...Proof of reality? [Archive]

Canute

Apr10-04, 05:58 AM

No one.But we have a clear ladder of rational choices,based on all observed facts+the success of the methods used to make sense of observed facts,not all logical and experimental possibilities are on equal foot.And certainly idealism is not on the first place.
Of course it isn't. Science assumes idealism is false. However the chances of it being true are 50/50 as far as science knows.

The berkeleyan type of idealism or some variants of the matrix hypothesis are indeed tenable seen from a philosophical and practical standpoint,being fully compatible with all observed facts.Even science has the apriori rejection of all types of idealism as a basic axiom,basically there is no way to disprove it,as of now at least.Some believe wrongly that the matrix hypothesis in general is not tenable because the Wachowsky brothers model presented in 'The Matrix' is not tenable.While this is correct there can easily be proposed much more complex models which make virtually impossible for us to realize we are living in the matrix.So that,after all,Bostrom could be right and we really live in a matrix.
The Matrix idea, as presented in the film, makes no sense. It has no metaphysical foundation. It suggests just an infinite regression of matrixes with no final reality. This is why although the Matrix was partly based on Buddhism it is not even close to the Buddhist view.

Still science has epistemological privilege [the scientific method is the best method known to explain and understand nature] being intrinsically pragmatic.
That's an opinion and no more.

Since there is no need to postulate additionally that our observed 'outside' reality is an illusion [less fundamental anyway] to make sense of all observed facts,in an intersubjective manner,the burden of proof is always on those who claim that there is something more,acting 'behind the scene' (it is very possible that there is nothing more though we cannot prove that).
This is not correct. There are sound logical reasons for inferring that there is more to reality than science can observe or describe. (See my last post). This is one reason why so many philosophers have been idealists.

metacristi

Apr10-04, 09:49 AM

Science assumes both that there exist an external reality independent of mind (in general) and that we can know it at least partially though,certainly,the image of external things is 'filtered' by the brain (meaning also that there is no claim that all attributes we assign to outside things are real).Accepting apriori idealism leads in the extreme case to solipsism (untenable logically) or to the matrix/berkeleyan type of idealism (I do not treat here the case when even our consciousness belongs entirely to our reality).But once we accept the existence of other minds why should we postulate the existence of something extra behind what we observe intersubjectively?Basically there are no sufficient reasons to believe that there is something extra acting behind the scene (the soul in 'God's mind' in the berkeleyan idealism,a consciousness at a higher up level in the matrix hypothesis) or that we cannot percieve the noumenon itself (to use Kant's terminology) at least some features of external things?That's why the simplest way to make sense of the observed realities,given by the scientific method,is to be prefered [the knowledge about the world obtained using the scientific method is preferred as the standard of knowledge,usually labeled 'objective knowledge'].For the moment,no final claim is involved since science is openly fallible.New data (even a better method than the current version of the scientific method) could change things dramatically.But first we must find sufficient empirical reasons,I'm afraid simple logical arguments (inductive in many cases,some deductive but not sound) are never enough...

Canute

Apr10-04, 11:50 AM

Accepting apriori idealism leads in the extreme case to solipsism (untenable logically) or to the matrix/berkeleyan type of idealism (I do not treat here the case when even our consciousness belongs entirely to our reality).
What is logically untenable about idealism?

But once we accept the existence of other minds why should we postulate the existence of something extra behind what we observe intersubjectively?
Because of the problem of essence or attributes. Also to avoid ex nihilo creation.

Basically there are no sufficient reasons to believe that there is something extra acting behind the scene
True, but there's no sufficient reason not to believe it either. (I didn't say 'acting' btw)

or that we cannot percieve the noumenon itself (to use Kant's terminology) at least some features of external things?
Kant said we cannot perceive the noumenal, and this seems to be correct to me.

That's why the simplest way to make sense of the observed realities,given by the scientific method,is to be prefered.
I would argue that science is concerned with the appearances of things, not reality, and that there are simpler ways to make sense of reality than science. I also disgree that science makes sense of things.

For the moment,no final claim is involved since science is openly fallible.New data (even a better method than the current version of the scientific method) could change things dramatically.But first we must find sufficient empirical reasons,I'm afraid simple logical arguments (inductive in many cases,some deductive but not sound) are never enough...
Enough for what? Without sound logical arguments we couldn't reason that the sun was going to rise tomorrow.

Janitor

Apr10-04, 11:57 AM

I must be the one person who hasn't seen The Matrix. :redface:

There is a very old philosophical stance called 'solipsism' which maintains that I am the only thing that exists, and so the various posts in this thread were merely made up by my own mind, and then they were playfully attributed to non-existent entities with names like Namloh2000.

(Actually, it occurs to me that it can't be that old of a stance, since I have to be the one who dreamed it up, right? Ah, why am I asking you guys, since you are figments of my imagination anyway.)

pocebokli

Apr10-04, 01:58 PM

because *I* am the one making up *your* posts just to trick myself in believing that i am not the only one in the whole creation:-)
muahaha!

metacristi

Apr11-04, 09:37 AM

Canute

True, but there's no sufficient reason not to believe it either. (I didn't say 'acting' btw)

I'm tired of explaining again and again this simple problem to you all over the internet.The problem is to establish a standard of knowledge (a method of establishing what is real also) working well for all our practical purposes in the simplest possible way,based on all observed facts.This is the main task of epistemology and the actual scientific method has proved to be the best so far.That's why it has epistemological privilege (being the standard of knowledge),still no final claim is involved.Some beliefs might be true still they cannot be considered as belonging to the standard of knowledge (usually labeled 'objective' knowledge) given by science before empirical confirmation using the rules of the scientific method.For example if I see an alien I do not have the right to say that my belief in aliens has epistemological privilege being objective knowledge (amounting to saying that all would be rational persons should believe the same).Thus some personal beliefs,involving facts not amenable to scientific scrutiny for the moment,for which one has a base,especially first hand experiences,are rational (a simple logical possibility is not enough,one has to have a good reason for believing something) but in any case has that person the right to claim that his belief has epistemological privilege.You might believe (rationally or not) whatever you want but this does not automatically mean that your belief,interpretation of observed facts,has automatically privilege over that of science's (the simplest account of all observed facts).For that you should provide empirical evidence,that can be intersubjectively tested,supporting the claim that there is still something extra (for example that we cannot percieve the noumenon in itself).The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

Hugo Holbling

Apr11-04, 04:41 PM

The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

No, it isn't. A popular example that i've used on other boards was that wherein the second phenomenological law of thermodynamics was refuted by Brownian motion, it being a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. Unfortunately there was in principle no experiment that could show this, but the kinetic theory nevertheless displaced it for theoretical reasons. The transition from phenomenological to kinetic theory thus came about in spite of there being no empirical difference or result - decisive or otherwise - that disproved the one and suggested the other. In this instance, then, we have a plain counter-example to your assertion above; it fails because it is too simplistic to account for the historical and contemporary practice of science. Other instances are legion, if you only look to the literature.

metacristi

Apr12-04, 04:42 AM

No, it isn't. A popular example that i've used on other boards was that wherein the second phenomenological law of thermodynamics was refuted by Brownian motion, it being a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. Unfortunately there was in principle no experiment that could show this, but the kinetic theory nevertheless displaced it for theoretical reasons. The transition from phenomenological to kinetic theory thus came about in spite of there being no empirical difference or result - decisive or otherwise - that disproved the one and suggested the other. In this instance, then, we have a plain counter-example to your assertion above; it fails because it is too simplistic to account for the historical and contemporary practice of science. Other instances are legion, if you only look to the literature.

I'd say that the 'replacement' of the classical thermodynamics with the kinetic theory was simply due to the fact that Boltzman kinetic approach used the atomic hypothesis (instead of the pozitivist principles behind classical thermodynamics) which was able to explain/describe a wider range of observed facts (brownian motion included) believed once of being totally separated.Sure full acception of this happened only later when even physicists became convinced of the existence of atoms but this does not change the essence of the problem (for chemists the kinetic theory only strengthened their belief in the existence of atoms).Finally we return at empirical facts,the most supported theory is chosen.I'd say that the term 'replaced' is improper,classical thermodynamics has not been really disproved even now,it has only a lower degree of coherence with the atomic hypothesis;certainly the brownian motion is a puzzle for the classical thermodynamics but in any case a crucial falsification.

But the context in which I used my assertion refers at situations when some claim that hypotheses using in their premises additional theoretical constructs,not indispensable to explain some observed facts (the same in fact),have the same epistemological privilege with those used by science (which provides the simplest account possible,sufficient reasons).It is true now that some theoretical constructs used in the premises of some scientific theories might be not falsifiable themselves (from all we know at a certain moment of time) but they are crucial for the observed empirical success of the predictions of those scientific theories.

No one say that such more complex theories could not be closer to the 'ultimate reality' still the only way to prefer them (as the standard of knowledge for a personal belief or preference of them is sometimes rational,especially when there exist first hand subjective experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry for the moment,which 'fit' better with the experiences) is either by finding some new empirical evidence (including a greater number of empirical 'confirmations' of their predictions on what we can already observe in general,as shown in the example with the atomic hypothesis) or by providing a method of establishing what is real better than the scientific method (which suggest that something extra exist) proved superior first on observed facts also.

Canute

Apr12-04, 05:15 AM

Canute
I'm tired of explaining again and again this simple problem to you all over the internet.
Perhaps I think your explanation is just a sign that you haven't thought about these issues much.

Hugo Holbling

Apr12-04, 09:41 AM

...certainly the brownian motion is a puzzle for the classical thermodynamics but in any case a crucial falsification.

The point is that there was no such "crucial falsification"; it can happen, as in this case, that two theories predict different consequences but the small variation is beyond the experimental capabilities of any investigation, usually in principle. In such an instance, the choice of one theory over the other is based on criteria other than the crucial result of experimentalist lore. If you want to make reference to additional facts in a wider domain then you are using a criterion of fecundity or similar, not rescuing the situation for experimentalism or the naive empiricism so far discussed.

It is true now that some theoretical constructs used in the premises of some scientific theories might be not falsifiable themselves (from all we know at a certain moment of time) but they are crucial for the observed empirical success of the predictions of those scientific theories.

Why is the epistemological priviledge you accord them not arbitrary, though? Their importance notwithstanding, why does that put them on a different footing?

No one say that such more complex theories could not be closer to the 'ultimate reality' still the only way to prefer them [...] is either by finding some new empirical evidence (including a greater number of empirical 'confirmations' of their predictions on what we can already observe in general,as shown in the example with the atomic hypothesis) or by providing a method of establishing what is real better than the scientific method (which suggest that something extra exist) proved superior first on observed facts also.

Are you aware that this is not how the history of science has proceded? Theories are preferred for myriad reasons, some theoretical, some (often) thematic (cf. Holton's account) and very few - if any - in this way. I suggest you look at the way Einstein arrived at his special theory and how he reacted to Kaufman's and Miller's falsifications, along with Eddington's expedition. Your version is still too simplistic, alas.

metacristi

Apr13-04, 01:50 AM

The point is that there was no such "crucial falsification"; it can happen, as in this case, that two theories predict different consequences but the small variation is beyond the experimental capabilities of any investigation, usually in principle. In such an instance, the choice of one theory over the other is based on criteria other than the crucial result of experimentalist lore. If you want to make reference to additional facts in a wider domain then you are using a criterion of fecundity or similar, not rescuing the situation for experimentalism or the naive empiricism so far discussed.

It's unclear what do you try to achieve...I've never claimed that the progress of science is a straightforward process,the phrase you contest was not intended to address this subject.Anyway because we started this topic,for me your example is a standard confirmation of the lakatosian account of how science works.Clearly we are far from the popperian clear cut logic driving scientific progress,still logic remain the main 'engine' behind it,in the majority of cases,with empirical evidence as the main criterion of rational choice on long run.Around 1860 the kinetic theory was clearly superior to phenomenological thermodynamics,it not only regained the results of classical thermodynamics but it obtained also the value of the speed of sound in different gases,the specific heat and so on which cannot be derived by the classical theory.Many scientists were convinced it was superior and that atoms do exist.With the noticeable difference of many physicists who,heavily influenced by the positivistic ideas of Comte and among scientists Mach,considered that the evidence in favor of atoms was still too weak.But soon they would be forced to change preferences,the kinetic theory continued to be theoretically and empirically progressive.First the success of Boltzmann's statistical approach and afterward the experiements of Thomson,Perrin (1908 about brownian movement) and Rutherford forced even the most conservatory physicist to change preferrences.On short run physicists still preferred the classical theory (inertia is inevitable especially when the evidence is not particulary strong in favor of one or another hypothesis) but on long run it was the empirical evidence which forced the preferences.

Hugo Holbling

Apr13-04, 02:11 AM

It's unclear what do you try to achieve...I've never claimed that the progress of science is a straightforward process,the phrase you contest was not intended to address this subject.

You were talking of the "crucial falsification" of experimentalist lore, of course, so my purpose was plain.

Anyway because we started this topic,for me your example is a standard confirmation of the lakatosian account of how science works.

What is a "confirmation" of Lakatos' methodology of research programmes supposed to be? Are you aware of the criticism it has faced, particular from a more sophisticated approach like Holton's?

You have failed to answer the other questions i put to you regarding epistemological priviledge that were very much on-topic.

metacristi

Apr13-04, 02:19 AM

Why is the epistemological priviledge you accord them not arbitrary, though? Their importance notwithstanding, why does that put them on a different footing?

I made it clear in what context I used that phrase,I do not really understand why do you obstinate to attack a different subject.What do you propose instead in such cases?To consider idealism (in the form of matrix hypothesis) for example as having the same epistemological privilege with the axiomatic system of science?Basically they make exactly the same predictions and cannot be separated from observed facts,science will work exactly in the same way no matter whether we live in the matrix,in God's mind or in an universe created by a transcedental leprechaun...Still,no matter the ultimate truth,we need a standard of knowledge,provided by the simplest account possible based on observed facts only and on the minimum of theoretical constructs.And this is provided by the actual axiomatic system of science,the body of accepted laws and the auxilary assumptions.This is why science has the principle of parsimony 'inbuilt' at its core.Here I totally disagree with your vision on the subject,there are not too many historical occasions when it was used indeed,but without it an infinite number of sligthly different hypotheses would claim epistemological primacy.Finally there is no need to believe in the reality of theoretical constructs indispensable for the empirical success of a scientific theory (as some realists would require) before confirming them experimentally in a sound way.But clearly if the theory using them in premises is the most successful experiemntally it has to be preferred to all others.If there are more the simplest should be chosen,on short run at least,entirely on pragmatic reasons.I am aware this is a difficult problem,defining 'simpler',but clearly if one theory has more not confirmed yet theoretical constructs it will not be preferred.Another criterion for simplicity will be if the hypothesis proceeds from unifying principles,especially if those principles make already part of accepted scientific knowledge (the maximum coherence possible with accepted knowledge).The Copenhagen Interpretation of QM is such an example because it retain full coherence with Special Relativity.Sure not all scientists will adhere to these 'simpler' programmes,even in periods of normal science,some might prefer alternative programmes,even stagnant ones,trying to make them progressive but till they succed the simpler theory makes temporarily,at least,part of the main body of scientific knowledge.I disagree here from there who say that no such theory should be accepted,not even temporarily,before it gains the empirical battle with its rivals.Thus I accept for example that the Copenhange in terpretation of QM+the standard mathematical formalism of QM is part of science for the moment,though I am skeptical that it really reflects the ontology of the quantum level (I am a supporter of hidden variables interpretations due to some personal strange experiences which fit much better with it).

metacristi

Apr13-04, 02:37 AM

Are you aware that this is not how the history of science has proceded? Theories are preferred for myriad reasons, some theoretical, some (often) thematic (cf. Holton's account) and very few - if any - in this way. I suggest you look at the way Einstein arrived at his special theory and how he reacted to Kaufman's and Miller's falsifications, along with Eddington's expedition. Your version is still too simplistic, alas.

Again have you realized in what context I used that phrase?I really doubt that scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs.Let's be rational.As regarding the subject you brought about I agree that scientific progress is not only a continuous domination of logic but I cannot agree with the relativism of Kuhn or Feyerabend.

Kaufmann's experiment seemed to falsify SR because a theory is not tested in isolation but also with some specific auxiliary hypotheses.As Planck proved it was the interpretation of data which seemed to falsify SR but finally things have been settled in SR's favor.Anyway the intial conclusions of Kaufmann were so tight (though Abraham's model fared slightly better) that Einstein considered those results results as a confirmation of his theory long before Planck settled the problem.

metacristi

Apr13-04, 02:43 AM

What is a "confirmation" of Lakatos' methodology of research programmes supposed to be? Are you aware of the criticism it has faced, particular from a more sophisticated approach like Holton's?

You have failed to answer the other questions i put to you regarding epistemological priviledge that were very much on-topic.

There is a clear difference between confirmation and verification.I haven't claimed it was verified.Still on that particular case you brought about the lakatosian view is vindicated,confirmed,by the scientific practice.

Hugo Holbling

Apr13-04, 03:05 AM

What do you propose instead in such cases?

I do not need to provide an alternative to critique your ideas, of course.

Still,no matter the ultimate truth,we need a standard of knowledge,provided by the simplest account possible based on observed facts only and on the minimum of theoretical constructs.

