There is an emergent property...

[Mentat]

Wow, this forum's changed alot since the last time I logged-on...

Anyway, since I may not be able to get back on the Forums again, I wanted to make sure that I explained something which I only sort of glossed over in previous threads, and which probably would have been useful in those threads, had it been further developed.

You see, while I spent so much time showing that the supposed emergent property of "subjective experience" doesn't exist (indeed, it's only definition is blatantly circular, and so any argument built from it will inevitably be a straw-man), I forgot to emphasize that there is an emergent property related to consciousness, which might (just maybe) explain why it does not appear to be perfectly reducible. The emergent property, btw, is nothing more than a master algorithm.

An algorithm describes a relationship of many parts in terms of one master "plan" of sorts, that the many parts are following (though, usually, the parts are not so much obeying a "plan" as the "plan" is being deduced from the behavior of the parts). Anyway, there are billions (perhaps trillions) of individual processes occuring between the individual units of thought, in the neocortex, and so it would be impossible to comprehend each individual action. Instead, the entire process is looked at, and the emergent algorithm is quantified as it's own entity (going by such names as "subjective experience" and simply "consciousness").

Because the algorithm describes the behavior of all or many of the parts, in a pattern that they form together, it is not a property of any of the individual parts, giving the sense of irreducibility.

Anyway, I figured I should state plainly what I had already implied sporadically. You see, this emergent (and irreducible) property has indeed been recognized by the scientists that I so often quote (Edelman, Tononi, Calvin, Dennett, etc). Dennett was referring to it when he created the intentional stance. Calvin and Edelman (along with all the other "Selectionist" scientists) are reducing the algorithm to more fundamental patterns, by relating it to a Darwinian process.

The recognition that algorithmic structures are often treated as emergent, separate, properties, is also helpful in other areas of philosophy, btw. For example: life. A thing is alive if it performs the functions of a living thing, but none of those function (alone) is "living" only the collection thereof, and the subsequent algorithm describing their behavior.

[confutatis]

Apparently you are not coming back, but I'd really like to see you explain how you can deny the existence of subjective experience, and still be able to account for the existence of illusions and hallucinations. That would be interesting.

[Mentat]

Apparently you are not coming back...


As much as I'd like to, it's becoming increasingly difficult. Perhaps I will be able to resolve it, though, as I've found a new approach to the problem. Anyway, inspite of my typical absence, know that I am trying to come back.


...but I'd really like to see you explain how you can deny the existence of subjective experience, and still be able to account for the existence of illusions and hallucinations. That would be interesting.

Did you happen to look through some of the older threads that I started (in which hypnagogue, Fliption, and Canute argued for a more Chalmerean approach ("Chalmerean" is my word for the philosophy of Chalmers), while I was trying to expound on a more Dennetian approach (philosophy of Dan Dennett). Anyway, if you haven't looked through those, I suggest that you do, but I will try to explain the basics here:

My problem with the typical approach is that, no matter how good a job a scientist or philosopher does at explaining all the mechanisms of consciousness, Chalmers and his followers can always reintroduce this concept of "subjective experience" and say that they are not accounting for it. Well, I showed (perhaps not satisfactorily, but exhaustively) that "subjective experience" has no real definition. Rather, it does have a definition, but its definition is plainly circular, and thus has no substance (meaning that any argument built on the assumption that it even exists will inevitably be a straw-man).

Instead of invoking this emergent property of "subjective experience" - which has no meaning, to my mind - I like the scientific, reductionist, approach, which explains all that needs explaining within the confines of the Scientific Method.

A scientific theory of consciousness should include:
1) The most discreet unit of consciousness.
2) The specific behaviors required for computation of external stimuli.
3) The specific behaviors required for memorization and recall of said stimuli.
4) The behaviors which allow for creativity and innovation.
5) The behaviors which allow for the compactification of this discreet, separate, information (for the purpose of easy recall) such that the illusion of a coherent, singular, thought may be processed.

The theories that I've proposed (not of my own originality, but that of respected scientists and philosophers of the mind, put together into a singular understanding (by myself) which, at least, makes it clear that consciousness is explainable, if not explained) do indeed satisfy these conditions. The only condition I know of that they do not satisfy is that of explaining "subjective experience", but I don't think they should have to since "subjective experience" (defined as it is) has no more meaning than the letters that compose it.

[confutatis]

My problem with the typical approach is that, no matter how good a job a scientist or philosopher does at explaining all the mechanisms of consciousness, Chalmers and his followers can always reintroduce this concept of "subjective experience" and say that they are not accounting for it.

But you don't solve that problem by denying that subjective experience exists. That would make people think you are a zombie.

Well, I showed (perhaps not satisfactorily, but exhaustively) that "subjective experience" has no real definition. Rather, it does have a definition, but its definition is plainly circular, and thus has no substance (meaning that any argument built on the assumption that it even exists will inevitably be a straw-man).

But that is simply Chalmers' argument in disguise. You may not recognize the similarity but it is there. What Chalmers says is that it's perfectly possible to account for conscious behaviour without invoking subjective experience. The only difference between Chalmers and Dennett is whether experience exists or not. Both agree that it can't be explained.

Instead of invoking this emergent property of "subjective experience" - which has no meaning, to my mind [...]

When you say "subjective experience" has no meaning, you are saying it's impossible to make true statements about it. I definitely don't think that is the case. It is true that hallucinations exist. How can you define hallucinations without invoking the concept of subjective experience?

A scientific theory of consciousness should include:
1) The most discreet unit of consciousness.
2) The specific behaviors required for computation of external stimuli.
3) The specific behaviors required for memorization and recall of said stimuli.
4) The behaviors which allow for creativity and innovation.
5) The behaviors which allow for the compactification of this discreet, separate, information (for the purpose of easy recall) such that the illusion of a coherent, singular, thought may be processed.

I agree with that, but the truth is that doing so amounts to nothing but a redefinition of what consciousness is. Explaining subjective experience is a completely different story, except that you need to understand consciousness - in a scientific manner - before you can understand what experience is.

The theories that I've proposed (not of my own originality, but that of respected scientists and philosophers of the mind, put together into a singular understanding (by myself) which, at least, makes it clear that consciousness is explainable, if not explained) do indeed satisfy these conditions. The only condition I know of that they do not satisfy is that of explaining "subjective experience", but I don't think they should have to since "subjective experience" (defined as it is) has no more meaning than the letters that compose it.

I don't disagree that the definition of 'subjective experience' is meaningless if it is strongly associated with consciousness. But I don't agree that you can get rid of the problem of explaining subjective experience by denying it exists.

[Fliption]

Wow confutatsis. Sometimes you amaze me. Nice posts.

Mentat,

I liked reading your first post. You say you left this out of your past discussions but honestly I remember you denying the existence of emergent properties completely. Even when I tried to say that it was simply useful to refer to these properties with a single word and there wasn't necessarily any real "thing" existing, you insisted that assigning a word to it implied it existed as a separate thing. This post of yours was all I was trying to acknowledge. So I was glad to read this post from you. I agree with this and it only makes sense that the view that consciousness, subjective experience, life etc is the result of millions of complex parts should be a focal point for science.

As I'm sure you know, I don't agree with your comments from there. I understand your point of view but the only way it stands up is if we assume you're a zombie. As Confutatis has astutely pointed out. This is simply another example of a reductionist trying to use the very hard problem of consciousness to undermine itself. The only way this can work is if your conclusion is built into your premises. You assume because science can't define it, then it doesn't exists. When the whole issue is that we know it exists and we can't scientifically define it. To deny the existence of something, as if you are a zombie, when you likely are not a zombie, just doesn't seem to be in the spirit of scientific inquiry. Even though it may be against the scientific method.

[Rader]

Hey Mentat, where you have you been besides, the middle of nowhere? :smile:

I like your master algorithm, it sound like SAS. You have never mentioned this before, or have I missed one of your posts. You seem to be evolving. Is it my perception or are you prerparing to change your worldview.

[Mentat]

But you don't solve that problem by denying that subjective experience exists. That would make people think you are a zombie.


That's exactly what everyone else has said here, and (no offense) it really makes me wonder if they're really listening to what I'm saying.

You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman).


But that is simply Chalmers' argument in disguise. You may not recognize the similarity but it is there. What Chalmers says is that it's perfectly possible to account for conscious behaviour without invoking subjective experience. The only difference between Chalmers and Dennett is whether experience exists or not. Both agree that it can't be explained.


Right. I like Dennett's approach better simply because he doesn't invoke the use of any terms that are not logically definable.


When you say "subjective experience" has no meaning, you are saying it's impossible to make true statements about it. I definitely don't think that is the case. It is true that hallucinations exist. How can you define hallucinations without invoking the concept of subjective experience?


Dennett devoted the first chapter (or, rather, the chapter before the first) of his book, Consciousness Explained, to explaining how hallucinations can exist. His basic explanation is the re-stimulation of the areas that are usually stimulated by external stimulus. William Calvin goes further, explaining exactly how such re-stimulations occur (it's two do with the actual structure of the pyramidal neurons of the neocortex).

Note, however, that a hallucination is never as potent as the actual experience. You cannot imagine being kicked in the stomache and actually feel pain because of having imagined it. This is, to put it simply, a variance in the algorithm.


I agree with that, but the truth is that doing so amounts to nothing but a redefinition of what consciousness is. Explaining subjective experience is a completely different story, except that you need to understand consciousness - in a scientific manner - before you can understand what experience is.


And, of course, you need to define what "experience" is in the first place, before I can see any reason for explaining it.

As I've told some of the other members before (they've had much the same objections that you have, though I do compliment you on your manner of presenting them), you cannot "re-define" consciousness if you never coherently defined it in the first place. And, if "subjective experience" (a logically undefined (perhaps undefinable) term) is invoked in the current definition, then consciousness was never really defined in the first place.


I don't disagree that the definition of 'subjective experience' is meaningless if it is strongly associated with consciousness. But I don't agree that you can get rid of the problem of explaining subjective experience by denying it exists.

I ask you this then: How can there be a problem explaining something which is meaningless? Is it not better to discard the term that we clearly had no good use for in the first place, and move on without it?

That is why I deny that "it" exists; because that is the logical thing to do when a meaningless term serves no purpose in the discussion...you discard it.

[Mentat]

Wow confutatsis. Sometimes you amaze me. Nice posts.


Actually, s/he reminded me of you alot. Same argument, with the same eloquence of presentation.


Mentat,

I liked reading your first post. You say you left this out of your past discussions but honestly I remember you denying the existence of emergent properties completely. Even when I tried to say that it was simply useful to refer to these properties with a single word and there wasn't necessarily any real "thing" existing, you insisted that assigning a word to it implied it existed as a separate thing. This post of yours was all I was trying to acknowledge. So I was glad to read this post from you.


I continue to learn, and re-evaluate my thoughts and opinions. As it is, I stress that the only emergent property of the computation of the brain is the resulting algorithm. I also hold (as does Dennett) that the irreducibility of this algorithm (resultant from the fact that none of the parts contain the pattern, only the whole) is what confuses some in their search for an explanation of consciousness.


I agree with this and it only makes sense that the view that consciousness, subjective experience, life etc is the result of millions of complex parts should be a focal point for science.


Yes, that's true. The only real problem I have is the term "subjective experience". It's meaningless (so far as I've seen), and it's constant invocation just blurs the topic.

I mean, seriously, if we were trying to explain some other phenomenon (any other phenomenon) and I kept interjecting that you still didn't account for "xxxxx" (which was a term I couldn't define, relating to a phenomenon I couldn't even prove existed), it would not only be stifling, but frustrating.


As I'm sure you know, I don't agree with your comments from there. I understand your point of view but the only way it stands up is if we assume you're a zombie.


Confutatis mentioned this, as have hypnagogue and Canute in the past. Well, if "zombie" means that I don't have "xxxx", then by all means let me be a zombie. I have no problem with that. In showing that "subjective experience" has no meaning, I should assume we would all arrive at the same conclusion: everyone is a zombie, since no one can display a non-existant quality.


This is simply another example of a reductionist trying to use the very hard problem of consciousness to undermine itself. The only way this can work is if your conclusion is built into your premises. You assume because science can't define it, then it doesn't exists.


Not at all. I assume that since you ("you" refers to you specifically, along with anyone else subscribing to the Chalmerean view) can't define it, it doesn't exist.


When the whole issue is that we know it exists and we can't scientifically define it.


That kind of reasoning, to me, is at the heart of many a failed philosophy. One is reminded of the constant debate of what constitutes "life", and what doesn't. In truth, we should never have come up with the term in the first place, if we hadn't yet seen a specific, definable, phenomenon that was distinctly different from other phenomena.

IOW, why come up with a word, that is supposed to serve as a distinction between one being and another, when we can't define the word, we can't explain it, we can't categorize it, we can't even prove that it exists in the first place. I guess we just like the word.

When looked at in this manner, is it not the logical choice to drop such empty distinctions ("empty", as in devoid of meaning and purpose), and thus spare ourselves the trouble of looking for an explanation for a phenomenon that we made up?

[Mentat]

Hey Mentat, where you have you been besides, the middle of nowhere? :smile:


Hey Rader, long time no see :wink:. I've been around, I've just been barred from going on the PFs most of the time. I hope this situation changes, but I can't guarantee anything.


I like your master algorithm, it sound like SAS. You have never mentioned this before, or have I missed one of your posts. You seem to be evolving. Is it my perception or are you prerparing to change your worldview.

No, I'm not really changing my worldview at all. My current assumption is still Materialism, I've just put more emphasis on the resultant patterns than I had previously.

[Mentat]

Just wanted to re-iterate that, despite my staunch opposition to the idea of an "emergent property" that had a seperate existence to the physical functions of the brain, I had mentioned the emergent algorithms before. Indeed, I think I used that exact term when making reference to Calvin's theory of hexagons (specifically with regard to the "basins of attraction"...it's been a while since I've discussed it at all, but I do recall mentioning this point).

Man I miss the PFs! I've got all these new ideas that I'd like to tell somebody, but (as always) nobody's going to get what I'm saying. And I don't really have time to post them and actually follow up on them here, so I'm still pretty stuck. :frown:

[Fliption]

Actually, s/he reminded me of you alot. Same argument, with the same eloquence of presentation.


I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, he/she has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.


I continue to learn, and re-evaluate my thoughts and opinions. As it is, I stress that the only emergent property of the computation of the brain is the resulting algorithm. I also hold (as does Dennett) that the irreducibility of this algorithm (resultant from the fact that none of the parts contain the pattern, only the whole) is what confuses some in their search for an explanation of consciousness.


I can accept all this. The use of such "algorithms" will be useful for discussion purposes if nothing else.


Confutatis mentioned this, as have hypnagogue and Canute in the past. Well, if "zombie" means that I don't have "xxxx", then by all means let me be a zombie. I have no problem with that. In showing that "subjective experience" has no meaning, I should assume we would all arrive at the same conclusion: everyone is a zombie, since no one can display a non-existant quality.


I'll try to explain what I mean and the problem I have with what you are saying. You keep saying that it has no meaning. What does it mean when we say something has no meaning? It means that it cannot be described with words or in terms of other things. Is this not correct? So what is the definition of any fundamental thing? There doesn't seem to be a way to define fundamental things.

The reason that people keep saying that you would have to be a zombie is because the only way any of us know about consciousness is through our own personal experience of it. I experience "being". I assume you do to. There is no other reason, other than personal experience, for anyone to suspect that consciousness exists. There is no evidence of it anywhere in the material world. It cannot be objectively studied in any way. The only way it is known is through personal experience. So if you deny consciousness and subjective experiences then you are denying that you have them, therefore you are a zombie. The inability to know consciousness any other way is exactly the same reason it cannot be scientifically defined. A scientific definition requires it to be reductively described in terms of more fundamental things. So to say there is no hard problem because it can't be defined, is using the hard problem to kill itself. It's a view that basically assumes all things must be reductively described in terms of other things to be known or even exists. If this were true than nothing could ever be fundamental; not to mentioned it assumes it's own conclusion.



Not at all. I assume that since you ("you" refers to you specifically, along with anyone else subscribing to the Chalmerean view) can't define it, it doesn't exist.


I can personally define it. I think I remember you having an issue with "what it's like to be" and I remember it not making a lot of sense to me and seeming a bit like a stretch. I think I responded to it at that time.




That kind of reasoning, to me, is at the heart of many a failed philosophy. One is reminded of the constant debate of what constitutes "life", and what doesn't.

When looked at in this manner, is it not the logical choice to drop such empty distinctions ("empty", as in devoid of meaning and purpose), and thus spare ourselves the trouble of looking for an explanation for a phenomenon that we made up?

But life is a holistic term. It is a category label and therefore requires specific boundaries. Consciousness is a term meant to describe a very specific feature that I experience everyday. I personally know what this thing is and know what the word refers to when I use it. The fact that I can't describe it to a zombie doesn't mean it doesn't exists. The fact that it cannot be defined and explained to a zombie and yet I personally know it exists is the hard problem.

The simplified formula is like this:

ME:
Personally know consciousness exists + Can't define it = Hard problem

ZOMBIE:
No personal knowledge of consciousness + Can't define it = Doesn't exists

So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.

[confutatis]

Hi Mentat. Sorry, I didn't see your reply to me, I must have missed it during the weekend. I hope you get a chance to read this.

That's exactly what everyone else has said here, and (no offense) it really makes me wonder if they're really listening to what I'm saying.

Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.

You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"?

What's left to be solved, in my humble opinion, is the question of how a meaningless concept such as "..." can be used for meaningful communication. People refer to their experiences all the time, and they seem to know what they are talking about.

I suppose what you really think is that "..." lacks, and cannot have, a scientific definition. That would make more sense.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman).

With this I wholeheartedly agree.

Dennett devoted the first chapter (or, rather, the chapter before the first) of his book, Consciousness Explained, to explaining how hallucinations can exist. His basic explanation is the re-stimulation of the areas that are usually stimulated by external stimulus. William Calvin goes further, explaining exactly how such re-stimulations occur (it's two do with the actual structure of the pyramidal neurons of the neocortex).

I wasn't really talking about explaining hallucinations, I was talking about defining it. My understanding is that a hallucination is a special kind of subjective experience. I don't think we can define hallucinations in terms of neurology, even though we can certainly explain it in those terms, as you say Dennett did.

So how would you define (as opposed to explain) "hallucination" without invoking the concept of subjective experience? Or "..." as you call it?

Note, however, that a hallucination is never as potent as the actual experience.

Just playing the devil's advocate here: what do you mean by "the actual experience"? I don't understand it; please define your terms :smile:

You cannot imagine being kicked in the stomache and actually feel pain because of having imagined it.

I'm sure you can, but you would never think you imagined it, you would think it was real. Happens to people with mental disorders all the time.

But this is a side issue anyway.

And, of course, you need to define what "experience" is in the first place, before I can see any reason for explaining it.

I'm not so sure about that. Wouldn't an explanation be a definition in itself?

if "subjective experience" (a logically undefined (perhaps undefinable) term) is invoked in the current definition, then consciousness was never really defined in the first place.

No problem here. Subjective experience can't have anything to do with consciuosness, I've been saying the same things myself.

How can there be a problem explaining something which is meaningless? Is it not better to discard the term that we clearly had no good use for in the first place, and move on without it?

Yes, I agree entirely, but a lot of people will beg to differ. They will say "consciousness is subjective experience", and when you explain consciuosness without explaining subjective experience they will say, "ah, but you have not really explained consciousness".

I think the whole problem is the idea that consciousness needs explaining in the first place. That trips everyone up. Instead of "Consciousness Explained", why didn't Dennett call his book "The Brain Explained", or "Human Behaviour Explained"? That, I just don't get.

That is why I deny that "it" exists; because that is the logical thing to do when a meaningless term serves no purpose in the discussion...you discard it.

You remind me of some book I read a few years ago. At some point the author went on a long rant on why the word 'mind' should be dropped from our vocabulary; since science has proved that the brain and the mind were the same thing, we should just use 'brain' instead. That got me thinking how some sentences would sound funny, such as "I need some peace of brain" or "unicorns only exists inside people's brains". Also, can you imagine people going to the theater to watch a movie called "A Beautiful Brain"?

In the end, this issue of consciousness is just a big battle of words. The issue is not what we know about it, but simply what names we should give to the things we know. Much, much ado about nothing.

[Fliption]

Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.


I'm sure Mentat won't succomb to this attitude. I think this is just an example of how people extrapolate their own motives and attitudes onto everyone else. I personally have had very engaging and enlightning discussions with people here. Discussions that have caused me to go out and buy literature and change my way of thinking. I'm sure this has happened in the reverse direction too.


In the end, this issue of consciousness is just a big battle of words. The issue is not what we know about it, but simply what names we should give to the things we know. Much, much ado about nothing.


Grrrr. :mad: Railroading in progress.

[confutatis]

I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, [confutatis] has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.

Just for the sake of clarification, I'm not interested in the issue of consciousness per se. The issue I'm interested in is far more important, but at the same time it is strictly subjective, meaning it's extremely difficult to talk about.

Even though I can't explain what the issue is, I can point at some things an understanding of the issue would allow me to know. It's all about people:

- why do they claim to know things they cannot possibly know?
- why are they often obsessed with ideas that can't possibly matter to anyone?
- why are they mostly silent about ideas that really matter?
- why do they behave as it death was not a certainty?

Yet none of those things is the issue. The issue has to with the fact that people try very hard to hide what they really have in mind. It's not enough for me to go around asking people what their real thoughts are, because what I really want to understand is why they are always trying to hide their real thoughts.

Consciousness just happens to be one particularly useful clue to understanding the issue. Essentially what is being discussed in those threads here has nothing to do with science or consciousness per se; what people really have in mind when they talk about consciousness is death. You know that, I know that, everyone knows that, yet no one ever mentions the word 'death'. Why?

I hope one day to be able to answer that question.

So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.

Just as a side comment, I'm sure you couldn't care less about what consciousness really is; what you really want is to be convinced that you will continue to be conscious after your body dies. That's all there is to it, nothing more, nothing less. That's why you like the idea of a "hard problem". As I said, I used to like that idea myself.

What is still a bit of a mystery to me is why people like Dennett, or Mentat, do not seem to like the idea that their consciousness may survive physical death. It would seem those people are only too happy to cease to exist, which is of course inconsistent with everything else they say, so there's got to be more to it.

[Fliption]

Even though I can't explain what the issue is, I can point at some things an understanding of the issue would allow me to know. It's all about people:


Can I assume that you're views are summed up in the Marion thread with the link? Somehow I think it doesn't sum up to your view. If not, then I think you still need to work on presenting a coherent summation of it or providing a link that does. That is if you keep insisting on inserting it into the topics like this.

You know that, I know that, everyone knows that, yet no one ever mentions the word 'death'. Why?

I hope one day to be able to answer that question.


I know how you can get an answer. Ask yourself. It is obvious that you are talking about yourself here and once again extrapolating that to everyone else. I can't blame you here. It takes alot of work not to be egocentric.


Just as a side comment, I'm sure you couldn't care less about what consciousness really is; what you really want is to be convinced that you will continue to be conscious after your body dies. That's all there is to it, nothing more, nothing less. That's why you like the idea of a "hard problem". As I said, I used to like that idea myself.


Once again you are simply extrapolating your own attitudes onto everyone else. To minimize a view that you disagree with to nothing more than a personal desire as if it doesn't have any intellectual merit is somewhat insulting. I personally don't believe I will exists after I die. Regardless of what we conclude about consciousness. I just can't imagine how my personal identity can be anything but my brain. But I have no doubt that is why you liked it. But I will debate the side that makes the most sense to me. Nothing more.


What is still a bit of a mystery to me is why people like Dennett, or Mentat, do not seem to like the idea that their consciousness may survive physical death. It would seem those people are only too happy to cease to exist, which is of course inconsistent with everything else they say, so there's got to be more to it.

This ought to clue you in that I am right. You are extrapolating your own experiences onto everyone else and so it only makes sense that there is a contradiction like Dennett and Mentat. I used to do this too but I have since learned that there are many people who really are just totally different from me. They don't think like me. They don't act like me. Everything is different. Mentat and Dennett take their views because they see intellectual merit in it or they have some other personal agenda(which may or may not have anything to do with death.) The same goes for me and everyone else here.

[confutatis]

Can I assume that you're views are summed up in the Marion thread with the link?

I couldn't possibly have put it better than she does. That's why I posted the link. If you understand her point of view on consciousness, then you understand mine.

I personally don't believe I will exists after I die.

Most people don't believe they will exist after they die, including most who claim they do. That's the whole problem.

I just can't imagine how my personal identity can be anything but my brain...

Reality is not constrained by the limited powers of your imagination.

Mentat and Dennett take their views because they see intellectual merit in it or they have some other personal agenda(which may or may not have anything to do with death.)

It's good for you that you know why Mentat and Dennett take their views. I personally don't have much of an idea. And I don't know where is the intellectual merit in denying that the self exists.

[Fliption]

I couldn't possibly have put it better than she does. That's why I posted the link. If you understand her point of view on consciousness, then you understand mine.


Ok that's good to know. I just thought it left a lot of stuff out, as it never seems to stress the role of language that much. At least not into the absurdities I've seen you post. Although the guy who was remarking in red did seem to go into this direction and this person seemed to think that he disagreed with Marion. This was why I wasn't sure.


Most people don't believe they will exist after they die, including most who claim they do. That's the whole problem.

Reality is not constrained by the limited powers of your imagination.

So now we're liars? Heh.

None of this is relevant. My main point was that my belief in my existence after death is not contingent on the results of a discussion of consciousness. It seemed you were tying the two together and I've given the reasons why they have nothing to do with one another. For me at least.


It's good for you that you know why Mentat and Dennett take their views. I personally don't have much of an idea. And I don't know where is the intellectual merit in denying that the self exists.

There is no other option. Either they have their views for intellectual reasons or for personal agenda reasons. I don't know which one it is. I suspect it is the later although Mentat will disagree with me of course.

[confutatis]

I just thought it left a lot of stuff out, as it never seems to stress the role of language that much.

Yeah, a lot of stuff out... how about these bits:

"I have claimed that what I have to say provides a different perspective on the question of consciousness - one from which we may be able to cut through the confusion that usually surrounds the debate"

When I say philosophers are confused about consciousness, I get treated as a lunatic. Despite the fact that many philosophers, such as this one, think exactly the same.

"The problem with consciousness is not that it is mysterious and heat, say, isn't. Heat is mysterious in exactly the same way that consciousness is. Science is mysterious"

Is it just me, or is she really saying "everything is a hard problem"?

"Are Zombies logically possible? - No. There is no physical universe without consciousness, and no consciousness without the physical universe. The mistake lies in confusing knowledge with reality"

When I said the same thing, you thought it was absurd.

"Is consciousness surprising? - Yes, but it is so not because of some mysterious property. It is surprising because in order to construct meaningful explanations, we have excluded it from science at the very beginning of the scientific enterprise"

How do you create 'meaningful explanations' without using language?

"Is science a means to gather knowledge about reality? - No. Science is systematic knowledge about experience. The step from what we know to what exists in an absolute sense is always a fallacy"

Isn't fallacy just another word for 'lie'? Do you think Marion Gothier is schizophrenic too?

--------------

You have those to go by now. You may want to discuss those ideas in light of Gothier's paper, or not. It's up to you.

[Fliption]

Yeah, a lot of stuff out... how about these bits:

"I have claimed that what I have to say provides a different perspective on the question of consciousness - one from which we may be able to cut through the confusion that usually surrounds the debate"


I didn't say it wasn't similar in parts. I said it seemed to leave stuff out.

I'm referring mostly to the comments you made about how there is no subjective experience without language. I don't see this view anywhere in this article. I could have missed it. This is one reason I want to read it several times.


When I say philosophers are confused about consciousness, I get treated as a lunatic. Despite the fact that many philosophers, such as this one, think exactly the same.


As far as I'm concerned your views wouldn't classify you as a lunatic. But the inconsistent presentation of those views is suspect. Note the difference. This is why I'm glad you're presenting a link of someone else explaining it.


"Are Zombies logically possible? - No. There is no physical universe without consciousness, and no consciousness without the physical universe. The mistake lies in confusing knowledge with reality"

When I said the same thing, you thought it was absurd.


Still do. But I'm still looking at the article because I want to understand the reasoning. That makes all the difference.


"Is science a means to gather knowledge about reality? - No. Science is systematic knowledge about experience. The step from what we know to what exists in an absolute sense is always a fallacy"

Isn't fallacy just another word for 'lie'? Do you think Marion Gothier is schizophrenic too?


The schizophrenic reference was directed at the inconsistencies in presentation; not the view itself. Just so we're clear. I am open to the view if I can ever understand it.

And no, the two words are different. A fallacy is a statement or an argument based on a false or invalid inference. A lie is a statement made with the intent to mislead. So to call someone a liar is making a statement about their motives as well as the truth value of their statements.
--------------

You have those to go by now. You may want to discuss those ideas in light of Gothier's paper, or not. It's up to you.

I will discuss them there. This is why I haven't disagreed/agreed with any of the statements from that article yet. This post is just to suggest that you're past comments are not necessarily synonmous with that article. But it doesn't matter. If you say it is then I will concentrate on that and forget the rest of the stuff.

[confutatis]

I'm referring mostly to the comments you made about how there is no subjective experience without language. I don't see this view anywhere in this article. I could have missed it. This is one reason I want to read it several times.

Forget about the language stuff. You think it was absurd because you didn't understand it. If you did, you would think it was rather trivial. So just assume it's a triviality and forget about it.

As far as I'm concerned your views wouldn't classify you as a lunatic. But the presentation of those views is suspect.

I notice you do put a lot of emphasis on personal judgements.

A fallacy is a statement or an argument based on a false or invalid inference. A lie is a statement made with the intent to mislead. So to call someone a liar is making a statement about their motives as well as the truth value of their statements.

Whatever. How am I supposed to know what you think a 'lie' means? It's pointless to keep arguing the exact meaning of each word; the point being discussed is a lot more important. My point is that science is not a true description of reality; call it a lie, a fallacy, an illusion, an ontological error - it makes no difference to the argument!

[Fliption]

Forget about the language stuff. You think it was absurd because you didn't understand it. If you did, you would think it was rather trivial. So just assume it's a triviality and forget about it.

Ok


I notice you do put a lot of emphasis on personal judgements.


I'm emphasizing every point where I think you have mis-understood or are misrepresenting my words.


Whatever. How am I supposed to know what you think a 'lie' means? It's pointless to keep arguing the exact meaning of each word; the point being discussed is a lot more important. My point is that science is not a true description of reality; call it a lie, a fallacy, an illusion, an ontological error - it makes no difference to the argument!

This is funny. :smile: I defined the word lie for you a few days ago just for this reason and you didn't understand why I was doing it. Now you don't know how you're supposed to know what I mean by lie. :biggrin: :biggrin: :biggrin:

I'm trying to be very clear with everything we discuss because I truly am having a hard time understanding much of what you are saying. Rather than assume your statements are inconsistent, I'm defining words , hoping clarifications of definitions will clear up any perceived inconsistencies. Just want you to understand that it might be trivial to the topic but I'm struggling to communicate with you.

[confutatis]

This is funny

I'm sorry. I've been trying to be polite, and keep the discussion on an intellectual level by ignoring your personal attacks, but you just won't stop them. So I give up. No matter what I say, with you the conversation always ends up on meaningless personal quibbles.

I defined the word lie for you a few days ago just for this reason and you didn't understand why I was doing it. Now you don't know how you're supposed to know what I mean by lie.

Nobody cares about your definitions!

I'm trying to be very clear with everything we discuss because I truly am having a hard time understanding much of what you are saying.

It should be obvious to you by now that my ideas are completely beyond your grasp. You may conclude that I'm a stupid fool looking for ego agrandizement; you may conclude I'm far ahead of you when it comes to this subject; you may conclude I'm just having fun at your expense. Whatever you conclude, just the hell leave me alone!!!!!!

Rather than assume your statements are inconsistent...

Oh, shut up! Here are some quotes from you:

"You aren't very consistent in your comments."

"One of the biggest advantages of this is the ability to communicate to the other side. I see no evidence of your ability to do this. "

"From this fact and the responses that consistently focus on irrelevant points, I can only believe that you don't have the grasp on things that you think you do."

"Your views can't possibly be internally consistent"

"I don't have to know what's going on in your mind to make a statement about your views. I said your views could not possible be internally consistent. Your views are all over these web pages. I don't need to know anything about your mind to make this assertion."

You are just a foolish young man pretend to be wise. I've been young too. Go learn a few things before engaging in philosophical discussions with people who know a lot better than you (and I'm not even talking about myself here; you seem to run into the same problem with almost everyone you talk to)

Just want you to understand that it might be trivial to the topic but I'm struggling to communicate with you.

You are struggling simply because you don't know as much as you think you do. And congratulations, you are the first person on this forum to be added to my Ignore list. You may continue to reply to my posts, but please be aware that I won't be reading your replies.

I'm not ignoring you because of your abusive manners - I can take that kind of crap anytime, it doesn't touch me. What's really annoying to me is the low intellectual level of your posts. That I can't stand, and I was hoping I was mistaken about you, that you did have something important to say. So far all I got from you is the single repetition of a same idea - consciousness is a hard problem because I say so - coupled with delusional attacks of psychobabble.

Good bye. It's been interesting.

[Fliption]

Wow, you've got issues. I was simply trying to politely communicate that you should be patient with my definition clarifications because I am struggling to communciate with you.

I'm sorry. I've been trying to be polite, and keep the discussion on an intellectual level by ignoring your personal attacks, but you just won't stop them. So I give up. No matter what I say, with you the conversation always ends up on meaningless personal quibbles.


I have not been focusing on personal attacks of you. I am consistently pointing out to you where what you say either isn't consistent or your definition is different. I don't know which one it is. That's up to you to help me figure out. You may perceive constructive criticism as personal attacks but they aren't. Sorry. I will admit to suffering some frustration to your continued curt responses when it was obvious more was needed to understand what you were saying. But those moments don't affect my ability to analyze your view.


Nobody cares about your definitions!


Judging from your response here it seems you want me to speak intelligently with you on this matter. Yet you don't care about my definitions? Doesn't compute.


It should be obvious to you by now that my ideas are completely beyond your grasp. You may conclude that I'm a stupid fool looking for ego agrandizement; you may conclude I'm far ahead of you when it comes to this subject; you may conclude I'm just having fun at your expense. Whatever you conclude, just the hell leave me alone!!!!!!


I have not done anything to you personally. What I have done is exactly what is expected of a participant in the philosophy forum. If you continue to railroad threads with unexplained pronouncements then you can expect to be questioned on it. Sorry but this is a philsophy forum. Not a sunday school class. And as long as I am able, I will challenge any idea that I don't think is supported. So your request is contingent on your own actions.


Oh, shut up! Here are some quotes from you:


Everything you quoted from me was me responding to points where you clearly contradicted yourself. I don't even have to know what the words mean to know a contradiction when I see one.

"I am a ruti"
"I am not a ruti"

This is a contradiction. But what the hell is a ruti?

In some cases, inconsistencies are due to definition problems. But not all. As the above example shows.


You are just a foolish young man pretend to be wise. I've been young too. Go learn a few things before engaging in philosophical discussions with people who know a lot better than you (and I'm not even talking about myself here; you seem to run into the same problem with almost everyone you talk to)


Personal attacks now? I'm young and foolish now? Just because I don't think you're ideas are all you make them out to be? And I seem to run into the same problem with everyone do I? Want to provide an example? There are only a handful of extremists who don't like to see me posting. But for the most part I communicate fine with people here.


You are struggling simply because you don't know as much as you think you do. And congratulations, you are the first person on this forum to be added to my Ignore list. You may continue to reply to my posts, but please be aware that I won't be reading your replies.


And I'm sure I won't be the last with that attitude.

I don't "know" anything. What is there to "know" when it comes to philosophy? I'm just thinking and reasoning about the things that people say. Either they are consistent or they aren't. Either they follow from the assumptions or they do not.


I'm not ignoring you because of your abusive manners - I can take that kind of crap anytime, it doesn't touch me. What's really annoying to me is the low intellectual level of your posts. That I can't stand, and I was hoping I was mistaken about you, that you did have something important to say. So far all I got from you is the single repetition of a same idea - consciousness is a hard problem because I say so - coupled with delusional attacks of psychobabble.

Good bye. It's been interesting.

I'm sorry that you think criticism of your views is considered abusive behavior. Now saying someone's intellectual level is low might qualify as abusive but not criticism of views.

What I find interesting is that I have argued for a view that is held far more widely than yours is and yet you think that I need to make claims like "Consiousness is a hard problem because I said so?" Your arguments thus far haven't even come close to me having to resort to such silliness. Not that I ever would.


Good bye

Translated: Confutatis sticks fingers in ears and says "lalalalalal" :frown:

EDIT: BTW, I've added you to my buddy list :biggrin:

[Mentat]

I expressed surprised because as much as I agree with those comments, he/she has posted some things that don't seem consistent with this view at all.


Oh? Like what?


I'll try to explain what I mean and the problem I have with what you are saying. You keep saying that it has no meaning. What does it mean when we say something has no meaning? It means that it cannot be described with words or in terms of other things. Is this not correct? So what is the definition of any fundamental thing? There doesn't seem to be a way to define fundamental things.


While that is true, to what is "subjective experience" fundamental? Have you reduced some non-elementary phenomenon to the point where all that is left to explain is "subjective experience"? Or did you assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then seek to define it? There is a difference: In the first instance, one would have found a fundamental thing through reduction, which is reasoning bottom-top reasoning, which is good. In the other instance, one would have created a seemingly fundamental phenomenon for the purpose of producing what amounts to a strawman.


The reason that people keep saying that you would have to be a zombie is because the only way any of us know about consciousness is through our own personal experience of it. I experience "being". I assume you do to.


I know all this. The problem becomes that "subjective experience" still seems like something invented, which breeds top-bottom arguments and strawmen, and which must create such labels as "zombie" for those who don't perform this invented action. Of course, if you have a bottom-top way of arriving at subjective experience (foolish as that may sound, given that fact that we already have a hoped-for arrival, which makes it top-bottom from the start), then I suppose this won't be a problem.


There is no other reason, other than personal experience, for anyone to suspect that consciousness exists.


That doesn't seem well-worded, under the circumstances. I do recognize the existence of one's personal experience. What I don't recognize/accept is the existence of a transcendent quality which has elluded investigation.

I know that sounds vague, but that's what happens when one looks too deeply at a strawman. What I end up saying is that I'm sick of the term, itself, and that it doesn't really refer to anything outside of that which the Dennett-ites have already explained.

Basically, what bothers me is that Chalmers and his followers state that there is something missing from our (Dennett-ite) explanations of consciousness, and they label that something "subjective experience". They can't define what it is, really, aside from "what it's like to be", which is as vague and (IMHO) empty as the term itself.


There is no evidence of it anywhere in the material world. It cannot be objectively studied in any way. The only way it is known is through personal experience.


Is it not the goal of science to take an objective approach to all phenomena?

Of course, the true Chalmerean would reply, "That's what's wrong with/missing from the Scientific Method", but that just creates an entirely new debate about the merits of the Method in a world where some wish to assume something exists that they've never seen objectively.

In the end, we're right back where we started, with me denouncing the merits of a term that has no meaningful definition.


So if you deny consciousness and subjective experiences then you are denying that you have them, therefore you are a zombie.


