Universe. And if true, it would be a "reductive explanation of consciousness" that has SUCCEEDED.
hypnagogue
Jan31-04, 11:34 PM
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Is there anything in the physical Universe that doesn't receive and respond to something? Elementary particles receive and respond to the weak and strong forces. Larger systems "sense" and respond via gravity to each other's masses.
Perhaps we are being too narrow when we define consciousness as a process that "emerges" when a (biological) system becomes sufficiently complex. Perhaps consciousness could be said to be the sensing and responsiveness to ANY information, however minimal.
Perhaps we are being "elitist" to confer consciousness only to those biological systems with brains ...brains being "merely" a biological device that has evolved to process (receive and respond to) a LOT of information. Even one-celled creatures who, say, have an affinity to light, are sensing and responding to SOMETHING. This certainly constitutes an "awareness" of sorts, and possibly what could be considered a rudimentary consciousness.
Perhaps consciousness is on a continuum from very simple to very complex, and thus is FUNDAMENTAL to every part and parcel (particle and system) of the Universe. And if true, it would be a "reductive explanation of consciousness" that has SUCCEEDED.
A lot of philosophical considerations point to consciousness being a fundamental aspect of reality (this thread for example). But supposing that consciousness is on some level fundamental is actually the antithesis of a reductive explanation.
As for the biological view, I don't think it's elitist as much as it is pragmatic. We know for a fact that humans are conscious and we have good reason to believe that other animals are conscious as well. The further the systems we consider stray from being human, the less confidence we can have that these systems are conscious. So it is more a matter of starting in an area where we can be confident, learning what we can from that starting point, and then extrapolating to more general systems as our knowledge and theoretical frameworks progress. It may be true that an amoeba (or a rock) is conscious on some level, but for now that is just speculation.
hypnagogue
Jan31-04, 11:41 PM
Originally posted by Another God
So, if it is up to the combination, perhaps there is a critical distinction that needs to be made which I have never seen anyone make: Perhaps there is no such THING as consciousness, perhaps there is a myriad of phenomena that each may be 'conscious experiences'.
So a reductive explanation of 'Consciousness' will fail, because there is no such thing as 'Consciousness', there is instead attributes of consciousness. If you follow me...
I guess this is similar to saying there is no such thing as 'The Biological World', there are only creatures which may be said to be biological.
Does this make sense/Help?
I don't know how I feel about that. You can perhaps say that there is no intrinsic property that differentiates a biological system from a non-biological one, but from the 1st person view at least, there seems to be an obvious intrinsic difference between a conscious system and a non-concsious system.
Besides, even if we accept that what we need to describe are attributes of consciousness, all the familiar arguments still apply as to why we could not explain these attributes reductively in the materialist framework.
hypnagogue
Feb1-04, 12:37 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
Well, it depends. Yes, the materialistic stance is quite shallow, and no doubt it needs to be fleshed out, but the basis for it may still be there. Take a look at Place and Smart's work on identity theory: (I know they are Australian, but hell, we do have some minds all the way down here)It simply states that’s a Mind state IS a Brain state.
But this is still unintelligible under the conventional materialist framework. I am not saying it is impossible in reality-- obviously that is not the case. I am just saying that if you analyze a system that turns out to be a human brain using a materialistic analysis, you will never deduce that this system has consciousness. It may very well be the case that a mind state is a brain state; but if this is so, then the implication is that there is something about brain states that is not recognized in materialism.
I think that we should at least start at a point where we know that consciousness is the case.
A very sensible approach indeed, but I don't think using brains as the starting point necessitates that we build the theory explicitly around biology. If anything I think that should come as a result of empirical research rather than a starting assumption. (I don't think we need this assumption to do productive research on consciousness.)
If it is so that biology is conscious, then we can figure out what the constitution of biology is, and then see what the essential ingredients of the physics/biology boundary are. we can then say that they are the essential building blocks of consciousness, as they make biology, and biology is conscious, as it can react and interact with its environment. We can never argue necessity of biology for consciousness. But we can say "check it out, we have a working example, lets see how that happens"
Doesn't this research paradigm just boil down to determining what makes biology, and then just baldly asserting that those things that make biology also make consciousness? I may have misunderstood, but it sounds as if you are begging the question here.
Besides that my explanation of consciousness is based on biological or at least physical causation, and that programmed robots ignore the causation part of the initial condition for consciousness and just write the consciousness on top to be run on a bunch of silicon mapping, there seems to be a tesable and varifiable way of seeing if a robot is conscious in the same kind of sense that a human is conscious: that it attributed meaning to its environment. It is reacting in a meaningful and productive way TO ITSELF as well as to the environment.
In what way does a machine act any less causally than a life form?
If you suppose that there is a one to one mapping of brain states onto mind states, then in principle the entire behavioral proclivities of a person should be encoded in their neural firing patterns. In principle, these neural firing patterns could be emulated perfectly by a complex computer. So, in principle, you could build a computer (with a robot body and so on) that would act indistinguishably from its human counterpart; how then would you conclude that the human attributes meaning in such and such a way and that the computer/robot does not?
I am familiar with the Chinese Room argument and I suppose you might invoke it here. However, from the point of view of materialism, the human brain might as well be just as void of semantics as the computer which blindly runs instructions. It is just an input-output device, after all; just as it is eminently unclear how/at what point a computer running instructions would somehow become conscious, it is equally unclear how/at what point a human brain interpretting sensory input should somehow become conscious. We know the CR argument does not apply to human brains not from some special caveat in the argument that explicitly distinguishes how biological brains are different from all other cases; rather, we know the CR argument does not apply to human brains because we are human brains and we have 1st person evidence of our own consciousness to the contrary. It could very well be equally the case for an AI robot; it could be that although the CR argument indicates that the robot should not be conscious, in fact it is conscious, and it knows this from its own 1st person subjective experience. So the only way to refute the CR argument for any physical system under our current understanding is to be that system, and accordingly I don't think it can be relied upon to guide our intuition. If anything, it is simply another way of showing how our current understanding is wholely inadequate.
Obviously there is something somewhere along the line that introduces semantics (consciousness); whatever that 'thing' is, we know the human brain has it, but the robot might have it as well (and, strictly from the 3rd person view, it would certainly at least appear to have it, although appearance does not constitute a proof). To state outright that that special thing must be biology is, again, too much of an assumption for me. It could be the case, but it could equally not be the case.
Absolutely. That would be great to see. as much as i am not too keen on chalmers work, he is an interesting writer to read.
OK, good, I will put up a post on Chalmers' functionalism argument sometime soon.
Yes, the ontology that i follow in place and smart does not explicitly state this, but it is implied that you can go to the biology and find out what physical constituents made it possible to form. have that, and you have your physical energy level of consciousness.
Even if it did turn out that some property of biology accounts for consciousness, this would in turn imply that biology possesses some fundamental property pertaining to consciousness that is entirely omitted in the current materialist framework.
The metaphysical question of "even if it might not be so in our universe, but is it possible for consciousness to NOT result by this mix in another universe" is to me a wonderful question to speculate, but essentially one with no answer. how can we ever know whether consciousness of this sort is contingent here or a necessary factor of existence? that sort of thing keeps one awake at night.
The metaphysical argument is used more to highlight the notion that materialism alone is insufficient to explain consciousness. The argument simply stated says that it is conceivable that there be a metaphysical world that is physically identical to ours but in which a human brain is not conscious. The conclusion is that there is some non-physical property of brains that accounts for consciousness. (Or, if you prefer, it is conceivable that there is some metaphysical world where the CR argument serves as a sound refutation of consciousness in human brains; there is computation but no consciousness.)
Dark Wing
Feb2-04, 03:25 AM
Ok Hypnagogue, I think i have lost you somewhere, i am a little confused, so lets go through this a little slower so I know what you are arguing.
-What do you think the current materialistic stance is? you keep saying that you don't believe that by looking at the brain you can deduce consciousness within. And you claim that this means that the paradigm of materialism is lacking in explanation of anything that it trying to prove/study/look at. Basically, materialism is redundant in that it cannot explain what it is trying to as it does not even know what it is looking at.
Well, exactly. Because the word "consciousness" is completely misleading. there is no such thing. you cant deduce consciousness from looking at the brain, as there is no Consciousness there. But you can deduce movement and interaction of environmental stimulus, and you can see responses at neuro-chemical level. so i guess all i am saying is that consciousness is life. is movement of matter and energy. and, if you take the identity theory side of materialism, then this is exactly what they are saying. functionalism is looking at a reduction, eliminative materialism is basically looking at physics and claims there is nothing to reduce, and the concept of deducting consciousness is a complete farce. it just depends of what you mean by the materialistic stance: there are many... I am obviously very confused, please re-explain for my ignorance.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
It may very well be the case that a mind state is a brain state; but if this is so, then the implication is that there is something about brain states that is not recognized in materialism.
again, please explain to me what materialism is then. I have always taken it to be the study of the physical: i know the functionalist stance takes it from top down, but again, i am not sure what you are saying here, i am sorry.
A very sensible approach indeed, but I don't think using brains as the starting point necessitates that we build the theory explicitly around biology. If anything I think that should come as a result of empirical research rather than a starting assumption. (I don't think we need this assumption to do productive research on consciousness.)
it does not necessitate anything, really, it just gives us a good ground to understand the case of consciousness that we know exists. it is all very well to claim all kinds of things about AI, but if we don’t even know what we are dealing with when we say things like this, then its all pure speculation and word games. Wittgenstein has a lot to say about the misleading terms of mind philosophy, as does the churchlands, who put all of this to "folk psychology" but that again is another topic.
Doesn't this research paradigm just boil down to determining what makes biology, and then just baldly asserting that those things that make biology also make consciousness? I may have misunderstood, but it sounds as if you are begging the question here.
no, it says that those things that are biology are consciousness. consciousness is not made. it is just a term we have put on something that is. we think of it as something being made, we think of it as a bi product, we think of it as something other than simply movement of atoms, but its not. its just the physical world doing its thing.
In what way does a machine act any less causally than a life form?
If you suppose that there is a one to one mapping of brain states onto mind states, then in principle the entire behavioral proclivities of a person should be encoded in their neural firing patterns. In principle, these neural firing patterns could be emulated perfectly by a complex computer. So, in principle, you could build a computer (with a robot body and so on) that would act indistinguishably from its human counterpart; how then would you conclude that the human attributes meaning in such and such a way and that the computer/robot does not?
in general it does act less causally than a life form, as it has no attachment or ability to link into the world at all (hence the Chinese room argument). BUT in the 2nd case: where we build something PHYSICAL that actually fires and does things like a brain, then fine, you can attribute to it everything that a human has. why? there is no such thing as 1-1 mapping of the mind to the brain. there is only brain activity. you cant take the experience of brain activity and write a program for it or even explain it with out a concept of the neural activity like the cognitivists do. you cant do it. we are experiencing neural activity. you can scrape consciousness off like that and write it separate to causation.
Identity theorists and elimininative materialists all claim that is you make something like the brain, then you have a good reason to say it works like one. Functionalists like to claim that a pile of tin canes could form the function of the mind. they are very different claims.
I am familiar with the Chinese Room argument and I suppose you might invoke it here. However, from the point of view of materialism, the human brain might as well be just as void of semantics as the computer which blindly runs instructions.
No. the difference is in the seeming. there HAS to be more to the story, as we actually do attribute meaning to our actions and the world around us NO MATTER HOW WRONG THOSE ATTRIBUTIONS MIGHT BE. A computer has no way of making those attributions: we are an inside agent attributing to the outside world: we are attributing meanings to the computers action: outside in instead of inside out. a computer is only dealing with symbols: it has not way of understanding it at all. What the materialist stance, in my opinion is looking at, is why that might be the case. some choose to take it down to our constituents. that is the paradigm in which we are working here.
So the only way to refute the CR argument for any physical system under our current understanding is to be that system, and accordingly I don't think it can be relied upon to guide our intuition. If anything, it is simply another way of showing how our current understanding is wholly inadequate.
it is showing why the approach of functionalism has a lot of fault, and why we have to start relying on a real physical basis for what we are doing by stopping these stupid analogies and looking at exactly what we are dealing with. instead of saying "the brain is like a hydraulics system" or "a brain is like a computer" we have to give this a rest and say "a brain is like a brain, lets find out what that is" instead of running around and studying computers like they are going to suddenly turn over all the answers to the universe to us on their little sliver and green hard drives. That’s all Searle was trying to point out. it can be used as a guide to show that mainstream thought is heading wildly in the wrong direction, and we should start seriously exploring the other ideas that are around before too much embarrassment is caused, and Dennett fall flat on his face when Cog finally shows them that its not possible.
Obviously there is something somewhere along the line that introduces semantics (consciousness); whatever that 'thing' is, we know the human brain has it, but the robot might have it as well (and, strictly from the 3rd person view, it would certainly at least appear to have it, although appearance does not constitute a proof). To state outright that that special thing must be biology is, again, too much of an assumption for me. It could be the case, but it could equally not be the case.
the human brain does not "have" it, it IS it. and you can argue that its all the same in physics: that’s fine: we have found a universal consciousness causation in which we are all linked: but to me, consciousness is a meaningless term, and is simply a re-description of a physical system brought on by misunderstanding of how the body functions.
Even if it did turn out that some property of biology accounts for consciousness, this would in turn imply that biology possesses some fundamental property pertaining to consciousness that is entirely omitted in the current materialist framework.
or that biology does not contain anything: it is just the structure that allows consciousness to be experienced: maybe something (like a rock) can posses the fundamentals of consciousness, but not the means in which to experience it: so even then a robot may have the attributes to HAVE consciousness: it does respond etc. BUT it has no means of "experiencing" it, as it has no way of meaningfully connecting to the world.
The metaphysical argument is used more to highlight the notion that materialism alone is insufficient to explain consciousness. The argument simply stated says that it is conceivable that there be a metaphysical world that is physically identical to ours but in which a human brain is not conscious. The conclusion is that there is some non-physical property of brains that accounts for consciousness. (Or, if you prefer, it is conceivable that there is some metaphysical world where the CR argument serves as a sound refutation of consciousness in human brains; there is computation but no consciousness.)
even if it is conceivable, so what? just because you can conceive something means nothing. i can conceive of a pink elephant in another universe, does that mean that it is relevant to what’s happening here? in another universe, maybe there is a non-physical substance that causes mind. there is little evidence that that be the case here. we have found out non-physical substance- energy.
Dark Wing
Feb2-04, 03:31 AM
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Is there anything in the physical Universe that doesn't receive and respond to something? Elementary particles receive and respond to the weak and strong forces. Larger systems "sense" and respond via gravity to each other's masses.
well, i was more talking about conditioned responces: being able to change behaviour patterns via conditioning: but if you want to use just basic movement in general, then why not?
Perhaps we are being too narrow when we define consciousness as a process that "emerges" when a (biological) system becomes sufficiently complex. Perhaps consciousness could be said to be the sensing and responsiveness to ANY information, however minimal.
sure, as long as it can actually change its behaviour as well. maybe this is a more quantum mechanics question.
Perhaps we are being "elitist" to confer consciousness only to those biological systems with brains ...brains being "merely" a biological device that has evolved to process (receive and respond to) a LOT of information. Even one-celled creatures who, say, have an affinity to light, are sensing and responding to SOMETHING. This certainly constitutes an "awareness" of sorts, and possibly what could be considered a rudimentary consciousness.
i would confer consiousness to anything that has the ability to react to its environment: not just a blind action, but can actually be conditined away from its usual behaviour. whether energy IS actually consiousness, or whether it is only certian structures of ebergy that allow a structure to interact meaningfully with the environment - that is somthing proberly worth reaserching.
Perhaps consciousness is on a continuum from very simple to very complex, and thus is FUNDAMENTAL to every part and parcel (particle and system) of the Universe. And if true, it would be a "reductive explanation of consciousness" that has SUCCEEDED.
sure. i am all for it being a structual diffence: i just say that physics is the basis for it. it is the building blocks and starting point for all of this.
Dark Wing
Feb2-04, 03:35 AM
Originally posted by Canute
That's not a million miles from the Buddhist view.
Sure. all things coneceted, consiousness is a continuim, and all life is one. why not? take physics as your basis you hardly have anywhere else to go.
Originally posted by Dark Wing
Sure. all things coneceted, consiousness is a continuim, and all life is one. why not? take physics as your basis you hardly have anywhere else to go.
I don't think physicists would agree that universal consciousness follows from physics.
hypnagogue
Feb2-04, 07:55 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
-What do you think the current materialistic stance is? you keep saying that you don't believe that by looking at the brain you can deduce consciousness within. And you claim that this means that the paradigm of materialism is lacking in explanation of anything that it trying to prove/study/look at. Basically, materialism is redundant in that it cannot explain what it is trying to as it does not even know what it is looking at.
Well, exactly. Because the word "consciousness" is completely misleading. there is no such thing. you cant deduce consciousness from looking at the brain, as there is no Consciousness there. But you can deduce movement and interaction of environmental stimulus, and you can see responses at neuro-chemical level. so i guess all i am saying is that consciousness is life. is movement of matter and energy. and, if you take the identity theory side of materialism, then this is exactly what they are saying. functionalism is looking at a reduction, eliminative materialism is basically looking at physics and claims there is nothing to reduce, and the concept of deducting consciousness is a complete farce.
I find your position here a little confusing in light of things you have said previously:
I think that we should at least start at a point where we know that consciousness is the case. (i am aware that people will argue that we are not conscious, and that we are all just robots, but i am going to presume consciousness on the basis of Searls "seeming" argument).
On the one hand you present consciousness with a very behaviorist kind of flavor, saying it is nothing more than the movement of matter and energy, and that really there is no such thing as consciousness; on the other hand you say that consciousness is the case, on the basis of Searle's "seeming" argument.
Consciousness seems to be a bad word to use in these discussions, since it always gets twisted around at some point. It's too ambiguous. The relevant component of consciousness that I am talking about is experience or feeling (or equally well seeming, I suppose.) Despite confusions about what consciousness is and if it really exists or not, can we agree that it is certainly the case that humans have 1st person subjective experiences? I am presuming you answer yes to this question, otherwise, you deny the manifestly true and we cannot proceed.
