Why something rather than nothing? [Archive]

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 05:07 AM

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

Take the general form of the question as: Why is there A rather than B?
Where A, and B stands for facts, or state of affair.

A general form of the answer would be something like the following:

There exist fact C such that C makes the obtaining of fact A more likely than the obtaining of fact B. So, when comfronted with "why A rather than B?". One need only to find this unique C that would make A more likely than B.

So, if we are to answer P, then we have to find a fact C such that C makes something more likely than nothing. This is absurd, because C is part of something, and thus, there is no fact of the matter that would make something more likely than nothing. What does this mean? It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact.

answer to (p): It is simply a brute fact that there is something.

Note: If you are going to reply. Please, explain yourself in easy to understand terms. Please, Do not try to show off by using "big words", or being "vague, and profound". It never works. Imagine yourself writing a actual philosophy paper in order to get a grade. Please, no not write about new age stuff. I neet so many people that thinks that by being obscure, and vague, they are better than everyone. It is not true. Most of what these people say could be said in simpler terms, and they are not all that profound and deep. Be true to yourself, and don` t try to impress anyone.

vissarion.eu

Oct27-09, 05:35 AM

Who is P)? Physicists or philosoph? Or both?

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 05:37 AM

Who is P)? Physicists or philosoph? Or both?

P stands for a question

apeiron

Oct27-09, 05:42 AM

Alternatively, the answer is that there was once a state of everythingness (fact c) which then makes somethingness (fact a) more probable as what we have now than nothingness (fact b).

Then on further examination we realise that everythingness is also a form of nothingness and so really what we would want to talk about is vagueness and crispness.

We can then rephrase the whole question as why is there the dichotomised something that is an asymmetry rather than pure potential, an everythingness that is a nothingness, which is an unbroken symmetry?

I'm sure you will protest that vagueness must also be a something. But check the definition out first.....

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 05:52 AM

Alternatively, the answer is that there was once a state of everythingness (fact c) which then makes somethingness (fact a) more probable as what we have now than nothingness (fact b).
http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

No. I see there is a temporal order in here. If there "was" everything, then "at some point in time", there is something.

Another problem is if there was everything, then it begs the question of why there is not everything "now"( supposing a temporal order).

Then on further examination we realise that everythingness is also a form of nothingness

Not true. If there is everything, then is a world with people. This world would not be "nothingness"( whatever this means).

and so really what we would want to talk about is vagueness and crispness.

No. I don` t know your terms. If we are going to talk, we are going to use stardard technical terms within analytic philosophy.
I don ` t want to make up words that only i can undertstand.

We can then rephrase the whole question as why is there the dichotomised something that is an asymmetry rather than pure potential, an everythingness that is a nothingness, which is an unbroken symmetry?

No.

apeiron

Oct27-09, 06:07 AM

No. I see there is a temporal order in here. If there "was" everything, then "at some point in time", there is something.
.

And why would "temporal" order be a problem?

It would be a problem if the argument ran that "time" as it exists crisply broken out in our reality was also crisply broken out in the prior vaguer state. But that is explicity not being claimed.

No. I don` t know your terms. If we are going to talk, we are going to use stardard technical terms within analytic philosophy.
I don ` t want to make up words that only i can undertstand.
No.

You really make me wet myself laughing. If I had to restrict myself to what you know....

I think Bertrand Russell once wrote a famous little diatribe against ontic vagueness. A very standard cite. I don't agree with his take on it of course.

If you want to live within a discourse that simply ponders the paradoxes it creates - just as you are doing throwing out all these threads - then that's your hang-up.

Academic logic of the sort you seem inordinately fond is like a computer that goes blue screen any time it tries to compute any question of actual interest. But if your computer craps out, do you just sit there waiting forever in helpless silence? Or do you go find a better machine?

apeiron

Oct27-09, 06:23 AM

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 06:31 AM

And why would "temporal" order be a problem?

It would be a problem if the argument ran that "time" as it exists crisply broken out in our reality was also crisply broken out in the prior vaguer state. But that is explicity not being claimed.

