View Full Version : Vitalist nonsense versus Science.
I don't normally lump all of scientific discovery and inquiry into just "science", nor do I normally call an idea "nonsense", but I have reasons on this particular occasion.
Vitalism was the idea that, no matter how well science and philosophy could explain the function that produce "life", they could never explain what the "life" itself was. This is nonsense. It was shown, through many different fields of science and philosophy (hence the lumping together..."science"), that "life" had no meaning except for those exact functions that the vitalists had deemed unsatisfactory.
So, science has discovered that some supposed "mysteries" are not mysteries at all, but there simply needs to be a re-intuiting of the concept being studied - such that the function that were said to "produce" the mysterious phenomenon can now be seen to be the phenomenon, and there is nothing more to add.
The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.
Indeed, I'm surprised that the proponents of the vitalist view of consciousness can't see that they are doing just what the previous vitalists did with regard to "life". In fact, one philosopher has gone so far as to mention these previous vitalists, but then to say that he was different in his view of consciousness, since no physical function could ever be shown to be "subjective awareness"...isn't that exactly what the "life" vitalists said?!? It's not like people with such views are saying that you can't explain these mysteries because the physical functions can't be explained well enough. No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.
Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point? And what's vitalism got to do with anything?
Do you actually have an answer to Chalmers, or have you just made your mind up?
Are you aware that Dennett has no impact at all on the debate, other than to generate more of it?
Ok. You think Dennett is right and Chalmers is wrong, and there's a few non-philosophers who agree with you. What's your point?
And what's vitalism got to do with anything?
selfAdjoint
Dec20-03, 08:11 PM
In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.
Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up.
The reason I bring this up is because of the current problems with consciousness. People constantly say that scientific explanations of the functions of the brain will not be enough to explain how they "produce" consciousness. Well, I say (in agreement with Daniel Dennett and many cognitive scientists) that these functions are the consciousness, and there's nothing more (mysterious) to find.
But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive", but we can't look at something and say "That is conscious" and "That is not conscious". That's the first big clue that it is something more than a process.
What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?
This question ties into yet another, "Are subjective experiences the only things that matter, or is there some sort of objective reality? What is reality?". Two, actually. I'm not going to go into all of this, we would simply travel along a vast chain of philosophical questions. You see my point though, I hope?
You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour. That is what consciousness is, and that is why it is not defined simply as the processes.
I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occuring, it is FEELING the processes occuring. You can deny that you feel anything, but that doesn't serve much purpose. Whether you feel anything or not(or whether you understand the distinction of experiencing and feeling or not- I've talked to some people about this who simply could NOT understand me, but they showed up a day or two later and said they thought and thought and finally got it) is irrelevant, because other people do. You can deny that all you want, but it won't make a difference, because people know they do feel. And feeling is not a function of these processes- self awareness is, experience is, but not feeling. It's impossible for it to be a physical function.
Anyway, I shall stop now. Hopefully you understand what I'm saying. :)
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
In other words our posts are futile unless we can "Fisk" Chalmers? Nuts to that. And be careful what you ask for.
Did I say that? Uh, no.
I asked what the point of the post was. It's an interesting topic but there's nothing to say to someone who just asserts their opinion with no reasoning to accompany it.
Without any refereence to Dennett, Chalmers or anybody else's favorite guru there is indeed a lot of unexamined vitalism in the debates on consciousness. And it is right to show it up. [/B]
Perhaps, but vitalism in its old form is dead. It just muddles the issues to lump it together with the the issue of consciousnes. A bit of rigour wouldn't go amiss around here imho. Too much temperamental opinion.
It's a fascinating and difficult topic, one which baffles everyone in science at the moment. People post here as if they've never looked into, but are certain of the answer. This stifles sensible discussion.
selfAdjoint
Dec21-03, 11:57 AM
You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.
And yes I do go back a long way with the arguments of Searle and Nagle and all, and I dearly hope we're not going to retrace that whole weary road again.
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.
You say that vitalism is dead, and that the consciousness discussion is not about vitalism. I say that any position that claims outright that "there are some things scientists will never know" is pure vitalism, unless it's superstition. And that is what I read Chalmers as saying.
"there are some things scientists will never know"... Science can never provide an understanding of itself. Science is a set of laws describing the physical universe, not a description of those laws. Saying that a certain set of these laws being realized in a certain way IS something else makes no sense. There could be laws governing the laws of science, and laws governing those laws. Without knowledge of such, we can't provide an unquestionable description of any final result (in this case consciousness). Here is how it appears:
consciousness
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3
You can easily say, if we know this to be correct, that the correct combination of sciencelaws produces consciousness, and you are equally validated in saying that these sciencelaws ARE consciousness. A definition or a description of production- they are essentially the same. For instance:
triangle
3lines intersectinglines
That is a definition AND a description of production. Both mean the same thing. However, since science does not describe itself, our consciousness definition could look like this:
consciousness
otherlaw6 otherlaw7
law1 law2 law3 law4 law5
sciencelaw1 sciencelaw2 sciencelaw3
Of course, that could apply to our triangle example as well... However, triangles are man's creation- so we know all the laws that apply to them (seeing as we created those laws). Consciousness is not our creation... so we dont know all the laws. Also, no one has ever (to my knowledge) actually provided a definition of consciousness (or the functions that produce/define it). What would they be? Everyone's brain is different, yet we are all conscious... Are animals conscious? Computers? Rocks? These discussions aren't very productive without an actual specification of the things that produce/define consciousness itself.
Originally posted by Sikz
But see, it ISN'T like that. Life is not a feeling, that's the difference. We can look at something and say "That is alive" or "That is not alive"...
Ah, but we can't. Have you been to my other thread "Why call it 'alive'?"? There is no working definition of life. However, there is the biological definition, and from that we can say "this is alive and that is not alive", but this speaks only of functions, which the vitalists thought was not enough. Consciousness, as per the intentional stance, is also "just a function" which the current vitalists don't seem to think is enough.
What it ties into is the question of "Do concepts exist?". When you think, for example, of a horse- is that thought only a pattern of electrons in your brain (technicly if your answer is no, it isn't a PATTERN either, since patterns are concepts), or is it something else? The image of a horse that you have in your mind, is that image simply some electricity (I use ideas like "electricity" and "patterns" here, but be aware that if concepts are not real these things are not real either, since their definitions are concepts. They would still "exist" in a way... Maybe. Heh.), or is it an image produced by electricity?
I actually (currently) think that the image of a horse is a spatial stimulation of synchronously-firing interneurons in the neocortex, which was begun in response to the observation of a horse.
You can easily imagine yourself without consciousness. You would not have a field of vision; your eyes would take in information and transmit it to your brain as electrical impulses, but there is no reason you would actually "see" the image (you might argue that the definition of "see" is what I have just described. However, you can imagine the same function being carried out without the actual "image" being percieved- therefore there must be some seperation). Variables would be extracted from the image and fed into the programs of your brain (like a computer). Complex equations would take place, chemicals would be released and affect these equations, neurons would fire all over the place... And then a signal would be transmitted to the group of cells known as an "arm" or a "leg" or whatever other part of the body they might be, and it would carry out a task. You can imagine this entire process without the actual quality of "seeing" or of "feeling". There is no reason why you should FEEL an emotion instead of just having the chemicals effect your behaviour.