Now, to state that problem very simply and succintly: how is it that "movement of matter and energy" can "seem" to be anything at all? Based on even our most complete understanding, there is nothing in matter and energy that should ever give rise to "seeming." That is the crux of the issue at hand. What in physics can account for "seeming," even in principle, the same way the structure of H2O molecules accounts for water? The answer would seem to be 'nothing at all.' Accordingly, there should be more to our descriptions of reality than there currently is, in order to fully account for experience/feelings.
again, please explain to me what materialism is then. I have always taken it to be the study of the physical: i know the functionalist stance takes it from top down, but again, i am not sure what you are saying here, i am sorry.
Materialism: the stance that only the physical exists, and the description of that physical ontology (a catalogue of properties / fundamental entities such as charge, mass, spacetime, and so on, as interrelated by the laws of physics).
no, it says that those things that are biology are consciousness. consciousness is not made. it is just a term we have put on something that is. we think of it as something being made, we think of it as a bi product, we think of it as something other than simply movement of atoms, but its not. its just the physical world doing its thing.
Again, the way you have described things here, I don't think there is anything being done to objectively ascertain that biology is consciousness; it just assumed from the beginning and then carried through to the end.
No. the difference is in the seeming. there HAS to be more to the story, as we actually do attribute meaning to our actions and the world around us NO MATTER HOW WRONG THOSE ATTRIBUTIONS MIGHT BE. A computer has no way of making those attributions: we are an inside agent attributing to the outside world: we are attributing meanings to the computers action: outside in instead of inside out. a computer is only dealing with symbols: it has not way of understanding it at all.
You could just as well say that a human brain is only dealing with symbols and has no way of understanding it at all. Of course, we know this is not the case, but it really should be the case if you follow the logic of the CR argument. The only reason we know that CR does not apply to the human brain is from 1st person experience. If this is not the case, explain to me what caveats exist in the CR argument such that CR does not apply to human brains. Are these really justified by the argument or are they ad hoc patch-ups to make it compatible with reality?
the human brain does not "have" it, it IS it. and you can argue that its all the same in physics: that’s fine: we have found a universal consciousness causation in which we are all linked: but to me, consciousness is a meaningless term, and is simply a re-description of a physical system brought on by misunderstanding of how the body functions.
I disagree. No matter what you say about consciousness, it is really impossible to deny that experience or feelings exist. If you look over the materialist ontology (spacetime, mass, charge, matter, energy etc, and the laws of physics), from what in this ontology can it follow, even in principle, that experience or feelings should exist? I argue that experience cannot logically follow from any of these things, and thus should join them as an ontologically fundamental building block.
even if it is conceivable, so what? just because you can conceive something means nothing. i can conceive of a pink elephant in another universe, does that mean that it is relevant to what’s happening here? in another universe, maybe there is a non-physical substance that causes mind. there is little evidence that that be the case here. we have found out non-physical substance- energy.
Conceivability ties into explanatory power, which ultimately ties into our understanding of the world. If we possess a good explanation of a certain phenomenon, then any rational agent who accepts our axioms and understands our logic will not even be able to conceive of an event contrary to that predicted by the explanation. (Here, again, the relevant axioms are the fundamental, nonreducible components of materialism: spacetime, mass/energy, laws of phsycis, etc.)
Example: suppose we have two competing theories about the properties of water. On the first theory, the properties of water are determined by the water god Wata. This is not a very good explanation for several reasons, one of which being that it leaves us free to rationally conceive of something to the contrary; if Wata determines the properties of water, then why didn't he decide to make water look red instead of clear/green/blue? (For that matter, why is it Wata and not Raja who determines the properties of water?) I can easily conceive under this theory that water should turn out to be red; it has not been adequately explained to me why it must be the case that water has its characteristic properties as observed to exist in nature.
The second theory is the standard scientific one involving H2O molecules. On this theory, we start off with the characteristic materialist properties of H2O molecules-- their atomic structure and bonding propensities, and so on-- and from these, we show how a large collection of such molecules under the proper conditions must combine to form a macroscopic substance with the properties of water. Under this explanation, it is not even possible to rationally conceive that H2O molecules could combine to comprise a substance with properties different from water. The explanandum (thing to be explained) follows as a necessary consequence of the explanation, leaving no room for a rational imagination to contradict it.
If one can fully understand a materialist theory of consciousness and still rationally conceive of a metaphysical world physically identical to ours where human brains are not conscious (do not experience perceptual feelings), then the implication is that that materialist theory of consciousness is a pretty lousy one. Specifically, the axioms (materialist ontology) are insufficient; it has not shown how the explanandum (consciousness/seeming/experiencing/feeling) must be a necessary consequence of the explanation.
If my explanations still seem confusing or incorrect to you, you may want to check out a couple of papers by Chalmers that essentially embody what I am trying to say here:
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)
Another God
Feb2-04, 04:45 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
If one can fully understand a materialist theory of consciousness and still rationally conceive of a metaphysical world physically identical to ours where human brains are not conscious (do not experience perceptual feelings), then the implication is that that materialist theory of consciousness is a pretty lousy one. Specifically, the axioms (materialist ontology) are insufficient; it has not shown how the explanandum (consciousness/seeming/experiencing/feeling) must be a necessary consequence of the explanation.
Unless I am mistaken, I beleive that this point is the crux to the whole discussion, and that Dark Wing's claim is that although it is possible to conceive of such a situation, we know from first hand experience that it is not the case with 'myself', and since you are biologically congruent to myself, it is not the case with you, and since Apes are biologically analogous to us, it is not the case with them, and since Dogs, mice, fish are all related to us, then it is also not the case with them.
The problem of other minds is a genuine problem, but if we accept current scientific theory (materialism, evolution, causality) then we are forced to accept that my mind (brain) is essentially no different to you brain, which in turn is only different by a matter of degrees to every other mind in nature. As such every single mind in nature most likely results in 'experiences' akin to our own.
The obvious next step is to realise that with this constant throughout nature, it is feasibly to claim that there is something about the brain which necessarily gives rise to experience.
While I understand your point, and in fact agree with it, the contingent evidence points to the conclusion that biological brains of this vague layout must give experience. I don't know why, its just what they do. (I think this is what Dark Wing is saying)
Admittedly, staying with the problem of consciousness side is much easier. There are less jumps involved in the logic and it is safe. Following the line of reasoning that I just attempted to layout has two rather large assumptions/claims/hopes in it. The problem of other minds is ignorable because of common descent (we have to assume that 'seeming' is available in degrees, and is something that has evolved the whole way alongside us), and then there is the somewhat dodgy attempt to explain this constant by claiming that is simply must be a consequence of having a brain (or being biological, however far down we have to go).
Another God
Feb2-04, 04:49 PM
In otherwords, our abilites to imagine a world where there could be brains without experience is simply a trick played on us by our ignorance.*
Just like someone who doesn't understand newtons/einsteins laws could imagine a world where the sun revolved around the earth. It seems entirely reasonable, but as soon as u understand the details of the system and the laws that dictate them, it no longer actually seems possible.
*That is, of course, if Dark Wing is correct, which is something that may not be known for...a very long time for all we know.
hypnagogue
Feb2-04, 05:25 PM
Originally posted by Another God
In otherwords, our abilites to imagine a world where there could be brains without experience is simply a trick played on us by our ignorance.
I never claimed (for example) that an actually existing brain in this world which is identical to mine could possibly not have the same conscious states that I have. By extension, I am not skeptical that you yourself are experiencing some kind of conscious states, or that any other normally functioning person does as well.
There is a distinction to be drawn here betwen nomological (or natural) possibility and metaphysical possibility. These are two very different things. For instance, it is metaphysically possible that the speed of light in some metaphysical world be different from c, although this is (to our best understanding) nomologically impossible (impossible in this actual world we find ourselves in). In general, those things which appear to be contingent facts of nature (such as the value of c) are nomologically fixed but are not metaphysically necessary in any strong logical sense.
My claim is not that the activity of the brain in nature cannot/does not/could potentially not account for consciousness in this world. Quite the contrary, I believe that a brain performing the appropriate activities under the appropriate circumstances will always be conscious.
My claim is that the brain as it is modeled by materialism cannot theoretically account for consciousness. This is a claim about our model of reality, not reality as it actually is. I claim this because it appears to be a logical impossibility to theoretically derive the existence of consciousness starting from materialistic assumptions. Given that I fully accept the natural existence of consciousness and its natural relationship with the natural brain, the only rational route is to re-examine our assumptions (materialism).
We have a fact of existence (consciousness) that is impossible to derive from materialism; hence, materialism must be an insufficient model of reality; hence, we must modify materialism by adding more assumptions/axioms/contingent entities than it currently possesses, such that with our revised model of reality we will be able to satisfactorily explain consciousness as we observe it to exist in nature. (On some level, this will involve making at least some aspects of consciousness, or those things that somehow combine to create consciousness, irreducible and fundamental.) That is, with our revised model, we should be able to derive the properties of consciousness as they are related to brain function as a necessary consequence of our starting assumptions. Our explanation should be good enough that it leaves no rational room for imagining a reality to the contrary of what is observed in nature, given that we accept the starting assumptions as true. This explanitory rigor characterizes the strength of our explanitory power for (eg) the properties of water in terms of H2O molecules, and it is precisely the kind of explanitory rigor that is impossible to build into an explantation of consciousness using just our current materialist assumptions.
Hypno
I usually agree with you but you seem to have simply assumed here that consciousness is caused by brain. Or have I misread your words?
Another God
Feb3-04, 04:40 AM
Canute: I don't think it is a 'simple assumtpion', but rather a well thought through belief that the brain is the cause(/seat/existence/receptor) of consciousness.
And yes, once again Hypnagogue, I understand your point and accept it. I really do appreciate how clearly you explain yourself.
So, let me try to state things as I now understand them. You do not necessarily disagree with my last post, and in fact you probably agree with it: There is reasonable evidence to accept that there is necessarily something within the brain/biology which 'gives rise' to consciousness. The problem still remains though, that our understanding of the brain via materialism still simply cannot ever explain how that comes about.
LOL. OK, saying that now, I realise that no new ground has been reached. This is still exactly the initial complaint. Sorry about that, but it's all in good fun still.
I have always agreed with your position, since before I ever did any philosophy of the mind and then after as well. It was part of my rational of the universe that there is 'the objective', and then there is 'the subjective'. The subjective comes about through the objective, but obviously it is different. The objective is the universe, the subjective is a perception of the universe. As such, the best I could do was to postulate that there was some objective occurance/event/machinery that created subjective experience. Of course materialism will never find this subjectivity (because it only looks at the objective), but it may very well be able to find the objective machinery that causes it.
And so, yeah, this doesn't resolve the problem as such, but at least it gave me a basis for ignoring it for a while. Wait until we find the direct causality of experience and then we will start to understand whether there is an explanation for experience itself, or whether it is simply something we have to accept as a phenomenon...
I dunno. I am rambling. This topic does naught but confuse me everytime I go there. I suspect that that is precisely why no progress has been made in it since the begining of time.
Shane
hypnagogue
Feb3-04, 07:46 AM
Originally posted by Canute
Hypno
I usually agree with you but you seem to have simply assumed here that consciousness is caused by brain. Or have I misread your words?
I don't think the brain necessarily causes consciousness as such, but I do think it's obvious (or at least, we have very good reason to believe) that the consciousness that we experience systematically varies as a function of brain activity. This does not imply that the brain actually creates or comprises consciousness; it could be that consciousness (or microphenomenological 'things') exists independently of the brain and brain activity somehow manipulates the pre-existing 'thing.' (I use 'thing' very loosely here, since whatever that 'thing' would be in this case, it would be ontologically distinct in several important ways from physical things, or at least our materialistic conception of physical things.) Either way, it is still reasonable to assume that (for instance) someone with similar brain activity as mine in a similar setting as I am in will have similar experiences.
hypnagogue
Feb3-04, 08:09 AM
Originally posted by Another God
I have always agreed with your position, since before I ever did any philosophy of the mind and then after as well. It was part of my rational of the universe that there is 'the objective', and then there is 'the subjective'. The subjective comes about through the objective, but obviously it is different. The objective is the universe, the subjective is a perception of the universe.
I don't think subjective experience should be thought of on the most fundamental level as a perception of something in the way I understand you to mean it, which is as a representation. The way I see it, experience on the most fundamental level is a property of nature just as much as mass or charge, albeit with obvious ontological differences; experience in itself is just experience, a neutral natural phenomenon that need not be inherently representational. Obviously life has evolved to use experiential phenomena as representations of objective reality, but that is just a function that experience has come to serve for life over time rather than an actual inherent property. (By analogy, even if we always observe color to be an element of sexual selection in a species of birds, it doesn't mean that color is inherently sexual-- that is just a function that color has come to serve for the birds over time.)
And so, yeah, this doesn't resolve the problem as such, but at least it gave me a basis for ignoring it for a while. Wait until we find the direct causality of experience and then we will start to understand whether there is an explanation for experience itself, or whether it is simply something we have to accept as a phenomenon...
If Chalmers' argument is correct, then it is impossible even in principle to fully explain consciousness solely in terms of materialistic entities and properties. Even given a perfect theoretical mapping of brain states onto conscious states, we would still not be able to dispense of the explanitory gap using only a materialist framework. (I suggest you read the two articles linked to in my last reply to Dark Wing if you are interested in a more thorough argument.)
Fliption
Feb3-04, 09:00 AM
Originally posted by Another God
The obvious next step is to realise that with this constant throughout nature, it is feasibly to claim that there is something about the brain which necessarily gives rise to experience.
AG, I commend you on your comments. It seems you have understood Hypnagogue's posts and even linked it to your own thoughts on the objective and subjective. I understand what you're saying and agree for the most part. I do have a question regarding the above quote however. Can I reasonably state this and it be just as accurate....
"The obvious next step is to realise that with this constant throughout nature, it is feasibly to claim that there is something about radios which necessarily gives rise to music."
Yet, radios don't compose music. Tell me your thoughts on this analogy. To make the anlogy work, assume that you know nothing of how radios work.
Unfortunately there is no evidence that anything about the brain gives rise to consciousness. As Hypnogogue says, representional (or intentional, phenomenal etc) consciousness seems to be an evolved product of brain (or vice versa) but nothing suggests that brains are a necessary prerequisite for consciousness. Strictly speaking it isn't even completely clear how to define 'brain'. When you look at the behaviour of microphages or slime mould you have to wonder.
hypnagogue
Feb3-04, 10:43 AM
Originally posted by Canute
representional (or intentional, phenomenal etc) consciousness
Actually, I was trying to say in my response to AG that representational and phenomenal content are two distinct things. The representational content of a subjective experience is an exitrinsic, relational property, an 'aboutness' that relates it to objective reality. The phenomenal content of a subjective experience is an intrinsic, inherent property that is entirely self-contained.
For instance, take the subjective experience of the blueness of the sky. This subjective blueness has a representational content insofar as it represents information about the objectively existing sky 'out there.' But this is to be distinguished from its phenomenal content, which is simply its inherent property of perceived blueness. The former seems to be a convenient usage of the latter that life has evolved, but in its most stripped down sense there need not be anything representational about a phenomenal percept.
You're basically right, I was sloppy. However although I agreed completely with you said earlier about this I'm still slightly unsure whether 'phenomenal' consciousness is fundamental, which you implied.
I suspect that a state of 'emptiness' is not properly described as 'phenomenal consciousness', at least in the sense of 'pertaining to a phenomena'. That's why I lumped phenomenal consciousness in with the rest.
hypnagogue
Feb3-04, 01:29 PM
Where does a state of 'emptiness' come into play?
Actually, I'm not sure I entirely understand that second paragraph you wrote.
I was agreeing that phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic, not dependent on representations, and is more fundamental that representational consciousness. But in a not very clear way I was also suggesting that the fundamental consciousness that you argued may be an irreducible property of nature may not be phenomenal or intentional consciousness either. This is because it seems to me that fundamental experience of consciousness cannot really be called 'phenomenal'.
In a sense there is a phenomenon, namely the experience. But at the limit the phenomena is the experience, as opposed to being separate to it, whereas 'phenomenal consciousness' suggests (to me anyway) an experience somehow separate to the experiencer, in other words a phenomenon and a consciousness of a phenomenon.
God I'm pedantic sometimes. Sorry.
Another God
Feb3-04, 05:29 PM
In my mind phenomena is a word that describes the felt experience. So you can't have it seperated from the consciousness.
Fliption: I will have to think about it for a while. I keep tossing around the idea that radios do more than just music, they do talk back, advertisements, static etc. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say radios necessarily give rise to noise.
With this new version though, it seems much more appropriate to me to say yes, the analogy may be correct, although I am sure your point would be missed. You wouldn't like the thought of 'static' being just as meaningful to the radio analogy as consciousness is meaningful to the brain. But that is the only way i can see the analogy as being useful.
Fliption
Feb3-04, 10:23 PM
AG,
I think "noise" may technically be accurate, but I'm not sure it's relevant to the analogy. Assume you're an alien with no knowledge of radios and you have a radio that will only play one station. You cannot change stations to hear static. This station can play music or have people talking, it doesn't matter. You have knobs to control volume and EQ. Couldn't you, with the limited knowledge of an alien, make the same quote about this radio/music/talking that you made about brains/consciousness?
Here's the point: If you agree that this analogy applies then we have a good example of a situation where having good reasons to believe one way would actually be leading us astray. In this case, that music/talking is an emergent property of a radio's design. (I tried to leave out static because while it is obvious that voices and music are not generated by the radio, I'm not sure about the technical origin of white noise. The importance of static isn't so relevant. I'd include it if I knew you wouldn't say that "the radio does generate the static". Because I'm not technically savy enough to debate that [:)])
Originally posted by Another God
In my mind phenomena is a word that describes the felt experience. So you can't have it seperated from the consciousness./B]
I'll try to be more clear about what I meant. It's important because if consciousness is not reducible then it must be consciousness in its most 'unevolved' state, or rest state, that is fundamental.