Again, I do not know what your "crisply broken priori vaguer state". You ask me why time is important? The reason is that in general, time is thought of as a state of affair. In any case, time is not obvious. There are set of properties associated with time. We can described a state of affair that do not use time.

You really make me wet myself laughing. If I had to restrict myself to what you know....

You can wet yourself somewhere else, because i don` t buy it.

I think Bertrand Russell once wrote a famous little diatribe against ontic vagueness. A very standard cite. I don't agree with his take on it of course.

Ok. give me a reference, because I don` t know what you are talking about.

If you want to live within a discourse that simply ponders the paradoxes it creates - just as you are doing throwing out all these threads - then that's your hang-up.

Analytic philosophy give us results, and answers. I don ` t know what i read when i read your writing. it is more like english literatire. It is like you are trying to define every word yourself, and take pride in being vague, and obscure. That is not funny.

"Academic logic of the sort you seem inordinately fond is like a computer that goes blue screen any time it tries to compute any question of actual interest. But if your computer craps out, do you just sit there waiting forever in helpless silence? Or do you go find a better machine? "

You can use analogy, and metaphors. I am sure it would be great for an english literature course.

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 06:39 AM

Some general references on vagueness....
http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/

Some recent papers on ontic vagueness.....
http://www.unicamp.br/~chibeni/publi...cvagueness.pdf
http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_15/chibeni.htm
http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phl...cvagueness.pdf

Russell's 1923 argument against ontic vagueness....
http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/vagueness/

Look, i know the problems and arguments associated with vagueness. I would know what you are talking about if what you actually say does apply to the context of the discussion. It seems you are stealing some ideas, and words you don` t really know.

Are you a philosopher of some university? I would really want to read some of your papers.

apeiron

Oct27-09, 06:39 AM

Again

Russell's 1923 argument against ontic vagueness....
http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/vagueness/

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 06:46 AM

Again

Russell's 1923 argument against ontic vagueness....
http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/vagueness/

Ok, if you want to talk about De re vagueness, then great. If you want to convince me, then you need to give me clear statements, and arguments.

apeiron

Oct27-09, 06:53 AM

Look, i know the problems and arguments associated with vagueness. I would know what you are talking about if what you actually say does apply to the context of the discussion.
It seems you are stealing some ideas, and words you don` t really know.

Ahh, it all comes back to you now?

And first I'm inventing ideas and words, now I'm stealing them.

Look, its your choice to present a series of standard logical paradoxes and ask for comment. My argument is that the flaw is in the logical machinery rather than in the world being described. So respond to the argument even if it escalates things to a meta-level where other logic models are permitted to exist as coherent possibilities.

You've already agreed that answers to important questions cannot be delivered by the system you are using.

If you want confirmation that the world of scholarship is bigger than the one you know, you really ought to check this little chart out.....

http://www.iigss.net/gPICT.pdf

vectorcube

Oct27-09, 07:00 AM

Ahh, it all comes back to you now?

And first I'm inventing ideas and words, now I'm stealing them.

Look, its your choice to present a series of standard logical paradoxes and ask for comment.
http://www.iigss.net/gPICT.pdf

No, i did not. I gave you analysis, claims, and proves. This is not an open ended question at all.

If you do want to comment, then comment on the analysis itself. if you ask a mathematician, he would think of the prove. If you ask a philosopher, he would think of the argument. Why would you think i would ask for comment about a particular question?
Don` t you think such question is more fitting if you are in high school?

WaveJumper

Oct27-09, 02:11 PM

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

The "something" is an assumption. An assumption that science can never prove, because if it were to prove it, it would have to pass through our minds(we never experience the world directly;all we ever know is the image of the world generated in our awareness). Science and scientists have chosen to adopt the assumption that there is "something" out there, for the benefit of making progress.

There is no way now or in the future that someone will prove with certainty that there is such a thing as "something" or "out there". If 20th century physics is saying anything worthwhile on this topic, it is that "something" and "nothing" are never that far apart as when seen through our human senses.