But this is a vitalist-type statement, and flies in the face of the Scientific Method. This Method would dictate that there "FEELings" are "just" chemicals that effect your behavior. Why should there be anything else?
I realize that you might just deny this... It is not undeniable fact. Consciousness isn't the processes occuring, it is FEELING the processes occuring.
But "feeling" is also a process.
Originally posted by Canute
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know has got nothing at all to do with vitalism. Try reading Colin Mcginn and 'mysterianism', and he's a materialist.
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them. The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved; and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce.
Originally posted by Mentat
The claim that there are some things that science will never be able to know isn't exactly my definition of "vitalism". It is, IMHO, the claim that some mysteries exist on a plain beyond that of the physical processes that "produce" them.
That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.
The problem with this is that, in the first instance (the instance to do with "life"), it was shown that the supposed "mystery" really was (not "was produced by", but was) the physical processes involved;
Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.
and, in the second case (with regard to consciousness) it is now stunting science's ability to do what it does, since so many people are still holding to the vitalist view that "you may explain all of the physical processes involved, but you will never explain the mysterious phenomenon that they produce. [/B]
You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.
I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.
I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.
Originally posted by Canute
...You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.
While I agree with Canute here, I also think that vitalism is the metaphysical doctrine that living organisms possess a non-physical inner force or energy that gives them the property of life of organic matter. Maybe this helps, maybe it doesn't.
The belief dating to around 1600 that matter was divided into two classes based on behavior with respect to heat: organic and inorganic. Inorganic material could be melted but could always be recovered by removing the heat source. Organic compounds changed form upon heating and could not be recovered by removing the heat source. The proposed explanation for the difference between organic and inorganic compounds was the Vitalism Theory, which stated that inorganic materials did not contain the "vital force" of life and lasted until the mid-nineteenth century.
© Eric W. Weisstein
I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.
Why are the people you selected pretty much all dead? I have a question. What's wrong with mysticism? To begin, mysteries about life persist in the face of reductionist science.
selfAdjoint
Dec22-03, 07:28 PM
I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.
Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.
Originally posted by Canute
That is not vitalism, that is mysticism.
I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?
Nobody has shown that (if I understand you right). It's the just the scientifically orthodox hypothesis.
Yes, it is the scientific answer. And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?
You're muddling vitalism with a load of other things here. Vitalism is a claim about life, not about the epistemlogy of science.
I'm sure it's a nuisance that some people's opinions about the limits of science are stunting science's growth. However they are not all vitalists, most of them, like Plato, Popper, Kant, McGinn, Plank, Penrose and Hawkings, are just very aware of the difficult logical relationship between scientific hypothesising, indeed all hypothesising, and what all these hypotheses are about, namely reality itself and what is really true.
I don't think many of these folk would be pleased to be called a vitalist.
Well, I wont state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life, and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach.
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Not one of these worthy gentlemen has stunted the growth of science. No, not even Plato. Nor have the philosophers who have erected "The Hard Problem" into job security. Science ignores them and goes about its business.
Of course your're right. I was pointing out to Mentat that it was a bit daft to think that they had.
As you say, science has no way of addressing the hard problem, but must carry on regardless.
Originally posted by Mentat
I see. So vitalism was just a form of mysticism (to do with the essence of "life")?
I suppose so. I'm not quite sure of the defintions of these things.
Yes, it is the scientific answer.
Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.
And since it was the scientific answer in this case, why should we not assume (as has Dennett) that the scientific answer to the problem of consciousness is that it is the process?
Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.
Well, I wont state my personal opinions about those particular people; however, I know that Chalmer's view looks just like the vitalist view of life,
I doubt that Chalmers would agree.
and that's why I posted this thread: To see if the consciousness problem can be gotten rid of by a more scientific approach. [/B]
The evidence of science, and the analysis of the logic of the situation by philosophers suggests that it can't. Perhaps science can 'get rid' of it if decides to redefine itself slightly, but not otherwise, at least according to most people who don't earn a living looking for it scientifically.
metacristi
Dec24-03, 05:19 AM
Mentat
No, they are/were saying exactly what Chalmers (the aforementioned philosopher was David Chalmers, btw) said: "You can explain all of the physical functions, but you can never explain why this produces the mysterious phenomenon.
Actually Chalmers' position is much more complex,he doesn't claim that science cannot explain consciousness,he is only skeptical that neurology alone will be able to explain it.I have saved once from the net an interview with Chalmers,here is an excerpt from it:
You argue in your work that neuroscience will not be able to give a complete theory of consciousness. Do you think that current scientific work on consciousness is misguided?
Chalmers:Sometimes the sort of non-materialist view I put forward is seen as anti-scientific, but I don't see it that way at all. I argue that neuroscience alone isn't enough to explain consciousness, but I think it will be a major part of an eventual theory. We just need to add something else, some new fundamental principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience. Actually, I think my view is compatible with much of the work going on now in neuroscience and psychology, where people are studying the relationship of consciousness to neural and cognitive processes without really trying to reduce it to those processes. We are just getting much more detailed knowledge of the associations and correlations between them. Things are still in early stages, but one can imagine that as we build up and systematize our theories of these associations, and try to boil them down to their core, the result might point us toward the sort of fundamental principles I advocate. Of course that's a long way off yet.
Basically he argues,without making positive claims,that the actual knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to explain all features of consciousness as we know it.His position is rational the 'zombies','Mary's chamber' or 'Chinese room' philosophical arguments against the computational emergentist approach are enough to back a rational skepticism.Indeed,nonwithstanding Dennet's brave attempt,we are far from having sufficient reasons that the emergentist computational theory of consciousness is (approximatively) correct.I would name it a conjecture,we are only at the beginning of our quest to find a 'holistic' theory of consciousness (any unbiased scientist will recognize this).
I would argue also that vitalists do not make the generic claim that science cannot understand life,maybe some of them but not all,many of them merely doubt that the current known facts can lead to a successful theory of life.A sort of 'interactionist dualism' (we cannot put in evidence currently,the interaction being too weak) is still a feasible posibility (though we have no dualist scientific hypothesis as of now).Indeed,at most,Dennet's arguments are efficient against the cartesian type of dualism,but not against all types of dualism.Eccles' hypothesis (though it does not attain the status of scientific hypothesis) is a good example:dualism neither needs a 'cartesian theatre' nor break the conservation of energy law...The mistery remains...only time will settle things...
Originally posted by Canute
Science doesn't have an answer. It has a hypothesis.
What's the difference?
Because nearly everybody else thinks the idea doesn't make any sense. Science would love to adopt Dennett's view, but it can't. It doesn't add up, even to most scientists.
And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now).
Originally posted by Mentat
What's the difference?
An hypothesis is not a theory.
And yet all of the scientific attempts at explaining consciousness have fallen right into Dennett's predicted standards (and I've read at least 4 by now). [/B]
This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.
Originally posted by Canute
An hypothesis is not a theory.
No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.
This is not surprising. All scientific attempts to explain it can be expected to fail, for reasons Metacristi outlined.
Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this.
hypnagogue
Jan4-04, 04:17 PM
I've said this elsewhere, but I suppose it bears stating again since this thread is exclusively devoted to the 'vitalist' issue. The claims surrounding the 'hard problem' of consciousness and the vitalist theory of life are not analogous.
