Dennett's predecessor brings it all together...

[Mentat]

I'm sure we all know that Dennett was not the first Materialist philosopher of the mind. His theory is unique, but it is not without precedent. One example of a previous Materialist philosopher, who (I think) may shed considerable light on the issues that have been discussed in many previous threads, to do with consciousness and subjective experience.

The philosopher was David Hume. I think I mentioned him briefly before, on another thread.

Hume's ideas on consciousness seem integral to Dennett's philosophy, yet I don't think Dennett ever mentioned Hume in his books...this is perhaps because Dennett came up with his theory on his own, and certain parts just happened to have already been discovered by Hume in the 18th century.

Anyway, there are (at least) three points that were addressed by Hume, in his writings, that I feel are relevant here. Before we get to those, I need to do some preliminary defining of terms.

In Hume's philosophy, the term "impression" refers to those stimuli which immediately impress themselves on our sensory organs (e.g. the pain of being poked in the finger is an impression). On the other hand, there are also "ideas" (notice how he avoided the trap that Locke had fallen into, of lumping all sorts of thought and experience into "ideas"), which are either "simple" or "complex", and which are defined (basically) as those thoughts that are not impressed upon us by external reality, but which are purely subjective (produced inside the brain without external stimulus). A "simple idea", by Hume's definition, is (basically) one that is identical (except in degree) to a previous impression. A "complex idea" is one that is not identical to a previous impression, but which can be reduced into many "simple ideas" which can be traced back to some past "impression". Indeed, all thought, in Hume's paradigm, could either be traced directly back to an identical (except in degree) impression, or to a simpler "idea" - which could then be traced back to an impression.

He put a bit of (IMO, unnecessary) effort into proving that all simple ideas are identical (except in degree - what I mean by this, btw, is that (for example) when you imagine being kicked in the gut, you don't actually feel pain (no matter how vivid the imagination); ergo, the degree is different, but you would still not be able to imagine being kicked in the gut, if it had never been "impressed" upon you) to previous impressions, and that the impression must always precede the idea, but I don't think I need to dwell on that too much, for now.

Now to the three relevant points:

1) From Hume's paradigm, we get that any "idea" (a subjective experience that is not equal to a previous "impression") can be reduced, and eventually traced back to some objective phenomenon. Even my use of the English language, in such a manner as to explain these things to all of you, is a complex "idea" that can be broken up into simpler "ideas", which can be traced back to impressions.

2) From Hume's paradigm, we get that, when one strips away all "impressions" and innate behavior (i.e. nature and nurture) one does not have some naked "self" left over, but has nothing, since there is nothing more to the self or the mind than these things.

3) (My favorite) From Hume's paradigm, we get that questions of the form "how/why did the 'impression' get comprehended as it did in the first place?" are completely moot. The famous example of different shades of blue...one might easily be convinced that the "impression" of each different shade is necessary for the "ideas" of different shades, in later life. However, some may still ask "how did the mind ever see 'blue' in the first place?" or "how did that particular wavelength translate to 'blue', when first 'impressed' in the viewer?". Hume's answer (in a nutshell), "how else should it have looked?". Think about it, if that wavelength of light didn't look that way, it would have to look some other way, and we'd still be asking the same question. So, it looks the way it does because it doesn't look any other way. Simple as that.

The other senses are much easier to deal with than sight, which is why I chose a visual example. But it seems rather simple, that the visual cortex does what the visual cortex is supposed to do: process incoming stimulus from the retina - which has already done some processing of its own - and categorizing for future reference (whether as an "idea" or another "impression" of the same color).

Take all of this and tie it in with all of the other philosophy and theory that I've discussed in previous threads (that of Dennett, Calvin, and Edelman to name a few), and I just don't see the "hard problem" as having any weight anymore.

P.S. Those other threads, if you haven't been there yet, are:
"Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness" (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=11986), "'What makes a liquid liquid?' questions (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=14763), and The Flaw in the Definition of Consciousness (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=15230)

And those are just the ones I've started. There are plenty more of them.

[hypnagogue]

I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway. I think he gets your point, and feels that it is irrelevant...all of this is a lost cause, but we seem to get some sort of enjoyment from it anyways.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I still think you are missing the entire point, but it's probably a lost cause anyway.

I think I get your point. At the heart of the matter, in your mind, is the eventual linking of all these computational processes to the workings of the brain. After all, the maple syrup I'm imagining right now doesn't look anything like synchronously-firing neurons. But what is it, exactly, that you don't think I've understood yet?

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Mentat
I think I get your point. At the heart of the matter, in your mind, is the eventual linking of all these computational processes to the workings of the brain. After all, the maple syrup I'm imagining right now doesn't look anything like synchronously-firing neurons. But what is it, exactly, that you don't think I've understood yet?

I'm not going to take hypnagogue's spot to explain himself, but I will give my shot at the disagreement.

I think, maybe——you are forgetting to consider the experience of the consciousness argument. I'll define it this way. You are imaging maple syrup, so naturally you know what maple syrup smells and tastes like, even if you never had it, you still subjectively allow your firing neurons from the neural brain signals to do the computational methods for you. This is experience. This is what is the heart of the matter. If you can see it in your mind, you can taste it, you can feel it, then, afterall this must be the experience that your brains tells you that experience happened before. And those same synchronously-firing neurons are their to match up the unidentified object to the object that you are imagining. So, in conclusion what I'm saying is: experience is its own individual experience and those neurons are their own individual experience on how subjectively define that object——imaginatively.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Jeebus
I'm not going to take hypnagogue's spot to explain himself, but I will give my shot at the disagreement.

I think, maybe——you are forgetting to consider the experience of the consciousness argument. I'll define it this way. You are imaging maple syrup, so naturally you know what maple syrup smells and tastes like, even if you never had it, you still subjectively allow your firing neurons from the neural brain signals to do the computational methods for you. This is experience. This is what is the heart of the matter. If you can see it in your mind, you can taste it, you can feel it, then, afterall this must be the experience that your brains tells you that experience happened before. And those same synchronously-firing neurons are their to match up the unidentified object to the object that you are imagining. So, in conclusion what I'm saying is: experience is its own individual experience and those neurons are their own individual experience on how subjectively define that object——imaginatively.