Why? It is decidedly unclear why any of these presuppositions should be accepted or thought plausible. Why do theoretical constructs need to be minimised, for example, particularly if you then go on to declare an instrumentalist account satisfactory? Likewise, such an account is, ceteris paribus, not likely to be the simplest; and moreover, there are always antecedent assumptions that are unargued, unverifiable and unfalsifiable but involved in the formation of scientific theories. Why should your methodological advice get us what we require?

This is why science has the principle of parsimony 'inbuilt' at its core.

No, it doesn't. Are you aware of the writings of physicists like Bohr on the subject? We can only judge something like parsimony a posteriori because the consequences of additional postulates, hypotheses, theoretical entities or assumptions only become clear (if at all) after the fact, by which time the matter has been decided by other factors - or so said Bohr.

If we study the motivations of scientists in the past, we very often find that they were guided by something like an aesthetic sense, trying to find the most "beautiful" theory. Sometimes it happened that this was also the simplest, mutatis mutandis, if - like Copernicus - they were commited to some mathematical regularity, say, but sometimes it was not.

without it an infinite number of sligthly different hypotheses would claim epistemological primacy.

That is neither a good nor satisfactory reason to claim primacy, since i could just as well use your argument to claim likewise for any epistemology. The under-determination of theories by evidence, say, surely must imply that only leprechauns can provide the answers we seek, right?

Finally there is no need to believe in the reality of theoretical constructs indispensable for the empirical success of a scientific theory (as some realists would require) before confirming them experimentally in a sound way.

Well, that is another argument; i'll be glad to oppose you on it another time, perhaps.

But clearly if the theory using them in premises is the most successful experiemntally it has to be preferred to all others.

Calling such things "clear" does not make it so. How do you propose to measure success? If we followed this methodological advice in the past, many theories we now take to be accurate (or maybe true or truthlike) would have fallen at the first fence - like the special theory when confronted with Kaufman's experiments, for example. Your suggestion fails to account for the actual practice of scientists.

I am aware this is a difficult problem,defining 'simpler',but clearly if one theory has more not confirmed yet theoretical constructs it will not be preferred.

Why is this any clearer than before? In an instrumentalist account, it will make no difference in any case.

Sure not all scientists will adhere to these 'simpler' programmes,even in periods of normal science...

Do you believe in the existence of so-called "normal science"? If so, i suggest you look at the criticisms the idea received back when Kuhn first suggested it, particularly in the volume Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Musgrave and Lakatos. More to the point here, why should anyone else so believe?

...some might prefer alternative programmes,even stagnant ones,trying to make them progressive but till they succed the simpler theory makes temporarily,at least,part of the main body of scientific knowledge.

As we already discussed, if we are aiming for instrumentalist theories then simplicity is like fine weather: it is nice to have sometimes but the day will go on just as before regardless. Even in the Lakatosian methodology, the currently employed research programme need not be the simplest. It is unclear that you are saying anything here.

till on that particular case you brought about the lakatosian view is vindicated,confirmed,by the scientific practice.

On a very narrow reading, perhaps, but not likely. Have you tried to answer the critique aimed at Lakatos? How does this instance "confirm" Lakatos' ideas? I could equally claim that Einstein vindicates the ignoring of falsifications.

I really doubt that scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs.Let's be rational.

Thank you for telling me how to behave, but i think i'll continue to be irrational for a little longer. Since i did not say that "scientists of the past preferred theories using redundant theoretical constructs", it would be helpful if you did not imply that i did.

Anyway the intial conclusion of Kaufmann were so tight (though Abraham's model fared slightly better) that Einstein considered those results results as a confirmation of his theory long before Planck showed settled the problem.

I suggest you go back and read what Kaufman had to say about his work and also the reasons Einstein gave for holding to his theory in spite of it. The latter's view on confirmations - or "verification of little effects", as he called them - significantly differs from that you are attributing to him.

metacristi

Apr14-04, 10:20 AM

I will not address now all your points,maybe in the future.Still what you talk here [interesting though I profoundly disagree with many of your conclusions,for example I do not find reasonable your attack at the terminology used by me,the usual meaning of 'confirmation' is exactly how I presented it] is totally different from what I intended to say.I stress again your criticism totally missed the point.By the way what makes you believe that your point of view has to be accepted?Unfortunately there is no satisfactory account of how scientific progress occurs;simply stating that there is no method is not a solution either.I'd say that the most successful is the lakatosian account in spite of the fact that scientific practice recorded situations when instant refutations occured.

Science,beginning from its basic assumptions,continuing with the body of accepted scientific knowledge and auxiliary assumptions can be seen as huge research programme giving the best account of the observed facts in the most simple manner in spite of the fact that some theoretical constructs might be used sometimes (but this is not at all necessary to happen).The problem I was dealing is not how scientific hypotheses are accepted as belonging to the main body of science,this is a tenuous process indeed.The claim was that other programmes having the same body of already accepted scientific theories and auxiliary hypotheses+the vast majority of the basic axioms of science,assumptions of science (less the assumptions of naturalism and/or the apriori rejection of idealism) which introduce some new axioms,not indispensable for the success of the programme,is on the same foot with that given by the actual version of the scientific programm,the simplest possible.If you think that it's so,your choice,but of course this does not mean that your position is the most rational.

Probably I have to define also what do I mean by 'real' because you talked of instrumentalism.I'm afraid the logical structure of the hypothetico-deductive method lets the door wide open for inexistent theoretical constructs (in reality,but we are not aware of that at a certain moment) to still lead to very successful scientific theories...I will have to repeat partially what I've already said on this thread but I think this will make things clearer.

There is no philosophical/scientific arguments (at least currently) which to provide sufficient reasons to consider the Matrix hypothesis or the berkeleyan type of idealism as disproved.That's why science has among its basic assumptions the apriori rejection of all types of idealism,postulating also that there exist an external,objective,fundamental,world which we can measure,describe and understand.Sure we do not have now sufficient reasons to claim that we do not live in a matrix or in the mind of God but since the base of rationality is represented by observed facts there is no good reason to believe that we do.The burden of proof is on those who claim that there is something more.Besides even if we really live in the matrix the actual findings of science will not be nullified by the discovery that we live there,at least on the 'domain of definition' given by the matrix world.

The acceptance that there exist an 'objective reality' implies the existence of an external fundamental reality outside our wishes and desires which we can observe;possible in this objective reality exist an infinity of 'entities'.Before going further must be settled another important aspect.Can we really observe at least some of the noumenal (to use the Kantian term) features of reality or ontological reality is incognoscible (what we observe,the order we see,everything,being imposed by our own minds)?Again we cannot prove that what we observe is the 'naked' reality (at least some of the attributes assigned) but again the burden of proof is upon those who make the positive claim that it is otherwise.There is absolutely no good reason to think that we cannot know the reality at least partially though some attributes we assign to observed entities might not be primary ones (of course our theories are simple models there is no claim of exhaustivity).

The epistemological problem which arise next is to establish what entities or processes should we consider as belonging to this objective ontological reality,that is which entities should be considered real and which can be understood as being physical processes among real entities (based on all observed facts)?A method of investigation is needed for that,including a mean of verification.What methodology is the best?Can we rely only on our senses?Can we rely only on reason+intuition or on reason+intuition+senses?Empiricism has proved to be the most successful of establishing the truth about natural facts having at base both the correspondence and coherence philosophical theories of truth.The scientific method is the best empirical method known so far giving us the best model currently of the 'phenomena',natural facts as we observe them,time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.This is why science has epistemological privilege over the so called 'common truths' being the standard of objective knowledge giving us what should be considered as being real.Sure some personal,subjective,experiences (not amenable at scientific inquiry now) can be something absolutely real in spite of the lack of intersubjective,scientific,support (seeing some extraterrestrials for example) but we must be very careful with this type of experiences (many are not reliable).Thus they should not be considered as representing 'objective knowledge' (since science has epistemological privilege) but they give sufficient reasons to the experiencer to believe that what he saw is real,as a strictly personal belief of course.

From here on things are depending on the philosophy held and the facts observed.Personally I am a supporter of the brand of realism (hermeneutical realism which engulf also some anti-realist conceptions) which consider that science come closer and closer to the ontological,ultimate,nature of things though some of our theoretical attributes and constructs in very successful scientific theories might not be real.The reality of something must be established entirely by experiments,indirect confirmations are accepted,not confirmed empirically yet 'entities',though predictions of very successful otherwise theories,must not be considered real.Scientists have however the right to use them in further hypothesis making processes but entirely as theoretical constructs.Sure the existence of theoretical support from more,different,disciplines (as was the case with the atomic hypothesis before Thomson and Rutherford experimental confirmations) entitle scientists to believe that some theoretical constructs are real but this does not yet represent the sufficient arguments science always seek.Also the observed facts that can be explained in terms of processes among real entities are not considered as being real.Only the processes are real but the emergent phenomenon ('information') they create is not.For example no matter that all people will see a 'fata morgana' in the desert this do not entitle us to claim that fata morgana is real,indeed science show us with arguments beyond all reasonable doubt that this phenomenon is only an optical illusion and fata morgana does not exist in the objective reality other than some sort of information.

Hugo Holbling

Apr14-04, 10:47 AM

I stress again your criticism totally missed the point.

So you say, but i rather think you have failed to understand the Quinean criticism i've presented. *shrug* Handbags at dawn, i suggest.

By the way what makes you believe that your point of view has to be accepted?

I missed the part where i said that it does, i guess. I don't care in the least if you accept my criticisms or offer up a sacrifice to Mach instead.

Unfortunately there is no satisfactory account of how scientific progress occurs;simply stating that there is no method is not a solution either.

Well, if conflate the two in this way then a solution may be even further off than otherwise. I agree that there is "no satisfactory account" but i'll be glad to disagree in principle if you bring it up again. Perhaps you have misunderstood the approach of those like Galison, Cartwright and others who have shown the complexity of methodologies? The lack of a definitive method is not offered as a solution to anything.

The claim was ...

I know what the claim was. How do you answer Quine's remarks that this difference in footing is one of degree, not kind?

If you think that it's so,your choice,but of course this does not mean that your position is the most rational.

Luckily i'm not concerned to be more rational than you or anyone else. *shrug*

Empiricism has proved to be the most successful of establishing the truth about natural facts having at base both the correspondence and coherence philosophical theories of truth.

It has? What does "successful" mean in your account? What is the "truth about natural facts"? I think you could be a little more careful with these terms, especially if you are intending to make such claims.

...time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.This is why science has epistemological privilege over the so called 'common truths' being the standard of objective knowledge giving us what should be considered as being real.

Once again, it's not clear what "successful" is supposed to mean or why anyone should accept this assertion. If someone uses a different methodology that is successful within a certain domain according to their requirements, why are they not similarly justified in giving it epistemological priviledge? Examples are legion, of course.

Scientists have however the right to use them in further hypothesis making processes but entirely as theoretical constructs.

Why do you want to proscribe scientific practice in this way?

metacristi

Apr14-04, 12:20 PM

Look,pal,you are confusing me with a logical positivist.Unfortunately for you neither do I support the view that meaningful propositions are only those which are analytical nor that all non analytical propositions (which are enunciations about natural facts) are meaningless if they cannot be 'verified' (in Ayer's 'weaker',probabilistic,sense).As a matter of fact my stance is that metaphysical assumptions have a place inside science itself (nonwithstanding Popper's prescriptions) though they might seem nonfalsifiable at a certain moment but only as much as they prove indispensable for the empirical success (I do not find your criticism as being substantial regarding this problem) of the theory (theories) using them in their premises and so cannot be discarded.Of course this does not mean that redundant assumptions are meaningless.Since science is openly fallible if sufficient reasons will be found they will become part of science later,at least a successful theory where they are indispensable constructs or,even better,direct or indirect evidence for them..Thus my whole argument still stands and I ask again do you have a better approach?As for the existence of slight variations from the standard scientific method what is really important is that the principle of intersubjectivity is always present.Even Chalmers' first person approach proposal can be seen,at limit,as a slight variation of the third person usual approach.Finally there is no proof that this method is the best possible,maybe intuition is better,I certainly do not claim this,only that we must prove it first as being superior...on observed facts.By the way you give a lot of advices but you haven't been able to produce a coherent stance so far...

Hugo Holbling

Apr14-04, 02:08 PM

Look,pal,you are confusing me with a logical positivist.

Thank you for telling me what i'm doing.

Thus my whole argument still stands and I ask again do you have a better approach?

Unfortunately saying so does not make it so, and nor does avoiding questions. What's more, i don't have to provide a better approach to critique yours.

By the way you give a lot of advices but you haven't been able to produce a coherent stance so far...

*yawn* I don't have to "produce a stance" to point out the faults in your own. You are more than welcome to cease telling me what i've done and should do and begin answering criticisms.

Les Sleeth

Apr14-04, 03:45 PM

The problem is to establish a standard of knowledge (a method of establishing what is real also) working well for all our practical purposes in the simplest possible way,based on all observed facts.This is the main task of epistemology and the actual scientific method has proved to be the best so far.

That's why it has epistemological privilege (being the standard of knowledge),still no final claim is involved.Some beliefs might be true still they cannot be considered as belonging to the standard of knowledge (usually labeled 'objective' knowledge) given by science before empirical confirmation using the rules of the scientific method.

. . . .The number of internally consistent interpretations of observed facts,having also power of explanation,could be infinite,the only way to make difference between them is entirely empirical.

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning. It seemed you were careful to use the words "observed facts" and "objective knowledge." Is your assertion that the empirical method is deserving of "epistemological privilege" limited to knowledge of "externals" and sense data?
Beyond that, one might say empirical confirmation deserves epistemological privilege in terms of serving to convince others of what one claims to have experienced.

What I would object to, and I don't know if this is what you are implying, is the belief of some thinkers (a high percentage here at PF I'd say) that there is no other reliable method of acquiring knowledge. I wouldn't agree the "epistemological privilege" of empiricism should be extended to, for example, self knowledge or what might be discovered through self knowledge. If fact, I would say empiricism has absolutely no relevance to the deepest aspect of self knowledge.

Dayle Record

Apr14-04, 04:11 PM

...time has proved that the scientific method is the most successful,the most rational,based on a careful observation of facts done with the best instruments available,without hasty generalizations.

Reality is currently demonstrating that the above mentioned stuff, is lethal.

By design, we perceive deterrent pain, hunger, and lust; in that order. To suit some need of the cosmos, we now have abundant organic software with which, to destroy our planetary web of life. I don't want to believe that our evolution, by plan, would result in so much destruction. But seriously, who gave that monkey the gun?

Regarding reality, it is all real, what we perceive, what we feel, what we know, what we don't know, what we can perceive, what we can sense and feel, and what we can't sense and feel. We don't have enough measuring sticks to measure the whole thing. We ourselves don't measure up to the measure of the situation. So existence can be anything, as long as we keep the legislation of our mutual delusions to a minimum, we will be able to operate more smoothly in this uncertain venue.

This is really comical, in the sense, that I am looking at a viewscreen, whose basic operation, I don't really understand. The viewscreen was given to me, and then appearing on it is a question regarding the nature of existence posed in black letters, that diminish the light of the screen, so I can see them, in contrast. The letters want to know if they are a meat puppet, or a bit actor in a mystical movie, or if we are all in a movie. This is existence of a sort. Then I answer, by pressing on plastic finger rests, instead of calculating taxes that my very real government wants.

Dayle Record

Apr14-04, 04:21 PM

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning.

It may not be a problem with the transmitter, maybe it is a reception problem.

Les Sleeth

Apr14-04, 04:33 PM

It may not be a problem with the transmitter, maybe it is a reception problem.

When I said metacristi's English was "just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning," it was not meant as put down. I simply wanted to make sure I understood what he means before I critique what he says.

However, if you believe something is wrong with my reception, I would appreciate hearing what you think that might be.

metacristi

Apr15-04, 02:25 AM

Thank you for telling me what i'm doing.

I do not understand what you are talking about here.You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.If we shift the accent from the problem of meaning toward the demarcation between science and pseudoscience by allowing even metaphysics inside science,where valuable as I've argued,my stance is absolutely viable.Ayer's principle was meant to eliminate metaphysics,which he failed to do,but the idea that only fruitful theoretical constructs are allowed within science is still viable and in fact all scientists use it widely.I do not think Quine supported the introduction of redundant constructs in science or preference for programmes which use redundant constructs.Why do you believe for example that the sentence 'God (a certain model) has created our universe' is not a part of science?Because for the moment is a redundant construct.No one says that a research programme having God as an extra axiom (the rest of assumptions being almost unchanged) is not viable,it is,but it cannot have primacy.The principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality,also at the heart of the whole science.Otherwise even in our usual scientific quest we would be always entitled to introduce inside science constructs which have no role for the predictions the theory makes.For example if by using the usual inductive methods of agreement and so on we establish that the sufficient observed causes for a phenomenon Z are A,B,C there is no good reason to claim also that D is another cause which always appears in conjunction with A,B,C but we cannot observe it for the moment.When sufficient reasons will be produced then D will become also part of science,for the moment its introduction inside science is redundant.Likewise if from a set of assumptions let's say a,b,c,d,e,f ('a' being for example metaphysical,seemingly nontestable itself:strings for example it's hard to believe that we will ever be able to 'probe' at Planck's level) we deduce some predictions potentially testable g,h,i,j,k,l (some of them confirmed experimentally) but we observe that if we renounce at premise 'f' the predictions are the same then we are fully entitled to discard it till new evidence (be it in the form of a theory where it cannot be discarded) will force us to allow it inside science.Why do you insist to a different approach when dealing with the whole scientific programme vs alternative ones (containing redundant constructs)?Even creationists realized that they must prove that God hypothesis is fruitful within scientific theories in order to be entitled to claim epistemological primacy.