The problem of explaining life involves explaining objectively observable structures and functions such as growth, reproduction, etc. To vitalists, it was inconceivable that these structures and functions could be explained via physical processes, so they posited the existence of the immaterial spirit. However, the central problem nonetheless remained one of explaining objectively observable structures and functions; once these had been explained, there was nothing else that needed explaining, and so the explanatory problem was solved. The explanatory posit of the immaterial spirit was no longer needed, and thus discarded.
The problem of explaining consciousness involves explaining first person subjective experience. It is obvious that consciousness is associated with brain functioning, but the nature of the link between these two is far from obvious. In particular, for any purely physical explanation of consciousness, we will still be left with the question of why consciousness should be associated with physical processes at all; there is nothing in our understanding of time, space, matter, and energy that makes it conceivable that these things arranged in the proper way should somehow result in conscious experience. This problem is not raised by way of explanatory posits, as with the vitalists, but rather is the central issue in need of explanation.
Thus we have a persistent question built in to any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.
[edit for phrasing error]
selfAdjoint
Jan4-04, 06:44 PM
Thus we have a persistent question built in to any attempts at explaining consciousness: Why are the physical structures and functions of the brain accompanied by consciousness? There is no analogous built-in question in explaining life; it is meaningless to ask "why are the structures and functions of growth, reproduction, etc. accompanied by life?" since here there is no reason to suppose that anything above and beyond the structures and functions needs explaining. With consciousness there is reason to suppose just this, since any purely physical account of consciousness leaves us with an epistemic gap.
And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".
hypnagogue
Jan4-04, 10:17 PM
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
And here is where the philosopher departs from the scientist. For science does not propose to answer, or ask, why questions. Except in the trivial sense of "The neurochemical structure of the brain supports consciousness because it can".
Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?" However, it appears that a purely physically reductive account of consciousness cannot answer the question "How is it that physical structures and functions can account for consciousness?"
Originally posted by Mentat
No one mentioned theory. You said "answer". And scientists have indeed come up with theories of consciousness (Edelmann and Calvin are the two I mention more often, but there are others)...that's true theories, ones that have made pre-/post-dictions that turn out to be true.
I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.
I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.
Falling into Dennett's standards indicates failure? No, no, the fact that they all follow the line of reasoning that Dennett predicted they'd follow is all I was pointing out...there is no failure in this. [/B]
Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.
Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.
Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.
selfAdjoint
Jan5-04, 08:13 AM
Let me rephrase that then. Science can and does answers questions of the general formulation "How is it that X can account for Y?", such as "How is it that the microscopic structures and functions of H2O can account for the macroscopic properties of water?"
I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?
The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me. [/B]
You seem to be saying that neuroscientific data and conscious experience are two different categories of things, with no category between. Isn't this counter to your main argument?
Originally posted by Canute
I suppose one could argue ad nauseum about what is a theory and what is a hypothesis and what is a conjecture and what is an answer. But certainly there is as yet nothing one could call a scientific explanation of consciousness. There are just conjectures, including Edelmann's process based ideas, Dennett's hetero-phenomenology, Crick's oscillations, Blackmore's memes, Penrose's quantum decoherence in tubules, etc etc.
Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.
I don't know Calvin but Edelmann, in his book written with Guilio Tononi, makes it very clear from the start that the fact that consciousness has a scientific explanation is an assumption only. He states this a number of times. He is perfectly up-front about acknowledging that he has no proof and no evidence for it.
Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer, and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.
Hetero-phenomenology does not explain feelings. Philosopher Geoffrey Harnard has tirelessly pointed this out to Dennett, but with no answer yet. A theory of consciousness that says nothing about feelings is not very impressive. It's a throwback to Watson and Skinner, but a little more sophisticated than behaviourism.
Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.
Hypnogogue states the case clearly. There is an explanatory gap that no scientific theory has yet managed to cross, even speculatively. It cannot be crossed by science, as Chalmers and Mcginn argue, since there is a category mismatch.
Chalmer's is quite right when he says that scientific attempts to explain consciousness almost invariably use one of two strategies. Either the 'hard problem' is ignored, or consciousness is arbitrarily redefined in such a way as to obscure it. If you read any current journal on consciousness you can see this happening in nearly every scientific paper.
Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter?
hypnagogue
Jan5-04, 02:18 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.
Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.
Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.
hypnagogue
Jan5-04, 02:25 PM
Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think it does. Are you talking about statistical mechanics? That's just a calculating system for getting numbers. Where does science concern itself with "how is it" that small scale physics causes big scale physics?
Precisely by explaining the properties of macroscopic physics in terms of the properties of microscopic physics. For instance, the macroscopic liquidity of a liquid can be explained in terms of the chemical bonding structure of the atoms/molecules which compose the liquid.
The small scale physics happens, and we see big scale physics as a result; there is no separate "how" question. Similarly neurochemistry happens and we experience consciousness. There's no category in between, for me.
But we have a clear conceptual picture of how the small scale physics accounts for the large scale physics. We do not have a clear conceptual picture of how physics at any scale can account for consciousness, and there are strong reasons to believe that we never will unless we accept that our fundamental ontology (those things which are taken to exist axiomatically, without further explanation: spacetime and matter/energy) is somehow altered or expanded to take the existence of consciousness into account.
Originally posted by Mentat
Calvin's theory, is indeed (by the scientific definition of "theory") a theory. Dennett's heterophenomenology is a theory also, but not a theory of consciousness - instead, it is a theory of what a theory of consciousness should look like.
Ok. Let's just say that none of these theories have gained any degree of acceptance.
Sure, but he also shows that philosophical attempts will go on forever without answering the question of consciousness, and so, for those of us who want results, there should instead be a scientific answer,
Precisely what philosophers argue, in reverse. Take your pick.
and this one will not be confined by epistemic or other such metaphysical bounds. It will, instead, only be bound by the usual boundaries of science.
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.
Dennett's theory does address feelings. It simply lumps them in with the rest of conscious experience.
What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.
Might you state what the "hard problem" is, in terms that restrict a scientific inquiry into the matter? [/B]
It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Feelings, in the way Harnard uses the term, is not something to be lumped in with the rest of conscious experience. Harnard uses the term "feelings" synonymously with "conscious experience" to highlight the idea that every conscious experience feels like something-- after all, if it did not, it wouldn't be a conscious experience in the first place.
Dennet's theory aims to systematically bring out the associations between physical processes and feelings, but it does not coherently explain how physical processes should feel like something in the first place.
No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.
Originally posted by Canute
Boundaries which are of course epistemilogical and metaphysical.
The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.
What, you mean verbal signals and the like? He leaves them out, that is the overwhelming concensus.
Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.
It's here - http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html
Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.
If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
Then one will have explained conscious experience. All one has to do is by-pass the philosophical question of "what makes this physical process 'produce' this outcome" and look at it scientifically (see my thread on Faulty Expectations of a Theory of Consciousness (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=11986).
Originally posted by Mentat
No, instead he goes further into the heart of the matter, not treating feeling as some mysterious process, but as yet another physical process. Thus, in identifying feeling, itself, as such-and-such physical processes, he gets rid of the question of why such-and-such process is related to feeling, and allows for potential scientific understanding.[quote]
I agree that this is exactly what he does. The question is whether this approach might lead to an explanation or whether it just begs the question. I'd say the latter.