Often this fundamental state is taken to be phenomenal consciousness, as I think Hypnogogue did above, and Chalmer's does also. However the term is ambiguous and therefore can give rise to misunderstandings.
This is Austen Clark from http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwphil/pctall.html
"States of phenomenal consciousness involve a special kind of quality: phenomenal qualities. A state of phenomenal consciousness is a state in which something appears somehow to someone, and phenomenal qualities characterize that appearance."
This is the danger, that phenomenal consciousness is defined too narrowly, as a state in which 'something appears somehow to someone".
My point was that there are states more fundamental than this, states in which there is no distinction between the something that appears and the someone to whom it appears, and maybe 'phenomenal consciousness' is not the right term for them, given the above kind of useage and definition.
hypnagogue
Feb4-04, 07:14 AM
I think phenomenal consciousness could just as well be 'a state in which something appears somehow.' That's the way I have been taking it, at least. The 'to someone' part implies the presence of a further 'something that appears somehow,' which is the appearance of that 'someone' to whom the experiences are happening, or the appearance of selfhood. So to define phenomenal consciousness in the way you are using it may be a little circular or recursive. For instance, I would define the phenomenal consciousness of red as 'the appearance of redness,' whereas under the definition of phenomenal consciousness that you suggest, it would be 'the appearance of redness in conjunction with the appearance of self.'
In any case, it just a matter of how we define our terms. But I agree with your central point, which is that experience on the most fundamental level need not necessarily include the experience of selfhood.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 08:10 AM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
[B]I agree that, for a theory of consciousness to make sense, it must make reference to some sort of building blocks for consciousness; either in the form of an irreducible and fundamental entity, or in the form of some 'things' that are not themselves conscious but somehow combine to create consciousness.
Now the question becomes: are these building blocks included in our contemporary materialistic ontology? This is precisely where I believe that contemporary materialism must fail in any attempts to really explain consciousness, because I do not think any of the building blocks given to us in a materialistic ontology can do the job of showing us how to explain or deduce consciousness. We need more building blocks.
I've decided to go back... if NOT to the "beginning of time" ...then at least to page 13 of this thread ...and to devote the next hour to catching up with as many posts as have caught my eye.
Let me first see if I get the term "contemporary materialistic ontology" as meaning how "we" (i.e., "scientists") currently think matter is behaving? Please correct me if I got it wrong.
Anyway, based on this definition, I will squeeze in my paradigm to fit.
Matter -- actually "bound-up energy" -- is "behaving" as it ALWAYS has: by "sensing" one another (either as particles or systems) and "responding to" one another. We can discuss examples, but my contention is tha THIS represents "consciousness" at its bare minimum.
Might this not be the "building blocks" you've been hoping for?
As a side point here: your criterion for judging whether an entity is conscious or not is the degree to which it can interact with and be conditioned by its environment, why should physical constitution matter? I understand that you want to start off on surer footing by starting with safer assumptions, but we could (relatively) easily build a silicon based robot that could do the same things. All I am suggesting is that, if biological constitution is to be the most fundamental factor for consciousness in your hypothesis, then that should your primary assumption. Deriving (as opposed to fundamentally asserting) the necessity of biology for consciousness from an entity's ability to interact with the environment seems to be faulty, since you could just as well derive that a silicon robot should be conscious by the same criterion.
The DETECTION and RESPONSE TO stimuli ("forces") would be all that is necessary. "Conditioning" might BE a "response" but it is beyond my basic parameter for "consciousness".
Thus, I do not propose that "consciousness" is confined to biological systems and, while some may want to discuss "robots" there are plenty of non-biological systems (atoms through galaxies) that are "communicating with one another" even as we speak.
Like you, I have been weary of functionalism as a good starting ground for any hypothesis for consciousness. However, recently I read an argument with a functionalist flavor put forth by Chalmers that gives me pause. If you are interested, it might be appropriate to start another thread on the topic.
Wish you'd put it here in ONE SENTENCE. I'm hesitant to "go shopping" for additional threads to tempt me into discourse.
OK, back to the building block discussion. Suppose for the sake of argument that we eventually isolate the motion of electrons as the most fundamental necessary and sufficient physical correlate for consciousness: whenever we see electrons moving about in such and such patterns, we are confident that there will be such and such conscious experience on the part of the system.
First, why would it be necessary to "isolate the motion of electrons". We "know" they're always moving don't we (a serious question)? Perhaps it IS their "motion" that allows them to "pick up on" the presence of OTHER particles (like the positive charge of a proton) but then this would "simply" be part of the MECHANISM for "basic consciousness". No. All we have to do is consider whether the electron's "detection" and "response to" the proton can be considered a basic "unit of awareness".
Now, what in our materialist ontology could account for this? Electron charge? Electron mass? Electron spatiotemporal configuration? What combination of these could you throw together to show a priori that consciousness must be the result? I argue that no combination of these could be thrown together to show that consciousness must result. Rather, at this point, we would have to rework our ontology to grant an entirely new property to electrons, such that we would be able to see a priori that such and such configuration of electrons must result in consciousness. This new property would have to be either a fundamentally irreducible aspect of consciousness on the part of electrons, or it would have to be some kind of microphenomenological property of electrons such that electrons by themselves are not conscious, but when combined in patterns just so, their microphenomenological properties combine to result in consciousness.
There are MANY "forces" that "account for this: electrical charge; magnetic force fields; ionic fields; the em spectrum. Anything that mediates INFORMATION "accounts for" an entity's or a system's "ability" to "sense" and "respond-to" something else. Nothing "new" is needed.
This argument applies to any H2O formula we may wish to hypothesize for consciousness. You say we have not found the formula yet; I say that for any formula built solely from materialist building blocks, we will still not be able to show a priori that this formula must necessarily result in consciousness. We just need more building blocks than materialism will give us.
It is probably true that we will not be able to EVER "show" that electronics, atoms and galaxies are "conscoius" ...but we can THINK about it well enough.
I don't think anyone will argue that it is impossible for a person with the right configuration in our world not to have a mind. The question is whether or not it is a metaphysical impossibility; if the world were different somehow, would consciousness still be the necessary result of the right brain configuration? For instance, in our world it is impossible for an electron not to be attracted to a proton. In a metaphysical world with different laws of physics, this would not necessarily be the case.
First, there isn't any "wrong" "configuration" IF Everything has a "mind" ...of sorts. As to the mind's dependency on having a brain? I contend not. And a world -- both physical AND metaphysical -- with different "laws of physics" -- all that would be needed, once again, is that the parts of the "new Universe" be detecting and responding to one another for "consciousness" to be present. And, of course, having all parts NOT sensing and responding would then give us a STATIC -- hence DEAD -- Universe ...and nobody wants THAT.
It is a metaphysical impossibility for a world with identical H2O molecules and identical laws of physics to ours that these H2O molecules not combine to form (given suitable circumstances) a macrophysical substance with properties identical to water in our world. A very straightforward argument involving physical structures and functions can be given to support this claim. It is not at all clear, however, that a metaphysical world that is physically identical to ours should necessarily support consciousness. If it is claimed that this metaphysical world must support consciousness, no substantive argument can be given to support this claim, even in principle, for all the familiar reasons. This is another way of getting at the suggestion that there must be something more than just the physical involved in the phenomenon of consciousness.
Actually, I think I have given a good "substantive argument" to "support the claim" that ALL DYNAMIC WORLDS with systems that are "working together" will have "consciousness" at its most fundamental ...as well as its most complex.
I agree that there is no logical reason to say that it is not in virtue of some property of the brain and its constituents that consciousness exists. However, there is much logical reason to say that such a property is not included in our current materialist ontology.
The "brain" is an evolutionary "afterthought".
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 08:16 AM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
The idea is not that your artificial bat must be a zombie. The idea is that we can't be certain what effect the different physical constitution has on its purported consciousness. Upon what basis do you claim that the artificial bat must have the exact same experience as the natural bat?
The argument you have put forth so far leaves much room for doubt. In fact, it does little more than beg the question; your argument rests firmly on the assumption that physical transitions and such are all that is responsible for consciousness, whereas this is precisely the issue that is open to question. To advance, you must propose an argument detailing how it must be that the functional constitution of the bat is sufficient for explaining its first person experiences.
Would not ANY entity subject to CAUSE & EFFECT be having an "experience"? It's simply a matter of complexity of both the detection apparatus and the responsive possibilities of whatever.
And if I make it off page 13, I'll consider this hour well spent.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 08:24 AM
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I'm trying to firm up the discussion by pinning down the issues in a case where we don't have all the baggage of human consciousness to contend with. IMHO that's exactly what Nagle did in switching from talking about qualia in people to presumptive qualia in bats. The point is exactly that nobody knows what goes on in a bat's mind so the discussion can remain pure of special pleading.
If you don't like the bat, here's another one. Could an AI be built to sense colors the way people do, with the three receptor bands and intensity differencing and maybe a neural network for identification and memory, and if it could then be run through experiences with colors, some good some bad according to a carefully designed program so it had various associations with various colors, and if it then "discussed" its experience of colors with researchers and showed complex discussion behavior, not programmed in advance, could you then say the device was experiencing color qualia?
I say yes. And of course you know that there are creatures that can sense wavelengths that we cannot, in addition to magnetic and ionic field, chemicals and other "mediators of information". Nor can we "sense" -- from our vantage point -- the "weak and strong forces" that elementary particles "sense" and "respond to".
hypnagogue
Feb4-04, 08:29 AM
M. Gaspar, your position assumes that information transfer / manipulation is inextricably bound up with consciousness; you say that whenever information is exchanged (detected, responded to, etc.), there will be some sort of attendant experiential component.
This may well be the case, but if it is, it is not something that can be accounted for in the traditional materialistic framework. There is no postulate in materialism that states that information transfer is inherently experiential. By the materialist account, information transfer between two atoms (say) should just be characterized entirely by physically detectable energy tranfer between the two; starting from materialist assumptions, we should have no reason to suspect that such an information transfer has anything at all to do with experiences.
So your hypothesis of the relation between information and consciousness would qualify as the beginnings of one possible type of "fundamental, irreducible addition" to the materialist framework that I have been talking about. It would function much like the traditional laws of physics; we would not be able to deduce why this relation holds, we would just accept it as a fundamental and contingent way in which our world works. But as it stands, no such fundamental principle exists in our materialist account of reality; there is no "law of conscious information transfer" in the materialist account, or anything even analogous to it. That is the point I have been trying to make.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 08:29 AM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
So you are attempting point out the uncertainty of our knowledge of consciousness? I don't think any except the most extreme on either side really dispute that notion. At this stage of our understanding (and possibly forever), we just don't know enough to answer your question with much more than educated speculation. But this is a different matter from the subject of whether or not materialism can explain consciousness in principle.
Done! ...both page 13 and a proposal of how "materialism can explain consciousness in principle."
No time to read -- let alone respond to -- the next 4 pages ...which is why I am not CONSCIOUS of their content ...yet.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
[B]I think phenomenal consciousness could just as well be 'a state in which something appears somehow.'
Fine by me, (although I'm still a bit wary of the term 'appears')
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 04:37 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
...the materialistic stance is quite shallow, and no doubt it needs to be fleshed out, but the basis for it may still be there. Take a look at Place and Smart's work on identity theory: (I know they are Australian, but hell, we do have some minds all the way down here)It simply states that’s a Mind state IS a Brain state. What they have done is set up a field to explore: what is a brain state? if you can figure out what that is, then you have the next step to the reduction: take it down to biology, and then ultimately physics, and you have your building blocks for consciousness: but I will address that better where you have mentioned it bellow.
In the final analysis, the brain could "merely" be an organic device designed through evolution to detect a wide variety of signals, and to interpret them, store them and respond to them. The fact that we have developed instumentation to further gather data (signals) gives us a "consciousness" that is "aware" of objects that are "invisible" to us by wavelength and by distance. Still, "consciousness" could just be the sum product of what any entity (from particle to any dynamic material system) can detect/interpret/store/and respond-to.
So, yes, OUR "mind state" could be the same our our "brain state" ...but it is not necessarily the only TYPE of "mind" there is. We may just be on the "high end" of a "consciousness continuum" that is based on the complexity of detection and response possibilities of any given entity. Other entities less endowed ...like, say, an electron, might still have a "mind" by virtue of what IT could "detect" and "respond to" ...which would be, say, the positive charge of a proton.
Looks like I'm going to have to tackle the lengthy Dark Wing post on page 14 a bit at a time. No time to respond to it all now ...but don't want to skip it on my way to page 17.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 07:13 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
I think that we should at least start at a point where we know that consciousness is the case. (i am aware that people will argue that we are not conscious, and that we are all just robots, but i am going to presume consciousness on the basis of Searls "seeming" argument). If it is so that biology is conscious, then we can figure out what the constitution of biology is, and then see what the essential ingredients of the physics/biology boundary are. we can then say that they are the essential building blocks of consciousness, as they make biology, and biology is conscious, as it can react and interact with its environment. We can never argue necessity of biology for consciousness. But we can say "check it out, we have a working example, lets see how that happens"
You my SAY that "we can never argue (the) necessity of biology for consciousness" ...but there are many -- maybe most -- who do just that. I say "consciousness" is NOT dependent on biology, but that biological organisms HAVE developed the capacity to "sense" more "stimuli" than, say, a rock. But a rock "senses" gravity ...and some rocks "sense" magnetism. And I say that each "detection and response" is a "level" of consciousness.
So, what makes a biological cell that is reacting and interacting with its environment different from a robot that is showing the same behavioral patterns? nothing according to that definition. so the theory has to be expanded to show us how to tell immitation from the real thing (it is called "artificial Intelligence" after all :o)
If the reception, processing and response to information is the sole parameter and if a biological cell and a, what, nano-robot? could perceive EXACTLY the quantity and quality of incoming information, then there would be no distinction between their respective levels of consciousness. However, a living cell, I believe, probably DOES have the capacity to detect MORE than the nano-robot ...such as chemical information ...unless, of course, the robot was made to detect the exact same things.
Besides that my explanation of consciousness is based on biological or at least physical causation, and that programmed robots ignore the causation part of the initial condition for consciousness and just write the consciousness on top to be run on a bunch of silicon mapping, there seems to be a tesable and varifiable way of seeing if a robot is conscious in the same kind of sense that a human is conscious: that it attributed meaning to its environment.
Qhy do you say that a programmed robot "ignore" physical causation of consciousness? If "detection" and "response" is within the physical realm, then consciousness has been caused by physicality.
[quote]It is reacting in a meaningful and productive way TO ITSELF as well as to the environment.
Is one elementary particle "reacting in a meaningful and productive way" when it SENSES and RESPONDS TO other particles via info mediated by the weak and strong forces? I think it does.
not so much "these atoms moving like such means we will have this conscious experience" more i am saying that a certain formation of atoms will produce consciousness in the system
No, not "certain formation of atoms" but ALL formation of atoms...
...the nature of the conscious experience will be dictated by the biology: what kind of biology does this thing have in order to experience the environment with?
The only relevance to biology is the fact that biological organisms are more apt to have more sensors plus a larger repertoire of possible responses to stimuli. In and of itself, consciousness is NOT dependent on biology.
all of that is higher-level stuff that we may or may not predict on an atomic level. all i am interested in is what combinations make consciousness possible:[quote]
Answer: the detection and response to information.
[quote]...experiencing consciousness is another question all together.
Anything that is detecting and responding to something is having an "experience" ...which includes EVERYTHING as there is nothing (that I can think of) that isn't detecting and responding to SOMETHING ...even at the QM level.
It’s the combination that matters. certain combinations make one thing, other combinations make consciousness.
and if you know the combination that makes something biology, then you will know a priori that a certain amount of yay atoms on this combination will make consciousness. It’s like baking a microscopic cake.
And I propose that any operational system -- from atoms, to bugs, to stars and galaxies up to an including the Universe Itself -- is "experiencing consciousness". It's just a matter of DEGREE based on WHAT can be perceived and the range of FREEDOM the system has to respond.
The metaphysical question of "even if it might not be so in our universe, but is it possible for consciousness to NOT result by this mix in another universe" is to me a wonderful question to speculate, but essentially one with no answer. how can we ever know whether consciousness of this sort is contingent here or a necessary factor of existence? that sort of thing keeps one awake at night.
I sleep very well "knowing" that "consciousness" is FUNDAMENTAL to every constituent part of the Universe ...and has been so since the Universe was compressed into the "Primal Singularity" that preceded the last Big Bang. That's when the Universe "lost It's marbles" ...but It's more coherent now. [;)]
...even if in another universe something other than the pure physical is needed to support consciousness, it means nothing to us here. I will argue that we have all the ingredients for consciousness right here in front of us, we are just not looking hard enough for them.
One does not have to "look hard". One just has to look.
The above of course is merely speculation on my part, put forth with an air of "certainty" because I like to pretend I'm right.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 07:22 PM
Originally posted by Another God
So, if it is up to the combination, perhaps there is a critical distinction that needs to be made which I have never seen anyone make: Perhaps there is no such THING as consciousness, perhaps there is a myriad of phenomena that each may be 'conscious experiences'.
So a reductive explanation of 'Consciousness' will fail, because there is no such thing as 'Consciousness', there is instead attributes of consciousness. If you follow me...
I guess this is similar to saying there is no such thing as 'The Biological World', there are only creatures which may be said to be biological.
Does this make sense/Help?
Yes and no: it "makes sense" but doesn't "help".
I agree that the "myriad of phenomena" we have come to identify as "consciousness" may be something else. However, it is just as likely that there is a myriad of phenomena (like the detection of the physical forces ...or possibily "thought" itself) that is going on between systems that we have NOT come to identify as "consciousness" and yet ARE examples of it.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 07:30 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
A lot of philosophical considerations point to consciousness being a fundamental aspect of reality (this thread for example). But supposing that consciousness is on some level fundamental is actually the antithesis of a reductive explanation.