I said that 'a' could be metaphysical,it is part of science but there is no obligation for all scientists or would be rational people to believe in it's existence until we will have indirect or direct experimental confirmation.For example if I had lived around 1870 I would have certainly believed in the atomic hypothesis which even made predictions (it was able to accomomdate many observed phenomena in a wide area,previously thought as totally separated) but I would have not condemned physicists as Mach,Herz,Planck for not believing in the existence of atoms.The mistake was that the atomic hypothesis was marginalized when in fact it was theoretically and empirically progressive,even at that time more superior experimentally to the continuous hypothesis.

metacristi

Apr15-04, 02:52 AM

By the way because we talked of 'verification' versus 'confirmation'.It is a common practice to say that a theory was confirmed when a valid experiment support one of its predictions.This does not imply that the theory is true,verified or the best possible,not even that the theory was made more probable if you wish.Personally I think that the bayesian interpretation of probabilities,widely used in scientific practice,is a very solid base for those who try to justify induction,we do not need to justify induction within logic.Sure we can never prove a theory but we are fully entitled to have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of scientific statements (even some theories) for which we have a relevant sample of previous succes.We cannot rely on such scientific laws,in spite of the relevant sample of previous successes,on long run indeed but there is absolutely no good reason to not rely on them at our next use of them.Indeed otherwise we would have no science and technology either,why attempt to design a car if we cannot rely on the fact that tomorrow,when we plan to start building it,is uncertain that the laws of physics will still hold?

metacristi

Apr15-04, 03:17 AM

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning. It seemed you were careful to use the words "observed facts" and "objective knowledge." Is your assertion that the empirical method is deserving of "epistemological privilege" limited to knowledge of "externals" and sense data?
.

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.All rational people will believe that the Earth is round we have sufficient reason for that.Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

Hugo Holbling

Apr15-04, 03:39 AM

I do not understand what you are talking about here.

That much is plain.

You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.

On the contrary, you are talking from books, failing to answer questions and unable to appreciate that a critic need not offer an alternative to point out the shortcomings of your ideas.

If you want to claim an epistemological priviledge, you need to explain why scientific theories have an epistemological standing that differs in kind - not degree - from others. You are more than welcome to attempt this in a non-circular fashion instead of asserting that you've already done so, but if you are just going to waste my time again then please just say so.

metacristi

Apr15-04, 04:30 AM

Provide first a credible alternative proposal at what I've said above and I will find worth of continuing this discussion.Till then I waste my time either,I do not find your criticism as being substantiated.First I fail to see how your criticism is entitled,why research programmes which contain redundant assumptions are on the same level of rationality with the actual reasearch programme of science,i'm afraid the logic and even scientific practice does not support this view;anyway there is no claim of 'eternal truth',even the current axioms of science are open to rejection if sufficient reasons against are produced.If you could propose an alternative research programme where the God's of Homer are indispensable constructs,though we have to change some other assumptions hold by the actual research programme of science,which explain facts equally well,then yes there is no base to claim primacy for the actual version of the scientific research programme.Unfortunately there is no such proposal.I repeat I don't think Quine referred at successful prgrammes which have redundant assumptions as being on the same level of with programmes where the redundant assumptions have been eliminated.Secondly I fail to see why am I a logical positivist and thus falling under Quine's criticism (as I've explained above there is no supposition that each statement in the premises, taken in isolation from other assumptions,must be potentially testable).

Hugo Holbling

Apr15-04, 06:54 AM

Canute

Apr15-04, 07:05 AM

Metacristi - It would also help me if you explained what you mean by science having 'epistemilogical priviledge'. I've never known what you meant.

metacristi

Apr15-04, 10:23 AM

*sigh* I have already explained - many times - that i need not provide an alternative to note errors in your ideas. You are welcome to offer an argument as to why i am plainly mistaken in so thinking, but ignoring the point is not convincing. Nor, i might add, is mischaracterising my criticisms as supposing you are a logical positivist when i have already disclaimed that idea.

If i am merely taking arguments from books and you have me all figured out then you might be better advised to turn to the actual book i am using and address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological priviledge is possible. This, of course, is the matter that you continue to avoid: why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example? I have asked you this time and again, but i am yet to see a non-circular answer (or, indeed, any answer at all). Kindly cease mischaracterising me and offer an answer, or throw your toys at someone else.

Nothing is set in stone.This is why I do not rely too much on other sources,they good informally but cannot constitute a sort of Bible,especially in this controversial field.The majority of what I write comes from my own thought,facts and logic counts,I do not have to read all books existent to provide a logically defendable stance.

Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accomodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.This does not mean they exist in reality,as a matter of fact since they are not ddirectly involved in the new predictions made by the theories using them many scientists doubt that they should make part of science itself as of now.However,though 'quark hypothesis' seems an ad hoc hypothesis,it is accepted within the Standard Model,indeed there are different degrees of ad hocness,some have a so high degree of coherence with existing knowledge that fully deserve to become part of science itself,not all are all out crackpots (in the same position was once the neutrino hypothesis now widely supported empirically).

There is no such proposal for the Homer's God research program.I do not say it's impossible to construct one (I still expect your proposal) but it will be tremendously difficult to build one free from internal contradictions able also to keep pace with the standard research program of science.For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Secondly,assuming that an internally coherent program will ever be provided,the proponent will have first to deal with the following problems,on medium and long run at least:

1.Does the program accomodate all known empirical facts,already explained by the scientific program,with the exitence of Homer's God assumption playing an active role in comjunction with other premises?

2.Are there new testable predictions,apart from accomomdating all known facts,resulting from the combination of the initial assumption (that Homer God's exist) with some other premises?

3.Is the program falsifiable?If yes has the program the potential to be empirically and theoretically progressive,on long run,able to remain at the same level of empirical success with the standard program of science whilst keeping 'active' (in the process of new predictions making) the assumption that Homer's Gods exist without resorting to the ad hoc assumption that 'Homer Gods did it')?Is the program able also to accomodate also neutral facts previously ('fit' them within the program)?

If the answer is again yes but only with the expense of changing large parts of its premises in a very short amount of time then we have a problem.I'm afraid exactly this would have happened if for example we would have accepted let's say 100 years ago that Homer's Gods rsearch program was on the same level of priority with the usual scientific program.What reasons would we have to accept a program that changes almost on a daily basis?This would be a clear sign of the strong adhocness of one of the premises that never changes,I do not know which,but clearly the program as a whole is inferior,with experiments playing a key role.Basically is meaningless to say that we deal with one and the same research program.Why not change the assumption that Homer Gods exist itself?

Les Sleeth

Apr15-04, 10:38 AM

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.

Just so you know . . . I wasn't being critical of your English skills or suggesting you need to sharpen them. I was just letting you know if I question what you believe you've already explained, it's because I'm having a little trouble with how you put words together.

The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.

I agree.

Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.

Here is where I might have a problem. It depends on if you mean a "viable alternative method" for studying externals, or if you mean for studying anything, including the interior of consciousness. I will explain more below.

For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.

I agree one isn't logically justified in "automatically" assuming science cannot find the answer to consciousnes. But they would be justified if they have a sound reason to doubt. A crucial aspect of the empirical method is that what has been hypothesized to be true must be experienced (observed). So I would say it is experience which most establishes "epistemological privilege." As William James put it, “Nothing shall be admitted as fact except what can be experienced at some definite time.”

Yet James also said, " . . . everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real." I think that is relevant because not everyone finds sense experience the most valuable of human experiences. As far back as Socrates we hear of individuals recommending "know thy self" (and many of these people are thought of as "wise" human beings). If one were to develop the ability to experience the most inward nature of consciousness, and after repeated experiences one becomes certain that the senses, and therefore empiricism, can never get at it, then one would then be justified in believing science is not the right approach to learning about the nature of consciousness.

Further, with the added choice of acquiring that "inner" knowledge, one wouldn't necessarily agree that empiricism deserves "epistemological privilege."
One might very well decide that self knowledge is one's first priority, and understanding the external aspects of reality is below that in priority.

Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

This relates to the point I was trying to make in another thread. If what I said above is possible, there will be no way to externalize the experience of consciousness. Therefore, only "hints" we will acquire are if each individual learns to experience the inner aspect of consciousness for oneself. I cannot see your experience, you cannot see mine. You can only experience your own, I can only experience mine.

metacristi

Apr15-04, 10:41 AM

Hugo Holbling

Our disagreement begins from the assumption of Feyerabend that experiments cannot constitute the base of making the difference.Contrary to what you seems to believe I maintain my view that empirical data is crucial,on the long run at least.While it is true that Copernicus and even Galieo's views were somehow against the 'natural' interpretation of facts,at that time very few preferred them based only on some aesthetic reasons.It was Tycho Brahe's observations and especially the tremendous success of newtonian mechanics which made all scientists of the time to prefer their views.Thus scientific practice vindicate the appeal to experience on long run in spite of some counter examples along history.In my opinion history is full of examples when the lakatosian view was the closest to what happened,this is why I prefer it.Those who think it is no longer tenable have first to prove their case as being superior in experimental practice (though possible their view was at its turn disproved by some other counter examples).Anyway what counts even on the short run is that thefirst task of science is to work for all our practical purposes in the simplest way and that the principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality.Since science is openly fallible if other alternative programmes will prove superior the majority of scientists will consider it the standard of knowledge (though possible working to make progressing some empirically degenerating alternative programmes).If you have other proposals (better I hope backed by sufficient reasons) please go ahead.I'm listening.

Hugo Holbling

Apr15-04, 10:42 AM

Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accomodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.

Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological priviledge but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this priviledge in a non-circular way.

Les Sleeth

Apr15-04, 10:54 AM

. . . address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological priviledge is possible. . . . why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example?

I would enjoy debating Quine's point if I wasn't busy for the next couple of days. But as a quick answer to why I think epistemological priviledge is possible, I'll let my pragmatist leanings show and say epistemological priviledge is established by what "works."

When it comes to understanding physcial reality, empiricism has earned the right to claim epistemological priviledge. When what is claimed to be known is applied in a process, laser technology for instance, then we "know" something about the nature of light has been understood (i.e., because we can make it "work" or operate according to predicted principles). While quarks might be unknowable, there is plenty science has proven it knows. Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

Of course, I also believe epistemological priviledge is not absolute, but is determined by what one wants to know. So as I argued in my last post to metacristi, I would not agree that empiricism has epistemological priviledge in the case of certain subjective experiences.

Les Sleeth

Apr15-04, 11:00 AM

Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this priviledge in a non-circular way.

Well, you responded to my point, though not to me, while I wrote it.

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological priviledge in every area of human investigation.

Hugo Holbling

Apr15-04, 02:03 PM

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

I quite agree, but this is making my point for me: the Homeric gods "worked" in this way, just as myriad other worldviews and methodologies "work" for other groups, cultures and so on. Why should i assign an epistemic priviledge to one or the other?

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological priviledge in every area of human investigation.

Well, i applaud your caution.

Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

Les Sleeth

Apr15-04, 02:38 PM

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave. However, I didn't say the classic works of that period produced no hypotheses or applications.

I am assuming we are all talking about epistimology, and in this case getting proof about the nature of reality. Just because the Greeks made sense of the world through myth doesn't mean they knew anything about reality. But this method of linking experience to what is hypothesized has produced an incredible amount of knowledge. As I've already said, I don't think sense experience is the only sort of experience which brings knowledge. But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

confutatis

Apr15-04, 02:43 PM

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological priviledge in every area of human investigation.

Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...

Hugo Holbling

Apr15-04, 05:25 PM

Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave.

Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?

metacristi

Apr16-04, 02:09 AM

Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological priviledge but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this priviledge in a non-circular way.

I don't think we arrive somewhere if those arguments.Anyway it's hard to see how can you avoid the crackpot ad hoc hypothesis 'Homer's Gods are responsible for all we see or can discover'.Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.I'm afraid this is not enough and I've shown you above why,maybe on short run you're right,but there is no reason to think this holds also on medium and long run.To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts and for that first you have to propose an internally coherent model for scrutiny which does not contain redundant theoretical constructs and which avoid also the ad hoc hypothesis 'Homers' Gods did everything'.As far as I know Quine agreed with this,he's still an empirist after all that,there must exist a continuity stronger in some parts,weaker (nevertheless existing) in others,between all enunciations belonging to a scientific system,in contradiction with the acceptance of redundant assumptions,totally isolated from the rest of enunciations.Thus it seems to me that he accepts the principle of sufficient reason at least within the same systems (elimination of redundant assumptions) though allowing a competition between different scientific systems.Anyway since the principle of sufficient reason is one of the first epistemological principles,'engulfed' also by the actual scientific method(s) you'd have also to provide a method of deciding what is real without allowing contradictions of how some enunciations in the system have been inferred.The mere fact that we are entitled to create whatever systems we wish by holding a certain enunciation as being true provisionally (the existence of Homer's God for example) with the expense with having to change possible large parts of the system does not prove that on long run it will still be on the same level of rationality.Finally I really doubt that Quine has ever thought seriously at this since he only wanted to discredit the logical positivist interpretation of the meaning (which he succeeded) and proposed an alternative hypothesis something like Bohm's fully causal interpretation of QM (as Bohm's witnessed he only wanted to show that non local hidden variables are still feasible in spite of von Neumann's fourth postulate).Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

So we must wait even if you propose a coherent alternative program,equally supported empirically,to settle the things in a clear way.It might even happen that during this time the assumption that Homer's God exist to be made potentially testable in a clear way (indeed why not?) enabling us to treat it in isolation from other enunciations.

metacristi

Apr16-04, 02:22 AM

Hugo Holbling

It's not clear to me,you have not proposed an alternative view to mine's,do you disagree also with the epistemological privilege of science based on logical grounds (principle of sufficient reason)?Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).Or,not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s),there is a clear difference between saying that all epistemological systems are equivalent and denying the existence of a metalogical,immutable,method from outside science...

Hugo Holbling

Apr16-04, 02:42 AM

Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.

You'll recall that i asked you not to hopelessly mischaracterise me with a ridiculous straw man like this, but apparently that was too much to hope for. I have asked you to justify the epistemological priviledge and you have singularly failed, unless you think writing at length will eventually hit on something convincing. Don't waste my time again.

To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts

No, we don't: facts are theory-laden, as you ought to know. Indeed, this is a basic logical error.

Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

Yes, you are keen to assert things but not so willing to provide any justification. If you think Feyerabend proposed a system, i suggest you think again; a remark like that would incline me to think you're not basing this on his work.

Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).

Who are these people? Is this a spectator sport?

not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s)

He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.

Theothanatologist

Apr16-04, 04:35 AM

He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.
No scientific method?

In the immortal words of Arnold Drummond, Whatchoo talking about Willis?

You must have lost your gourd in order to say such silly stuff in the lion's den. Who are those philosophers of science worshipping at the altar of Feyerabend, chanting select winners from the Against Method gospel in the vain hopes of gaining hermetic knowledge? :wink:

Hugo Holbling

Apr16-04, 06:51 AM

I'll not take your bait, dear Ender. :biggrin:

Les Sleeth

Apr16-04, 11:38 AM

Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall. I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement. I've been trying to get him to tell me if he is limiting that priviledge to physical/external inquiry, of if he believes it applies to all knowing endeavors.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge. Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological priviledge for all areas of investigation).

Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?

I think we can make it vague by including varieties of experience like delusion, for instance. Most of us know what normal experience is (whether or not anyone can precisely define it); we trust it too, which is why we prefer an experienced doctor to operate on us over an inexperienced one. I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved). Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization. The truth is, we know little more than tautologies through rationalization alone.

As far as Greeks seeking confirmation through experience, I am sure true believers did. And I am pretty sure they didn't find it
in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was. Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science. Then I'd want to see them do it, which they nor any other knowledge discpline ever has. That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.

Les Sleeth

Apr16-04, 11:48 AM

Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...

True. I think we just have different ideas of what "happiness, contentment, fulfillment . . . " are. I believe science has great potential for helping to relieve suffering, particularly through correcting or aiding physical problems.

But I do not consider the absence of problems or suffering happiness, contentment, or fulfillment.

Hugo Holbling

Apr16-04, 02:31 PM

I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall.

I'm glad to continue this discussion because you seem genuinely interested, as opposed to avoiding the issue. You could say i was joking, but generally speaking i prefer to take the opposite point-of-view in a discussion because i feel i learn more that way, irrespective of my actual opinion.

I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement.

Not really. If we want to say that science should have an epistemological priviledge, it would appear to be a claim that requires justification. If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.

Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean. Very many worldviews have been both successful and useful insofar as they have helped their users to make sense of their world and achieve whatever aims they had. That our aims may differ is not a reason for awarding an epistemological priviledge.