[quote]The boundaries of science itself are indeed metaphysical, you're right. However, the theory would not have to deal with such boundaries, because anyone questioning the validity of the theory based on a problem with such boundaries is questioning the validity of Science, as a whole, not of any particular theory.
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding. Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.
Maybe we should worry about what he says about his own theory, rather than what other people have said.
Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.
Well, I didn't read the whole thing, but I did read his explanation of the hard and easy problems, and I'm moved to repeat what Edelman and Calvin and even Dennett, have been saying for so long: there really is no hard problem.
Ok, but you've got some healthy opposition.
If one can explain these things (and Chalmers seems to think we can):
the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
the integration of information by a cognitive system;
the reportability of mental states;
the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
I would say that, more simply put, Chalmer's position is that we need to expain the existence of 'what it is like to be'. As this is not a meaningful scientific description or defintion he argues that science needs to consider redefing itself in order to include consciousness, and thus have a chance of explaining it. In a sense the 'hard problem' is finding a scientific definition for consciousness, for only if we can find one can we say that it is a scientific entity. Calling it physical is a sort of bulldozer of a strategy, and is completely ad hoc and counterintuitive. Many people, me incuded, cannot make sense of this hypothesis.
Originally posted by Canute
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding.
Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occuring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?
Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.
Of course this is true, but what makes you think they haven't already defined it as thoroughly as they've defined everything else?
Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.
You are certainly not, and perhaps this is indicative that there is something really wrong with his theory...but then, nobody seemed to want to agree with Copernicus or Galileo or Darwin. Dennett could be wrong, or everyone else could be wrong...again.
confutatis
Feb25-04, 02:58 PM
Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occuring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?
That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.
Here's my criteria for accepting an explanation of "consciousness" as meaningful and possibly true:
- 'X' is a computer that can communicate with humans in English
- X is programmed to never lie, but because of that it often fails to answer a question
- X knows the meaning of some 50,000 words, including the word "consciousness"
- when asked "X, are you conscious?", X gives an answer
A truly meaningful explanation of consciousness must allow us to understand how it's possible to buid a machine that knows how to answer the question "are you conscious" without lying (nevermind what the answer is, it's beside the point). Dennett's theory spectacularly fails that. And so do all theories.
Chalmers is right, but for the wrong reasons.
TENYEARS
Feb25-04, 07:09 PM
Mentat, long time no talk kid. Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.
Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.
Originally posted by confutatis
That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.
But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?
Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, long time no talk kid.
How've you been?
Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.
Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.
If you're right, I'm sure it will make for an interesting new paradigm of discovery.
confutatis
Feb26-04, 02:58 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?
Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?
What needs to be clearly delineated is where "consciousness" differs from "ability to think". To a good extent my computer is perfectly capable of thinking, but I suspect you don't believe my computer is capable of thinking in a conscious manner. Can you explain why?
TENYEARS
Feb26-04, 06:25 PM
Confused us, why did you choose such a name, probably for the same reason you ask such questions. He was not enlightened. These are good questions, but you must answer them. If you have not, have you asked them yet? To think of them on your own means there is is a smell in the air, so follow your nose.
Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?
Keep the ball rolling, you never know what you may stumble into.
Originally posted by confutatis
Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?
Consciousness is a collection of thought.
You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.
Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?
This is an interesting statement, TENYEARS. What's the difference?
confutatis
Feb27-04, 11:30 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
Consciousness is a collection of thought.
You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.
I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?
If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?
Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?
Originally posted by confutatis
I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?
If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?
Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?
You want my opinion? What would constitute evidence of consciousness, for me, would be if the computers processing routines were working in a Selectionist manner, producing Multiple Drafts of each sub-experience by interaction between the discreet processing units.
But that's just because I like Dennett's approach.
Aside from this, if the computer could think (and there's no reason, IMO, to say it couldn't), then it would conscious. It might not be sentient, or even have a particularly high level of consciousness, but it would be conscious to some degree.
TENYEARS
Feb27-04, 09:01 PM
There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truely assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.
What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.
Then again, maybe I just lie.
Originally posted by TENYEARS
There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truely assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.
What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.
Then again, maybe I just lie.
It is not a lie if you believe it, TENYEARS.
TENYEARS
Mar1-04, 11:28 PM
Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.
hypnagogue
Mar2-04, 07:25 AM
Originally posted by confutatis
What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"?
If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)
Originally posted by TENYEARS
Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.
Do you really believe what you just said?
Originally posted by hypnagogue
If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)
Define "unconscious thought".
hypnagogue
Mar3-04, 02:57 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
Define "unconscious thought".
Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.
For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.
This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.
Hypno
For once I completely disgree with you. You have arbitrarily redefnined 'thoughts' to suit your argument. I think just about Just about everyone would normally say that a thought that one is not having is not a thought.
hypnagogue
Mar3-04, 05:44 PM
I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does). The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.
From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.
If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.
Hypno
Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.
Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.
Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).
I would say that 'unconscious thoughts' is an oxymoron. Even if it isn't it seems a rather empty phrase, since no such thing has ever been proved to exist, or ever will be.
TENYEARS
Mar4-04, 06:49 AM
Mentat, No.
hypnagogue/Canute, you are out of your minds, don't go to far, you may not come back.
hypnagogue
Mar4-04, 07:35 AM
I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.
Originally posted by Canute
Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.
I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience. Hence if you define thought as a process of which we are aware, I don't see the contradiction in naming a similar process of which we are not aware, so long as I always refer to it as unconscious thought. In doing so I have not redefined 'thought,' I merely have defined a new phenomenon which is similar in the relevant ways to 'thought' as you define it except for the experiential aspect; but, I have made it explicit that it does not include this experiential aspect.
Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.
That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with. The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)
Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).
Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition. It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.
Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privelege to conscious access.
hypnagogue
Mar4-04, 07:45 AM
Originally posted by Jeebus
If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.
I don't see why that wouldn't be possible. In fact such a phenomena may account for eg the situation where a person struggles to accept a certain idea even though he cannot pinpoint exactly why.
In cases of brain lesioned patients it's not uncommon to see internal conflicts like this occurring. For instance, I recall reading about a patient who had some kind of dissociation of conscious control of one of his hands. This led to the very strange occasion where he was buttoning up his shirt with his consciously controlled hand only to have it unbuttoned by the hand he could not control!
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.
You're probably right - but I'll have another shot at it.
I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience...snip
You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.
That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with.
I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?
The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)
Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.
Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition.
Nor me. It's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that there may just be a 'timeout' in our reasoning when we are not consciously considering a problem, thus allowing ourselves to get out of the rut that has so far prevented us from finding a solution. IOW we may find sudden solutions simply because we stopped thinking about the problem for a while.
(Although I'm not disagreeing that unconscious brain processes occur, but just suggesting that these are not thoughts).
It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.
I agree.
Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privelege to conscious access. [/B]
I agree with that also. I'm arguing only that those processes cannot be called thoughts unless you radically redefine 'thoughts'.
When you offer someone 'a penny for your thoughts' you do not expect them to say that they have no idea what they are.
hypnagogue
Mar4-04, 11:26 AM
Originally posted by Canute
I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?
I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.
Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort? It could be the case that the informational content of such thoughts was formed subconsciously, and that pre-existing information then made its way into conscious awareness (by whatever means are usually responsible for information in the brain being made accessible to consciousness). It just depends on if you want to define 'thought' as the informational process, or as the informational process in conjunction with awareness of it.