What you call "something" is merely the manifestation of the interaction of 4 fundamental forces. Why we see the manifestation of 4 forces as something is not a question that science can answer.

But it's in philosophy that everything is put into question, every single assumption that science makes. And as Lee Smolin says in the Trouble with Physics - in the end it might be the philosophers who'd be laughing.

Pattonias

Oct27-09, 03:05 PM

Before I introduce some pies to start throwing at each other, maybe we can actually get something out of this thread.

OP, are you saying that in order to prove that A is superior to B we have to have a C, and the C is derived from A and therefore can not prove or disprove the superiority of A?

So the question is:
What D (something outside of A and B) exists that would allow for A to be superior to B?

Could this come down to a 50:50. A equal chance of either having an A or B.

qraal

Oct27-09, 03:31 PM

Why should we take the "general form" of the question as you put it? Somethingness vs nothingness seems like an altogether different question than your little analogy.

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

Take the general form of the question as: Why is there A rather than B?
Where A, and B stands for facts, or state of affair.

A general form of the answer would be something like the following: (snipped)

It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact.

answer to (p): It is simply a brute fact that there is something.

You're assuming existence by calling it "brute fact". What does "brute fact" mean when discussing this sort of ontological question.

See no big words either, other than "ontological". Was that too big for you?

Pattonias

Oct27-09, 03:58 PM

apeiron

Oct27-09, 05:05 PM

I imagine that by "no big word" he implied no philosophy-only jargon. He wanted to try to keep the debate in the realm of common language. Instead of using words we might have seen on Plato's thesis paper.

I think what vectorcube actually said was please just discuss modal logic in the vernacular of modal logic. Please don't challenge my framework, just consider this particular working out I have constructed within this framework.

So he wants to limit the debate to the realm of a particular academic discourse. Treat it as a student exercise to be graded, as he said.

This would be fine. Except he then chooses precisely the kind of logical paradoxes which explode the framework. He pushes a tool (which can be useful in certain applications) to the point where it becomes self-contradictory rather than self-consistent.

Which is what justifies escalating matters to a meta-level where humans look at their tools and scratch their heads wondering what a better designed tool might look like. Or rummage through the drawers of academia to borrow someone else's more appropriate instrument.

And any scholars response to big words ought to be curiosity. The more varieties of thought we can explore, the more clear we become about the ways we ourselves are thinking.

magpies

Oct28-09, 01:29 AM

Ok if I'm following this right... Well first off on the subject of nothing and something. It is that either one or the other must come first if anything is to come at all. An example of this is the big bang theory... we have the universe and to explain its existance we have a theory that states that the universe started as a micro dot that basicaly blows up and eventualy becomes the universe we know. Now the problem with this is that ever awful question of "why?" or more to the point what came before. The answer we are given is that there was no before or that nothing came before... Yet when you ask was it possible that nothing was before the big bang they all say no. Funny how they just said basicaly that nothing was before the big bang...

Now that begs the question... What was before nothing? This is where the question comes to an end because the only possible answer to that is nothing. So before was nothing and before that was nothing or more to say that this is where the blank starting state of the universe must be. So this begs the question "How?" or more to the point... How will it end? The answer to this seems fairly obvious to me... That it wont end. To come to this conclusion all you need to do is understand how much space is in space. It is not a hard thing to think about and yet it is impossible to think about. If we started traveling at 100 times the speed of light in one straight direction out into space from anywhere we would never hit a wall that made us turn off our course. We could effectivly travel forever at that speed out into space.

So how big is the universe? A: As big as you can dream it be.

What was the first thing to exist? A: The first thing to exist was nothing.

How can we be sure there wasn't something before nothing? A: We really cant know if something did not exist before something else but eventualy the question of what caused what will result in us finding the answer that nothing was before it... This is what every parent knows when they tell thier kid that its just because after a long list of whys.

qraal

Oct28-09, 05:17 AM

Ok if I'm following this right... Well first off on the subject of nothing and something. It is that either one or the other must come first if anything is to come at all. An example of this is the big bang theory... we have the universe and to explain its existance we have a theory that states that the universe started as a micro dot that basicaly blows up and eventualy becomes the universe we know. Now the problem with this is that ever awful question of "why?" or more to the point what came before. The answer we are given is that there was no before or that nothing came before... Yet when you ask was it possible that nothing was before the big bang they all say no. Funny how they just said basicaly that nothing was before the big bang...