One problem: there is no "maple syrup" in my mind. It isn't an object, it's a collection of previous "impressions" (or, to go without Hume for a second, it's a collection of previous memories, which happen to fire together to produce almost exactly the same effect as if I were eating maple syrup (I say "almost exactly" because it can never reach the same degree as the actual "impression")).

[Mentat]

I just wanted to add a bit of reasoning that I thought would be obvious from what I posted originally, but I think I was mistaken...

The philosophies of Hume and Dennett (and their followers) lead to a logical framework which allows us to get rid of the idea that there are neural firings, and then there is an experience. After all, the synchronous firings never meet up at any one place (thus the experience is "smeared" out among different parts of the brain (as Dennett would put it)) and one perceives one coherent picture, while the firings occur at different times (thus the experience is "smeared" out temporally as well as spacially). So, trying to explain how the experience eventually comes to be (evolves) is like trying to explain how a natural disaster evolves...there is no one point in time or space wherein the whole disaster occurs, it takes a long time, and the end result (when the catastrophe subsides) is not a disaster, but is a world that has been ravaged by that disaster. Yet, one can't say that the disaster didn't happen, just because there was no exact place, nor any exact time, when/where it occured, you simply look back and lump all the events together so that, in retrospect, the whole set of occurances = a natural disaster.

[Canute]

Ok. But saying brain states are distribited in time and space is not contentious. It is precisely what gives rise to the binding problem. That is, it is part of the problem, part of what needs explaining, not the solution. It is a statement of fact and explains nothing.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Ok. But saying brain states are distribited in time and space is not contentious. It is precisely what gives rise to the binding problem. That is, it is part of the problem, part of what needs explaining, not the solution. It is a statement of fact and explains nothing.

Well, you would be 110% right (extra 10% for eloquency in presentation...something I'm trying to learn from your example) if there was an eventuality to these brain states, as so many philosophers have assumed. But, if they just keep going on, and re-stimulating themselves, without ever meeting up, then there is no "hard problem" of how they ever form a complete picture, they just don't.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, you would be 110% right (extra 10% for eloquency in presentation...something I'm trying to learn from your example) if there was an eventuality to these brain states, as so many philosophers have assumed. But, if they just keep going on, and re-stimulating themselves, without ever meeting up, then there is no "hard problem" of how they ever form a complete picture, they just don't.

I don't think you have a good grasp on what the hard problem is-- or at least, you are misrepresenting it here. Brain processes never meeting up-- that's still the binding problem, which asks how perceptual experiences are tied together to form the perception of single, coherent objects.

The hard problem deals with how it is that subjective experiences exist at all, and need not invoke the binding problem. Someone in a ganzfeld setup, for example, visually experiences only a uniform (say) red field; in this scenario, there are no diverse visual experiences to bind together, so the binding problem is irrelevant. But we still may ask why the person experiences redness at all (in the sense that a blindsighted person does not). Why shouldn't the person just be a zombie, with no experience of redness, yet still be able to process information from the visual stimulus? That's the hard problem. I hope the difference is clear.

[olde drunk]

you report information very well and grasp heavy concepts.

what i don't understand is your 'point'. what have you learned studing these philosophers and what can you add?

who and what is Mentat?? when you go outside on a clear spring day, do you smell the air? can you feel the natural renewal of life?

what do you believe? not what hume or dennett wrote.

do you believe in sunny days and baseball?

peace,

[selfAdjoint]

In Consciousness Explained Dennett has a beautiful passage where he's sitting on a patio under rustling trees, immersed in the balmy air and the birdsong -- and he brings it all home with his account of his own consciousness, with nothing of what he calls "skyhooks" and I call "magic" . Let me be clear about that; I don't mean ritual magick or literal magic, but rather appeals to something that is beyond empiricism and analysis.

[Zero]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
In Consciousness Explained Dennett has a beautiful passage where he's sitting on a patio under rustling trees, immersed in the balmy air and the birdsong -- and he brings it all home with his account of his own consciousness, with nothing of what he calls "skyhooks" and I call "magic" . Let me be clear about that; I don't mean ritual magick or literal magic, but rather appeals to something that is beyond empiricism and analysis. I don't understand why more people don't see the elegance and beauty of a "machine"( the human body, including the brain) working in glorious harmony to engage the natural world of which it is a small part.

[hypnagogue]

That might be elegant and beautiful, but it fails to explain all the phenomena that need explaining.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't think you have a good grasp on what the hard problem is-- or at least, you are misrepresenting it here. Brain processes never meeting up-- that's still the binding problem, which asks how perceptual experiences are tied together to form the perception of single, coherent objects.


But they never do...that's the only reason Dennett thinks the Materialistic paradigm can work: The perceptual experiences (whatever those are) never have to meet up and become a singular, coherent experience (whatever that is) because it works just as well for the information to be integrated (as in a computer) such that, in retrospect, it seems like a coherent experience (and "seems like" can be replaced with "is processed as").


The hard problem deals with how it is that subjective experiences exist at all, and need not invoke the binding problem.


How do you know that they do exist at all, if they aren't even defined?


Someone in a ganzfeld setup, for example, visually experiences only a uniform (say) red field; in this scenario, there are no diverse visual experiences to bind together, so the binding problem is irrelevant. But we still may ask why the person experiences redness at all (in the sense that a blindsighted person does not).


A blind-sighted person does experience the color, otherwise they wouldn't know what the color was later. But then, I don't know anything about blindsight studies, and don't pretend to...I just know what you've told me so far, and it seems as though the subject can report the color that they saw, later, while not having experienced it at the time...is that right?


Why shouldn't the person just be a zombie, with no experience of redness, yet still be able to process information from the visual stimulus? That's the hard problem. I hope the difference is clear.

Yes, it is. You're better at this explaining than I am, and I appreciate your ability as well as your use thereof to teach me.

The problem still remains, as stated in my little quote (at the end of each post): How else do you expect a visual cortex to process visual stimuli? It doesn't "know" any other way, besides visual experience. If you get a silicon machine that does the same things as a visual cortex, it will experience visual stimuli also, that's what they're made to do.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
That might be elegant and beautiful, but it fails to explain all the phenomena that need explaining.

What phenomenon does it leave out (note: please do not include any undefined terms in your answer)?

[Mentat]

Originally posted by olde drunk
you report information very well and grasp heavy concepts.