I should note that the same could be said for, say, color-- information in the brain that codes for light wavelengths can exist in some parts of the brain without being available to conscious access. I would, however, refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious colors' on the same grounds that you refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious thoughts.' I admit that this might be an inconsistency on my part. However, my reason for such discrimination is that, for me, the notion of 'color' is dominated by its experiential aspect (what it looks like) whereas the notion of thought is dominated by its informational/functional aspect (what it refers to/what it does). This said, I again emphasize that both have informational/functional aspects in brain processing that can exist independently of consciousness and both can have experiential aspects.
I don't think we fundamentally disagree on concepts so much as terminology. In any case, if you take the strict stance that thought must include an experiential component by definition, then of course I agree that 'unconscious thought' is a contradiction in terms.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.
For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.
This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.
And what exactly is the difference between a collection of "unconscious thoughts" and a conscious one?
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does).
I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?
The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.
And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.
From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways).
In what ways?
However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.
What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it? What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?
Originally posted by Canute
You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.
But is there anything "wrong" with that position?
I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?
Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.
Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.
Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.
hypnagogue
Mar4-04, 02:34 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?
The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.
We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create. It is a given, even moreso than it is a given that (say) the moon objectively exists. It is the most fundamental given for human beings that there is. I can easily change my notion of computation to include some unseen properties, but I cannot change my notion of subjective experience such that it no longer has the properties I observe it to have. If I do this, I am no longer talking about subjective experience, for the same reason that if I redefine 'moon' to mean "a white circle" I am no longer talking about a massive rock that orbits the earth.
And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.
What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.
In what ways?
A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.
What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it?
Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.
What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?
No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.
Hypnogogue
I agree that we are only arguing about terminology. But still I think it's important to do this. (I'm still annoyed with er, what's his name, for hijacking 'intentional' to mean something completely different to what everyone else has always meant for so long). There is a danger of embodying errors and contradictions in the definition of things when it comes to consciousness. In fact that seems to be half of the problem with it.
You obviously know this and your point about 'red' is a good one. As you guessed I do feel that it's inconsistent to treat 'red' as any different to something more obviously computational in origin. After all 'red' must be computational in origin even if it doesn't feel like we have to 'work out' the colour of things.
Mind you, if everybody in the trade suddenly decided to define thoughts as 'any mental process contributing to overall mental function' or something like that, then I'd have to go along with it. Then we would have to have two different words for conscious and unconscious thoughts, presumably 'C-thoughts' and 'U-thoughts'. But at the moment it seems to me that when people say thoughts they mean conscious ones.
I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.
Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?
Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort?
Don't know, and to be honest I'm not yet compeletely convinced that they do. But if we knew this then at least Buddhist meditation might become a lot easier to practice. [:)]
The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.
But I'm happy to agree to differ. As far as I know it's a priori impossible to prove that the definition of a term is incorrect.
hypnagogue
Mar4-04, 03:20 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?
No, I don't think so, because if we agree to define thought only in terms of a conscious though, our discussion basically disappears and we agree.
The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.
Completely agree. For this reason it is probably better to stick with your definition of thought.
Originally posted by Mentat
But is there anything "wrong" with that position?
If you don't mind redefining what 'thinking' is then no. However currently it is accepted that computers do not think, since thinking implies consciousness. If thinking is redefined so it does not imply consciousness then my pocket calculator can think, and an abacus can think with a bit of help.
Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.
I think I've said all I can on this one. If consciousness was identical to brain states there'd be no explanation for why science is trying so hard to explain it.
Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.[/color] [/B]
The very fact that you have to use the word 'illusion' shows that even you think conscious thoughts are different to unconscious processes. How do you explain this difference? The difference cannot be explained as an illusion. One cannot have an illusion of being conscious when in reality one is not.
Many people argue that our 'sense of self' and/or normal perception of reality is an illusion. But this is an illusion in the sense of a misperception or misinterpretation of the meaning of our experiences, not a suggestion that they don't exist. If they don't exist then they cannot be an illusion.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.
We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create.
Fine, but you still haven't defined "subjective experience" in the first place...so how could you "re"-define it?
What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.
And what does it mean to experience a thought? What does it mean to have a thought without experiencing it? I can't understand the distinction because the terms being contrasted have not been properly defined.
A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.
How do you know that? If the amount of attention your CPU pays to a particular spatial firing (or spatiotemporal one, for that matter) is what produces (in retrospect) the illusion that you "exerienced" that one any more than you "experienced" another one, then you still don't have an explanation for "experiencing one thought while not experiencing another", but you have made it a moot issue (btw, "experience" is always in scare-quotes because I still don't have a working definition of it from your side of the debate).
Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.
Is it not also possible in principle that one never experienced the thought, but remembers doing so? (Much like I remember flying over my town, but never really did so...it was a dream)
No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.
Well, the afore-quoted was just a more blunt statement of the possibility that I'd been hinting at within the rest of the post (and some previous posts).
Originally posted by Canute
If you don't mind redefining what 'thinking' is then no.
Why not? They don't seem to be getting anywhere with their current definition.
However currently it is accepted that computers do not think, since thinking implies consciousness. If thinking is redefined so it does not imply consciousness then my pocket calculator can think, and an abacus can think with a bit of help.
Wait a minute...since when is it a bad thing to assume a computer is conscious? We assume a dog is conscious, and a computer can process and interact better than a dog can, can't it?
I think I've said all I can on this one. If consciousness was identical to brain states there'd be no explanation for why science is trying so hard to explain it.
Sure there would: They're constantly met with philosophical opposition. The proclamation that "the hard problem still stands" is going to get in the way of even the most impressive of theories. William Calvin's theory would be an enormous step in the right direction, if people would just drop the "hard problem" (not off-hand, but after the realization that it (the hard problem) is based on false premises).
The very fact that you have to use the word 'illusion' shows that even you think conscious thoughts are different to unconscious processes. How do you explain this difference? The difference cannot be explained as an illusion. One cannot have an illusion of being conscious when in reality one is not.
Not of "being conscious", of having been conscious of one thought, while unconscious of another. You were processing both thoughts, there was simply more "attention" being paid to the one, instead of the other. All of this falls right back on the Darwinian process that I've described numerous times, since the variant patterns are competing for supremacy in a closed working space.
hypnagogue
Mar8-04, 02:09 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
Sure there would: They're constantly met with philosophical opposition. The proclamation that "the hard problem still stands" is going to get in the way of even the most impressive of theories. William Calvin's theory would be an enormous step in the right direction, if people would just drop the "hard problem" (not off-hand, but after the realization that it (the hard problem) is based on false premises).
Without mentioning the validity of the hard problem in itself, I'd like to say that recognizing the hard problem will not 'get in the way' of any scientific theories of consciousness. At most the hard problem will call into question metaphysical assertions about consciousness which cannot really be conclusively supported or refuted by evidence anyway.
For instance, if Calvin's theory is fruitful, then no one who recognizes the hard problem will deny its fruitfulness-- they will just call into question its completeness. They will question if it really does explain everything that needs explaining, but that does not amount to refuting or standing in the way of the theory itself.
Mentat
I think we'll have to agree to differ. You seem to be saying that you don't know what subjective experiences are, and there's no way of defining them meaningfully to someone who doesn't know what they are like already.