We can say, of course, that the obvious distinction here is that certain approaches provide knowledge of reality and that this is why we may attribute an epistemological priviledge; however, that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not. The most important matter, nevertheless, is to wonder if sentences that long are deliberate or just a result of my stupidity.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge.

Well, my arm can easily be twisted: knowledge of what?

Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological priviledge for all areas of investigation).

The serious difficulties mentioned above aside, i might be tempted to admit that, but i'd want to know how we decide when an advantage is present.

I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved).

A fool can deny anything. Can you deny, in like fashion, what other methodologies and worldviews have achieved? Who judges such things but those employing them on the basis of their goals?

Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization.

The rise of empiricism is somewhat more complex that that, but i'll grant you the point.

And I am pretty sure they didn't find it in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was.

Doesn't that strike you as an unfair and rather too swift dismissal of what the Greeks did with their worldview? Your certainty notwithstanding, it probably behooves us to check (particularly in the context of this discussion).

Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

I didn't expect to see essentialist notions like "the nature of reality" on a physics board, but i'm pleasantly surprised. Concepts like this, along with knowledge in the first place, are again rather more complex. What else are people doing with their ideas, however crackpot we may suppose them to be, but investigating reality? Is everyone an instrumentalist?

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science.

I hope i've explained above why this is too quick: Quine's remark, which i presume you know of (after all, i'm just getting this stuff out of books, as i've been told already), was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and i've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods. Even if i'm talking through my hat, the matter isn't so clear-cut as at least one poster has presumed.

That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.

That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the priviledge because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I hope this bluster has given you something to think about (even if only for a few seconds) and attack.

metacristi

Apr17-04, 03:50 AM

Holbling

We are both wasting our times in this case.But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth,I don't think you are in such as position,even if you were a professional philosopher,facts speaks and the controversies are even greater now in this field than before.Ask some scientists and you'll hardly find one who is a commited relativist,feyerabendist (though he says that there are still rules,he defended his position against the accusations of pure anarchy).I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.The quark model,though ad hoc at the time when was proposed,actually made some predictions and there is even indirect evidence for the existence of quarks (the collision electron positron at very high energies where the jets of pions obtained originate from different points showing indirectly the presence of smaller particles whose trajectories are conserved by hadrons,the variety of energies at which exist the J/psi particles which are analogous with the atomic spectres,showing indirectly the existence of two smaller components and so on).Such theoretical constructs are accepted usually even in the absence of indirect or direct evidence or at least potential testability but only if their predictions explain a wide enough range of empirical facts.Sometimes even ad hoc hypotheses are accepted if they are coherent with the body of all accepted scientific knowledge,as I said not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level.Even if we were to accept that a specific variant of the Greek Gods research program (when Murray Gell Mann first presented his model of quarks) as being on the same level of priority with that of science's don't you think the latter observations,I presented above, constitute a diproval of that variant of the model?Of course you can build potentially (but I'm not really sure it is an easy task) another variant,which will have the same fate on very short time,anyway this is a clear evidence that the scientific approach is superior on long run.As I said I could easily use the bayesian interpretation of probabilities for that.Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

We can never deduce knowledge from observations,we can only infer it indeed,still this does not mean all possible explanations are on the same level of rationality.Observed facts speak,having the principle of sufficient reason at base,of course once we accept the basic assumptions of science,otherwise it becomes an incoherent system.This approach does not exclude absolutely anything,since science is openly fallible,even the basic assumptions are open to revise.If it were not so then I would be fully entitled to claim that my worldview,my 'research system',based also on my own interpretation of some strange experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry now,that a 'soul' of some sort does survive death,is on the same level with the whole research program of science.Or the Creationist science program.We need a standard of knowledge,the minimum to be accepted by all would be rational people.Of course,my 'research program' is not non rational or irrational.But it is still a mere belief,notwithstanding that rational,I am basically open to accept later that my personal experiences can be explained within the standard program of science with sufficient reasons,without the need to resort at the existence of a soul.But of course it might also happen that science will find sufficient evidence supporting my view.To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.Or at least a hypothesis which does not contain redundant assumptions,where all assumptions are valuble to the process of making new predictions,which explains facts already explained by science and makes also some new predictions.Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?Understand of rationality,it is based on all observed facts and the principle of sufficient reason (allowing some valuable theoretical constructs in science though there is no need to believe in their existence before direct or indirect experimental evidence for them).Why are they on the same level?Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

Canute

Apr17-04, 06:53 AM

Sleeth - But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.
I think this is a good point. Empricirical knowledge is gained through experience. This is true whether that knowledge is derived from a scientific experiment, a revelation on the road to Damascus, or a meditative experience of non-dual oneness and many-ness of Being. Science has no priviledge over other systems of knowledge that are equally or more emprirical.

Also, as all knowledge derives ultimately from experience it is not always easy to distinguish which is more or less 'emprirical'.

On top of this most scientific 'knowledge' is more theoretical than empirical. Based on observation yes, but there is nothing in the way of experience to 'empiricise' much of scientific theory, and most scientific entities are no more than theoretical constructs.

Science is based more on observation than experience and as such is by definition less empirical than methods based on exploring direct experience.

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

Hugo Holbling

Apr17-04, 08:06 AM

But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth

I'm not, and your explicit attempts to poison the well are rather pathetic. I don't think my ideas are superior to yours; instead, i think that i'll disagree to try to learn something. Alas, you have nothing but invective to offer.

I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.

Yet you seem to presume to tell me what i think, where i got it from, what my motives are and how i need to address you. Perhaps you should cease pissing in the well and ask yourself if this is the way to present your ideas in the best light?

Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

No, you haven't. All you do is write and write without actually saying anything. The priviledge you want to award is epistemological, yet you refuse to address the epistemological points at issue here and declare the priviledge to be justified by assuming it implictly before you even start. That, alas, is what you are plainly unable to even appreciate, let alone counter. My last post explained this, but you apparently don't follow. How can you award your priviledge in a non-circular way? Try again, preferably without insulting me.

To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.

This is naive empiricism at its best (and therefore worst). "Facts" don't speak at all; they are theory-laden all the way down. The question here is what we are supposed to mean by terms like "superior" in the first place, a question you steadfastly refuse to answer.

Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?

This only serves to demonstrate your inability to charitably read my posts here and continue the mischaracterisation to make an empty point. By questioning the awarding of an epistemological priviledge i do not thereby commit myself to the notion that all ideas are equally rational. This rather disappointing non sequitur makes me wonder if you have any interest in learning anything and prefer instead to just shout at me until i give up.

Why are they on the same level?

Why are you incapable of dealing with me charitably? Why should i argue against your straw men?

Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

Are you able to stop insulting me? Others might find your insistence that i can't think for myself and am merely parroting what i read in some books to be objectionable, but not me. In the absence of any justification as to why i should waste my time on someone so insistent on poisoning the well here and telling me i can't think on my own, can you tell me the lottery numbers instead?

Hugo Holbling

Apr17-04, 08:09 AM

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.

Canute

Apr17-04, 09:00 AM

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.
It's impossible for me say what I mean by angry but I imagine you also have experiences of anger (especially here!) so let's say they are the same experiences.

Is your anger theory-laden, (or your hunger, pain etc)? To me they seem to be direct experiences. I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact. I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

At the moment I would say that when I perceive an orange I am theorising about the pattern of photons and the signals in my brain, however the experience of wanting to eat it (for instance) is direct and non-theoretical.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

Hugo Holbling

Apr17-04, 10:56 AM

I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all i'm getting elsewhere is insult.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact.

Is it? Given that i'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books i've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Any experience makes its apearance within the frame of our customary points of view and forms of perception.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though: what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but i'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

What do you think?

metacristi

Apr17-04, 11:14 AM

Hugo Holbling

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning;anyway I've already (implicitly) recognized that explanations of newly observed facts might be theory laden when I said,as Popper observed once,that we cannot deduce explanations from facts,we can only infer them (as matter of fact they could be infinite).Still this does not represent an argument against some general rules,it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden,I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.Even today many scientists,the vast majority of them in fact,reject his anarchism.You might disagree with me,I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it (evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference),but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

Everything goes indeed but only if you provide also a method of establishing what is real.Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science and possible more variants of the method (though this is very controversial especially among scientists) anyway all these methods have the principle of intersubjectivity,be it only at limit,and the principle of sufficient reason incorporated (used including in the theory making process as I've explained before).The fact that there exist equally valid competing scientific hypotheses does not change too much the situation when talking about the whole of science;it (science) splits into more competing huge research programs indeed,but the above mentioned basic principles,potentially making the difference between them,are still accepted.No problem even if we accept some new assertions as being provisionally true (specific to that version of the research program),even by changing large parts of the actual accepted knowledge,if it offers a valid explanation and respects also the above mentioned basic requirements (something which I still expect from you to provide).

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths',a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.So Feyerabend might be somehow right,still keeping some rules,there is not exactly a total anarchy;as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Thus if I were to claim that my worldview is on the same level of rationality with that of science's (which I don't,at least for the moment,I still try to make it empirically progressive) I would be forced either to provide a hypothesis using the soul as a fruitful theoretical construct indispensable for the new predictions made,present indirect/direct evidence sustaining the existence of a soul whilst still accepting the actual basic requirements of the scientific method (+possible some other auxiliary assumptions) which to sustain my hypothesis,or provide a better method of establishing what's real,if I were to reject at least one of those basic requirements of the actual method.If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has even epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.If my system does not epxplain (counting as predictions) some already known but not unrelated facts,as many as possible,I cannot even claim that it has the same privilege.

Hugo Holbling

Apr17-04, 11:47 AM

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning

It's only a problem insofar as you continue the insults. I'm glad you've refrained in your goodbye speech, at least.

it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden

Instead, this is a standard remark in the philosophy of science. I know, because i found it in a book.

I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.

At least we agree about Lakatos. :frown:

The problem here - yet again - is that you declare things to be so without offering any justification at all; saying that the arguments proceed "rightly" cooks the books before i've even objected. Others, like Dupre, Cartwright, Galison, to name but a few, have noted what you cannot; namely, that denying the existence of a single method does not imply anarchism at all. Instead, it could be that science is far too complex to be accounted for without the plurality of methodologies that we actually see if - ironically enough, given this thread to date - we look instead of theorising.

I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it

I understand well enough, but see no reason to accept this epistemological priviledge when you have used it in your arguments, smuggling it in implicitly beforehand. In any case, my objection was never that it was incoherent or inferior, so i don't know where you're getting this stuff. Either you misunderstood (perhaps my fault) or these are more straw men.

(evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference)

*shrug* You could ask for clarification before insulting me, i guess.

but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

What "point of view" am i espousing, exactly?

Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science

Here is your problem: we do not have a "single science" and the talk in the philosophy of science these days is about the disunity of science (i know, because i read it in a book). I suggest you look at Galison's collection of papers for an introduction, if you're interested.

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.

To begin with, i haven't proposed such a system and called it equally valid; instead, i've time and again asked why an epistemological priviledge should be granted to your naive empiricism. The example of the Homeric gods was provided to ask why those gods stand on a different epistemological footing to quarks, to give you a chance to show why your priviledge should allow me to choose quarks instead of gods for some reason or other.

In the second place, it isn't at all obvious that anyone interested in this question should allow you to smuggle in an epistemological priviledge a priori, as you have here: why should we priviledge the scientific method, so-called, when the issue here is precisely to ask why this priviledge should be granted to start with? Even if i were to fit your mischaracterisation and declare an alternative epistemology equally valid, we judge the two by some means of comparison - not by assuming the one to be priviledged and asking the other to match up to it. You are assuming the result beforehand in order to justify it, which isn't cricket.

I won't attack the sniff of parsimony i smell here for now...

The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths'

Nonsense. How do we decide what "superiority" means in this context? It won't do to say that the scientific method, so-called, has empirical support because that again assumes what is to be proven; namely, that it gets at reality while other methodologies do not.

a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.

If you had read any philosophy of science, you'd know that Bayesian analysis is subject to severe skepticism.

as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Why don't you read his own works instead of mischaracterising them? I promise i won't insult you for getting information out of a book, even though i was fair game on that charge.

If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.

Wrong again. You cannot grant an epistemological priviledge on the basis of scientific method or the demarcation criteria you offer here without first explaining why we should accept their epistemological priviledge. That is what you still have failed to do.

Whatever the case, i thank you for an interesting discussion. I hope you will refrain from insult next time, as i sincerely hope we'll cross paths again.

metacristi

Apr18-04, 02:53 AM

You solve nothing by not allowing empirical facts as the criterion of making the difference between theories on rational grounds (or even different branch of scientific programmes,I mean the whole of science here) at least on long run.You cannot simply say 'concepts are theory ladden therefore you cannot make an empirical difference between alternative theories or programmes',this is on the same foot with saying 'subjective experiences are private therefore science will never be able to accomodate them'.My point is that there is a strong ground for this,even history of science does support this view,I will present later an example;there is an evolution of science,the point of Lakatos.There is absolutely no proof that such a programme where large chuncks of science,not coherent at limit with at least some (many) of old enunciations,is possible practically,though I agree that it is equally valid on short run.You must first prove that such a programme is possible and we can continue the discussion.It seems to me that if I try to retroactively create such a programme (assuming that I do this in 1870 for example but taking in account the later development of science) it would not have stand in a more or less stable form in time.If I understood well,sorry if I mischaracterise again,never inteneded by the way,but you haven't explained too much of your views,you do not support this approach.While such alternative programmes are viable on purely empirical grouns on short run I don't think they resist on long run.Empirical grounds still prove crucial to make the difference.

Some concepts might be theory ladden indeed still we can make the difference using common concepts accepted by competing programmes,at a more basic level.There might exist cases when crucial experiments do not exist indeed,still this does not prove that there are not cases when even instant disproval is possibile,not to mention diproval of specific variants of a programme.As a matter of fact on long run history proves that we can make a difference.Even Kaufmann's experiment is a good exmaple here,though it seems to vindicate Kuhn first.Einstein's theory seemed diproved because it was used a model of Kaufmann's experimental dispositive which was specific for Abraham's model (specific to that theory).Not even Planck,though using another model for Einstein's theory,was able to settle things in 1906.Still in later reviews Bucherer using the results of other experiments (acceptable by both programmes Abraham's and Einstein's) measuring the value of e/m0 settled the things in the favor of Einstein's theory by proving that in Kaufmann's experiments that value is almost constant for SR theory,varying in a significant way for the data of Abraham's model.By 1915 this problem has been completely resolved using empirical grounds entirely.Finally some concepts might be embedded in all those programmes,at a very basic level,like was the atomic theory,thus allowing empirical difference between programmes on long run at least.

Hugo Holbling

Apr18-04, 03:11 AM

Apparently the several times you've said this discussion is over were not enough. I don't think i can help you here since you still fail to appreciate that you simply cannot use an "epistemological priviledge" to justify an "epistemological priviledge". I already explained the circularity inherent in your approach and left you with plenty of questions and hidden presuppositions in your account to consider; what's clear is that you may not smuggle in your conclusion as a premise as you continue to do, and i think this is plain enough for everyone else that i'm content to leave it for now. Perhaps there is a communication problem here, but my post above stands as it is.

Edit: no need to apologise. Let me know how i can make this clearer, if i can.

metacristi

Apr18-04, 03:33 AM

What to explain?i don't think that the accepted knowedge of an alien culture on the other part of the galaxy,situated at roghly our level of development,is too different...I think finding one would settle things clearer.

Canute

Apr18-04, 06:58 AM

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all i'm getting elsewhere is insult.
Yes, I've never understood why M thinks science has 'e-priviledge'. I've asked on a few threads with no answer yet.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.
I was considering two things. Firstly that all knowledge begins in experience, and secondly that certain knowledge lies in a unity of knower and known (as per Aristotle and Popper and other notables). If all experiences are theory-laden then neither of these two things would be true, knowledge would begin in theory and certain knowledge would be impossible. Also introspection suggests to me that if not all then most experiences are direct and 'pure'.

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Is it? Given that i'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books i've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.
I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid. However you raise a good point here, namely that experience and subject are denied by some.

I cannot see how to deny experience. However I would agree that ultimately 'self' is an epiphenomenon which can be transcended. In this state experiences occur, but those experiences are un-owned, there is no 'self' having them. This is precisely the knower and known becoming one. But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):
Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view. because of this he missed the fact that meditative practitioners assert that 'points of view' and 'forms of perception' are exactly what are to be avoided in pursuing knowledge through experience.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though:
Is it? It seems exactly the point to me.

what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but i'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.
Good points. I don't think the views of Churchland or Bohr are correct, partly for the reasons you give. There's a chicken and egg problem (as there is with all scientific explanations).

What do you think?
Ah, my favourite question. :smile: I think that exclusive use of the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge produces a horribly warped idea of reality. According to science consciousness, the thing that allows us to know anything in the first place, cannot be shown to exist, cannot be causally or reductively explained, has no reason for existing, has no purpose or function, did not evolve, cannot be studied except in the third-person (even though third-persons cannot be shown to be conscious) and consists of no more than matter self-referencing. To me Heidegger was spot on, science confuses Being with beings.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical priviledge over all other forms of enquiry into truth. Science denies the possibility of certain knowledge so can only come in second at best. Combining them seems the best way forward, not dismissing either but accepting each for what they can tell us and what they can't.