But I don't deny consciousness. I simply define it, without the use of any phantom terms. I define it (basically) as the computing process of any being capable of interacting with the objective world. In humans, there are the added abilities of "self-consciousness" and the like, but those abilities still fall into the category of computation, as I've shown in previous threads. These are the "easy problems", according to Chalmers. The only thing left to explain is the "hard problem of subjective experience"...but, really, without using those terms, what phenomenon is there left to explain?


A scientific definition requires it to be reductively described in terms of more fundamental things.


Not exactly. Without picking at semantics, we still recognize the fact that science has defined quarks and leptons as "fundamental". Scientists have had no problem defining them in terms of structure (though that's being debated, it's basically either a string or a point), activity, and frequency of presence (commonness). All this, inspite of their not being made up of anything else.


I can personally define it. I think I remember you having an issue with "what it's like to be" and I remember it not making a lot of sense to me and seeming a bit like a stretch. I think I responded to it at that time.


Basically, "what it's like to be", uses too many vague terms. And there is no objective of the infinitive "to be" (i.e. to "be" what?). If "be" is left alone, then it means "exist", and what is it like to "exist"? How can anyone know what it's like to exist if you can't ever experience non-existence?

It makes sense to say "what it's like to know that I am", but not just "what it's like to be".


But life is a holistic term. It is a category label and therefore requires specific boundaries. Consciousness is a term meant to describe a very specific feature that I experience everyday.


I don't understand. Consciousness is the only feature that you experience everyday. It's the only thing you experience ever. But it has specific boundaries: Anything you don't experience, is something you are not conscious of...

I just don't see the problem.


I personally know what this thing is and know what the word refers to when I use it. The fact that I can't describe it to a zombie doesn't mean it doesn't exists. The fact that it cannot be defined and explained to a zombie and yet I personally know it exists is the hard problem.


I personally know that God exists. Yet, if I were to rely on clergy-like statements, such as "you have to experience the grace of God, before you can know Him", I would look like a fool whenever I tried to talk about God - at least, to the rational thinker. More importantly, the rational thinker would quickly discover that I had assumed that "God" existed before I even knew what that entailed...ergo, I would have a religious strawman (as do so many in the world today).

So, if you just "know" that something exists, without meaningful definition, and without the most remedial of explanations, are you not commiting the same foolish fallacy as the clergyman? (No offense to any members of the clergy who may post here; my issue is not with the clergy, but with the reasoning typical among them. Also, this should remain an illustration, and nothing more, as specifically religious topics are not discussed on the PFs.)


The simplified formula is like this:

ME:
Personally know consciousness exists + Can't define it = Hard problem

ZOMBIE:
No personal knowledge of consciousness + Can't define it = Doesn't exists


RATIONAL THINKER (IMHO):
No personal knowledge of something = nothing, yet, to define.


So this is why people keep saying you have the position of a zombie because the only thing that separates the two views is personal knowledge of the existence of something that needs explaining.

The only thing that separates the views is the assumption that something exists a priori. This is not a practice among the typical zombie :wink:

[Mentat]

Nobody listens to anyone on philosophy forums, I learned that a long time ago. The good thing about it is that you can use other people's criticisms to further develop your views. Apart from that, it's just name-calling and misunderstanding.


That has not been my experience. Of course, there have been instances, but usually it was due to one or more problem-causing members, who were eventually removed anyway.


What's left to be solved, in my humble opinion, is the question of how a meaningless concept such as "..." can be used for meaningful communication. People refer to their experiences all the time, and they seem to know what they are talking about.


That's because the concrete references they make refer to existent, defined, phenomena...usually, "subjective experience" is just used to lump it all together.


I suppose what you really think is that "..." lacks, and cannot have, a scientific definition. That would make more sense.


Of course it would, there is no term to define.


I wasn't really talking about explaining hallucinations, I was talking about defining it. My understanding is that a hallucination is a special kind of subjective experience. I don't think we can define hallucinations in terms of neurology, even though we can certainly explain it in those terms, as you say Dennett did.

So how would you define (as opposed to explain) "hallucination" without invoking the concept of subjective experience? Or "..." as you call it?


What's the difference, in this context, between explanation and definition?


Just playing the devil's advocate here: what do you mean by "the actual experience"? I don't understand it; please define your terms :smile:


I mean the actual stimulation, from an outside source, of those spatiotemporal firings, which can later be re-stimulated as a purely spatial (and thus less potent) firing.


I'm not so sure about that. Wouldn't an explanation be a definition in itself?


You didn't seem to think so when it came to hallucinations.


No problem here. Subjective experience can't have anything to do with consciuosness, I've been saying the same things myself.


Then why assume it exists in the first place?


Yes, I agree entirely, but a lot of people will beg to differ. They will say "consciousness is subjective experience", and when you explain consciuosness without explaining subjective experience they will say, "ah, but you have not really explained consciousness".

I think the whole problem is the idea that consciousness needs explaining in the first place. That trips everyone up. Instead of "Consciousness Explained", why didn't Dennett call his book "The Brain Explained", or "Human Behaviour Explained"? That, I just don't get.


Because consciousness does indeed need explanation. The brain is not equivalent to consciousness. Neither is human behavior. Consciousness is a specific behavior of the brain.


You remind me of some book I read a few years ago. At some point the author went on a long rant on why the word 'mind' should be dropped from our vocabulary; since science has proved that the brain and the mind were the same thing, we should just use 'brain' instead. That got me thinking how some sentences would sound funny, such as "I need some peace of brain" or "unicorns only exists inside people's brains". Also, can you imagine people going to the theater to watch a movie called "A Beautiful Brain"?


Clearly the scientist you referred to was wrong. "Brain" does not equal "mind". "Brain" equals computer. "Mind" equals program.

[Fliption]

I know all this. The problem becomes that "subjective experience" still seems like something invented, which breeds top-bottom arguments and strawmen, and which must create such labels as "zombie" for those who don't perform this invented action. Of course, if you have a bottom-top way of arriving at subjective experience (foolish as that may sound, given that fact that we already have a hoped-for arrival, which makes it top-bottom from the start), then I suppose this won't be a problem.


I don't understand why you keep saying that subjective experience is invented. If you start out with the assumption that a hard problem is not possible then of course you're going to come to such conclusions.


That doesn't seem well-worded, under the circumstances. I do recognize the existence of one's personal experience. What I don't recognize/accept is the existence of a transcendent quality which has elluded investigation.


There is no explanation of the feature I'm referring to. You don't accept a transcendent quality that has eluded investigation, but nothing in any explanation adequately explans why anyone should have such an illusion. No matter how I look at this it doesn't go away.


I know that sounds vague, but that's what happens when one looks too deeply at a strawman. What I end up saying is that I'm sick of the term, itself, and that it doesn't really refer to anything outside of that which the Dennett-ites have already explained.

What they have explained does not connect to what I am referring to when I speak of these things.


Basically, what bothers me is that Chalmers and his followers state that there is something missing from our (Dennett-ite) explanations of consciousness, and they label that something "subjective experience". They can't define what it is, really, aside from "what it's like to be", which is as vague and (IMHO) empty as the term itself.


So you, personally, really don't know what it is they are talking about?

really, without using those terms, what phenomenon is there left to explain?

The only thing to say is to appeal to your own experience. Of course, if you're a zombie then this will do us no good.


Not exactly. Without picking at semantics, we still recognize the fact that science has defined quarks and leptons as "fundamental". Scientists have had no problem defining them in terms of structure (though that's being debated, it's basically either a string or a point), activity, and frequency of presence (commonness). All this, inspite of their not being made up of anything else.


Wel of course. I was approaching this from the angle that science has assumptions about what is fundamental and then proceeds to reductively explain things in terms of those fundamental things. As time goes by, the list of fundamental elements may change. I wonder how anything is ever decided to be fundamental though. I'd be interested to know how long we unsuccessfully try to reductively explain something before we move in that direction. As far as consciousness goes, as long as there are people who pretend they don't know what the hard problem is, we'll probably never get there.


I don't understand. Consciousness is the only feature that you experience everyday. It's the only thing you experience ever. But it has specific boundaries: Anything you don't experience, is something you are not conscious of...

I just don't see the problem.


I'm just saying the two terms are not analagous. Life is an arbitrary category label that is diffucult to place into words. It is by nature difficult to define. As for consciousness, well you pretty much just defined it the only way it can be defined above which illustrates my point that it isn't the same as trying to define "life".


I personally know that God exists. Yet, if I were to rely on clergy-like statements, such as "you have to experience the grace of God, before you can know Him", I would look like a fool whenever I tried to talk about God - at least, to the rational thinker. More importantly, the rational thinker would quickly discover that I had assumed that "God" existed before I even knew what that entailed...ergo, I would have a religious strawman (as do so many in the world today).

Welcome to the hard problem. Your inability to argue for your personal belief in the language of the rational thinker would be analagous to the hard problem. Except that subjective experience should have a whole lot more believers than god does.


So, if you just "know" that something exists, without meaningful definition, and without the most remedial of explanations, are you not commiting the same foolish fallacy as the clergyman?

No. I can easily deny god. I cannot so easily deny my own subjective experiences. The strength of this argument is built on the assumption that people other than myself aren't zombies. So naturally a zombie would have the same issues you're having.


The only thing that separates the views is the assumption that something exists a priori. This is not a practice among the typical zombie :wink:

The difference between the views is exactly what I've stated. You are requesting that the hard problem be defined so that it can be tackled and solved. The problem is that the act of defining it is the same as solving it. The certainty of the problem does not rely on a reductive definition. It is known through experience. I have not assumed the existence of anything. I have a word that I use to refer to an experience of "what's it like". Whenever I read the explanations you refer to, I do not see an explanation for this experience that I have labeled. I'm not suggesting that anything trancendent exists. But an explanation as to how such an illusion can exists is no where to be found either. So one difference could be that you are a zombie. If not, then the difference between us is in our interpretation of what is required of an "explanation".

[confutatis]

What's the difference, in this context, between explanation and definition?

There is really no difference. As I suggested a few lines below, an explanation can be a definition. Supposedly I don't have to argue this point with you, you seem to understand it.

I don't think you see the problem as I see it. Maybe the problem doesn't exist; it certainly doesn't seem to exist for some people, which would explain why they don't see it. The problem is, who decides what your explanation is really addressing? Let me give you an example of physics, which is a lot simpler than this consciousness stuff.

To the ordinary man, the principle of relativity of motion doesn't make much sense. When he takes a step, the ordinary man can't possibly think of his movement as anything other than his position changing while the rest of the universe remains in place. No matter how much respect one has for the science of physics, no one can take seriously the notion that the statement "I'm moving while the universe is at rest" is not a true account of his experience of walking. So, it is my impression, the ordinary man comes to think of 'movement' in advanced theoretical physics as somehow disconnected from the ordinary meaning of 'movement'. As a consequence, what physicists have to say about 'movement' doesn't seem to be of much interest to the ordinary man, at least from the ordinary man's perspective.

Back to our discussion of 'subjective experience', I'm quite convinced it's possible to come up with scientific explanations for it. However, as you have pointed out, it's quite difficult to come up with a scientific definition of 'subjective experience' which bears much resemblance to the ordinary meaning of the concept. As a result, ordinary people will feel compelled to dismiss scientific statements about 'subjective experience' much the same way we dismiss scientific statements about 'movement'. It's not that the ordinary man thinks scientists are wrong, but rather he realizes science has borrowed a concept from his language and applied a different meaning to it; therefore whatever scientists may have to say about the borrowed concept, it matters little to him, if at all.

Then why assume [subjective experience] exists in the first place?

Because many rational people insist it exists, and if you can't prove them wrong then you can't be sure you are right.

Because consciousness does indeed need explanation. The brain is not equivalent to consciousness. Neither is human behavior. Consciousness is a specific behavior of the brain.

I strongly disagree with this. To start with, consciousness is not a phenomenon to be directly observed in the world, not even inside brains, it is concept create up to describe something of a rather complex nature. So consciousness must necessarily be whatever it is that the concept has been conjured up to describe. My best guess is "certain patterns of behaviour by humans", which by itself is complex enough. But I can't possibly accept that the word 'consciousness' was created to describe 'specific behaviour of the brain'.

Clearly the scientist you referred to was wrong. "Brain" does not equal "mind". "Brain" equals computer. "Mind" equals program.

Actually, I do think "brain equals mind", I just don't think we can get rid of one of the concepts, as they are used in different contexts. A mind is a brain seen from the inside; a brain is a mind seen from the outside. Only some unimaginable holistic perspective could be capable of expressing the two perspectives as a single concept.

And I don't think brains have anything to do with computers. They clearly don't work according with the same principles. Computers cannot deal with contradictions, paradoxes, ambiguities; brains thrive on those things.

[Mentat]

I don't understand why you keep saying that subjective experience is invented. If you start out with the assumption that a hard problem is not possible then of course you're going to come to such conclusions.


I'm sorry if I haven't explained my point sufficiently. Let me try again, step-by-step:

1) There is a phenomenon, whereby a being can interact with his/her environment purposefully. This phenomenon breeds intelligence, creativity, and emotion. The phenomenon is (obviously) consciousness.

2) This phenomenon can be scientifically explained in terms of the functions of the brain (specifically, the neocortex), both fundamental and algorithmic.

3) There are philosophers and scientists who have stated point #2, but they have been ridiculed by their peers for leaving something out.

4) Since these philosophers and scientists have actually covered every area (to varying levels of adequacy and accuracy), I've tried to understand what it is that their peers believe they've missed.

5) The best input I've gotten has either been by Chalmers or has sounded very much like him. The reasoning, in a nutshell, is that, while the aforementioned philosophers and scientists have explained all the "easy problems" to do with the functions of the brain, they have not explained the "hard problem" of how those functions are connected to "subjective experience".

6) My problem with this is that Chalmers has not meaningfully defined "subjective experience".

Conclusion: If there is no actual (definable; meaninful) phenomenon left to explain (and thus, no "hard problem"), then why can't Chalmers and his followers just work toward solving the so-called "easy problems", like Dennett and others are already doing?


There is no explanation of the feature I'm referring to. You don't accept a transcendent quality that has eluded investigation, but nothing in any explanation adequately explans why anyone should have such an illusion. No matter how I look at this it doesn't go away.


But do you even know to what you are reffering? If there is a transcendant quality, what is it? What is there left to explain after the work of Dennett, Calvin, Edelman, LeDoux, etc? My problem is not with the idea that we don't understand the whole picture yet. I openly admit that we don't. What I have a problem with is your implying that there is a specific thing that isn't being worked on, and yet not being able to meaningfully define what that "thing" is.


What they have explained does not connect to what I am referring to when I speak of these things.


Ok. Then what are you referring to? Give me an example of "subjective experience" at work, please. Specifically, give me an example of a phenomenon/function that is not explanable without invoking "subjective experience", and then show how that phenomenon is now better explained after having introduced "subjective experience".


So you, personally, really don't know what it is they are talking about?


Not really. I understand the term "subjective". I also understand the term "experience". Indeed, I understand how something can be a part of one's own personal experience, and thus rightly labeled "subjective experience". But I do not understand what Chalmers thinks is unexplained/unexplanable. I see one's personal experience as perfectly explanable in terms of a Dennettian theory, and cannot see what is missing.


The only thing to say is to appeal to your own experience. Of course, if you're a zombie then this will do us no good.


Ok...while I'm rather positive that I am a zombie, let's just say I'm not. Let's say that I can appeal to my own experience to understand what you mean. Ok, so I am experiencing the sensation of the keyboard under my fingertips. I'm experiencing the stream of photons leaving the monitor screen. Indeed, I'm actually experiencing the information that this collection of black characters is supposed to incite...

The problem is, I can replace the word "experiencing" with "computing" or "processing" without altering my meaning in the slightest. And if Chalmers means "computing" or "processing" when he says "experiencing" then there is no hard problem, since "computing" and "processing" are exactly what he refers to as "the easy problem".


I'm just saying the two terms are not analagous. Life is an arbitrary category label that is diffucult to place into words. It is by nature difficult to define.


Life is indeed an arbitrary category label, but that doesn't make it "difficult to define" it makes it meaningless. The start of many fruitless debates, nothing more. "Alive" has not defined boundaries, no real definition, no meaning whatsoever, except as an arbitrarily assigned label to that which "seems" alive.


As for consciousness, well you pretty much just defined it the only way it can be defined above which illustrates my point that it isn't the same as trying to define "life".


You're right. They're not analogous. "Subjective experience" and "life" might be, but "consciousness" and "life" are not. "Subjective experience" fits the exact criteria for an arbitrary category label, which I assigned to "life" (above).


Welcome to the hard problem. Your inability to argue for your personal belief in the language of the rational thinker would be analagous to the hard problem. Except that subjective experience should have a whole lot more believers than god does.


But I can define "God". I can't even begin to define what you mean by "subjective experience" without immediately equating it with "computation", which would eliminate the "hard problem" (because "computation" is part of the "easy problem", according to Chalmers).


No. I can easily deny god. I cannot so easily deny my own subjective experiences. The strength of this argument is built on the assumption that people other than myself aren't zombies. So naturally a zombie would have the same issues you're having.


There's that term again...for the record, I do have my own person experiences. I just know them to be physical computative process, and nothing more.


The difference between the views is exactly what I've stated. You are requesting that the hard problem be defined so that it can be tackled and solved. The problem is that the act of defining it is the same as solving it. The certainty of the problem does not rely on a reductive definition. It is known through experience. I have not assumed the existence of anything. I have a word that I use to refer to an experience of "what's it like". Whenever I read the explanations you refer to, I do not see an explanation for this experience that I have labeled.


The experience of what what's like? You say what "it's like". What is "it"?

[Fliption]

But do you even know to what you are reffering? If there is a transcendant quality, what is it? What is there left to explain after the work of Dennett, Calvin, Edelman, LeDoux, etc? My problem is not with the idea that we don't understand the whole picture yet. I openly admit that we don't. What I have a problem with is your implying that there is a specific thing that isn't being worked on, and yet not being able to meaningfully define what that "thing" is.


Well I have no idea what is being "worked on". I'm of the opinion that it cannot be solved with the current assumptions regardless of whether it's being worked on or not.

Yes, I do know what I'm referring to. When you ask "what is it?", what is it that you are looking for me to tell you? Are you looking for words that allow you to scientifically approach it? Don't you realize that my knowledge comes from experience and you asking me for words is like trying to explain the color red to a blind man?

I see one's personal experience as perfectly explanable in terms of a Dennettian theory, and cannot see what is missing.

The problem is, I can replace the word "experiencing" with "computing" or "processing" without altering my meaning in the slightest.


Are you suggesting that if you could step into the position of my PC when it is doing math calculations, that you would find it experiencing the act of doing math exactly as you do yourself?


Life is indeed an arbitrary category label, but that doesn't make it "difficult to define" it makes it meaningless. The start of many fruitless debates, nothing more. "Alive" has not defined boundaries, no real definition, no meaning whatsoever, except as an arbitrarily assigned label to that which "seems" alive.


This may be the case today but it does not necessarily have to be the case. Category labels can be useful if they are consistently defined. But this is not relevant to this topic.


You're right. They're not analogous. "Subjective experience" and "life" might be, but "consciousness" and "life" are not. "Subjective experience" fits the exact criteria for an arbitrary category label, which I assigned to "life"
Not to me it doesn't. I know completely what subjective experience is.


But I can define "God". I can't even begin to define what you mean by "subjective experience" without immediately equating it with "computation", which would eliminate the "hard problem" (because "computation" is part of the "easy problem", according to Chalmers).


I think your answer to my question above will be critical to me understanding your point. I see a distinction between measuring the wave length of light and the experience of the color red. I suspect you will say that you do not see this as a distinction. But I think you know full well what is meant by subjective experience. This whole exercise is an attempt to try to get someone to explain the position in a way that doesn't rely on your experiential based knowledge of the situation. It is simply using the hard problem to undermind the hard problem. But this approach only works when you are thinking inside of a box with an established set of assumptions. It is these assumptions that we're now questioning. You cannot comment on the best placement for a box from the inside.


There's that term again...for the record, I do have my own person experiences. I just know them to be physical computative process, and nothing more.

If you are saying that the experience of the color red does not exists then we have nothing else to talk about. You are either a zombie who merely claims to have experiences or you are a troubled person with alot invested in a particular world view. However, if you are saying that the eye and brain can pick up light and based on wavelength computations present what I am referring to as the experience of red then this is fine. But now you have to explain how it does it. You have to casually connect the two. If you do this well enough, then you should be able to make predictions and test to see if I'm seeing and feeling what you predicted. And you can't just ask me. You have to be able to measure it.


The experience of what what's like? You say what "it's like". What is "it"?

Zombie. What's interesting about this whole thing is that you claim in a serious note that you really do experience things as if you know what it is I am referring to. You say "for the record I do have my own personal experiences" as if you are saying that you know to what I am referring. Yet you still don't see what's missing in dennett's explanation. So maybe you don't really experience what I do? Maybe you really are a zombie?

Just to show you how futile this discussion may be, it is beyond my comprehension that you don't see what's missing in Dennett's explanations. I am more likely to believe that you are a zombie and really don't know what's missing than I would believe that you really believe that a computing machine can see colors.

You look at the explanations and compare it to your experience(or lack thereof) of the world and ask me "what's missing?". Your looking for words or a desciption of whats missing. The best answer I have is to tell you to look at the explanations and then compare it to your experience of the world because that is what's missing! This is the dilemma we have here.

[Al]

I think you cannot apply the same argument to life and conciousness. Life is a definition, while experience is appalling, self-imposing reality. If you tell me you experience life, its just a tag you put on the fact of experiencing. Maybe "conciousness" is just another tag, but when you reduce all the tags, something remains, which is equal to your (mine, ours) existence, and cannot be denied. I think that's the problem with Dennett's et al. argument. Now Denett may be right in telling that the experience can be explained in terms of fundamental language, that is in terms of self-arising entities/interactions constituting the universe, for exemple, mass, energy, logical operations. It may be that we cannot intrinsically grasp the explanation, as Marion Gothier argues. Yet if the conciousness can be dissected in logical operations, how come we can grasp the operations but not their integration?

[Fliption]

I think you cannot apply the same argument to life and conciousness. Life is a definition, while experience is appalling, self-imposing reality. If you tell me you experience life, its just a tag you put on the fact of experiencing. Maybe "conciousness" is just another tag, but when you reduce all the tags, something remains, which is equal to your (mine, ours) existence, and cannot be denied. I think that's the problem with Dennett's et al. argument. Now Denett may be right in telling that the experience can be explained in terms of fundamental language, that is in terms of self-arising entities/interactions constituting the universe, for exemple, mass, energy, logical operations. It may be that we cannot intrinsically grasp the explanation, as Marion Gothier argues. Yet if the conciousness can be dissected in logical operations, how come we can grasp the operations but not their integration?

I'm not sure I think much of Marion Gothier's view. I've read the thread that confutatis provided but I haven't responded to it because....well....because Confutatis has me on ignore lol. And he seems to be the only one that cares about this view. I still need to think more about it but my initial impression is that claiming we cannot comprehend consciousness because of our relationship with it seems a bit like a cop out. I understand that an argument was made that we achieve knowledge by "taking the experience out" but this just seems to be an illustration of the hard problem rather than a refutation of it. After spending so much time convincing us that consciousness is unique and then concluding that there is nothing mysterious about it; that it may very well be completely physical seems confused and over reaching in a way that is typical of an aprior attempt to rationalize a complex situation. Afterall,"mysterious" is not an absolute condition. It is a relative statement about our ability to know and explain. So I agree with your question. Exactly where and how does the understood physical laws become the uncomprehendable laws of consciousness? How doe one create an uncomprehendable property from comprehendable parts? All she has done is create a whole new "hard" problem it seems.

As for Dennett's view...... it just seems obstinate and off the topic.

[hypnagogue]

It might be helpful here to introduce some terms: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (or P-consciousness and A-consciousness for short). Access consciousness, very roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that play a functional role: attention, verbal report, intentionality (about-ness), motoric activity, perceptual discrimination, and so on can be taken to be instances of A-consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness, again roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that are experiential: the redness of an object, the timbre of a musical note, and the felt texture of a smooth tile can be taken to be instances of P-consciousness.

I am not sure if Mentat's position is that P-consciousness does not exist or if it is that P-consciousness is subsumed under A-consciousness (i.e., that it is impossible to have A-consciousness without P-consciousness); I would appreciate a response here from Mentat pinpointing which of these views he holds, as opponents of the hard problem often take positions that do not explicitly differentiate between the two. This will help clarify further discussion.

I would also like to say something about zombies. There is a bit of a fallacy of thought going on here that is easy to slip into, and I have done it myself in the past (even if only half-jokingly). First, to frame zombies in the nomenclature above, a zombie is a being with A-consciousness identical to that of a normally functioning human, but still lacking P-consciousness altogether. Thus a zombie behaves identically to a normally functioning human, even though the first person view of the zombie is non-existent.

The problematic notion I'd like to address is that one who denies the hard problem is acting in a zombie-like way by refuting, in some manner, the problem of P-consciousness. This seems like a natural position to take, since a zombie presumably could not understand the hard problem on the basis of its lack of P-consciousness. However, strictly speaking, this position cannot follow since the zombie behaves identically to a normal human, including verbal reports indicating a belief of P-conscious qualities. Therefore a zombie could be just as much a proponent of the hard problem as an enemy of it. Indeed, if all zombies had systematic difficulties understanding the hard problem, then on average they would not have A-conscious properties identical to the average human, contradicting our intial definition.

This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

[confutatis]

The problematic notion I'd like to address is that one who denies the hard problem is acting in a zombie-like way by refuting, in some manner, the problem of P-consciousness. This seems like a natural position to take, since a zombie presumably could not understand the hard problem on the basis of its lack of P-consciousness. However, strictly speaking, this position cannot follow since the zombie behaves identically to a normal human, including verbal reports indicating a belief of P-conscious qualities. Therefore a zombie could be just as much a proponent of the hard problem as an enemy of it. Indeed, if all zombies had systematic difficulties understanding the hard problem, then on average they would not have A-conscious properties identical to the average human, contradicting our intial definition.

I'm impressed! The first person here who seems to understand that!

This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

It seems ironic to me that the hard problem is so hard that it can't even be properly stated. It's no surprise there's so much cynicism around it.

There is a hard problem, but it has nothing to do with consciousness in particular. Consciousness just happens to be a good example of a truly hard problem, one that is far more fundamental than anything Chalmers addresses. The issue is language and its ability to represent reality. The truly hard problem is how to explain the relationship between language and reality, or between explanation and explanandum to use a more pompous language. The problem comes from the fact that any description of the explanandum, or the relationship between explanation and explanandum, is also an explanation. No matter how hard you try it, it is impossible to come up with any explanation that transcends the domain of explanation. So one may be tempted to think that explanations are all that exist. This is Dennett's position, by the way.

[Fliption]

I am not sure if Mentat's position is that P-consciousness does not exist or if it is that P-consciousness is subsumed under A-consciousness (i.e., that it is impossible to have A-consciousness without P-consciousness);


Yes, this is the same question I'm asking I think. Judging from past conversation, I'm thinking the answer will be that they are one and the same thing.


This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

I don't follow this zombie clarification. I understand what you're saying. I just don't understand why you're saying it. The nature of the hard problem is one of explanation. Is this correct? The fact that consciousness cannot be reductively explained using the fundamental elements we currently assume. I can understand this issue because I can compare my experience to the explanation and see that something is missing. I don't understand how a zombie scientist could ever find the explanation of his A-consciousness unsatisfactory. He may believe himself to have some form of p-consciousness, but what characteristics could this P-consciousness have that would not allow it to be reductively explained? What nature could it possibly have that would make the zombie scientist feel that something is missing?

A further question to ask is, if a planet existed that consisted of nothing but zombies and no one was conscious, would there be a hard problem?

[confutatis]

The nature of the hard problem is one of explanation. Is this correct? The fact that consciousness cannot be reductively explained using the fundamental elements we currently assume.

I hope hypnagogue replies, but I'd also like to offer my view. According to Chalmers, the hard problem applies to P-consciousness only. A-consciousness is what zombies have and that can be explained; Chalmers calls that the "easy problem".

I can understand this issue because I can compare my experience to the explanation and see that something is missing.

Yes, you see that P-consciousness is missing from an explanation of A-consciousness. That would be correct. But a zombie would think he sees it to. You must keep in mind that, according to Chalmers, there's nothing a zombie may say or do that would reveal his zombieness, because everything a zombie says and does is the result of A-consciousness - including statements about P-consciousness!

I don't understand how a zombie scientist could ever find the explanation of his A-consciousness unsatisfactory.

For the same reason you do: he doesn't see P-consciousness in it. Or, rather, the physical action of a zombie scanning the words of an explanation of A-consciousness causes the zombie to move his mouth and tongue and utter the phrase: "I don't see P-consciousness in it!".

He may believe himself to have some form of p-consciousness, but what characteristics could this P-consciousness have that would not allow it to be reductively explained?

A very simple fact: for the zombie, P-consciousness is an illusion. He thinks he has it but he doesn't. Therefore no explanation of anything real will appear to the zombie as an explanation of his P-consciousness, for the simple fact that no true explanation of anything real can imply that an illusion is real.

Ironically, that's exactly what Dennett and Mentat say about us non-zombies! That we believe in an illusion called P-consciousness, and then complain that their true theories of real phenomena can't account for something that, from their perspective, is not real. That's why Dennett and Mentat do not mind being called zombies - they are just being cynical.

A further question to ask is, if a planet existed that consisted of nothing but zombies and no one was conscious, would there be a hard problem?

I think even Chalmers acknowledges that zombies would also eventually come up with a hard problem, except in their case it would be a pseudo-problem whereas in our case it's a real problem :smile:

[Fliption]

Yes, you see that P-consciousness is missing from an explanation of A-consciousness. That would be correct. But a zombie would think he sees it to. You must keep in mind that, according to Chalmers, there's nothing a zombie may say or do that would reveal his zombieness, because everything a zombie says and does is the result of A-consciousness - including statements about P-consciousness!


Right. I understand that. But are we saying that a zombie can't think for himself? The whole point of defining a zombie this way seems to be to make it impossible for "other people" to differentiate a zombie from a non-zombie to illustrate a point about consciousness.



For the same reason you do: he doesn't see P-consciousness in it. Or, rather, the physical action of a zombie scanning the words of an explanation of A-consciousness causes the zombie to move his mouth and tongue and utter the phrase: "I don't see P-consciousness in it!".


Again, this implies a zombie doesn't think for himself. I didn't realize that we were assuming that consciousness is what allowed me to think, calculate and make decisions. If we are that's fine. I'll just need to come up with another word to describe people like Mentat who don't know what the color red is.


He thinks he has it but he doesn't.

I'm trying to understand why. The only reason I can fathom is that they have been defined as deterministic robots who are simply programmed to say the same things that conscious people say.


I think even Chalmers acknowledges that zombies would also eventually come up with a hard problem, except in their case it would be a pseudo-problem whereas in our case it's a real problem :smile:

If they are allowed to think for themselves, I don't see how this can be true. But they may not be defined that way in which case I can see how that's true and I just need to come up with another word.

[Mentat]

Well I have no idea what is being "worked on". I'm of the opinion that it cannot be solved with the current assumptions regardless of whether it's being worked on or not.

Yes, I do know what I'm referring to. When you ask "what is it?", what is it that you are looking for me to tell you? Are you looking for words that allow you to scientifically approach it? Don't you realize that my knowledge comes from experience and you asking me for words is like trying to explain the color red to a blind man?


What you are saying is that your own experience is more than can be explained under current assumptions, right? But you can't tell me what it is that remains unexplained?

Oh, btw, you can't explain the color red any better to a person capable of sight. You can only point out examples, which is what I asked you to do with regard to this thing which has eluded explanation but which definitely exists.


Are you suggesting that if you could step into the position of my PC when it is doing math calculations, that you would find it experiencing the act of doing math exactly as you do yourself?


Not at all. My method of processing is distinctly different, but it remains a "method of processing", nothing more.


This may be the case today but it does not necessarily have to be the case. Category labels can be useful if they are consistently defined. But this is not relevant to this topic.


No, but what is relevant is that we have the term before the definition. What I'm trying to tell you is that that is a terrible way to reason. The phenomenon is supposed to be understood as existing, distinct from other phenomena, before a word is assigned to it (because then, at least we'll know what "it" is, to which the word refers).


I think your answer to my question above will be critical to me understanding your point. I see a distinction between measuring the wave length of light and the experience of the color red.


I hate to pick at words (though, as you well know, I think it is necessary that the words be correct, so as to avoid the possibility of confusion), but I too see a difference between "measuring" a particular wavelength of light and experiencing the color. What I don't see is the difference between being stimulated by a particular wavelength of light, which you then process in terms of previous stimulations and remember, and "experiencing" a certain color. I don't see what's left to explain, and those things that I mention are all part of the "easy problem".


If you are saying that the experience of the color red does not exists then we have nothing else to talk about.


I never said that. There's a difference between equating experience with computation, and saying that the experience never happened at all.


However, if you are saying that the eye and brain can pick up light and based on wavelength computations present what I am referring to as the experience of red then this is fine.


"Present"? To whom?

[Mentat]

It might be helpful here to introduce some terms: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (or P-consciousness and A-consciousness for short). Access consciousness, very roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that play a functional role: attention, verbal report, intentionality (about-ness), motoric activity, perceptual discrimination, and so on can be taken to be instances of A-consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness, again roughly, is taken to be those aspects of consciousness that are experiential: the redness of an object, the timbre of a musical note, and the felt texture of a smooth tile can be taken to be instances of P-consciousness.


I need a better definition of "P-consciousness", as you probably expected. "The redness of an object" is a matter of perceptual discrimination, is it not?


I am not sure if Mentat's position is that P-consciousness does not exist or if it is that P-consciousness is subsumed under A-consciousness (i.e., that it is impossible to have A-consciousness without P-consciousness); I would appreciate a response here from Mentat pinpointing which of these views he holds, as opponents of the hard problem often take positions that do not explicitly differentiate between the two. This will help clarify further discussion.


I just don't understand what P-consciousness means. Your assesment of opponents of the hard problem appears to hold true with me, since I don't so much think that P-consciousness doesn't exist, or that it is subsumed under A-consciousness. What I really think is that the term doesn't make sense.

I suppose I could say that, were you to give me a specific instance of what you'd consider P-consciousness, I'd show that it is really just A-consciousness. But, at the same time, to do so does seem to imply that P-consciousness doesn't exist at all.


I would also like to say something about zombies. There is a bit of a fallacy of thought going on here that is easy to slip into, and I have done it myself in the past (even if only half-jokingly). First, to frame zombies in the nomenclature above, a zombie is a being with A-consciousness identical to that of a normally functioning human, but still lacking P-consciousness altogether. Thus a zombie behaves identically to a normally functioning human, even though the first person view of the zombie is non-existent.


Hold on a second. While this is the best definition of "zombie" I've ever seen, it is also the one that lays bare the ridiculousness of the notion. There are specific neo-cortical activities (things that would fall under the category of A-consciousness, or so I'd suspect) which can fully explain having a first-person view of objective phenomena. Indeed, Dennett went into a lengthy evolutionary explanation of that very matter in Consciousness Explained.

So, being a "zombie" becomes having no P-consciousness, with which I have no problem, so long as we don't deny them any of the things that A-consciousness can be shown to entail - i.e. self-consciousness, emotion, intuition, creativity, memory, perceptual discrimination (in all of it's forms; i.e. noticing, and responding to, the difference between textures, colors, shapes, and sounds), and reasoning ability.


The problematic notion I'd like to address is that one who denies the hard problem is acting in a zombie-like way by refuting, in some manner, the problem of P-consciousness. This seems like a natural position to take, since a zombie presumably could not understand the hard problem on the basis of its lack of P-consciousness. However, strictly speaking, this position cannot follow since the zombie behaves identically to a normal human, including verbal reports indicating a belief of P-conscious qualities. Therefore a zombie could be just as much a proponent of the hard problem as an enemy of it. Indeed, if all zombies had systematic difficulties understanding the hard problem, then on average they would not have A-conscious properties identical to the average human, contradicting our intial definition.


Has it not occured to you that I might have been right when I told Fliption that everyone is a zombie? Think about it. I'm clearly a zombie, since I could claim to have P-consciousness, but I can't explain it. This exact statement holds true for all of you, does it not?


This is a great complication, because it implies that if I were to suddenly become a zombie, my first person view would be dramatically different even though I could not know about it personally, let alone indicate it to others either directly or indirectly. I do not think that this defeats the hard problem, but rather it underscores its hardness by emphasizing the epistemic difficulties involved.

Or it shows that, if the hard problem exists at all, then we are all zombies.

[hypnagogue]

Yes, this is the same question I'm asking I think. Judging from past conversation, I'm thinking the answer will be that they are one and the same thing.

Technically speaking, they can't be. One presumes that P-consciousness is a subset of A-consciousness and the other that P-consciousness does not exist altogether. That is, the former says that phenomenal redness exists in virtue of (say) computation, while the latter says that redness does not exist in the first place.

I don't follow this zombie clarification. I understand what you're saying. I just don't understand why you're saying it. The nature of the hard problem is one of explanation. Is this correct? The fact that consciousness cannot be reductively explained using the fundamental elements we currently assume.

Yes. I am just trying to be conceptually precise about the terms (specifically "zombie") that we are using. I still think the hard problem is a valid one.

I can understand this issue because I can compare my experience to the explanation and see that something is missing. I don't understand how a zombie scientist could ever find the explanation of his A-consciousness unsatisfactory.

The process of comparing conceptual tokens is subsumed under A-consciousness. A zombie may not have P-consciousness, but he still has second order beliefs that he does, and his beliefs are identical to a normal human's. (Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)

If we presume that zombies think that something is missing from a physically reductive explanation of consciousness to a greater degree than humans do on average, then we are assuming that

a) there is some overlap between P- and A-consciousness in humans, i.e. that at least some aspect of A-consciousness is causally related to some aspect of P-consciousness (otherwise there would be no discernable difference in the behavior of a human and a zombie), and
b) the part of a zombie's A-consciousness corresponding to this P/A overlap is missing in virtue of its lack of P-consciousness (thereby accounting for the difference in its behavior, i.e. failing to recognize the hard problem).

However, this contradicts our initial definition that a zombie's A-consciousness must be identical to its human counterpart. Therefore, it is not possible that a human acknowledges the hard problem and his zombie counterpart does not acknowledge it to the same degree. Zombie Chalmers believes in the hard problem just as vigorously as human Chalmers, and zombie Dennett is no more set against the hard problem than is human Dennett.

[Mentat]

You know, the more I think about it, the clearer it becomes to me that a zombie is simply one lacking a final destination for the stimuli entering his/her brain. As such s/he is simply an exception to the Cartesian Theater model. But, if this is so, then we are all, most definitely, zombies. The Cartesian Theater model has been shown to have no merit, and is sometimes even used as an epithet.

For those who don't know what's wrong with the Cartesian Theater model, it usually comes back to one question: What happens next?

If there really were a "center", wherein "experience" played itself out, who would be observing it? Would they be conscious? If so, would they not need to have an observer within their own brains? It goes on ad infinitum without ever getting any closer to explaining consciousness. Thus, it is discarded.

P.S. Forgive me, Fliption, for having resurrected the old homunculus problem. I remember I never explained it well enough for you to get what I meant, which led to many fruitless debates, but it just seemed necessary that I remove the Cartesian Theater, along with any theories that fall into the same trap.

[Fliption]

What you are saying is that your own experience is more than can be explained under current assumptions, right? But you can't tell me what it is that remains unexplained?