Now that begs the question... What was before nothing?

"Before" requires time and time implies space. Absence of either can't be described as anything we can imagine.

"Why something or nothing?" can only be asked in a world with time, space and logic... something. Meaningful question asking presupposes the very things that we're trying to 'trace' the origins of, and our usual tools of logic and analysis breakdown when applied to such a self-referential puzzle.

Apeiron's approach - as discussed in the current thread on consciousness (http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=2413735&postcount=105) - is as meaningful as any other attempt at providing a map to such trackless territory. Equally possible IMHO is Paul Davies' attempts at defining a Universe which self-selects from the primordial plenum/void, following ideas from Stephen Hawking about history having a quantum indefiniteness.

Pattonias

Oct28-09, 09:19 AM

apeiron

Oct28-09, 03:28 PM

Not to burst anyones bubble, but if their actually was a "single particle" of whatever type at the origin of our universe as we know it; wouldn't their have to be a potentially infinite number of these particles existing beyond our universe that are just as capable of generating other universes. Our universe could exist within a sea of universes.

Big bang approaches would normally talk of a primal quantum fluctuation rather than a single particle. But yes, if you take that approach, it just pushes first causes further into the past. QM fluctuations have to take place in "something".

The interesting question is how do we get beyond any kind of somethingness.

As initial conditions, the choices seem to be nothing, everything or vagueness. Or to instead argue there is no need for somethingness to have a beginning, no boundary - we can take it as eternal.

I should add that vagueness has the advantage that it combines the essence of the other three common choices. It is both a nothing that is everything, and is eternal in that it is timeless (yet could give rise to time).

qraal

Oct28-09, 05:32 PM

Big bang approaches would normally talk of a primal quantum fluctuation rather than a single particle. But yes, if you take that approach, it just pushes first causes further into the past. QM fluctuations have to take place in "something".

The interesting question is how do we get beyond any kind of somethingness.

As initial conditions, the choices seem to be nothing, everything or vagueness. Or to instead argue there is no need for somethingness to have a beginning, no boundary - we can take it as eternal.

I should add that vagueness has the advantage that it combines the essence of the other three common choices. It is both a nothing that is everything, and is eternal in that it is timeless (yet could give rise to time).

Thus the "boundless" or Pleroma. Makes sense. Reminds me of Ain Suf in Kabbalah or Boehme's Ungrund.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 06:45 PM

20th century physics is saying anything worthwhile on this topic, it is that "something" and "nothing" are never that far apart as when seen through our human senses.

Explain this to me.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 06:51 PM

Before I introduce some pies to start throwing at each other, maybe we can actually get something out of this thread.

OP, are you saying that in order to prove that A is superior to B we have to have a C, and the C is derived from A and therefore can not prove or disprove the superiority of A?

No. Again, when ask the question of the form: " Why A rather than B". You can either think of A, B as state of affairs, or facts. Ex:The question of the form: "Why is the sky blue, and not green?". A reasonable answer might be to appeal to some conditions in the atmosphere, and the properties of light( Facts).

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:01 PM

Why should we take the "general form" of the question as you put it? Somethingness vs nothingness seems like an altogether different question than your little analogy.

Why not? The general form is first explicated by the philosopher Robert Nozick. Why don` t you ask him? Ops, his dead.

You're assuming existence by calling it "brute fact".

No. In my hypothesis, I never called existence brute fact. My hypothsis does assume existence of the world, and is a justified assumption, unless you want to doubt it. Do you?

What does "brute fact" mean when discussing this sort of ontological question.

Brute fact has a technical meaning in philosophy.

X is a brute fact if and only if 1. X is contingent, and 2. It is not entailed by other facts.