To waffle on - if we want to understand the world it must be inevitable that we combine science, metaphysics and what we know from personal experience. Whatever we call this combination it is not science, ergo the practice of science alone isn't ever going to give us a true understanding of the world. The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

olde drunk

Apr18-04, 10:07 AM

i confess that i haven't read all the posts on this thread, however, i wonder why bother???

if you do not accept that you exist then nothing can be discussed or 'proved'. to me, this shows a complete lack of selfconfidence.

in order to move forward, we MUST believe that we are our own individual authority( not egotistically but confidently).

once i have faith in self, i am free to accept experience and determine it's value.

it seems a fruitless waste of time debating whether or not there is a reality. all i know is that i am experiencing something and i want to understand it by discussing and/or sharing what has been learned. perhaps, the real problem is that we all experience reality in a slightly different way.

when i experience pain i have pain, same for pleasure, etc, etc --let's not debate whether it's an illusion or photons or a dream. let's discuss what is learned and how to apply the lesson for a better society, etc.

it all begins with self awareness. that's my reality.

love and peace,

Hugo Holbling

Apr18-04, 10:30 AM

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper i'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view.

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical priviledge over all other forms of enquiry into truth.

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?

Canute

Apr18-04, 03:21 PM

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).
I can't see a way of denying that, on the other hand I can't see how it can be demonstrated either. All I can do is go back to the chicken and egg problem here. Even if we do interpret experiences before having them it would seem odd to argue that in an evolutionary or a 'morphogenical' sense we develop the means of interpreting experiences before we develop the means of having them.

I'm convinced that we have experiences directly when we focus on what they are). However perhaps it's true that much of the time we do not focus on what they are, and thus 'colour' them with our discriminations, preferences and habitual reactions. Underneath these, however, is the original experience, the one we had which led to their subsequent processing.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper i'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.
I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.
Ok

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.
I suppose I meant 'the scientific way of thinking', rather than meaning to imply Bohr didn't think for himself. (I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

I do respect Bohr as a thinker, particularly for his explorations of what the findings of QM research might mean. However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa). Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object? (I'm no physicist but complementarity and the C-interpretation appear to be on their way out. Not that this is in any way a criticism of him).

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?
That's very even-handed of you. In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain. All other forms of it are not. Hence, for instance, idealism is unfalsifiable and always will be however much scientific research we do. All knowledge gained through proofs or through our sensory apparatus is uncertain, relative, dependent on assumptions or premises, and as such has limits.

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued. To add some weight I'll also cite Spinoza as saying that "nothing exists external to God, and certainly not man's understanding of him". I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?
All the undecidable questions of metaphysics, plus Zeno's paradoxes of motion, Russell's paradox, Goedel's proofs, the impossibility of certain proof, the problem of infinities and infinitessimals, the undetectability of consciousness, wavicles, the 'something-nothing' problem entailed by materialism, etc. These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways. (BTW I'd say the same of religion for similar reasons - in case you think I'm arguing for God).

Hugo Holbling

Apr18-04, 04:41 PM

I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

... no cognitive activity takes place save as the input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synaptic connections, that theory. Theory-ladenness thus emerges not as an unwelcome and accidental blight on what would otherwise be a neutral cognitive achievement, but rather as that which makes processing activity genuinely cognitive in the first place.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken in to be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

(I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

You didn't; i brought it up to counter your remarks on Bohr.

However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa).

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object?

Bohr thought that it was impossible to maintain a sharp separation of observer and observed. He talked often in metaphors and i recall a story in which the observer peered closer and closer at reality until he finally saw himself peering back, but i can't remember where at the moment; it may be a paraphrasing of one of his parables. Maybe i'll remember in the morning?

In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways.

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?

RageSk8

Apr18-04, 08:21 PM

Here is a good link that relates to this subject. (http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/05/out_of_the_matrix?mode=PF)

Davidson would reply that Cartesian skeptics are misusing the expression "really real." It makes sense to say that the people I encounter in my dreams, or the things I see after taking hallucinogens, are not really real. For denying them reality is just a way of saying that we cannot make beliefs about these people or things cohere with the rest of our beliefs -- specifically, with our beliefs about other people and things. The expression "not really real" is, in such contexts, given its meaning by contrasting cases in which we are prepared to say that those other people or things are really real.

Davidson's point is that retail skepticism makes sense, but wholesale skepticism does not. We have to know a great deal about what is real before we can call something an illusion, just as we have to have a great many true beliefs before we can have any false ones. The proper reply to the suggestion that beavers might be illusory is this: Illusory by comparison to what?

Even a mind-bending movie like "The Matrix" supports this insight. If you see the film after having read Davidson, you will be struck by the fact that the hero has mostly the same beliefs after he is ripped out of his artificial environment as he did before. He still believes millions of the same commonplaces -- the commonplaces that make it possible for him to use the same language outside the Matrix that he used inside it. He had been fooled about what was going on around him, but had never been fooled about what sorts of things the world contains, what is good and what evil, the color of the sky, the warmth of the sun, or the salient features of beavers.

Canute

Apr19-04, 05:05 AM

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:
The trouble is that all the Churchlands' theorising is based on the same presumption, what Gold & Stoljar call the 'neuron hypothesis', which states that all reference to mental events are simply 'folk-psychological' and that all such events will eventually be reduced to neuroscience or 'psychopharmacology'. I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken in to be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.
It seems fair enough to say that all experiences derived from sensory data are theory-laden, (if one calls a set of connections in the brain a 'theory' as seems do be done in your quoted extract).

However we know this already from philosphers (Plato again). The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose, which suggests that certain knowledge is impossible and that mind is an illusion reducible to brain computation and 'connectionism', begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.
I wasn't drifting off into Kuhn country, but was using 'paradigm' in its everyday sense, in which as individuals we all have one. My impression is that Bohr stuck with looking at the issue from the 'western' 'third-person' point of view (unlike Shroedinger for instance). However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?
I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?
I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?
Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known. Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us.

“Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.”
(Critique of Pure Reason) Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place -

“What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?
Ok - same difference.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this? (Just so I know where we are likely to agree and disagree).

Hugo Holbling

Apr19-04, 06:47 AM

I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose ... begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

No problem. I don't mind ad hoc or quotes, in any case.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this?

No.

Canute

Apr19-04, 02:08 PM

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?
The same as the writers mentioned, the 'hard' problem and all that. I fail to see how science can explain something it cannot prove to exist.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?
What consciousness is, how (or if) it is caused, and how we can know (experience) anything.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.
Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?
They are distinct categories of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be certain for reasons given earlier. By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.
If you're not sure then I'll stick to my opinion, which I still think is correct. :smile: I don't believe that what I said was contentious.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?
Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?) I don't have a quick answer on 'truth', but briefly I take a truth to be what is the case. It's a bit more complicated because if we are to know that something is the truth then it must be the sort of thing we can know. (E.g. 2+2=4 we can know is the case because it's a tautology. The existence of self-awareness we can know, because we know directly).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

Hugo Holbling

Apr19-04, 02:23 PM

Thanks for your additional remarks.

Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?)

Ah, well. You can find it here (http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewtopic.php?t=58) (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

You can post quotes if you like but i've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.

Canute

Apr19-04, 05:07 PM

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.
Sorry - I didn't mean he wasn't interesting - I just couldn't remember how he connected with the topic.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?
Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

Ah, well. You can find it here (http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewtopic.php?t=58) (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).
I wasn't saying I couldn't be bothered. I have quite a few threads here and elsewhere on the go and get confused which is which sometimes. My apologies.

You can post quotes if you like but i've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.
Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers. I'll stick to 'glib and not very rigorous' for now.

Edit: Aha - just read some of your essay on truth. (I thought it was very good). It illustrates what I meant earlier by saying that I took a naive approach to truth. I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute. This gives me just four kinds of truth, or equivalently four kinds of knowledge. (Bear with me, I'm having to figure out what I think as I go).

These are relative truths that I do or do not know, and absolute truths that I do or do not know. I exclude all truths or true knowledge that I cannot know from this system, since it can't possibly ever be true as far as I'm concerned. This is a sort of mixed subjective/objective way of coming at it, and it seems functional (even if rather folk-epistemilogical).

This has the strange consequence that a certain truth is one which I am certain is true. But then what else can a certain truth be? One has to trust ones own rationality somewhere along the line and if one doesn't know a truth is certain then it isn't, if you see what I mean.

Les Sleeth

Apr19-04, 09:04 PM

If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.
. . . . Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean
. . . . that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not.
. . . Quine's remark . . . was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and i've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods.
. . . . That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the priviledge because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view (hey, you told me to attack . . . just kidding! :biggrin:). However, I am serious when I say I believe the reason for all your objections above are not because of a problem with experience, but they are inherent to the epistemological approach of rationalization. I define rationalization for this little critique as the attempt to justify, prove, or formulate statements of “verisimilitude” (to rely on Popper) without reference to experience.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to. Recently I had to revisit his thinking to figure out what Ragesk8 meant when he referred to himself as a “holist,” so my interpretation of your point might be influenced by that.

I do see a way to interpret Quine’s idea of a man-made “fabric of knowledge and belief” as you suggest. In this holist view, he suggests there is no statement which can be considered completely immune to revision. Quoting from his Two Dogmas of Empiricism he says, “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . . A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth-values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. . . . . Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. . . . Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.”

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended. I say it is because rationalization cannot be anything but circular. That’s why I quoted the statements you made above. Every statement can be said to be self-justifying, and every premise can be questioned with “how do we know what __________ [fill in the blank] is.”

The rationalists had a couple of millennia to show us they could get out of their endless circular traps, and they never could. It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt) and everyone else into rationalizing were/are nonetheless dinosaurs, still trying to figure out too much in their heads. It’s amazing what a little experience adds to any subject being thought about. Talk about a major adjustment to one’s thinking!

Do you want to argue if a wall is there? We’ll never decide because how do we define what a wall is? How do we know if the eyes accurately convey the image of a real wall? Just the very statement, “is there a wall,” assumes we can know (or not) and so is circular. So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain. Of course, no doubt (if you are a die-hard rationalist) you can say “how do I know if what just flattened my face was a wall, or if I am just imagining it?” Me, looking at another bloody face, accepts that the wall is there (until new evidence suggests otherwise) and can see no more need for discussion about that issue.

Hugo Holbling

Apr20-04, 01:25 AM

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended.

Alternatively, he could be pointing out the necessity of boundary conditions for methodologies.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt)

I'm afraid i do doubt and am quite surprised by the reverence shown to Popper by several members here.

So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

EXPERIENCE AND KNOW! (although that's your decision since I am also an individualist)

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience and your remarks do no better, other than to give me pause and wonder if i am wasting my time here. Nevertheless, i'm inclined to be more charitable than you; thus:

It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

How does this process work?

Hugo Holbling

Apr20-04, 01:33 AM

Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers.

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether i'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.

Theothanatologist

Apr20-04, 02:21 AM

I've been following this thread since i registered for this board. Being a philosophisticator myself, i couldn't help but zero on your musings of a philosophical nature.

I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd. This is manifestly false, because first of all it would be a sweeping generalization that marginalizes the difference under a mischaracterization. Anaximander pushed a dualist view while Heraclitus was comfortable with a non-essentialist take of Being as Becoming, a ceaseless fluctuation, constantly changing state of affairs. Parmenides dealt a deathblow to material monism with his privileging of the intelligible over the sensible, and his philosophy in turn spawned a school of puralists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Leucippus and Democritus intended to replace monism with their atomism. The only true monist among the Greeks would be Xenophanes, who thought that God was identical with the entire universe.

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century. And even then, empiricism bloomed only in England, where Bishop George Berkeley and David Hume took the principles of empiricism to new heights. However, thanks to Hume the philosophy of empiricism found itself at a dead end, stuck in the abyss of skepticism. The logical positivists exhumed Hume and resurrected his Fork of Knowledge (a posteriori and a priori), but they didn't last beyond the first half of the 20th century. Wittgenstein instigated a linguistic revolution in the mid 20th century and after Wilfred Sellars published his book on empiricism, it's safe to say that empiricism is no longer in vogue. :)

Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (Critique of Pure Reason)

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').
Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place - “What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.

Canute

Apr20-04, 03:18 AM

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd.
Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century.
I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did? I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.
I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?
I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.
I know.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.
Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.

Canute

Apr20-04, 03:42 AM

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.
I wasn't saying it was satisfactory, just that there is no other way forward. Are you saying that you know how we know?

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether i'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).
Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.
But of course not everyone agrees. This is the problem, and why one has to make ones own mind up based on pragmatic considerations (or remain forever on the spot trapped in philosophical debate). 'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case). That doesn't mean throwing philosophical considerations out of the window, just acknowledging that they are not a final guide to what is true.

"There is one great question," he writes in 1911. "Can human beings know anything, and if so, what and how? This question is really the most essentially philosophical of all questions." (Bertrand Russell in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell 1911,)

Analytic philosophers have not yet answered this question. I don't intend to wait through another two millenia of philosophical anlaysis before deciding what I think is the best way to know what is true. I haven't got time. If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

BTW when I said my approach was 'naive' I didn't mean simpleminded. It might be wrong of course, but you'll have to show that. It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

To be clear - I think it is possible to know certain truths, but not by the senses or by reason alone. There are a few reasons for this, some of which you give in your essay. I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

Theothanatologist

Apr20-04, 03:59 AM

Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.
You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did?

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.
I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.
I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.
I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known. The faculty of reason does encourage the intellect to posit objects without a corresponding form of intuition, which lies outside of experience, but this is not a "certain knowledge" by any stretch of the imagination.

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.
Passing the buck... :biggrin:

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.C'est la vie. :wink:

Canute

Apr20-04, 04:24 AM

You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?
Non-dual means literally 'not-two', it does not mean 'one'. If I could explain what it means I'd be cleverer than Chuang-Tsu. Roughly it's the view that all dualisms are ultimately false, in the sense that ultimate reality and ultimate states of consciousness (roughly same thing in this view) are non-dual, beyond truth/falsity, one/many etc. Mathematically speaking it's the view from the meta-system.

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.
I'll change it to 'most philosophers who conclude that certain knowledge is possible agree that it is only achievable by a 'oneness' of knower and known'. (I suppose a Christian mystic or gnostic would say becoming one with God, but personally I don't hold with God). Others (like Popper) do not take this final step but conclude certain knowledge is impossible. I take this conclusion as consistent with the first, but less well considered.

I have problems with the word 'empiricism' because people take it to mean various different things. For that reason I'm not arguing for it.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.
Ok - see above for my amendment assertion. Who is it that disagrees?

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known.
Quite agree. I didn't suggest otherwise.

Passing the buck... :biggrin:
It's you that's passing it. Try typing 'Hawking End of Phsyics' into your search engine. Or do want me to do it? Have I offended you in some way?

Hugo Holbling

Apr20-04, 06:32 AM

Are you saying that you know how we know?

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

But of course not everyone agrees.

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.

Canute

Apr20-04, 09:09 AM

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?
Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.
Do you read what I write?

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.
It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.
So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.
I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.
I think I agree. If you doubt something then you can conceive of it being false. However if you cannot conceive of it being false it is not necessarily true.

Les Sleeth

Apr20-04, 11:12 AM

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism. . . . wonder if i am wasting my time here.

Hugo, I really don't think your view is "wrong." I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack." I was in a playful mood last night, and that accounts for some of my comments. I've been enjoying your comments so far. I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

My comments below mix up the order of your post, I hope you don't mind.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper [i]Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

That's what I was took my interpretation from. His point about experience infringing only on the edges of any system of thought, and that within any system of thought we can revise components to still get the answer we want I think is pretty good. If that is what you are referring to, then I don't think Quine is saying there cannot be an epistomological priviledge established in some area of investigation, but rather he demonstrates what believing something a priori can do to one's objectivity.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience . . .

I haven't purposely mischaracterized you, but obviously I might have done so anyway (purposefully or not). I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism. But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made? Of course, that doesn't excuse me from making my case, so here is what I was referring to.

I chose a number of your quotes of which I claim two types characterize the overly-rationalistic debate. For example, you said, ". . . we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way." You also said, ". . . it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what 'successful' or 'useful' are supposed to mean." And then a combination of both! "That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place?"

What I find to be a problem with those types of arguments is that there is no way to propose anything without first stating assumptions (premises), and also unless we accept (even if temporarily) certain definitions. I realize either can be used improperly, and in fact often are. But the problem, I claim, is that even if one is perfectly logical there is no way to state anything and prove the truthfulness of it with pure reason alone (other than tautologies). So when you say we cannot state what is real can be tested because we've already assumed what's to be proven, what is the way out of that dilemma? I say there is no logical way out, we are stuck going in circles unless . . .

Les said: It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

Hugo said: How does this process work?

I remember when I first started reading philosophy I was hoping it would make me wise. Several years later I decided that it had made me dizzy because nothing was ever decided until, that is, empiricism came along. With that lots of stuff got decided. Why? The only reason I can see is the addition of experience to reason. That is what did it.

Now, in case you think I believe empiricism is the answer for everything . . . I don't. I've simply stated that experience proved its epistomological advantage very well there. But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological priviledge to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

That has been my point to you all along. I can see how relative epistomological priviledge might be allowed.

Hugo Holbling

Apr20-04, 11:15 AM

Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

Do you read what I write?