I can tell you what remains to be explained. But the ability to communicate it to you is dependent on your ability to experience that which cannot be explained as well. If you do not experience it or you choose to deny that you experience it, then the only way I can tell you what it is is to explain it.


Oh, btw, you can't explain the color red any better to a person capable of sight. You can only point out examples, which is what I asked you to do with regard to this thing which has eluded explanation but which definitely exists.

Right. But the difference is that red is a visual subjective experience associated with a physical object, which allows me to point to something. Subjective experiences in general is not so easy to do. I can't point to anything. I can only attempt to reference it to your own personal experience by saying "it feels like something to be Mentat". Why should it feel like anything at all?


Not at all. My method of processing is distinctly different, but it remains a "method of processing", nothing more.


Since it is nothing but another method of processing then you should be able to explain and recreate the whole process.


No, but what is relevant is that we have the term before the definition. What I'm trying to tell you is that that is a terrible way to reason. The phenomenon is supposed to be understood as existing, distinct from other phenomena, before a word is assigned to it (because then, at least we'll know what "it" is, to which the word refers).

It may be a terrible way to reason but no one here is doing that. I DO KNOW what it is. I keep saying this. Why would I attach a word to something that has no meaning to me?


I hate to pick at words (though, as you well know, I think it is necessary that the words be correct, so as to avoid the possibility of confusion), but I too see a difference between "measuring" a particular wavelength of light and experiencing the color. What I don't see is the difference between being stimulated by a particular wavelength of light, which you then process in terms of previous stimulations and remember, and "experiencing" a certain color. I don't see what's left to explain, and those things that I mention are all part of the "easy problem".

How can you be so sure of what the easy problem is when you can't see the hard problem?


I never said that. There's a difference between equating experience with computation, and saying that the experience never happened at all.


I agree. I was just trying to understand which one you were proposing. I think Hypnagogue is asking the same thing.


"Present"? To whom?

You didn't answer the question. One problem at a time.

[Mentat]

Technically speaking, they can't be. One presumes that P-consciousness is a subset of A-consciousness and the other that P-consciousness does not exist altogether. That is, the former says that phenomenal redness exists in virtue of (say) computation, while the latter says that redness does not exist in the first place.


Wait a minute. Why can't P-consciousness and A-consciousness be the same thing? (I'm not saying I think they are, I just think I'll be better able to understand them after this question is answered.)

Oh, btw, what is redness?


Yes. I am just trying to be conceptually precise about the terms (specifically "zombie") that we are using. I still think the hard problem is a valid one.


Inspite of the fact that you appear - until further clarification presents itself - to have shown yourself and Fliption to be zombies as well?


The process of comparing conceptual tokens is subsumed under A-consciousness. A zombie may not have P-consciousness, but he still has second order beliefs that he does, and his beliefs are identical to a normal human's. (Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)


Why not? From a purely A-consciousness PoV, belief is not just the disposition to make certain verbal utterances, but the disposition to rule in favor ("rulings", meaning simple computative processes of discrimination) of one idea over another, based on previous stimulations.

btw, you, too, may not have P-consciousness, and instead have but a second-order belief that you do. After all, you haven't really explained what it is, and that is the same predicament that a zombie would have, is it not?


If we presume that zombies think that something is missing from a physically reductive explanation of consciousness to a greater degree than humans do on average, then we are assuming that

a) there is some overlap between P- and A-consciousness in humans, i.e. that at least some aspect of A-consciousness is causally related to some aspect of P-consciousness (otherwise there would be no discernable difference in the behavior of a human and a zombie), and
b) the part of a zombie's A-consciousness corresponding to this P/A overlap is missing in virtue of its lack of P-consciousness (thereby accounting for the difference in its behavior, i.e. failing to recognize the hard problem).

However, this contradicts our initial definition that a zombie's A-consciousness must be identical to its human counterpart. Therefore, it is not possible that a human acknowledges the hard problem and his zombie counterpart does not acknowledge it to the same degree. Zombie Chalmers believes in the hard problem just as vigorously as human Chalmers, and zombie Dennett is no more set against the hard problem than is human Dennett.

So, I ask you again, what is the difference, after all that you've said here, between a zombie and everyone else?

[Fliption]

What you are saying is that your own experience is more than can be explained under current assumptions, right? But you can't tell me what it is that remains unexplained?


I can tell you what remains to be explained. But the ability to communicate it to you is dependent on your ability to experience that which cannot be explained as well. If you do not experience it or you choose to deny that you experience it, then the only way I can tell you what it is is to explain it.


Oh, btw, you can't explain the color red any better to a person capable of sight. You can only point out examples, which is what I asked you to do with regard to this thing which has eluded explanation but which definitely exists.

Right. But the difference is that red is a visual subjective experience associated with a physical object, which allows me to point to something. Subjective experiences in general is not so easy to do. I can't point to anything. I can only attempt to reference it to your own personal experience by saying "it feels like something to be Mentat". Why should it feel like anything at all?


Not at all. My method of processing is distinctly different, but it remains a "method of processing", nothing more.


Since it is nothing but another method of processing then you should be able to explain and recreate the whole process.


No, but what is relevant is that we have the term before the definition. What I'm trying to tell you is that that is a terrible way to reason. The phenomenon is supposed to be understood as existing, distinct from other phenomena, before a word is assigned to it (because then, at least we'll know what "it" is, to which the word refers).

It may be a terrible way to reason but no one here is doing that. I DO KNOW what it is. I keep saying this. Why would I attach a word to something that has no meaning to me?


I hate to pick at words (though, as you well know, I think it is necessary that the words be correct, so as to avoid the possibility of confusion), but I too see a difference between "measuring" a particular wavelength of light and experiencing the color. What I don't see is the difference between being stimulated by a particular wavelength of light, which you then process in terms of previous stimulations and remember, and "experiencing" a certain color. I don't see what's left to explain, and those things that I mention are all part of the "easy problem".

How can you be so sure of what the easy problem is when you can't see the hard problem?


I never said that. There's a difference between equating experience with computation, and saying that the experience never happened at all.


I agree. I was just trying to understand which one you were proposing. I think Hypnagogue is asking the same thing.


"Present"? To whom?

You didn't answer the question. One issue at a time. It's much less confusing that way.

[Fliption]

Has it not occured to you that I might have been right when I told Fliption that everyone is a zombie? Think about it. I'm clearly a zombie, since I could claim to have P-consciousness, but I can't explain it. This exact statement holds true for all of you, does it not?

As I said to confutatis in another thread. This assumes that humans can objectively know everything that exists in reality.

[Mentat]

I can tell you what remains to be explained. But the ability to communicate it to you is dependent on your ability to experience that which cannot be explained as well. If you do not experience it or you choose to deny that you experience it, then the only way I can tell you what it is is to explain it.


As per your first statement, I expect that you will give what explanation you have to give.


Right. But the difference is that red is a visual subjective experience associated with a physical object, which allows me to point to something. Subjective experiences in general is not so easy to do. I can't point to anything. I can only attempt to reference it to your own personal experience by saying "it feels like something to be Mentat". Why should it feel like anything at all?


First off, yes, the computation of "red" is a subjective one, I don't see how any computer could compute objectively.

Secondly, I don't expect you to point to something that is subjective, I expect you to give a definition. I can define "red". Can you define "subjective experience"?

Finally, it doesn't feel like anything to me, because I have nothing to compare it to...I've never been anyone else.


Since it is nothing but another method of processing then you should be able to explain and recreate the whole process.


Recreate! Surely you jest. As I explained at the very outset of the thread called "Faulty expectations of a theory of Consciousness", no scientific theory is ever expected to produce the phenomenon that it explains. It is merely expected to explain what it is and is not, when/under what circumstances it occurs, and then to be able to recreate the circumstances and prove that it does indeed occur under those circumstances.

So, since there is a certain computation that occurs whenever you are exposed to a certain wavelength of light, I need only explain which wavelength it is, which form of stimulation (and re-stimulation) is occuring in the pyrimidal neurons of your neocortex, under what conditions this occurs (which I have already established: whenever the wavelength is present and stimulates your retina, this computation occurs), and then reproduce the conditions (which I could easily do by, for example, turning my words red).


It may be a terrible way to reason but no one here is doing that. I DO KNOW what it is. I keep saying this. Why would I attach a word to something that has no meaning to me?


I wouldn't expect you to, but you have to relate what that meaning is, and I can't just trust that you have a meaning in mind.


How can you be so sure of what the easy problem is when you can't see the hard problem?


Simple, I read the piece by Chalmers which defined the "easy problem".


You didn't answer the question. One issue at a time. It's much less confusing that way.

What question? I looked back at the antecedent post, and the only question I'm seeing is my own (namely: to whom is this thing being "presented"? That is the term you used, and that is the term needs explanation).

[Mentat]

As I said to confutatis in another thread. This assumes that humans can objectively know everything that exists in reality.

Only if you're bound to induction. If it can be deduced that there is nothing more to explain, after all the facets of A-consciousness have been explained - and that the definition of "zombie" is one having A-consciousness, but nothing more - then it can be logically concluded that everyone is a zombie.

[Fliption]

However, this contradicts our initial definition that a zombie's A-consciousness must be identical to its human counterpart. Therefore, it is not possible that a human acknowledges the hard problem and his zombie counterpart does not acknowledge it to the same degree. Zombie Chalmers believes in the hard problem just as vigorously as human Chalmers, and zombie Dennett is no more set against the hard problem than is human Dennett.

But I don't see how this could ever exists. How could a zombie's A consciousness be identical when a human's A consciousness is connected somehow to P consciousness and a zombies is not? There has to be some difference somewhere, doesn't there?

[Fliption]

Only if you're bound to induction. If it can be deduced that there is nothing more to explain, after all the facets of A-consciousness have been explained - and that the definition of "zombie" is one having A-consciousness, but nothing more - then it can be logically concluded that everyone is a zombie.

If you could deduce such things, yes. But you cannot.

[Mentat]

If you could deduce such things, yes. But you cannot.

Sure I can. I can inductively or deductively prove the first proposition. The second stands as "accepted" since hypna posted it, and I find no fault with it. And the conclusion is valid, provided the premises are.

[Fliption]

I can define "red". Can you define "subjective experience"?

You first. I don't think you can do it.


Finally, it doesn't feel like anything to me, because I have nothing to compare it to...I've never been anyone else.


I'm about to give up. Obviously you feel something. You don't refer to it as "what it feels like to be Mentat" for the reason you provided but that's just the way that I, as an outsider, would refer to whatever feeling you may have.


Recreate! Surely you jest. As I explained at the very outset of the thread called "Faulty expectations of a theory of Consciousness", no scientific theory is ever expected to produce the phenomenon that it explains. It is merely expected to explain what it is and is not, when/under what circumstances it occurs, and then to be able to recreate the circumstances and prove that it does indeed occur under those circumstances.


Obviously producing the phenomenon is not always something that can be done. I understand this. But we're not talking about creating a black hole here. We're talking about computation. Simple instructions like a software program. Just so you don't think I am debating the role of a scientific theory with you, I'm not saying that you have explained it and now have to produce it to qualify as a valid theory and convince me. I'm saying that you have not explained it and this is why you cannot produce it.


So, since there is a certain computation that occurs whenever you are exposed to a certain wavelength of light, I need only explain which wavelength it is, which form of stimulation (and re-stimulation) is occuring in the pyrimidal neurons of your neocortex, under what conditions this occurs (which I have already established: whenever the wavelength is present and stimulates your retina, this computation occurs), and then reproduce the conditions (which I could easily do by, for example, turning my words red).


This doesn't satisfy me. It doesn't explain what I am referring to. You should be able to produce what you have described very easily.


I wouldn't expect you to, but you have to relate what that meaning is, and I can't just trust that you have a meaning in mind.


I will have to solve the hard problem before I can make you understand it. Makes sense to me. You get to keep your view either way.


Simple, I read the piece by Chalmers which defined the "easy problem".


Since he did such a good job explaining it, why not read his explanation of the hard problem as well?


What question? I looked back at the antecedent post, and the only question I'm seeing is my own (namely: to whom is this thing being "presented"? That is the term you used, and that is the term needs explanation).

You were responding to the second option that I was giving you as part of a question. I think Hypnagogue is asking the same question and you may have answered it since then.

[Fliption]

Sure I can. I can inductively or deductively prove the first proposition. The second stands as "accepted" since hypna posted it, and I find no fault with it. And the conclusion is valid, provided the premises are.
Ok fine, you can deduce it. But I cannot.

[confutatis]

But I don't see how this could ever exists. How could a zombie's A consciousness be identical when a human's A consciousness is connected somehow to P consciousness and a zombies is not? There has to be some difference somewhere, doesn't there?

Congratulations! After much wrangling, you are finally beginning to see what's wrong with Chalmers' argument.

Apparently only two things can follow from Chalmers' definition of a zombie: either they can't possibly exist, as you realized, or we are all zombies, as Mentat says.

Where is that guy who said this discussion is merely about semantics? :smile:

[Fliption]

Congratulations! After much wrangling, you are finally beginning to see what's wrong with Chalmers' argument.

Apparently only two things can follow from Chalmers' definition of a zombie: either they can't possibly exist, as you realized, or we are all zombies, as Mentat says.

Where is that guy who said this discussion is merely about semantics? :smile:

This is all true. But it isn't a semantic problem only, because none of this relevant. I have been using the zombie concept when I should have been using some other word. I personally don't see the signficance of the distinction hypnagogue has pointed out. It doesn't seem to me that the definition has to be this way to make the case that Chalmers is trying to make. My only beef with it is it means I have to find another word to call Mentat. The issue remains regardless of what I call it though.

[hypnagogue]

I need a better definition of "P-consciousness", as you probably expected. "The redness of an object" is a matter of perceptual discrimination, is it not?

Again, I cannot precisely pick out the concept in words, but I can only point to it. When you look at a stop sign, what does it look like to you? Among its many apparent properties, it has a certain visual phenomenal quality that you call 'redness.'

Discrimination is clearly involved here (eg, discriminating the redness of the sign from the blueness of the sky), but discrimination alone does not exhaustively characterize this phenomenon. For instance, for a human there is something different about discriminating hues of color and pitches of tone. You may say that this difference is purely underpinned by computational differences, and that may be the case, but we are only trying here to point to instances of what we mean by P-consciousness, not explain them.

Let me put it another way. Imagine that one day you encounter a curious cognitive dissociation. Suddenly you can't see anything at all, that is, the world looks to you the same way it looked in the past when you would close your eyes. And yet, you can walk around just as well as you could before, and you can accurately describe the world (e.g. by telling someone "I see a red stop sign" when a red stop sign is placed at a distance before you) just as well as you could before. This would be a case of visual A-consciousness without visual P-consciousness.

I'm not claiming that this is possible in practice; indeed, I suspect it most probably is not. I am simply using this example to illustrate how we can conceptually delineate between A and P consciousness. Even if it turns out that they are one and the same thing, there still would seem to be the distinctive property that there are different aspects or viewpoints of that one thing.

I suppose I could say that, were you to give me a specific instance of what you'd consider P-consciousness, I'd show that it is really just A-consciousness. But, at the same time, to do so does seem to imply that P-consciousness doesn't exist at all.

If P-consciousness does not exist for you, then your personal experience of acting in the world would be the same as your current personal experience of deep sleep: i.e., you would have no personal experience at all. If you respond to this by saying that you would indeed have personal experience just in virtue of your A-consciousness as you acted in the world, then you would be acknowledging the existence of P-consciousness and adding some claims about its properties (eg it exists whenever certain A-conscious activities occur). This is not the same as denying its existence altogether.

So, being a "zombie" becomes having no P-consciousness, with which I have no problem, so long as we don't deny them any of the things that A-consciousness can be shown to entail - i.e. self-consciousness, emotion, intuition, creativity, memory, perceptual discrimination (in all of it's forms; i.e. noticing, and responding to, the difference between textures, colors, shapes, and sounds), and reasoning ability.

A-consciousness entails the behavioral characteristics of, say, sadness, but it doesn't entail the personal feeling of sadness. If there is no P-consciousness, then by definition there is no personal feeling of sadness. This is the familiar schism; A-consciousness speaks of 3rd person observable properties, whereas P-consciousness speaks of 1st person observable properties. To the extent that sadness is characterized by objectively observable behaviors and brain activities, it has an A-conscious aspect; and to the extent that it is characterized by particular subjective feelings, it has a P-conscious aspect. Similar remarks can be made about the other members of your list.

Has it not occured to you that I might have been right when I told Fliption that everyone is a zombie? Think about it. I'm clearly a zombie, since I could claim to have P-consciousness, but I can't explain it. This exact statement holds true for all of you, does it not?

It doesn't follow that your failure to explain P-consciousness entails that you are a zombie. If I can't explain how weather works, that doesn't mean there is no weather.

I maintain that I am not a zombie in virtue of my P-consciousness. To make this claim I am forced to assume that there is indeed some kind of overlap or causal connection between my A-conscious utterances and my P-conscious perceptions (otherwise I would have no basis in saying that I know I am P-conscious). So, ultimately, our viewpoints are probably not as far apart as they might seem on the surface-- we both acknowledge some sort of deep connection between A and P. Where we mainly disagree is on the nature of P.

[hypnagogue]

But I don't see how this could ever exists. How could a zombie's A consciousness be identical when a human's A consciousness is connected somehow to P consciousness and a zombies is not? There has to be some difference somewhere, doesn't there?

There are at least two possibilities for how it could be that some creature has A-consciousness identical to a human but no P-consciousness.

1) It could be that A is not nomologically sufficient to influence a human's P consciousness in the way that it does. (Nomological sufficiency refers to a sufficiency that obtains in our reality as a result of its contingent natural laws, and as such is a stronger constraint than logical sufficiency.) If this were the case, then even though some aspects of my A-consciousness might always be accompanied by P-consciousness, a creature could exist in our reality with an A-consciousness identical to mine, such that it would not have my P-consciousness.

Note that A-consciousness is ultimately a functional concept, so this possibility might allow that a computer with an A-consciousness identical to mine would not have P-consciousness even though it might not allow that a human with A-consciousness identical to mine would not have my P-consciousness.

2) It could be that A is not logically sufficient to influence a human's P consciousness in the way that it does. If this were the case, then even though it might be the case that any creature in our universe which has an A-consciousness identical to mine has at least some sort of P-consciousness, it could still be the case that in some metaphysically possible world with different laws of nature, a creature with my A-consciousness would have no P-consciousness at all. This is the scenario Chalmers likes to use: there could be some metaphysical world physically identical to ours, in which a creature physically identical to me (and thus with identical A-consciousness) still does not have P-consciousness.

I think I can pinpoint the difficulty you are facing. You are assuming that there is some aspect of a human's A-consciousness that depends upon the human's P-consciousness, and that the presence of the human's P-consciousness is necessary for his A-consciousness to act in the way that it does (eg, you are assuming that a human's conceptual acceptance of the hard problem, as born out by his behavior and verbal reports, is possible only if he has P-consciousness). I think this necessity is too strong a limit. I see why P interacting with A in this way would be sufficient to cause the human to behave as if he accepts the hard problem, but I don't see why it is necessary-- I think it is logically possible that a zombie have the proper brain activation such that he behaves as if he accepts the hard problem even without 'input' from P-consciousness.

Suppose human H enters a brain state B, indicating roughly his belief in the hard problem, as a result of his P-consciousness. It is logically possible that there exists some metaphysical zombie who has entered the same brain state as H by means other than input from P.

[hypnagogue]

Apparently only two things can follow from Chalmers' definition of a zombie: either they can't possibly exist, as you realized, or we are all zombies, as Mentat says.

Neither follows, actually. It could be the case that if I build a computer functionally identical to me (eg with identical A-consciousness), it still might not be P-conscious. (Chalmers uses zombies that are physically identical to humans, but he places them in metaphysical worlds with contingent laws that are not identical to all the contingent laws of our world. He does not contend that a physical replica of a person in our world could possibly not be P-conscious.)

As for your second claim, we can note that if P-consciousness interacts with A-consciousness, this interaction may be sufficient, but not necessary, to produce utterances such as "I am seeing the color red."

[Jeebus]

How can you be so sure of what the easy problem is when you can't see the hard problem?

I have no intention of speaking for Mentat because he already gave his answer but, what I want to ask you, Fliption is: If you can't "see" the easy problem; what makes you believe there is even a hard problem with out the fundamentals for its basis?

And I could also say "How can you be so sure of what the hard problem is when you can't see or explain the easy problem without verification of what either constitutes its parts? You could shirk this question forever both ways, neither will be explained unless you start off easy.

[Fliption]

Suppose human H enters a brain state B, indicating roughly his belief in the hard problem, as a result of his P-consciousness. It is logically possible that there exists some metaphysical zombie who has entered the same brain state as H by means other than input from P.

Ok, I can accept this but to me it implies a zombie is deterministically a slave of external forces. I agree that a brain state stating a belief in P could happen without an actual P event but I just don't understand why this would ever happen. I can interject a state that I wish a computer program to be in as well. But if I don't purposefully interject this state and allow the program to run it's course, it would have no reason to casually come into such a state on it's own. This is why I say that such a creature would have to be a slave to external influences and have no casual logic in it's own actions. It doesn't do anything because of it's own calculations. It doesn't seem to think at all.

No matter. What word should I use to describe someone who denies the hard problem because they do not have consciousness and therefore can explain their cognitive existence easily with the reductive tools of science?

[confutatis]

Neither follows, actually. It could be the case that if I build a computer functionally identical to me (eg with identical A-consciousness), it still might not be P-conscious.

Chalmers is not talking about computers, as you pointed out yourself. The point Chalmers makes is that P-consciousness is not required to explain A-consciousness. He bases his claim on the notion of a physically identical entity which exhibits identical A-consciousness but lacks P-consciousness. He doesn't base his claims on seemingly-conscious computers.

(Chalmers uses zombies that are physically identical to humans, but he places them in metaphysical worlds with contingent laws that are not identical to all the contingent laws of our world.)

I believe you are wrong about Chalmers, but if you are right then that claim is just ridiculous, as it would imply that the hard problem is only a problem in the zombie universe. I definitely don't think that's what Chalmers is saying.

As for your second claim, we can note that if P-consciousness interacts with A-consciousness, this interaction may be sufficient, but not necessary, to produce utterances such as "I am seeing the color red."

I didn't claim we may be zombies. All I said was that there's nothing in Chalmers' definition of what a zombie is that allows us to feel different from them. We believe we have P-consciousness and so do zombies. Exactly where is the difference? In the "fact" that we are right about our belief and the zombie is wrong? That doesn't make any sense.

(here's a paper by Chalmers in case people think I'm misrepresenting his position: http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html)

[Fliption]

I have no intention of speaking for Mentat because he already gave his answer but, what I want to ask you, Fliption is: If you can't "see" the easy problem; what makes you believe there is even a hard problem with out the fundamentals for its basis?


I think you have misunderstood. I don't have an issue with understanding the easy problem. I just found it amusing that Mentat (who claims to not understand what the hard problem is all about) used the term "easy problem" as if he understood the distinction. Which he admittedly doesn't. When he labels a set of activities as "the easy problem", he can't be sure he is correct because he doesn't understand the hard problem.

[hypnagogue]

Chalmers is not talking about computers, as you pointed out yourself. The point Chalmers makes is that P-consciousness is not required to explain A-consciousness. He bases his claim on the notion of a physically identical entity which exhibits identical A-consciousness but lacks P-consciousness. He doesn't base his claims on seemingly-conscious computers.

I know, I was merely stating a possible case where a zombie as I have defined it (with A-consciousness identical to a human but no P-consciousness) could possibly exist in this reality.

Chalmers' point is not so much that P need not be invoked to explain A, as it is that completely explaining A does not completely explain P.

I believe you are wrong about Chalmers, but if you are right then that claim is just ridiculous, as it would imply that the hard problem is only a problem in the zombie universe. I definitely don't think that's what Chalmers is saying.

I think you need to brush up on your Chalmers. :biggrin:

The Conceivability Argument

According to this argument, it is conceivable that there be a system that is physically identical to a conscious being, but that lacks at least some of that being's conscious states. Such a system might be a zombie: a system that is physically identical to a conscious being but that lacks consciousness entirely. It might also be an invert, with some of the original being's experiences replaced by different experiences, or a partial zombie, with some experiences absent, or a combination thereof. These systems will look identical to a normal conscious being from the third-person perspective: in particular, their brain processes will be molecule-for-molecule identical with the original, and their behavior will be indistinguishable. But things will be different from the first-person point of view. What it is like to be an invert or a partial zombie will differ from what it is like to be the original being. And there is nothing it is like to be a zombie.

There is little reason to believe that zombies exist in the actual world. But many hold that they are at least conceivable: we can coherently imagine zombies, and there is no contradiction in the idea that reveals itself even on reflection. As an extension of the idea, many hold that the same goes for a zombie world: a universe physically identical to ours, but in which there is no consciousness. Something similar applies to inverts and other duplicates.

From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their metaphysical possibility. Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature. But the argument holds that zombies could have existed, perhaps in a very different sort of universe. For example, it is sometimes suggested that God could have created a zombie world, if he had so chosen. From here, it is inferred that consciousness must be nonphysical. If there is a metaphysically possible universe that is physically identical to ours but that lacks consciousness, then consciousness must be a further, nonphysical component of our universe. If God could have created a zombie world, then (as Kripke puts it) after creating the physical processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained consciousness.

- David Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)

The claim, nonetheless, is not ridiculous. It is not an ontological claim about what exists, but an epistemic claim about what we can know about consciousness. (edit: scratch that; as Chalmers uses it, it is an ontological argument, although it can be modified to be purely an epistemic argument.) If there could be some world physically identical to ours that contains humans without P-consciousness, this underscores our conceptual difficulties with explaining P-consciousness in this world, where we are accustomed to being able to explain almost anything with a physically reductive explanation. Thus the hard problem obtains in our universe, and metaphysical zombies are only used to illustrate this point.

I didn't claim we may be zombies. All I said was that there's nothing in Chalmers' definition of what a zombie is that allows us to feel different from them. We believe we have P-consciousness and so do zombies. Exactly where is the difference? In the "fact" that we are right about our belief and the zombie is wrong? That doesn't make any sense.

If I am looking at a stop sign and I say, "I am seeing redness," I am referring to a certain mental state of mine. If I close my eyes, generate no internal visual imagery, and then say "I am seeing redness," then clearly my mental state is not the same as it was beforehand, even if my utterance is. The referent of the utterance has changed.

[Fliption]

After reading the link that Confutatis provided, I'm trying to figure out why this isn't paradoxical.


so that qualia don't seem to play a primary role in the process by which we ascribe qualia to ourselves!

he'll tell you that he thinks that Bob Dylan makes good music. How can this ability for self-ascription be explained? Clearly not by appealing to qualia, for Zombie Dave doesn't have any. The story will presumably have to be told in purely functional terms.

The claim is made here that qualia is simply "along for the ride". If this is true then I can understand why Hypnagogue says the zombie definition is what it is. And I would agree. But the problem I'm having is that I can't explain how someone could ever come to write an article such as this if not for the existence of the qualia itself. Am I misunderstanding this?

I actually agree with everything that is being said by Chalmers and Hypnagogue about zombies except for one thing. It makes sense to me that they could conceivably be identical in everyway except for the belief in the hard problem itself. That's where I'm still not seeing the possibility. I just can't imagine why a planet of nothing but zombies would ever have a "hard problem" to solve.

[Overdose]

Forgive me if im repeating what others have said i only got to page 3 of the thread, but isnt the 'subjective experience' that philosophers are refering to mearly personal experience, and isnt personal experience what some thing feels like for you?
And arnt philosophers mearly saying that no matter how detailed you describe the systems and sub-systems of the brain. These could never enable (hyphoteticaly) someone who wasnt conscious to understand what it 'feels' like to be conscious?
kind of like the descriptions of componants of a tv not being about articulate what its like to watch a episode of buffy the vampire slayer. (not that ive ever watched it *ahem)

[confutatis]

I know, I was merely stating a possible case where a zombie as I have defined it (with A-consciousness identical to a human but no P-consciousness) could possibly exist in this reality.

Well, I don't think you can possibly have A-consciousness exactly like a human without being a lot like a human. But that is a side issue anyway.

I think you need to brush up on your Chalmers.

I have read most of the papers on Chalmers' web page (my job bores me to death). I still see a contradiction in his ideas, and from my perspective your quote shows it explicitly:

Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature.

So - probably - our laws of nature are enough to explain why we are not zombies. Isn't that correct?

But the argument holds that zombies could have existed, perhaps in a very different sort of universe.

A very different sort of universe with very different natural laws? Could be, but in that case the hard problem should be stated in terms of those very different natural laws, not in terms of our own. That's not what Chalmers does; he conceives of a very different universe, and then uses his knowledge of facts about that universe to make claims about our own. But how can he know anything about a universe where the natural laws are very different from our own? That's what I find ridiculous.

For example, it is sometimes suggested that God could have created a zombie world, if he had so chosen.

I have no issue with this but the problem, as Chalmers himself hints at, is the nagging feeling that that's exactly what God did, that we are all zombies according to the way Chalmers defines zombies. You have pointed the problem yourself, and now you seem to be overlooking it.

From here, it is inferred that consciousness must be nonphysical.

That is not the only option. It can also be inferred that consciousness must be an illusion. That's what Mentat infers, and I don't see anything wrong with his argument.

If God could have created a zombie world, then (as Kripke puts it) after creating the physical processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained consciousness.

Let me show you a similar idea:

If God could have created a world without water, then after creating the physical processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained water.

Surely you don't want to claim that water is a metaphysical substance, do you? We all know that our universe didn't have water in the beginning, but the existence of water can be fully explained by the same laws that explain the universe without water.

[confutatis]

I want to make sure you're clear on my position because it doesn't appear you are.

I understand your position. You think the way Chalmers defines a zombie doesn't make much sense. And I agree.

I have an issue with the way zombie is being defined here for two reasons. 1) I currently see a problem with it and 2) I don't feel it needs to be defined this way to illustrate the point of the hard problem.

You are right about #1, but you are partially wrong about #2. The zombie thing is central to Chalmers' ideas. You may have a different concept of a hard problem which does not require zombies, but then your hard problem is not the same as Chalmers'.

From various discussions I've seen here, people are making too much out of the whole zombie topic and don't seem to understand the real point.

It's probably because people are not really talking about what you think they are talking about. Happens all the time in forums like this.

I said that zombies must not believe in the hard problem.

That's not what you said. Here's the quote from your post:

It makes sense to me that they could conceivably be identical in everyway except for the belief in the hard problem itself.

It's not clear from that sentence alone whether you think zombies do not believe in the hard problem, or if belief in the hard problem is what defines one as a zombie.

This is a non-sequitur

It's not a non-sequitur if you were talking about a definition. This is always a problem; it's hard to know if people are defining things and then stating what they think follows from their definitions, or if they are simply stating what they believe to be true. You have now made it clear that you were talking about your beliefs, not about definitions. And there's no point arguing about someone's beliefs without knowing how they came up with them. I don't know why you think zombies must not believe in the hard problem, since my belief is that zombies can't possibly exist.

I have a feeling that when I do get there, I'll be all alone. :frown:

I have found that the more I understand about the world and about myself, the harder it is to make people understand things the way I do. But for the most part I consider understanding as just a form of entertainment, so it doesn't bother me that people don't see things the way I do, because more likely than not everyone is wrong, including myself.

There are far more important things to do in life than "understanding". Only bored people waste time with philosophy.

[hypnagogue]

A very different sort of universe with very different natural laws? Could be, but in that case the hard problem should be stated in terms of those very different natural laws, not in terms of our own. That's not what Chalmers does; he conceives of a very different universe, and then uses his knowledge of facts about that universe to make claims about our own. But how can he know anything about a universe where the natural laws are very different from our own? That's what I find ridiculous.

The metaphysical universe in which these zombies live is physically identical to our own. Chalmers' implication, then, is that we cannot give a physical explanation of consciousness in our own universe-- if we could, it should apply equally well to our physically identical zombie counterparts, but it doesn't.

I have no issue with this but the problem, as Chalmers himself hints at, is the nagging feeling that that's exactly what God did, that we are all zombies according to the way Chalmers defines zombies. You have pointed the problem yourself, and now you seem to be overlooking it.

Chalmers' argument doesn't imply that we are zombies. It does highlight the difficult issue of our epistemic access to our P-consciousness, however: by what means can/do we have knowledge of P? It would seem on the face of it that we can't have access to it if we have the same access to everything a zombie does, but there are ways around this. For instance, it could be that P-consciousness is in some way sufficient, but not necessary, to induce the kind of activity in me that leads me to say "I see a blue sky." A zombie might be led to say the same thing, but by means of a somehow different process.

That is not the only option. It can also be inferred that consciousness must be an illusion. That's what Mentat infers, and I don't see anything wrong with his argument.

The problem with this line of thinking is that it still leaves the big questions unanswered. P-consciousness is all about appearances in the first place, so saying that it is an illusion does not get us anywhere. It is still just as mystifying how such an illusion could be illusory in the way that it is.

If God could have created a world without water, then after creating the physical processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained water.

Surely you don't want to claim that water is a metaphysical substance, do you? We all know that our universe didn't have water in the beginning, but the existence of water can be fully explained by the same laws that explain the universe without water.

If there is a world physically identical to ours, then it follows from this that there is water. It does not seem to follow in the same way that in a world physically identical to ours, there are conscious beings. This is the key difference in the argument you seem to be overlooking.

[hypnagogue]

The claim is made here that qualia is simply "along for the ride". If this is true then I can understand why Hypnagogue says the zombie definition is what it is. And I would agree. But the problem I'm having is that I can't explain how someone could ever come to write an article such as this if not for the existence of the qualia itself. Am I misunderstanding this?

You're not misunderstanding, I think. This a deep issue of our epistemic access to P-consciousness. It appears as if we make certain actions (such as saying "I see that the sky is blue") in virtue of our P-conscious contents/properties/attributes. If this is so, it does raise serious questions about the possible existence of a creature with an identical A-consciousness but a non-existent P.

In view of this quandary, we might be lead to claim that any system with an identical A-consciousness to some conscious human must have an identical P. This is a purely functionalist notion, and accepting it forces us to make some apparently wild claims. For instance, Ned Block has composed the thought experiment of the Chinese Gym, where each individual in China communicates to the others by means of a walkie talkie, such that their communications are functionally isomorphic to neurons sharing information in the brain. If we accept strictly that identical A-consciousness must imply identical P, then we must accept that if each member of this Chinese Gym took on the functional characteristics of each of your neurons, then it would be P-conscious in precisely the same way you are. Given the proper input, it would 'say' "I see that the sky is blue" precisely when you would say the same thing, and presumably the whole ensemble collectively would be seeing the same phenomenal sky as you do when you make this statement.

So, it appears that there are ridiculous claims to be made all around the board when it comes to consciousness. Of course, it could be that the Chinese Gym really is P-conscious as a collective, but it seems to be a serious violation of our intuition-- just as bad, perhaps, as supposing that there could be a creature with an identical A but not an identical P.

For my own part, I currently think a panpsychist ontology is the best way to navigate the issue, but it's difficult to arrive at some paradigm on this problem for too long before more pressing issues arise.

I actually agree with everything that is being said by Chalmers and Hypnagogue about zombies except for one thing. It makes sense to me that they could conceivably be identical in everyway except for the belief in the hard problem itself. That's where I'm still not seeing the possibility. I just can't imagine why a planet of nothing but zombies would ever have a "hard problem" to solve.

Perhaps if a race of creatures evolved with A-consciousness similar to our own but no P, they wouldn't ever make reference to something like a P. But I think this is the wrong way to conceive of the problem. Presumably such a race would not have an A identical, on average, to humans, so they would not be zombies in the true sense.

Perhaps a better way to think of it is to suppose that tomorrow, by some strange occurence, all humans on this planet retained their A but lost their P. Would we go on merrily talking about the blueness of the sky and so on? Well, that really depends on the nature of the relationship between A and P-- if P is necessary to get us to behave as if we have it, then there would soon be a drastic change in our collective As; if it is not necessary, then it could be the case that by some means, we continues to behave as if we had it even though we don't. Perhaps it would turn out this way naturally, in which case P would have to be epiphenomnal and causally inefficacious; or, perhaps it would take some wild scenario like aliens interfering with our brain patterns in order to induce us to continue acting as if we had it, in which case we could conclude that P is sufficient, but not necessary, to get us to behave as if we have it.

[confutatis]

The metaphysical universe in which these zombies live is physically identical to our own.

I do have trouble reconciling your "physically identical to our own" above with your previous mention of "different laws of nature". My perception is that you are contradicting yourself; how can you have a physically identical universe with different laws of nature?

But I might be missing something, so I'll await further comments.

Chalmers' argument doesn't imply that we are zombies.

Chalmers clearly states (and I need no brushing up for this :smile:) that the only difference between ourselves and a zombie is the truth about beliefs about P-consciousness. As I said, the only essential difference is that the zombie belief that they have P-consciousness is false, while our belief that we have P-consciousness is true. Yet Chalmers also states that the zombie has no way to find out that his beliefs about consciousness are false.

Do you have a way to find out that your beliefs about consciousness are false? No? What makes you different from a zombie then?

The problem with this line of thinking is that it still leaves the big questions unanswered. P-consciousness is all about appearances in the first place, so saying that it is an illusion does not get us anywhere. It is still just as mystifying how such an illusion could be illusory in the way that it is.

And yet Chalmers' zombies do not have P-consciousness and still have the illusion of having it. Can you explain how that is possible, because to me it makes no sense at all.

If there is a world physically identical to ours, then it follows from this that there is water.

I meant identical in the sense that it is describe by the same natural laws. Our knowledge of physics and chemistry explains why there's so much water in Louisiana, and it also explains why there's so little water in Nevada.

It does not seem to follow in the same way that in a world physically identical to ours, there are conscious beings.

That is only because you are assuming, a priori, that the laws that explain the presence or absence of water are incapable of explaining the presence or absence of consciousness. It's a circular argument. But the contrary argument, that they can explain, is also circular. This is the key point so many people seem to be overlooking.

[Fliption]

Keep up the good work Fliption, and eventually you'll see why this hard problem is nonsense.


I want to make sure you're clear on my position because it doesn't appear you are.


No, you're not misunderstanding anything. It's a crucial point in Chalmers' argument that nothing that zombies do or say can be used to imply that they lack P-consciousness.


I have an issue with the way zombie is being defined here for two reasons. 1) I currently see a problem with it and 2) I don't feel it needs to be defined this way to illustrate the point of the hard problem. So just to be clear, I do believe there is a hard problem. I just don't think this problematic definition of zombies is needed.

From various discussions I've seen here, people are making too much out of the whole zombie topic and don't seem to understand the real point. I see that Hypnagogue has even felt that he had to clear up some confusion about this being a thought exercise of epistemology and not ontology. The same message I found myself saying over and over again in other threads, you may recall.


Since neither Mentat nor myself believe in the hard problem itself, then we must be zombies. Just look at your words above, that's what they imply.

No they don't imply that. I said that zombies must not believe in the hard problem. That is not the same thing as saying that people who don't believe in the hard problem are zombies. There's a big difference. This is a Non-sequitur (affirming the consequent) logical fallacy.


You are getting there.

Perhaps. I have a feeling that when I do get there, I'll be all alone. :frown:

[hypnagogue]

I do have trouble reconciling your "physically identical to our own" above with your previous mention of "different laws of nature". My perception is that you are contradicting yourself; how can you have a physically identical universe with different laws of nature?