I'm not sure where you get the idea that the 'hard' problem' is not a scientific one. It's certainly not a problem in many philosophies, and isn't really even a 'western' philosophical problem, since it is generally scientists who insist that consciousness arises from brain rather than philosophers, who in the main go for idealism.
Philosophers, people who think while trying not to make assumptions, merely point out that IF consciousness arises from brain then it is impossible for science to explain it. This is a scientific problem, not a philosophical one.
I'll leave you with Max Planck, who expressed the problem perfectly.
“Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve.”
Originally posted by hypnagogue
Without mentioning the validity of the hard problem in itself, I'd like to say that recognizing the hard problem will not 'get in the way' of any scientific theories of consciousness. At most the hard problem will call into question metaphysical assertions about consciousness which cannot really be conclusively supported or refuted by evidence anyway.
For instance, if Calvin's theory is fruitful, then no one who recognizes the hard problem will deny its fruitfulness-- they will just call into question its completeness. They will question if it really does explain everything that needs explaining, but that does not amount to refuting or standing in the way of the theory itself.
I see what you mean.
But, then, couldn't a theory be complete by Science's standards, and still not satisfy the "hard problem" (which is, at its heart, a "why" question...or so it appears, anyway)?
Originally posted by Canute
Mentat
I think we'll have to agree to differ. You seem to be saying that you don't know what subjective experiences are, and there's no way of defining them meaningfully to someone who doesn't know what they are like already.
So there is no way to define them...since an a priori assumption that I'm just going to know what you are talking about is not just illogical but the true enemy of logic (if you'll forgive my false logical piety [;)]).
I'm not sure where you get the idea that the 'hard' problem' is not a scientific one. It's certainly not a problem in many philosophies, and isn't really even a 'western' philosophical problem, since it is generally scientists who insist that consciousness arises from brain rather than philosophers, who in the main go for idealism.
The hard problem is a philosophical take-off of a scientific assumption. Scientists assume that the brain performs conscious functions, philosophers are the ones that add the question of "why" these two should be related (which is not a question that scientists are capable of asking let alone answering).
Originally posted by Mentat
So there is no way to define them...since an a priori assumption that I'm just going to know what you are talking about is not just illogical but the true enemy of logic (if you'll forgive my false logical piety [;)]).
It is not difficult to define 'experience'. It is just impossible to do it scientifically, for fairly obvious reasons.
Think of it this way. It is agreed by everyone who has ever considered the matter that idealism is unfalsifiable. If we could show that consciousness arose from brain then this would falsify idealism. Ergo we cann show that consciounsness arises from brain, and therefore quite obviously we cannot show how it happens.
Why this argument is so little used I don;t know. As far as I know it is unrefutable. I you're around Hypno what do you think?
The hard problem is a philosophical take-off of a scientific assumption.
I notice you use 'take off' to avoid using 'refutation'.
Scientists assume that the brain performs conscious functions, philosophers are the ones that add the question of "why" these two should be related (which is not a question that scientists are capable of asking let alone answering). [/B]
The view of some scientists is that brain gives rise to consciousness. In order to justify this assumption, and explain how it is plausible, they search for the corrleates of consciousness. This is what scientists are looking for, and that search is the scientific study of consciousness.
Philosophers do not invent problems, they point them out. You seem to think that there is some dividing line between philosophy and science. There isn't one.
I do not understand where you get your idea of the scientific view, it is nothing at all like yours. There is no 'scientific view' n the origins of consciousness, nor yet a proof of its existence.
Yet for some reason scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation. It is hard to say why this is so, but presumably it is because although there is no scientific evidence for conscousness scientists are conscious human beings, and find it hard to dismiss the fact.
hypnagogue
Mar9-04, 03:11 PM
Originally posted by Canute
Think of it this way. It is agreed by everyone who has ever considered the matter that idealism is unfalsifiable. If we could show that consciousness arose from brain then this would falsify idealism. Ergo we cann show that consciounsness arises from brain, and therefore quite obviously we cannot show how it happens.
Why this argument is so little used I don;t know. As far as I know it is unrefutable. I you're around Hypno what do you think?
I don't think showing brain activity to be the cause of consciousness would necessarily falsify idealism. An idealist could still hold that the brain itself is just an idea in the mind of God (or still has a fundamentally idea-like nature, or somesuch).
Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think showing brain activity to be the cause of consciousness would necessarily falsify idealism. An idealist could still hold that the brain itself is just an idea in the mind of God (or still has a fundamentally idea-like nature, or somesuch).
Good point. I forgot the mind of God. Still, isn't there something a bit odd about the idea that God created brains and brains created our consciousness? Also by most defintions 'God' is consciousness, independent of physical attributes. So even if God did create brains then it remains the case that consciousness gives rise to brains.
But I think you're right. It's not as simple as I suggested. I'll try try to refine it a bit.
Originally posted by Canute
I notice you use 'take off' to avoid using 'refutation'.
No, I used "take-off" because it took off from a scientific assumption...it doesn't refute the assumption, it's a hybrid version of it.
The view of some scientists is that brain gives rise to consciousness. In order to justify this assumption, and explain how it is plausible, they search for the corrleates of consciousness. This is what scientists are looking for, and that search is the scientific study of consciousness.
I beg to differ. None of the scientific theories of consciousness I've ever read have been about the correlates of consciousness, but have been instead about what processes in the brain are consciousness. Indeed this distinction is often stated rather plainly in one way or another, at the beginning of the book.
Philosophers do not invent problems, they point them out. You seem to think that there is some dividing line between philosophy and science. There isn't one.
That may be bad wording, Canute. Science is a branch of Philosophy ("philosophy" being the "love and pursuit of wisdom/knowledge/understanding"), but, in being a "branch" it is subject to limitations that Philosophy as a whole is not subject to.
I do not understand where you get your idea of the scientific view, it is nothing at all like yours. There is no 'scientific view' n the origins of consciousness, nor yet a proof of its existence.
What?
Yet for some reason scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation. It is hard to say why this is so, but presumably it is because although there is no scientific evidence for conscousness scientists are conscious human beings, and find it hard to dismiss the fact.
Scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation because that is the entire purpose of science: to provide explanations for phenomena.
Originally posted by Mentat
[quote]I beg to differ. None of the scientific theories of consciousness I've ever read have been about the correlates of consciousness, but have been instead about what processes in the brain are consciousness. Indeed this distinction is often stated rather plainly in one way or another, at the beginning of the book.
You have not read much then. The literature is awash with papers about NCC's.
What?
I thought I was clear. Science cannot prove that consciousness exists. Also, while there are many conjectures, there is no scientific view (i.e. view founded on scientific evidence) on the origins of consciousness. There will not be one until the hard problem is solved.
Scientists conclude that consciousness needs an explanation because that is the entire purpose of science: to provide explanations for phenomena. [/B]
The purpose of modern science is unclear to me, but I'll take your word for it. However do you not think it paradoxical that science is trying to explain something it cannot define and cannot show to exist?
I think science has defined consciousness. The problem is that you don't like the definition.
Dlanorrenrag
Mar20-04, 06:50 PM
Maybe Chalmers is recognizing and grappling with an innate, metaphysical, spiritual property of each particular vibrating string of matter that enables it to "stick-polarize-remember" fuzzy patterns in association with other levels of material organization within the whole. If such properties are tightly bound up with perception, then the focus of any sticky attempt to measure or perceive patterns of feelings of consciousness would seem likely to skew and render non-falsifiable the attempted observation. In other words, might understanding how basic particles of matter are able to polarize one another be requisite to reducing Chalmers' hard problem about consciousness? Sure glad I got that off my chest.