For my sins, i do indeed.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur. If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another. Thus, when you say:

'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case).

... it makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuff.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think i'm being difficult for the sake of it.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?

Hugo Holbling

Apr20-04, 11:38 AM

I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack."

You can tease all you like, but principled objection doesn't appear to be welcome here. Oh well.

I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

*shrug* I don't take this stuff personally but i'm not interested in the behaviour i've had directed at me so far, in this thread.

That's what I was took my interpretation from.

Read on a little further. Quine remarks thus:

For my part i do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and i consider it to be a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistemological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Fair enough, but my falling wouldn't prove that.

I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism.

In fact, you do me a great honour: usually my name is mentioned in the same breath as irrationalist (along with "jackass" and some others i won't repeat).

But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made?

You can suggest i walk on all fours if you like; it seems to be the fashion here already.

But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological priviledge to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

I'm afraid i'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). I also don't believe you that "empiricism relies only on sense experience", not least because sense-datum accounts of knowledge are long-dead.

That has been my point to you all along.

Fair enough, but countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

Canute

Apr20-04, 12:20 PM

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.
I'm not trying to fit you into a box. I can't think what gave you that idea. The question I asked was purposely a non sequitur, that why I asked it. You asked me what 'knowing' was. I was illustrating that there couldn't be an answer to it because The question is a non sequitur. (I haven't characterised you yet, so I can't have mischaracterised you).

For my sins, i do indeed.
I feel that you're reading things into what I'm writing that aren't there. That could be my fault of course.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur.
In what way? It doesn't seem one to me.

truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another.
I agree, but this is the whole problem with the discussion. My view is that 'truth' can only be known from direct experience. (A view I'd call empiricism if the term didn't seem to be usually interpreted as related only to sensory experience).

In this case how can I define what truth is, since experiences are incommensurable? I'd have the same trouble explaining what I think 'pain' is. I could attempt to define truth it in relative terms, (systems of proof and so on), but much better philosophers than I have done that already. I don't need to do this, since I do not take systematic proofs or even the evidence of my senses as bringing complete certainty so I can bypass all the stuff about correspondence theories and so on. I suspect I'm roughly in agreement with Sleeth on this one.

makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuf.
Usually I'd completely agree with you. But discussions that relate to consciousness (knowing etc) are a bit different. They always have this defintion problem at their heart. As you'll know it crops up all the time in consciousness studies. It leads to strange situations - for instance Francis Crick, in papers claiming to explain consciousness, argues at the same time that we shouldn't try to define it.

The issue of 'knowing' raises all these issues and they can't be avoided. I cannot tell you what 'knowing' is, any more than you can tell me. All we can do is assume that we have the same sort of experiences and are talking about the same thing. We are only having the same discussion as researchers have about whether consciousness should be defined as 'what it is like' or more intra-subjectively. (Perhaps 'knowing' can be defined as 'what it is like to know).

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think i'm being difficult for the sake of it.
Charitable is certainly not how I'd characterise it, but I expect I don't come across as I think I do either. You sigh and shrug as if it's as if you are bored in the company of mortals.

I have no idea why you called this comment a non sequitur. I pointed out that I'm not changing my opinions just because you think I should, and before you have shown what is wrong with them. What makes that a non-sequitur?

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?
Of course, but this is why I was trying to figure out your angle, there are lots of ways of coming at it. But I'll give up on that since you misinterpret my motives.

In the end I'd go with this from the Kuan Tsu.

"What all people desire to know is that (meaning the external world).

But our means of knowing that is by this" (our self, our mind).

How can we know that?" (the external world)?

Only by perfecting this."

Thus I'd say that (certain) truth lies on the inside not the outside, for while 'truth' implies a fact, something that is the case (let's say) 'certainty' implies knowing, and knowing is the task of consciousness, which is not on the outside, not 'lo there or lo here' to quote the apocryphal Jesus.

Les Sleeth

Apr21-04, 10:54 AM

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistomological priviledge to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No one, I think, is disputing the potential utility to people to employ myths or superstition, or any other device that helps them cope psychologoically. But I thought metacristi's initial point concerning epistomological priviledge was about what helps us find proof of reality. In other words, what best contributes to knowing.

That is the problem, how can we "know that we know," as William James put it. We can believe in gods, no problem, but how will the gods help us acquire information about the nature of reality? For that matter, how can we even find the gods to ask them (or however one gets knowledge from god belief) about reality?

So the point never has been awarding epistomological priviledge to physical objects over gods, except in the sense of what we actually can study and get to know. Physical reality just happens to be available to experience, gods so far have not been found.

Les said: . . . I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

Hugo responded: I'm afraid i'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). . . . countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

I do not see how we can leave "utility" out of what we value epistomologically. I want some reassurance that my methods of knowing are actually giving me knowledge. How do I achieve that?

Well, trying to figure out how reality works by ideas, reason and imagination alone left us perpetually undecided. There were no reassurances to be found in purely rationalistic endeavors. We can say there are gods, but anyone can say "how do you know?". We can say we know because our belief in gods makes us feel better, but then anyone can say "maybe, but you've assumed what we're asking you to demonstrate." Thus, these arguments keep reason alone from ever being able to decide for sure about knowing.

So we add a test, and the test is what "works." Now, the rationalist can also demand justification for why what "works" should be assigned any particular epistomological priviledge. We cannot justify it rationally, just like we cannot justify anything with pure rationality. What we've done, essentially, is decided rationality needs something more to work epistomologically, and so we added two entirely different components to rationality: experience, and, less formally, utility.

The current epistomological paradigm seems to be that we rely on rationality to consider if something is true, we try to observe what we propose, and then (when possible) we try to use what we've observed in some practical application. The feedback particularly from something "working" indicates reality has been perceived correctly. Can we doubt it? Yes, but only with radical skepticism. The evidence is mounted before our eyes.

Of course, just being able to manipulate physical reality doesn't mean we've understood all there is to understand about what exists. I catch thinkers here at PF assuming all the time that because of the successes of empiricism at producing knowledge, that empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge; and that because empiricism only produces physical knowledge, physicalism has been all but proven. But those assumption overlook a huge possibility which is, that the only reason physical aspects are being discovered through empiricism is because physical aspects are all empiricism is capable of revealing!

The interior world of consciousness, though under attack by the physicalist hopefuls:wink:, still holds itself aloof from their reductionist efforts. I still think experience is what we need to study the nature of consciousness, just not sense experience.

Canute

Apr21-04, 04:18 PM

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's. Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

olde drunk

Apr21-04, 05:23 PM

Les Sleeth

Apr21-04, 07:54 PM

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's.

It doesn't really matter to my point if it's anthropomorphic . . . dodo's found what worked for them too. I'll explain more of what I mean as I answer your post. I am going to mix up the order of your statements a bit to help me keep from repeating myself.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data. Meditation is experience, but what one learns from it is not via sense experience. I think you know I am an advocate for the value of that "inner" experience, so I hope you don't think I am discounting it. I am just granting empiricism the standards of its own definition.

Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

I made a mistake when I accepted Hugo's term "utility" without explaining what I meant. I assumed everyone was familiar with philosophical pragmatism, which I can now see was a bit egocentric . . . more below.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

My perspective on "utility" or "usefulness" is pragmatic in the sense that Pierce, James, et al, developed the pragmatic concept. This uniquely American philosophy truly reflects our down-to-earth attitude (later hair splitting disputes notwithstanding). I can't express how much I love it as an unpretentious standard for evaluating if one has accurately perceived or understood reality. However, to use it one cannot evaluate superficially; one must have the wisdom to realize that what first shows up in a situation very often isn't all there is to it.

Let's start with a simple example. If I propose humans will be most likely to survive if they cooperate, I can test that by figuring out how to get people to cooperate, and then seeing how that "works." If we really do thrive when we cooperate, then a principle may have been validated. I emphasize "may" because the cooperative experiment will almost certainly develop aspects down the road that didn't show up in the beginning. So a second part of the test is to do cooperativeness over time.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. :cool: But has it really worked?

They have not correctly understood what it is that leads to crop decimation, and so they likely will not focus enough on figuring out how to prepare for the idiosyncrasies of nature. Also, like a child who is beaten while growing up, their brutality desensitizes people, and encourages them to accept that as the norm. Violence as a standard has proven not to be socially beneficial. So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

Along comes the scientist, and he says, "let's not just speculate, let's look at what we can do to prepare for hard times." We study climate and weather patterns, we do statistical studies on past frequencies of conditions, we calculate how much people need to survive desperate times . . . When we have accurately portrayed the way reality is, then our plans should "work." When we haven't, then we get wiped out.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, say, in a solar cell. The model predicts that resident electrons in a semiconductor material will be forced out by sunlight, and then other electrons migrating into vacated positions through an external circuit will create a current. When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.

Les Sleeth

Apr21-04, 08:19 PM

Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk

I hope you read my response to Canute; I believe I've argued well that my evidence isn't merely anecdotal.

However, I think you might be expressing something I believe, which is that our consciousness is not a perfectly-confirming tool of the truth. The situation isn't really, in my opinion, that all "truths" are subjective; but rather, it is that we humans are nothing but subjective and so we have no other avenue to the truth. We cannot possibly escape it because no matter how "objective" we try to be, there is no way to avoid the reality that what we experience and think is taking place inside our consciousness.

I also agree that (I hope this is what you are saying) that looking "outward" confirms what devoted empiricists already believe. I think a great many people have a priori decided that what's "out there" is all there is. If that is all one is looking for, and if that is all one accepts as "truth," then obviously anything else which might exist is going to be missed.

Canute

Apr22-04, 06:26 AM

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data.
I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. :cool: But has it really worked?
I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.
But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, snip.... When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.
I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.
Yes I realise that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

Les Sleeth

Apr22-04, 02:09 PM

I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Yes, I don't think you have understood it (I will try to answer some of your objections below). I HIGHLY recommend giving pragmatism a look if you haven't ever studied it. I did a thread on it in the old PF, but maybe I'll try another one after the two I have planned already.

I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time. If you look at what has caused a great deal of misinterpretation in the past, it has always been the rush to form conclusions before all the evidence was in.

In the days of Henry Ford, it was believed the way you motivated a worker was to keep him intimidated. If you looked at the new situation of an assembly line, it seemed this theory might be correct. But as people got used to that situation, the downside began to show itself.

Lots of things are like that. Heroin is a great way to relieve stress . . . up front that is. The backside of heroin use reveals itself after one does it for awhile.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.

I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true. We might not have perfect understanding yet of everything involved in the success we had (which often shows up when the cell fails or operates in ways not predicted by the concept), but nonetheless certain things are confirmed.

I am not saying that anything can be taken at face value with pragmatism, it has to be worked with intelligently, thoroughly, and patiently -- just like we must do in any investigative approach. The hurry to reach conclusions is a perennial problem for all interpretative efforts.

Yes I realise that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

Right, that's what I said (or meant). I think happiness is incredibly practical. I can't see any reason to limit practicality to physical stuff.

Canute

Apr22-04, 04:23 PM

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.
I agree. I'll look out for the thread.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time.
It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?
Have you been talking to her?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.
I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true.
I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

Les Sleeth

Apr23-04, 10:36 AM

It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

I didn't mean time exactly, I meant to look at any situation with sufficient depth to see its patterns develop -- it just so happens that takes time.

I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

My approach is to do the best I can, see the biggest I can, be as thorough as I can. I only have the conscious tools I have; the issue for me is what helps me understand. No intellectual tool is perfect as far as I can see, but every little bit helps. I can tell you without the slightest exaggeration that I am almost obsessed with the technique of looking for what "works." As I said, one uses it intelligently, realizing its limitations.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective. I agree in can be used as you say, to help us with "what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it." But for me I take it much further.

It is possible that pragmatism works best for someone who believes reality has a "nature." That is, some existential bottom line which cannot change essentially. I do believe that reality in general has an immutable aspect and human nature too. So when something works, whether technology or within the human realm, I suspect that its conformed to that nature. Personally, I have yet to find a better intellectual technique to guide me in contemplating the nature of reality.

I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

You seem in too much of a hurry to understand. If you've seen a pattern, then as far as I'm concerned that has potential value. Later you might observe something else which, when considered with the pattern, will help you understand the overall situation.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

You are now talking about something quite different from pragmatic evaluation. I've never suggested it has much value in speculative or purely theoretical thinking (except possibly for inductive thinking). We can't understand what we can't experience, and so if we can't experience anything that indicates a photon is conscious, there won't be a way to take that idea any further.

You know, pragmatic evaluation isn't meant to replace other mental techniques we make use of. It is another evaluative tool. One has to use it empiricially (in the sense of your meaning of empiricism), carefully, objectively, etc., and even then it is just an "indicator" and not some absolute determining factor.

Canute

Apr23-04, 12:51 PM

Les Sleeth

Apr23-04, 06:00 PM

I'm not quite clear whether we really disagree on this or not.

I agree totally with pragmatically assessing the usefulness of new ideas based on what happens. But surely this can only be done after we have defined what we mean by useful, and defining 'useful' has nothing to with pragmatism, it has to do with our agenda and goals. If we want to reduce the population of rabbits then spreading a fatal disease amongst them is useful. However it's not at all useful if we are trying to increase the population. 'Usefulness' only has meaning relative to a goal or overall purpose. Without this context it can only be an empty term.

This is what I meant by saying that 'usefulness' should not be applied to scientific discoveries and methods prior to defining what science is trying to achieve. The term can have no meaning before that is done.

So I'm not in any way against pragmatism, just saying that we have to know what we're being pragmatic about before we start making judgements of usefulness.

At the moment we seem to assume that a discovery is useful if something can be done with it, but this strikes me as a misuse of the term.

I think you might have overlooked one thing I said: "It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective."

So forget about "useful," it is not directly relevant to pragmatic evaluation. The standard is what "works," in the sense of paying attention to how designing things (systems) relying on our concepts about the nature of reality is confirmed or contradicted by how well something functions after applying what we've hypothesized to be true.

Canute

Apr24-04, 10:16 AM

Les Sleeth

Apr24-04, 10:35 AM

I can go along with that. However in relation to the utility or truth of scientific knowledge, whether the truth of such knowledge should be judged by its 'usefulness', this just seems to shift the problem to what we mean by 'works', and whether this is any better a guide to its value or truth.

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.

Because of this, linking back to the earlier issue, we cannot automatically grant epistemilogical priviledge to knowledge gained through scientific methods. Knowledge gained through some other methods also work, and it could be argued that it works much better. :biggrin:

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.

Canute

Apr24-04, 11:25 AM

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.
No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.
Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

Les Sleeth

Apr24-04, 12:14 PM

No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.

Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism. :wink:

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge. To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal. I did not say or imply it had any epistomological value beyond that because I don't think it does. But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do? My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work. What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!

metacristi

Apr26-04, 06:49 AM

Nicely said,indeed we cannot award to science an absolute priviledge,as a matter of fact very few repsectable scientists really claim this.The point is that so far it is the best 'tool' making sense of the observed reality,it's accepted enunciations deserving to be the standard of knowledge,accepted by all would be rational people.

In gnoseology,and implicitly in epistemology,knowledge is defined as being a set of enunciations for which exist sufficient reasons to be considered as being true (provisionally of course we can never attain certitudes in science).Thus to accept something as being knowledge (in general) we must have reasons for that,reasons which are represented by the correspondence with facts (in the form of highly coherent enunciations explaining/describing facts accurately,making also predictions).Since the scientific method has proved to be the most successful so far we are entitled to consider now as being part from the standard of knowledge only the enunciations that have been inferred (not deduced) from observed facts using the actual variant of the scientific method.In spite of the possible attacks on what success means the success of scientific induction is a reality,indeed the so called 'common truths',inferred hastily by people,are very unreliable (anyway there is no alternative,enough different and highly coherent,set of enunciations which to replace the actual accepted scientific knowledge).This does not mean that other enunciations are forbidden to be considered knowledge,on a purely personal base,when a ground exist and the scientific inquiry is not possible (for example the existence of extraterrestrials) but in any case are those people (whose interpretation of some strange,personal,observations is that aliens do exist) entitled to claim that that assumption (aliens exist) makes part from the standard of knowledge if she does not provide also some sufficient reasons for that (at least a scientific hypothesis,making new testable predictions,with prospects to become a scientific theory).The same is valid also in the case of consciousness.

Canute

Apr26-04, 01:22 PM

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism. :wink:
I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.
Look at it this way. In business 'management by objectives' is considered a useful management tool. It is pragmatic. It depends on constant monitoring of performance against targets, with targets quantified and methods of measurement agreed. It is a very pragmatic means of judging performance. However it doesn't work at all until targets have been agreed upon.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.
By my definition of empiricism, which is "the view that all knowledge is based on or derived from experience" (Penguin Dict. of Philosophy) meditational practice is more empirical than scientific 'third-person' observation. I do not see any objection to this view. This is especially so when one considers that it is commonly argued that certain knowledge is identical with its object, a scenario only achievable introspectively.

To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.
Absolutely. Discussions of knowledge inevitably go beyond science.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.
Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal.
I don't disagree with that. After all it'd be a sorry state of affairs if it wasn't true. Physical aspects are science's specialism.

But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do?
I do, but no more than that.