2 is not completely precise, because i don` t want to get into all the technical stuff here.
The basic idea is that X is the effect, or result of some other facts. That is to say, There is not facts q, such that q implies the existence of X.

"See no big words either, other than "ontological". Was that too big for you?"
What are you talking about? It is tiny!

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:18 PM

This would be fine. Except he then chooses precisely the kind of logical paradoxes which explode the framework. He pushes a tool (which can be useful in certain applications) to the point where it becomes self-contradictory rather than self-consistent.

.

Do you have problem reading? Where did i give any logical paradoxes that explode the "framework"? Wat "framework" are you talking about?

Which is what justifies escalating matters to a meta-level where humans look at their tools and scratch their heads wondering what a better designed tool might look like. Or rummage through the drawers of academia to borrow someone else's more appropriate instrument.

I have no idea what problems you are talking about, but i take no shame in using other peoples tools.

And any scholars response to big words ought to be curiosity. The more varieties of thought we can explore, the more clear we become about the ways we ourselves are thinking

No, i am not into "new age" stuff. I think they are vague, pretentious, and completely useless. I think people that seek profundity by being unclear as a form of self-delusion, and sickness.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:28 PM

qraal

Oct28-09, 07:29 PM

No, i am not into "new age" stuff. I think they are vague, pretentious, and completely useless. I think people that seek profundity by being unclear as a form of self-delusion, and sickness.

I agree about the vague, pretentious and largely useless assessment of most New Age drivel, but you go and ask one of the biggest questions in philosophy then expect a simple answer. Was that even reasonable? Are you after a debate or merely a loud proclamation of your apparent belief that every discussion should be easy for you to state and analyse. Why should that be so?

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:33 PM

"Before" requires time and time implies space. Absence of either can't be described as anything we can imagine.

"Why something or nothing?" can only be asked in a world with time, space and logic... something. Meaningful question asking presupposes the very things that we're trying to 'trace' the origins of, and our usual tools of logic and analysis breakdown when applied to such a self-referential puzzle.

Apeiron's approach - as discussed in the current thread on consciousness (http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=2413735&postcount=105) - is as meaningful as any other attempt at providing a map to such trackless territory. Equally possible IMHO is Paul Davies' attempts at defining a Universe which self-selects from the primordial plenum/void, following ideas from Stephen Hawking about history having a quantum indefiniteness.

Tell me how time implies space? Why would logic be in the same category as space time?
Are you joking me?

qraal

Oct28-09, 07:37 PM

Nothing is not a 'thing'. It is simply falses to assume something can come from nothing. To say 'nothing' is simply to say " there is no state of affair".

Things could just the way things are, because they are that way. They don` t have to be.

Your first sentence I agree, second maybe, third makes no sense.

qraal

Oct28-09, 07:40 PM

Tell me how time implies space? Why would logic be in the same category as space time?
Are you joking me?
I'm not sure who's the joker here.

How can space exist or be observable without time and observers? How can distinguishable things exist without logic? Explain. That's the essence of this puzzle and what you've refused to address.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:41 PM

As initial conditions, the choices seem to be nothing, everything or vagueness.

Nothing means "There is no state of affair".

What about vagueness?

It is both a nothing that is everything, and is eternal in that it is timeless (yet could give rise to time).

This is crazy. Nothing is everything?..? Honestly, if you want to define the word 'nothing' as some potential. Why don` t you say "there is this potential....."?

apeiron

Oct28-09, 07:44 PM

No, i am not into "new age" stuff. I think they are vague, pretentious, and completely useless. I think people that seek profundity by being unclear as a form of self-delusion, and sickness.

Vectorcube, what level of education have you actually reached? What courses have you taken? Have you yet published anything? I mean how qualified are you to pass judgement?

You are getting little respect here as you have shown little respect. Even within any philosophy department you would have to deal with professors who are deconstructionists, theologians, eastern experts. How do they like being called sick and deluded?

apeiron

Oct28-09, 07:47 PM

Thus the "boundless" or Pleroma. Makes sense. Reminds me of Ain Suf in Kabbalah or Boehme's Ungrund.