The claim is that the physical laws of nature do not exhaustively represent all the laws of nature.

Do you have a way to find out that your beliefs about consciousness are false? No? What makes you different from a zombie then?

Presumably if a zombie were to be granted P-consciousness, he would notice the difference.

Once again, there are deep issues here about epistemic access. Is there a way to find out that a belief as of a certain subjective experience is false? I don't know. It is a difficult issue with no clear answer.

On some views, P-consciousness is incorrigible-- that is, it is impossible to be wrong about a belief as of a certain subjective experience. Does this imply that a zombie in Chalmers' sense must have P-consciousness since it believes it does? No, I think not, since perhaps the metaphysical difference in the zombie's world that allows him to be functionally identical to a human without having attendent P-consciousness also allows him to be incorrect about his beliefs about P-consciousness. If this were true, then the incorrigibility of P-consciousness would be a result of the contingent laws of our universe involved in granting us P-consciousness. On the other hand, some claim that P-consciousness in this reality itself is not incorrigible.

And yet Chalmers' zombies do not have P-consciousness and still have the illusion of having it. Can you explain how that is possible, because to me it makes no sense at all.

Such zombies have second order beliefs of P-consciousness without first order P-conscious contents, whereas we have both. Strictly speaking, the zombie is under no illusion at all, since there is no 1st person view for the zombie from which it can be illusioned. The zombie is under an illusion no more than a rock is under an illusion. It seems that to have an illusion in the first place, one must have some sort of subjective perspective with which to be aware of such an illusion.

I meant identical in the sense that it is describe by the same natural laws. Our knowledge of physics and chemistry explains why there's so much water in Louisiana, and it also explains why there's so little water in Nevada.

If a conglomeration of H2O molecules exists in the zombie world, it follows that there is water. If a conglomeration of neurons exists in the zombie world, it does not follow that there is P-consciousness.

That is only because you are assuming, a priori, that the laws that explain the presence or absence of water are incapable of explaining the presence or absence of consciousness. It's a circular argument. But the contrary argument, that they can explain, is also circular. This is the key point so many people seem to be overlooking.

It is not an a priori assumption, it is an a posteriori deduction from our apparent systematic failure to satisfactorily explain P-consciousness in physical terms. The deduction may or may not be false, but it is not something assumed at the outset-- it is a conclusion arrived upon.

[Fliption]

Let me touch on the relevance of this particular definition of zombie. Isn't the conceivability argument about the idea that consciousness does not follow from the laws of the universe as we understand them? Is this the whole point? The whole idea to me seems to be claiming that consciousness is not explained or accounted for with a purely physical explanation. At least no one has been able to do it yet. So let's say we can create (or conceive of) a being where all the laws of nature are not broken. Is it conscious? We do not know because we do not understand how the laws of nature can lead to such a thing. This seems like the whole point to me. Correct me if I have misunderstood.

So why is it so relevant that this being must exhibit the exact same behaviour that I do? So what if he doesn't see the hard problem because he doesn't see anything that cannot be explained via the laws of nature. We cannot know for certain whether this being is conscious(he could just be lying) and have no reason to believe it is by simply looking at it's physical make-up which is still the point. What am I missing?

[hypnagogue]

Let me touch on the relevance of this particular definition of zombie. Isn't the conceivability argument about the idea that consciousness does not follow from the laws of the universe as we understand them? Is this the whole point? The whole idea to me seems to be claiming that consciousness is not explained or accounted for with a purely physical explanation. At least no one has been able to do it yet. So let's say we can create (or conceive of) a being where all the laws of nature are not broken. Is it conscious? We do not know because we do not understand how the laws of nature can lead to such a thing. This seems like the whole point to me. Correct me if I have misunderstood.

You are referring to the problem of other minds vis a vis the problem of the metaphysical possibility (conceivability) of zombies. You are correct in pointing out that these two problems are intimately tied together. The zombie argument (as used by Chalmers) just goes a little further in making some metaphysical claims about the relationship between consciousness and phsyics. But yes, even if we suppose that the idea of a zombie is logically incoherent (metaphysically impossible), we are still left with the familiar core problems: the existence and nature of P-consciousness, asymmetry of access to P-conscious states, and so on.

So why is it so relevant that this being must exhibit the exact same behaviour that I do?

Zombies are used in this way to illustrate the seeming dissociation between reality as science/physics describes it and reality as it presents itself in P-consciousness. If there is a systematic difference in the behavior of zombies and of humans, then this systematic difference must be explicable in terms of physics (since 3rd person behavior is presumably explicable entirely in terms of physics). As you are stipulating that this difference must be due to lack of P-consciousness, it must follow then that P-consciousness is explicable entirely in terms of physics. In this case P-consciousness would literally be those physical processes missing from zombies such that they behave as if they have no P-consciousness.

So what if he doesn't see the hard problem because he doesn't see anything that cannot be explained via the laws of nature.

My Chalmerian zombie twin must believe in the hard problem just as much as I do. To frame it again: If he doesn't, then there is a difference in his 3rd person behavior which is explicable entirely in terms of physics. So if we say that this difference is due to his lack of P-consciousness, and that this difference is explicable in terms of physics, it follows that P-consciousness exists entirely in terms of extrinsic physics, contradicting the ontological intuition behind the hard problem.

We cannot know for certain whether this being is conscious(he could just be lying) and have no reason to believe it is by simply looking at it's physical make-up which is still the point. What am I missing?

You are correct, the central problems remains as real as ever.

For instance, let us suppose that zombies (in Chalmers' strong sense) are logically impossible, and therefore that P-consciousness exists entirely in virtue of physical laws. If this is the case, there is no ontological gap between physical reality and P-consciousness: they are the same thing. However, in this scenario, we are still left with massive epistemological gaps between the two: the problem of other minds, asymmetry of access, etc. Furthermore, we are left with a further mystifying problem: why should an epistemological gap exist if there is no ontological gap?

[Al]

Maybe because the physics explanation of reality is incomplete?

[confutatis]

For instance, let us suppose that zombies (in Chalmers' strong sense) are logically impossible, and therefore that P-consciousness exists entirely in virtue of physical laws. If this is the case, there is no ontological gap between physical reality and P-consciousness: they are the same thing.

Can we consider that possibility for a moment, without falling in the materialist trap? I'm a monist and not a materialist, and even though I find my position difficult to explain, I see a lot of people share it.

However, in this scenario, we are still left with massive epistemological gaps between the two: the problem of other minds, asymmetry of access, etc. Furthermore, we are left with a further mystifying problem: why should an epistemological gap exist if there is no ontological gap?

All those problems have a simple explanation that's not mystifying at all. Our misunderstanding of language constrains our ability to understand things, because most of what we know we learn through language, yet we know very little about language itself. Our situation is not unlike that of a man who travels to a foreign country, hires an incompetent interpreter, and finds himself having trouble communicating with everyone. Until he realizes his interpreter is the source of the problem, he will be lead to think the locals don't make any sense. Our languages often stand between us and reality, and they are not good at interpreting facts.

From that view, the source of your epistemological gap is the fact that any statement about anything must always include three distinct elements. In English those are the subject, the object, and the verb. In math, it's two quantities and an operation, or two sides of an equation and the equal sign. Whenever you look at anything from the point of view of language, you will always see two distinct entities and a relationship between them. Very often the two entities are exactly the same, and the relationship is just a fictitious linguistic device.

[hypnagogue]

If the epistemological gap is only linguistic, then it should be possible in principle for me to literally see your 'red' and see to what extent it is similar to my 'red.' Are you proposing the only reason I can't do this is because of some linguistic confusion? It seems to run much deeper to me.

[Al]

We still don't know if its really impossible to look from other person's subjective persepective. We cannot exclude that in some future a technology can be developed to wire two brains together (some animals can do it, ants, for instance). I wonder what would the two people experience then. I supose that they will keep individual conciousness if the dualists are right, and would "meld" as a conciousness if the materialists are right.

[confutatis]

If the epistemological gap is only linguistic, then it should be possible in principle for me to literally see your 'red' and see to what extent it is similar to my 'red.'

All you are saying above is that you can't know everything. And the idea that there's anything wrong with that is an erroneous notion that's purely linguistic in nature.

Are you proposing the only reason I can't do this is because of some linguistic confusion?

No, the reason you can't know what's on my mind is because you are not omniscient. The linguistic confusion is involved in the fact that you think your limited, imperfect knowledge is an aspect of reality.

[hypnagogue]

All you are saying above is that you can't know everything. And the idea that there's anything wrong with that is an erroneous notion that's purely linguistic in nature.

There's more to it than that. If P-consciousness exists entirely in virtue of physical phenomena, it should admit itself to physical analysis. We should be able to know which systems are P-consciousness, and exactly what way in which they are P-conscious. But it appears as if we cannot-- it appears as if it is impossible in principle to do this with any degree of certainty. If it is a physical phenomenon, why should it be opaque to physical analysis even in principle?

I'm not saying we should be able to know everything. I am saying that in principle, we should be able to objectively observe all phenomena that are rightly called physical-- there should be nothing asymmetric or hidden about consciousness from a 3rd person view. But there is, and there are strong arguments that it cannot be otherwise, even in principle.

[Jeebus]

I think you have misunderstood. I don't have an issue with understanding the easy problem. I just found it amusing that Mentat (who claims to not understand what the hard problem is all about) used the term "easy problem" as if he understood the distinction. Which he admittedly doesn't. When he labels a set of activities as "the easy problem", he can't be sure he is correct because he doesn't understand the hard problem.


Thanks for clarifying that up for me. Can you direct me to a link were Mentat made this mistake? I must have skipped over it because if it is in this thread I surely missed it; reason being I only read selective posts.

Thanks, by the way.

[Fliption]

Thanks for this response to my question.



If there is a systematic difference in the behavior of zombies and of humans, then this systematic difference must be explicable in terms of physics (since 3rd person behavior is presumably explicable entirely in terms of physics).


I understand what you're saying. But why is this the case? It seems as if there is an assumption that something non-physical cannot influence the behavior of something physical. Why is this assumption being made? I don't understand why it's necessary to make this assumption because it is obviously not true in this case. If this were true then it proves that consciousness is purely physical. Otherwise we wouldn't be talking about this issue right now. Surely this conversation is influenced by the fact that we have consciousness and can't explain why and not because god is pulling strings?



For instance, let us suppose that zombies (in Chalmers' strong sense) are logically impossible, and therefore that P-consciousness exists entirely in virtue of physical laws. If this is the case, there is no ontological gap between physical reality and P-consciousness: they are the same thing. However, in this scenario, we are still left with massive epistemological gaps between the two: the problem of other minds, asymmetry of access, etc. Furthermore, we are left with a further mystifying problem: why should an epistemological gap exist if there is no ontological gap?

Exactly. I just thought that this was the main point of the zombie thought exercise to begin with. So I didn't see the definition clarification of zombie as being very relevant to the solution of the hard problem, like some people seem to be saying.

[Fliption]

Thanks for clarifying that up for me. Can you direct me to a link were Mentat made this mistake? I must have skipped over it because if it is in this thread I surely missed it; reason being I only read selective posts.

Thanks, by the way.


Well I don't know if I'd call it a mistake. I just thought it was interesting. His quote is on page 3 of this thread and here is the paragraph:


I hate to pick at words (though, as you well know, I think it is necessary that the words be correct, so as to avoid the possibility of confusion), but I too see a difference between "measuring" a particular wavelength of light and experiencing the color. What I don't see is the difference between being stimulated by a particular wavelength of light, which you then process in terms of previous stimulations and remember, and "experiencing" a certain color. I don't see what's left to explain, and those things that I mention are all part of the "easy problem".


So he is listing out all the things he thinks the easy problem encompasses when he admits to not understanding the hard problem. Contrary to what he has said here, I would argue that some of these things he listed are indeed part of the hard problem and not the easy problem. The word "experience" is the key. He just assumes that the all physical brain activity equals experience. He just glossed right over the hard problem. I relalize that he thinks it's all easy problems but he said that these were easy problems according to Chalmers and that doesn't seem true at all.

[hypnagogue]

I understand what you're saying. But why is this the case? It seems as if there is an assumption that something non-physical cannot influence the behavior of something physical. Why is this assumption being made?

Let me introduce a new term here to make discussion a little easier: a C-zombie is a zombie in Chalmers' sense, i.e. it is a creature physically identical to a human and existing in a metaphysical world physically identical to our own, such that its A-consciousness is identical to that of a human but it has no P-consciousness.

You postulated that no C-zombie should be able to behave as if it appreciates the hard problem, due to its lack of P-consciousness. If this is the case, then P-consciousness must be necessary for the existence of A-conscious behaviors indicating P-conscious beliefs (or "A as if P" for short). But, there is no problem in principle for physics to completely explain A-conscious properties of any kind. Therefore, if A-conscious properties indicating beliefs in P-conciousness must be caused by P-consciousness, and if such A-conscious properties are entirely in the domain of physics, then P-consciousness must be entirely in the domain of physics as well. There is no dissociation here from P-conscious properties and A-conscious properties, and so they wind up becoming the same thing: whenever there is A as if P, on this view, it must follow that there is P, and from this it looks as if physics' ability to explain all A implies that it can explain P.

(Otherwise, we would have to explain why certain physical phenomena-- those embodied by A as if P-- cannot occur without some non-physical component, even though there is every reason to believe that they should be able to occur quite naturally underneath the wing of purely physical laws. A far more natural and less ad hoc interpretation under this condition of necessity is to simply assume that P is A and nothing more, that there is no difference between the two. I don't think this is the view you want to take.)

We don't run into this problem if we suppose that P-consciousness is sufficient, but not necessary, to produce A-conscious properties indicating belief in P-conscious properties. If this is the case, then we can have A as if P but not P. In this scenario, physics does not automatically ensnare all the phenomena involved. Despite its ability to exhaustively explain A, there is something more about P that eludes the grasp of physics. So there is then a dissociation between the two that itself needs explanation.

If we say that P is sufficient but not necessary to produce A as if P, then that means A as if P can be produced via several mechanisms. One mechanism might be the kind of 'dead,' robotic, P-less production of A that you have alluded to before; we can imagine that a computer emulating a human brain's functional properties might be such an instance, where A is duplicated but there is no P. Another mechanism for generating A as if P would be that instantiated in P-conscious human brains, where the window could be open for the kind of interactionist dualism you refer to in your post (although this route is not a necessary one to take for a proponent of the hard problem).

Exactly. I just thought that this was the main point of the zombie thought exercise to begin with. So I didn't see the definition clarification of zombie as being very relevant to the solution of the hard problem, like some people seem to be saying.

The clarification just brings things into sharper focus. It's not surprising that opponents of the hard problem have found more problem with this interpretation of zombies than yours, since your interpretation of zombies (with the necessity of P for A as if P) actually turns out to be closer to their views of strict and complete identity between mind and brain, as I hope I showed successfully above.

[confutatis]

It's not surprising that opponents of the hard problem have found more problem with this interpretation of zombies than yours, since your interpretation of zombies (with the necessity of P for A as if P) actually turns out to be closer to their views of strict and complete identity between mind and brain

Just for the record, I want to clarify that not everyone who opposes the hard problem do so because they hold a view of strict and complete identity between mind and brain. I do not hold such a view but I still oppose the hard problem.

What Chalmers is trying to sell is nothing but good old Cartesian dualism. He certainly deserves the merit of finding a way of expressing Descartes' ideas in a more modern/scientific framework, but the central issue is the same. The "hard problem" is just a modern replacement for the cogito. And that means, with all due respect to the parties involved, that Chalmers and his followers are lagging some 350 years behind when it comes to philosophy. Cartesian dualism is not a tenable philosophical position; that has been shown by people far more qualified than I am, so I won't dwell on it.

That said, dualism, in some form or another, is part of anyone's worldview. Even die-hard materialists such as Dennett and his followers do not really believe in their theories when it comes to an understanding of themselves; their claims to deny the supremacy of a first-person worldview are betrayed by the language they use to describe their own world. Perhaps the only difference between the Cartesian dualist and the materialist monist is their attitude towards what they can't understand: the former accepts it, the latter rejects it. That's all there is to the debate as far as I can tell; the bottom line is neither side really understands why things are the way they appear to be.

However, there is an alternative. It's not well explored because it is somewhat new, at least compared to the two other currents of thought, but my study of the subject has revealed that it is at least about a century old. There is no clear label for the philosophy yet; the best name I've seen for it is "dual-aspect monism". It is a form of monism that successfully incorporates dualism as an attribute of perception rather than an attribute of reality. Central to the idea is an understanding of the role knowledge plays in perception, which also requires an understanding of the role language plays in knowledge. The idea is far from simple, but to those who understand it, it makes far more sense than the other two competing views.

I believe anyone who understands dual-aspect monism will reject both Chalmers' and Dennett's ideas, while still acknowledging both positions have some truth to them. That is my position, but I realize it sounds paradoxical to those who are not familiar with it. Fliption has been kind enough to point that out, even though I can only see his criticisms as failure to see past his current philosophical framework.

As a side note, according to dual-aspect monism the identity between mind and brain can be explained by asserting that, while it's true that the brain contains the mind, it's also true that the mind contains the brain, and that both mind and brain are equally real. It's their mutual containment relationship which makes it possible for both to exist, but it's not correct to say, as the materialists do, that the brain must evolve before the mind appears. Due to their mutual containment, they must necessarily evolve together, as the absence of one would imply the absence of the other.

[hypnagogue]

What Chalmers is trying to sell is nothing but good old Cartesian dualism. He certainly deserves the merit of finding a way of expressing Descartes' ideas in a more modern/scientific framework, but the central issue is the same. The "hard problem" is just a modern replacement for the cogito. And that means, with all due respect to the parties involved, that Chalmers and his followers are lagging some 350 years behind when it comes to philosophy. Cartesian dualism is not a tenable philosophical position; that has been shown by people far more qualified than I am, so I won't dwell on it.

You are misreading Chalmers. Descartes was an interactionist substance dualist, and Chalmers is committed neither to interactionism nor a 'mind substance.' Chalmers leaves the door open for epiphenomenalsim, and actually prefers monism over dualism.

As I see things, the best options for a nonreductionist are type-D dualism, type-E dualism, or type-F monism: that is, interactionism, epiphenomenalism, or panprotopsychism. If we acknowledge the epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and we rule out primitive identities and strong necessities, then we are led to a disjunction of these three views. Each of the views has at least some promise, and none have clear fatal flaws. For my part, I give some credence to each of them. I think that in some ways the type-F view is the most appealing, but this sense is largely grounded in aesthetic considerations whose force is unclear.

- Chalmers, Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)

Note also that there is no clear distinction between 'dual aspect monism' and 'aspect dualism.' Both pick out the same general concept of different ontological aspects or properties ultimately belonging to the same entity. And in fact, in formulating a tentative theory of consciousness in his paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html) , Chalmers embraces precisely such an aspect dichotomy rather than one of substance:

This leads to a natural hypothesis: that information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This has the status of a basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the physical. Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical processing.

So Chalmers is most certainly not a redux of Descartes, and in fact is probably best described as an aspect dualist, or dual aspect monist if you prefer. Forgive me if I am using 'dual aspect monist' in a different manner from you, but if I am, I would like to know what distinguishes dual aspect monism from aspect dualism. In any case, it is clear that aspect dualism can be easily recast as at least some kind of monism, and this is the position that Chalmers seems to prefer.

The type-F monism that Chalmers describes may also be useful in illuminating our recent discussion of zombies. Again from "Concsioucness and its Place in Nature":

A type-F monist may have one of a number of attitudes to the zombie argument against materialism. Some type-F monists may hold that a complete physical description must be expanded to include an intrinsic description, and may consequently deny that zombies are conceivable. (We only think we are conceiving of a physically identical system because we overlook intrinsic properties.) Others could maintain that existing physical concepts refer via dispositions to those intrinsic properties that ground the dispositions. If so, these concepts have different primary and secondary intensions, and a type-F monist could correspondingly accept conceivability but deny possibility: we misdescribe the conceived world as physically identical to ours, when in fact it is just structurally identical. Finally, a type-F monist might hold that physical concepts refer to dispositional properties, so that zombies are both conceivable and possible, and the intrinsic properties are not physical properties. The differences between these three attitudes seem to be ultimately terminological rather than substantive. (emphasis mine)

I myself also find this type-F monism the most attractive solution to the problem of consciousness, and as I maintain the metaphysical possibility of zombies, I would fall under the third category Chalmers describes above. That is, I maintain that physical properties refer to dispositional (extrinsic) properties only, and therefore there could exist a world with the same physical (extrinsic) properties as our world but different intrinsic properties. On the other hand, you may find yourself siding with one of the first two categories, thus accounting for your rejection of the possibility of zombies (although it should be pointed out that rejecting the possibility of zombies does not entail rejecting the hard problem).

[Fliption]

Therefore, if A-conscious properties indicating beliefs in P-conciousness must be caused by P-consciousness, and if such A-conscious properties are entirely in the domain of physics, then P-consciousness must be entirely in the domain of physics as well.


I decided to leave this for a day because I felt there was the potential that I wasn't seeing the forest for the trees. As usual, things look different when I come back. On a technical note, I'm not sure I understand why the domain of physics should cover everything that interacts with the physical. If this were really true then I would reasonably conclude that consciousness is physical because the fact that we are talking about this strongly suggest an interaction. But I will accept it for now because I think I see more clearly the intent of the definition and perhaps I have been too picky.

I do understand what you mean when you say that a zombie can say things like "That object is red" and even "I believe in the hard problem". I understand that there is a certain A consciousness state that relates to every single behavior that can be exhibited by a person with P-consciousness. I understand why this is an important point to make in the definition of zombie. But while I agree that the A-consciousness state that allows a zombie to say and believe in the hard problem is possible, I do not believe that such a state would ever occur if we assume the zombie is calculating in a casual, logical way. This was the point I was making. Obviously, I agree that the state is possible in principal. I just don't believe the zombie would ever casually arrive in such a state. Now that I think about it, I'm not sure my point is all that different from saying sufficient but not necessary.


The clarification just brings things into sharper focus. It's not surprising that opponents of the hard problem have found more problem with this interpretation of zombies than yours, since your interpretation of zombies (with the necessity of P for A as if P) actually turns out to be closer to their views of strict and complete identity between mind and brain, as I hope I showed successfully above.

Even though I do not believe that a zombie would ever believe in the hard problem, Chalmers point stands because the A consciousness state that allows me to say the hard problem exists can be mimicked in a zombie in principal. But I still struggle a bit with the issue from above about the domain of physics emcompassing all that interacts with the physical. I still feel the most a scientist could ever get is to say "the belief in the hard problem is equivalent to the differences in these two A consciousness states." To then conclude that a belief in the hard problem is equivalent to P-Consciousness itself doesn't seem like very good logic.

[confutatis]

You are misreading Chalmers. Descartes was an interactionist substance dualist, and Chalmers is committed neither to interactionism nor a 'mind substance.' Chalmers leaves the door open for epiphenomenalsim, and actually prefers monism over dualism.

I agree I may have oversimplified things a bit. The point I was trying to make is that Chalmers' view is similar to Descartes' in the sense that it raises problems that are unsolvable in principle. Or, as Chalmers calls it, "hard".

Note also that there is no clear distinction between 'dual aspect monism' and 'aspect dualism.' Both pick out the same general concept of different ontological aspects or properties ultimately belonging to the same entity.

I disagree. In the philosophy I'm calling dual-aspect monism language plays an extremely important role. Whatever it is that Chalmers has in mind, I do not see language being given enough emphasis to qualify his view as anything resembling the view I'm talking about.

And in fact, in formulating a tentative theory of consciousness in his paper, Chalmers embraces precisely such an aspect dichotomy rather than one of substance

But, again, he does not refer to language as playing any fundamental role.

Forgive me if I am using 'dual aspect monist' in a different manner from you, but if I am, I would like to know what distinguishes dual aspect monism from aspect dualism.

I'm quite positive you're using 'dual aspect monism' in a different manner, but there really isn't a standard vocabulary to talk about what I have in mind. It's just something I thought I came up with by myself, and later realized a lot of other people came up with very similar ideas.

I think the key difference from aspect dualism is that aspect dualism refers to reality made of some "substance" which takes different "aspects" depending on... depending on what? I'm not sure what in the philosophy gives rise to the dichotomy in perception. Dual-aspect monism, as I'm defining it anyway, makes it clear that the dichotomy is just an illusion caused by our misunderstanding of the nature of our knowledge.

Another key difference, I suppose, is that in dual-aspect monism there is no hard problem. The supposed inability to explain subjective experience in terms of objective knowledge is a misperception - objective knowledge itself is the explanation of subjective experience, because the world is perfectly isomorphic to the mind that observes it. It's just that our language tends to conceal that isomorphism. The reason that happens is because we tend to assign meaning to words, rather than to their relationships with other words. Just like you think the meaning of the word 'red' is this, whereas the real meaning of the word 'red' is defined by its relationship with all other words in the language.

you may find yourself siding with one of the first two categories, thus accounting for your rejection of the possibility of zombies (although it should be pointed out that rejecting the possibility of zombies does not entail rejecting the hard problem).

Actually, I reject the conceivability of zombies, and that does entail rejecting the hard problem, as I'm sure you'd agree (with the entailment, not the rejection)

[hypnagogue]

Fliption--

It's a difficult and subtle point, but I believe it stands. I think I can state it a little more clearly now, and it may be helpful to do so even thoough you seemed to have relaxed your conceptual requirement for the necessity of P for A as if P.

Our problem from earlier in this thread arises from the tension between the set of statements

1. P is necessary for A as if P
2. P is non-physical
3. all A is physical
4. all physical entities/states can be described entirely by the laws of physics

(By "physical" I mean extrinsic/relational/dispositional properties only.)

From premises 1-3, we conclude that a non-physical entity is necessary for the existence of certain physical entities. But this contradicts premise 4, which says essentially that no physical entity requires a non-physical cause. So either we must abandon premise 4, or we must abandon one of 1, 2, or 3.

To abandon premise 4, we would have to show that, for instance, my disposition to say things such as "The sky looks so blue today" is inexplicable, in principle, by physics. But this seems like an impossible task. Science can straightforwardly tell a causal story about light wavelengths striking my retina, being transduced into neural signals, and causing a cascade of neural events in my brain terminating in a set of motoric signals that move my mouth/tongue/throat/etc such that I utter "The sky looks so blue today." So abandoning premise 4 is off limits, and we must abandon one of the other premises.

Premise 3 is safe, since A-consciousness is defined in such a way that it is a purely physical phenomenon. That leaves 1 and 2. If we refuse to reject 1 (as you seemed reluctant to do previously), then we must reject premise 2. But rejecting 2 essentially makes us materialists and leaves us with all the familiar problems, so it becomes clear that we should reject premise 1.

But while I agree that the A-consciousness state that allows a zombie to say and believe in the hard problem is possible, I do not believe that such a state would ever occur if we assume the zombie is calculating in a casual, logical way. This was the point I was making. Obviously, I agree that the state is possible in principal. I just don't believe the zombie would ever casually arrive in such a state. Now that I think about it, I'm not sure my point is all that different from saying sufficient but not necessary.

Possibility in principle is all that is needed, since the possibility in principle for A as if P but not P implies that P is not necessary for A as if P.

There are a number of ways we could imagine this possibility in principle to be realized. If P is epiphenomenal and plays no causal role, then we can easily imagine a world with identical physical laws to our own which followed a course of history identical to our own. In this world, you and I are having the same discussion as we are in our own world, but we in fact do not have P. This is possible since all the causal agents in our world are duplicated in this particular zombie world, leading to the same events.

On the other hand, if P does play some causal role, then perhaps we can imagine a world with a surrogate causal agent for P, such that it replicates P's causal role without having P's phenomenal properties.

But I still struggle a bit with the issue from above about the domain of physics emcompassing all that interacts with the physical. I still feel the most a scientist could ever get is to say "the belief in the hard is equivalent to the differences in these two A consciousness states." To then conclude that a belief in P-Consciousness is equivalent to P-Consciousness itself doesn't seem like very good logic.

We indeed do not have to conclude that P is physical based on what you have presented here. But in order to do this, we must suppose that P is not necessary for A as if P, as discussed above.

[Fliption]

Fliption--
On the other hand, if P does play some causal role, then perhaps we can imagine a world with a surrogate causal agent for P, such that it replicates P's causal role without having P's phenomenal properties.


I do understand what you're saying but I still found myself cringing every once in a while until I read this one paragraph above. It has put what you're saying into perspective and I now think I fully understand your point and agree with what you're saying. I do personally believe beyond doubt that there is a casual relationship here so I continued to struggle but this point about a surrogate helped me to see exactly where you're coming from.

I think that while I agree that in principal a zombie can believe in the hard problem whether P consciousness is casual or not, I still think the possibility of these events happening in practice are not likely which is why we will probably continue to be tempted to call people like Mentat a zombie. :smile:

Thanks for the clarification.

[hypnagogue]

I agree I may have oversimplified things a bit. The point I was trying to make is that Chalmers' view is similar to Descartes' in the sense that it raises problems that are unsolvable in principle. Or, as Chalmers calls it, "hard".

Chalmers does not hold that the hard problem is unsolvable even in principle (although some philosphers do, such as Colin McGinn with his concept of cognitive closure). If Chalmers thinks the hard problem is literally unsolvable, I imagine he wouldn't bother trying to solve it.

Besides, materialist viewpoints seem to raise problems that are just as hard. If my visual percepts literally are just an illusion, how could they possibly have the illusory characteristics that they have in virtue of a purely materialist ontology?

I think the key difference from aspect dualism is that aspect dualism refers to reality made of some "substance" which takes different "aspects" depending on... depending on what?

In Chalmers' interpretation, the dual aspects arise as a result of the difference between intrinsic properties and extrinsic properties. As he puts it:

This view holds the promise of integrating phenomenal and physical properties very tightly in the natural world. Here, nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a spacetime manifold. Physics as we know it emerges from the relations between these entities, whereas consciousness as we know it emerges from their intrinsic nature.

Another key difference, I suppose, is that in dual-aspect monism there is no hard problem. The supposed inability to explain subjective experience in terms of objective knowledge is a misperception - objective knowledge itself is the explanation of subjective experience, because the world is perfectly isomorphic to the mind that observes it. It's just that our language tends to conceal that isomorphism.

Thus far I don't see how your position is any different from Dennett's materialist eliminativism.

The reason that happens is because we tend to assign meaning to words, rather than to their relationships with other words. Just like you think the meaning of the word 'red' is this, whereas the real meaning of the word 'red' is defined by its relationship with all other words in the language.

To this I say, nonsense. Suppose I devise my own new language. My language has only one word, "unga." "Unga" refers precisely to my visual experience as of this. There are no other words to which unga may refer, and yet it has a clear referent.

Besides, if all words are defined by their relationship to other words, then it is impossible for a word to refer to reality (except that part of reality corresponding to these words). If this is the case, then words should have syntax but no semantics. I should be able to study the syntax of a Chinese dictionary and some Chinese texts and eventually come to as complete an understanding of Chinese as a citizen of China, without ever speaking to a Chinese speaker or seeing externally grounded diagrams such as 'table --> (picture of a table)'. By the same token, linguists should not have needed the rosetta stone to decode heiroglyphics. But obviously this cannot be the case; words acquire meaning in virtue of their relationship to the world. They must be grounded in something external to the linguistic system itself. In the case of "red" (as well as "unga"), the word is grounded in (refers to) my visual experience of this color.

Actually, I reject the conceivability of zombies, and that does entail rejecting the hard problem, as I'm sure you'd agree (with the entailment, not the rejection)

It depends on the type of zombies you're talking about. Arguably one could reject the conceivability of Chalmers' zombies without rejecting the conceivability of Block's Chinese Gym zombie.

[confutatis]

Chalmers does not hold that the hard problem is unsolvable even in principle (although some philosphers do, such as Colin McGinn with his concept of cognitive closure).

He does hold that the hard problem is unsolvable within a materialistic context.

Besides, materialist viewpoints seem to raise problems that are just as hard.

I don't want to argue this point because I would seem to be arguing for materialism, which I'm not. I just want to point out that materialism does not, in principle, pose any unsolvable problem. To find unsolvable problems you have to transcend the materialist perspective.

Thus far I don't see how your position is any different from Dennett's materialist eliminativism.

It is different on a very fundamental point: from my perspective, "matter causes mind" is just as true as "mind causes matter". You seem to be overlooking the importance of the second assertion.

To this I say, nonsense. Suppose I devise my own new language. My language has only one word, "unga." "Unga" refers precisely to my visual experience as of this. There are no other words to which unga may refer, and yet it has a clear referent.

Your language doesn't allow you to make any true statements about 'unga'. It's not the kind of language I'm talking about.

Besides, if all words are defined by their relationship to other words, then it is impossible for a word to refer to reality

To this I say, nonsense :smile:

It's perfectly possible for words to refer to reality based on their relationships to other words alone, as long as those relationships reflect asymmetries in reality. When reality exhibits symmetries, words cannot refer to it, which is why we have all those inverted spectrum scenarios. For instance, all you know about 'right' is that it is 'not left', but you have no way to know if my right is the same as your right; for all you know, it could be your left. But it doesn't stop there, it goes into higher levels. For instance, all you know about 'top and bottom' is that it is 'neither right nor left', but again you have no way to know if what I experience as 'top and bottom' is what you experience as 'right and left'.

If you take that to the highest level possible, of the language as a whole, then you clearly see that language is far less connected to reality than you currently dream of. I have a very simple argument for this: if language really reflected reality, then all semantically correct statements would correspond to facts about reality. As you surely know, that is far from being the case.

If this is the case, then words should have syntax but no semantics. I should be able to study the syntax of a Chinese dictionary and some Chinese texts and eventually come to as complete an understanding of Chinese as a citizen of China

Dictionaries do not define a language; they don't expose enough word relationships. In order to learn Chinese, you need to be exposed to an awful lot of it, certainly far more than just a dictionary. But it is not true that you can't learn Chinese by studying the language alone. How do you suppose those geniuses at the army crack enemy codes?

[hypnagogue]

I don't want to argue this point because I would seem to be arguing for materialism, which I'm not. I just want to point out that materialism does not, in principle, pose any unsolvable problem. To find unsolvable problems you have to transcend the materialist perspective.

I would agree, in a way. Materialism, when applied to its own domain, poses no unsolvable problems. But P-consciousness does not appear to be in the domain of materialism, and it appears as if materialism is not suited to solving the problem of P-consciousness. Even if we choose to label P-consciousness an illusion, it is still paradoxical how it could even have the illusory properties that it does if materialism is true.

It is different on a very fundamental point: from my perspective, "matter causes mind" is just as true as "mind causes matter". You seem to be overlooking the importance of the second assertion.

I don't think you've gone into enough detail on this point.

Your language doesn't allow you to make any true statements about 'unga'. It's not the kind of language I'm talking about.

What if 'unga' means 'I see this color' (or if you prefer, 'there is this color')? Then clearly it can have a truth value, despite it being the only word in my language.

Here is what you said initially:

The reason that happens is because we tend to assign meaning to words, rather than to their relationships with other words. Just like you think the meaning of the word 'red' is this, whereas the real meaning of the word 'red' is defined by its relationship with all other words in the language.

What of a child who learns his first word? His father points to his mother and says "momma," and eventually the child learns to refer to his mother as "momma" himself. The child knows no other words, so there are no other words for his "momma" to achieve meaning from, and yet clearly the word "momma" now has meaning for the child. How can this be if the meaning of the word "momma" is strictly contingent upon other words?

Another scenario: before a hypothesized experimental result is determined empirically, what determines the truth value of the hypothesis? Does it not yet have a truth value? When does it attain a truth value, when the experimenters observe that it has been verified (or falsified), or when the experimenters think internally/speak/write about the empirical results?

If you take that to the highest level possible, of the language as a whole, then you clearly see that language is far less connected to reality than you currently dream of.

I'm not necessarily making claims about the connections between language and reality. What I am making claims about is the connection between language and perceptual experience.

Suppose there is a 5 year old child, A, who has seen and can percpetually distinguish between cats and dogs, but suppose that his limited vocabulary only allows him to make the crudest of linguistic distinctions regarding what makes a dog a dog, such that these distinctions alone are not sufficient to tell dogs and cats apart. To this end we might imagine that A would say "a dog is a furry animal with 4 legs and a tail, a snout, two eyes, a nose," etc.-- a description that agrees perfectly with any description of a cat. So A can perceptually discriminate between cats and dogs, even if he cannot say precisely what it is about dogs that makes them different from cats.

Now suppose that there is another child, B, with the same vocabulary set as A, except for words referring to furry, four legged animals (although he knows what furry, four, legged, and animal mean). Not only does B have no words for furry, four legged animals, he has never seen one. Suppose that B learns what dogs and cats are only in virtue of reading a simple, linguistic description of what they are-- perhaps A has written him a letter telling him about dogs, which matches precisely the description of cats in a children's book (with no pictures). What will B label a cat if one is presented to him? He may call it either a dog or a cat, since it is a furry, four legged animal, or he may claim that he doesn't know which one it is. Why can A distinguish between the two whereas B cannot, if they are working with the same linguistic tools? Because A's linguistic notions of cat and dog are associated with his past perceptual experiences of cats and dogs, whereas B has no such perceptual experience of cats or dogs to ground the semantics of these terms.

Dictionaries do not define a language; they don't expose enough word relationships. In order to learn Chinese, you need to be exposed to an awful lot of it, certainly far more than just a dictionary. But it is not true that you can't learn Chinese by studying the language alone. How do you suppose those geniuses at the army crack enemy codes?

They crack them by finding systematic relationships between the code and a natural language. But such schemes are made much easier due to the fact that symbols in a code stand for letters in an alphabet. Chinese has no alphabet, it has distinct symbols for each concept.

Even putting that objection aside-- to borrow from your example, how would the interpreter, going only by syntax, differentiate between the words for 'left' and 'right'? Even if he manages to narrow things down enough such that he knows one word must mean 'left' and the other 'right,' how is he to differentiate between these without ultimately making some inference grounded in facts about the external world? For instance, if he finds that one word refers to the dominant hand of most people in China, he may conclude that this word means 'right,' but this inference is draw via reference to an externally existing fact about Chinese people; or he may find that one word means 'left' by roundabout reference to the direction in which the sun sets, but this again relies on an empirical fact. (e.g., if the text of some human-like alien civilization fell to earth tomorrow, we would not know which of their hands tends to be dominant, nor would we know in which direction their sun sets, and so we could not make sense of any of these.)

[confutatis]

What if 'unga' means 'I see this color' (or if you prefer, 'there is this color')? Then clearly it can have a truth value, despite it being the only word in my language.

If your language only had that one word, could you think about other things? For instance, could you think about not-unga? And if you can think about non-unga, can you invent a word for it? If you can come up with a new word, that means you already have the concept in your mind. When I'm referring to language here, I'm referring to the totality of concepts you have in your mind, not the totality of arbitrary symbols which may or may not exist as expressions of those concepts.

What of a child who learns his first word? His father points to his mother and says "momma," and eventually the child learns to refer to his mother as "momma" himself.

The child may only know one word, but his/her head must already be full of concepts before the first word is learned. It's one thing to know that 'momma' is the sound that goes together with a particular concept; it's another thing to become aware of the concept in the first place. I'm talking about the latter, not the former.