Now THIS I do not understand. How is what I've been saying the "antithese of a reductive explanation"? Do I not understand the word "reductive" has meaning to "reduce down" to is barest essentials. Please advise.
As for the biological view, I don't think it's elitist as much as it is pragmatic. We know for a fact that humans are conscious and we have good reason to believe that other animals are conscious as well. The further the systems we consider stray from being human, the less confidence we can have that these systems are conscious. So it is more a matter of starting in an area where we can be confident, learning what we can from that starting point, and then extrapolating to more general systems as our knowledge and theoretical frameworks progress. It may be true that an amoeba (or a rock) is conscious on some level, but for now that is just speculation.
You're reminding me of the story of the guy who lost his keys at night, and the only place it made sense for him to LOOK for them was under the street light ...as everywhere else was DARK and so he wouldn't see them even if they were there.
Of course it's "speculation" ...and may ALWAYS be. Still, I don't mind "groping in the dark" for the "keys".
I am here to present as good a case a possible ...but I don't expect to "prove" anything.
M. Gaspar
Feb4-04, 07:39 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
[B]I don't know how I feel about that. You can perhaps say that there is no intrinsic property that differentiates a biological system from a non-biological one, but from the 1st person view at least, there seems to be an obvious intrinsic difference between a conscious system and a non-concsious system.
Again: all systems are conscious in MY paradigm.
Besides, even if we accept that what we need to describe are attributes of consciousness, all the familiar arguments still apply as to why we could not explain these attributes reductively in the materialist framework.
The "problem" with "describing attributes" are that we (human beings) tend to equate everything with US! If it mothers it's young and steals a banana, it's conscious. If it scampers away from us (like a coackroach when it SEES us!) it's "merely" "reacting" in a mechanical sort of way.
I believe that we have been too narrow in our definition of what constitutes consciousness. If one uses my parameter, one could actually QUANTIFY "consciousness" along a continuum based on what a system (or particle) can detect at a given point in time and its possible range of responses.
hypnagogue
Feb4-04, 09:13 PM
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
Now THIS I do not understand. How is what I've been saying the "antithese of a reductive explanation"? Do I not understand the word "reductive" has meaning to "reduce down" to is barest essentials. Please advise.
To explanitorily reduce a phenomenon P here means to describe how the properties of P come about due to the combination of some other set of phenomena P'. For instance, to give a reductive account of the properties of water means to describe how the properties of water come about due to the electrostatic properties of H2O molecules, under suitable conditions of temperature and pressure and so on. So if we presume that consciousness is ontologically fundamental / contingent in nature, ie that it simply exists in its own right and is not composed of smaller 'things,' then we are doing the exact opposite of an explanitory reduction. Instead of showing how consciousness is composed of other, more basic phenomena, we are instead claiming that consciousness cannot be 'reduced' in such a way at all.
I am here to present as good a case a possible ...but I don't expect to "prove" anything.
I appreciate you presenting your case, but perhaps it would be advisable to begin a separate thread on your personal hypotheses of consciousness. This thread is intended to discuss the philosophical feasibility of giving reductive explanations of consciousness in particular, and it is turning into a bit of a 'grab bag' for all things consciousness, detracting from the focus on the main lines of discussion. I welcome your views and will be glad to discuss them with you, but again, this particular thread seems to be getting sidetracked a bit.
M. Gaspar
Feb5-04, 02:51 AM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
To explanitorily reduce a phenomenon P here means to describe how the properties of P come about due to the combination of some other set of phenomena P'.
Is this not what I have been doing by explaining the phenomenon of consciousness as being due to the combination of some other set of phenomena ...namely, the DETECTION and RESPONSE TO "information".
Consciousness is indeed a phenomenon -- a PROCESS -- that I propose goes on at every level of physicality by virtue of the sense/respond phenomenon. It then becomes a matter of complexity of information that be PERCEIVED and the potential repertoire of RESPONSES that determines the "degree of consciousness" that an entity "possesses".
For instance, to give a reductive account of the properties of water means to describe how the properties of water come about due to the electrostatic properties of H2O molecules, under suitable conditions of temperature and pressure and so on. So if we presume that consciousness is ontologically fundamental / contingent in nature, ie that it simply exists in its own right and is not composed of smaller 'things,' then we are doing the exact opposite of an explanitory reduction.
But I am NOT saying that consciousness is a fundamental "ingredient" of the Universe but the result of a "process" that IS intrinsic to the Universe. The Universe, after all, "hangs together" by VIRTUE of its "ingredients" sensing and responding to each other. Do you not think we are only AMONG a myriad of temporary systems that are operating in a "Cause & Effect" Universe?
Instead of showing how consciousness is composed of other, more basic phenomena, we are instead claiming that consciousness cannot be 'reduced' in such a way at all.
Do you still say I am violating reductionism?
I appreciate you presenting your case, but perhaps it would be advisable to begin a separate thread on your personal hypotheses of consciousness. This thread is intended to discuss the philosophical feasibility of giving reductive explanations of consciousness in particular, and it is turning into a bit of a 'grab bag' for all things consciousness, detracting from the focus on the main lines of discussion. I welcome your views and will be glad to discuss them with you, but again, this particular thread seems to be getting sidetracked a bit.
Actually, I did start a thread -- the "Consciousness Continuum" -- but no takers. I think I will read the article you recommended first so that I may have something to "respond to" myself. Then I will present my proposal under Theory Development.
Meanwhile, it was not my intention to "hi-jack" this thread but to use my "personal hypothesis" as an EXAMPLE of "why reductive explanations of consciousness" NEEDN'T fail.
I'll be going back to pg. 14 of this thread to see if there is anything more I can insert -- or assert -- that is in keeping with the thrust of this thread. Otherwise, you've saved me a few hours of posting ...which makes up for the cartridge you owe me. [;)]
Gaspar
Imo it would be better if you picked up the discussion from where it is, not from where it was some time ago.
Information is relevant, but information exchange cannot explain consiousness, since information exchange can occur in the absence of consciousness.
Consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical until the 'explanatory gap' can be crossed. The only alternative is to show that there is no gap. Many have tried and and nobody has yet succeeded.
One strategy is to argue that mind and brain are one thing, but even if this is judged a coherent idea (which few think it is) it does not solve anything, since it does not resolve the matter of which of mind and brain is ontologically more fundamental. At our current state of knowledge we do not know whether brain gives rise to consciousness or vice versa. Until we know this then any argument that mind and brain are indentical doesn't help to answer the ontological question. It also ignores the important distinction between mind and consciousness.
In my view the hypothesis that consciousness is more fundamental than matter has far greater explanatory power and reach then the other view, and would have been adopted long ago if it wasn't for the fact that it is considered unscientific. All the known evidence is in its favour.
Regardless of whether this is true it is interesting to come at the explanatory gap from the other side for a change, and to speculate how it might be crossed starting from consciousness and ending with brain. A recent paper in the 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' makes this proposal. As this paper got past the referees we must assume that it is not an absurd idea and does not contradict the evidence.
At the moment scientific research into consciousness is based on scientific metaphysical assumptions. All the talk is of the creation of a 'science of consiousness'. This is a very very one-sided approach and it may explain why we are not getting anywhere on this question.
All the evidence suggests that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. If it is fundamental, as this suggests, then it follows that is more fundamental than matter (since matter is always reducible, i.e. made out of something other than itself). Consciousness, on the other hand, need not be made out of something other than itself. That is, at the limit an experience is what it is.
I'll pin my colours to the mast for once and say that imvho there is 'something that it is like' to be nothing,(taking 'nothing' in its scientific sense), that this entails that consciousness cannot not exist, and that this explains why there is anything at all rather than nothing. It is difficult to make testable predictions from this view, but postdictions abound (e.g. the existence of the explanatory gap). It also explains why science cannot explain consciousness, for by this view science has got hold of the wrong end of the stick big time.
(Dammit, why aren't my edits being saved if I do more than one edit? Am I doing something wrong?)
M. Gaspar
Feb5-04, 08:23 AM
Originally posted by Canute
Gaspar
Imo it would be better if you picked up the discussion from where it is, not from where it was some time ago.
Today is Feb. 5. Page 14 was Feb. 2. I don't think we're talking ancient history here. And even if it WERE, let us not pretend that the discussion on these threads is linear in any way. What I was doing was addressing the POVs of participants vis a vis a reductive explanation of consciousness and my own particular POV.
Since then -- that is, since YESTERDAY: post above -- it has been politely suggested that I am "off topic" and so hesitate to respond to your comments about my "personal hypothesis". And now that I've hesitated .......... I will proceed. However, if you -- or anyone reading this -- knows how to kick all of my posts and your subsequent ones over to my thread "Consciousness Continuum" ...please inform me how ...as this will be the last time I speak of my ideas here.
Information is relevant, but information exchange cannot explain consiousness, since information exchange can occur in the absence of consciousness.
My point is that ANY "information exchange" constitutes a "degree" of "consciousness" and that, in fact, there is never an "absence of consciousness" in a cause & effect Universe.
Consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical until the 'explanatory gap' can be crossed. The only alternative is to show that there is no gap. Many have tried and and nobody has yet succeeded.
One strategy is to argue that mind and brain are one thing, but even if this is judged a coherent idea (which few think it is) it does not solve anything, since it does not resolve the matter of which of mind and brain is ontologically more fundamental. At our current state of knowledge we do not know whether brain gives rise to consciousness or vice versa. Until we know this then any argument that mind and brain are indentical doesn't help to answer the ontological question. It also ignores the important distinction between mind and consciousness.
In my view the hypothesis that consciousness is more fundamental than matter has far greater explanatory power and reach then the other view, and would have been adopted long ago if it wasn't for the fact that it is considered unscientific. All the known evidence is in its favour.
Regardless of whether this is true it is interesting to come at the explanatory gap from the other side for a change, and to speculate how it might be crossed starting from consciousness and ending with brain. A recent paper in the 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' makes this proposal. As this paper got past the referees we must assume that it is not an absurd idea and does not contradict the evidence.
At the moment scientific research into consciousness is based on scientific metaphysical assumptions. All the talk is of the creation of a 'science of consiousness'. This is a very very one-sided approach and it may explain why we are not getting anywhere on this question.
All the evidence suggests that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. If it is fundamental, as this suggests, then it follows that is more fundamental than matter (since matter is always reducible, i.e. made out of something other than itself). Consciousness, on the other hand, need not be made out of something other than itself. That is, at the limit an experience is what it is.
I'll pin my colours to the mast for once and say that imvho there is 'something that it is like' to be nothing,(taking 'nothing' in its scientific sense), that this entails that consciousness cannot not exist, and that this explains why there is anything at all rather than nothing. It is difficult to make testable predictions from this view, but postdictions abound (e.g. the existence of the explanatory gap). It also explains why science cannot explain consciousness, for by this view science has got hold of the wrong end of the stick big time.
(Dammit, why aren't my edits being saved if I do more than one edit? Am I doing something wrong?)
Maybe the Universe doesn't want you to change your mind ...noting what happened to Einstein and his "cosmological constant".
In any event, I have changed MY mind, in that I want to address all you have said above, but not here ...in deference to the desires of the thread's author. Since it appears that you are even more technically challenged than I [g)] , it is probably futile to ask you how to kick this ...and all my posts since page 13 -- over to MY thread "Consciousness Continuum" to "prime the pump" as it were ...or a least put a quarter in the cup! It's lonely at the top. [*(]
Dark Wing
Feb6-04, 03:38 AM
Ok, Ok, lets get to this again. If the argument is that materialism as it stands cannot account for all of the problem of consiousness, agreed. If it did, then there would be nothing left to debate (and what fun would that be?)
So what we need to do is look at what we believe consiousness to be. now, people wish to include subjectivness, 1st person view, seeming, feeling, emotion, everything... Ok, thats great. all of this can be consiousness.
How can i talk of consciousness on a physical leavel and then start making claims of seeming, as as it was pointed out, it does not seem like atoms and energy or matter have consiousness.
this is what i would like to say. The essence of consiousness lies in physics. why? it is through these building blocks that biology is formed. consious experience however, can ONLY be reached through biology as far as we know. biology alows us to respond and interact with our world. so all this seeming and emotion is very much a biology driven reponce to certian things. It may be found that other things that are not biology have the ability to have a consious experience, but right now we do not know that to be the case.
What would be a nice case to mention here - someone mentioned to me that violet electric light has its own consious. why? they claimed that they could make this electric light do what they wanted it to do: ie, go against its own normal behaviour pattens, and go and seek out all cancerious cells in the body (for instance) Does anyone know anythin about this? this might be a point case example of somthing that is not biology but is conscious?
About concieving that there could be a place inwhich the brain does not contain consiousness as a metaphysical question, i still dont see how that is relevent to the study of this contingent world. Sure, maybe it is the case elsewhere. conception of somthing is not a good reason to consider it. if we wanted to accept everything we concieved as an arument for the demise of a previous thought, then we would be back into superstition, not science.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
If Chalmers' argument is correct, then it is impossible even in principle to fully explain consciousness solely in terms of materialistic entities and properties. Even given a perfect theoretical mapping of brain states onto conscious states, we would still not be able to dispense of the explanitory gap using only a materialist framework. (I suggest you read the two articles linked to in my last reply to Dark Wing if you are interested in a more thorough argument.)
this is just it. we are not mapping consious states to brain staes. or vice versa. there is not seperation, and therefore no mapping can happen. it is case of "oh, look, we stimulate this neuron, and check out that laughter" it not mapping, its understanding. there is no explanatary gap, if you conceieve that biology is our link to our world, and therefore the reason we even have a consious experience. what consiousness IS is an entirly diffrent question: but we can expalain the experience.
On the one hand you present consciousness with a very behaviorist kind of flavor, saying it is nothing more than the movement of matter and energy, and that really there is no such thing as consciousness; on the other hand you say that consciousness is the case, on the basis of Searle's "seeming" argument.
No, i am saying that energy and matter make the building blocks on which a consious experience may lie. energy and matter cannot be conditioned, nor will they change their behaviour patten (lets not go down the quantem mechanics line just yet). When i say there is no such thing as consiousness, i am saying that there is nothing emergant from any form of materialism to explian conscious experience. it just is. Do we have proof that this is the case? not yet. I am simply putting this up as a new paradigm to study: instead of reducing one to the other, claim that one IS the other, and study the brain as the brain. see how it connect to our senses to create that wonderful feeling of subjectivity. there is no explanatary gap, as there is no gap at all. stop thinking of it as a problem, and see it as a contingent fact: the brain works as a processing machiene, and what it does is make us feel the environment through very physical biological ways. these processes are slowly being understood better as we go along. we know how to make people feel things by giving them certian chemicals. we can explain a lot of the world through chemical interaction. even our subjective experiences are begining to be explained by brain movement.
Its going to take a lot of time and study. But i think its possible, if not then at least a worthy reaserch project.
as far as we stand in the CR argument, we are the chineese dude in the room. the one you cant tell from the analouge system. interesting? the problem of other minds? no doubt. But malcholm has a great paper about that where he basicly turns the problem around toshow that we should not worry about others being consious, but worry about if we are consious ourselves. I will find a link on the net to it, i only have it in paper here, I will dothat soon, and write a more formulated answer more offically to your reply post hypnagogue. sorry if this is a little unorganised, i am in a bit of a rush.
M. Gaspar
Feb6-04, 05:37 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
No, i am saying that energy and matter make the building blocks on which a consious experience may lie. energy and matter cannot be conditioned, nor will they change their behaviour patten (lets not go down the quantem mechanics line just yet).
Sorry, Hypnagogue, but I must reply to Dark Wing here:
Of COURSE energy and matter "change their behavior patterns" based on information they receive/perceive from each other. Does not the electron shift it's orbit based on something it's detecting? Do not elementary particles "stick together" due to certain forces THEY are detecting. Do not galaxies "hang together" because of "information" THEY'RE detecting (gravity for starters). As to QM? Don't get me started.
Again: It's a Cause & Effect Universe and "information detection and response" are the most basic components of "consciousness".
When i say there is no such thing as consiousness, i am saying that there is nothing emergent from any form of materialism to explain conscious experience. It just is.
Oddly, I agree that consciousness is NOT "emergent" but just "is" DUE TO the proclivity of all the parts of the Universe to detect and respond to each other.
Do we have proof that this is the case? not yet.
Sure we do (have "proof"). Everything that physicists study "proves" that "matter" SENSES & RESPONDS TO "forces". They just don't call it "consciousness". But they SHOULD.
I am simply putting this up as a new paradigm to study: instead of reducing one to the other, claim that one IS the other, and study the brain as the brain. see how it connect to our senses to create that wonderful feeling of subjectivity.
I like MY "new paradigm" better. The brain is "simply" a biological device designed via evolution to DETECT & RESPOND TO INFORMATION in a most complex way. (And not all "feelings of subjectivity" are "wonderful" as, for instance, my subjective response at being told I am not "on point".)
There is no explanatary gap, as there is no gap at all. Stop thinking of it as a problem, and see it as a contingent fact: the brain works as a processing machine, and what it does is make us feel the environment through very physical biological ways. these processes are slowly being understood better as we go along. we know how to make people feel things by giving them certian chemicals. we can explain a lot of the world through chemical interaction. even our subjective experiences are begining to be explained by brain movement.
It's still info-exchange at its core.
M. Gaspar
Sorry. I wasn't suggesting your posts weren't relevant. I just didn't want to go back over previous points in the discussion. Actually I like your information theory in many ways. I just don't see how it explains consciousness as opposed to the contents of consciousness. The question is how does information become meaning.
Originally posted by Dark Wing
Ok, Ok, lets get to this again. If the argument is that materialism as it stands cannot account for all of the problem of consiousness, agreed.
This is not quite right. It is true that materialism cannot account for consciousness, but it accounts very well indeed for the problem of consciousness.
this is what i would like to say. The essence of consiousness lies in physics. why? it is through these building blocks that biology is formed. consious experience however, can ONLY be reached through biology as far as we know.