My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.
I think I understand your view, which mostly I agree with, and I realise that you're not arguing for absolute priviledge. However I am. I'm suggesting that direct experience has absolute epistemilogical priviledge. As far as I'm aware this is the orthodox philosophical view. Science is good at what it does, but what does it does not do includes producing certain or absolute knowledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work.
This is not pragmatic until you have defined 'works'. That may sound pedantic but it is the point at issue.

What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?
Never mind God, science cannot ever tell us what matter is. The moment science gets near to reality it is of no use, it becomes metaphysics. These are its limits.

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.
What do you mean by 'works'?

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!
I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

Mathematician Spencer-Brown also wrote a book called Only Two Can Play This Game (1972). He wrote it under the pseudonym of James Keys. It is dedicated "To his Coy Mistress." It begins with a "Prescript" which itself begins: "If like me you were brought up in a western culture, with the doctrine that everything has a scientific explanation, there will be certain ideas you will not be allowed to know.” This is someone who Russell thanked for solving a few of his set-theoretic problems, so he was no fool.

Les Sleeth

Apr26-04, 02:56 PM

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Something didn't work. :biggrin:

I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.

I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences. In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly. I've counseled managers who over-planned details to the point that keeping track of progress took so much time nothing ever got done. How did I judge that? Well, I know that when people have come together to do business, they need to achieve certain things for the business to survive, and those things weren't getting done with those managers. Of course, if you ask them, they thought MBO was working perfectly for them; but the reason they did was because they weren't looking at the big picture.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?

Well, I'd say MBO works, when done properly, to bring about effective management. I'd say the business is working if it gives its employees a living. And I'd say that selling cigarettes doesn't work to bring about a healthy society. Each case has its own internal standards, but none of that has to do with the principle of what "works."

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry. You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use. I see reality itself as what both allows some things to work, and doesn't allow other things to work. Does the Mafia work? Partially; it may take more time, but the part that doesn't work is destroying it. Does a serial killing work for the killer? Partially; but the part that doesn't work destroys him. Does heroin work? Partially; but . . .

Does love work. Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does understanding work? Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does meditation work? Yep, and if it is done correctly I've never found a down side if there is one.

So some things seem to work from start to finish, other things need wisdom to see the full consequences. That is why I still say, the pragmatic perspective, when understood and applied properly, is an excellent means for evaluating things.

Les said: I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

Canute said: Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality. There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.

When I claimed it might be tautological for the 100% physicalist, I was being a little sarcastic. What I meant was, that for him reality can only be exposed through science. I think it is worth keeping the ideas of science and physical reality separate if for no other reason than to point out the limitations of science.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what? That's all I really care about. Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall. In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due. I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist or be relevant, and not to the epistomological methods of science itself. I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological priviledge to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? :smile: )

metacristi

Apr27-04, 04:55 AM

There is absolutely no reason now to claim an absolute epistemological priviledge for science and the actual variant of empiricism used to establish what is real,not even in what empiricism in general is concerned,since science is based on a series of assumptions regarding the existence of an objective reality and some alternative,highly coherent and sufficiently different,systems of enunciations,potentially better on long run,are logically possible (so far no such successful approach,potentially having a new method,has been proposed).

Still for the moment,from all we know using the principle of sufficient reason,the best approach is empiricism.In accordance with the criterions of truth defined within gnoseology and epistemology (the correspondence with facts+internal coherence+coherence with other accepted enunciations+finally integration within larger-as scope-theories),our models of reality must be non contradictory and capable to describe/explain as many as possible of the observed features of reality.Since at the base of model making is the analogical reasoning,we expect our models to be able to reveal also new features of reality based on what we observe (counting also as predictions of our models).This is why the predictory power (new predictions) is crucial,otherwise there is no good reason to think that our model is something more than an ad hoc explanation without any further prospects.It is exactly here where science's way of knowing has proved superior,so far at least,to all other approaches,giving consistent results,always providing sufficient reasons for its assumptions.This is why when scientists say it's dangerous to carry radioactive materials in the pocket all rational people will avoid this but when an astrologer predicts that on May 12 2011 will come the end of the world very few will really believe.Common knowledge is very unreliable,it usually lacks the sufficient reasons needed.Finally there is no proof that other methods cannot be better indeed (including here the process of establishing what hypotheses deserve to be scientific-now based on the principle of sufficient reason also) unfortunately no one has been found so far.If they exist and can be found by us then certainly no rational people would try to prevent them become the science of tomorrow,we must always define a standard of knowledge,provisionally.

Canute

Apr27-04, 09:41 AM

Something didn't work. :biggrin:
Lol

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.
Nor me.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences.
How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. Only be defining your objectives.

In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly.
I didn't say it didn't work. (Actually I don't think it does, but that's irrelevant here) All I was pointing out was that it is management by objectives. If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?
Depends who you ask. For the managers it's working well. I'm not suggesting that we have to make moral judgements when deciding whether something works or not. We can use any yardstick we like.

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry.
I have no argument with the way you decide whether something works or not. I do the same. However in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute.

You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use.
How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

Does meditation work?
This is an unaswerable question. If you want to know about some kinds of things it does not work, if you want to know about others it does. 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality.
I find it odd that you value meditation yet say this, and do not see the self-circularity in it. The two sentences are equivalent. It's like saying meditation is the best way of gaining the knowledge one gains through meditation. It can't possibly not be true.

There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.
I don't believe that astrology or psychic detective work produces knowledge, but I could be wrong. I'd certainly put science above these.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what?
So it follows that there is no absolute way of measuring the usefulness of science, whether it works or not, or whether the fact that in scientific terms it works tells us anything much about whether the scientific model is is true. We have to measure it anthropocentrically (you're right, that's what I meant).

That's all I really care about.

Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall.
Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view.

In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).
I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.
What do you mean by 'beneficial'. :biggrin:

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due.
Not at all. I've been giving it its due throughout. I think you are giving it more than its due by unconsciously measuring it by its own standards, which are bound to be flattering.

I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist
It's more subtle than that. I would also claim this.

I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological priviledge to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? :smile: )
What do you mean by 'effective'?

Les Sleeth

Apr27-04, 02:08 PM

How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. . . . If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this. . . . We can use any yardstick we like. . . . in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute. . . . 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do. . . . What do you mean by 'beneficial' . . . What do you mean by 'effective'? . . . How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times. As of now, the responses I chose in the above clips let me know you're not understanding me. Believe me, there's no need to question me about setting objectives. And I do NOT mean the evidence of my senses only. I assume I've not been clear enough about what I mean, so let me try one more time to explain myself.

Let me start off with your remarks about defining what's effective or beneficial. Personally I feel it's a waste of time to talk about that in relation to my meaning of pragmatism because I willing to grant any achievement can be considered effective or beneficial to a situation short term. So you want to shoot your wife? Well, a gun is effective and beneficial to your objective. I am not attaching any value judgements whatsoever to the chosen action. What "works" minimully is anything, and I mean anything, that helps someone achieve an objective.

But people's short term objectives are almost always linked to higher level goals. If you wanted to shoot your wife for the insurance money, I'd start questioning you about what you ultimately want. Why do you want the money? Because you will get out of debt and get to buy things. Why do you want to do that? You think it will make you feel good. After killing your wife and spending that money will you really feel good? And so on . . . In the end I'd ask, so will killing your wife really "work" in terms of your ultimate goal?

The truth is, everything people do is for the purpose of getting what they want, but everything they are doing doesn't necessarily lead to the results they hope for. Why not? Here we get into a little of the deeper meaning of pragmatic evaluation the way I am using it.

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways. So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.

What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways. When I think I see that, I pay attention to it because if I can understand something about the underlying aspect, I can design stuff in harmony with that. The assumption is, the more something is designed in harmony with the underlying nature of reality, the better it will work in terms of achieving desired results and consistancy. By the same token, anything working as predicted and consistantly reflects something about that underlying nature. So my pragmatism is an epistomological technique, a way to look for clues.

Now, I rely on two classes of pragmatic evalution. One is for understanding "stuff," as science does (such as in my earlier solar cell example). As I said, I've not found anything better than science for investigating stuff. And the other is human consciousness, which like the rest of reality I think has a "nature" too. But each has different rules for success when designing systems for/with them, as far as I can tell. Human situations, for example, seem to thrive best when they assist people in being happy, developing as individuals, and achieving things.

Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view. . . . I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.

Canute

Apr27-04, 05:35 PM

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times.
Yes, it's a hopeless way of communicating.

However I do not think I am misunderstanding you. I don't disagree with most of what you say.

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways.
I believe you can't possibly be wrong. There must be a meta-system if the universe is systematic. I won't bang on about George Spencer-Brown forever but he covers all this in his talks and mathematics. If he's too mathematical for you try Chuang-Tsu, who he completely agrees with. They suggest that you and I are ultimate reality.

So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.
Me too.

[quote]What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways.
Like the laws of form?

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.
I'm not against improving the human lot. But I believe we have a responsibility to do the same for everything that is sentient, for both pragmatic and empirically knowable reasons.

Les Sleeth

Apr28-04, 12:03 PM

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.

I don't think I have to "decide" anything if my goal is to look at things with a clear mind. We've talked before about the stillness of mind that can be attained through meditation. Sometimes one can be so still the mind becomes like a window that is open, and one is then merely "seeing" through the window. Before the mind is opened like that, one peers through the pane, and of course it always distorts the view; to me, that is parallel to having "values" (or opinions, or bias, etc.) in place as one experiences.

Now, I am not saying there isn't a time to close the window and reflect on what one has seen, and at that time of interpretation one's opinions and values very much make a difference to what one has to say about what has been seen. I might decide this is "valuable" to that, or that is valuable to this, etc. But during the time of "seeing" with an eye for the pragmatic evaluation one will do later, one is merely looking for patterns, consistant behaviors, underlying influences, and so on.

(BTW -- I'm not in management, but I was an organizational development consultant in my former professional life, among other things)

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

Well, I really don't know what you think I said that is self-referential (of course, I've already explained several times I didn't mean "utility" when talking about what "works"). If I were to say, like Socrates, that every proposition is false, then I am being self-referential. You claimed that to say science reveals physical principles is self-referential because it is the same as saying science does science. Yet science is a series of steps involving hypothesizing, sense observation, logical interpretation, and verification. That is science. We know it now, but I don't think it was immediately clear to everyone that science was only going to expose physical aspects of reality. Even today you hear science-types regularly contend that there is no scientific evidence of God or soul or spirit or life force . . . well, duuhhhhhhhh :rolleyes:

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological priviledge in the study of physical reality is not self-referential. When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work"). I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe. Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma. That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

So my acknowledgement that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest. It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well. So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.

I'll define "works": to apply principles as one understands them, and then for what results to function as one predicted. If something behaves according to plan, then it also reflects something about the nature of reality.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do. In my quest to know reality, I don't feel I can afford to pass up any method or aid which might assist me in that quest. Regarding pragmatic measure, it is what it is, and it does what it does. Nothing more and nothing less . . . I have no idealistic illusions about it.

Canute

Apr29-04, 07:34 AM

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.
We're going to have to agree to differ. Perhaps we could disentangle this over a beer but we can't seem to here.

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological priviledge in the study of physical reality is not self-referential.
But science cannot explain physical reality. You've said this yourself. Science uses the scientific method to model the scientific evidence in a scientific way in order to produce scientific theories. It's bound to be good at doing it.

When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work").
That is to interpret 'works' as meaning 'can predict physical interactions'. If that's how you define 'works' then yes, science works. It's bound to, seeing that it's entirely concerned with predicting physical interactions. But this your personal definition of 'works'. Other people are free to define it differently.

[quote]I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe.
Does the universe have an underlying physical nature, or is that a scientific assumption? If it has one then certainly science cannot explain it, for it is a metaphysical issue.

Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma.
I agree. If you judge then you must set standards against which to judge. However I'd argue that one does not need to judge, and that this is how one escapes getting trapped in the dillemma.

That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.
By that view the universe must remain forever mysterious to us and we must make do with knowing just what works. I don't agree.

So my acknowledgement that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest.
I presume you mean that science predicts physical interactions. In that case science definitely 'works'.

It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well.
Fine. (And there is no doubt that science helps us understand things scientifically).

So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.
Don't get that bit.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.
I think your definition of 'works' (or 'useful' or whatever) is practical and logical. I'm just saying that it is dangerous to overlook the subjective nature of those judgements. It's possible to start thinking that because science makes predictions about physical interactions this shows that it 'works' in some abstract sense. As a method of understanding reality it does not work at all, both for the epistemilogical reasons we've discussed and also because it cannot do metaphysics.

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do.
I quite agree that the best we can do is all we can do. However it seems that I believe that we can do a lot more than you think we can.

Do you think we should drop this? We seem to be in a rut. I'm happy with a draw. :smile:

Les Sleeth

Apr29-04, 12:13 PM

We're going to have to agree to differ. Perhaps we could disentangle this over a beer but we can't seem to here. . . . Do you think we should drop this? We seem to be in a rut. I'm happy with a draw. :smile:

Next time I'm in England we will have that beer! I was ready to drop it but you said a couple of things that inspired a few more comments.

But science cannot explain physical reality. You've said this yourself. Science uses the scientific method to model the scientific evidence in a scientific way in order to produce scientific theories. It's bound to be good at doing it.

What I said is that science explains physical reality better than any other method we now have at our disposal; and, that the best evidence which supports that statement is how much we can design things which work/function/operate according to how science has described physical reality. I am not saying it has yet explained all of physical reality.

Does the universe have an underlying physical nature, or is that a scientific assumption? If it has one then certainly science cannot explain it, for it is a metaphysical issue.

This statement of yours is the main reason I wanted to answer you. If you were a tiny little bacterium living on a huge iceberg in the ocean, and you and other scientific bacteria label all the principles that makes that iceberg exist "physical," then you'd say the iceberg has an underlying physical nature. However, the physical itself has an underlying nature, which is the water out of which it arose.

I often use water analogies because (OMG, I'm about to reveal part of my belief system :eek:) I believe at the foundation of all existence is some single, infinite, eternal, homogeneous substance which I think is the "ground state" of light. Yes, now you know, I am a monist.

What is the matter of our universe then? A monist theory might say it is compressed, oscillating light at some spot in the infinite, eternal ground state continuum. What is the universe doing now? It is decompressing, with its stars flying apart, and its light flying out of the compressed state of atoms. What is energy? As potential it is compression, and as action it is decompression.

This is like the iceberg which is melting back into the ocean. That ice is not really of a different nature than water, but it has taken on traits that accentuate certain water properties. Similarly, I see what we call "physical" as the traits given the foundational substance. The cause of those traits I would parallel to what you've called the "metasystem" (ground state light would be the "absolute"). At the boundary where the physical meets its metasystem and source/the absolute, that is where things get blurry, and that is where I think science is forever going to have problems with the physical side of that boundary. Like the question now of where did all the universe's energy originate? No one can answer it with a physical explanation, and so you hear normally hard core physicists offering what amounts to (IMHO) science fiction (like quantum fluctuations causing multiple universe's to come bubbling up out of nothing).

So you see, my idea of physical isn't all that definitive in the final analysis. I see it mostly a set of conditions or a metasystem of light that we, who are light as well, exist within (for now).

I have a little more to say about this below.

Les said: Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma. . . . That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

Canute said: I agree. If you judge then you must set standards against which to judge. However I'd argue that one does not need to judge, and that this is how one escapes getting trapped in the dillemma. . . . By that view the universe must remain forever mysterious to us and we must make do with knowing just what works. I don't agree.

Those of us who believe "something" is behind the physical aspects of reality are forced to limit ourselves to induction if we wish to theorize. I think it was Quine who pointed out induction doesn't work for the actual application of science. It might help indicate where to look for evidence, but if we ever get to the point where we are observing all facets of a formerly inductive model, it can then be considered deductively and made available to science.

The monist and metasystem concepts can only be described inductively because we cannot see them. If we wish to join them with the modelling done by pure physicalists, the only hope I believe we have is to produce a metasystem-absolute model which logically accounts for the physical workings of reality. No hedging either . . . it has to account for relativity, the constancy of light speed, quantum specifics, time and space, gravity and nuclear forces, etc.

However, even if we inductively come up with a model that logically accounts for every known physical facet, we still cannot say we "know" it is true. That's because (and I thought we both agreed about this), in order to know, one must experience what one hypothesizes to be true. So above when you state I am saying "the universe must remain forever mysterious to us," actually I am only saying that if one uses the intellect alone it must. I am not saying it isn't possible to experience aspects of the metasystem or the absolute (though I don't believe it can be done through the senses since they aren't sensitive enough to detect their own originating structure and construction material). We, (using the language of my model) the conscious light that receives the info senses send us, might be able to feel/experience ourselves and then know something about the foundation of all existence.

But once we are back in the theorizing arena, and we are talking to those who are only using their senses and intellect, it is back to induction and pointing to the holes in physicalist theory. YOU might know, but since that knowledge can only be experienced inside you, and not "observed" externally, I can't see an intellectual bridge that can be built between inner and sense experience except induction, which really doesn't satisfy either side's definition of "knowing."

Now I return once again to why I am willing to say science deserves epistomological priviledge when it comes to investigating the physical aspects of reality. What I mean is, as long as we are staying inside the boundaries of the mechanics the "metasystem" sustains which create and maintain our universe, and someone wants to call that "physical," it is okay with me to say science does the best job of investigating it. Science "works" because it really is looking at something that is going on. I don't believe mechanics is all that is going on (like many science types believe), but it's going on nonetheless.