Imparcticle
Mar21-04, 12:01 AM
However do you not think it paradoxical that science is trying to explain something it cannot define and cannot show to exist?
Or rather, we are having a hard time defining it ourselves. It obviously exists, does it not?
Originally posted by FZ+
I think science has defined consciousness. The problem is that you don't like the definition. [/B]
No, it hasn't been scientifically defined it yet. Individual scientists have individual definitions but they all disagree with each other. All widely agreed definitions are not scientific.
No scientific proof of its existence is available yet so you can't really say science has defined it. It's an odd situation.
Individual scientists have individual definitions but they all disagree with each other.
Isn't that the whole point of science? Individual disagreement is what makes science work.
Fliption
Mar21-04, 09:36 PM
Originally posted by FZ+
Isn't that the whole point of science? Individual disagreement is what makes science work.
I think so but this is pushing what Canute is saying a bit far I think. If I found a scientist who diagreed with evolutionary theory you'd probably be quick to say he wasn't a legitimate scientist. So disagreement only goes so far. There is generally agreement on a base level of established knowledge for the most part. I think when scientists disagree, they generally do it on the answer to a scientific question. But if they don't agree on the question itself, then it's hard to see how anything scientific can result.
Yes that's the point. And actually it's worse than that. There is no individual scientific definition of consciousness that works, never mind an orthodox one. Read any scientific paper or book on consciousness and the definition invariably leaves out the one thing philosophers (and common sense) say should left in, namely 'what it is like'.
This is the sort of crazy muddle (Chalmer's might say 'sleight of hand') that we get.
“…almost a decade ago, Crick wrote ‘Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. It is better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because of the dangers of premature definition. Until the problem is understood much better, any attempt at a further definition is likely to be either misleading or overly-restrictive, or both’ (Crick, 1994). This seems to be as true now as it was then although the identification of different aspects of consciousness (P–consciousness. A-consciousness, self-consciousness, and monitoring consciousness) by Block (1995) has certainly brought a degree of clarification. On the other hand, there is little doubt that consciousness does seem to be something to do with the operation of a sophisticated control system (the human brain), and we can claim more familiarity with control systems than can most philosophers, so perhaps we can make up some ground there.” (Owen Holland and Rod Goodman)
I found a scientist who diagreed with evolutionary theory you'd probably be quick to say he wasn't a legitimate scientist.
No I won't. It is a matter of attitude. If he had a credible reason, and a credible alternative, and positive evidence, then I wouldn't say that at all. Evolution theory has changed alot, due to people who disagreed.
But if they don't agree on the question itself, then it's hard to see how anything scientific can result.
Let's give an example, to disprove this.
Take one theory of everything. Scientists, legitimately practising the scientific method, have not only disagreed on candidates for this theory, but have also disagreed on what criteria it needs to fulfill. (Eg. marcus would tell you that a TOE needs to be conservative, not inventing new stuff. A string theorist may disagree.)
Read any scientific paper or book on consciousness and the definition invariably leaves out the one thing philosophers (and common sense) say should left in, namely 'what it is like'.
Common sense is a very bad word, as far as science is concerned. The fact remains that this is still a definition of consciousness, and the idea that experience sorts itself out is also legitimate. You may disagree with this definition, but that is your disagreement. Science has defined consciousness. Some people simply do not like it.
Speaking objectively, the way science can win this (if we see it as a competition), is to explain consciousness as far as its own definition. The rest, including the hard problem of experience, will probably prove intractable, and definitions requiring something more will probably fizzle out in time, simply by virtue of the fact it is a question made to be unanswerable, and eventually meaningless.
Fliption
Mar24-04, 11:58 AM
Originally posted by FZ+
[B]No I won't. It is a matter of attitude. If he had a credible reason, and a credible alternative, and positive evidence, then I wouldn't say that at all. Evolution theory has changed alot, due to people who disagreed.
This whole discussion is really about what we arbitrarily label as "scientific". Now that I read your statement, I can see that you can pretty much claim anything you want to be scientific and there's not much I or Canute can say or do to change that. It's just a silly word game. I just interpreted Canutes original point to be that there are some standards with which all scientists agree. The scientific method for one. Your statement implies that scientists can disagree on anything and everything. It is hard for me to see how scientists can accomplish anything and contribute to established knowledge if they can't even get past what is a philosophical issue of defining the problem. Whether you want to call such things scientific or not, is subjective. You and Canute just disagree about the label.
Let's give an example, to disprove this.
Take one theory of everything. Scientists, legitimately practising the scientific method, have not only disagreed on candidates for this theory, but have also disagreed on what criteria it needs to fulfill. (Eg. marcus would tell you that a TOE needs to be conservative, not inventing new stuff. A string theorist may disagree.)
The only way this proof works is if we assume that TOE has a scientific definition LOL. If this is true then Canute could argue that it does not. Again, this is subjective whether we label anything as scientiifc. But I still argue it would be hard to establish a pragmatic benefit from an area with so much semantic confusion.
Also, I'm not sure that the TOE is what you claim but I could be wrong. I was under the impression the objective of a theory of everything is to tie all the known forces together. That's what it is. If a scientist doesn't think this, then he's not on the same page with what the objective of a TOE is to begin with. And he's just using the wrong word or phrase. Just like scientists are likely using the wrong word when they say "consciousness" to describe whatever it is they define it to be.
Science has defined consciousness. Some people simply do not like it.
I didn't see you dispute the claim that there was disagreement on the definition. You simply claimed that disagreement was scientific. So how exactly can you say "science has defined it?" when there are so many definitions?
Speaking objectively, the way science can win this (if we see it as a competition), is to explain consciousness as far as its own definition. The rest, including the hard problem of experience, will probably prove intractable, and definitions requiring something more will probably fizzle out in time, simply by virtue of the fact it is a question made to be unanswerable, and eventually meaningless.
"Unanswerable" is a distinction that unbiased philosophy should discern.
The more I think about this topic, the more silly it seems. I can actually agree with you if we want to assume that a scientific definition is one that allows for scientific inquiry via the scientific method. This understanding allows 500 different scientific definitions. But I think Canutes point was that there is no single "established" definition, which is evidence that the philosophical issue of consciousness is likely not being addressed(or cannot be) by science. Certainly not in a way that can contribute anything to "established" knowledge. It is likely science is studying something that it labels "consciousness" but it doesn't represent what people mean when they speak of consciousness.
Originally posted by Fliption
But I think Canutes point was that there is no single "established" definition, which is evidence that the philosophical issue of consciousness is likely not being addressed(or cannot be) by science. Certainly not in a way that can contribute anything to "established" knowledge. It is likely science is studying something that it labels "consciousness" but it doesn't represent what people mean when they speak of consciousness. [/B]
Yep, this is the problem. Individual researchers have their own definitions and they are all different. Scientific defintions of consciousness do exist (I collect them for a hobby, the sophistry is fascinating) but it is quite easy to pick holes in all of them. The only definitions that are widely agreed are unscientific 'philosophical' or 'folk-psychological' ones ('what it is like' etc), and these do not provide a basis for scientific research or theorising.