But consciousness does not arise from biology as far as we know, so why do you assume it? Once you've assumed it the discussion is over.
if we wanted to accept everything we concieved as an arument for the demise of a previous thought, then we would be back into superstition, not science.
It is not superstitious not to make assumptions.
this is just it. we are not mapping consious states to brain staes. or vice versa. there is not seperation, and therefore no mapping can happen. it is case of "oh, look, we stimulate this neuron, and check out that laughter" it not mapping, its understanding.
If I understand you right you are arguing either for behaviourism or that consciousness is brain. Both these views have been shown to be incoherent. If they aren't then we don't need to study the brain to understand the mind, for it will be much easier the other way around.
No, i am saying that energy and matter make the building blocks on which a consious experience may lie.
That'll stay as just your opinion until someone finds some evidence of its truth.
I am simply putting this up as a new paradigm to study: instead of reducing one to the other, claim that one IS the other, and study the brain as the brain. see how it connect to our senses to create that wonderful feeling of subjectivity.
But if mind and brain are the same thing then why does it matter which we study? We can let psychologists study the brain instead of neuroscientists.
we know how to make people feel things by giving them certian chemicals. we can explain a lot of the world through chemical interaction. even our subjective experiences are begining to be explained by brain movement.
True. But it doesn't help. Nobody argues that brain states are not causally linked to conscious states. The question is how far does this causality extend.
hypnagogue
Feb6-04, 07:46 AM
M. Gaspar, please don't take my comments to mean I don't want you posting in this thread. I just want the discussion to stay on track. On further reflection, I think my main objection was that you posted a flurry of posts which could have been condensed into one post. But anyway, now that you're caught up and into the discussion that shouldn't be a problem anymore. So I apologize for coming off the wrong way and ask you to please not hesitate to make your own contributions to this thread.
That having been said, I would like to comment on a view that is in some degree held by both M. Gaspar and Dark Wing. Both seem to advocate "response to information" as tightly bound up with the concept of consciousness. Strictly speaking, although consciousness certainly does involve response to information, it is not a good idea to equate or tightly correlate the two. There are mounds of research suggesting that a great deal of the information processing that the brain does occurs entirely independently of consciousness. For instance, patients with blindsight (http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/blindsight.html) can meaningfully interact with objects even though they have no visual awareness of these objects or conceptual awareness of exactly how it is that they can react meaningfully to things they can't see. This suggests that "response to information" is not a sufficient condition for consciousness; response to the environment can occur without attendant conscious experience.
hypnagogue
Feb6-04, 09:07 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
this is what i would like to say. The essence of consiousness lies in physics. why? it is through these building blocks that biology is formed. consious experience however, can ONLY be reached through biology as far as we know. biology alows us to respond and interact with our world.
But response and interaction with our world are not sufficient conditions for consciousness. See my previous post.
What would be a nice case to mention here - someone mentioned to me that violet electric light has its own consious. why? they claimed that they could make this electric light do what they wanted it to do: ie, go against its own normal behaviour pattens, and go and seek out all cancerious cells in the body (for instance) Does anyone know anythin about this? this might be a point case example of somthing that is not biology but is conscious?
I find it curious that you entertain this as an example of some nonbiological system that might be conscious, when we could just as well "make something do what we want to do," ie go against its own normal behavior patterns, and go and seek out some particular type of object in the environment, by building a suitable robot. But it seems to me that you refuse to give a robot as much consideration as a candidate for consciousness as you would to a bundle of photons.
concieving that there could be a place inwhich the brain does not contain consiousness as a metaphysical question, i still dont see how that is relevent to the study of this contingent world. Sure, maybe it is the case elsewhere. conception of somthing is not a good reason to consider it. if we wanted to accept everything we concieved as an arument for the demise of a previous thought, then we would be back into superstition, not science.
Again, the conceivability argument is just another way of reflecting how consciousness is epistemologically and ontologically distinct from 'ordinary' physical phenomena. Simply put, we cannot rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where H2O molecules do not combine to form water, but we can rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where the neurons of a human brain do not combine to form consciousness.
The reason this is relevant is that it illustrates a fundamental difference in the way we understand and can explain consciousness vis a vis classical physical objects, and this in turn has ontological consequences-- it tells us something about how the world must actually be. Once we accept the axioms of materialism, we can show that H2O molecules form water by logical necessity, but we cannot show an analogous logically necessary link between the physical world as we understand it and consciousness, even in principle. This suggests that the model of the world put forth by materialism is insufficient to account for consciousness. If materialism/physicalism/mechanism were sufficient to explain consciousness, then we should be able to produce an argument showing how consciousness follows from their assumptions by logical necessity. If we cannot theoretically derive consciousness from these theoretical models of reality even in principle, this suggests that if the world really were as these models of reality state it is, then consciousness would not exist. But, of course, consciousness does exist. So these models must be fundamentally inadequate depictions of the world, as they have nothing meaningful to say about consciousness.
For a detailed discussion of the explanatory gap, please see the paper The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness-- C. D. Broad on the Explanatory Gap (http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf), by Ansgar Beckermann. It is a bit of a lengthy read (14 pages), but perhaps after reading it you will come to a fuller appreciation for why the explanatory gap cannot be so easily shaken off. (This paper includes a refutation of the notion that simply equating qualitative properties with physical processes makes for a successful reductive/physical explanation.)
this is just it. we are not mapping consious states to brain staes. or vice versa. there is not seperation, and therefore no mapping can happen. it is case of "oh, look, we stimulate this neuron, and check out that laughter" it not mapping, its understanding. there is no explanatary gap, if you conceieve that biology is our link to our world, and therefore the reason we even have a consious experience. what consiousness IS is an entirly diffrent question: but we can expalain the experience.
From the 3rd person view, there is no problem: we excite some neurons, we observe laughter. There is a clear causal connection. But that is not the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is traversing the gap from the 3rd person view to the 1st person view. In your example, we can observe the person's laughter, but we cannot observe his qualitative sense of comedy. We can explain his laughter as observed from the 3rd person view via a functional explanation: the activation of certain neurons leads to the activation of other neurons, and eventually motor neurons are activated which fully account for the characteristic motor behaviors of spastic breathing and smiling facial expression. But this functional 3rd person explanation cannot explain why the person subjectively experienced humor from his 1st person view.
The 3rd person view involves the straightforward causal connection from one structural/functional system (the brain) to other structural/functional systems (respiratory system, facial musculature, etc.) The 3rd-to-1st person view involves a causal connection from a structural/functional system (the brain) to a intrinsic, qualitative system (consciousness). It is obvious how one structural/functional system can causally connect to another structural/functional system, but not obvious at all how a structural/functional system can causally connect to qualitative experience. Under a materialistic framework, there is no straightforward theoretical explanation, only correlation, between the two. So it is appropriate at this point to speak of 3rd-to-1st person phenomena as a "mapping" instead of merely identifying the two. The explanatory gap perseveres (again, please see Beckermann's paper).
energy and matter cannot be conditioned, nor will they change their behaviour patten (lets not go down the quantem mechanics line just yet).
Sure energy and matter can be conditioned. In fact, in principle we can explain a person's behavioral conditioning (response and interaction with his environment) entirely in terms of matter and energy-- that is, in terms of the plasticity of his neurons, and their physical adaptation and rewiring as a function of environmental inputs. Neurons that adapt as such change their net computational processing, which in turn changes one's behavioral patterns. That is a clear-cut and conceptually complete example of matter being conditioned and changing in response to its environment, and still we have no indication whatsoever of consciousness in our explanitory model.
as far as we stand in the CR argument, we are the chineese dude in the room. the one you cant tell from the analouge system. interesting? the problem of other minds? no doubt. But malcholm has a great paper about that where he basicly turns the problem around toshow that we should not worry about others being consious, but worry about if we are consious ourselves. I will find a link on the net to it, i only have it in paper here, I will dothat soon, and write a more formulated answer more offically to your reply post hypnagogue. sorry if this is a little unorganised, i am in a bit of a rush.
I look forward to reading the paper. Still, I think my critique of the CR argument stands. The philosophical thrust of the CR argument applies to human brains just as much as it does to computers, or systems of pipes, or any other physical system.
Say the Chinese Room is the brain of a Chinese person, and the person inside the CR (or CB-- Chinese Brain) is a microscopic demon who is conscious in the same way humans are, but only understands and speaks English. (A bit of a stretch as compared to the traditional CR formulation, I know, but it still serves to illustrate my point.) If the English speaking demon inside the CB does all the CB's computations for it, the demon will have the CB interpretting Chinese symbols (as encoded in the CB's auditory neurons from external stimuli) and behaviorally responding to them (speaking proper Chinese in a meaningful way with respect to the auditory stimuli), but we have no reason to think that the demon itself will understand Chinese as a result. Conceptually, there will still be synatx (physical processes) but no semantics (awareness of the significance of the syntax) for the conscious agent inside the CR.
Of course, we may suppse that although the conscious agent inside the CR/CB will not be aware of the semantics of the Chinese symbols, the CB itself will be aware of the Chinese semantics-- it is a brain, after all, so we should suspect that it will be conscious of the information it is processing as much as we expect any other brain to be conscious of the information it processes. But to accept this position is to accept a critical flaw in the CR argument. If the CB can be aware of Chinese semantics while the English speaking demon inside it is not, then it could equally well be the case that the analogous phenomenon holds for the traditional CR argument. That is, it could be that although the English speaking person inside the Chinese Room does not understand the symbols he is manipulating, the CR taken as a system will understand the semantics.
M. Gaspar
Feb6-04, 07:16 PM
Originally posted by Canute
[B]M. Gaspar
Sorry. I wasn't suggesting your posts weren't relevant. I just didn't want to go back over previous points in the discussion. Actually I like your information theory in many ways. I just don't see how it explains consciousness as opposed to the contents of consciousness. The question is how does information become meaning.
You have asked excellent questions and I thank you for them.
Let me see if I can run them through my paradigm:
What would be the "contents of consciousness"? Possibly all that an entity "remembers". Our brains, for instance, are "set up" to "store" a LOT of information (units -- or WHOLE CHUNCKS OF -- "experiences" that can be accessed, referenced and assigned "meaning" ...somehow. Still, I cannot think -- as yet -- how an entity would form "meaning". In fact, I'm not sure how to DEFINE "meaning" with regard to "consciousness. What would YOU say?
This is not quite right. It is true that materialism cannot account for consciousness, but it accounts very well indeed for the problem of consciousness.
But I have said that materialism DOES account for consciousness, by exchanging information to such a degree and complexity that "meaning" arises. Thank you for that word. It is giving me something new to think about.
But consciousness does not arise from biology as far as we know, so why do you assume it? Once you've assumed it the discussion is over.
Hold on, Canute, you're preaching to the CHOIR! I am among those who do NOT believe that consciousness is contingent on biology. Biology may have achieved an "advanced state" of consciousness ...but it is NOT the only thing that's conscious. Each cell of an organism is conscious of SOMETHING ...usually MANY things. And the parts of the atoms are "aware" of each other, as might the galaxies be.
It is not superstitious not to make assumptions.
Say again.
If I understand you right you are arguing either for behaviourism or that consciousness is brain.
Then you definitely DON'T "understand me right". The brain is an organ that enhances an entities ability to detect, store and USE information. Consciousness is NOT the brain but the RESULTS of the brain's functionality. And, while I know what "behaviorism" is, I'm not sure I understand what you are suggesting when using the word when discussing consciousness. Remember, "behavior" is basically a RESPONSE that can be either "reflexive" (hence, "primitive") or "creative" {"advanced"). Thus the reptilian brain has been "overgrown" by higher cognitive capacities that give us "free will" ...INTENTIONALITY.
Both these views have been shown to be incoherent. If they aren't then we don't need to study the brain to understand the mind, for it will be much easier the other way around.
Please say again.
That'll stay as just your opinion until someone finds some evidence of its truth.
I'm not here to "prove" anything ...just play around with idea. If I turn out to be "right" about something(s) down the road (when the physicist finally "get there" ), goody for me ...and at least I'll have this record of my "earlier arrival".
And it would be EVEN BETTER if something I say inspires someone with a much better "left brain" than mine to "prove something" through mathematics or logic (the latter of course being hopeless). My theories thus far -- for the record -- are: (1) consciousness, the product of information exchange; (2) intention -- a product of consciousness -- which impinges on the field twixt "virtual" and "manifested"; and (3) an eventual "phase transition" will turn MORE energy into matter -- the phase transition being triggered by loss of heat or density or somethin' which would be the result of the continued expansion of the Universe -- thereby "generatong" sufficient gravity to STOP and REVERSE the expansion.
Number 3 stands the best chance of being mathematically proven ...if it's true.
But if mind and brain are the same thing then why does it matter which we study? We can let psychologists study the brain instead of neuroscientists.
We need to study both to maximize each.
M. Gaspar
Feb6-04, 07:39 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
M. Gaspar, please don't take my comments to mean I don't want you posting in this thread. I just want the discussion to stay on track. On further reflection, I think my main objection was that you posted a flurry of posts which could have been condensed into one post. But anyway, now that you're caught up and into the discussion that shouldn't be a problem anymore. So I apologize for coming off the wrong way and ask you to please not hesitate to make your own contributions to this thread.
Thanks.
That having been said, I would like to comment on a view that is in some degree held by both M. Gaspar and Dark Wing. Both seem to advocate "response to information" as tightly bound up with the concept of consciousness. Strictly speaking, although consciousness certainly does involve response to information, it is not a good idea to equate or tightly correlate the two.
Why? I think it's a GREAT idea.
There are mounds of research suggesting that a great deal of the information processing that the brain does occurs entirely independently of consciousness.
Remember: there are "degrees of consciousness" ...even within a single system. A system as a whole might be "aware" of certain incoming -- or stored -- information ...but not of others at any given time. There is a distinction between the word "conscious" which relates to what we tend to think of as an "awake" state in biological organisms (did they faint or are they comotose?)
Let us not "collapse" into one another the dual meanings of the word "conscious" ...tho I admit to having a very hard time coming up with the distinctions that I'm referring to.
I think of consciousness as going on at many levels ABOVE or BELOW whatever threshhold makes them "known to" the entity as a whole. But if an entity is receiving and responding to information -- even when it doesn't "know" it is -- it is still "conscious" of the information on some "level".
For instance, patients with blindsight (http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/blindsight.html) can meaningfully interact with objects even though they have no visual awareness of these objects or conceptual awareness of exactly how it is that they can react meaningfully to things they can't see. This suggests that "response to information" is not a sufficient condition for consciousness; response to the environment can occur without attendant conscious experience.
You see, we don't know of all the "sensory appartus" that may be at our disposal -- and, in fact, being USED. Obviously, these people are "sensing" and "responding to" SOMETHING and thereby "conscious" of it whether they know it or not! [g)]
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
What would be the "contents of consciousness"? Possibly all that an entity "remembers".
The contents of consciousness is whatever one is conscious of at any moment. That may be a memory, but it will be many other things as well.
Our brains, for instance, are "set up" to "store" a LOT of information (units -- or WHOLE CHUNCKS OF -- "experiences" that can be accessed, referenced and assigned "meaning" ...somehow. Still, I cannot think -- as yet -- how an entity would form "meaning". In fact, I'm not sure how to DEFINE "meaning" with regard to "consciousness. What would YOU say?
Defining 'meaning' in the abstract is a difficult problem. The term gets used differently in different contexts. I certainly don't have a sensible way of doing it.
However I suspect meaning depends on relations. That is, for information to have meaning it must be related to other information with meaning. For instance, the meaning of theorems within a formal system is derived from the other theorems, and ultimately from the axioms. This implies that 'meaning' exists only relatively, and is always dependent on the assumed meaning of some other information rather than having an independent existence as an abstract entity.
But I have said that materialism DOES account for consciousness, by exchanging information to such a degree and complexity that "meaning" arises. Thank you for that word. It is giving me something new to think about.
What makes you say that materialism can account for consciousness? There are strong objections to this view.
Hold on, Canute, you're preaching to the CHOIR! I am among those who do NOT believe that consciousness is contingent on biology. Biology may have achieved an "advanced state" of consciousness ...but it is NOT the only thing that's conscious. Each cell of an organism is conscious of SOMETHING ...usually MANY things. And the parts of the atoms are "aware" of each other, as might the galaxies be.'
Ok. This answers Hypnogogues point about blindsight or unconscious actions. If microphenomenalism is true then there may be no unconscious actions or reactions, as you suggest. But you are still saying that matter gives rise to consciousness, which disqualifies you from my choir. [:D]
Then you definitely DON'T "understand me right". The brain is an organ that enhances an entities ability to detect, store and USE information. Consciousness is NOT the brain but the RESULTS of the brain's functionality.
But in that case consiousness is something different to brain.
And, while I know what "behaviorism" is, I'm not sure I understand what you are suggesting when using the word when discussing consciousness. Remember, "behavior" is basically a RESPONSE that can be either "reflexive" (hence, "primitive") or "creative" {"advanced"). Thus the reptilian brain has been "overgrown" by higher cognitive capacities that give us "free will" ...INTENTIONALITY.
You suggested that we can understand consciousness by noting that stimulating neurons can give rise to laughter. This is a behaviourist (black box) approach to consciousness that leaves out 'seeming' and 'feeling' and therefore ex hypothesis it cannot explain consciousness.
BTW 'intentionality' has been redefined in consciousness studies as 'aboutness' rather than as relating to teleology and purpose. This is a pity imho but it's the way it is.
Please say again.
If consciousness is brain then psychology and neuroscience are the same discipline.
And it would be EVEN BETTER if something I say inspires someone with a much better "left brain" than mine to "prove something" through mathematics or logic (the latter of course being hopeless).
I agree that nothing can be proved about reality (as opposed to contingent existence)by any method including mathematics. However that doesn't prevent us using logic to narrow down the possible true answers to just one, or prevent us from knowing it's true.