Bottom line: I don't think we who believe there is a metasystem or an absolute can ever interface properly with science. If we really do have a way to experience what we say, then our best hope is to encourage others to learn how to experience it for themselves. There is no line of reasoning, sans experience, that can achieve logical certainty. My strategy here is to grant to science that it is perceiving apsects of reality, while looking for ways to show there are aspects science, and therefore physics, aren't accounting for and never will.

Canute

Apr29-04, 07:49 PM

Next time I'm in England we will have that beer!
I'll look forward to it.

Yeah I was going to stop but you've said some interesting things. I'm going to comment in little bits because I agree with one bit then not the next all through, and there are all sorts of issues. On the whole I don't think you're as empirical as you think you are.

What I said is that science explains physical reality better than any other method we now have at our disposal;
Not for me it doesn't I'm afraid. Science cannot explain anything important about physical reality. A scientific TOE is of no interest to me whatsoever. I want to understand non-scientific things, like what does 'phsyical' mean, and why do physical things exist.

and, that the best evidence which supports that statement is how much we can design things which work/function/operate according to how science has described physical reality. I am not saying it has yet explained all of physical reality.
How can a discipline that cannot explain the existence, composition, and ultimately even the behaviour of matter be the best way of understanding physical reality?

This statement of yours is the main reason I wanted to answer you. If you were a tiny little bacterium living on a huge iceberg in the ocean, and you and other scientific bacteria label all the principles that makes that iceberg exist "physical," then you'd say the iceberg has an underlying physical nature. However, the physical itself has an underlying nature, which is the water out of which it arose.
I don't think that works, because water is physical. The physical has to arise from something non-physical to avoid an infinite regress of substances. Something without any physical qualities.

I often use water analogies because (OMG, I'm about to reveal part of my belief system :eek:) I believe at the foundation of all existence is some single, infinite, eternal, homogeneous substance which I think is the "ground state" of light. Yes, now you know, I am a monist.
I don't think monism works. How can just one thing exist?

This is like the iceberg which is melting back into the ocean. That ice is not really of a different nature than water, but it has taken on traits that accentuate certain water properties. Similarly, I see what we call "physical" as the traits given the foundational substance.
But what foundational substance could be monist, and why can't science detect it? Also why can't metaphysics come up with any substance that would fit the bill? Why do all questions about ultimate reality have to be unanswerable? If monism is correct then we'll never know it.

The cause of those traits I would parallel to what you've called the "metasystem" (ground state light would be the "absolute"). At the boundary where the physical meets its metasystem and source/the absolute, that is where things get blurry, and that is where I think science is forever going to have problems with the physical side of that boundary.
Very true. The 'problem of consciousness', Zeno's paradoxes, the 'problem of attributes', the origins of matter, science is bounded by the walls of its cave.

Like the question now of where did all the universe's energy originate? No one can answer it with a physical explanation, and so you hear normally hard core physicists offering what amounts to (IMHO) science fiction (like quantum fluctuations causing multiple universe's to come bubbling up out of nothing).
Yes, I don't take all that stuff very seriously. It is impossible for science to explain where energy originated. I doubt science will even ever explain what it is.

So you see, my idea of physical isn't all that definitive in the final analysis. I see it mostly a set of conditions or a metasystem of light that we, who are light as well, exist within (for now).
But isn't light physical?

Those of us who believe "something" is behind the physical aspects of reality are forced to limit ourselves to induction if we wish to theorize.
Yes. This is why Buddhists don't theorise. If you theorise you end with a theory.

If we wish to join them with the modelling done by pure physicalists, the only hope I believe we have is to produce a metasystem-absolute model which logically accounts for the physical workings of reality. No hedging either . . . it has to account for relativity, the constancy of light speed, quantum specifics, time and space, gravity and nuclear forces, etc.
But it can't be done. In the scientific view metaphysical questions are unanswerable, so no scientific theory or model will ever have a sound metaphysical foundation. It must always rest on assumptions.

However, even if we inductively come up with a model that logically accounts for every known physical facet, we still cannot say we "know" it is true.
I agree. Induction cannot bring certainty by definition. A model isn't knowledge, and it is impossible to account for every physical fact (the First Cause for instance).

That's because (and I thought we both agreed about this), in order to know, one must experience what one hypothesizes to be true. So above when you state I am saying "the universe must remain forever mysterious to us," actually I am only saying that if one uses the intellect alone it must.
Agree again.

I am not saying it isn't possible to experience aspects of the metasystem or the absolute (though I don't believe it can be done through the senses since they aren't sensitive enough to detect their own originating structure and construction material). We, (using the language of my model) the conscious light that receives the info senses send us, might be able to feel/experience ourselves and then know something about the foundation of all existence.
And again.

But once we are back in the theorizing arena, and we are talking to those who are only using their senses and intellect, it is back to induction and pointing to the holes in physicalist theory. YOU might know, but since that knowledge can only be experienced inside you, and not "observed" externally, I can't see an intellectual bridge that can be built between inner and sense experience except induction, which really doesn't satisfy either side's definition of "knowing."
Mostly agree, but not quite. I agree that the truth about reality cannot be 'proved'. I think we know enough about logic and metaphysics to be sure of that. However I believe it is possible to work out the truth, and more or less demonstrate it, because it must be the only logical solution. However, for the reasons you give, one cannot go all the way to knowing its truth by reason.

Btw Spencer-Brown argues that we misuse the word 'proof'. Technically what we do in axiomatic systems is demonstrate, not prove. I think this is an important point.

Bottom line: I don't think we who believe there is a metasystem or an absolute can ever interface properly with science.
Maybe never interface with scientists, but there's no problem interfacing with science.

If we really do have a way to experience what we say, then our best hope is to encourage others to learn how to experience it for themselves. There is no line of reasoning, sans experience, that can achieve logical certainty. My strategy here is to grant to science that it is perceiving apsects of reality, while looking for ways to show there are aspects science, and therefore physics, aren't accounting for and never will.
I think that you're wrong here. If there are things that science cannot account for then it is a bad way of understanding reality, or rather it is not a way of understanding reality.

Les Sleeth

Apr30-04, 11:42 AM

I think that you're wrong here. If there are things that science cannot account for then it is a bad way of understanding reality, or rather it is not a way of understanding reality.

Not for me it doesn't I'm afraid. Science cannot explain anything important about physical reality. A scientific TOE is of no interest to me whatsoever. I want to understand non-scientific things, like what does 'phsyical' mean, and why do physical things exist. . . . How can a discipline that cannot explain the existence, composition, and ultimately even the behaviour of matter be the best way of understanding physical reality?

At last I see why we are disagreeing so strongly on this issue, which has been a mystery to me because we seem to agree about more important things.

I have to say, respectfully, that your first statement above doesn't make sense to me, while your second statement seems to provide a clue about why you believe it.

I would bet my britches you do science all the time with things you want to achieve in your home or profession. You might hypothosize a solution to, say, a leaky espresso maker, replace a seal or clean out mineral deposits, and then observe the results. When the machine works the way you want, you've used the scientific method to achieve your goal. Can you honestly say that approach doesn't work with all such things that can be observed with the senses, or that you personally don't find it valuable to surviving or being more comfortable on this planet?

So what if science cannot explain what it is that establishes the "physical"? As you imply, you and others of us think the answer to that is metaphysical, which is why it is outside the domain of science. You might personally not care about scientific exploration to understand the things you are intersted in, but your personal preferences have no bearing on the objective consideration of whether science is effective in its own realm we have supposedly been talking about in this thread. I mean, really, why judge science by what it cannot do?

I don't think that works, because water is physical. The physical has to arise from something non-physical to avoid an infinite regress of substances. Something without any physical qualities.

Another problem we seem to have is how concretely you take things I say. My analogy is not about water. The physicalness of water and ice has nothing to do with my point. I was trying to analogize that the physical appearances of the universe -- atoms, forces, energy, light -- might be the "forms" of something that starts out "formless." Water represented the formless ocean of my theorized ground state substance, and ice represented a "form" of, and in, that ocean.

I don't think monism works. How can just one thing exist?

It isn't easy to understand, but if it were (and if it is also true of course), then we'd already understand it. But here we run into a big problem with your persective on knowing reality. You say you don't care about the understandings science gives us, yet if I could give you a monistic model that accounts for the physics of things, you wouldn't be able to understand it. So where does that leave us?

I don't know why you find it so hard to see monism as a possibility because if you start breaking down matter, which is the basis of the universe, you find energy, light, forces . . . i.e., just a few basic traits which are able to assume an incredible variety of shapes to give us "appearances." Is it that difficult to imagine those basic traits derive from something even more basic?

But what foundational substance could be monist, and why can't science detect it? Also why can't metaphysics come up with any substance that would fit the bill? Why do all questions about ultimate reality have to be unanswerable? If monism is correct then we'll never know it.

Relying on my water-ice analogy again, what if you were made of ice, and all your detection tools were made of ice? They would be too structured to detect the unstructured condition of their own makeup.

However, I didn't say we'd never know experientially, I only said it can't be known intellectually or through the senses, and therefore scientifically. There is the possibility I've already spoken of, which is to learn to experience the "essense" of our own consciousness, and thereby come to know the absolute foundation of one's own existence. If you could develop that internal skill, you might just see that the basic stuff of your consciousness is the same basic stuff that makes up everything else. Of course, if you did see that, it is yet another step to understand how all the things which exist in our universe are given structure. So there are two main issues in the monistic model: what is the formless foundation, and how does it get structured into "form."

The idea is, the ground state is so flexible and indestructible, that it can take many shapes.

But isn't light physical?

Yes, but I am claiming what "physical" means is some minimum degree of structure. Light as we know it has the structure of transverse oscillation, whose wavelength by the way, is stretching as the universe expands. What if the ground state of light is some non-oscillating but vibrant condition, and not "particles" at all. When compressed it accentuates its vibratory quality, polarizes it, and "particlizes" it? When it decompresses enough I am suggesting it will lose its form and blend into an infinite continuum of formless ground state light.

Yes. This is why Buddhists don't theorise. If you theorise you end with a theory.

That's a joke, right? Buddhist theory could fill a library. Maybe the Buddha himself didn't theorize, but plenty of Buddhists have and still do speculate about the nature of things.

But since you've brought up Buddhism, the Buddha did speak of a ground state, that's what we attain union with in "enlightenment." The monist conception very much fits with Buddhist thinking.

Canute

May5-04, 03:44 PM

At last I see why we are disagreeing so strongly on this issue, which has been a mystery to me because we seem to agree about more important things.

I have to say, respectfully, that your first statement above doesn't make sense to me, while your second statement seems to provide a clue about why you believe it.
Well, I would say your second para. contradicts the first, but it doesn't matter.

I would bet my britches you do science all the time with things you want to achieve in your home or profession.
I agree that I do science every moment of the day, as you say. My life probable depends on it.

Can you honestly say that approach doesn't work with all such things that can be observed with the senses, or that you personally don't find it valuable to surviving or being more comfortable on this planet?
I've never suggested this. I definitely find science useful, up to a point. (Perhaps we ought to define science sometime). My point is that the usefulness of science to me has no bearing on its 'truth' as an explanation of things, or its value as a human activity, and little on its epistemological status.

So what if science cannot explain what it is that establishes the "physical"?
So science cannot provide an explanation of anything, it can only model interactions.

As you imply, you and others of us think the answer to that is metaphysical, which is why it is outside the domain of science.
To be honest I do not think metaphysics is much more help than science. They are two sides of a coin. Science cannot explain anything precisely because metaphysical questions are unanswerable. (Heidegger is good on why this is so).

I mean, really, why judge science by what it cannot do?
How else can one judge it? I enjoy studying science because it provides a lot of evidence as to the nature of reality. However that evidence clearly shows that reality is not scientific.

Another problem we seem to have is how concretely you take things I say. My analogy is not about water.
Yes sorry. I wasn't just picking on water. I was suggesting that there is nothing of which you can conceive that could logically act as 'water' in your metaphor. I'll come back to this below.

It isn't easy to understand, but if it were (and if it is also true of course), then we'd already understand it. But here we run into a big problem with your persective on knowing reality. You say you don't care about the understandings science gives us, yet if I could give you a monistic model that accounts for the physics of things, you wouldn't be able to understand it. So where does that leave us?
This is a tricky issue. In my view monism is not logical, which is why I can't understand it, if you see what I mean. Again see below. Btw it's not that I don't care what science says, it's just that I do not consider that it represents a true understanding of reality. I would say that the existence of metaphysical questions makes that inarguable.

I don't know why you find it so hard to see monism as a possibility because if you start breaking down matter, which is the basis of the universe, you find energy, light, forces . . . i.e., just a few basic traits which are able to assume an incredible variety of shapes to give us "appearances." Is it that difficult to imagine those basic traits derive from something even more basic?
I agree in outline but let's focus on this ultimate monist substance/entity. Is this something or nothing? Does it exist or not-exist? Neither of these are logical answers to the question according to philosophers. In metaphysics it is an undecidable question (if true it is false, if false it is true, since either answer leads to contradictions). This is the problem with monism

However I do half agree with you about monism, in the sense of all things reducing in a wayto one thing. But to make this work logically requires seeing this one thing in a 'non-dual' way, otherwise it's back to the 'problem of essence' and undecidable questions. Note that 'non-dual' means 'not two', and not 'one'.

However, I didn't say we'd never know experientially, I only said it can't be known intellectually or through the senses, and therefore scientifically. There is the possibility I've already spoken of, which is to learn to experience the "essense" of our own consciousness, and thereby come to know the absolute foundation of one's own existence.
Here we agree.

If you could develop that internal skill, you might just see that the basic stuff of your consciousness is the same basic stuff that makes up everything else.
In my view there is no 'might' about it. It is possible and countless people have done it, and will in future. Can't prove this unfortunately, although the scientific evidence supports the idea.

So there are two main issues in the monistic model: what is the formless foundation, and how does it get structured into "form."
Is not the main issue how a single substance can logically exist without changing the meaning of 'exist' (because existence is always relative)?

It is in the nature of reality that metaphysical questions cannot be answered. There must be a reason for this, just as there is for why apples fall down. Monism does not explain our inability to reason our way to the truth, but simply accepts it as a fact. In this sense monism is an appeal to mystery, for it says that if monism is true we cannot ever know why anything exists or what it is. (That's a shortcut through the arguments, I'll expand if it sounds ad hoc). A proper understanding would make clear why there is always an inevitable explanatory gap.

Yes, but I am claiming what "physical" means is some minimum degree of structure.
I agree. This implies that ultimate reality is immaterial, without phsyical properties. This is where I feel monism fails. It cannot get across this gap between the physical and the absolute for it suggests that the absolute exists, and how can something without properties exist (using 'exist' in an everyday sense)?

I passed through monism on my way to the Buddhist view, but I could never make sense of it for these kinds of reasons, and because it does not seem to explain anything, does not lead to any understanding.

Light as we know it has the structure of transverse oscillation, whose wavelength by the way, is stretching as the universe expands. What if the ground state of light is some non-oscillating but vibrant condition, and not "particles" at all. When compressed it accentuates its vibratory quality, polarizes it, and "particlizes" it? When it decompresses enough I am suggesting it will lose its form and blend into an infinite continuum of formless ground state light.
Not sure I understand all that but I'd agree that light plays some fundamental role in cosmogeny. Let there be light and all that. However I don't agree that light can be truly fundamental, for logical reasons outlined (or hinted at) above.

That's a joke, right? Buddhist theory could fill a library.
Buddhist explanations and teachings could fill a library. However these are not based on theorising, they are based on experience. Of course skilled Buddhists theorise about all sorts of things, but if a skilled Buddhist says something is true then it is not an assertion based on a theory. Theoretical knowledge is not considered knowledge. Either you know or you don't.

Maybe the Buddha himself didn't theorize, but plenty of Buddhists have and still do speculate about the nature of things.
In a sense it's true that Buddhists theorise and speculate. But you won't find any of those theories or speculations in the literature. Theorising and conjecturing may be a means to an end, but if all one has is theory then one is not a skilled Buddhist.

But since you've brought up Buddhism, the Buddha did speak of a ground state, that's what we attain union with in "enlightenment." The monist conception very much fits with Buddhist thinking.
I'm afraid this is a misunderstanding, albeit a widespread one. Buddhism is very specifically not monism or dualism. This is why there are no unanswerable metaphysical questions in Buddhism (or Taoism etc). The logic is different. Bear in mind the constant references to the absolute as the 'one and many', or the two Brahmans etc. This is also the reason that the absolute cannot be characterised in words without self-contradiction.

I don't know the Suttras well but there's a great passage in one (Surangama) where the Buddha explains that not only does the absolute neither exist nor not-exist, but that it is a mistake to think either that it both exists and not-exists, or that it neither exists nor not-exists. It is something that cannot be characterised properly in dualistic terms (or any terms at all come to that).

I know how illogical that sounds but if you're into the issue of self-reference and axiomatic systems it can be explained logically, or perhaps 'meta-logically' is a better word. (This is what logician George Spencer-Brown's 'Laws of Form' was all about, and he turns out to be a friend of Wu Wu Wei, highly respected Advaita master).