Let me use a notation to make things easier: I will append a '+' sign whenever I'm talking about a concept a word refers to, and '-' when I'm talking about the word itself (eg: mother-, mère-, madre-, mutter-, are different words in different languages for the concept mother+)

The child knows no other words, so there are no other words for his "momma" to achieve meaning from, and yet clearly the word "momma" now has meaning for the child. How can this be if the meaning of the word "momma" is strictly contingent upon other words?

The meaning of momma- is momma+. The meaning of momma+ is contingent upon concepts such as object+, room+, person+, face+, eyes+, and so on. Even though it may take years for the child to learn the words object-, room-, person-, face-, eyes-, those concepts must be in place from a very early age.

Another scenario: before a hypothesized experimental result is determined empirically, what determines the truth value of the hypothesis?

Semantics.

When does it attain a truth value, when the experimenters observe that it has been verified (or falsified), or when the experimenters think internally/speak/write about the empirical results?

That depends. The experimenter learns something by observing the experiment, and that knowledge becomes true to him as concepts (eg: this+ causes+ that+). But concepts as such cannot be communicated, so the experimenter must choose some words in his vocabulary, and create a relationship between the words that mirror the relationship between the concepts in his mind. And here is where semantics shows up its ugly head: how can the experimenter choose words that perfectly recreate the concept "this+ causes+ that+" in the mind of everyone else?

I'm not necessarily making claims about the connections between language and reality. What I am making claims about is the connection between language and perceptual experience.

The connection may be clear for the speaker, but for the listener/reader it must be reconstructed. It's one thing to explain what momma- means by pointing your fingers at momma+. It's quite another thing to explain what "consciousness- is- an- epiphenomenon- of- the- brain-"; it's really difficult for anyone to figure out what concepts a person has in mind when uttering that sentence. However, no one is born a speaker, which means our knowledge of what words mean is always imperfect. Which means not everything we learn from other people is true, in the sense that it would be true if we had learned it from personal experience.

Suppose there is a 5 year old child, A, who has seen and can percpetually distinguish between cats and dogs, but suppose that his limited vocabulary only allows him to make the crudest of linguistic distinctions regarding what makes a dog a dog...

To cut a long story short, learning about cats+ and dogs+ is not the same thing as learning about cats- and dogs-. If you know nothing about cats- you can still think about cats+. If you know about cats- but do not know about cats+, then you may be tempted to think cats- is just another word for something you already know (such as dogs+). You may, in fact, enter into a long philosophical discussion as to whether dogs- really exist as every dog- can be shown to be a cat+ (which is of course nonsense if you know that dogs+ are not cats+)

They crack them by finding systematic relationships between the code and a natural language. But such schemes are made much easier due to the fact that symbols in a code stand for letters in an alphabet.

I'm sorry but you're wrong on this. Those forms of encryption (letter substitution) are no longer used since, as you said, they are so easy to crack. What makes cracking codes possible is that people usually know what a coded message probably means - there aren't many things one can talk about during war. But this is a side issue anyway.

Even putting that objection aside-- to borrow from your example, how would the interpreter, going only by syntax, differentiate between the words for 'left' and 'right'? Even if he manages to narrow things down enough such that he knows one word must mean 'left' and the other 'right,' how is he to differentiate between these without ultimately making some inference grounded in facts about the external world? For instance, if he finds that one word refers to the dominant hand of most people in China, he may conclude that this word means 'right,' but this inference is draw via reference to an externally existing fact about Chinese people; or he may find that one word means 'left' by roundabout reference to the direction in which the sun sets, but this again relies on an empirical fact. (e.g., if the text of some human-like alien civilization fell to earth tomorrow, we would not know which of their hands tends to be dominant, nor would we know in which direction their sun sets, and so we could not make sense of any of these.)

Even though my example was trying to address something different, I will comment on that as it touches on the same issue. The issue is what I referred to as symmetries. There is a symmetry between 'left' and 'right' that prevents you from knowing what other people mean by it, except that if something is on the right then it can't be on the left. That's all you know about left and right; for all you know your left+ might be my right+ and we'd still agree that most people prefer to use their right- hand. So the meaning of right- is not right+, it's something else close to "not left-". But of course there's more, because there are things that are neither right- nor left-. Even so, things that are neither right- nor left- tell you very little about what right+ and left+ could possibly be.

In the end, we can only discover what right- and left- mean to the extent that we can perceive assymetries. And this has two very important consequences:

- the entirety of our perceptions cannot possibly exhibit any kind of assymetry
- as such, any description of our perceptions that implies assymetry (eg: mind vs. body) is an artificial construct
- since descriptions are made of abstract symbols, the dichotomy between the description of our perceptions and the perceptions themselves must have been introduced by the symbols, not by our perceptions themselves

I'm not sure exactly how language, as expressed by symbols, creates this false dichotomy, but I'm sure that it does. The reason I'm so sure is because there is no dichotomy between any aspect of my perceptions and the entirety of them; in other words, I never experience anything that I believe I should not be experiencing. Clearly it is our theories that must be wrong, not our perceptions.

[hypnagogue]

If an infant has a concept of 'mother' before learning to say 'momma,' then surely a dog has a concept of 'master' despite never learning any words at all. Is a dog, then, a linguistic animal despite never speaking or writing?

[confutatis]

If an infant has a concept of 'mother' before learning to say 'momma,' then surely a dog has a concept of 'master' despite never learning any words at all. Is a dog, then, a linguistic animal despite never speaking or writing?

Parrots can speak many words. I guess that makes them linguistic animals then :mad:

[hypnagogue]

Some parrots have shown the ability to use language relatively intelligently.

Anyway, my point is that you seem to refer to much more than is normally referred to by 'language.' Concepts of the kind you refer to can exist without linguistic tokens, and are probably best characterized as perceptual concepts (baby's concept of momma, pre-language, is defined by baby's visual perception/recognition of its mother's face). That was my point at the outset-- perception is not a purely linguistic phenomenon, although you seem to be trying to paint it as such.

[Fliption]

Confutatis

I've been following along here, taking advantage of the dialogue you're having with Hypnagogue to once again try to understand your view. It seems the last 2 or 3 posts have been some of the most comprehensive as far as describing the heart of your view that I've seen. It seems there are some arguments being presented that are crucial to understanding your view. I have read these posts several times trying to make sure I understand them before I post any questions or develop any opinions. I do not have an opinion right now. I need a little more clarification.

It seems to me a crucial thing to understand is what you mean by "symmetry" and "asymmetry". While I know what these words mean, I'm not sure how you're applying them here. We have one example of -left and -right that you say has symmetry which leads to the same problem that we have in inverted spectrum scenarios. Sometimes you used the "symmetry/asymmetry" concept when referring to the relationship between words. And other times you referred to these concepts as something that reality would exhibit. Exactly what is it that has symmetry or does not have symmetry? And what criteria classifies it has having symmetry? I just need a little more clarification/examples on of what you mean by these concepts.

[confutatis]

you seem to refer to much more than is normally referred to by 'language.' Concepts of the kind you refer to can exist without linguistic tokens

That doesn't change the fact that we can assign tokens to those concepts, and apply the same rules as we do for all other concepts. There's nothing particularly different about a concept that currently lacks a word, except the fact that it currently lacks a word.

perception is not a purely linguistic phenomenon, although you seem to be trying to paint it as such.

Perception is a purely linguistic phenomenon as far as our theories go, because our theories are also purely linguistic phenomena. There are far more things than things that we can talk about, but there's nothing we can say about those things, except in the languages of art, myth, folklore, etc.

[confutatis]

It seems to me a crucial thing to understand is what you mean by "symmetry" and "asymmetry".

It certainly is, because ultimately it can be shown that there is a symmetry between "mental" and "physical", and because of that symmetry we have no way to know exactly what is different about them. But let's save that for a future discussion.

While I know what these words mean, I'm not sure how you're applying them here. We have one example of -left and -right that you say has symmetry which leads to the same problem that we have in inverted spectrum scenarios.

I believe the left vs. right problem is also classified as an inverted spectrum scenario, but I'm not sure. In any case, the idea is the same: flip everything, and nothing in our descriptions change.

Sometimes you used the "symmetry/asymmetry" concept when referring to the relationship between words. And other times you referred to these concepts as something that reality would exhibit.

Concepts certainly exhibit symmetry, as in left/right. You can replace every single instance of one word with the other, and your knowledge still remains intact. You can't do that with 'left' and 'top', for instance, so left and top are asymmetrical. Still, taken together, left and right are symmetrical with top and bottom.

As to whether reality exhibits symmetries, the answer is a bit more complex. The existence of a certain symmetry between concepts implies that we have no way to know which aspects of reality the concepts refer to. For instance, if the words 'red' and 'green' are really symmetrical as some people think, then all you can know about reality is the relationship between 'red' and 'green', not what they really are. You can't know if 'red' means this or this.

This is where things start to get interesting, because things that appear different to different observers are not considered real; we usually call them 'illusions'. For instance, if there is no objective way to assert if grass looks like this or like this, then it necessarily follows that grass is neither this nor this, and our perception of color is an illusion. Still we do perceive something, so what is it that we perceive after all?

Let's not argue that last bit for now. First, we can't be sure that 'red' and 'green' are really symmetrical. Second, we're not yet ready to discuss what 'illusion' mean in the context of the kind of monism I'm talking about.

Exactly what is it that has symmetry or does not have symmetry?

Language definitely has it. Reality exhibits symmetry to the extent that we are ignorant of some of its aspects. For instance, suppose we have two perfectly identical cards placed side by side on a table. We call the card on the left 'card A', the one on the right 'card B'. We leave them on the table, go away to get something, and when we come back we find the wind has blown them away. We can no longer tell which card is which, even though we are sure both are still there. So we say there is a symmetry between card A and card B by virtue of their identical appearance.

what criteria classifies it has having symmetry?

We find symmetries by using thought experiments, such as the one above about two identical cards.

[Fliption]

Unfortunately, I'm still not clear on exactly what it means for things to be symmetric or asymmetric. It sounds as if the criteria for being symmetric has something to do with our ability, or lack thereof, to know. Know what? It sounds as if it means we can't know what aspect of reality a word refers to? Is that close? I'm just not clear. I'll try to be more specific below.




Concepts certainly exhibit symmetry, as in left/right. You can replace every single instance of one word with the other, and your knowledge still remains intact. You can't do that with 'left' and 'top', for instance, so left and top are asymmetrical. Still, taken together, left and right are symmetrical with top and bottom.


Why is 'left' and 'right' symmetric and 'top' and 'left' are not?


This is where things start to get interesting, because things that appear different to different observers are not considered real; we usually call them 'illusions'. For instance, if there is no objective way to assert if grass looks like this or like this, then it necessarily follows that grass is neither this nor this, and our perception of color is an illusion. Still we do perceive something, so what is it that we perceive after all?


People seeing different things is different from the inability to objectively prove that people are seeing the same thing. Inverted spectrum scenarios are a statement about our ability to know whether we are referring to the same thing, with the color red for example. This doesn't mean that we necessarily DO see different things thus making it an illusion. But this may be getting too far ahead. I'm not sure I'm prepared to move this far until I understand symmetry better.


First, we can't be sure that 'red' and 'green' are really symmetrical.

Why can't we be sure? It certainly seems that we have an inverted spectrum scenario with them so why would they not be symmetric? I'm hoping your answer will illuminate more on what it means to be symmetric.


Language definitely has it. Reality exhibits symmetry to the extent that we are ignorant of some of its aspects. For instance, suppose we have two perfectly identical cards placed side by side on a table. We call the card on the left 'card A', the one on the right 'card B'. We leave them on the table, go away to get something, and when we come back we find the wind has blown them away. We can no longer tell which card is which, even though we are sure both are still there. So we say there is a symmetry between card A and card B by virtue of their identical appearance.


Does this symmetry exists if we had not originally labeled them as 'card A' and 'card B'? If not then again it seems symmetry only applies to concepts and not reality.

The reason I'm trying to understand this distinction is because it seems symmetry is applied to both concepts and external objects differently and it makes the definition of symmetry more confusing to me. And I'm hoping to make it as simple as I can. At least at first. There should only be one definition of symmetry that can be applied to both concepts and reality but I'm not sure what that single definition is yet.

[hypnagogue]

That doesn't change the fact that we can assign tokens to those concepts, and apply the same rules as we do for all other concepts. There's nothing particularly different about a concept that currently lacks a word, except the fact that it currently lacks a word.

Perhaps you can find a better word to use than language. The way you are using it, we can easily speak of mice having language, but that doesn't square with the way the word 'language' is used.

Perhaps we might say that a language is some set of concepts existing within an organism's mind/brain that can be expressed externally by a systematic set of abstract symbols. Symbols as such may not be sufficient for language, as in the case of parrots (even if it is arguable that a parrot's 'speech' truly consistitutes a symbol of a concept in the first place), but surely they are necessary. If I never speak or write a word or have internal mental chatter, but have at least some set of concepts in my mind, then surely I cannot be said to have any linguistic properties.

Perception is a purely linguistic phenomenon as far as our theories go, because our theories are also purely linguistic phenomena. There are far more things than things that we can talk about, but there's nothing we can say about those things, except in the languages of art, myth, folklore, etc.

Depends what you mean by theory. Is my perception of what differentiates this color from this a theory? If so, then all animals with red/green color perception can be said to have such theories. If not, then you cannot say that subjective redness is a merely linguistic phenomenon.

[confutatis]

Unfortunately, I'm still not clear on exactly what it means for things to be symmetric or asymmetric.

Some abstract concepts can be difficult to grasp.

It sounds as if it means we can't know what aspect of reality a word refers to? Is that close?

Sort of. Think of inverted spectrum scenarios: the same word may refer to different experiences, yet that difference never shows up in their usage of the word.

Why is 'left' and 'right' symmetric and 'top' and 'left' are not?

Look at your computer. It is true that there is one pixel on the left side of the screen for every pixel on the right, but it's not true that there's one pixel at the top for each pixel at the left. The image on your computer can be rotated around an imaginary vertical line in the middle of the screen, around an imaginary horizontal line, and around a point in the middle. But there is no form of rotation that can exchange 'top' with 'left' without also exchanging 'bottom' with 'right'. So 'left' is symmetrical with 'right', 'top' is symmetrical with 'bottom', and 'left and right' are symmetrical with 'top and bottom'.

Does this symmetry exists if we had not originally labeled them a 'card A' and 'card B'?

The symmetry exists because you perceive two identical cards as two objects rather than one. What name you give them is immaterial; what matters is that you can give them names, and the names must be arbitrary. There is nothing about one card that makes it different from the other, except the fact that one card is not the other.

If not then again it seems symmetry only applies to concepts and not reality.

It applies to both. Is 'red' a word or a colour? It is both. Same idea.

[confutatis]

Perhaps you can find a better word to use than language. The way you are using it, we can easily speak of mice having language, but that doesn't square with the way the word 'language' is used.

I didn't come up with this idea myself. The first time I saw it I balked at the notion just as you are doing now. It took me a couple of years to understand why 'language' is the right word.

Symbols as such may not be sufficient for language, as in the case of parrots, but surely they are necessary.

Would you say primitive humans had language skills before they invented the first word? If so, how could they have language skills before language existed?

Language encompasses more than symbols; syntax and semantics are far more important and far more relevant than which words we choose to express which concepts. Syntax and semantics reflect aspects of our consciousness as well as of reality; lexicon is of no interest to any metaphysical inquiry and therefore can be completely ignored.

Is my perception of what differentiates this color from this a theory?

If I ask you what differentiates this color from this, then your answer will be a theory.

then you cannot say that subjective redness is a merely linguistic phenomenon.

In your mind, is there something about 'redness' which the word 'redness' leaves out? I'm not talking about what 'redness' means to other people, I'm talking about what it means to you. If the word 'redness' encompasses every aspect of your concept of redness, what exactly is different between the word and the concept? What does the concept of redness bring to your mind that the word 'redness' does not?

[hypnagogue]

Would you say primitive humans had language skills before they invented the first word? If so, how could they have language skills before language existed?

Perhaps they had a latent ability for language, but it doesn't follow that they literally had language. I may have a latent ability for scuba diving, but I am not a scuba diver.

Language encompasses more than symbols; syntax and semantics are far more important and far more relevant than which words we choose to express which concepts. Syntax and semantics reflect aspects of our consciousness as well as of reality; lexicon is of no interest to any metaphysical inquiry and therefore can be completely ignored.

I mostly agree here, but it doesn't make sense to refer to syntax in the absence of tokens to be ordered according to that syntax. If you don't have the tokens, you don't have syntax.

If I ask you what differentiates this color from this, then your answer will be a theory.

I agree that this is trivially the case. However, I maintain that my answer in this instance will be an abstract representation of the process by which I distinguish the colors, not the actual process itself.

In your mind, is there something about 'redness' which the word 'redness' leaves out? I'm not talking about what 'redness' means to other people, I'm talking about what it means to you. If the word 'redness' encompasses every aspect of your concept of redness, what exactly is different between the word and the concept? What does the concept of redness bring to your mind that the word 'redness' does not?

You try to eliminate a distinction between the public and private meanings of the word, but that cannot be done. My word 'redness' refers to everything there is about redness in my subjective space. But not everything in my subjective space can be shared with other subjective spaces. (If it could, an eye doctor would not have to ask me which glasses suited me best-- he would just slip into my mind, literally see through my eyes, and make the determination from there.) So there is necessarily a dichotomy of reference between public and private referents.

Besides this, there is still a distinction between the word and the concept. The word refers to the concept. It is a pointer. Equating the two is like equating my finger with the moon. The moon is not biological, nor is this linguistic.

[hypnagogue]

Sort of. Think of inverted spectrum scenarios: the same word may refer to different experiences, yet that difference never shows up in their usage of the word.

The differences may not show up in the abstract language itself, but they most suredly show up once it is made evident to what these words refer. That is, once they have been solidly grounded in their referents, they can be compared and distinguished.

Assume I use 'right' and 'left' the standard way, and you use them the inverted way. Say you, me, and another 'normal' English speaker are standing in a line playing Simon Says. The instruction comes, "Raise your left hand." I raise what I call my left, my normal partner raises what I call his left, and you raise what I call your right. An analogous situation holds for the command "Raise your right hand." The referents of these words have been exposed and made evident to all, and on this basis I can distinguish my meanings of 'left' and 'right' from yours.

The same would hold for the inverted spectrum scenario, if only I could observe the subjective referents of your words 'red' and 'green.' But whereas I can see you raising your right hand upon the command "Raise your left hand," I cannot see what you imagine upon the command "Imagine the color green."

[Fliption]

Look at your computer. It is true that there is one pixel on the left side of the screen for every pixel on the right, but it's not true that there's one pixel at the top for each pixel at the left. The image on your computer can be rotated around an imaginary vertical line in the middle of the screen, around an imaginary horizontal line, and around a point in the middle. But there is no form of rotation that can exchange 'top' with 'left' without also exchanging 'bottom' with 'right'. So 'left' is symmetrical with 'right', 'top' is symmetrical with 'bottom', and 'left and right' are symmetrical with 'top and bottom'.


Yes I understand this. This is just the traditional usage of the word "symmetry' but what I'm having trouble with is connecting this traditional symmetry property to what I can know about your experiences. Let me see if I can explain what I mean.

Hypnagogue seems to be having a similar issue when he says this:


Assume I use 'right' and 'left' the standard way, and you use them the inverted way. Say you, me, and another 'normal' English speaker are standing in a line playing Simon Says. The instruction comes, "Raise your left hand." I raise what I call my left, my normal partner raises what I call his left, and you raise what I call your right. An analogous situation holds for the command "Raise your right hand." The referents of these words have been exposed and made evident to all, and on this basis I can distinguish my meanings of 'left' and 'right' from yours.


You see how he thinks that we are comparing the words 'right' and 'left' to an actual referent in the outside world? Namely the arms. But in this quote from you it seems different:


For instance, all you know about 'top and bottom' is that it is 'neither right nor left', but again you have no way to know if what I experience as 'top and bottom' is what you experience as 'right and left'.

So here the referrent of the the words 'left' and 'right' isn't the actual external arm. It is the experience of right and left. Used in this way then we do indeed have the same problem that we have with color. So I'm not real clear which method is the correct one: The one Hypnagoue used or this one from you above.

If it's the one from you, then I'm still having a problem with the symmetry concept, as I stated above. If I cannot know that my experience of 'left' is the same as your experience of 'left' and you may actually be experiencing what I would call 'right', then how is it that I know that your experience of 'left' isn't what I would call 'top'? I'm just not understanding how the fact that 2 words are opposites, or symmetrical have anything to do with what I can know about your experiences.

[confutatis]

Perhaps they had a latent ability for language, but it doesn't follow that they literally had language.

This is not the right way to approach the issue. The issue is, we do have language, and to a good extent we do think and perceive the world in ways that can be expressed with language.

it doesn't make sense to refer to syntax in the absence of tokens to be ordered according to that syntax.

But it does make sense to refer to syntax as something which must already be in place before we attempt to order tokens. How would we order tokens if we had no predefined syntax? How would I know that the correct way to express today's date is "today is Wednesday" as opposed to "Wednesday today is"?

If you don't have the tokens, you don't have syntax.

If you don't have syntax, tokens are useless.

I agree that this is trivially the case. However, I maintain that my answer in this instance will be an abstract representation of the process by which I distinguish the colors, not the actual process itself.

Your answer is all I have to go by. Whatever the actual process is that your description of the process leaves out, I'm completely ignorant of it.

My word 'redness' refers to everything there is about redness in my subjective space. But not everything in my subjective space can be shared with other subjective spaces.

This is completely beside the point. You have a concept of 'redness', and you have something the concept refers to. All I said is that, for you, there's no difference between the concept and what the concept refers to. I'm talking about the personal relationship each of us has with language, not the relationships we have with each other through language. I'm not sure you can see the distinction.

Besides this, there is still a distinction between the word and the concept.

Of course there is a distinction, but the important issue is that the distinction has no bearing on what is true and what is false. As far as you are concerned, everything you say is true is perfectly equivalent with what you perceive to be true. If that equivalence is absent, that means you are lying about your perceptions.

Assume I use 'right' and 'left' the standard way, and you use them the inverted way. Say you, me, and another 'normal' English speaker are standing in a line playing Simon Says. The instruction comes, "Raise your left hand." I raise what I call my left, my normal partner raises what I call his left, and you raise what I call your right. An analogous situation holds for the command "Raise your right hand." The referents of these words have been exposed and made evident to all, and on this basis I can distinguish my meanings of 'left' and 'right' from yours.

That implies you have not understood what I was trying to say. Of course if I'm mistaken about what 'left' and 'right' mean, that mistake will eventually become evident. But if I'm born with some strange "disorder" which causes me to see the world as it appears to you when you look at a mirror, then that fact won't become evident in my usage of the words 'left' and 'right'. For instance, when you ask me to raise my right hand, I will raise what I have been taught to be my right hand, only the way I see it my right hand occupies a position in my visual field which, for you, is occupied by your left hand.

This is a classic inverted spectrum scenario and I'm not sure why you're missing my point.

[confutatis]

Hypnagogue seems to be having a similar issue ...

I hope my reply to hypnagogue makes things clear for you.

So here the referrent of the the words 'left' and 'right' isn't the actual external arm. It is the experience of right and left. Used in this way then we do indeed have the same problem that we have with color.

I'm glad you understood it.

So I'm not real clear which method is the correct one: The one Hypnagoue used or this one from you above. If it's the one from you, then I'm still having a problem with the symmetry concept, as I stated above. If I cannot know that my experience of 'left' is the same as your experience of 'left' and you may actually be experiencing what I would call 'right', then how is it that I know that your experience of 'left' isn't what I would call 'top'?

Actually, you don't know. As I said, 'left and right' are symmetrical with 'top and bottom'. Put in another way, 'horizontal' is symmetrical with 'vertical'. This is actually easy to verify: just tilt your head 90 degrees to the left, and your experience of the world immediately changes: what was 'left' is now 'top'. See what I mean?

Now, if after tilting your head you want to argue that 'left' remains 'left', then I urge you to wait, because I happen to think the same. However, asserting that is not easy matter, as it implies some interesting things about inverted spectrum scenarios. Again, please wait until we have cleared out any possible misunderstandings.

I'm just not understanding how the fact that 2 words are opposites, or symmetrical have anything to do with what I can know about your experiences.

That is because most of what you know about other people's experiences you know by means of language. You know that people think stop signs are red because they say so. You know that, except for colourblind people, everyone perceives stop signs as being red. But those inverted spectrum scenarios imply that the reason we agree that stop signs are red may not have much to do with what stop signs really look like to different observers. The source of our agreement may have more to do with language than with the way we experience the world. For instance, the reason we all agree that stop signs are red may be simply because 'red' means 'whatever colour stop signs look to you'. That would throw hypnagogue's concept of redness to the category of 'illusion'.

If you understand that we can agree on the way we describe our perceptions even if we perceive in different ways, then the natural question to ask is, exactly what are the things we agree about the world which are independent of our perception of the world? Which, jumping a little bit ahead, is just another way of saying, how many of the things we think are true happen to be semantical truths rather than facts about reality?

I've been trying to raise those two questions ever since I wrote my first post here. So far no one seems able to understand the need to ask them.

[confutatis]

Perhaps you can find a better word to use than language. The way you are using it, we can easily speak of mice having language, but that doesn't square with the way the word 'language' is used.

It just occurred to me that what I'm referring to as 'language' could also be described as "having perfect isomorphism with language". I'm happy to use that term if you want, even though I can't see why it matters, since everything that is true about language is also true about anything that exhibits perfect isomorphism with it.

On a side note, if mice have subjective experiences, then their subjective experiences can be described with language - or something perfectly isomorphic with language.

[Fliption]

I hope my reply to hypnagogue makes things clear for you.

Yes it does.


Actually, you don't know. As I said, 'left and right' are symmetrical with 'top and bottom'. Put in another way, 'horizontal' is symmetrical with 'vertical'. This is actually easy to verify: just tilt your head 90 degrees to the left, and your experience of the world immediately changes: what was 'left' is now 'top'. See what I mean?

Heh. No, I don't. I mean I understand what your saying but I didn't get the point of it as it relates to this topic.


Again, please wait until we have cleared out any possible misunderstandings.

Ok


That would throw hypnagogue's concept of redness to the category of 'illusion'.


This, I'm not so sure about. It depends on what you mean by illusion. We may need to skip this for now as it seems to be a consequence of the view and not part of understanding the view itself. And I'm still trying to understand.


If you understand that we can agree on the way we describe our perceptions even if we perceive in different ways, then the natural question to ask is, exactly what are the things we agree about the world which are independent of our perception of the world? Which, jumping a little bit ahead, is just another way of saying, how many of the things we think are true happen to be semantical truths rather than facts about reality?


Well, there is no concept that I can experience that I can be sure I have communicated to you in such a way that it draws the exact same concept into your mind. There is no word that does not have this problem. We can get over this dilemma to the extent that a word directly refers to an external object. The truth of any statement about such an object should also be able to be verified externally. For example, a house is a concept that I can use and then point to a house. I can then say "A house exists here". Now I cannot say that my experience of looking at a house is the same as you're experience of looking at a house. But this doesn't affect the truth value of the statement "A house exists here".

It seems that we only get into trouble when we deal with words that are descriptors of experience. I'm not even sure that the color 'red' qualifies here. I can say that "the trafficlight is red" and you can agree that it is red. The truth value here is that we have agreed that the trafficlight is emitting at a very specific wavelength. We both use the word red and we have successfully communicated the wavelength of the light. The process by which we do this may be very different and we can never know how we actually perceive red. But why does this impact knowledge about the wavelength of light?

Now if you say "I love my dog". Then I have no idea how you really feel about your dog. That's because love is a descriptor of experience that doesn't directly relate to anything externally.

Notice that I haven't mentioned the word symmetry or asymmetry anywhere. As I said above, all words may conjure up different concepts in our minds. Every single one of them. I cannot understand how words being asymmetric changes this fact. Unless, I'm just not understanding how the concept of symmetry is being used in this view. Which, I obviously don't.

[hypnagogue]

That is because most of what you know about other people's experiences you know by means of language. You know that people think stop signs are red because they say so. You know that, except for colourblind people, everyone perceives stop signs as being red. But those inverted spectrum scenarios imply that the reason we agree that stop signs are red may not have much to do with what stop signs really look like to different observers. The source of our agreement may have more to do with language than with the way we experience the world. For instance, the reason we all agree that stop signs are red may be simply because 'red' means 'whatever colour stop signs look to you'. That would throw hypnagogue's concept of redness to the category of 'illusion'.

If you understand that we can agree on the way we describe our perceptions even if we perceive in different ways, then the natural question to ask is, exactly what are the things we agree about the world which are independent of our perception of the world? Which, jumping a little bit ahead, is just another way of saying, how many of the things we think are true happen to be semantical truths rather than facts about reality?

I agree that red, in public usage, loosely means "whatever color stop signs look to you." This does not deflate my personal usage of the term. They can coexist. Intersubjectively, red means "whatever color an observer associates with light of wavelength 600nm." Subjectively, red means "the specific color that a specific observer associates with light of wavelength 600nm." Colors observed as a result of 600nm light striking the retina may vary from individual to individual, but they can nonetheless be categorized under the same category since they are produced on the same basis.

Say the objective world can be arbitrarily labeled according to numbers, and subjective experience can be arbitrarily labeled according to letters. The role of the brain is essentially to provide a mapping between the two sets. So say we let the number 600 = 600nm light, r = this color, and g = this color, and we have two observers whose brains interpret stimuli according to f(x) and h(x) respectively. Then it may be the case that f(x) = r and h(x) = g if and only if x = 600 for both cases. So there is a systematic difference between f and g, but also a systematic similarity. For f, the word 'red' = r and for h the word 'red' = g. But a fundamental property of these systems is that f cannot directly compare his red to h's red, and vice versa. As a result, when they converse about redness they are essentially conversing about that component of redness that can be shared amongst them in public discourse, and that is precisely the objective input element, 600. Essentially, they systematically agree about redness because given that f = r and h = g, it must follow (discounting hallucinations) that x = 600 in both cases, and since x is the only piece of information about redness that they can publically share, it seems that their concepts of redness pick out the same thing when in fact they do not on a different level of analysis.

[Fliption]

Subjectively, red means "the specific color that a specific observer associates with light of wavelength 600nm."

This is what I was getting to in my post above. It's similar to 2 computers being given the exact same inputs and then calculating a problem. They may order and perform the calculation in different ways but they will come to the same conclusion. In this case, the problem has been solved and there is no need to question whether we really know the answer simply because they performed the calculation differently.

[confutatis]

Well, there is no concept that I can experience that I can be sure I have communicated to you in such a way that it draws the exact same concept into your mind. There is no word that does not have this problem.

I think we're digressing from the original issue, which is that many true statements about the world are true by virtue of something other than observations of the world. For instance, I don't have to make any observation of the world to assert that "two plus two equals four".

Once you understand that, you realize that many things you think are true about the world may not be statements about the world at all. That is the issue I'd like to talk about.

For example, a house is a concept that I can use and then point to a house. I can then say "A house exists here". Now I cannot say that my experience of looking at a house is the same as you're experience of looking at a house. But this doesn't affect the truth value of the statement "A house exists here".

That's all fine with me, but beside the point.

I can say that "the trafficlight is red" and you can agree that it is red. The truth value here is that we have agreed that the trafficlight is emitting at a very specific wavelength.

People agreed on the meaning of 'red' long before they knew light was electromagnetic radiation. "600-nanometer" adds nothing to your understanding of what 'red' means that 'the color of stop signs' doesn't. It's just another way of stating what you already know.

The process by which we do this may be very different and we can never know how we actually perceive red. But why does this impact knowledge about the wavelength of light?

It doesn't. Knowledge about the wavelength of light belongs in the category of things that are true by virtue of something other than observations of the world. That is why even a blind man can know it.

Notice that I haven't mentioned the word symmetry or asymmetry anywhere. As I said above, all words may conjure up different concepts in our minds. Every single one of them. I cannot understand how words being asymmetric changes this fact.

Asymmetry does not make a concept easier to communicate, it only makes the concept more meaningful. Statements about asymmetrical concepts convey more information than statements about symmetrical ones. A statement such as "left is the opposite of right" tell you very little about what 'left' and 'right' really are.

Think of 'matter' and 'space', for instance. What is matter but simply the absence of space, and space the absence of matter? It seems correct to say "the universe is made of matter", but taken by itself the statement really says nothing about the universe. You could as well say "the universe is made of space". Unless you can tell something about 'matter' that makes it asymmetrical with space, the difference between the two statements can't be decided. And in fact there is asymmetry between matter and space: we observe more space than matter. That is one of the things that allow you to understand what people say by 'matter', and why it is different from 'space'. Assuming, of course, there is no symmetry between 'more' and 'less', in which case you are back to the original problem.

Ultimately, the point of this whole exercise is to realize that 'mental' and 'physical' are perfectly symmetrical. There is nothing you can say about 'mental' that makes it clear that 'mental' is anything but the opposite of 'physical', and vice-versa. And that makes materialism, the notion that "physical precedes mental", just a meaningless exercise in rhetoric. The opposite, "mental precedes physical", could be just as valid. Materialism is a powerful notion because people tend to think it's possible for the physical to exist without the mental, therefore breaking the symmetry. But that is a misperception.

[confutatis]

I agree that red, in public usage, loosely means "whatever color stop signs look to you." This does not deflate my personal usage of the term. They can coexist.

Actually, there's more to 'red' than just a particular color. The important thing about 'red' is that it is a color like no other; it's not 'green', 'blue', 'yellow', and so on. Even for you, I believe what red looks like is far less important than its uniqueness.

Say the objective world can be arbitrarily labeled according to numbers, and subjective experience can be arbitrarily labeled according to letters. The role of the brain is essentially to provide a mapping between the two sets.

How does the brain know the difference between the objective world and subjective experience????

The objective world is just a theoretical construct. Insofar as it is supposed to be different from our observations, it can't be observed; insofar as it is supposed to be the same, the distinction is meaningless.

This is a tricky issue. The answer to "how does the world look like when nobody is looking?" has only been approached in the recent past, in the field known as Quantum Mechanics, and so far all that physicists know about objective reality is that they don't know what it is. One thing is certain though: it's not what we think it is.

[hypnagogue]

Actually, there's more to 'red' than just a particular color. The important thing about 'red' is that it is a color like no other; it's not 'green', 'blue', 'yellow', and so on. Even for you, I believe what red looks like is far less important than its uniqueness.

I agree, though this does not allow us to avoid the problem of redness in itself.

How does the brain know the difference between the objective world and subjective experience????

The objective world is just a theoretical construct. Insofar as it is supposed to be different from our observations, it can't be observed; insofar as it is supposed to be the same, the distinction is meaningless.

This is a tricky issue. The answer to "how does the world look like when nobody is looking?" has only been approached in the recent past, in the field known as Quantum Mechanics, and so far all that physicists know about objective reality is that they don't know what it is. One thing is certain though: it's not what we think it is.

You're ducking the issue. Yes, the notion of objectivity is a tricky one. Nonetheless, we can coherently refer to 600nm light. 600nm light can be dissociated from subjective redness to the extent that, eg, a physical measuring device will read off '600nm' whenever we perceive redness, but will not literally appear to be red. There is thus some sort of underlying, functional, measurable entity behind both my perception of redness and a measuring device's detection of 600nm light, which is not equivalent to phemonenal redness. To the extent that this entity can reveal itself in a variety of forms distinct from phenomenal redness, it can be dissociated from phenomenal redness.

[confutatis]

I agree, though this does not allow us to avoid the problem of redness in itself.

I don't think there is a problem of redness as such. First because it's impossible, even in principle, for me to know what your experience of red is besides what you can tell me. Even if I could get inside your brain it would still be my experience, not yours. So it is a fact of life that there's nothing to your experience of red that I can know about, other than what we can communicate. But second, and even more important, is that however it is that you experience red, it has no bearing on anything I know. If God tells me, "hypnagogue experiences green objects the same way you experience red ones", I would turn to God and ask, "so what?".

You're ducking the issue.

I'm not.

Yes, the notion of objectivity is a tricky one. Nonetheless, we can coherently refer to 600nm light. 600nm light can be dissociated from subjective redness to the extent that, eg, a physical measuring device will read off '600nm' whenever we perceive redness...

The point I was trying to get is that when you remove subjective experience from the world, all you're left with is a linguistic description of abstract entities. Without experience, instead of light with a certain color and certain brightness, all you're left with are abstract notions. Ironically, what you call "objective reality" is completely abstract and therefore not "real". You don't seem to be taking this important issue into account.

So when you say the brain's job is to match subjective experience to objective reality, what you are really saying is that the brain must match experience to abstract notions that the brain itself comes up with. Hardly the idea of objective knowledge people usually have in mind - there's nothing objective about objective knowledge!

[hypnagogue]

I don't think there is a problem of redness as such. First because it's impossible, even in principle, for me to know what your experience of red is besides what you can tell me. Even if I could get inside your brain it would still be my experience, not yours.

That's like saying "I can't know what your computer is like, because if I used it then it would be my computer." It would be 'your experience' in some technical sense, but that only confuses the issue. The point is, if you could really get inside my brain as you say, you would see the world the same way I do, even if those experiences in some sense would belong to you. And that's the issue. The only way for you to know if you see the world the same way as I do is to literally see the world the same way as I do, then somehow compare that to the way you are accustomed to seeing it.

But second, and even more important, is that however it is that you experience red, it has no bearing on anything I know. If God tells me, "hypnagogue experiences green objects the same way you experience red ones", I would turn to God and ask, "so what?".

And God would say, "well, now that you know for sure that you two see opposite colors, you can have the visual pathways of your brain analyzed and see what analogous differences exist in the way your brains function. This will give you the beginnings of a theory on how consciousness is systematically tied to the activity in your brain. If you're smart enough and careful enough, this may give you the insight you need to formulate a complete theory of consciousness. A complete theory of consciousness would answer one of the oldest, most troubling philosophical problem to have plagued humans and would have have practical applications for predicting which physical systems have consciousness, and what kind of consciousness these systems have. Aside from undreamed of technological innovations and personal modifications that might follow from this knowledge, an entire host of hotly debated ethical issues would suddenly become tractable. Proper administration of this knowledge would cease unnecessary suffering and unnecessary conflict. And this would only be the beginning."

The point I was trying to get is that when you remove subjective experience from the world, all you're left with is a linguistic description of abstract entities. Without experience, instead of light with a certain color and certain brightness, all you're left with are abstract notions. Ironically, what you call "objective reality" is completely abstract and therefore not "real". You don't seem to be taking this important issue into account.

This is a problem of how we can know objective reality. Regardless of how you choose to characterize it (concrete or abstract), the simple fact remains that there is some entity associated with redness that can be dissociated from phenomenal redness-- some kind of causal agency that underpins both phenomenal redness and other, distinct phenomena, like a measuring device's measurement of 600nm. Systematic agreement about the existence of redness can be attributed to the systematic existence of this causal agency whenever phenomenal redness exists. If two different representations of this causal agency exist such that the representations themselves cannot be compared, then the only basis for comparison is that causal agency itself.

So when you say the brain's job is to match subjective experience to objective reality, what you are really saying is that the brain must match experience to abstract notions that the brain itself comes up with. Hardly the idea of objective knowledge people usually have in mind - there's nothing objective about objective knowledge!

Strictly speaking, you should not be allowed to refer to the brain by your own reasoning. After all, the brain is just an abstract notion that your mind has come with, isn't it?