My theories thus far -- for the record -- are: (1) consciousness, the product of information exchange;
If consciousness is a product, and not the exchange itself, then what is consciousness?
We need to study both to maximize each. [/B]
What do you mean by 'both' here? I thought you were saying that they were the same thing. Any attempt to argue that consciousness is physical runs into these problems.
nightlight
Feb7-04, 10:28 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?
The identity ("can redefine"...) you're advocating is not a scientific model/theory of the phenomenon but an approach, or strategy how to build a model/theory. It has no predictive or explanatory power -- it is an empty scientific model.
To advance from your strategy on how to build a model ("can redefine") to the actual scientific model ("actually define") you would have to produce, effectively, a list containing in the left column all conceivable configuration of matter and fields and in the right column, for each row, all direct experiences which are associated with that configuration. Thus, even as a mere strategy, it is a strategy for the most simple-minded brute force catalogue of the phenomena. It is not even strategy for building a theory.
Calling "identity approach" a theory or explanation of consciousness would be like calling a statement "for each planet there is a specific period and a specific orbit" a theory explaining planetary motion. It is merely an expression of "feeling" that there is some lawfulness/pattern in the phenomena. Without specifying what exactly that pattern is it is no better than caveman's conjecture that gods are showing stars in heavens -- he merely senses some pattern there and can't say anything more about it.
The "intentional stance" is basically a scientific principle, stated in philosophical terms, it is the anti-mysticism. Basically, if something meets all of the physical qualifications for a particular phenomenon, then the phenomenon is occuring. If something meets all of the physical qualifications for life, then it is alive, and there is nothing metaphysical to add to it. If something meets all of the physical qualifications of being conscious, then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it. The verbal smokescreen above is in the hazy phrase "all the physical qualifications" -- what are they? How long would such list be? What is the right side of the identity for each physical configuration -- just 1 word "consciousness" (?) or "experiences red" or "experiences bright red" or "experiences bright red in the upper left".... .... ?
... then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it. Provided some day this mushy idea for a possible strategy on how to begin approaching the construction of a "theory of consciousness" finally materializes into an actual theory which can answer, for any configuration of atoms and fields submitted, "what is it exactly like to be such configuration," i.e. what are the specific experiences that such configuration has (if any).
M. Gaspar
Feb8-04, 06:39 AM
Originally posted by Canute
The contents of consciousness is whatever one is conscious of at any moment. That may be a memory, but it will be many other things as well.
Please help me tease out the distinctions between what is meant by "being conscious." In fact, let us turn to AHD (American Heritage Dictionary):
Conscious: Adj. 1. a. having an awarenes of one's own existence, sensation and thoughts and of one's environment ...as in "injured by conscious"; b. capable of thought, will or perception ..as in "Man is a conscious being. 2. subjectively known or felt ...as in "conscious remorse". 3. intentionally conceived or done; deliberate ...as "a conscious insult. 4. Having or showing self-consciousness; aware ..as in "conscious of his shortcomings. Noun: from psychoanalysis: the component of waking awareness perceptible by an individual at any given moment; consciousness. [Lat. conscius, meaning "knowing with others; com-, together + scire, to know.]
Thus, an entity could be a "conscious being" even when it is "unconscious". This is one part of the distinction. The other is that while an entity might not "be aware" of detecting or responding to incoming information above a certain "threshhold" of "awareness" -- such as "not conscious of" one's own motives in doing something ...or all the noise around one when one is concentrating on something interesting -- AT SOME LEVEL the entity is detecting and responding to incoming that incoming information.
My proposal is that "consciousness" -- at it's most basic -- is the "detecting and response to" information ...whether that information is the positive charge of a proton which the electron detects and responds to ...or the relative masses of two bodies mediated via gravity that "tells them" where to "be" with regard to one another.
I am contending that "consciousness" is on a "continuum" from very simple to very complex, depending on WHAT an "entity" (which would include an electron, bug or planet) is capable of SENSING and the complexity of its repertoire of RESPONSES.
I especially like -- in AHD's definition -- the ROOT of the word "conscious" ...that is "knowing with others". Since there is nothing (that I can think of) within the "physical domain" that DOESN'T detect and respond to SOMETHING ...everything is "conscious" of something ...and SOMEthings are "conscious" of more things than others.
However, I agree that the element of an entity's giving "meaning" might be one way of identifying "higher" systems of consciousness ...except that I just watched a documentary on FLEAS! last night that said that when fleas see a slowly flashing light in front of them, that they make that "mean" that an ANIMAL IS PASSING By ...and so jump for it! Thus, it is INTERPRETATION of incoming data -- as in detecting a certain wavelength and interpreting it as "red" -- might be part of the consciousness process ...at whatever "level" it is operating.
Unfortunately for me, I must leave off here ...but will be back to respond to the rest of your post...
Defining 'meaning' in the abstract is a difficult problem...
Dictionary definitions of consciousness are invariably woolly. (Not one of my dictionaries of science and philsophy even risks giving a definition). One famous (current) dictionary entry on consciousness ends with the statement 'nothing worth reading has been written about it'.
In science there is no agreed definition. This is for technical reasons, namely that consciousness cannot be defined scientifically. In consciousness studies 'experience' or 'what it is like to be' is used. This is the best definition since it is widely agreed that this is what needs to be explained.
You can see that by these definitions information exchange doesn't help explain it. That isn't to say that IE isn't an important issue, but saying that consciousness is caused by IE is no different to saying it is caused by brain.
It is one thing to say that consciousness is necessary for IE to take place, or that IE is always accompanied by consciousness, but this does not explain why or how IE gives rise to consciousness. (Unless you're suggesting that consiousness is identical to IE, in which case you face the same problems as those who say it is identical with brain).
Interesting about fleas. So scientific research suggests that they might be conscious after all, just like lay folk thought was bleedin' obvious already. No doubt science will soon be able to prove that humans are conscious as well, as soon as it solves the problem of defining what it's talking about.
M. Gaspar
Feb8-04, 08:26 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
But response and interaction with our world are not sufficient conditions for consciousness.
But this is only because "we" say so. If we allowed for consciousness to be fundamental to the Universe as a product of the intrinsic sense and response mechanism of the System ...then it WOULD be "sufficient".
And then we would understand that "consciousness" is a matter of "degrees" based on what CAN be "sensed" by an entity -- particle or galaxy or anything in between -- and what options (that is, level of "free will") that the entity has at it's disposal.
Might we not be being anthropocentric in RECOGNIZING "consciousness" only when it resembles OURS?
I find it curious that you entertain this as an example of some nonbiological system that might be conscious, when we could just as well "make something do what we want to do," ie go against its own normal behavior patterns, and go and seek out some particular type of object in the environment, by building a suitable robot. But it seems to me that you refuse to give a robot as much consideration as a candidate for consciousness as you would to a bundle of photons.
Not true. I am an Equal Opportunity Panpsychist! To whatever extent the robots "senses" its environment and "chooses" what to DO ...then, to that extent it is CONSCIOUS!
Again, the conceivability argument is just another way of reflecting how consciousness is epistemologically and ontologically distinct from 'ordinary' physical phenomena. Simply put, we cannot rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where H2O molecules do not combine to form water, but we can rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where the neurons of a human brain do not combine to form consciousness.
Why bother to imagine another Universe when we have THIS one to think about? Anyway -- if all the "ingredients, processes and forces" were the same in an identical Universe -- then it seems to follow that "results" would be the same ...but just as I am NOT a proponent of pre-determinism, I do not believe it WOULD turn out EXACTLY the same. HOWEVER, I think that -- since the PROCESS of "consciousness" would be "present" in "BOTH" Univereses -- each Universe WOULD give rise to "higher consciousness" ...tho it might look and function differently from "the brain".
And, lest I forget, the "process" WOULD yeild "consciousness" via "ordinary physical phenomena".
Will address the balance of this post later, starting with (for MY benefit)...
The reason this is relevant is that it illustrates a fundamental difference in the way we understand and can explain consciousness...
hypnagogue
Feb9-04, 01:16 AM
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
You see, we don't know of all the "sensory appartus" that may be at our disposal -- and, in fact, being USED. Obviously, these people are "sensing" and "responding to" SOMETHING and thereby "conscious" of it whether they know it or not!
[...]
But this is only because "we" say so. If we allowed for consciousness to be fundamental to the Universe as a product of the intrinsic sense and response mechanism of the System ...then it WOULD be "sufficient".
This is not at all a desirable way to look at the problem. Your formulation amounts to redefining what we are trying to analyze, so that ultimately we are not addressing the issue we want to address, which is qualitative, experiential, subjective awareness. If there is not subjective experience, there is not consciousness in the relevant sense of this discussion. There is no good basis for saying that unconscious information processing (eg blindsight) is really conscious, and furthermore such an assertion only distracts our attention from the real issue we are trying to address.
Consciousness, as it has been discussed in this thread, is a phenomenon of qualitative, subjective experience. This amounts to saying that there must be something to be experienced from the 1st person point of view in order for a phenomenon to qualify as consciousness. If a phenomenon is not accompanied by a 1st person experience (eg as in blindight), then it does not count as consciousness. This is a basic, foundational point accepted in all serious consciousness literature and discussion, and it should be accepted here as well. Again, if what you are talking about does not fit this definition, then although it may be a topic worth discussing separately, it is not 'consciousness' as the word has been used throughout this thread, nor is it 'consciousness' as the word is used just about everywhere else.
Why bother to imagine another Universe when we have THIS one to think about?
I have already explained several times why the 'metaphysical' argument is directly relevant to this universe we find ourselves in. Please see one of my past explanations.
Anyway -- if all the "ingredients, processes and forces" were the same in an identical Universe -- then it seems to follow that "results" would be the same
Again, the argument goes that it is conceivable that there be a universe physically identical to ours that is devoid of consciousness. The implication is that whatever is responsible for consciousness in this universe, it is at least partially 'non-physical' in nature.
M. Gaspar
Feb9-04, 01:50 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
...The reason this is relevant is that it illustrates a fundamental difference in the way we understand and can explain consciousness vis a vis classical physical objects, and this in turn has ontological consequences-- it tells us something about how the world must actually be.
And "how" the Universe may actually "be" is "an Eternal Entity of Energy that's Experiencing Itself Evolving. The "mechanics" that may be "generating consciousness" is the "Information Exchange System(s)". When "storage" reaches a critical level, a "higher level" of understanding one's environment (...and by "environment" I mean 100% of everything that is happening to each entity at any point in time and by "understanding" I mean a "Gestaldt" of the "collective experience" of each system that permits a more complex interpretation of incoming information.
The "higher" the awareness ...the more "free will" ...that is, the more possible RESPONSES. Perhaps -- at that "moment" -- an entity would have the quality of "reflection" -- which submits what it "remembers" to its current real-time experiences ...whereby INTERPRETATION takes place at "higher level" (wider ranger of stimuli to interpret; complexity ) which is the door-way to MEANING!
I'll be back to continue responding to your pg. 18 post at this point (tho I'm anxious to reply to your post above this one, but it's about 6 posts "away"; I don't want to skip anything.)...
Once we accept the axioms of materialism ...
Short reply: Matter is a form of Energy. It's all the same stuff in a self-sustaining process. My proposal fits within the functions of physicality; in fact, its sort of dependent on it.
Hmm. Isn't the net energy of the universe equal to zero?
M. Gaspar
Feb9-04, 06:37 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Hmm. Isn't the net energy of the universe equal to zero?
I don't know what this means? Is it that the energy available and the work being done cancel each other out? Whatever the case -- and by whatever manner of computation yeilds a "net energy of zero" -- I know you can't be implying that there is "no energy" in the Universe. Too much going on, don't ya think?
M. Gaspar
Feb9-04, 07:00 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
... Once we accept the axioms of materialism, we can show that H2O molecules form water by logical necessity, but we cannot show an analogous logically necessary link between the physical world as we understand it and consciousness, even in principle. This suggests that the model of the world put forth by materialism is insufficient to account for consciousness. If materialism/physicalism/mechanism were sufficient to explain consciousness, then we should be able to produce an argument showing how consciousness follows from their assumptions by logical necessity. If we cannot theoretically derive consciousness from these theoretical models of reality even in principle, this suggests that if the world really were as these models of reality state it is, then consciousness would not exist. But, of course, consciousness does exist. So these models must be fundamentally inadequate depictions of the world, as they have nothing meaningful to say about consciousness.
That is correct: something is missing. And I am proposing what it is: that the basic sensing and responding to information within and among all PHYSICAL SYSTEMS give rise to consciousness based on complexity of detection systems, storage and response. This is how physicality gives rise to consciousness: as systems develop more complex and accute sensing systems -- and can "remember" previous info -- an interplay of prior and current experiences can take place. This is a form of "reflection" which might "elevate" what was once simple "perception" into "meaning generation".
Because I see this possibility as a potentially SUCCESSFUL "reductive explanation of consciousness" ...I feel I can continue to discuss it here. If you feel otherwise at any time, I will fledge the nest ...but right now my little musings are happy here.
For a detailed discussion of the explanatory gap, please see the paper The Perennial Problem of the Reductive Explainability of Phenomenal Consciousness-- C. D. Broad on the Explanatory Gap (http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf), by Ansgar Beckermann. It is a bit of a lengthy read (14 pages), but perhaps after reading it you will come to a fuller appreciation for why the explanatory gap cannot be so easily shaken off. (This paper includes a refutation of the notion that simply equating qualitative properties with physical processes makes for a successful reductive/physical explanation.)
I look forward to reading this and the last 12-pager you recommended since nothing YOU have said thus far has -- as yet -- deterred me from my proposal.
I am, however, daunted by the length of the post I am trying to respond to.
Dark Wing
Feb9-04, 09:32 PM
Ok, it it obvious that we have crossed lines here again, I am not sure you understand exacly what it is i am saying, unless you are simply claiming that what i am saying cannot be.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Again, the conceivability argument is just another way of reflecting how consciousness is epistemologically and ontologically distinct from 'ordinary' physical phenomena. Simply put, we cannot rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where H2O molecules do not combine to form water, but we can rationally imagine a world physically identical to ours where the neurons of a human brain do not combine to form consciousness.
So i will say that I disagree entirley with the concievability argument. What i am trying to say is that I cannot concieve of a world which is physicaly identical to ours inwhich neuronal activity does not produce consiousness. Just as H2O creates water, so does the thing that stops a thing from being physics and turns it into biology create consiousness. MAKE consiousness. CONSTITUTES consciousness. My argument is that it IS a logical neccesity.
From the 3rd person view, there is no problem: we excite some neurons, we observe laughter. There is a clear causal connection. But that is not the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is traversing the gap from the 3rd person view to the 1st person view. In your example, we can observe the person's laughter, but we cannot observe his qualitative sense of comedy. We can explain his laughter as observed from the 3rd person view via a functional explanation: the activation of certain neurons leads to the activation of other neurons, and eventually motor neurons are activated which fully account for the characteristic motor behaviors of spastic breathing and smiling facial expression. But this functional 3rd person explanation cannot explain why the person subjectively experienced humor from his 1st person view.
I am trying to say that that IS the subjective experience of the person.
Sure energy and matter can be conditioned. In fact, in principle we can explain a person's behavioral conditioning (response and interaction with his environment) entirely in terms of matter and energy-- that is, in terms of the plasticity of his neurons, and their physical adaptation and rewiring as a function of environmental inputs. Neurons that adapt as such change their net computational processing, which in turn changes one's behavioral patterns. That is a clear-cut and conceptually complete example of matter being conditioned and changing in response to its environment, and still we have no indication whatsoever of consciousness in our explanitory model.
You are talking about biology. My claim was that you cannot condition physics. I am not talking about anything with any form of biological plasticity, I am well aware of neuronal conditioning. I am asking you to try and condition an electron.
M. Gasper, yes, of course it all follows the laws of physics. information transfer? communication between the diffrent sub atomic particals so they all know where they are meant to be going/ doing etc? Maybe, but its irrelivant to this. even if they are, and you want to call that consiousness, it dosent change the fact that biology neccesarily gives rise to conscious experience, which is diffrent from consiousness.
Hypno, your argument against the CR stance is one that is similar to the CPU objection, i will describe it once i find the paper.
I cant find the Malcolm paper online, but i will give you its title:
"Knowledge of Other minds" byt Norman Malcolm
hypnagogue
Feb9-04, 10:28 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
So i will say that I disagree entirley with the concievability argument. What i am trying to say is that I cannot concieve of a world which is physicaly identical to ours inwhich neuronal activity does not produce consiousness. Just as H2O creates water, so does the thing that stops a thing from being physics and turns it into biology create consiousness. MAKE consiousness. CONSTITUTES consciousness. My argument is that it IS a logical neccesity.
Do you say it's inconceivable because you have actually reasoned it out step by step, or do you say that from loyalty to a prior metaphysical commitment you have already made?
Again-- please see the Beckermann paper I referenced for a clear explanation why H2O/water is not analagous to neurons/consciousness. There are principled reasons for believing that this is the case, rather than taking one position or another a priori.
I am trying to say that that IS the subjective experience of the person.
We can observe a brain from the 3rd person view; you claim that the brain is subjective experience; so we should be able to observe another's subjective experience from the 3rd person view. How do you account for the fact that there is nothing "experiential" to be observed in a bunch of neurons? I'm just not satisfied by this approach. If you tell me the bunch of neurons just ARE experiential nonetheless, I suppose I could equally just as well tell you that my dog just IS the moon, even though you could never tell by observing him. I don't mean to sound silly or anything, but if you so straightforwardly connect the brain and consciousness, there should be simple ramifications for our abilities to directly observe the subjective experiences of others that just don't hold.
Basically: how do you take into account the seemingly obvious ontological differences between consciousness and brain if one is quite literally just the other?
You are talking about biology. My claim was that you cannot condition physics. I am not talking about anything with any form of biological plasticity, I am well aware of neuronal conditioning. I am asking you to try and condition an electron.
What does it mean to condition an electron?