Thank you.


what i don't understand is your 'point'. what have you learned studing these philosophers and what can you add?


I don't have a "point", except to "report information well and grasp heavy concepts". I have learned nothing conclusive from these philosophers and can add nothing conclusive to them, and I like it better that way (viz a viz changing primary belief with each new philosophy).


who and what is Mentat?? when you go outside on a clear spring day, do you smell the air? can you feel the natural renewal of life?

what do you believe? not what hume or dennett wrote.

do you believe in sunny days and baseball?

peace,

I prefer rainy days and reading...but I understand what you mean. You're wondering how I can maintain the joi de vive if I see reality only through the eyes of materialistic philosophers, right? The truth is, I have a set of core beliefs that have no entered the picture here. I right down what Dennett and Hume say, because what I believe myself is both irrelevant to the conversation and a potential obstruction of logical discussion.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
The problem still remains, as stated in my little quote (at the end of each post): How else do you expect a visual cortex to process visual stimuli? It doesn't "know" any other way, besides visual experience. If you get a silicon machine that does the same things as a visual cortex, it will experience visual stimuli also, that's what they're made to do.

I think everything else you addressed in this post of yours is being addressed elsewhere, and this may be too, but I'll reply again anyway.

Here is your explanatory method as applied to H2O molecules and water fluidity:

Say we have a set X of H2O molecules under certain circumstances. Such a set is always observed to correspond to macroscopic fluidity. How else do you expect it to be? That is just the way it is.

This is an impoverished explanation because it has not yet made explicit any a priori logical ties between the properties of H2O molecules and the fluidity of water. It has no bridge principle. To have a good explanation, we must provide a bridge principle that makes explicit the logical ties, such that one could predict a priori from the description of X its macroscopic properties. Such a bridge principle is easy enough to construct in this case, but it is not so obvious in the case of the relationship between brain processes and subjective experience. Until we find such a bridge principle we can't be satisfied with brute correlation as an explanatory mechanism.

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Mentat
One problem: there is no "maple syrup" in my mind. It isn't an object, it's a collection of previous "impressions" (or, to go without Hume for a second, it's a collection of previous memories, which happen to fire together to produce almost exactly the same effect as if I were eating maple syrup (I say "almost exactly" because it can never reach the same degree as the actual "impression")).

That previous colletion of images, nonetheless, would form the object in your mind imaginatively to make that memory of what maple syrup is. And how do you know it isn't in your mind? What does that mean exactly to your reference of the imaginary effect on the degree of actual impression of maple syrup?

[olde drunk]

Originally posted by Mentat
Thank you.



I don't have a "point", except to "report information well and grasp heavy concepts". I have learned nothing conclusive from these philosophers and can add nothing conclusive to them, and I like it better that way (viz a viz changing primary belief with each new philosophy).

I prefer rainy days and reading...but I understand what you mean. You're wondering how I can maintain the joi de vive if I see reality only through the eyes of materialistic philosophers, right? The truth is, I have a set of core beliefs that have no entered the picture here. I right down what Dennett and Hume say, because what I believe myself is both irrelevant to the conversation and a potential obstruction of logical discussion.

why cheat the universe of your unique views?? if you can undersatand these concepts, you must have an opinion on what is realy happening in our reality. i would rather discuss views and ideas, not debate what someone else said or wrote.

to each his own, peace!

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
What phenomenon does it leave out (note: please do not include any undefined terms in your answer)? [/B]
Complete answers have to undefined terms in them otherwise they will be trivially self-referential. This is the mathematical equivalent of the hard problem. It's worth understanding why this is so because it is directly relevant.

A theory is equivalently a set of definitions. Any non self-referential set of definitions must contain an undefined term. Consciousness is science's ultimate undefined term, the final term in its theory that cannot be defined. This is what Max Planck was implying in that quote I posted to you.

It does not take a Sherlock Holmes to interpret the evidence. Ex hyothesis science cannot explain subjective experience or ultimate reality, and we know any theory of everything must have an undefined term in it. This is the hard problem from a mathematical perspective.

BTW this is why it is incorrect to take Buddhism as being based on theory. If it was it would suffer from the same problem. This issue is what led Einstein to make his well known comment that insofar as as a mathematical system describes reality it is not provable, and vice versa.

It is arrogant of you, IMHO, to dismiss all these arguments as if their proponents were stupid philosophers rather than infallible scientists. I do not feel that as yet you have grasped the issues.

I thought that you were trying to this, but I'm becoming less and less certain. If the problem was as simple as you assert it to be then we would have solved it, in outline at least, in the 18th Century, and probably much earlier.

[Zero]

Originally posted by Canute


However it seems fairly obvious since ex hyothesis science cannot explain subjective experience or ultimate reality, and since we know that any theory of everything must have an undefined term in it. This is the hard problem from a mathematical perspective. "Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existance of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
"Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existance of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one.

How's this for logic:
1) All mechanistic processes are objectively observable.
2) Subjective experience is a mechanistic process.
3) Subjective experience is not objectively observable.

hmm

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
How's this for logic:
1) All mechanistic processes are objectively observable.
2) Subjective experience is a mechanistic process.
3) Subjective experience is not objectively observable.

hmm Are you sure about #3? I'll admit that our ability to track the operation of the mind is at its infancy, but already we can see how certain parts of the brain produce certain "subjective experiences", and can even use electrodes to create those experiences directly.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Are you sure about #3? I'll admit that our ability to track the operation of the mind is at its infancy, but already we can see how certain parts of the brain produce certain "subjective experiences", and can even use electrodes to create those experiences directly.

Those things might be something like the objective footprints of subjective experience, but they are not subjective experience itself. Surely this is a useful tool for getting a better understanding of consciousness, but the fact remains that I cannot literally see what you see-- I cannot observe your subjective experience. If what you see literally is a mechanistic process, I should be able to literally see it in your brain. If you propose rather that subjective experience is some kind of 'aspect' of your brain processes, the fact remains that this aspect is completely hidden from my objective observation of you.

[Canute]

Originally posted by Zero
"Subjective experience" and "ultimate reality" are null phrases, from my standpoint. There is no reason to assume the existance of either as being somehow "apart" from the mechanistic operation of the human brain, and the universe as a whole. The desire to believe there is something beyond the mechanistic and material is an emotional stance, not a logical one. [/B]
This is not the case, and it is provably not the case. Hypno has shown this above, and there are many other ways of showing it. Your view also contradicts the view of just about every well known philsopher or scientist that ever lived except Ayn Rand, who, not by coincidence, has not been able to construct a coherent Objectivist metaphysic.