The problem seems to be that consciousness is incompatible with physicalism. For a while this did not matter because 'Behaviourism' shielded science from the problem. However now that Behaviourism is discredited the problem is back.
Up until Behaviourism most philosophers and many natural scientists were idealists. But in the meantime physicalism has taken over. Now that consciousness has become a scientific issue again this creates a clash between the orthodox metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and the facts. Perhaps this will be resolved but it seems unlikely, and many including me say it's impossible in principle.
It's not a competition and I'm not knocking science exactly, just suggesting that science can only explain the physical in terms of the physical and therefore cannot explain consciousness. The definition problem is the same problem as the explanation problem, since a 'theory' is really just an elaborate definition.
I just interpreted Canutes original point to be that there are some standards with which all scientists agree. The scientific method for one. Your statement implies that scientists can disagree on anything and everything.
Nope. They cannot disagree in terms of attitude, or what you call the scientific method. And shouldn't the idea of what is science be left to those who consider themselves to be scientists?
That's what it is. If a scientist doesn't think this, then he's not on the same page with what the objective of a TOE is to begin with. And he's just using the wrong word or phrase. Just like scientists are likely using the wrong word when they say "consciousness" to describe whatever it is they define it to be.
Who decides? Again, we have a problem is that there are no real ultimate authorities. No one can say that the TOE is x, and all who say differently is wrong. Each is right, in a different context. They are not using the wrong word.
So how exactly can you say "science has defined it?" when there are so many definitions
The heart of matter is that science does not exist as a single block-like institution. If you mean science as in saying the grand old lord of science has decreed x, then yes, science has not defined. Science has not defined anything at all. But in terms of scientists knowing what they talk about in terms of consciousness, and then dealing with these in a scientific fashion, which is all this could mean, then they have defined it. Several times over.
It is likely science is studying something that it labels "consciousness" but it doesn't represent what people mean when they speak of consciousness.
Some people genuinely mean this when they talk of consciousness. And scientists' usual conception of ToE does not mean what people usually think of ToE as.
However now that Behaviourism is discredited the problem is back.
I don't think behaviourism is discredited at all. I don't even think it possible to discredit behaviourism, and we can't put limits of physicalism either.
Fliption
Mar27-04, 03:01 PM
Who decides? Again, we have a problem is that there are no real ultimate authorities. No one can say that the TOE is x, and all who say differently is wrong. Each is right, in a different context. They are not using the wrong word.
There is no argument against what you're saying. Just like there is no way I can even prove that you exists. But both these views are extreme. Canute's point shouldn't be taken so rigidly. He is assuming that we don't live in a world of semantic anarchy the way you have described it. And I think it's a safe assumption for the most part. Especially in science.
As for consciousness, I guess the only point is that no scientific definition addresses the philosophical problems that have been around for centuries. So these definitions, regardless of whether they are "right or wrong", are not relevant to a philosophical discussion of consciousness because they aren't talking about the same thing.
To clarify a bit. Science is predicated on the non-existence of anything that does not have physical attributes. If consciousness has no phsyical attributes then it lies beyond science. This is why science cannot explain what underlies matter ('essence') or what underlies the existence of the universe ('fundamental reality'). This is not a criticism of science, just an observation on its self-defined limits.
Whether consciousness actually does have no physical attributes is a moot question. However it's a common view. McGinn and Descartes and others argue that it has no extension. If so it is not science's job to explain it.
On ToE's we might note that even Stephen Hawkings thinks that such a thing is possible, for epistemilogical reasons (incompleteness theorems etc). Max Planck and others would agree for different reasons, in that we cannot include ourselves (consciousness) in the theory. Also a Toe in the sense of a theory that reconciles the fundamental forces is not a ToE. It is a theory of how the fundamental forces can be reconciled. IOW it is a ToE in a restricted sense only, and leaves out more than it includes.
Behaviourism has been discredited and nobody I know of still claims that there is any sense in it. In fact it never really caught on in the first place among researchers, it just won the hearts of the editors of a lot of journals and thus dominated the literature. It never did have that many supporters in the trade.
Dayle Record
May7-04, 01:13 PM
It is really best if we do not clinically define, the undefinable. Even if we peeled off every iota of the skin of the onion, there would still be the nothingness, there would still be the magic of how the onion remembered its self by making seed, from its association from other onions. There would still me the millenia that made that seed mesh with the ground, to resist gravity and go both upward and downward, seeking different things, in opposition to different forces.
I warn any of you with this current climate of cavalier examination of the conscious process; that one's view of salient facts, varies wildly from another's views of the same facts.
If we come up with some sanctioned definition, then why not just let Deep Blue run the world, since that computer surely knows all languages by now, and can be filled with mathematical formulae that would properly dole out the world's resources? If we say the process, or this process or that process is it, then so defined it can be legislated. Life can be made in machine shops, and then with this much more predictible mentality, controllable mentality, perhaps our mentality will be abolished; or at least relegated to obsurity.
There are people in very high places in government, high places in industry, who have no regard for life, law, or certainly natural process. As far as I know, I am deeply engaged and invested in the natural process of my life. Neither Dr. A, nor Dr B, get to define the magic of it, certainly not in any official capacity, that might have legislative imperitive.
I know that as soon as possible, brain cells will be used as part of bio computational processes, hopefully for long space travel. The creation of cyborgs, is certainly well underway, in some places where ethical questions of stem cell, or embryonic tissue, aren't even asked; except where it helps win elections. All this mapping of the chemistry and energy of the brain, is for industrial use, aside from courtroom drama, or crowd control. Slave minds are being created, and there are already test subjects that are being used willingly and unwillingly for electromagnetic analysis, and control interface technology. NASA's mind reading trick, made the front page of MSN recently.
Seriously if we don't declare us, and our process of consciousness magical/sacred/fundamentally sacrosanct, then all our heads will be strip malls of sorts. In the future; you will think that you want something, and somewhere else, the powers that be, will be checking your work credits, to see if you may have it. What if that turns out to be the air that you breathe? What happens to the trained floating heads in space, when the funding drops off for the project that sustains them? Will we legislate that those humans made of human DNA, but not born of a woman, aren't by definition, human, with full rights?
I know this is tangental thinking, but we are being seriously "parted out" as they say in the auto wrecking industry. We have to be very careful about electing to accept "definitions" of very basic states of existence, that we hold to be our lives.
hypnagogue
May7-04, 02:20 PM
I presume you are speaking out against the materialist conception of consciousness. While I do not agree with this conception, I hold my position because of what I believe to be the truth, not out of fear of the consequences of accepting the alternative. If consciousness really can be exhaustively defined as such and such process in the brain, so be it. The primary concern should be understanding reality, not fabricating arbitrary conceptions of it in order to maintain a certain value system. You might as well have sided with the church against Galileo if that is really your mindset.
Hi Hypno
As usual you've said what I was I was going to say. Let's have the truth, whatever it is.
There is no chance of materialism being proved or disproved anyway, for logical reasons, so there is nothing to fear from research except the responsibilities that might come with knowing what's true.
Dayle Record
May8-04, 12:38 AM
I am not sure the "truth" can be known. We all know so differently. So what I am saying is that this territory is highly subjective, and to define it, might just be a form of totalitarian belief; to justify outrageous deployment of sentient tissues, and electromatic wavelengths that intrude on the sanctity of our minds.
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