There is a clear dichotomy we can draw. Public phenomena and private phenomena. The quality of my subjective experience is completely private, but it has a certain structure that can be communicated by various means (speech, body language, etc). The structural/functional aspects can thus be shared publically, and in this sense they are objective. If you prefer, substitute "intersubjective" for "objective," but the point stands. Some things admit themselves to public observation, analysis, and mutual confirmation (structural/functional aspects) and some do not (qualitative aspects).

[Fliption]

I think we're digressing from the original issue, which is that many true statements about the world are true by virtue of something other than observations of the world.


It may appear to be digressing because I didn't connect my points quickly enough but the point I was trying to make is that all words have this problem which doesn't allow me to know what experience you are referring to when you use that word. It isn't a matter of whether or not the word is symmetric or not. I had understood you to make the claim that this situation only existed when there was symmetry. And only when there is asymmetry can we really have any knowledge. So I went into all this to illustrate how "symmetry" doesn't connect to the issue to me at all. However, from the rest of your post I see how this might be considered digressing as I now think I know what you mean when you say symmetry.


People agreed on the meaning of 'red' long before they knew light was electromagnetic radiation. "600-nanometer" adds nothing to your understanding of what 'red' means that 'the color of stop signs' doesn't. It's just another way of stating what you already know.


I was under the impression that you were claiming I couldn't know anything about red because when we all use the word we could be referring to different experiences. I'm simply suggesting that the experience is simply the process by which we identify 600nm. Whether we know it is exactly 600nm is not really relevant to me.


Think of 'matter' and 'space', for instance. What is matter but simply the absence of space, and space the absence of matter?


Ahhhh, so this is what you mean by symmetry! Ok, now this I can understand. To interpret this I'd say that 2 words have symmetry when their definition refers to each other without referring to some other external concept as a distinction. I wouldn't have called this symmetry. This is just what I call circular definitions. And imo, circular definitions are a different issue from inverted spectrum scenarios.



Ultimately, the point of this whole exercise is to realize that 'mental' and 'physical' are perfectly symmetrical. There is nothing you can say about 'mental' that makes it clear that 'mental' is anything but the opposite of 'physical', and vice-versa. And that makes materialism, the notion that "physical precedes mental", just a meaningless exercise in rhetoric. The opposite, "mental precedes physical", could be just as valid. Materialism is a powerful notion because people tend to think it's possible for the physical to exist without the mental, therefore breaking the symmetry. But that is a misperception.

Ok if the claim is that mental and physical are circular definitions, then I can just drop all this inverted spectrum scenario business and this becomes much simpler to discuss.

As info, materialists like Mentat wouldn't agree with what you have written above because they don't see it as "physical precedes mental". To Mentat, mental IS physical. There is no distinction and therefore there is nothing to have symmetry with.

As for my opinion on this, I disgaree that mental and physical are circular definitions. I would say the distinction has to do with whether information is public or not. I see Hynagogue is going in this same direction. This reminds me of that long thread on defining materialism. I spent 20 pages trying to convince people that the distinction between materialism and it's opposing views has to be about the nature/origin of the contents of the mind as it relates to things outside the mind. Or another way of saying subjective/private versus objective/public. To define it the way they were trying to made the term meaningless. So I agree that some of the usage of these terms has been messy and circular but it is because people don't understand the proper philosophical definitions of them.

(As info: They were trying to define 'matter' as "everything that really exists". If this were the real definiton then how could anyone not be a materialists? Why would anyone believe in something that does not really exists? You have to watch these guys. They're sneaky :smile: )

[confutatis]

There is a clear dichotomy we can draw. Public phenomena and private phenomena. The quality of my subjective experience is completely private, but it has a certain structure that can be communicated by various means (speech, body language, etc). The structural/functional aspects can thus be shared publically, and in this sense they are objective.

I won't comment on most of your reply because it is beside the point I'm trying to make, and I'm short of time today. The above though is an interesting point.

You say we can communicate the structural aspects of the world, but you don't make it clear if we can communicate what is not structural. That is exactly the issue I'm trying to discuss. I don't know if there are non-structural aspects of reality that can be communicated; that depends on the existence of at least one fundamental "asymmetry", which makes at least some aspects of the world look unequivocally identical for every observer. I don't know if that asymmetry exists or what it could be; I take it on faith that there are several, but I don't know what they are.

[confutatis]

from the rest of your post I see how this might be considered digressing as I now think I know what you mean when you say symmetry.

Good!

I was under the impression that you were claiming I couldn't know anything about red because when we all use the word we could be referring to different experiences.

I didn't say that; I said there are some things you can't know. But you can still know that stop signs and firetrucks are red. You can also know that red and green are different colors.

Ok, now this I can understand. To interpret this I'd say that 2 words have symmetry when their definition refers to each other without referring to some other external concept as a distinction. I wouldn't have called this symmetry. This is just what I call circular definitions.

Circular definitions are a different issue. Concepts defined in a circular manner do not need to refer to anything real. You can think of symmetry in language as a set of circular definitions that you can successfully map to some aspects of your experience. For instance, 'left' and 'right'. You certainly know that there's more to 'left' than simply 'the opposite of right'.

I disgaree that mental and physical are circular definitions.

They're not circular, they're symmetrical. You know what 'mental' and 'physical' refer to.

I would say the distinction has to do with whether information is public or not.

public = physical, private = mental; makes no difference.

This reminds me of that long thread on defining materialism. I spent 20 pages trying to convince people that the distinction between materialism and it's opposing views has to be about the nature/origin of the contents of the mind as it relates to things outside the mind. Or another way of saying subjective/private versus objective/public. To define it the way they were trying to made the term meaningless.

Actually, any definition of anything is meaningless, as it is just a statement of the same idea in different words.

So I agree that some of the usage of these terms has been messy and circular but it is because people don't understand the proper philosophical definitions of them.

I don't know if proper philosophical definitions of any term exist.

As info: They were trying to define 'matter' as "everything that really exists". If this were the real definiton then how could anyone not be a materialists?

That's exactly the materialist's dilemma: how can anyone not be a materialist? Which, by the way, is just a particular case of a more universal dilemma: how can can anyone disagree with me as to what is true, given that what I know to be true cannot possibly be false?

You have to watch these guys. They're sneaky

I think you can be very naive if you think people manipulate words with some agenda in mind. Some undoubtedly do, like politicians, lawyers, businessmen, but most people tend to be sincere when they express their philosophical views. The reason we hold different, often antagonic worldviews has little to do with intellectual dishonesty.

[hypnagogue]

You say we can communicate the structural aspects of the world, but you don't make it clear if we can communicate what is not structural. That is exactly the issue I'm trying to discuss.

My position is that we can't communicate what is not functional/structural. 'Redness,' insofar as I can converse with you coherently about it, is a purely structural/functional concept-- as characterized by physical laws, its propensity to create certain measurements in certain devices, and so on. (Whenever we say "this light is red," a measuring device will read off "600nm.") Thus red, in this sense, is identical to what scientists call light with a wavelength of 600nm (or thereabouts).

However, we cannot communicate about the subjective aspects of redness-- what it looks like to me vs. what it looks like to you. Red, in this sense, is identical to what philosophers call phenomenal redness. Phenomenal redness is not structural or functional, but rather is an intrinsic property. As a result, it is not expressible in language, and for the same fundamental reasons, a purely physically reductive science must either remain silent on the issue or deny its existence.

We seem to disagree about what 'red,' in general usage, means. Your position seems to identify red with the scientific concept of 'light of 600nm,' or at least characterizes it in the same spirit, insofar as you have claimed that red is a purely linguistic (extrinsic) concept and does not refer to perceptual experiences-- that red is exhaustively characterized by its relationships with other things. I claim that 'red' refers to the phenomenal aspect (which may vary from person to person), which is intrinsic and hence is not exhaustively characterized not by its relationships with other things-- there is something about red above and beyond its extrinsic relationships, some inherent property. On this view, people agree as to what is red on the basis of the common causal chain precipitating their phenomenal experiences. Basically, I am saying that one's language refers directly to one's phenomenal experiences, but that in public usage the only common element among such experiences that is available for comparison (and hence available for discussion) is the underlying structural/functional causal chain leading up to those experiences.

[confutatis]

We seem to disagree about what 'red,' in general usage, means. Your position seems to identify red with the scientific concept of 'light of 600nm,' or at least characterizes it in the same spirit, insofar as you have claimed that red is a purely linguistic (extrinsic) concept and does not refer to perceptual experiences-- that red is exhaustively characterized by its relationships with other things. I claim that 'red' refers to the phenomenal aspect (which may vary from person to person), which is intrinsic and hence is not exhaustively characterized not by its relationships with other things-- there is something about red above and beyond its extrinsic relationships, some inherent property.

I don't dispute there's some inherent property to the things you perceive as red, I just disagree that that's what the word 'red' refers to. There's a subtle issue here which I think you're failing to contemplate.

Suppose you experience a certain color in your dreams. It's a color like no other, so you can't describe what it is. You can't tell someone that the color in your dreams is like this or that object. But you can still talk about it! You can give the dream-color a name, say, unga, and tell me that in your dreams some people have unga eyes, that the sky looks unga when it's about to snow, that nothing is sexier than a woman wearing an unga dress, and so on. The more you talk about unga to me, the more meaning I will ascribe to the word, despite the fact that I have no experience of it whatsoever.

The subtle issue I think you are missing is this: for you unga means the color you experience in your dreams, but to me it's only a language token whose meaning is defined by its association with other tokens. You think the color you experience is equivalent to the meaning of the word, but the fact that I know the meaning without knowing the experience implies they can't possibly the same thing. The reason you think they are the same is simply because you have given the same linguistic token for two different things. You learn facts about 'red', and you have this subjective experience you choose to call "red", but 'red' has as much to do with "red" as 'spirit' (as in 'vodka is a spirit') has to do with 'spirit' (as in 'the spirit of the times').

The fact alone that you must refer to "my subjective experience of red" as something different from "the color of stop signs" betrays the fact that you think of them as being different things. It's just that the fact that you call "my subjective experience of red" 'red', and "the color of stop signs" also 'red' confuses you.

On this view, people agree as to what is red on the basis of the common causal chain precipitating their phenomenal experiences. Basically, I am saying that one's language refers directly to one's phenomenal experiences, but that in public usage the only common element among such experiences that is available for comparison (and hence available for discussion) is the underlying structural/functional causal chain leading up to those experiences.

A better way to say it is that there are two languages, one spoken by you and you only, and the other spoken by everyone, including yourself. To some extent they intersect, but for the most part they don't. Just look at this forum!

[hypnagogue]

The subtle issue I think you are missing is this: for you unga means the color you experience in your dreams, but to me it's only a language token whose meaning is defined by its association with other tokens. You think the color you experience is equivalent to the meaning of the word, but the fact that I know the meaning without knowing the experience implies they can't possibly the same thing. The reason you think they are the same is simply because you have given the same linguistic token for two different things.

You don't know the entire meaning. You don't know all there is to know about unga. I know something about unga that you don't; namely, what it looks like. Your understanding of unga is a subset of all there is to understand about the entire concept; specifically, you only know the functional aspects associated with unga, and not the intrinsic aspect.

The fact alone that you must refer to "my subjective experience of red" as something different from "the color of stop signs" betrays the fact that you think of them as being different things. It's just that the fact that you call "my subjective experience of red" 'red', and "the color of stop signs" also 'red' confuses you.

I think of them as separate things, yes. I already pointed this out, but perhaps not clearly enough: 'red' as in 'the color of stop signs' is a public usage meaning something like science's 'light with wavelength 600nm.' Strictly speaking, this is not a color at all, and is not to be confused with the phenomenally perceived color that one labels 'red.'

In essence it appears as if we agree. I hold that the word red has a dual aspect of reference. Any given person's personal concept of redness is diretcly associated with whatever this looks like to that person. But when 'red' is used publically, as in a discourse between two people, it can only refer to associated functional aspects (600nm light), which is not the same thing as (although causally related to) this. I think where we part is that I take the personal understanding of 'red' to be red's primary referent, and the public reference to 600nm light as something of an accidental consequence owing to our inability to directly perceive eachother's subjective experiences, whereas you seem to take an inverted stance on red's primary referent.

[confutatis]

You don't know the entire meaning. You don't know all there is to know about unga. I know something about unga that you don't; namely, what it looks like. Your understanding of unga is a subset of all there is to understand about the entire concept; specifically, you only know the functional aspects associated with unga, and not the intrinsic aspect.

Well, everything you said about my understanding of 'unga' is true about your understanding of 'red'. You didn't invent the word, so all you (and I) know about it is perfectly equivalent to what I would know about 'unga': nothing except its functional aspects. Exactly what is standing in our way of accepting that the intrinsic aspect is irrelevant to the meaning of the word?

In essence it appears as if we agree.

Could be. It's hard to tell sometimes.

I hold that the word red has a dual aspect of reference.

I hold that one of the aspects matters, the other doesn't. We need the functional aspect to communicate, and that's what words are for. But we don't need to think about the intrinsic aspect of the concept, as it has no effect on our perception of the word.

In essence I think that is the most important point: it doesn't matter what words refer to mean, because they may refer to different things for different people. Truth is not in the intrinsic aspect of the language, because that aspect is not communicable. Truth is in relationships.

I think where we part is that I take the personal understanding of 'red' to be red's primary referent, and the public reference to 600nm light as something of an accidental consequence owing to our inability to directly perceive eachother's subjective experiences, whereas you seem to take an inverted stance on red's primary referent.

I feel forced to take the inverted stance because, if we could directly perceive each other's subjective experiences, then language as we know it could not exist. First, because the differences between public and private referent would become clear for everyone to see. And second, because we wouldn't need language in the first place; communication would be done by transferring thoughts, and that would bring about world peace and who knows what else.

Rumour has it that's exactly how people communicate in heaven. I'm sure it must be.

[hypnagogue]

Well, everything you said about my understanding of 'unga' is true about your understanding of 'red'. You didn't invent the word, so all you (and I) know about it is perfectly equivalent to what I would know about 'unga': nothing except its functional aspects. Exactly what is standing in our way of accepting that the intrinsic aspect is irrelevant to the meaning of the word?

Suppose for some reason that tomorrow your phenomenal perception of red and green switch, so that stop signs look this color and grass looks this color. Will you go on happily referring to red stop signs? I suspect that, at least at first, you would go on wondering about who painted all the stop signs green and why the grass turned red. Eventually, you might adjust and just come to switch the labels, calling this (as perceived by you) red and this (as perceived by you) green, and after some time you would speak of colors in a fashion indistinguishable from the way you did originally. But your internal perceptions of these colors would not be indistinguishable-- you, personally, could easily tell the difference between what 'red' used to mean to you and what it means to you now. Hence, the meaning of the word has changed for you on the basis of its changed intrinsic aspect, and so the intrinsic aspect must indeed carry some substantial weight in your personal conception of the word.

I hold that one of the aspects matters, the other doesn't. We need the functional aspect to communicate, and that's what words are for. But we don't need to think about the intrinsic aspect of the concept, as it has no effect on our perception of the word.

The intrinsic aspect is what the functional aspects are anchored in. If the intrinsic aspects change, then the functional aspects change as well, at least until you re-callibrate your language so that it once again fits in with the way everyone else uses it.

In essence I think that is the most important point: it doesn't matter what words refer to mean, because they may refer to different things for different people. Truth is not in the intrinsic aspect of the language, because that aspect is not communicable. Truth is in relationships.

I agree that it is this way for language as it is used publically. The truth in the publically agreed upon statement "That stop sign is red" lies in the stop sign's functional/relational properties. But I also think we can sensibly speak of truth in a purely private sense. I may never know the truth about what you are personally experiencing, but surely you do.

I feel forced to take the inverted stance because, if we could directly perceive each other's subjective experiences, then language as we know it could not exist.

I agree, but I don't think this requires us to think of the functional aspects of language as primary, eg what the words mean/refer to in the first instance of one's own personal conception of them.

[confutatis]

Suppose for some reason that tomorrow your phenomenal perception of red and green switch, so that stop signs look this color and grass looks this color. Will you go on happily referring to red stop signs? I suspect that, at least at first, you would go on wondering about who painted all the stop signs green and why the grass turned red. Eventually, you might adjust and just come to switch the labels...

Well, I don't think that's exactly how people react. Because you were convinced that red is this, you will insist that something happened to the world which caused stop signs to change color. Not only that, the neurological glitch would probably be interpreted as some event of cosmic significance. Trust me, I've read enough about people who undergo what are essentially similar experiences, and they all react the same way.

I once read a book, I believe it was by Charles Tart, in which the author was describing the dilemma of understanding drug experiences from a rational point of view. As you probably know, people who take hallucinogens usually go bananas after their experience, and start talking about things that make no sense at all. The interesting thing the book describes is the dilemma: the best way to understand what a subjective experience really is is to have it yourself. As you would say, the best way to know what 'red' is is to experience it. However, in the case with hallucinogens, no scientist who takes it as a matter of research fails to go bananas just like any of his subjects. Upon returning from his "trip" he suddenly loses interest in the subject, and starts pursuing cosmic things.

(as I wrote that I just realized that we may be no different: our experience of 'red' stands in our way of understanding 'red' from a rational perspective, or at least makes us lose interest in the subject. Certainly blind people are far more interested in learning about colors than we are)

I may never know the truth about what you are personally experiencing, but surely you do.

No, I surely don't know the truth about my experiences, because that truth is tainted by several things beyond my awareness and my power to control.

I don't think this requires us to think of the functional aspects of language as primary, eg what the words mean/refer to in the first instance of one's own personal conception of them.

At one point in your life all you had to go by were the functional aspects. You certainly were not born speaking English. As a child, all your parents and everyone around you ever give you are the functional aspects, and you have to figure out the intrinsic aspects for yourself. However, that process does not last too long and by the time you are an adult you no longer care about new functional/structural aspects. Everything you hear that you fail to make sense of gets chalked up as "nonsense". (by 'you' I mean any person; I'm not immune to that myself)

So our language is tainted by the individual hues each speaker adds to it, as they fail to make sense of existing concepts and add their own personal interpretation to them. It's no wonder we ended up with such a mess.

[hypnagogue]

Well, I don't think that's exactly how people react. Because you were convinced that red is this, you will insist that something happened to the world which caused stop signs to change color. Not only that, the neurological glitch would probably be interpreted as some event of cosmic significance. Trust me, I've read enough about people who undergo what are essentially similar experiences, and they all react the same way.

That's a possibility but I don't think it would have to happen that way. If a person wasn't driven insane by such an occurence, eventually he would have to start referring to stop signs as red just to get on in the world. After a while, this reference would not become effortful but reflexive, and so red would come to mean a new thing to him, something distinct from what he knew to be red beforehand even though externally there is no distinction to be drawn in his language before and some time after his color-swapping incident.

I once read a book, I believe it was by Charles Tart, in which the author was describing the dilemma of understanding drug experiences from a rational point of view. As you probably know, people who take hallucinogens usually go bananas after their experience, and start talking about things that make no sense at all. The interesting thing the book describes is the dilemma: the best way to understand what a subjective experience really is is to have it yourself. As you would say, the best way to know what 'red' is is to experience it. However, in the case with hallucinogens, no scientist who takes it as a matter of research fails to go bananas just like any of his subjects. Upon returning from his "trip" he suddenly loses interest in the subject, and starts pursuing cosmic things.

That's a pretty strong claim. I do know what you're talking about, as I saw several speakers involved with psychedelics at the Tuscon conference of consciousness who did appear to be 'bananas.' But there were also several who remained quite grounded, at least as far as one could tell from their talks. I personally know people who are perfectly well grounded and 'normal' (not bananas or 'out there') despite extensive experience with psychedelics. I have experience myself but I think I'm as perfectly rational as I was beforehand, and certainly I'm not bananas (or would you disagree? :biggrin:).

(as I wrote that I just realized that we may be no different: our experience of 'red' stands in our way of understanding 'red' from a rational perspective, or at least makes us lose interest in the subject. Certainly blind people are far more interested in learning about colors than we are)

Here's the rub. We can't fully comprehend red without experiencing it. Or rather, I can't fully comprehend what red means to me if I neglect what this looks like to me, and likewise you can't fully comprehend what red means to you if you neglect what this looks like to you. If we want to be more general we can say that the concept of color cannot be fully understood in the absence of some sort of visual subjective experience to be systematically associated with the linguistic usage of the word, and from this it follows that blind people cannot fully understand color (though they can fully understand properties of photons and the like).

If studying red from a rational perspective means only studying its functional aspects, then it follows that a rational perspective cannot fully grasp this (neither as it looks to me, nor as it looks to you, nor as it looks to anybody). But I wouldn't characterize it this way; we can attempt to come to a rational understanding of red and simultaneously acknowledge our phenomenal experiences of redness, and indeed that is much of what philosophy of mind is all about. The experience of phenomenal redness may present a formidable challenge in understanding red, but it doesn't necessarily preclude us from understanding it-- we just have to be careful in our reasoning.

No, I surely don't know the truth about my experiences, because that truth is tainted by several things beyond my awareness and my power to control.

You know your experiences seem a certain way to you. Whatever tainting factors you can imagine can only influence the way your experiences appear to you, but your experiences just are these assorted appearances. So it can't be that such factors stand in the way of your knowing your experiences. If I have an illusion as of a 3D necker cube, then I may be misled about the truth of the nature of cube (it is actually flat) but I'm not wrong about the experience (it really does appear to be 3D to me).

At one point in your life all you had to go by were the functional aspects. You certainly were not born speaking English. As a child, all your parents and everyone around you ever give you are the functional aspects, and you have to figure out the intrinsic aspects for yourself. However, that process does not last too long and by the time you are an adult you no longer care about new functional/structural aspects. Everything you hear that you fail to make sense of gets chalked up as "nonsense". (by 'you' I mean any person; I'm not immune to that myself)

So our language is tainted by the individual hues each speaker adds to it, as they fail to make sense of existing concepts and add their own personal interpretation to them. It's no wonder we ended up with such a mess.

We may be approaching a chicken/egg issue here. How did language start? It certainly didn't start in the way you correctly assess its current status, or else it would have to have been a 'given' and not something created entirely by humans. The first person to come up with a word for 'red' surely meant by that word his experience of this. It turned out to work fantastically that other people could recognize this same thing and call it 'red' also only on the basis of underlying functional commonalities. Once 'red' thus became a public concept, it rightfully refered to such functional aspects in its purely public sense, but in its subjective origin (both in the first speaker(s) and in every infant that acquired language thereafter) it refers to the (possibly different) phenomenal perceptions built up from this common functional base.

[Fliption]

Circular definitions are a different issue. Concepts defined in a circular manner do not need to refer to anything real. You can think of symmetry in language as a set of circular definitions that you can successfully map to some aspects of your experience. For instance, 'left' and 'right'. You certainly know that there's more to 'left' than simply 'the opposite of right'.


Ok. But the critical realization for me is that it definitely involves a circular definition.


They're not circular, they're symmetrical. You know what 'mental' and 'physical' refer to.


Sure they are. You just said this:

"You can think of symmetry in language as a set of circular definitions that you can successfully map to some aspects of your experience. "

Being circular is what it means to have symmetry according to this.


public = physical, private = mental; makes no difference.

The moon is purple!


Actually, any definition of anything is meaningless, as it is just a statement of the same idea in different words.


One step at a time. This seems like an extreme conclusion that leads to chaos. I'm just trying to understand the steps that get you there first. Currently, I disagree with this view.


I don't know if proper philosophical definitions of any term exist.

Then take my word for it because I do know and they do exists.


That's exactly the materialist's dilemma: how can anyone not be a materialist? Which, by the way, is just a particular case of a more universal dilemma: how can can anyone disagree with me as to what is true, given that what I know to be true cannot possibly be false?


This isn't what I was saying. It's one thing for 2 people to hold different views on what is truth and not understand how anyone could disagree. It's another entirely for someone to define the opposing view in such a way that it's just wrong by definition. This is just dishonest debate. If we're going to philosophical disagree then we have to agree on what it is we are disagreeing about. How can 2 parties intellectually disagree on materialism when they don't even agree on what it means to be material? These 2 people may not even disagree at all. It's just sloppy philosophy.


I think you can be very naive if you think people manipulate words with some agenda in mind. Some undoubtedly do, like politicians, lawyers, businessmen, but most people tend to be sincere when they express their philosophical views. The reason we hold different, often antagonic worldviews has little to do with intellectual dishonesty.

I think it is naive to believe people don't do this. This statement seems odd coming from someone who, in another thread, said the only reason people held the views we do about consciousness was because we were afraid of our own non-existence:biggrin:.

While I disagreed with that motivation for myself, I do believe that many people are dishonest in discussions like this. Some of them are so sneaky (to use that word again) that they don't even realize their own bias. :biggrin:

[Mentat]

Man, there're alot of responses, since I was here last :eek:. I'll try to get to all of them eventually, but don't have much time right now, so I'll just respond to this one...

Again, I cannot precisely pick out the concept in words, but I can only point to it. When you look at a stop sign, what does it look like to you? Among its many apparent properties, it has a certain visual phenomenal quality that you call 'redness.'

Discrimination is clearly involved here (eg, discriminating the redness of the sign from the blueness of the sky), but discrimination alone does not exhaustively characterize this phenomenon. For instance, for a human there is something different about discriminating hues of color and pitches of tone. You may say that this difference is purely underpinned by computational differences, and that may be the case, but we are only trying here to point to instances of what we mean by P-consciousness, not explain them.


But if "P-consciousness" is merely the act of performing A-consciousness within one's own "computer", then why don't we just say that instead?


Let me put it another way. Imagine that one day you encounter a curious cognitive dissociation. Suddenly you can't see anything at all, that is, the world looks to you the same way it looked in the past when you would close your eyes. And yet, you can walk around just as well as you could before, and you can accurately describe the world (e.g. by telling someone "I see a red stop sign" when a red stop sign is placed at a distance before you) just as well as you could before. This would be a case of visual A-consciousness without visual P-consciousness.


But how could I have visual A-consciousness, if I don't process the visible world? IOW, if I can't see anything, how can I tell you about it? I would be as a blind man.


If P-consciousness does not exist for you, then your personal experience of acting in the world would be the same as your current personal experience of deep sleep: i.e., you would have no personal experience at all. If you respond to this by saying that you would indeed have personal experience just in virtue of your A-consciousness as you acted in the world, then you would be acknowledging the existence of P-consciousness and adding some claims about its properties (eg it exists whenever certain A-conscious activities occur).


Not really (forgive me if I seem argumentative, this point really doesn't seem valid to me yet), since I could define the first-person viewpoint (which is the only one that any conscious computer can have anyway) as yet another process of A-consciousness.


A-consciousness entails the behavioral characteristics of, say, sadness, but it doesn't entail the personal feeling of sadness.


But, if personally feeling sadness is a behavior, then A-consciousness would indeed entail the personal feeling.

I refer you to my newest thread (haven't typed it yet), which will be entitled "Physical, Design, Intentional: An elaboration on 'algorithm'".


If there is no P-consciousness, then by definition there is no personal feeling of sadness. This is the familiar schism; A-consciousness speaks of 3rd person observable properties...


But why would a being that only has A-consciousness speak of it's own processes in the 3rd person?


It doesn't follow that your failure to explain P-consciousness entails that you are a zombie. If I can't explain how weather works, that doesn't mean there is no weather.


It's not that I can't explain it (that burden rests upon you, as you are certainly aware), it's that I can't understand it. And, since all of you can understand it, based solely on having experienced/processed it yourselves, then it seems possible that I am a zombie.

[hypnagogue]

Let me put it another way. Imagine that one day you encounter a curious cognitive dissociation. Suddenly you can't see anything at all, that is, the world looks to you the same way it looked in the past when you would close your eyes. And yet, you can walk around just as well as you could before, and you can accurately describe the world (e.g. by telling someone "I see a red stop sign" when a red stop sign is placed at a distance before you) just as well as you could before. This would be a case of visual A-consciousness without visual P-consciousness.

But how could I have visual A-consciousness, if I don't process the visible world? IOW, if I can't see anything, how can I tell you about it? I would be as a blind man.

Your response here seems to indicate that you are coming into the discussion with too much a priori baggage. P and A are surely intricately intertwined, but in the first instance P is not defined in terms of processing at all. Any such claims we make about P must be infered and/or empirically justified, not taken as givens. In particular you seem to strongly equate P with processing the visual world: no P implies no visual processing. But this is not the case, as is demonstrated in blindsighted patients, who can perform well above chance in forced choice visual tasks despite claiming that they can't see anything. If we are to believe their verbal reports, then clearly they are doing some A-conscious visual processing while having no P to speak of.

I'm not claiming that the scenario quoted above (which we could think of as an extraordinary case of blindsight with full A-conscious capacity and no P) is really possible; in fact I don't think it is at all. But the point was to try to clarify what I mean by P-consciousness. If you openly conceive of the above scenario without importing any a priori assumptions on what you think P must be, then perhaps you will be able to identify what I'm referring to.

[confutatis]

In particular [Mentat seems] to strongly equate P with processing the visual world: no P implies no visual processing. But this is not the case, as is demonstrated in blindsighted patients, who can perform well above chance in forced choice visual tasks despite claiming that they can't see anything. If we are to believe their verbal reports, then clearly they are doing some A-conscious visual processing while having no P to speak of.

Hypnagogue, you said Mentat is coming to the discussion with a lot of a-priori baggage, but from my perspective you are doing exactly the same. You are assuming blindsight is evidence that there is a difference between A and P; I think it's just as valid to assume that there's no difference at all between A and P, and that blindsight is just a mild form of blindness. Think about it: if someone is completely blindsighted but gives no verbal or behavioural clues about it, would that person be blind?

I'm not claiming that the scenario quoted above (which we could think of as an extraordinary case of blindsight with full A-conscious capacity and no P) is really possible; in fact I don't think it is at all.

I think this can be taken to mean you don't really believe P can exist in the total absence of A. Am I correct? And if so, wouldn't that make the C-zombie concept a logical impossibility?

But the point was to try to clarify what I mean by P-consciousness. If you openly conceive of the above scenario without importing any a priori assumptions on what you think P must be, then perhaps you will be able to identify what I'm referring to.

Here and I'm butting in your conversation with Mentat, so feel free to dismiss my comment, but I don't really think you understand what Mentat is saying. I never got, from any of his posts, the notion that he denies the existence of P-consciousness; he just thinks there's nothing to be said about it, because anything you try to say about it can be shown to be about A-consciousness.

I personally think you and some others here are missing a subtle but important point. Consider, for instance, the difference between ontology and epistemology: the idea of dividing reality between "what things really are" and "what we know about things" implies there is some unknown discrepancy between reality and our knowledge of it, which is a self-evident truth. However, the only way you can possibly maintain the distinction is to assert that the discrepancy is not only unknown but also unknowable. For if we could know how our knowledge differs from reality, then we would also know "how things really are" and the distinction between ontology and epistemology would vanish into thin air.

The argument about consciousness is no different. A-consciousness is what you can know about the mind, P-consciousness is that which, no matter how much you know about A, may still be different from A despite the apparent similarities. I see only two possibilities: if P is knowable from A, then P is the same thing as A; if P is fundamentally unknowable, then it's not the same thing as A, but it's still unknowable. I don't know exactly which position Mentat takes, but ultimately it makes no difference. It's pretty hard to define P-consciousness as being different from A-consciousness without making any claim that you know something about the difference, which ultimately renders the definition nonsensical.

[hypnagogue]

Hypnagogue, you said Mentat is coming to the discussion with a lot of a-priori baggage, but from my perspective you are doing exactly the same.

I should have made it clearer then that I meant a priori baggage about what P must be, above and beyond what it is defined to be. There is clearly a distinction to be made, from one's own 1st person view, between A and P consciousness. Attempting to show that A and P are the same thing does not deflate the observation that there at least is an apparent difference between the two from the subjective perspective, and that must be our starting point before we can really get anywhere in the discussion.

You are assuming blindsight is evidence that there is a difference between A and P; I think it's just as valid to assume that there's no difference at all between A and P, and that blindsight is just a mild form of blindness. Think about it: if someone is completely blindsighted but gives no verbal or behavioural clues about it, would that person be blind?

There always must be assumptions when we attribute P-consciousness to other beings. It's reasonable enough, however, to assume that verbal reports are a pretty reliable indicator of the presence or absence of P. Now, if a blindsighted person reports no P for a certain portion of his visual field, and we conclude that he therefore really has no P here, then clearly we can begin to sketch out a relationship between P and A. We can now say that P is not equivalent to A, since some A persists in the complete absence of P. Perhaps we can postulate a deep connection between the portions of A that are absent in this blindsighted person and P. Even here, however, it is difficult to establish anything more than a correlation.

I think this can be taken to mean you don't really believe P can exist in the total absence of A. Am I correct? And if so, wouldn't that make the C-zombie concept a logical impossibility?

I believe that in our world, P-consciousness as it is typically experienced by humans most probably cannot exist in the absence of human A-consciousness.

Your zombie implication is off the mark in several respects. First of all, "no P without A" implies that A is necessary for P. But C-zombies were devised to show that A is not sufficient for P. It is entirely logically coherent that A be necessary, but not sufficient, for P. (In order for you to the drive to the store, it is necessary that your gastank be full, but the satisfaction of this condition is not sufficient to get you to the store; you still need to use the keys to enter and start the ignition, know the sequence of directions needed to get to the store, etc.)

Second of all, even if we suppose that insights into blindsight suggest that C-zombies cannot exist in this world (and we have every reason to suspect that this is true), this only implies the nomological, not the logical, impossibility of C-zombies. As far as we know it is nomologically impossible to exceed the speed of light, but that does not imply that it is logically impossible.

The argument about consciousness is no different. A-consciousness is what you can know about the mind, P-consciousness is that which, no matter how much you know about A, may still be different from A despite the apparent similarities.

A-consciousness is what you can know about other minds. P-consciousness is what you can know about your own mind.

I see only two possibilities: if P is knowable from A, then P is the same thing as A; if P is fundamentally unknowable, then it's not the same thing as A, but it's still unknowable.

P is knowable to the individual. I know about my own P, otherwise I wouldn't be talking about it. But if P were straightforwardly the same as A, then I should be able to know your P just as well as I do mine. That I cannot do this implies that the issue is more complex than the way you are presenting it.

[Fliption]

I think you are the only person on this forum who can understand that if I manage to find the way to express the idea clearly.

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

[confutatis]

I should have made it clearer then that I meant a priori baggage about what P must be, above and beyond what it is defined to be. There is clearly a distinction to be made, from one's own 1st person view, between A and P consciousness. Attempting to show that A and P are the same thing does not deflate the observation that there at least is an apparent difference between the two from the subjective perspective, and that must be our starting point before we can really get anywhere in the discussion.

Thanks for clarifying that.

I do not dispute there is a perceived distinction; that would be foolish.

There always must be assumptions when we attribute P-consciousness to other beings.

This is where I think you might be wrong, but it's difficult to explain why. I know it's difficult because I had difficulty understanding the notion myself. But I'll try again anyway, this time by asking a question rather than posing an argument.

I think I know what you mean by P-consciousness, but suppose I don't. How would I go about finding out what the concept of P-consciousness refers to, and whether it applies to me or not?

I'm hoping you'll see what an attempt to answer thse questions brings to mind.

It's reasonable enough, however, to assume that verbal reports are a pretty reliable indicator of the presence or absence of P.

I think verbal reports are the only indicator, reliable or not, given that at some point in your life you didn't know what P was (I'm talking about the concept, not the phenomenon).

Now, if a blindsighted person reports no P for a certain portion of his visual field, and we conclude that he therefore really has no P here...

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but this seems to indicate you think P and language go together. Put yourself in the position of a blindsighted person and try to think what subjective phenomenon could prevent you from making statements about your visual field.

...then clearly we can begin to sketch out a relationship between P and A. We can now say that P is not equivalent to A, since some A persists in the complete absence of P.

It is a known fact that not everything in A is mirrored in P. There's no question that they are not the same thing. The real question is, how are they different? It seems to me the difference has a lot to do with language: P can be verbalized, A cannot, except for the portion of A which intersects with P.

I believe that in our world, P-consciousness as it is typically experienced by humans most probably cannot exist in the absence of human A-consciousness.

I do have trouble with arguments based on the notion of "our world", because to me there is only one world by definition. That makes communication a bit difficult.

Your zombie implication is off the mark in several respects. First of all, "no P without A" implies that A is necessary for P.

I should probably have said "no knowledge of P without knowledge of A", and that applies to the first-person case as well.

But C-zombies were devised to show that A is not sufficient for P.

But the argument for C-zombies assumes a priori that A is not sufficient for P. I think this is why Mentat refers to it as a strawman argument.

It is entirely logically coherent that A be necessary, but not sufficient, for P.

All I can say is that it seems logical to some people and illogical to others. It seems logical from a certain point of view, and it seems illogical from another. But it's really difficult to get people who look at the argument from a different point of view, and it's not because they won't, it's because they don't realize the other point of view is just as valid.

As far as we know it is nomologically impossible to exceed the speed of light, but that does not imply that it is logically impossible.

I'm not sure what you mean by that, as it is a fact of physics that speeds greater than c can't be measured because of the way speed is defined. This, by the way, seems one of the most difficult things for people to understand: that the way we define things creates limitations on what can be said about those things. Many physicists understand that very well; in fact I learned this from an extremely bright physicist. But it took me months.

What I've been trying to understand are the limitations on what can be said about P-consciousness based on the way we define it. I think you are the only person on this forum who can understand that if I manage to find the way to express the idea clearly.

A-consciousness is what you can know about other minds. P-consciousness is what you can know about your own mind.

Whatever it is you know about your mind, you must have learned it from other people. Unless by "know" you mean something different from what I have in mind.

P is knowable to the individual. I know about my own P, otherwise I wouldn't be talking about it.

So how come C-zombies talk about P? Chalmers explicitly says they do.

But if P were straightforwardly the same as A, then I should be able to know your P just as well as I do mine. That I cannot do this implies that the issue is more complex than the way you are presenting it.

I don't think you fully understand the way I'm presenting the issue, but I also think we're making progress understanding each other.

To some extent, you know a good deal about my P, which is what allows us to communicate. There are certainly things about me that I know and you don't, but I'd like to suggest another approach to describe that aspect of our consciousness. Describing P as completely unknowable doesn't really work; it provides substance for materialistic claims a-la Dennett.

[Mentat]

Your response here seems to indicate that you are coming into the discussion with too much a priori baggage. P and A are surely intricately intertwined, but in the first instance P is not defined in terms of processing at all. Any such claims we make about P must be infered and/or empirically justified, not taken as givens. In particular you seem to strongly equate P with processing the visual world: no P implies no visual processing. But this is not the case, as is demonstrated in blindsighted patients, who can perform well above chance in forced choice visual tasks despite claiming that they can't see anything. If we are to believe their verbal reports, then clearly they are doing some A-conscious visual processing while having no P to speak of.


While I understand most of what you're saying, I can't see why one calls it "A-consciousness" at all. That stands for "Action-consciousness" right? From your description of it, it seems that it is simply "Action" with no consciousness involved at all. You are referring to something that simply does the right thing at the right time to appear as though it is conscious. So, why does one include the term "consciousness" in "A-consciousness" when it doesn't refer to consciousness at all?


I'm not claiming that the scenario quoted above (which we could think of as an extraordinary case of blindsight with full A-conscious capacity and no P) is really possible; in fact I don't think it is at all. But the point was to try to clarify what I mean by P-consciousness. If you openly conceive of the above scenario without importing any a priori assumptions on what you think P must be, then perhaps you will be able to identify what I'm referring to.