However I agree with you in as much as subjective experience and ultimate reality must always, ex hypothesis, be 'null phrases' for science.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Those things might be something like the objective footprints of subjective experience, but they are not subjective experience itself. Surely this is a useful tool for getting a better understanding of consciousness, but the fact remains that I cannot literally see what you see-- I cannot observe your subjective experience. If what you see literally is a mechanistic process, I should be able to literally see it in your brain. If you propose rather that subjective experience is some kind of 'aspect' of your brain processes, the fact remains that this aspect is completely hidden from my objective observation of you. That doesn't seem to follow. It seems more like you go out of your way to define(subjectively, of course, and without evidence) the terms of the debate so that "subjective experience" cannot under any circumstances result from mechanical processes.

Of course, the difficulty arises with the utter complexity of the brain. We start with something like 100 billion neurons, each capable of making up to 15,000 connections. That figures out to about...ummm...one hell of alot of neural pathways. Insisting that "subjective experience" cannot be created by that sort of network is acceptable, I guess, even if it is not logical. Insisting that the only evidence you will accept is that we track every single one of those pathways, in real time, is ridiculous.

Further, the claims of a "soul" are like claiming "my car runs on invisible gremlins...oh, and I guess that the engine and battery and gas and stuff might have a little to do with it, but mostly its the gremlins. Oh, yeah, I know the engine has to be running, and the condition of the car appears to affect the performance, but it HAS to be gremlins! Yes yes yes, I know the car has to have gas in it, but that is because gasoline emits gremlin radiation that the gremlins convert to horsepower"

IOW, you have a perfectly rational explanation, and decide to tack an unsupported claim on top of it, for what I take to be purely emotional reasons.

[Canute]

Originally posted by Zero
That doesn't seem to follow. It seems more like you go out of your way to define(subjectively, of course, and without evidence) the terms of the debate so that "subjective experience" cannot under any circumstances result from mechanical processes.
Hypnogogue states only the facts. It's not his fault if experiences are subjective.

Of course, the difficulty arises with the utter complexity of the brain. We start with something like 100 billion neurons, each capable of making up to 15,000 connections. That figures out to about...ummm...one hell of alot of neural pathways. Insisting that "subjective experience" cannot be created by that sort of network is acceptable, I guess, even if it is not logical. Insisting that the only evidence you will accept is that we track every single one of those pathways, in real time, is ridiculous.
In this context the brain is perfectly simple. It is a physical entity the functioning of which affects our subjective experience.

It doesn't matter what the brain is, or how complex it is, the problem is one of explaining how somenting physical gives rise to something non-physical, Call the brain a rock if you like, or the most complx thing in the universe, the basic problem remains the same.

Further, the claims of a "soul" are like claiming "my car runs on invisible gremlins...oh, and I guess that the engine and battery and gas and stuff might have a little to do with it, but mostly its the gremlins. Oh, yeah, I know the engine has to be running, and the condition of the car appears to affect the performance, but it HAS to be gremlins! Yes yes yes, I know the car has to have gas in it, but that is because gasoline emits gremlin radiation that the gremlins convert to horsepower"
Did someone mention 'souls'? I missed that.

Also you miss the fact that a car does not do anything at all unless there is a gremlin driving it.

[Zero]

That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
IOW, you have a perfectly rational explanation, and decide to tack an unsupported claim on top of it, for what I take to be purely emotional reasons.

Ad-hominem

It's easier to just assume someone is biased and irrational so that you don't have to address the issues than it is to lay out exactly why you hold the opinion you do. Don't worry, you don't have to do anything. I'm just pointing it out in case some reader might be lead astray.

Also I see this thread (once again) dangerously getting into this physical/nonphysical distinction. I think the problems with consciousness can be communicated without having to go into that mess. Be careful with that word Canute. Next you'll find out that Zero thinks Physical means "Everything that exists". So naturally there is nothing non-physical to him. By definition it must be so. The problems of consciousness are real and shouldn't be side-stepped because someone creates a semantic mess by defining things as they see fit without proper inquiry into the philosophical issue being discussed.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

I'm not sure what logic or evidence you're referring to but I'm sure you could list it all out if I asked you to. But instead of doing that, why don't you relate this logic to some of the key issues laid out by hynagogue? Specifically address where the hard problem lies. That would be helpful. Mentat is actually trying to do just that. It just seems he isn't quite able(or willing) to grasp the problem. Perhaps you can help.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
That is still assuming that there is a non-physical element to "subjective experience", which the evidence and logic don't support.

The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory.

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Ad-hominem

It's easier to just assume someone is biased and irrational so that you don't have to address the issues than it is to lay out exactly why you hold the opinion you do. Don't worry, you don't have to do anything. I'm just pointing it out in case some reader might be lead astray.

Also I see this thread (once again) dangerously getting into this physical/nonphysical distinction. I think the problems with consciousness can be communicated without having to go into that mess. Be careful with that word Canute. Next you'll find out that Zero thinks Physical means "Everything that exists". So naturally there is nothing non-physical to him. By definition it must be so. The problems of consciousness are real and shouldn't be side-stepped because someone creates a semantic mess by defining things as they see fit without proper inquiry into the philosophical issue being discussed. Not ad hominem at all...as far as I know, being emotional isn't an insult, and to my way of thinking I can discern no other reason to embrace mysticism over materialism.

Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined. The basic argument for non-physical seems to be "because it has to be there, it just has to!!" That sounds more emotional than logical to me. On the other hand, I say that while the non-physical might "exist"(whatever that means for something with no existance), there is no evidence or logical need to assume it.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
The evidence does support it.

Evidence 1: I subjectively experience.
Evidence 2: No one can observe my subjective experiences but me.
Definition: All things physical must be objectively observable.
Conclusion: Subjective experience is not physical.

or

Definition 1: Subjective experience is defined at least partially intrinsically.
Definition 2: Physical phenomena are defined exclusively extrinsically.
Postulate: Intrinsic phenomena cannot be derived from extrinsic phenomena (follows from the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic).
Conclusion: Subjective experience cannot be derived from physical theory. It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.