Hypno, your argument against the CR stance is one that is similar to the CPU objection, i will describe it once i find the paper.
I cant find the Malcolm paper online, but i will give you its title:
"Knowledge of Other minds" byt Norman Malcolm
OK, thanks, I'll look for it.
hypnagogue
Feb9-04, 10:44 PM
Originally posted by M. Gaspar
That is correct: something is missing. And I am proposing what it is: that the basic sensing and responding to information within and among all PHYSICAL SYSTEMS give rise to consciousness based on complexity of detection systems, storage and response. This is how physicality gives rise to consciousness: as systems develop more complex and accute sensing systems -- and can "remember" previous info -- an interplay of prior and current experiences can take place. This is a form of "reflection" which might "elevate" what was once simple "perception" into "meaning generation".
This argument has no legs to stand on if you try to present it as a reductive explanation in a materialistic framework. Information whirls around, it all gets terribly complex, and then-- ta da!-- consciousness magically emerges from the complexity.
The problem is we have no reason to suppose that complex information flow should somehow result in consciousness in a materialistic framework. Why should it? It does not follow from materialism that this should be the case; in fact, if anything such a hypothesis is unintelligible underneath a materialistic paradigm.
I think you have recognized this elsewhere and presented the basic metaphysical assumption that consciousness exists fundamentally alongside information. Given this assertion, it certainly does become at least intelligible that complex human consciousness should arise purely from information flow in the brain. However, this metaphysical assumption that makes your hypothesis intelligible simultaneously makes your explanation of consciousness non-reductive. Instead of explaining how consciousness arises from physical things/processes, you instead grant it the status of a fundamental, contingent entity in your ontology, and thus no reduction is necessary or attempted.
(Perhaps you could explain 'higher human consciousness' in your framework reductively with reference to your fundamental consciousness/information identity, but the point is that somewhere along the line you have conceded that you cannot carry on the reduction any longer, and you simply accept that consciousness in some form exists fundamentally in the universe, and cannot be explained in terms of anything else. This, again, is the antithesis of a reductive explanation of consciousness.)
Dark Wing
Feb14-04, 07:31 PM
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Do you say it's inconceivable because you have actually reasoned it out step by step, or do you say that from loyalty to a prior metaphysical commitment you have already made?
Yes there is a reasoned process, ignoring previous metaphysical commitments. It is the reasoned process of the identity theory argument, which I have tried to explain, but obviously cannot, so I will instead refer you to "Is consciousness a Brain Process?" by U.T. Place, and "Sensations and Brain Processes" by J.J.C. Smart. They will address everything you have mentioned that I have not been able to adequately reply to. I am sorry.
We can observe a brain from the 3rd person view; you claim that the brain is subjective experience; so we should be able to observe another's subjective experience from the 3rd person view. How do you account for the fact that there is nothing "experiential" to be observed in a bunch of neurons? I'm just not satisfied by this approach.
Oh come on, surely you can see the difference. you may observe the act of someone having a subjective experience, sure. You are witnessing brain activity, are you not? and what IS a subjective experience if it is not our own sensory organs processing information? so yes, you may observe it easily. doesn’t mean you are having the same experience by observation as they are having personally. I hope that’s not what you are leading to.
If you tell me the bunch of neurons just ARE experiential nonetheless, I suppose I could equally just as well tell you that my dog just IS the moon, even though you could never tell by observing him. I don't mean to sound silly or anything, but if you so straightforwardly connect the brain and consciousness, there should be simple ramifications for our abilities to directly observe the subjective experiences of others that just don't hold.
And what ramifications do you suppose these are? I can tell you that when a certain neuron is firing, then you are observing a certain oblique line. I can also tell you that when a certain neuron is firing, you will be experiencing pleasure, laughter, and pain. I can predict these things, and even stimulate them to make you have that subjective experience. you can’t look inside a brain, and have their experience by observation. But I believe there will be a time when we know what every neuron does, and what its consequence both conscious and subconscious is. the work is already well underway. What kind of observation do you want? If one can do all of the above, and even rewire it to make a different sensation, then is that evidence enough for you? Prediction ability of a neuron firing: is that evidence of observation enough of you?
As for as your dog being the moon, but you cant tell by observation,: if you think a claim to consciousness to the brain has any resemblance to that kind of analogy, then you have seriously mistaken all that I have said, by fault of my own for not explaining myself clearly. I am sorry for that. please read the above papers, I think you will find them interesting, and a better exposition on what I am trying to say.
Basically: how do you take into account the seemingly obvious ontological differences between consciousness and brain if one is quite literally just the other?
there does not need to be any ontological differences here. we are simply thinking about it in the wrong way. you could almost think of consciousness as a talent, or an ability, one that we have in virtue of our biology. If someone has amazing ability to play an instrument, you do not say they have music in a literal sense, just that they show an ability to do something. we have the ability to 'do' consciousness, if you will, we do not "have" consciousness. It’s just not that kind of thing. (IMO)
What does it mean to condition an electron?
to make it behave contrary to its normal behavior. to make it react in opposition to the laws that usually hold it to be in a normal case. You can condition a cell away from heat, or to react in different ways to different stimuli. you cannot do that with an electron. If you want a definition of consciousness to be the ability to react and interact with the environment (which is what I am proposing, as a basic 1st premise) then this ability to condition is very important.
Fliption
Feb16-04, 09:00 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing What kind of observation do you want? If one can do all of the above, and even rewire it to make a different sensation, then is that evidence enough for you? Prediction ability of a neuron firing: is that evidence of observation enough of you?
It seems to me that what you have described is a correlation between brain and consciousness. In my mind, this is not the same things as explaining consciousness. Showing a correlation doesn't tell us anything about why one necessarily creates the other.
As for as your dog being the moon, but you cant tell by observation,: if you think a claim to consciousness to the brain has any resemblance to that kind of analogy,
Not having met Hypnagogue's dog, I can't really say how correlated his dog is to the moon. Maybe his dog howls at all full moons? Rather than explain why, he can just say his dog is the moon based on this correlation. The correlation is all he would have to show to make his analogy work because that is all you have done.
If someone has amazing ability to play an instrument, you do not say they have music in a literal sense, just that they show an ability to do something. we have the ability to 'do' consciousness, if you will, we do not "have" consciousness. It’s just not that kind of thing.
Except that playing an instrument can be reductively explained and having the ability to do consciouness cannot.
The basic hypothesis of materialism is that consciousness is a property of matter. This hypothesis is however denied by our present scientific knowledges about matter and brain.
Read why Quantum Electrodyamics proves the failure of materialism on the following site
http://members.xoom.virgilio.it/fedeescienza/englishnf
and let's discuss my arguments here.
Marco Biagini,
Ph.D. graduated in Solid State Physics.
Dark Wing
Feb16-04, 05:22 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
It seems to me that what you have described is a correlation between brain and consciousness. In my mind, this is not the same things as explaining consciousness. Showing a correlation doesn't tell us anything about why one necessarily creates the other.
You want to bring this down to correlation? i am trying to argue that there is no correlation, as what you are talking about in trying to correlate these things are one and the same. in reality, the the higher level thing you are trying to correlate down does not actually exsist. one thing does not create the other. there is just the one thing: brain activity. end of story. we have no reason to suppose that there is anything other than that in exsistance, except this dire need to hang onto old time folk theory that there must be a mind. believing in consiousness as a correlatable (?) substance or event is just silly.
Not having met Hypnagogue's dog, I can't really say how correlated his dog is to the moon. Maybe his dog howls at all full moons? Rather than explain why, he can just say his dog is the moon based on this correlation. The correlation is all he would have to show to make his analogy work because that is all you have done.
it is not correlation. it is a diffrent way of looking at the scenario through physical cause and effect. thats it. no correlation. I am not trying to correlate. i am trying to see if its possible to redefine.
Except that playing an instrument can be reductively explained and having the ability to do consciouness cannot.
playing an instrument: not just playing, but explaining why some people have an innate sence to it that others do not: can be reductivly explained, can it? it seems to me that an innate sence of musicality that makes the greats the best in the world is very similar to this innate sence we all have that is consciousness. so if you want to reductivly explain innate musical ability, surley you must think that a reductive explaination of consciouness must at least be able to be reaserched. i will come back and give a run down of place's paper for you all so you undersatand what i mean by "is", as i am obviously not explaining myself properly.
Fliption
Feb16-04, 09:19 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
[B]You want to bring this down to correlation? i am trying to argue that there is no correlation, as what you are talking about in trying to correlate these things are one and the same. in reality, the the higher level thing you are trying to correlate down does not actually exsist. one thing does not create the other. there is just the one thing: brain activity. end of story.
There is a very compelling argument in philosophy (and it has been presented here clearly by hypnagogue) that says consciousness cannot be accounted for by the current material ontology. And this includes the brain. You cannot just assert that these things are the same things. You have to make a case for it. And it seems clear to me that you have tried to do so by showing correlations. It appears that showing correlations is all that can be done with the current materialists assumptions. How can you assert that mind and brain are the same if you have not correlated them in some way?
we have no reason to suppose that there is anything other than that in exsistance, except this dire need to hang onto old time folk theory that there must be a mind. believing in consiousness as a correlatable (?) substance or event is just silly.
Dire need to hang onto old time folk theory? You obviously don't have a grasp of the problem here. It seems as if you have preconceived notions about this topic and that's what you're responding to. I personally couldn't care less about any of these folk conceptions. I see a legimate problem that cannot just be swept away by re-defining/ignoring it.
it is not correlation. it is a diffrent way of looking at the scenario through physical cause and effect. thats it. no correlation. I am not trying to correlate. i am trying to see if its possible to redefine.
A re-definition still has to be based on something. If you're view isn't based on correlation then it's nothing more than a guess. I can just as easily claim that consciousness IS the same as my keyboard. And since my keyboard can be reductively explained, so can consciousness. Why should I have to correlate my keyboard with my mind somehow to do this? Can't I just assert that they are the same thing, therefore no correlation is possible?
playing an instrument: not just playing, but explaining why some people have an innate sence to it that others do not: can be reductivly explained, can it? it seems to me that an innate sence of musicality that makes the greats the best in the world is very similar to this innate sence we all have that is consciousness. so if you want to reductivly explain innate musical ability, surley you must think that a reductive explaination of consciouness must at least be able to be reaserched.
The ability to do music can easily be explained, in principal with brain activity. We can even program computers to do this with our current technology. Yet, there is no purposefully conscious computer that I know of. We wouldn't even know how to make one conscious because we don't reductively understand consciousness.
It is obvious that some computers(people) may do a better job of composing music than others. This can easily be explained by showing that some computers(people) just have better musical software(musical brains).
Even then, whether someone has amazing musical ability or not is a highly subjective determination. This is not the case with consciousness. We either have it or we don't. If you cannot see why this analogy doesn't work, then you cannot see the problem that Hypnagogue has posted. Unless you're a lucky person, you cannot solve the problem until you have grasped it.
Dark Wing
Feb17-04, 12:21 AM
Originally posted by Fliption
There is a very compelling argument in philosophy (and it has been presented here clearly by hypnagogue) that says consciousness cannot be accounted for by the current material ontology. And this includes the brain. You cannot just assert that these things are the same things. You have to make a case for it. And it seems clear to me that you have tried to do so by showing correlations. It appears that showing correlations is all that can be done with the current materialists assumptions. How can you assert that mind and brain are the same if you have not correlated them in some way?
This problem you are talking about is only involved in one sector of current materialistic ontology. and that side is those who take the top down approach, by presuming that consciousness is this thing that ellicits explaining in the 1st place.
This is what i am trying to say. it is not part of the materialistic ontology that has been talked about so far, but from another sector of materialism that is not so popular at the moment, one that dennett and searle do not cover, one that none of the philosophers including chalmers mentions here. materialsm is not restricted to these people. it is a very wide ontology.
what i am trying to say is that you cannot even have consciousness, or conscious experience if you do not have contact to the world. what does our biology do? allow us to interact and react to our world. there is nothing more to consiousness than that. and yes, i do believe that some things can be more conscious than others. easily. it all depends on how many levels we can interact with our world on: the more levels, the more consciousness, as far as i am concerned.
So you start with the basics. bottom up. we have physics. a certian configuration of the right kind of atomic structure and you have biology. This biology, at the smallest level, has the ability to react in many ways to the same stimulus. what happnes from there? it gets more and more complex, untill we get the level of complex interaction that we humans have, this interaction we call consiousness. there is nothing more to it than that in my opinion. if you want to say that this is outside materialistic ontology, then fine, say that. but there is no reduction as we are not reducing anything. we are only looking at what the body is doing, and watching the method it uses to achieve its ends, and then we sit back and say "hey, that has to be more than just a brain reaction, i felt somthing there" really? there is mopre to you than the physical being? there is more to your feeling and reaction to the world than a combination of your history and memory (both genetic and your own)? and is there more to your experience than what you perceieve through your biological organs, including your brain? i am simply saying that if you think there is more to it than that, then yes you are outside the materialistic realm, because you are dealing with a substance that we cannot see even in the subatomic region. all materialism wants to say in its broadest sence is that there is nothing about concsiousness that cannot be explained by physics. in other words, there is no mysitical substance or process that is making us conscious. we may not have figured out the exact process that is is play yet, and we may not be able to explain it to people as well as they like yet, but it is a reaserch paradigm that has been set up for investigation, and its very presumptuious to disregard it on the grounds that have been presented. that is all i am saying. taken from a bottom up prespectivem there is no correlation as there is nothing to correlate. there is only physical action.
The ability to do music can easily be explained, in principal with brain activity. We can even program computers to do this with our current technology. Yet, there is no purposefully conscious computer that I know of. We wouldn't even know how to make one conscious because we don't reductively understand consciousness.
the way they are trying it with AI these days: to try and semanticly map the mind so they can write it in a computer: wont work as they still have no way of connecting to the real world. we dont reductivly understand consiousness because noone is looking into it properly at the moment, and every one seems intent on ignoring all the steps taken in neuropsycology in preference to this stupid computer annolgy of the mind. we need a new way of looking at things because everyone is stuck on this top down idea, and claiming that a bottom up idea is logically impossible as it misses consciousness up the top, when what they are actually looking at IS consciousness, and its not what they thought it was going to be. if consciousness can be taken to a physical level, then people feel ripped off, as they dont want to think they are simply a hysical machiene, it would take some form of humanity away from them.
It is obvious that some computers(people) may do a better job of composing music than others. This can easily be explained by showing that some computers(people) just have better musical software(musical brains).
so you are willing to say that computers are better at things as they have better software, but humans wont have somthing better due to a better balance in their brains?? what makes a human better at somthing if it is not their physicalness? and what is consciousness if it is not somthing physically built in the system? if you dont want consciousness to be physical, then what is it? it cant be energy, even energyis physical. we live in a closed physical system. if its not materialisticly explainable, then how is it explainable? or is it somthing better left in the great unknown cause its too damn hard to think about now? what should we do? stop looking for causal reaction in the brain? stop studying the physical system for its reaction? give up the whole of a materialstic look at the mind and neuro chemistry, simply because it looks like that its logically impossible for consciousness to be (heaven forbid) a biological process that helps us interact with our world?
Even then, whether someone has amazing musical ability or not is a highly subjective determination. This is not the case with consciousness. We either have it or we don't. If you cannot see why this analogy doesn't work, then you cannot see the problem that Hypnagogue has posted. Unless you're a lucky person, you cannot solve the problem until you have grasped it.
Why does consciousness need to be a "all or none" deal where are you then going to draw the line? do insects have consiousness? what animal does? what animal does not? how are you going to tell? are you going to say that some things are just automata? if so, then are we just automata? how can you draw a line for consciousness, and what are going to be your boundaries for it? i dont actually see the problem, as i dont see an explanatary gap at all. there dosent need to be one. there only needs to be one if you start to ignore the materialstic nature of what it could be.
hypnagogue
Feb17-04, 01:11 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
i dont actually see the problem, as i dont see an explanatary gap at all. there dosent need to be one. there only needs to be one if you start to ignore the materialstic nature of what it could be.
But there is nothing in the materialistic model that consciousness could be.
Again, the suggestion is not to abandon research on the brain and how it relates to consciousness. The suggestion is that our conceptual model (materialism) is insufficient to account for consciousness, and so our conceptual model needs reworking. If the actual brain fully accounts for consciousness, then there is something about the actual brain that is not accounted for in our materialistic model of the brain.
If a given phenomenon is entirely materialistic in nature, all of its aspects should be entirely observable via 3rd person investigation. Thus, if consciousness is entirely embodied by our materialist model of the brain, all of its aspects should be observable via neuroscience. But in fact none of the 1st person aspects of consciousness are observable via neuroscience. Unless you expect neuroscience to someday find qualia literally sitting around in the brain, you have the meaty problem of explaining how it is that there are certain aspects to material reality that cannot be observed even in principle.
Notice that I say "aspects"; so say we take it for granted that neuron system A engaged in activity B literally is pain. Well, in observing A we do not detect qualitative pain; we only detect objective measurements of neurons firing. It follows that there is an aspect to A that we are not detecting in our observation, one that we cannot detect even in principle. How is it that this can be the case in a materialist ontology? Under materialism, we should be able to detect any aspect of any phenomenon that objectively exists, at least in principle, should we not?
Fliption
Feb17-04, 02:04 PM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
if consciousness can be taken to a physical level, then people feel ripped off, as they dont want to think they are simply a hysical machiene, it would take some form of humanity away from them.
This quote above doesn't seem relevant. There are good philosophical arguments being presented here. What people "want" shouldn't be mentioned unless the arguments are obviously weak. At this point, I'd point to the "consciousness doesn't exists" argument as a more likely candidate for wishful thinking in order to preserve a particular view. But I'm giving it the benefit of the doubt by reading and considering these arguments.
so you are willing to say that computers are better at things as they have better software, but humans wont have somthing better due to a better balance in their brains??