This reminds me of the paper that selfAdjoint posted on another thread. You are implying that, while it may not be possible in practice to have "A-" (really just referring to the appropriate "action") without P-consciousness, you can imagine it to be the case, and thus there must be a distinction between the two (after all, how could one imagine one thing existing without another if the two are not distinct entities?). However, the author of that paper (who was that, by the way?) made a rather good argument (IMO) toward the fact that our ability to imagine something that can only weakly be conceived (with many conceptual gaps, leading to the tendency to think that it is impossible in practice) is no indication that such a thing is even possible in principle (much like Sylvan's box (I think that's what it was called) is not possible, even in practice, though it is something about which one can (ficticiously) write).

[confutatis]

the author of that paper made a rather good argument (IMO) toward the fact that our ability to imagine something that can only weakly be conceived (with many conceptual gaps, leading to the tendency to think that it is impossible in practice) is no indication that such a thing is even possible in principle

I find it strange that someone actually has to write a paper about that, given that it should be so obvious to anyone. But apparently I'm wrong, since the world is full of people who believe in some mythical power words supposedly have. Describe an empty box that has something inside, and instead of dismissing the idea as being illogical, many people will try hard to make sense of it. Worse, some even believe to be successful at making sense out of nonsense. Go figure...

[hypnagogue]

While I understand most of what you're saying, I can't see why one calls it "A-consciousness" at all. That stands for "Action-consciousness" right? From your description of it, it seems that it is simply "Action" with no consciousness involved at all. You are referring to something that simply does the right thing at the right time to appear as though it is conscious. So, why does one include the term "consciousness" in "A-consciousness" when it doesn't refer to consciousness at all?

The word 'consciousness' picks out many different concepts. To facilitate precise, meaningful discussion, it is useful to pick out and refer to some of these distinguishable concepts that all exist underneath the greater hood of the word 'consciousness.'

The most general bifurcation we can make is between P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and A-consciousness (access consciousness). We've already discussed P-consciousness to death. Here's a good definition (http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?access+consciousness) of access consciousness:

access consciousness
<philosophy of mind> Also known as a-consciousness, is a kind of direct control. A representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting and action.

Above, you seemed to be using the word "conscious" to mean "P-conscious." So if we make that substitution, then what you meant to say was...

From your description of it, it seems that it is simply "Action" with no P-consciousness involved at all. You are referring to something that simply does the right thing at the right time to appear as though it is P-conscious.

That is a pretty accurate description. In everyday life, we use the information made available from the A-consciousness of others to make inferences about their P-consciousnesses. Of course, a given A-conscious behavior only gives the appearance as if there is a certain P-conscious experience underlying it, an appearance that may be misleading or outright false.

So, why does one include the term "consciousness" in "A-consciousness" when it doesn't refer to consciousness at all?

We need the A-consciousness of others to make judgments about their P-consciousness, so epistemically the two are deeply related. A-consciousness is our means of expressing and knowing about P-consciousness. But you are correct to note that the definition of A-consciousness does not directly refer to P-consciousness at all, and this is a key point I have been trying to establish. Your strategy to deny P thus far has been to equate P with A at the outset, but now perhaps you see that there is a bit of a conceptual wedge we can drive between the two.

This reminds me of the paper that selfAdjoint posted on another thread. You are implying that, while it may not be possible in practice to have "A-" (really just referring to the appropriate "action") without P-consciousness, you can imagine it to be the case, and thus there must be a distinction between the two (after all, how could one imagine one thing existing without another if the two are not distinct entities?). However, the author of that paper (who was that, by the way?) made a rather good argument (IMO) toward the fact that our ability to imagine something that can only weakly be conceived (with many conceptual gaps, leading to the tendency to think that it is impossible in practice) is no indication that such a thing is even possible in principle (much like Sylvan's box (I think that's what it was called) is not possible, even in practice, though it is something about which one can (ficticiously) write).

It's not as simple as this, as I indicated in that thread. The conceivability argument (with zombies and such) is intimately related with the explanatory argument and the knowledge argument, such that you can't really fully grasp or fully deny any one of them without fully grasping / denying the others. The explanatory argument appears to be particularly relevant. Very briefly, it goes

(1) Physical accounts explain at most structure and function.

(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness; so

—

(3) No physical account can explain consciousness.

(more at http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html)

If this is accurate, then the 'weakly conceived' critique of the conceivability argument is toothless. True, we can't imagine the complexity of the brain in great detail; but even if we could, it would still not be apparent how the brain is responsible for P-consciousness. In effect, the explanitory argument appears to make the conceivability argument 'strongly conceived' by making it applicable to all cases.

By way of analogy, suppose I claim that it is impossible to derive an imaginary number from the set of real numbers using only the operations of addition and multiplication. In a sense, my initial intuition here is weakly conceived, as I cannot possibly imagine every single case of adding / multiplying every permutation of numbers. But I don't need to imagine all the details. I can see underlying principles which makes my intuition true for all cases.

[Fliption]

I find it strange that someone actually has to write a paper about that, given that it should be so obvious to anyone. But apparently I'm wrong, since the world is full of people who believe in some mythical power words supposedly have. Describe an empty box that has something inside, and instead of dismissing the idea as being illogical, many people will try hard to make sense of it. Worse, some even believe to be successful at making sense out of nonsense. Go figure...

I certainly can relate to this but when I confront it, I have two choices. Either 1) everyone truly is being nonsensical or 2) perhaps there is something that I am not understanding.

Since I am not an all-knowing person nor do I consider myself to be smarter than everyone else, I usually allow room for number 2.

[hypnagogue]

I find it strange that someone actually has to write a paper about that, given that it should be so obvious to anyone. But apparently I'm wrong, since the world is full of people who believe in some mythical power words supposedly have. Describe an empty box that has something inside, and instead of dismissing the idea as being illogical, many people will try hard to make sense of it. Worse, some even believe to be successful at making sense out of nonsense. Go figure...

This is just a strawman. The article used the 'empty box' as an example for intuition, not as a directly analogous case, and for good reason; it is not directly analogous.

'Empty' is defined in such a way that the usage of the word automatically precludes any notion of 'containment.' 'A-consciousness' is not defined in such a way that the usage of the word automatically entails some sort of P-consciousness. The author used the former to demonstrate a case where it is obvious that an imaginary story asserts a paradox as a truth, in order to demonstrate that this is possible in principle; then the author implies that this may be the case for stories about C-zombies. What the author does not do is say that stories about C-zombies are obviously the same as stories about full empty boxes.

That you equate the two so strongly makes you, at least in this instance, a functionalist in the strongest sense. By this reasoning, Ned Block's Chinese Gym (a gym filled with people communicating via walkie talkie such that each performs the function of a neuron and that the whole mirrors the function of a human brain) is P-consciousness and it's absolutely illogical not to think so. Who knows, the Chinese Gym may actually be P-conscious... but I wouldn't say it was so obvious as to think it completely illogical to think otherwise. Would you?

[confutatis]

I certainly can relate to this but when I confront it, I have two choices. Either 1) everyone truly is being nonsensical or 2) perhaps there is something that I am not understanding.

Since I am not an all-knowing person nor do I consider myself to be smarter than everyone else...

Now is it my impression, or are you trying hard to sound wise? tsc tsc...

[hypnagogue]

I think I know what you mean by P-consciousness, but suppose I don't. How would I go about finding out what the concept of P-consciousness refers to, and whether it applies to me or not?

This is a tricky issue, of course, with no definitive answer. Here's a variation on the theme I have been using:

Look at a scene. Now close your eyes. There is a discernable difference between the two cases; as a first approximation we might say that in the former you are aware of visual information and in the latter you are not. So far we haven't said anything that strongly indicates P rather than A, so we need to do better.

Now, draw a picture of the scene, copying everything that you perceive as structural information of the scene. You will now have a line drawing of the scene that has the same structural informational content as your own awareness of it. (Your line drawing should not have color, since color does not present itself in visual awareness as structural information.) Conceptually subtract the structural information contained in the line drawing from the structural information contained in your visual awareness. If you have some remaining 'residue' of awareness, then you have visual P-consciousness. If you do not, then you (probably) don't have visual P-consciousness.

I'm not completely satisfied with that answer myself, but maybe it's a start.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but this seems to indicate you think P and language go together. Put yourself in the position of a blindsighted person and try to think what subjective phenomenon could prevent you from making statements about your visual field.

They must go together in some sense if we can meaningfully refer to subjective experiences. However, this doesn't imply that they are the same thing, or that one is necessary for the other.

I imagine if I were a blindsighted person, the blind portion of my visual field would either be a patch of darkness or a somehow altogether spot of 'unseeableness' like a spot behind my head. In any case, I could make statements about it along the lines of the following: "I don't see anything there." Again, there's nothing here that leads me to believe that they must be the same thing-- at most I infer that words can refer to experiences.

It is a known fact that not everything in A is mirrored in P. There's no question that they are not the same thing. The real question is, how are they different? It seems to me the difference has a lot to do with language: P can be verbalized, A cannot, except for the portion of A which intersects with P.

A-consciousness can be verbalized, by definition. The 'A' stands for 'access.' If it is A-conscious, it is 'consciously' accessible, and if it is 'consciously' accessible, it is available for some kind of verbal report.

I do have trouble with arguments based on the notion of "our world", because to me there is only one world by definition. That makes communication a bit difficult.

It's necessary to make that distinction when we talk about zombies. Anyway, you are taking the term too literally. We don't have to suppose that other worlds actually exist in order to talk about them; they are simply toy model worlds with different natural laws. Cosmologists talk of such toy model universes on a regular basis; they do not suppose that these models actually exist somewhere.

I should probably have said "no knowledge of P without knowledge of A", and that applies to the first-person case as well.

That probably applies to the first person case, but there may be some sense in which there can be first person P without an explicit, corresponding first person A. For practical purposes I'll agree, but I don't think it can be taken as an uncontested given (even if it might seem nonsensical).

But the argument for C-zombies assumes a priori that A is not sufficient for P. I think this is why Mentat refers to it as a strawman argument.

No, it has the reasoning of the explanatory argument behind it, as I explain in a previous post in this thread.

I'm not sure what you mean by that, as it is a fact of physics that speeds greater than c can't be measured because of the way speed is defined. This, by the way, seems one of the most difficult things for people to understand: that the way we define things creates limitations on what can be said about those things. Many physicists understand that very well; in fact I learned this from an extremely bright physicist. But it took me months.

But speed is defined in this way not for some arbitrary reason; it is defined in this way in order to correspond to what is observed to happen in nature. If we redefine speed so that we can talk of speeds greater than c, we still won't be able to measure such a thing because it's physically impossible. Language is not as ironclad as we come to think it is, but at the same time it's not as arbitrary as you make it out to be.

Whatever it is you know about your mind, you must have learned it from other people. Unless by "know" you mean something different from what I have in mind.

An infant knows the sky is blue, even if it doesn't have words for 'sky' or 'blue.' At the very least, if an infant can perceive this, then an infant will know this when its eyes are pointed towards a clear sky. And that in itself is reflexive knowledge of the mind.

So how come C-zombies talk about P? Chalmers explicitly says they do.

C-zombies don't really talk about P in the same sense that I do, even if they come to move their lips in the same way and utter the same sounds. I (presumably) talk about P in virtue of having P, whereas a C-zombie only talks about P in virtue of some causal phenomenon other than P.

To some extent, you know a good deal about my P, which is what allows us to communicate. There are certainly things about me that I know and you don't, but I'd like to suggest another approach to describe that aspect of our consciousness. Describing P as completely unknowable doesn't really work; it provides substance for materialistic claims a-la Dennett.

I can infer the structural and functional aspects of your P, by means of knowing your A (eg hearing you speak about your P). But this gets us no farther from the deflationist materialistic approach; I still know nothing about you other than what is made known to me via your A. The important point is that I know nothing about your P beyond its structural and functional aspects, and there is more to your P than just its structural and functional aspects. Therefore I do not know a great deal about your P, and the part I do not know is precisely that part that is not expressible via A (eg, via a materialist / heterophenomenologist approach).

[Fliption]

Now is it my impression, or are you trying hard to sound wise? tsc tsc...

Hmm, what I've written seems clear and to the point to me. I apologize if my tone has shown frustration in the past. It isn't my intention to offend you at all. In this particular post I'm just trying to point out that I think you don't properly understand the zombie argument. Which is perfectly fine. I misunderstood it myself. I think you are misunderstanding it because your words are exactly what I thought when I misunderstood it. It does seem nonsensical at first glance. But once you understand how to take it (not literally) and what the real point of the illustration is, I think you'll find it to make sense. Well, you may still disgaree with it( as many people do) but I don't think you'll find it nonsensical.

[confutatis]

This is just a strawman. The article used the 'empty box' as an example for intuition, not as a directly analogous case, and for good reason; it is not directly analogous.

I never said it was, although perhaps the author said it. I haven't read the whole paper, and was only commenting on the bit about the possibility of stating paradoxes.

'Empty' is defined in such a way that the usage of the word automatically precludes any notion of 'containment.'

I can assure you that quite a few people think words don't preclude anything. If you go to a Catholic mass, the priest will assure you that what he drinks after consecration is the blood of Christ, even as it came from a bottle of wine, smells like wine, tastes like wine, and would definitely be classified as 'wine' as a result of a chemical analysis. I'm a Catholic myself, but I don't understand why they have to claim all sorts of nonsense like that. My guess is that the nonsense has the specific purpose of confounding the faithful, but I'm only guessing.

'A-consciousness' is not defined in such a way that the usage of the word automatically entails some sort of P-consciousness.

Well, sometimes the paradox implied by some definitions is not clear to see. For instance, it wasn't immediately obvious to Newton that the idea of a fully deterministic universe would lead to a paradox. In fact it took centuries for everyone to be convinced that the Newtonian universe ultimately made no sense, even though people always intuitively knew that.

I think both Chalmers' and Dennett's approach lead to paradoxes, but I realize few people are capable of contemplating that possibility.

That you equate the two so strongly makes you, at least in this instance, a functionalist in the strongest sense.

I do not equate the two, I think we don't have a good way of defining what's different about them, even as I perceive them to be different. It's a problem of finding the right way to define concepts so that our definitions agree with our perception. As it is today, neither Chalmers' nor Dennett's definitions make much sense, and in the end all these discussions are about personal choices - each side chooses one aspect as relevant and dismisses the contradictions as irrelevant.

By this reasoning, Ned Block's Chinese Gym (a gym filled with people communicating via walkie talkie such that each performs the function of a neuron and that the whole mirrors the function of a human brain) is P-consciousness and it's absolutely illogical not to think so. Who knows, the Chinese Gym may actually be P-conscious... but I wouldn't say it was so obvious as to think it completely illogical to think otherwise. Would you?

"Obvious" is relative. Before Newton, it was obvious that the universe was non-deterministic. After Newton it became obvious that it was deterministic. Nowadays quantum mechanics has made it obvious that the universe is non-deterministic. Whether a thing is obvious or not doesn't seem relevant to me.

However, I don't think much can be said about your Chinese Gym, since from my perspective the very concept of consciousness does not fit the facts very well. In fact, the Chinese Gym is a good example of how it's difficult to know when to describe something as conscious or not. I definitely think we need a novel approach, but I wouldn't be foolish to suggest one by myself. I'll wait for someone famous to do it.

[confutatis]

I apologize if my tone has shown frustration in the past.

I don't mind the frustration, but I really hate to be "psychoanalyzed" the way you and Sleeth so often do. I have nothing against psychoanalysis, I realize many people pay for such services and are often pleased with the results; I just don't like it when people use their shallow notions of psychology to make claims about a person they know very little about. That truly irks me.

It isn't my intention to offend you at all.

I'm never offended; it's just that I often have a feeling that I might as well talk to my cat, as the chances of mutual understanding seem higher sometimes. At least the cat will just walk away when he gets bored, instead of throwing meaningless psychobabble at me.

Now let's leave that aside and try to have an intelligent discussion one more time...

In this particular post I'm just trying to point out that I think you don't properly understand the zombie argument.

It's fair enough that you think that, but it's not true.

I misunderstood it myself.

Which happens to differ from my experience, because I used to think Chalmers was right, and now I think he has left out a very important fact.

I think you are misunderstanding it because your words are exactly what I thought when I misunderstood it.

Did you ever thought the problem with Chalmers' argument had to do with semantics? I never got that from your posts.

It does seem nonsensical at first glance.

It didn't seem nonsensical at my first glance. I actually thought it made perfect sense. Then I learned something and I came to think it makes some sense, but it's not perfect. It is definitely at odds with known facts, although exactly why is not easy to see, otherwise Chalmers himself would have seen it.

But once you understand how to take it (not literally) and what the real point of the illustration is

If I'm not to take an argument literally, then I'm not to take its implications literally. I have no problem with doing that whatsoever; I enjoy all kinds of stuff that cannot be taken literally and find great meaning in them, more meaning in fact than with things that should be taken literally. I'm often profoundly moved by things other people perceive as garbage.

Perhaps that is what I'm missing. Perhaps Chalmers' argument is not supposed to make much sense, it's supposed to inspire and move you. Maybe it's supposed to show die-hard materialists that there are things forever beyond the reach of science. If that is really what it is, then I rest my case. But if it is supposed to be a rational argument about a scientific subject, then I still see problems.

[Fliption]

That truly irks me.


I have my pet peeves as well. The funny thing is that when someone does these things it causes me to do the very thing that irks you. :grumpy: It's simply because I associate (perhaps incorrectly) my pet peeves with certain personal characteristics.


Did you ever thought the problem with Chalmers' argument had to do with semantics? I never got that from your posts.


Let's make sure I'm being clear to you. I'm not really referring to Chalmers argument as a whole. I have been and still am willing to hear a different perspective on these things. I'm talking specifically about the zombie exercise, which is only a piece of Chalmers argument. It is your comments on this piece that sound as if you don't understand it fully. For example, you have taken issue with the "other worlds" that hypnagouge mentions. You seem to be saying that it doesn't make sense for someone to make a world with new laws and claim that something is possible there and then extrapolate that to our own world as a possibility. Well, of course I agree with this. This would be an awful way to prove anything is possible in our world. But this isn't what the exercise is intended to do. It is a thought exercise to illustrate the difference between what hypnagogue calls "nomological" and "logical" possibility. So it really has nothing to do with other worlds. If you understand what he means by these terms then you may not need this illustration tool and you may very well have valid points to dispute his points but disputing "other worlds" isn't getting to it.

The whole issue to me (and hypnagogue can correct me if he thinks I misrepresent things) is about whether the body of knowledge and ability from the materialists pardigm can conceive of a reason why humans must be conscious, given what it knows about how the brain etc works. This doesn't mean that you and I can't go into a room and come up with some a'priori reason why this must be the case. Chalmers is making a claim about materialism's ability to do these things.

[confutatis]

It is a thought exercise to illustrate the difference between what hypnagogue calls "nomological" and "logical" possibility. So it really has nothing to with other worlds. If you understand what he means by these terms then you may not need this illustration tool and you may very well have valid points to dispute them but disputing "other worlds" isn't getting to it.

I don't dispute the fact that there are things that cannot be explained. You seem to think I'm of the opinion that consciousness can be fully explained in physical terms, whereas my position is that what you have in mind when you think about the hard problem cannot be explained at all. You suggest we need a new paradigm to explain consciousness, I maintain no such paradigm can possibly exist.

The whole issue to me is about whether the body of knowledge and ability from the materialists paradigm can conceive of a reason why humans must be conscious, given what it knows about how the brain etc works. This doesn't mean that you and I can't go into a room and come up with some a'priori reason why this must be the case. Chalmers is making a claim about materialism's ability to do these things.

I fully understand that. Chalmers is trying to show that materialism fails to answer some questions that are meaningful from the materialist point of view itself. In other words, that the materialistic worldview is incomplete. I have no problem with that; the problem I have is with the notion that there exists some paradigm which explains consciousness better than the current one. There isn't, and nobody, not even Chalmers, has come up with one yet.

[Fliption]

the problem I have is with the notion that there exists some paradigm which explains consciousness better than the current one. There isn't, and nobody, not even Chalmers, has come up with one yet.

Ahhh, finally! Well, I think we agree on this!

I know I've used the phrase " a new paradigm" but maybe I misled when I used it. I'm not familiar enough with what Chalmers thinks about this to comment on it but my thoughts are that a "new paradigm" cannot explain consciousness. It only finds a place for it. As you said, Materialism assumes something about consciousness that Chalmers attempts to show is inconsistent. The "new paradigm" wouldn't explain consciousness; It would only make an assumption about it that is consistent with the rest of the paradigm. The assumption that consciousness is a fundamental property of reality and not an effect of more fundamental material parts. While this puts a sort of "fix" on the problem, I agree it doesn't really explain anything. But I'm not sure how one explains anything that is fundamental since typically the act of explaining something involves equating it to its more basic constituent parts. Are matter and energy considered explained? Maybe Chalmers thinks so, but I don't think I do.

[confutatis]

I know I've used the phrase " a new paradigm" but maybe I misled when I used it.

So I'm not the only one being cryptic? That's good to know.

I'm not familiar enough with what Chalmers thinks about this to comment on it but my thoughts are that a "new paradigm" cannot explain consciousness. It only finds a place for it.

Most religions provide paradigms that accomodate consciousness just the way we experience it. In fact, that is the reason I take religion seriously and regard it as more important than science.

Look at this for instance: materialists says love is the result of a chemical reaction, religion says love is something God expects of people. I find the religious explanation far easier to understand and accept than the materialistic one. I'm perfectly happy with the scientific paradigm so long as I have religion to explain that which science cannot.

The "new paradigm" wouldn't explain consciousness; It would only make an assumption about it that is consistent with the rest of the paradigm.

Look, you just said you are not all-knowing or smarter than anyone else. Do you think if that could be done, or if there were any advantage to it, people smarter than you and I wouldn't have done it already?

I'm not sure how one explains anything that is fundamental since typically the act of explaining something involves equating it to its more basic constituent parts.

The problem with consciousness is deeper than that. The reason consciousness can't be explained is because you need consciousness to understand any explanation. An explanation of consciousness would amount to a description of the English language written in English - useless to people who already know English, and useless to people who don't.

But there are aspects of consciousness that can, and should, be explained. For instance, I'd love to understand why I can't get rid of my nail-biting habit. I'm quite sure a scientific, materialistic approach may reveal the answer and provide me with extremely useful knowledge. And I couldn't care less whether materialists don't believe in God so long as they give me information I can use.

Are matter and energy considered explained?

Not currently, but there are people working on it. Those are not "hard problems"; many physicists believe everything can be explained in terms of information.

[Fliption]

So I'm not the only one being cryptic? That's good to know.


I'm pretty sure I used "new paradigm". I'm not sure I actually said it "explains" consciousness. That's why I said "perhaps I have misled" . So I don't think I've been cryptic. I used cryptic to mean too brief, circular and making flashy conclusions with no adequate explanations. I don't think this is me :wink:


Most religions provide paradigms that accomodate consciousness just the way we experience it. In fact, that is the reason I take religion seriously and regard it as more important than science.

Look at this for instance: materialists says love is the result of a chemical reaction, religion says love is something God expects of people. I find the religious explanation far easier to understand and accept than the materialistic one. I'm perfectly happy with the scientific paradigm so long as I have religion to explain that which science cannot.


Great. I don't have a problem with this view of things. But somewhere there has to be a discussion of what science can and cannot explain. That's what I think is in scope for philosophy.


Look, you just said you are not all-knowing or smarter than anyone else. Do you think if that could be done, or if there were any advantage to it, people smarter than you and I wouldn't have done it already?


I don't know, ask Chalmers. I didn't come up with these ideas. But I have read them and realize that they are saying something about reality that makes more sense then what materialism is claiming. It's funny you ask me this above when I can ask the same thing about your view. Somehow everyone, including Chalmers and Dennett don't get yours. Of course, you didn't say you weren't all knowing and smarter than everyone else. I said that, so nevermind.


The problem with consciousness is deeper than that. The reason consciousness can't be explained is because you need consciousness to understand any explanation. An explanation of consciousness would amount to a description of the English language written in English - useless to people who already know English, and useless to people who don't.


I'm not saying the problem isn't deeper than that. I'm just saying at this basic level I don't think consciousness can be explained. I think your view above is similar to what Canute's been saying lately. He has been saying it a bit differently as he has been using Godel(I think) to conclude what appears to me to be the same type of conclusion.


But there are aspects of consciousness that can, and should, be explained. For instance, I'd love to understand why I can't get rid of my nail-biting habit. I'm quite sure a scientific, materialistic approach may reveal the answer and provide me with extremely useful knowledge. And I couldn't care less whether materialists don't believe in God so long as they give me information I can use.


Do you ever try to reconcile the fact that materialism works so well in these areas but then breaks down in other areas? That's what I think people like Chalmers are trying to do.


Not currently, but there are people working on it. Those are not "hard problems"; many physicists believe everything can be explained in terms of information.

To the extent that an explanation is a reductive description, there is nothing to work on. Fundamental things just are.

[confutatis]

I don't have a problem with this view of things. But somewhere there has to be a discussion of what science can and cannot explain. That's what I think is in scope for philosophy.

I don't think materialists ever claimed they can explain conscious experience. They do tend to dismiss the question, or classify experience as illusion, but they are hardly alone in their inability to properly answer every single question they may be asked. It seems to me the strength in their view comes from the fact that it is as incomplete as any other, but it has the advantage of being useful. I personally think it has the disadvantage of being ugly, but that is just my personal judgement.

But I have read them and realize that they are saying something about reality that makes more sense then what materialism is claiming.

Materalistic claims do not make much sense to people who are not materialists. That is not a problem with their view; the real problem would be if it didn't make sense to materialists themselves.

It's funny you ask me this above when I can ask the same thing about your view. Somehow everyone, including Chalmers and Dennett don't get yours.

That is because I happen to have a view that was developed by people as smart as Chalmers and Dennett, possibly more so. I don't think I am the genius you think I'm claiming to be; there's nothing original to anything I ever posted here, it's all ideas I picked up somewhere.

I think your view above is similar to what Canute's been saying lately. He has been saying it a bit differently as he has been using Godel(I think) to conclude what appears to me to be the same type of conclusion.

Godel was definitely on to it. The only problem is that his theorem does not mean what many people think it means, but I believe his theorem was just an expression of a deeper insight.

Do you ever try to reconcile the fact that materialism works so well in these areas but then breaks down in other areas?

Nope. I don't think there's anything to be reconciled, because I never thought materialism was true. Materialism lacks a solid foundation, even materialists know that. One shouldn't be bothered by the empirical success of materialism, because empirical success has nothing to do with truth.

[Fliption]

I personally think it has the disadvantage of being ugly, but that is just my personal judgement.


Heh, "ugly". I like that.


One shouldn't be bothered by the empirical success of materialism, because empirical success has nothing to do with truth.

Whoa! That's a whole new can of worms there. You'll get lots of push back on this one, as I'm sure you know.

[Mentat]

Sorry it's been so long. This thread was probably long forgotten by now. My access to the internet became almost non-existent for quite a while.

The word 'consciousness' picks out many different concepts. To facilitate precise, meaningful discussion, it is useful to pick out and refer to some of these distinguishable concepts that all exist underneath the greater hood of the word 'consciousness.'

The most general bifurcation we can make is between P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and A-consciousness (access consciousness). We've already discussed P-consciousness to death. Here's a good definition (http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?access+consciousness) of access consciousness:

access consciousness
<philosophy of mind> Also known as a-consciousness, is a kind of direct control. A representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting and action.


So, "access consciousness" is a kind of direct control...what exactly does that mean? Your definition states that a representation is access-conscious if it is poised to be under direct control of reasoning, reporting, and action.

Well, reasoning and reporting are actions, so the definition is basically saying that a representation is access-conscious if it acts so as to appear to be conscious (or, rather, so as to appear to be "p-conscious"). Now, if we take all such things as reasoning, reporting, categorization, and computation to be "actions" (of the computer in question -- in this case, the brain), then these processes would all serve as naught but indications of something else: p-consciousness. Is that right?


That is a pretty accurate description. In everyday life, we use the information made available from the A-consciousness of others to make inferences about their P-consciousnesses. Of course, a given A-conscious behavior only gives the appearance as if there is a certain P-conscious experience underlying it, an appearance that may be misleading or outright false.


So one may perform all the processes mentioned above (all the "actions"), which indicate consciousness, while never actually being conscious? Is there an action that is missing from such a case, which would leave this "zombie" falling short of p-consciousness? Or is it something else entirely? After all, if p-consciousness were an action, then it would fall under a-consciousness. But, if it's not an action, then what is it? And why do we assume it's existence, when any action that we observe to indicate it could be misleading?

I know this covers a lot of points that we'd already covered before, but I need to reprocess exactly how this point is expounded, before I can comment on it. I don't want to just repeat old arguments. Instead, I want to try and see your point without bias (if that's possible), while at the same time remembering everything I'd read, and have read since the last time we discussed this.


We need the A-consciousness of others to make judgments about their P-consciousness, so epistemically the two are deeply related. A-consciousness is our means of expressing and knowing about P-consciousness. But you are correct to note that the definition of A-consciousness does not directly refer to P-consciousness at all, and this is a key point I have been trying to establish. Your strategy to deny P thus far has been to equate P with A at the outset, but now perhaps you see that there is a bit of a conceptual wedge we can drive between the two.


Only if we assume that they both exist. I still don't get why we, a priori, accept the existence of p-consciousness, and then immediately shroud it in mystery, by stating that all the actions that indicate it can be fabricated.


It's not as simple as this, as I indicated in that thread. The conceivability argument (with zombies and such) is intimately related with the explanatory argument and the knowledge argument, such that you can't really fully grasp or fully deny any one of them without fully grasping / denying the others. The explanatory argument appears to be particularly relevant. Very briefly, it goes

[quote]
(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness; so


Is not your middle premise somewhat axiomatic...why should we assume that it is true? After all, if consciousness were, itself, a function of certain computers, then saying that an explanation of function does not suffice to explain it would be clearly inaccurate.


By way of analogy, suppose I claim that it is impossible to derive an imaginary number from the set of real numbers using only the operations of addition and multiplication. In a sense, my initial intuition here is weakly conceived, as I cannot possibly imagine every single case of adding / multiplying every permutation of numbers. But I don't need to imagine all the details. I can see underlying principles which makes my intuition true for all cases.

Deduction rather than induction. Your analogy is accurate, but not necessarily analogous. First, one must know why we assume the existence of an imaginary number in the first place. Since it is invaluable in most areas of mathematics, this is already established. But, is this the case with P-consciousness? In what fields is it so necessary that we have assumed it's existence?

As I used to mention quite frequently, there is almost always something wrong with assuming the existence of "something", and then -- only after accepting that this "something" exists -- attempting to define it and show it's relation with other things that are better understood.

It appears that the existence of something that lacks form and structure, but which is related to the thinking process, would be a very important point for neurologists (and all other such scientists of the mind), and yet it doesn't ever seem to come up. The reason for this, it seems to me, is something that you used to say quite often: You cannot discover p-consciousness through even the most in-depth study of the actions of the brain.

This either means that there is no such thing, or it means that there is such a thing, but that it has no effect on the brain or body whatsoever.

There have been other mysterious things in science's past. Dark Matter/Dark Energy is one example that comes to mind. We still don't really know what makes it up (at least, not since the last time I checked, which has been a little while now :shy:). Yet, it is completely different from p-consciousness in that the effects of its presence were noticed before its existence was postulated.

A better example would probably quarks and leptons; the fundamental particles (hopefully :wink:). You've said before that p-consciousness should be assumed to be something fundamental, and thus not built up from anything else, but independently existent. Yet, the other things that have been assumed to be fundamental (the elementary particles) were discovered by first noticing effects, and then postulating causes. P-consciousness, OTOH, seems to be first postulated and then justified (or so some hope) by observing some effects.

Forgive me for going on as I have, but it's been a while...I just wanted to make sure I was coherent.

[hypnagogue]

I still think you're coming at the problem slightly askew via your insistence on stating that P-consciousness is assumed. P-consciousness is certainly routinely assumed in the third person case; I readily assume you are P-conscious, despite my lack of direct evidence of your phenomenal perceptions, on the basis of indirect evidence in the form of your A-conscious actions, your status as a fellow human being, etc. (Direct evidence of your phenomenal experiences could only be constituted, I believe, if I were to myself experience your experiences, which is impossible as far as anyone knows.)

However, the 3rd person case is not the only ontologically relevant perspective to consider, even if limiting ourselves to an idealized attempt at purely 3rd person investigation has proved to be epistemically fruitful in science. In the 1st person case, P-consciousness is not an assumption; in fact, it couldn't be anything farther from an assumption. To deny that I experience certain phenomenal qualities when I look at a soda can is no better than denying that there exists a site on the internet called Physics Forums with a member who calls himself Mentat. With no means of objectively demonstrating such phenomenal qualities, we are left with a tension between solving a puzzle whose pieces don't seem to fit or simply throwing out one of the pieces. To construct a truly honest and comprehensive picture of reality, we must not throw away any of the pieces nature gives to us, regardless of how daunting or strange the consequences may be.

One fact well worth noting is that, from the 1st person perspective of a human, P-consciousness and A-consciousness appear to be deeply intertwined. If I appreciate the beauty of the sky and make the A-conscious utterance "the sky is beautiful today," I take it straightforwardly that what has moved me to say this is the sky's rich blueness, perhaps the shapes of the clouds, and so on: my P-conscious experience of it. You were correct to point out the inherent difficulty here-- if we say that P straightforwardly led to A, then in accordance with the definitions we should redefine P as A, seemingly leaving no more room for P.

I think the problem here is our tendency to treat P as if it must fit in a chain of events, somehow reifying it by classifying it along the same lines as we are accustomed to so expertly classifying and analyzing physical phenomena. But all philosophical investigation points to the suggestion that P is something entirely distinct from a physical phenomenon, and thus we should not fall into the trap of conceptualizing it as if it were just that.

I believe the most promising approach is to regard P not as a piece of the pattern in the tapestry of reality, but rather to regard it as the very material from which the tapestry is fashioned (the intrinsic), which supports the existence of abstract patterns of relationships (the extrinsic-- physical phenomena). On this view, P-consciousness (or at least some very primitive, alien form of it) is that elusive something sought by Hawkings that breathes fire into the (extrinsic) equations described by physics. Gregg Rosenberg advances a very sophisticated and promising (and of course, much more thorough) version of this thesis in his upcoming book "A Place for Consciousness," set to be released this fall. (He has a preliminary version online located at http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html-- I believe the final version will be edited significantly, but if you're curious this will probably be enough to give you a good idea of the basic points.)

[Mentat]

I still think you're coming at the problem slightly askew via your insistence on stating that P-consciousness is assumed. P-consciousness is certainly routinely assumed in the third person case; I readily assume you are P-conscious, despite my lack of direct evidence of your phenomenal perceptions, on the basis of indirect evidence in the form of your A-conscious actions, your status as a fellow human being, etc. (Direct evidence of your phenomenal experiences could only be constituted, I believe, if I were to myself experience your experiences, which is impossible as far as anyone knows.)

However, the 3rd person case is not the only ontologically relevant perspective to consider, even if limiting ourselves to an idealized attempt at purely 3rd person investigation has proved to be epistemically fruitful in science. In the 1st person case, P-consciousness is not an assumption; in fact, it couldn't be anything farther from an assumption. To deny that I experience certain phenomenal qualities when I look at a soda can is no better than denying that there exists a site on the internet called Physics Forums with a member who calls himself Mentat. With no means of objectively demonstrating such phenomenal qualities, we are left with a tension between solving a puzzle whose pieces don't seem to fit or simply throwing out one of the pieces. To construct a truly honest and comprehensive picture of reality, we must not throw away any of the pieces nature gives to us, regardless of how daunting or strange the consequences may be.


But what is this "piece"? Is it something that we experience from a 1st-person PoV, or is it the 1st-person PoV itself? If it is merely the ability for conscious awareness of the world from a 1st-person vantage point, then I don't see what the big issue is...honestly, from what other reference point could a being actually percieve the world? To be sure, there is a bit more involved in having a 1st-person perspective, like self-consciousness (awareness of the fact that you exist as an entity separate from other entities). But this is really just another action, which occurs in some of the most primitive of beings on Earth (e.g. a lobster will seek out food, but will never eat itself...this gives it a sort of "special" place in its world, relative to other things, and is clearly a form of self-consciousness (albeit, a primitive one)). From an evolutionary stand-point, it is a quite logical step, that more advanced beings should be able to process their own existence (via introspection) to a much greater degree than lower beings. From a creationist stand-point the point is even easier to make. It just doesn't seem like there should be an issue at all, if it's merely about having 1st-person experience of the world with which you interact.

Now, if it is indeed something more than just the 1st-person experience itself, then it must be something experienced, in which case it itself is an objective phenomenon, processed right along with the rest of the objective phenomena in the world, by sentient beings. But, if it is an objective phenomenon, then there should be no logical problem with the idea that we will eventually reduce it in terms of function and form, just as we can with every other objective phenomenon (at least, ideally).


One fact well worth noting is that, from the 1st person perspective of a human, P-consciousness and A-consciousness appear to be deeply intertwined. If I appreciate the beauty of the sky and make the A-conscious utterance "the sky is beautiful today," I take it straightforwardly that what has moved me to say this is the sky's rich blueness, perhaps the shapes of the clouds, and so on: my P-conscious experience of it.


So the blueness of the sky is part of P-consciousness, and not A-? Is not distinguishing that the sky is one shade of blue and not some other color a categorizational activity of the brain? It is as much an action that you percieve "blueness" as that you remarked on it, is it not?


You were correct to point out the inherent difficulty here-- if we say that P straightforwardly led to A, then in accordance with the definitions we should redefine P as A, seemingly leaving no more room for P.


Perhaps it's the wording, but there appears to be something wrong with this point. If "P" leads to "A" then "P" is a distinct process from "A". To speak of one as leading to the other is to differentiate them, eliminating the opportunity for redefining "P" as "A".

On the other hand, if what we'd assumed to be something qualitatively different from an "A" function, was in fact just another "A" function, then we could indeed redefine "P" as "A", since there would have been no "P", merely complicated "A"s.

I hope that didn't seem too irrelevant, it seemed noteworthy to me.


I think the problem here is our tendency to treat P as if it must fit in a chain of events, somehow reifying it by classifying it along the same lines as we are accustomed to so expertly classifying and analyzing physical phenomena. But all philosophical investigation points to the suggestion that P is something entirely distinct from a physical phenomenon, and thus we should not fall into the trap of conceptualizing it as if it were just that.

I believe the most promising approach is to regard P not as a piece of the pattern in the tapestry of reality, but rather to regard it as the very material from which the tapestry is fashioned (the intrinsic), which supports the existence of abstract patterns of relationships (the extrinsic-- physical phenomena). On this view, P-consciousness (or at least some very primitive, alien form of it) is that elusive something sought by Hawkings that breathes fire into the (extrinsic) equations described by physics. Gregg Rosenberg advances a very sophisticated and promising (and of course, much more thorough) version of this thesis in his upcoming book "A Place for Consciousness," set to be released this fall. (He has a preliminary version online located at http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html-- I believe the final version will be edited significantly, but if you're curious this will probably be enough to give you a good idea of the basic points.)