It'd be nice if you could back that up. I could just as well say that it does follow, except that you don't want it to follow in order to hold onto your worldview.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
It'd be nice if you could back that up. I could just as well say that it does follow, except that you don't want it to follow in order to hold onto your worldview. Read my edit.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion.

My conclusion does follow from #1 in each case, yes. However, this is not something I have assumed. This is something I have observed to be the case in nature.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
My conclusion does follow from #1 in each case, yes. However, this is not something I have assumed. This is something I have observed to be the case in nature. No, it is absolutely an assumption. Have you every seen a functioning "mind" outside of a brain?

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Not ad hominem at all...as far as I know, being emotional isn't an insult, and to my way of thinking I can discern no other reason to embrace mysticism over materialism.


I said Ad hominem because you focused on the individual rather than the argument. Focusing on a feature of the individual meant to discredit the argument without evidence is a fallacy for sure. Just deal with the issue.



Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined. The basic argument for non-physical seems to be "because it has to be there, it just has to!!" That sounds more emotional than logical to me. On the other hand, I say that while the non-physical might "exist"(whatever that means for something with no existance), there is no evidence or logical need to assume it.

I don't disagree with any of this. When you define these words the way you do then what you are saying must be true. But these silly words/definitions don't have anything to do with the hard problem of consciousness being discussed here.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
No, it is absolutely an assumption. Have you every seen a functioning "mind" outside of a brain?

If we take it for granted that a brain's physical properties are necessary for consciousness, we still have not shown them to be sufficient.

[Zero]

There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
If we take it for granted that a brain's physical properties are necessary for consciousness, we still have not shown them to be sufficient. You haven't shown them to be insufficient, and that is the claim and assumption you are making, based on circular logic.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.

Which is? Are you denying that you subjectively experience the world?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
There IS no hard problem. That's the point, the "hard problem" is an illogical pseudo-question based on unfounded assumption.

Yes there is, unless you can explain to me how the brain is responsible for consciousness as well as you can explain to me how the properties of H2O molecules are responsible for macroscopic fluidity. That is, unless you can show consciousness to be a logically necessary result of brain processes, you have failed. Just saying "whenever we have brain activity X we have subjective experience Y" is not enough. That is an a postiori account, but to vanquish the hard problem we need an a priori account.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes there is, unless you can explain to me how the brain is responsible for consciousness as well as you can explain to me how the properties of H2O molecules are responsible for macroscopic fluidity. That is, unless you can show consciousness to be a logically necessary result of brain processes, you have failed. Just saying "whenever we have brain activity X we have subjective experience Y" is not enough. That is an a postiori account, but to vanquish the hard problem we need an a priori account. Do you accept that the functioning of the brain is tied to the nebulous concept "consciousness? Do you accept that we have solid substantial evidence that the activities of the nervous system is tied in some way to that other pseudo-term "subjective experience".

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Which is? Are you denying that you subjectively experience the world? My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
You haven't shown them to be insufficient, and that is the claim and assumption you are making, based on circular logic.

P: Brain activity X occurs.
Q: Subjective experience Y occurs.

Perhaps we can establish P->Q empirically, that is, a postiori, but the hard problem is not about establishing such a connection. The hard problem is about establishing an a priori connection.

The only way I can logically imagine P ^ ~Q is if I have not been shown a priori that P is sufficient for Q. Given a physical explanation of subjective experience, I can still logically imagine P ^ ~Q-- there is nothing in the logic of the explanation that prevents me from doing so. (Contrast with the logic of the explanation of macroscopic fluidity in terms of H2O molecule properties, which logically forces me to conclude that the macroscopic properties must include fluidity.) This is the same thing as saying that it has not yet been shown that P is a priori sufficient for Q.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?

Just trying to figure out which assumption you think is wrong. I just went to Hypnagogue's number 1 "I have subjective experience". Thought you claimed it was not a good assumption.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Do you accept that the functioning of the brain is tied to the nebulous concept "consciousness? Do you accept that we have solid substantial evidence that the activities of the nervous system is tied in some way to that other pseudo-term "subjective experience".

I do accept this, although I do not accept your disparaging use of the "pseudo" prefix. In any case, you are describing an a postiori account, when the hard problem is about an a priori account.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I do accept this, although I do not accept your disparaging use of the "pseudo" prefix. In any case, you are describing an a postiori account, when the hard problem is about an a priori account. Where's the evidence, equivalent to the evidence for the mind-brain link, that supports something beyond the physical? Come on, show me, I wanna see it!![:D]

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Where's the evidence, equivalent to the evidence for the mind-brain link, that supports something beyond the physical? Come on, show me, I wanna see it!![:D]

I already stated this, several posts back.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I already stated this, several posts back. You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?

What hypnagogue is telling you Zero is that there is no reductive explanation for consciousness. Have you "quoted a study published in a scientific journal that accomplishes this?" Is there a link that I missed?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
You showed physical evidence, quoted a study published in a scientific journal? Is there a link that I missed?

You want physical evidence for a non-physical phenomenon?

The evidence for its being non-physical is precisely that it cannot be detected objectively. And yet, we know it exists.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
You want physical evidence for a non-physical phenomenon?

The evidence for its being non-physical is precisely that it cannot be detected objectively. And yet, we know it exists. Darn it, you had me all excited...[:(]

BTW, I don't want to be rude, gosh no I don't, trust me if I did you would know it...anyhoo! The evidence for something non-physical existing is that it doesn't exist, but it does? Sorry, I just can't contain that level of illogic in my head, not the same week I watched 'Being John Malkovich'. As Mentat has stated repeatedly, if you accept the perfectly logical idea that "subjective experience" is a linguistic shorthand for the incredibly complex interactions between the nervous system, sensory organs, and the world at large, there is no need to add an unproven and unprovable entity.

In other words, experience is a function of brain function, nothing more or less, and there is no reason to assume otherwise.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
In other words, experience is a function of brain function, nothing more or less, and there is no reason to assume otherwise.

Where are the scientific journals and links that reductively explain how this is the case? I can't wait until they figure out how to explain colors to a blind man.

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Zero
It doesn't follow, except that you WANT it to follow.#1 in both cases assumes your conclusion. . . .

Next, I'll tell you that "non-physical" is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world, and therefore cannot be defined.