No, I am perfectly willing to say that and in fact did say it. Musical ability can be explained reductively, in principle, with brain stuff. A person can be more musically talented than another person and this fact can, in principle, be explained reductively. This is why IMO, it is not analogous to consciousness.
what makes a human better at somthing if it is not their physicalness? and what is consciousness if it is not somthing physically built in the system?
So you're going to use you're current world view and ontology to argue the insanity of a different ontology? This is like asking a dishonest tax payer to audit his own returns.
if you dont want consciousness to be physical, then what is it? it cant be energy, even energyis physical. we live in a closed physical system. if its not materialisticly explainable, then how is it explainable? or is it somthing better left in the great unknown cause its too damn hard to think about now? what should we do? stop looking for causal reaction in the brain? stop studying the physical system for its reaction? give up the whole of a materialstic look at the mind and neuro chemistry, simply because it looks like that its logically impossible for consciousness to be (heaven forbid) a biological process that helps us interact with our world?
This has slowly turned into a discussion of materialism and I'm not sure that's where this needs to go. I for one don't think we need to get into vague terms like "physical" to have this discussion. No one is suggesting that you have to change everything about your worldview. What is being discussed is whether consciousness should be added to the list of fundamental elements of nature. Nothing more. Whether these fundamental elements are considered "physical" or not seems irrelevant to me. I'm not sure what Hynagogue would think. I think Hypnagogue used the term materialism as way to identify the current view that needed to be tweaked. I don't think his main point was to state an opinion on materialism in general versus all it's alternatives. Hypnagogue can correct me if I've misunderstood.
(Bottomline: I'd just really hate to see this thread get into the very sloppy arguments around something being physical or not. See all my particpation in the "materialism" threads to get an idea of how messy and unproductive that would be.)
where are you then going to draw the line? do insects have consiousness? what animal does? what animal does not? how are you going to tell? are you going to say that some things are just automata? if so, then are we just automata? how can you draw a line for consciousness, and what are going to be your boundaries for it?
Consciousness has been defined in this thread very specifically. The line can be drawn at the point where "it is like something to be" the object in question. So the question of whether it exists in insects etc., and to what extent it exists, is not a issue of semantics and fuzzy terms. It is a practical issue of being able to detect consciousness. Which, by the way, is more a problem for anyone arguing that consciousness can be reductively explained. See Hypnagogue's response above for more on that.
Dark Wing
Feb17-04, 06:31 PM
hypnagogue: thankyou for your patience, it is really appreciated.
Notice that I say "aspects"; so say we take it for granted that neuron system A engaged in activity B literally is pain. Well, in observing A we do not detect qualitative pain; we only detect objective measurements of neurons firing. It follows that there is an aspect to A that we are not detecting in our observation, one that we cannot detect even in principle. How is it that this can be the case in a materialist ontology? Under materialism, we should be able to detect any aspect of any phenomenon that objectively exists, at least in principle, should we not?
ok, now we have an example to work with. You want to know where the qualitative experience if pain can be observed from a 3rd person prespective. so, what is pain? a qualitative experience that seems to be part of consciousness, as you can say "i am in pain"and our definition of consciousness seems to be "it is like somthing to be" as flipton has put up. forget consciousness having anything to do woth environmental reaction, which is what i have been trying to define it as. fine.
So, what can the 3rd person observe in relation to this experience? they can see the needle prick a finger, then track the signal as it moves up the arm and is processed by various parts of the brain, as signals for a speech reaction are initiated and pain realeving behaviour can be observed. that process: the nerves in the fingers picking up the pin prick, and the brain reaction to that: to me that IS pain, and is the 3rd person observation of the qualia. the experience of pain is exacly that physical process, nothing more. consciousness simply is that process. this "seeming" like there is another level to it somehow that has not been explained by the nervous system is deeply misleading. you can get everything you want just by following the process in its objective steps.
If i imitiated that same process in you, regardless of the finger prick, i could make you think that there was a needle in your finger, simply because your nervous system has been stimulated in the same way. it dosent matter if you knew that there wasent: conscious experience is not heavily dictated by knowledge on this kind of physical level. any higher experience is, in my opinion, just a more complex version of this same model. so we can observe the process of consciousness - if what we are observing in the objective sence is not the process of consiousness, then are you saying that we are simply seeing the biological process, in which the qualia aspect is stapled on to at a later stage? when i argue that the brain IS consciousness, i am saying that there is nothing more to consciousness than the processing of such information. this "seeming" is simply what it feels like for it to be doing its thing. its our ability to predict and to react to our world.
that is well covered by the materialistic stance. as far as i know thats what the materialistic stance is. maybe what we dont have in the materialistic stance is a well defined verion of consiousness. i dont thing "it is like somthing to be" is a good enough definition for any meaningful converstaion. maybe its a good way to see if somthing is conscious or not: test to see if it it like somthing for it to be, but beyond that, how do you test or even research with such a definition?
Dark Wing
Feb17-04, 06:47 PM
Originally posted by Fliption
This has slowly turned into a discussion of materialism and I'm not sure that's where this needs to go. I for one don't think we need to get into vague terms like "physical" to have this discussion. No one is suggesting that you have to change everything about your worldview. What is being discussed is whether consciousness should be added to the list of fundamental elements of nature. Nothing more. Whether these fundamental elements are considered "physical" or not seems irrelevant to me. correct me if I've misunderstood.
I thought asking if consciousness was "physical" or not was very relevant: the whole purpose of setting up materialism in the 1st place was the claim that it was a physical thing, and not a spirit. it was the 1st step away from spirit beings and a decartian kind of flow diagram. so if you want to say that it is physical, then you are attaining to the materialistic doctrine, end of story. has it explained it yet? no. but it hasent been around long either. all materialism originally said was "hey, we can study this, as it happens to be with in the scientific realm". thats it. no more ghosts. just somthing solvable. Should it be a fundemntal force of nature? is consciousness its own form of energy? I didnt realise that that was the question that we were asking.
Consciousness has been defined in this thread very specifically. The line can be drawn at the point where "it is like something to be" the object in question. So the question of whether it exists in insects etc., and to what extent it exists, is not a issue of semantics and fuzzy terms. It is a practical issue of being able to detect consciousness. Which, by the way, is more a problem for anyone arguing that consciousness can be reductively explained. See Hypnagogue's response above for more on that.
what is a more fuzzy definition of consciouness than that? we need somthing a little more substancive to make any kind of real claim about anything, that is all i am trying to say. so defining it more as the ability to act - to show it as an ability, rather than something else - then we can start saying "this is conscious as it is doing this" (it is conscious as it has the ability to have a cognitive state). once we have better boundaries, then we will actually have a paradigm in which to study it.
hypnagogue
Feb18-04, 01:17 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
If i imitiated that same process in you, regardless of the finger prick, i could make you think that there was a needle in your finger, simply because your nervous system has been stimulated in the same way.
Agreed, but this fact is compatible with views other than the identity view, so it doesn't seem to be particularly relevant to your case here.
so we can observe the process of consciousness - if what we are observing in the objective sence is not the process of consiousness, then are you saying that we are simply seeing the biological process, in which the qualia aspect is stapled on to at a later stage?
I think you phrase that question a little misleadingly. Certainly observing the brain in action is observing a physical process that is deeply related to the subjective experience of consciousness. And saying that qualia are "stapled on at a later stage" also indicates more than I mean to say-- if anything it seems to me that qualia occur simultaneously with their correlated brain activities, and the connection is probably much deeper than "stapling on" seems to indicate.
But yes, essentially what I am saying is that observing the brain in action is observing a biological process and not the subjective experiences that are correlated with it. It's not clear to me how you could possibly disagree without redefining "subjective experience" to mean something entirely different from what we normally accept it to mean, which appears to be exactly what your strategy is.
when i argue that the brain IS consciousness, i am saying that there is nothing more to consciousness than the processing of such information. this "seeming" is simply what it feels like for it to be doing its thing.
If the "seeming" is simply what it feels like for a neurobiological process to do its thing, why do we detect absolutely no indication of the "seeming" with 3rd person observation? Furthermore, how is it even intelligble under a materialist framework that neurobiological processes should feel anything at all in the first place?
If a nonconscious computer observed the human brain in action, it would never have any reason to believe that anything like "subjective experience" should be associated with the brain activity. The only reason we even think to draw up this association is that we ourselves experience consciousness in the first person. But, again, if we drew only from the objective/materialistic/3rd person view (like that nonconscious computer), we would have no reason to suspect that subjective experience should be associated with a human brain at all. All we would be able to observe would be information processing that leads to complex behavioral interaction with the environment, which is exactly what you are trying to reduce consciousness to. But your own first person subjective experience should tell you that there is more to consciousness than just that.
i dont thing "it is like somthing to be" is a good enough definition for any meaningful converstaion.
It may be inadequate on its own, and thus may need to be further expounded upon and developed, but at bottom it is an absolutely essential and indispensible starting point. To say consciousness, at the most basic level, is not characterized by subjective experience is to misleadingly redefine consciousness into some other, distinct concept. This new concept may be easier to work with, but in working with it we will not make solve the truly important problem (the "hard" problem) of consciousness.
Fliption
Feb18-04, 10:17 AM
Originally posted by Dark Wing
so if you want to say that it is physical, then you are attaining to the materialistic doctrine, end of story.
Again, I don't believe whether something is physical or not is relevant. What we're discussing is whether consciousness can be reductively explained. If not, then it needs to be added as a fundamental component to the current pardigm, which just happens to be materialism. It doesn't mean we can't call it materialism when we're finished. Of course, we may not be able to call it that but that is an entirely different discussion.
Should it be a fundemntal force of nature? is consciousness its own form of energy? I didnt realise that that was the question that we were asking.
Check out the title of this thread. That IS the topic. If something cannot be reductively understood then we have to consider that it might be fundamental to nature.
what is a more fuzzy definition of consciouness than that? we need somthing a little more substancive to make any kind of real claim about anything, that is all i am trying to say. so defining it more as the ability to act - to show it as an ability, rather than something else - then we can start saying "this is conscious as it is doing this" (it is conscious as it has the ability to have a cognitive state). once we have better boundaries, then we will actually have a paradigm in which to study it.
This is convenient. You may not think that the definition I gave is workable but the problem is that it IS what needs to be explained. The existence of "what it is like to be" is exactly what we cannot explain. The fact that you have to change the definition in order to reductively analyze it is exactly the point being made here. The thing needing explained cannot be explained reductively. When you change the definition so that you can reductively explain it, you haven't explained what needs explaining. I don't think we need an explanation about "ability to act". It is "what it's like to be" that needs an explanation.
In some ways defining the term 'consciousness' is the last major hurdle facing science. It's a big problem.
I has some stuff already written on this so I've posted it below. It's much too long so don't feel obliged to read it. Still I had it handy as an extract from something else and thought it was relevant. It might stir up the debate anyway...
It seems that although we can define consciousness well enough to talk to each other about it, and even have reputable academic journals devoted to the discussion of it, there is a problem with the easy and obvious ‘folk’ descriptions that allow us to do this. Without exception they suggest that consciousness is an entity or substance that lies beyond the realms of scientific enquiry.
The simple and generally agreed minimum descriptive terms that apply to consciousness, that always apply to consciousness, that must apply to consciousness, and that would not apply to anything that was not consciousness include the common ‘something that it is like’, or ‘experience’, or ‘attention’, or ‘Being’ and other variations on the theme. Yet nowhere in the scientific literature is there any suggestion that any of these terms, or any combination of them, could be elevated to serve as an accurate definition of consciousness, for they are not scientific. They are considered to be over-simplified descriptions of it.
There is certainly a problem with developing any ‘science of consciousness’ based on such singular but scientifically woolly definitions. These descriptions suggest that ultimately consciouness is an immaterial substance with no third-person observable aspects. Thus they are not simply inadequate as scientific definitions of consciousness, they are actually antithetical to any scientific explanation of it.
For this reason they cannot be accepted by scientists. All sorts of questions would be raised if we were to agree that any of these everyday descriptions of consciousness should be the basis for our investigations of it. It would not be long before the question of how one can claim to be study an entity from a third-person perspective while simultaneously avowing that that entity has no measurable or observable effect on the physical world from which its existence might be inferred would come up, and would require an answer. Unfortunately it is unanswerable. Scientifically speaking 'consciousness' is a term without a referent.
Still, as long as it remains undefined this problem need not be acknowleded. We can argue that we have to wait for a proper definition of consciousness before we can decide whether science can explain it or not (and ignore the irony). In this way the mystery of consciousness is perpetuated, and all the arguments can be made for the extensive research funding that will be required to demystify it.
While this strategy works well in a sense, in that for as long as consciousness remains undefined nobody can prove that it is not a scientific entity, it does not solve the problem of how to scientifically study consciousness, or in fact say anything scientific about it at all.
The popular strategy for overcoming this problem is to talk about something else entirely. (This is allowable because, as we know, we cannot yet define consciousness, and because of this we cannot be quite sure what it is and what is not). Most commonly we can talk about mind and brain instead, turning a blind eye to the extensive evidence that mind and consciousness are not the same thing.
The hypothesis that mind and consciousness are the same thing seems to be the principle means by which the topic is made scientific. The argument is that if consciousnes experience arises from, or is identical with mind, and if mind arises from or is identical with brain, and if brain can be studied by science, then consciousness can be studied by scientific methods. This is a fallacious argument even in the unlikely event that its numerous assumptions hold. To say that feelings of anger are physically caused and arise from brain processes is not to say that the entity doing the feeling can be studied by third-person methods. And the curiously undeterministic mechanism which gives to consciousness the unique property of being physically caused but not physically causal would have to found whether or not we agree that it can be studied in this way.
Nevertheless it is an immensly useful tactic to equate consciousness and mind. By doing this we can equate consciousness with computation rather than the act of experiencing, and discuss mental calculation as if we were talking about consciousness itself, (what it is like to experience the doing of the calculating). This important assumption is therefore almpst invariably incorporated into scientific papers in the first few paragraphs.
Scientific writers are free to do this for one reason only, that being that we do not have a scientific definition of consciousness. We do not have one because we cannot have one, no such thing exists. Unless one argues that consciousness does not exist then those holding the ‘scientific’ view of consciousness are faced with no option but to adopt Francis Crick’s strategy.
“Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. It is better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the dangers of premature definition. Until the problem is understood much better, any attempt at a further definition is likely to be either misleading or overly-restrictive, or both." (Crick, 1994).
Nothing has changed since he wrote this, and it is hard to see why it ever should. Apparently we are not even allowed the same kind of working definition that we have for everything else we are working on.
In summary it seems inevitable that consciousness will never have an acceptable scientific definition, and that this is precisely the reason that it does not appear to be an entirely scientific entity. In other words, as Chalmers argues, science defines conscious experience as beyond science, and it follows inevitably that science cannot define consciousness without redefining itself. There is no escape from this situation. Either science must leave consciousness forever undefined or it must redefine what ‘science’ and 'scientific' mean.
I’ve collected some prominent definitions of consciousness from here and there for my own purposes. Here’s a recent example from a paper showing how to justify the writer's computation-based research and theory. It’s nicely illustrates what Chalmer’s calls the ‘sleight of hand’ of scientific writers on this topic.
“We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word ‘consciousness’ has no well defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal information processing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual-machine architectures capturing various features of consciousness...”
"...On that basis we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing, building, analysing and experimenting with virtual machine architectures which attempt to elaborate the hypothesis. This activity may in turn nurture the development of our concepts of consciousness, along with a host of related concepts, such as ‘experiencing’, ‘feeling’, perceiving’, believing’, ‘wanting’, ‘enjoying’, remembering’, noticing’ and ‘learning’, helping us to see them as dependent on an implicit theory of minds as information processing virtual machines...”
“...On this basis we can find new answers to old philosophical puzzles as well as enriching our empirical theories… The result, it is hoped, is that the successor concepts will be free of the many conundra (such as the apparent possibility of zombies) which plague our current concept of consciousness...”
“...Some people offer putative definitions of ‘consciousness’, for instance defining it as ‘self-awareness’, or ‘what it is like to be something’. ‘experience’, ‘being the subject or seeming’ or ‘having somebody home’, despite the fact that nothing is achieved by defining one obscure expression in terms of another.” (Sloman & Chrisley JCS)
This is the level of thinking to which scientific researchers are reduced by the issue of consciousness. I can’t think of another area of academic research where such circular nonsense would have ever got past the referees. (The same issue publication carries the bold assertion by Holland and Goodman that “we do not experience what it is to experience something.”)
My prediction is that there will never be an agreed scientific definition of consciousness. If I was James Randi I'd put a million dollars on it. Any takers?
regards - and apologies for writing so much
Canute
hypnagogue said:If a nonconscious computer observed the human brain in action, it would never have any reason to believe that anything like "subjective experience" should be associated with the brain activity.
While I agree with this, do you think the computer could "sense" that the human brain in action was experiencing something it couldn't comprehend mentally, but emotionally? Like seeing the human brain 'working' but not knowing what it is doing? All it could do is percieve and "sense" that the human brain is in subjective state?
Fliption
Feb18-04, 10:56 PM
Originally posted by Canute
My prediction is that there will never be an agreed scientific definition of consciousness. If I was James Randi I'd put a million dollars on it. Any takers?
[/B]
Heh, I was just about to go to the money line myself[:D]. It is against almost everything about me(since I am certain of almost nothing), but this is one topic that seems so clear and convincing that I was definitely willing to say I'd bet my entire fortune Hypnagogue(and yourself) is right. I can say this about nothing else though. I still claim ignorance and confusion about reality in general [:((]
hypnagogue
Feb23-04, 07:22 AM
Originally posted by Jeebus
While I agree with this, do you think the computer could "sense" that the human brain in action was experiencing something it couldn't comprehend mentally, but emotionally? Like seeing the human brain 'working' but not knowing what it is doing? All it could do is percieve and "sense" that the human brain is in subjective state?
The computer would have no reason to propose that the brain is in any way associated with what we think of as subjective experience. Having no subjective experience of its own, and having only objective data to work with, the computer would never rationally suspect that anything like subjective experience even exists in the first place.
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