I shall probably look at it today, but for now my question becomes (as it has in the past), if "P-consciousness" were something aside from the physical, how could it interact with the physical? Indeed, it is a point at which I had hinted earlier (however unintentionally), by mentioning the fact that neurologists never seem to run into this "P-consciousness" phenomenon; it never seems to effect anything in the brain. And yet you always define it as intrinsically related to A-consciousness, which is exactly that which these scientists are studying.

btw, It will not be necessary, on this particular occasion, to worry about what does and does not constitue "physicality" (thank God), because the postulate "P is not physical" is being taken for granted (meaning that there is such a thing as physical reality, that P is not a part of that realm, but that it still interacts with it (this last premise being based upon the definitive qualities of P)).

[hypnagogue]

But what is this "piece"? Is it something that we experience from a 1st-person PoV, or is it the 1st-person PoV itself?

It is experience itself, which really comprises both of the items on your list. I don't know of any better way to explain this than the "what it is like" and the zombie examples. (For the zombie example, forget about logical possibility and philosophical implications and all that-- just imagine yourself walking around and talking and doing everything you do, but without the attendant conscious experiences, as if you were in a deep sleep. What you are missing in this case is P-consciousness, much like as if you were sleep walking, acting in the world without P-conscious subjective experience of acting in the world.) I think these two examples make the point rather straightforwardly. When you have had difficulty with these examples in the past, has it been because you honestly could not understand what they were getting at, or because you have purely logical objections already in place?

Now, if it is indeed something more than just the 1st-person experience itself, then it must be something experienced, in which case it itself is an objective phenomenon, processed right along with the rest of the objective phenomena in the world, by sentient beings.

It's not so much the what but the how. You never literally see 600nm photons; you see this. You never literally see a mountain; you see your consciously perceived subjective model of it. We make extrapolations from our subjective experiences to construct the idea of the objective world, but everything we directly experience is only subjective experience, somehow correlated (we quite plausibly believe) with that objective world. Nothing that is experienced, in the sense of direct conscious experience, is objective. If we know anything about the objective world, it is only in virtue of systematic correlations or isomorphisms between the structure of that world and our own subjective experiences. Thus the objective can only be said to be 'experienced' in an indirect, metaphorical sense.

So the blueness of the sky is part of P-consciousness, and not A-? Is not distinguishing that the sky is one shade of blue and not some other color a categorizational activity of the brain? It is as much an action that you percieve "blueness" as that you remarked on it, is it not?

Perceptual discrimination falls under A, not P. But there is more to our experience of color than just discrimination. If it were just discrimination, we would not viscerally experience this or this; we would just behave as if they were different. But from the 1st person view, it is clear that we do more than just behave as if they were different; we subjectively experience them differently. If all you did was just perceptually discriminate them, you would be able to tell me that this is different from this, but they would not look like they do to you. They would not look like anything-- there would be no visual experience.

I shall probably look at it today, but for now my question becomes (as it has in the past), if "P-consciousness" were something aside from the physical, how could it interact with the physical?

Using the analogy I provided in my last post, this would be like asking how the fabric of a tapestry interacts with the abstract patterns woven on it. In other words, a classification error of sorts, if we are expecting the 'interaction' of the fabric with the patterns it instantiates to be of the same nature as the 'interaction' of those patterns among themselves.

Physical phenomena are characterized entirely in terms of their extrinsic, relational properties-- their patterns of interaction and tendencies to change other patterns. Thus, physics is ultimately a description of abstractions, abstract relationships and patterns. We are left with the question, what is it that supports these abstract patterns? The analogue of physics in the case of the tapestry describes in a purely abstract sense the patterns on the the tapestry, their relationships, and so on. What is it that is being patterned and related here? It is the fabric of the tapestry. Likewise, the panpsychist proposal put forth by Rosenberg is that subjective experience, in some manner, is the underlying carrier for all these abstractions described by physics. It seems to be an ideal candidate for such a role, not the least part in virtue of its seemingly intrinsic nature. Many concerns immediately arise from such a hypothesis, of course, but rather than get into those details here you would be better served reading Rosenberg's anticipation of and replies to these concerns.

Indeed, it is a point at which I had hinted earlier (however unintentionally), by mentioning the fact that neurologists never seem to run into this "P-consciousness" phenomenon; it never seems to effect anything in the brain. And yet you always define it as intrinsically related to A-consciousness, which is exactly that which these scientists are studying.

True, but they are not getting the whole story, for the same reason that studying only the patterns on a tapestry will not give us the whole story of the tapestry's nature.

[Mentat]

It is experience itself, which really comprises both of the items on your list. I don't know of any better way to explain this than the "what it is like" and the zombie examples. (For the zombie example, forget about logical possibility and philosophical implications and all that-- just imagine yourself walking around and talking and doing everything you do, but without the attendant conscious experiences, as if you were in a deep sleep. What you are missing in this case is P-consciousness, much like as if you were sleep walking, acting in the world without P-conscious subjective experience of acting in the world.)


Do you think it's actually possible, even in principle, for a being to behave exactly as though it were conscious, and yet not be? Why would the zombie behave as it does if it has no experience of the world around it? IOW, if it doesn't experience the world, how does it know what to do?


It's not so much the what but the how. You never literally see 600nm photons; you see this. You never literally see a mountain; you see your consciously perceived subjective model of it. We make extrapolations from our subjective experiences to construct the idea of the objective world, but everything we directly experience is only subjective experience, somehow correlated (we quite plausibly believe) with that objective world. Nothing that is experienced, in the sense of direct conscious experience, is objective. If we know anything about the objective world, it is only in virtue of systematic correlations or isomorphisms between the structure of that world and our own subjective experiences. Thus the objective can only be said to be 'experienced' in an indirect, metaphorical sense.


Where does "objective" end and "subjective" begin? Is there some cut-off point in the brain? Is the cut-off point just before one enters the brain? The computing model of the brain, from which most scientists appear to be working, makes "subjective" appear to simply mean "the effect that the stimulus has on the over-all structure and function of certain parts of the computer". But this does not appear to be what you mean, since there would be no subjectively-existant image of a mountain in the previous model of thinking. There would simply be the effect that the visual stimulus had on the appropriate parts of the brain.

Basically, I don't understand the use of the term "subjective" here.


Perceptual discrimination falls under A, not P. But there is more to our experience of color than just discrimination. If it were just discrimination, we would not viscerally experience this or this; we would just behave as if they were different.


So, if our visual cortexes could visually distinguish between one color and the next, this does not qualify as an experience of one color or the other, but simply as a behavior that coincides therewith? That doesn't seem right. After all, the question again becomes: why would we "behave" differently about one color than about another if we didn't experience them in the first place?


If all you did was just perceptually discriminate them, you would be able to tell me that this is different from this, but they would not look like they do to you. They would not look like anything-- there would be no visual experience.


Then how would I be able to tell you that they were different? What tips me off to their difference from one another, if it is not a computation of both with reference to each other (as well as with reference to previous encounter with such colors, and the discrimination and categorization that occured at that time)?


Using the analogy I provided in my last post, this would be like asking how the fabric of a tapestry interacts with the abstract patterns woven on it. In other words, a classification error of sorts, if we are expecting the 'interaction' of the fabric with the patterns it instantiates to be of the same nature as the 'interaction' of those patterns among themselves.


Dennett talked a bit about what you appear to be getting at. I mentioned it in a thread about the Physical, Design, and Intentional stances (probably long gone, by now). Anyway, the idea that the experience/processing of objective stimuli, by a conscious computer is of a different nature than the stimuli themselves is not directly opposed to the Physicalist position. Indeed, it (the computation/experience) is of a different nature than those individual parts which compose it (in this case, neurons, or collections thereof). However, this difference is (according to Dennett, on the topic of the three stances) purely with relation to the synergy of the many parts into a process that is then taken as an individual entity, greater than the sum of its parts. It's like the process of natural selection, in nature. Natural selection and evolution stand out as irreducible "entities" (if the term may be used loosely) since a reduction of them, into the many sub-processes involved, will not give the full flavor of the greater "entity". But that doesn't mean that it isn't a physical process, or that there's something other than the physical involved. It just means that the complex behaviors of many physical parts, taken together as a dynamic synergy, produce a gestalt of sorts, which may be conceived of on its own.

Another example is a symphony. There is nothing about a symphony that can't be reduced to the physical vibrations produced by the individual instruments involved, but the symphony still exists as a distinct "entity". Indeed, this fact is borne out all the more so, when one realizes that a symphony can exists on more than one medium (e.g. it could be in written form, on a sheet of paper).


Physical phenomena are characterized entirely in terms of their extrinsic, relational properties-- their patterns of interaction and tendencies to change other patterns.


Physical phenomena, sure. Physical elements themselves, not really. The patterns of behavior to which you refer are reduced to more fundamental processes, and so on until you reach the most elementary particles and spacetime itself.

[Mentat]

Here's that thread, btw: http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=24993

[hypnagogue]

Do you think it's actually possible, even in principle, for a being to behave exactly as though it were conscious, and yet not be?

I wasn't talking about logical possibility. I was trying to pinpoint what I mean by P-consciousness. We can't discuss more advanced issues if you can't acknowledge an understanding of the basic terms.

Basically, I don't understand the use of the term "subjective" here.

Unsurprisingly. :wink: I mean subjective in the same way I mean P-conscious.

So, if our visual cortexes could visually distinguish between one color and the next, this does not qualify as an experience of one color or the other, but simply as a behavior that coincides therewith? That doesn't seem right. After all, the question again becomes: why would we "behave" differently about one color than about another if we didn't experience them in the first place?

Do you think a computer is conscious? If not, do you think it behaves differently according to what inputs are fed into it?

If the case of the computer is contentious, use an atom instead. An atom is a system that behaves differently according to its 'inputs.' Is an atom conscious? If not, why does it behave differently according to different inputs?

Then how would I be able to tell you that they were different? What tips me off to their difference from one another, if it is not a computation of both with reference to each other (as well as with reference to previous encounter with such colors, and the discrimination and categorization that occured at that time)?

I didn't preclude neural computations from the mix. Some sort of computation would be exactly what would tip you off. The point is that subjective experience cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of computation. You seem to be begging the question by consistently equating the two, when that is the issue that is up for grabs to begin with.

Dennett talked a bit about what you appear to be getting at. [snip]

We've been down that road plenty of times. I don't see the point in endlessly reiterating our stances. Physical phenomena logically entail symphonies and the like (excluding, of course, the subjective experience of hearing a symphony or the like); they don't logically entail P-consciousness.

Physical phenomena, sure. Physical elements themselves, not really. The patterns of behavior to which you refer are reduced to more fundamental processes, and so on until you reach the most elementary particles and spacetime itself.

Physics makes no claims about fundamental particles or spacetime beyond these entities' power to affect eachother, be it realized (as in a description of an atom smasher) or only potential (as in, say, a single fundamental particle isolated in a vacuum). To physics, an elementary particle has no properties beyond those which can influence other physical properties; spacetime has no properties beyond those that explicitly relate to particles and the like; etc. To make a claim about an intrinsic property would be to make a claim about a property that is not defined by its propensity for interaction, in other words something undetectable even in principle by physical instruments. Physics remains silent about intrinsic properties.

[Mentat]

I wasn't talking about logical possibility. I was trying to pinpoint what I mean by P-consciousness. We can't discuss more advanced issues if you can't acknowledge an understanding of the basic terms.


But the term is only useful if it is an actual distinction. Not to draw parallel between the mystery of life and the mystery of consciousness (as I have done in the past), but can it not be said that "life" would be a completely irrelevant distinction if there is no possible way for a being to perform all the functions of living and yet not be alive?

What I mean is that I can't see the point of acknowledging a distinction that can never actually exist, even in principle.


Unsurprisingly. :wink: I mean subjective in the same way I mean P-conscious.


:uhh:


Do you think a computer is conscious? If not, do you think it behaves differently according to what inputs are fed into it?


I think you are a computer, and I think you are conscious. I also think my PC is conscious to some extent, but not to the same extent that I am. Consciousness refers to it's ability to interact, which is quite limited.


If the case of the computer is contentious, use an atom instead. An atom is a system that behaves differently according to its 'inputs.' Is an atom conscious? If not, why does it behave differently according to different inputs?


It reacts. We interact. And we do so with purpose. My real question is not "how can a zombie interact, if it does not experience the world?" it is "how can/why would a zombie interact in that particular manner if it does not experience the world?".


I didn't preclude neural computations from the mix. Some sort of computation would be exactly what would tip you off. The point is that subjective experience cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of computation. You seem to be begging the question by consistently equating the two, when that is the issue that is up for grabs to begin with.


I equate the two because I don't see anything lacking from pure computation...if I did see some lack, then I would see the need to fill it with a new concept (like P-consciousness).


We've been down that road plenty of times. I don't see the point in endlessly reiterating our stances. Physical phenomena logically entail symphonies and the like (excluding, of course, the subjective experience of hearing a symphony or the like); they don't logically entail P-consciousness.


I agree. The most solid definitions of P-consciousness I've seen have actually included the necessity that they be beyond the physical functions and structures, thus precluding that the opposite be the case (by virtue of the very meaning of the term being used).

I just don't know that P-consciousness (here defined as: that part of experience that is beyond the function and structure of computation) exists in the first place.


Physics makes no claims about fundamental particles or spacetime beyond these entities' power to affect eachother, be it realized (as in a description of an atom smasher) or only potential (as in, say, a single fundamental particle isolated in a vacuum). To physics, an elementary particle has no properties beyond those which can influence other physical properties; spacetime has no properties beyond those that explicitly relate to particles and the like; etc. To make a claim about an intrinsic property would be to make a claim about a property that is not defined by its propensity for interaction, in other words something undetectable even in principle by physical instruments. Physics remains silent about intrinsic properties.

Do not theories such as LQG and SMT attempt to define the properties of the particles themselves? Indeed, from my very limited knowledge of LQG, it appears to also focus on the very properties of spacetime itself. Sure, up to now, physics has not touched on the nature of the fundamental entities, but one must also notice that, up to now, physics has not been able to unite -- or fully understand the relationship between -- the two best theories it has for understanding how those entities behave. They are still taken as the fundamental constituents of the Universe, and (according to the aforementioned "best theories") are the "fabric" on which the patterns of behavior and interaction occur.

[hypnagogue]

But the term is only useful if it is an actual distinction. Not to draw parallel between the mystery of life and the mystery of consciousness (as I have done in the past), but can it not be said that "life" would be a completely irrelevant distinction if there is no possible way for a being to perform all the functions of living and yet not be alive?

It is an actual distinction. The functions of life exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'life' means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of life simply follows from them. The functions of the brain do not exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'consciousness' (or rather, P-consciousness) means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of P-consciousness still does not follow. At best, given a complete functional understanding of the brain, we would have to posulate additional psychophysical laws to map the functions onto facets of P-conscious experience (eg, 40 hz oscillation in area X of the visual cortex maps onto visual experience of redness). The need for such ad hoc psychophysical laws is a direct consequence of the fact that the physical, functional description of the brain does not suffice to entail P-consciousness; there is something 'extra' that such an account omits.

It reacts. We interact. And we do so with purpose. My real question is not "how can a zombie interact, if it does not experience the world?" it is "how can/why would a zombie interact in that particular manner if it does not experience the world?".

Interaction is really just an elaborate kind of reaction, at least going by the physicalist picture.

The physicalist picture also offers an account of how a human agent could go about interacting in such and such a manner without experience, because there is nothing in the physicalist picture that takes experience into account in the first place. Given a physical description of a functional brain, it follows rather straightforwardly (conceptually, at least) how photons impinging on the retina could lead to a chain reaction of neural activity culminating in the utterance of the phrase "I see red." Here we have an elaborate story detailing human interaction in the world without any reference to, or entailing of, phenomenal experience. We have reference to photons and neurons, which logically entail an utterance. Nowhere do we have this, the phenomenal percept presumably subjectively experienced by our human agent.

I equate the two because I don't see anything lacking from pure computation...if I did see some lack, then I would see the need to fill it with a new concept (like P-consciousness).

There is nothing lacking from pure computation, if we seek to describe the objective phenomena. There is only something lacking if we consider the subjective phenomena. And besides, P-consciousness is not a hypothesized entity that we drum up in the service of explanation; it is an experienced entity, a given in nature, for which we seek an explanation. If it were the former, we would be free to throw it away whenever we wished, as you continually propose; as it is actually the latter, we cannot ignore it unless we are satisfied with an incomplete account of reality.

Do not theories such as LQG and SMT attempt to define the properties of the particles themselves?

The level of nature described is irrelevant; what matters is how the properties themselves are defined. Extrinsic properties are defined in relational terms, and it should be clear that all the properties described by physics are relational properties. If physics were to describe a property in something other than relational terms, it would follow that that property could not be measured, clearly a violation of physics' objective epistemology.

[Mentat]

It is an actual distinction. The functions of life exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'life' means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of life simply follows from them. The functions of the brain do not exhaustively characterize our notion of what 'consciousness' (or rather, P-consciousness) means; completely describe the functions, and the phenomenon of P-consciousness still does not follow. At best, given a complete functional understanding of the brain, we would have to posulate additional psychophysical laws to map the functions onto facets of P-conscious experience (eg, 40 hz oscillation in area X of the visual cortex maps onto visual experience of redness). The need for such ad hoc psychophysical laws is a direct consequence of the fact that the physical, functional description of the brain does not suffice to entail P-consciousness; there is something 'extra' that such an account omits.


I agree that no level of comprehension of the physical functions will ever explain P-consciousness...I'm just not convinced that it needs explaining, because I'm not convinced that it exists.

Besides, the concept of "life" is actually not as completely understood as you make it seem. In fact, most of the good definitions of "life" (the ones that include all things which we naturally deem "living") must also include such things as viruses and fire. What I'm saying is that there can be an entity which performs all of the functions necessary for being called "alive", and yet not really be alive...but, is it that there's something missing from this entity (something illusive, and non-physical), or is it that "life" is a meaningless distinction, which should simply be discarded, because it clouds the issues?


Interaction is really just an elaborate kind of reaction, at least going by the physicalist picture.

The physicalist picture also offers an account of how a human agent could go about interacting in such and such a manner without experience, because there is nothing in the physicalist picture that takes experience into account in the first place. Given a physical description of a functional brain, it follows rather straightforwardly (conceptually, at least) how photons impinging on the retina could lead to a chain reaction of neural activity culminating in the utterance of the phrase "I see red."


I don't see why verbal utterance is always the end-result in a physicalist approach. Why not go to the point just before this utterance, when the visual cortex processed the "red" stimulus? Of course, there was no end result to this computation (quite obviously so, considering the fact that the red was probably a part of a bigger picture (not all of which was red), around which the eyes' saccades were visiting and re-visiting different parts to get greater amounts of information about the bigger picture), it is an on-going process -- still occuring when the person makes the utterance. That is one of the reasons I don't like reference to "experience" as though it were an event. Experiencing the color red was not one event, but a set of events, which culminated naught, but which brought forth a general conclusion with regard to the utterance made.


Here we have an elaborate story detailing human interaction in the world without any reference to, or entailing of, phenomenal experience. We have reference to photons and neurons, which logically entail an utterance. Nowhere do we have this, the phenomenal percept presumably subjectively experienced by our human agent.


Well, it should be assumed that the human agent had been (and probably still was) experiencing/processing the "red" stimulus. That isn't left out of a physicalist account, it's just usually glossed-over, since the exact neural processes involved in the categorization, memorization, &c are not yet perfectly understood.


There is nothing lacking from pure computation, if we seek to describe the objective phenomena. There is only something lacking if we consider the subjective phenomena. And besides, P-consciousness is not a hypothesized entity that we drum up in the service of explanation; it is an experienced entity, a given in nature, for which we seek an explanation. If it were the former, we would be free to throw it away whenever we wished, as you continually propose; as it is actually the latter, we cannot ignore it unless we are satisfied with an incomplete account of reality.


Interesting. Experience is an experienced entity? Does one always experience the fact that they are experiencing, or does one usually just experience the phenomenon and move on without giving a second thought to the concept of having experienced it? The point I'm making is that there seems to be no difficulty accepting that "subjective experience" is the equivalent of "1st-person computation" until you consider the ability to experience the fact that one is experiencing (i.e. until one introspects). Yet, if it could be accepted that all of the experiences we have while not introspecting are just 1st-person computation, then the experience of experience would be a meta-computation; a computation about previous computations. This is still something for which physicalist theory could account.


The level of nature described is irrelevant; what matters is how the properties themselves are defined. Extrinsic properties are defined in relational terms, and it should be clear that all the properties described by physics are relational properties. If physics were to describe a property in something other than relational terms, it would follow that that property could not be measured, clearly a violation of physics' objective epistemology.

First off, there are a lot of properties that cannot be exactly measured, as per the HUP.

Secondly, if physics attempts to describe some particular aspect of the physical nature (e.g. the shape) of some fundamental entity, then it is not describing any relation, just an intrinsic property. The superstring theory (as one example) has done just that.

Finally, the issue at hand (which brought forth this discussion of physics epistemology) is whether physics can identify the fundamental entities at work in the Universe, instead of just describing their relationships with each other. It becomes clear that it can, when one looks at current Theoretical Physics.

[hypnagogue]

Besides, the concept of "life" is actually not as completely understood as you make it seem. In fact, most of the good definitions of "life" (the ones that include all things which we naturally deem "living") must also include such things as viruses and fire. What I'm saying is that there can be an entity which performs all of the functions necessary for being called "alive", and yet not really be alive...but, is it that there's something missing from this entity (something illusive, and non-physical), or is it that "life" is a meaningless distinction, which should simply be discarded, because it clouds the issues?

I agree with you that the varying definitions of life that one finds are, to some degree, arbitrary. When one tries to define life rigorously, one often finds phenomena slipping into the category that one wouldn't have called 'alive' to begin with. But this is irrelevant to my point, which is simply that life, under any construal, is just an assembly of functional properties (metabolism, reproduction, etc.), and so is amenable to an entirely functional explanation. With consciousness, we have direct first-person evidence of pure, intrinsic properties. Not all the targeted explanandums in consciousness are functional in nature, unlike the situation with life.

This, for example, is not entirely defined by 'what it does'; there is the added component of 'what it looks like.' And no, 'what it looks like' cannot be exhaustively described by 'what the brain does.' I know you are going to contend this, but we've discussed this ad nauseam already, so perhaps I'm just not communicating well enough. Please see chapter 2 of Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness, The Argument Against Physicalism (http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr2.htm), for a sophisticated and in depth review of my position.

Well, it should be assumed that the human agent had been (and probably still was) experiencing/processing the "red" stimulus. That isn't left out of a physicalist account, it's just usually glossed-over, since the exact neural processes involved in the categorization, memorization, &c are not yet perfectly understood.

You continue to equivocate and beg the question. Physicalism refers to the visual processing of the photons; it does not refer to the experiential property of redness. These are not the same thing, and the former does not entail the latter. Please see the text.

First off, there are a lot of properties that cannot be exactly measured, as per the HUP.

You do not need to be able to measure exactly in order to conduct the activity of measurement.

Secondly, if physics attempts to describe some particular aspect of the physical nature (e.g. the shape) of some fundamental entity, then it is not describing any relation, just an intrinsic property. The superstring theory (as one example) has done just that.

The concept of shape is meaningless without reference to some pattern of structural relationships among the extensions along the object's dimensions. Even if we assume that there is a most fundamental kind of string that cannot be divided into further strings, if we claim that this string has a shape in any meaningful sense, we are making a purely structural, relational claim. This is born out by the fact that, for any given shape of any given string, we could completely characterize the nature of its shape simply by plotting a series of points in the proper way on a suitably constructed set of axes. We can do this because shape is an abstract property describing relationships and nothing else. If shape were an intrinsic property, we would expect that there is something about the nature of the string's shape that is omitted once we have duplicated its relational aspects, but this is not the case. Remember, an intrinsic property is one that cannot be exhaustively characterized in terms of a system of relationships.

Finally, the issue at hand (which brought forth this discussion of physics epistemology) is whether physics can identify the fundamental entities at work in the Universe, instead of just describing their relationships with each other. It becomes clear that it can, when one looks at current Theoretical Physics.

No, that is not the issue at all. The issue is whether physics describes intrinsic properties at work in the universe. The fundamental entities that physics describes are still characterized in purely relational terms, what Rosenberg calls bare differences. Again, please see chapter 2 as linked above for a better account of what I'm getting at.

[Mentat]

Well, Hypna, I read a good deal of that chapter, and I have some responses:

1) With regard to "bare differences" and the relational way in which physics looks at entities, I guess your pretty much right. What I'm wondering (and what may have caused my initial rejection of the concept) is whether the description of intrinsic properties is logically possible at all. Logic works on truth values, and truth values only have properties as they relate to each other. There is nothing instrinsically describable about "truth" or "falsehood". "False" just isn't "true" and vice versa. So why should science (a logical construct) seek to explain anything intrinsic, when such explanation would be outside the realm of both logic and empiricism (which is, itself, a logical construct)?

2) With regard to "Mary". It was quite enlightening, with regard to your position, since it now appears that your objection to physicalism is that it usually focuses on the processes by which one becomes conscious, and not on the consciousness itself. This is where the separation of A- and P-consciousness would come in, if such a distinction were valid. However, as Edelmann has pointed out in both of his major books (Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, and A Universe of Consciousness) a scientific explanation never explains anything but the process, the circumstances that are conducive to that process, and how to reproduce those circumstances. He gives the example of a hurricane, but I will use the example of gravity (I know I have before, but I think I've got a different slant on it this time):

Gravity has been explained in terms of a "push", a "pull", a pre-programmed change in inertia, and (the currently excepted explanation) a curvature of space-time itself by the presence of mass. However, the scientists (and crackpots) who have devised their versions of the aforementioned explanations have -- it appears -- been completely concerned with what causes gravity, instead of the gravity itself. Regardless of whether it is caused by a curvature of spacetime or a bombardment of neutrinos (yes, that actually was a circulating hypothesis on the web), we are still not addressing the intrinsic properties of gravity, only the circumstances conducive to it, and the things that may be required to produce it. Because of this distinction, I can imagine a case where the curvature is there, but the particle does not move in the prescribed direction, because nothing has yet explained to me the explicit necessity of a curvature to entail gravity.

I'm purposefully using some of the words that are used both in the referenced book and in the few bits of Chalmers that I've read (usually just references to it by other philosophers), but replacing "consciousness" with "gravity" and "computation" with "curvature".

Do you see what I'm getting at? Science does not explain intrinsic properties because it has no need to. Indeed, it is the scientific stance (science being a physicalist approach) that the explanation of a phenomenon can be complete without such inspection into intrinsic properties.

[hypnagogue]

Well, Hypna, I read a good deal of that chapter, and I have some responses:

Thanks.

1) With regard to "bare differences" and the relational way in which physics looks at entities, I guess your pretty much right. What I'm wondering (and what may have caused my initial rejection of the concept) is whether the description of intrinsic properties is logically possible at all. Logic works on truth values, and truth values only have properties as they relate to each other. There is nothing instrinsically describable about "truth" or "falsehood". "False" just isn't "true" and vice versa. So why should science (a logical construct) seek to explain anything intrinsic, when such explanation would be outside the realm of both logic and empiricism (which is, itself, a logical construct)?

Intrinsic properties are not entirely defineable in terms of conceptual systems consisting only of sets of bare differences and their relationships. (I'll call such systems 'schematic systems.') But this does not imply that the natures of intrinsic properties are entirely elusive to schematic analysis. Those aspects of intrinsic properties that schematic systems can capture are precisely their relational aspects.

You may be wondering just how we can know about the nature of intrinsic properties as thus construed, and how it can be possible for intrinsic properties to enter into systems of relations in the first place. The paradigmatic case here is phenomenal consciousness. With P-consciousness, we have evidence of the existence of intrinsic properties via a direct, immediate acquaintance with them. We do not need to discover them schematically, since their nature is directly apparent to us. (In Rosenberg's framework, this is possible because there is a sense in which phenomenal properties compose or realize the schematic systems of relationships described by physics (such as a human brain), rather than 'being produced by' or 'interacting with' them.) Indeed, we cannot discover phenomenal properties only via a schematic system, which accounts for why I can know all the facts about the brain of, say, a bat, without having complete knowledge of the bat's phenomenal experiences. At the very best, I can extract the schematic set of relationships into which its phenomenal percepts engage, but I cannot know if sounds sound qualitatively the same way to it as they do to me.

We can make sense of the concept of a system of relationships existing among intrinsic properties by a similar appeal to P-consciousness. For example, some colors appear to us qualitatively brighter than others (a scalar relationship), and the occurence of some phenomenal properties appear to either necessitate or exclude others (a conditional inclusion/exclusion relationship), such as how brightness seems to necessitate hue, or how the appearance of a necker cube as facing up excludes the experience of seeing it as facing down.

What is the upshot for science? Science studies schematic systems of relationships, so it appears that science can at least reveal to us, in principle, the systems of relationships existing among intrinsic properties. The question of how to ascertain the existence of such intrinsic properties in the first place finds the beginning of an answer by noticing correlations between directly experienced phenomenal experiences and physical activity occuring in the brain, and attempting to inductively generate general conditions for the existence of phenomenal consciousness from the observed specific cases (no news there). Rosenberg argues to great effect for a revised conception of causation, resulting in a framework that appears to make that inductive procedure more tractable (in addition to addressing simultaneously a host of problems involving in causation, consciousness, and their theoretical overlap).

I know, again, that you probably have a number of objections to some of the things I've said here, and that I've invariably left holes in the argument by giving such a brief overview. Again, I'd like to refer you specifically to the text, this time chapter 12: The Carrier Theory of Causation (http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm). You should be able to extract the force of the arguments given here (up until section 12.4) without suffering too much from having skipped the previous chapters. Be aware, however, that this chapter does not contain the entire content (or even most of the content) of Rosenberg's revised framework for causation, and also that he uses the terms 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' a little differently than I have been using them here. (Basically, he generalizes the concepts to apply to a range of cases and refers to the kind of bottom-line intrinsic property I have been talking about here as 'intrinsic tout court.')

That's all I have time for right now, but I'll get back to the remaining parts of your post later.

[Philocrat]

Subjective Eperience dispute is out of date. The argument is no longer about whether subjective experience exists or is defineable or is explainable, but wholly about how much of it is already passively transmitted and extended outward to the objective realm. The logical implication of those who claim that subjective experience may not exist afterall merely implies that subjective experience is already causally and functionally objective. The algorithm should quite rightly deduce that subjective consciousness is objective consciousness, and that if there were any difference at all it would be that the former is wholly dependent upon the latter for self-realisation.

[hypnagogue]

Sorry for the long layoff; I've just returned from a long trip.

2) With regard to "Mary". It was quite enlightening, with regard to your position, since it now appears that your objection to physicalism is that it usually focuses on the processes by which one becomes conscious, and not on the consciousness itself.

A better characterization of the objection would be to say that there is no theoretical connection between the processes by which one supposedly becomes conscious and the consciousness itself. There is no compelling reason to believe, a priori, that the brain doing such and such should be associated with the qualitative perception of a color, for example. Contrast this with the scientific account of any physical phenomenon P, where one should be able to derive P given the appropriate set of physical facts and laws-- the derivation, of course, constituting an a priori connection between the set of facts and laws and P.

However, as Edelmann has pointed out in both of his major books (Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, and A Universe of Consciousness) a scientific explanation never explains anything but the process, the circumstances that are conducive to that process, and how to reproduce those circumstances.

Agreed. Put in other terms, a scientific explanation never explains anything but a schematic set of relationships-- extrinsic properties. Therefore, with regard to intrinsic properties, we should not expect a purely scientific account to have anything meaningful to say, except insofar as it is able to catalogue the set of relationships that might exist among such properties. Since subjective experience is composed of intrinsic properties, we should not expect science to say anything about it beyond describing the sets of relationships that exist among its qualitative elements as a function of brain activity. In other words, we should not expect a scientific account of phenomenal consciousness to be a complete account of phenomenal consciousness.

Gravity has been explained in terms of a "push", a "pull", a pre-programmed change in inertia, and (the currently excepted explanation) a curvature of space-time itself by the presence of mass. However, the scientists (and crackpots) who have devised their versions of the aforementioned explanations have -- it appears -- been completely concerned with what causes gravity, instead of the gravity itself. Regardless of whether it is caused by a curvature of spacetime or a bombardment of neutrinos (yes, that actually was a circulating hypothesis on the web), we are still not addressing the intrinsic properties of gravity, only the circumstances conducive to it, and the things that may be required to produce it. Because of this distinction, I can imagine a case where the curvature is there, but the particle does not move in the prescribed direction, because nothing has yet explained to me the explicit necessity of a curvature to entail gravity.

There isn't an explanatory gap here. You can only imagine that a particle should not move in the prescribed direction if you neglect to take into account some of the physical facts or laws. For example, in your hypothetical account it appears as if, in the course of your imagining, you have neglected to include the fact that particles follow geodesics. From a complete description of the physical facts and laws-- matter curves space in such and such a fashion, particles follow geodesics, and so on-- a logically sound analysis can only lead you to conclude that the particle does indeed follow the prescribed direction.

You might object that there is nothing yet explained that should entail why particles should follow geodesics, or some more basic phenomenon underpinning this fact. We will eventually hit some rock bottom where we must just take it as a brute fact that the world is such and such a way. Many philosophers conclude that the existence of P-consciousness and its relationships with brain activity must fall into just such a class of brute facts, which could be catalogued under the heading of psycho-physical laws.

Even if we allow psycho-physical laws the same unexplained, rock-bottom status as their counterparts in physics, there is still a disanalogy. Psycho-physical laws would at least refer to, if not explain, intrinsic properties such as this, whereas physics as we know it refers only to extrinsic properties. There would still be something fundamentally new here, some domain which the extrinsic approach of physics could not broach.

Do you see what I'm getting at? Science does not explain intrinsic properties because it has no need to. Indeed, it is the scientific stance (science being a physicalist approach) that the explanation of a phenomenon can be complete without such inspection into intrinsic properties.

Clearly it cannot. How can a theory of this be complete if its most quintessential character, its defining characteristic, remains opaque to the theory?

We don't even need to mention P-consciousness to realize the incompleteness of physical theory. Physics describes extrinsic properties, a system of relationships consisting only in bare differences. Even for uncontroversially objective phenomena, there still remains the question, what is it that realizes these bare differences? In what do these bare differences subsist? What is it that carries these differences and allows them to exist in the first place? To answer such questions, we need to make reference to intrinsic properties; extrinsic properties will not do the job.

Again, for a better explanation of what I'm getting at here, you might want to refer to chapter 12 of Rosenberg's book, The Carrier Theory of Causation (http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm).

[selfAdjoint]

A better characterization of the objection would be to say that there is no theoretical connection between the processes by which one supposedly becomes conscious and the consciousness itself. There is no compelling reason to believe, a priori, that the brain doing such and such should be associated with the qualitative perception of a color, for example. Contrast this with the scientific account of any physical phenomenon P, where one should be able to derive P given the appropriate set of physical facts and laws-- the derivation, of course, constituting an a priori connection between the set of facts and laws and P.

Well, the different opsin molecules in the retina, sampling the ambient EM at several narrow bands, followed by the post processing in the visual cortex, essentially forming the differences of the intensities in the bands, would give us the ability to derive certain topological and ordering properties that we ascribe to color. I think we could derive the fact that the lowere visual frequencies correspong to "bright" or by cultural assimilation based on experience with fire, "warm" colors and the higher ones to "dark" or "cool" ones. This is a long way from a fine color-sense, but the processing is only a little way into the brain, too.

I know you will never accept physicalism, but I see nothing in the present state of understanding of the brain to justify the big leap to dualism. And whatever you say, it IS dualism, because you deny the competence of the physical universe to generate some facet of reality.

[hypnagogue]

Well, the different opsin molecules in the retina, sampling the ambient EM at several narrow bands, followed by the post processing in the visual cortex, essentially forming the differences of the intensities in the bands, would give us the ability to derive certain topological and ordering properties that we ascribe to color. I think we could derive the fact that the lowere visual frequencies correspong to "bright" or by cultural assimilation based on experience with fire, "warm" colors and the higher ones to "dark" or "cool" ones. This is a long way from a fine color-sense, but the processing is only a little way into the brain, too.

This is in line with what I've been saying. We shouldn't expect the relationships between qualitative perceptions to be entirely opaque to physics, since physics describes relationships. So, from science, we can deduce a three-channel perceptual system with varying intensities along each channel and the like-- what we can't deduce is a sense of the qualitative feel of those colors themselves. For that we rely on direct perception, and science really has nothing to say here. An alien with a different visual system will never know what this looks like, even if he has a pretty good idea of how it participates in human vision.

I know you will never accept physicalism, but I see nothing in the present state of understanding of the brain to justify the big leap to dualism.
And whatever you say, it IS dualism, because you deny the competence of the physical universe to generate some facet of reality.

I deny the competence of our conceptual understanding of physics to account for some facet of reality. Big difference there. In Rosenberg's conception, the web of relationships described by physical theory is underpinned by intrinsic properties, which themselves are of the same general (experiential) nature as the kind of intrinsic properties we encounter in qualitative consciousness. Physical theory makes no mention of such intrinsic properties, be they in some sense experiential or not.

In other words, in Rosenberg's picture, there is one kind of stuff in the universe that underpins all phenomena. There is no metaphysical dualism here; the stuff that allows for the existence of physical phenomena is the same stuff that makes itself apparent in P-consciousness. The only 'dualism' here is an epistemological dichotomy inherent in our understanding of natural phenomena: we describe relationships without any mention of anything that is to be doing the relating. Thus, what is questioned is not the competence of the physical universe to generate anything, but rather the completeness of physical theory as an account of reality as a whole.

[yanniru]

I ran across a rather deep paper from the Ukraine on machine consciousness which includes quantum effects, emergent effects and levels of complexity. It is so inclusive that I suspect it may be an adequate model for natural (human) as well as artificial consciousness. I have not read this paper in depth yet. But I think some posters on this forum may find it quite interesting. Here is the link and the abstract:


http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0409140
Emerging Consciousness as a Result of Complex-Dynamical Interaction Process
Authors: Andrei P. Kirilyuk
Comments: 32 pages, 42 eqs, 54 refs; Report presented at the EXYSTENCE workshop Machine Consciousness: Complexity Aspects (Turin, 29 September - 1 October 2003), this http URL
Subj-class: General Physics
A quite general interaction process within a multi-component system is analysed by the extended effective potential method, liberated from usual limitations of perturbation theory or integrable model. The obtained causally complete solution of the many-body problem reveals the phenomenon of dynamic multivaluedness, or redundance, of emerging, incompatible system realisations and dynamic entanglement of system components within each realisation. The ensuing concept of dynamic complexity (and related intrinsic chaoticity) is absolutely universal and can be applied to the problem of consciousness that emerges now as a high enough, properly specified level of unreduced complexity of a suitable interaction process. This complexity level can be identified with the appearance of bound, permanently localised states in the multivalued brain dynamics from strongly chaotic states of unconscious intelligence, by analogy with classical behaviour emergence from quantum states at much lower levels of world dynamics. We show that the main properties of this dynamically emerging consciousness (and intelligence, at the preceding complexity level) correspond to empirically derived properties of natural versions and obtain causally substantiated conclusions about their artificial realisation, including the fundamentally justified paradigm of genuine machine consciousness. This rigorously defined machine consciousness is different from both natural consciousness and any mechanistic, dynamically single-valued imitation of the latter. We use then the same, truly universal concept of complexity to derive equally rigorous conclusions about mental and social implications of the machine consciousness paradigm, demonstrating its indispensable role in the next stage of civilisation development.

[Preator Fenix]

I too am back Mentat.

And I still disagree with you.

[yanniru]

What is a Mentat?