Your statement "non-physical is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world" assumes your conclusion. You do not know if that is true or not.

Originally posted by Zero
My brain engages in certain processes that we define as "experience" yes. Since those "experiences" are a function of my individual brain activity, they can be defined as "subjective". What is your point?

Again your conclusion is assumed. You do not know if experiences are solely a function of brain activity. How can you know, using purely physical-detecting research techniques, if brain function might be limited to contributing to some non-physical experiential property of consciousness?

Further, the common argument taht there is "no evidence" is to ignore those who claim they do experience something non-physical. That may not be proof, but it is evidence. In light of such experiential reports, it could be that you and other physicalists lack the consciousness skills needed to experience the non-physical (personally I suspect that is exactly what the problem is; that is, it is physicalists fetish with physical reality that blinds them to the more subtle experience of the non-physical).

In any case, because you do not experience anything non-physical (or recognize the experience) doesn't mean you can assume there is no non-physical. Your statements should accordingly be, "I am not aware of anything non-physical." One cannot extend one's personal lack of experience to be proof of a lack in objective reality.

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Where are the scientific journals and links that reductively explain how this is the case? I can't wait until they figure out how to explain colors to a blind man. The heck are you talking about? Explaining colors to a blind man is a purely mechanistic problem, again not requiring some magical, mysictal, or emotional explanation to cheapen reality. The reason you can't explain color to the blindman is because of hardware and programming differences. Its the same reason why I can't get a camera to play music, or hook a Mac up to a PC without serious hassles.

[Zero]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
Your statement "non-physical is nonsense, because if it is non-physical, it doesn't interact with the physical world" assumes your conclusion. You do not know if that is true or not.



Again your conclusion is assumed. You do not know if experiences are solely a function of brain activity. How can you know, using purely physical-detecting research techniques, if brain function is limited to contributing to some non-physical experiential property of consciousness?

Further, to say there is "no evidence" is to ignore those who claim they do experience something non-physical. That may not be proof, but it is evidence. In light of such experiential reports, it could be that you and other physicalists lack the consciousness skills needed to experience the non-physical. In fact, I suspect that is exactly what the problem is; that is, it is physicalists fetish with physical reality that blinds them to the more subtle experience of the non-physical.

In any case, because you do not experience anything non-physical (or recognize the experience) doesn't mean you can assume there is no non-physical. Your statements would have to be, "I am not aware of anything non-physical." You cannot extend your personal lack of experience to be proof of a lack in objective reality. Getting deep into the pseudomystical gunk now, aren't we? Anecdote isn't evidence, "special abilities and knowledge' is code word for "you gotta get brainwashed to believe it", and you cannot extend your lack of satisfaction with materialism so far as to make unfounded assumptions.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
The heck are you talking about? Explaining colors to a blind man is a purely mechanistic problem, again not requiring some magical, mysictal, or emotional explanation to cheapen reality. The reason you can't explain color to the blindman is because of hardware and programming differences. Its the same reason why I can't get a camera to play music, or hook a Mac up to a PC without serious hassles.

I'm asking you to show where science has explained consciousness reductively. This was your claim of certainty and I'm asking you to show me where. Where are my articles? I'm so excited!

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Getting deep into the pseudomystical gunk now, aren't we? Anecdote isn't evidence, "special abilities and knowledge' is code word for "you gotta get brainwashed to believe it", and you cannot extend your lack of satisfaction with materialism so far as to make unfounded assumptions.

Zero, I see some poor behavior going on in the General Discussion forum. You might want to go on back over there and straighten it out. I'm glad they got you in charge of such an important discussion area. Hope you get that worked out.

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
I'm asking you to show where science has explained consciousness reductively. This was your claim of certainty and I'm asking you to show me where. Where are my articles? I'm so excited! Frankly, I don't see the need to. I count it as a flaw, but not a fatal one.

[Zero]

Mostly, it seems to be a flaw in my credit...

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Frankly, I don't see the need to. I count it as a flaw, but not a fatal one.

But this has been Hypnagogue's main point in all these threads. There is no reductive explanation of consciousness because it isn't possible. So if you don't feel the need to show that there is then why are you posting in this thread?

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Mostly, it seems to be a flaw in my credit...

It's spelled "Credibility"

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
But this has been Hypnagogue's main point in all these threads. There is no reductive explanation of consciousness because it isn't possible. So if you don't feel the need to show that there is then why are you posting in this thread? Ha! Who says it isn't possible? I just said I didn't come up with it, and that's all I'm saying. [:D]

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
It's spelled "Credibility" Ad hominem, I presume? Pleased to meet you.


Actually, the links I've found have been "pay per view"...you have to buy the research notes, and I'm sorely lacking in plastic fundage.[:D]

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Ha! Who says it isn't possible? I just said [i]I[/] didn't come up with it, and that's all I'm saying. [:D]

Yes, I know this. But this thread is about why it isn't possible to be reductively explained. If you don't have any philsophically worthy comments to add to this discussion then why are you posting here? No one cares what you believe. The point of the thread is to discuss "why".

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
[B]Ad hominem, I presume? Pleased to meet you.


I haven't used any comments about you as a reason to make a conclusion about the issue we're discussing. I'm still looking for articles before I draw conclusions. So no Ad hominem here. I'll provide a link to definitions of these if you want to brush up on what they mean.



Actually, the links I've found have been "pay per view"...you have to buy the research notes, and I'm sorely lacking in plastic fundage.

Don't waste your money because if they actually claim a reductive explanation, they are false advertising. It doesn't exists.

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Zero
Getting deep into the pseudomystical gunk now, aren't we? Anecdote isn't evidence, "special abilities and knowledge' is code word for "you gotta get brainwashed to believe it", and you cannot extend your lack of satisfaction with materialism so far as to make unfounded assumptions.

Not me!

"Anecdote" = strawman argument.

"Brainwashed" = your paranoia.

Besides, you didn't answer my complaint properly. You are the one making concrete statements about obective reality (that the non-physical doesn't exist). If you ever can demonstrate the physical is responsible for all, then you might be justified in your claim. That is not yet proven, so it is not illogical to hypothesize that those aspects unexplained by physical principles might have a non-physical source.

I and others are mostly saying that physical principles do not yet explain everything. It is the physicalists who have lost their objectivity because they assume a priori their lack of experience means there is no non-physical. Further, they fail to properly acknowledge the very real problem of trying to observe the non-physical using physical detection techniques.

So I still say, one's fetish shouldn't influence objective statements about reality.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
The evidence for something non-physical existing is that it doesn't exist, but it does?

That's not at all what I claimed. I claimed that subjective experience cannot be observed objectively, but it can be observed (subjectively).

As Mentat has stated repeatedly, if you accept the perfectly logical idea that "subjective experience" is a linguistic shorthand for the incredibly complex interactions between the nervous system, sensory organs, and the world at large, there is no need to add an unproven and unprovable entity.

When I refer to subjective experience, I do not refer to my brain functions. The two may be tied in integral ways, but that is not the point. The point is that I am referring to a certain point of view. E.g., normally when I talk about water I am referring to my macroscopic point of view of water, and the thought of H2O molecules never enters my mind. Thus even though water and H2O molecules are the same thing, I can still refer to the concept of water from one point of view without referring to the concept of its molecules.

When I refer to subjective experience I refer to my qualitative experience of the world. This is a conceptual point of view quite distinct from the concept of brain activity. I am not adding anything unnecessary; I am very simply referring to something I directly observe. If anything, it is quite necessary for me to assert the existence of subjective experience if I am to be honest with myself.

Unproven? Subjective experience is perpetually proven to me, every instant that I am awake! You are speaking as if the 1st person perspective does not exist, and that there is only a 3rd person point of view. That is obviously false.

[Zero]

Actually, as I stated before, it is wholy possible for non-physical whatever to exist, although it escapes me as to how you would prove it. However, there is no logical reason to include it, either. Since you cannot detect, define, or measure the non-physical, there is no logical way to use it in a theory of anything. It is a fancy way of saying "I don't know", and then filling in whatever ideas make you feel warm and squishy inside.

And, Fliption, I know you dig having me around, don't fight the feeling![6)]

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Actually, as I stated before, it is wholy possible for non-physical whatever to exist, although it escapes me as to how you would prove it. However, there is no logical reason to include it, either. Since you cannot detect, define, or measure the non-physical, there is no logical way to use it in a theory of anything. It is a fancy way of saying "I don't know", and then filling in whatever ideas make you feel warm and squishy inside.

I would agree that this critique applies to terms such as 'spirit,' 'life force,' etc.

However, it does not apply to subjective experience, because by definition we can detect it. No, we cannot detect it objectively, but we quite obviously observe it all the time subjectively. It is thus quite logical to speak of subjective experience-- any logical difficulties only arise when we try to combine our concept of the 1st person POV with our concept of the 3rd person POV.

[Zero]

Actually, I may have come up with a "reductive theory of consciousness", but I can't be sure, since I'm not a navel-gazer by trade or general inclination.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I would agree that this critique applies to terms such as 'spirit,' 'life force,' etc.

However, it does not apply to subjective experience, because by definition we can detect it. No, we cannot detect it objectively, but we quite obviously observe it all the time subjectively. Actually, this could go somewhere. So, you don't buy into "spirit", "life force", etc, correct, at least for the sake of this argument?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Actually, this could go somewhere. So, you don't buy into "spirit", "life force", etc, correct, at least for the sake of this argument?

Correct.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Correct. And you claim that your evidence of "subjective experience" is the experience itself?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
And you claim that your evidence of "subjective experience" is the experience itself?

Yes.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yes. So, how do you know that you are percieving it correctly, in order to state that it cannot arise from the purely physical?

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
So, how do you know that you are percieving it correctly, in order to state that it cannot arise from the purely physical?

It's not a question of 'correct' or 'incorrect.' I imagine you are planning to say that it could just be an illusion. But that would not get us anywhere, because then we would have the same problems explaining the illusion itself.

What is that problem? One way to phrase the problem is that subjective experience possesses intrinsic properties, whereas our physical theories speak only of extrinsic properties. The objective notion of length, for example, has no meaning if I do not have some reference marker with which to compare quantities of length. However, my subjective notion of 'redness' does not come by way of comparison or reference to other colors or concepts; it is self-defining, in a way, and so it is said to have an intrinsic quality.

For instance, suppose you are floating in the center of a large, uniformly lit (such that there are no shadows or gradations of color), atmosphereless white sphere with nothing in it but yourself. (You can survive because you are in a space suit, although you cannot remove any part of your suit.) Suppose that you and the sphere are stationary, so you cannot approach its edge. Can you tell how wide the sphere is? No, you can't, because you have no references with which to compare it. You cannot go up to it and measure its circumference with a tape measure, you cannot calculate how far its edge is from you by yelling and estimating the time delay of the echo, and so on. In the absence of a reference, the sphere's width is undefined to you; not surprising, since extension is an extrinsic property. At best, you know it is at least a bit bigger than yourself, but you only know that by way of reference to your own body's physical dimensions.

But you can perceive that the sphere is white. You do not have to compare its color to anything else to know this; you don't have to look down at your boot and say "OK, now that I see both my boot and the sphere, I can tell that the sphere is white." You simply perceive its white-ness, and even in the absence of any other reference colors, you know it is white. That is because your perception of the sphere's color is an intrinsic property.

So if subjective experience is to be physical, that is equivalent to saying that there must be some way to get intrinsic properties from extrinsic properties. But this is not possible. We cannot use a set of things that are inherently defined with respect to other things to create something that is entirely defined by itself. The best we can do from a set of extrinsic (relational) properties is create more complex chains of relations, but we can't somehow manipulate relationships to get something that is characterized by its lack of relationship with anything else.

[Zero]

"Redness" is referenced against the first imprinted "red" color, as it was explained to us. It is exactly the same as how a computer recognizes your passwords, only more subtle. The first red thing we identify as such is "red", and then all other "redness" is checked against it. The notion of "red" is absolutely measured against a reference. In fact, humans can detect huge variations of colors, based on comparing to stored data in the brain. I don't get your point, unless I am missing something.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
"Redness" is referenced against the first imprinted "red" color, as it was explained to us.

Even if I grant you that for the sake of argument-- what was the first experienced redness referenced against?

Besides, your counterargument might be valid for something like color recognition, which can be explained objectively (there is even a sense, objectively of course, in which a red-and-green pair of 3D glasses 'recognizes' certain colors)-- but at bottom it does not address how the extrinsic properties of the brain account for the intrinsic properties of experience.

It is exactly the same as how a computer recognizes your passwords, only more subtle.

A computer recognizes passwords, but does it experience passwords?

The first red thing we identify as such is "red", and then all other "redness" is checked against it.

You are talking about objective 'recognition' or discerning of light wavelengths. Thus you are talking about the wrong type of phenomenon: objective and not subjective. I can build a machine that does exactly what you have described without expecting it to experience color, just like I do not expect that my computer actually experiences passwords. Moreover, it can be shown that both you and I can recognize color without experiencing it (eg with an experiment involving unconscious primes). So recognizing a color in this sense is not the same thing as experiencing a color.

edit: Or, to use a better phrasing: Recognizing a wavelength of light is not the same thing as experiencing a color.

[Jeebus]

One quick question about the computer. Couldn't a computer recognize from awareness of validity of the 'correct' password and the 'incorrect' password. Wouldn't this awareness be semi-synonymous with the term experience?

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
.

edit: Or, to use a better phrasing: Recognizing a wavelength of light is not the same thing as experiencing a color. Yes it is...I just did it, to test myself.

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
And, Fliption, I know you dig having me around, don't fight the feeling![6)]

I always knew you believed whatever you wanted to regardless of the evidence. Thanks for the proof.

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zero
Yes it is...I just did it, to test myself.

But I already gave you scientific evidence that you can recognize something without subjectively experiencing it. They are not the same thing, even if they overlap in our usual daily experience; they can be dissociated.

I should mention that the opposite direction works too; for instance, someone with capragas syndrome (I believe that's the correct term but I couldn't verify it with google) can subjectively experience faces without being able to recognize them.

[Zero]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
But I already gave you scientific evidence that you can recognize something without subjectively experiencing it. They are not the same thing, even if they overlap in our usual daily experience; they can be dissociated.

I should mention that the opposite direction works too; for instance, someone with capragas syndrome (I believe that's the correct term but I couldn't verify it with google) can subjectively experience faces without being able to recognize them. i'm going to back out now, this is wasting my time and yours, I think. We're both pretty well convinced of our positions. We will reject any argument that the other person has. I'm just going to call it a draw and move on.[:D]

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
i'm going to back out now, this is wasting my time and yours, I think. We're both pretty well convinced of our positions. We will reject any argument that the other person has. I'm just going to call it a draw and move on.[:D]

Is this a philosophy forum or a kindergarten class? The whole point isn't to "win" anything or even have a "draw". It's to try to understand where the views diverge and why. All of this in an effort to learn.

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Is this a philosophy forum or a kindergarten class? The whole point isn't to "win" anything or even have a "draw". It's to try to understand where the views diverge and why. All of this in an effort to learn. Sure, but I know his position, he knows mine, and coming up with more and more elaborate examples of our positions probably isn't going to change his mind or mine. No, it isn't about winning or losing, which is why I don't mind pulling out of the conversation when it doesn't seem to me to be getting anywhere. I figured calling it a "draw" was a more graceful way of putting an end to my end of the discussion.

The semi-traditional way of ending this sort of thing is to say "I give up on trying to convince you, you are too stupid to understand so I'm putting you on ignore, you are a worthless waste of bandwidth!" I've got to much respect for hypnagogue and his posting on this thread to insult him that way, but I wanted him to know I wasn't planning on carrying on my end of the discussion anymore. [6)]

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Zero
Sure, but I know his position, he knows mine, and coming up with more and more elaborate examples of our positions probably isn't going to change his mind or mine. No, it isn't about winning or losing, which is why I don't mind pulling out of the conversation when it doesn't seem to me to be getting anywhere. I figured calling it a "draw" was a more graceful way of putting an end to my end of the discussion.
[6)]

I see. I didn't perceive that you were doing a very elaborate job of giving examples or trying to respond to his. That's why I posted my last response. For example, his logical proof (which doesn't prove anything, it just illustrates the problem being discussed), wasn't even addressed by you except to say that assumption number 1 wasn't a valid assumption. Even though in a later post you agreed that it is an assumption you have as well. Mostly, you just ignore the details like these and resort to the "where's the evidence?" type of statements. This topic is about whether consciousness can be reductively explained. The only evidence that needs to be shown is that no one can explain it. This discussion just centers around why that fact will never change. The only evidence remaining for such a discussion is logical proofs.

[pelastration]

It can be interesting to look to: digital versus analogue.
Digital can never give all the fine-tuning of the analogue world.
Dennett only looks to the digital aspects.

[selfAdjoint]

Originally posted by pelastration
It can be interesting to look to: digital versus analogue.
Digital can never give all the fine-tuning of the analogue world.
Dennett only looks to the digital aspects.

Pelastration, could you document that assertion about Dennett? I've read a number of his books and never saw any such limitation.

[pelastration]

Interesting. Neural science on BBC.
While looking to a hand moving (ie. take a coin, shooting a gun) on a movie ... the brain zone controlling ' the sense of touch' is also activated.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/sci_act.shtml

direct link to download the realone file: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ram/sia.ram

[pelastration]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
Pelastration, could you document that assertion about Dennett? I've read a number of his books and never saw any such limitation.
Thanks selfAdjoint,

It was not coming directly from him but: http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge82.html

Quote: "Experimental psychologist Steven Pinker speaks of "a new understanding that the human mind is a remarkably complex processor of information." To Pinker, our minds are "organs of computation." To philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, "the basic idea of computation, as formulated by the mathematicians John von Neumann and Alan Turing, is in a class by itself as a breakthrough idea." Dennett asks us to think about the idea that what we have in our heads is software, "a virtual machine, in the same way that a word processor is a virtual machine." Pinker and Dennett are talking about our mental life in terms of the idea of computation, not simply proposing the digital computer as a metaphor for the mind. Other scientists disagree (See below: "Is Life Analog or Digital" by Freeman Dyson), but most recognize that these are big questions." end quote.

I maybe over-interpreted. ;-). But I don't like Dennett. So ...

Now that page gives a discussion on digital vs analogue, and Smolin makes this nice remark: "So while the holographic principle says that no observer in the universe can access more than a finite amount of information, that information may be stored in a way that cannot be represented digitally by any computer that could be built inside the universe."