Thanks qraal. Those two references are new to me. I'll have to check them out.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:49 PM

Was that even reasonable? Are you after a debate or merely a loud proclamation of your apparent belief that every discussion should be easy for you to state and analyse. Why should that be so?

The question is not really hard, and i had fun trying to analysis it. Most answers to the question tend to have very elogant analysis.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 07:55 PM

who's the joker here.

Who am i talking to?

How can space exist or be observable without time and observers? How can distinguishable things exist without logic? Explain. That's the essence of this puzzle and what you've refused to address.

Are you joking me?
I was asking you why your claim " time implies space" is true? I don` t think i ever comment about the relationship between time, and space.

vectorcube

Oct28-09, 08:04 PM

Vectorcube, what level of education have you actually reached? What courses have you taken? Have you yet published anything? I mean how qualified are you to pass judgement?

I took alot of upper & graduate courses in philosophy. I also read alot of philosophy textbooks. I wrote papers for classes, but never publish anything on philosophy.
What about you?

Even within any philosophy department you would have to deal with professors who are deconstructionists, theologians, eastern experts. How do they like being called sick and deluded?

Most are in english departments. Good poetry is only good at eluminating the human soul.

apeiron

Oct28-09, 08:19 PM

I took alot of upper & graduate courses in philosophy. I also read alot of philosophy textbooks. I wrote papers for classes, but never publish anything on philosophy.
What about you?
.

Yeah, I've published in philosophy journals. Written four books. Spent 30 years on these issues.

qraal

Oct29-09, 12:04 AM

Who am i talking to?

I could make a rude reply, but what do you really want to know? Addressing the person making an argument isn't actually getting to the point is it?

The argument is: why is there something instead of nothing? You seem to be claiming it's an incoherent question to start with, which isn't an incoherent claim itself but your approach seems confrontational and oddly restrictive.

Are you joking me?
I was asking you why your claim " time implies space" is true? I don` t think i ever comment about the relationship between time, and space.

Time implies space at least according to Special & General Relativity. Can't have one without the other. Or do you think that's incorrect? Would you like to explain why?

apeiron

Oct29-09, 01:04 AM

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

There exist fact C (everything) such that C makes the obtaining of fact A (something) more likely than the obtaining of fact B (nothing).

So, when confronted with "why A rather than B?", one need only answer with fact C.

It is of course absurd to suggest that C (everything) is part of A (something), but on the other hand completely obvious that A is necessarily a part of C, and so trumps fact B. There is an underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing.

We then have to go through the whole argument again because now the question becomes why an everything rather than a nothing.

Which is where we turn to vagueness as a still better choice.

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 01:29 AM

Yeah, I've published in philosophy journals. Written four books. Spent 30 years on these issues.

Great, i am going to have to give you a sticker. I will say the samething i said in so many other post. I don` t care about your big your brain. I don` t care for new age, pretentious philosophy which you seem to be all over on. How much of "nothing is everything" is going to be your theme??

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 01:43 AM

I could make a rude reply, but what do you really want to know? Addressing the person making an argument isn't actually getting to the point is it?

I do want them to know that i am talking to them.

The argument is: why is there something instead of nothing? You seem to be claiming it's an incoherent question to start with, which isn't an incoherent claim itself but your approach seems confrontational and oddly restrictive.

Explain to me why you think this is so. My analysis is just one way of looking at the question, and to this day, i know two, and three people that gave a very elogant analysis of the question( robert nozick, derek parfit, and some guy i can ` t remember).

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 01:53 AM

apeiron

Oct29-09, 02:10 AM

If we called this set S. S contains every contingent concrete object. It is already everything.

But not everything is a contingent concrete object in any proper definition. And if it were, then posing the question in terms of something is what would be redundant.

The existence of some thing does not then necessitate the existence of all possible things. But the existence of every possible thing does then also necessitate the existence of some thing.

Perhaps that is why Nozick (Invariances p148) says: "Philosophers of modality count with three number: 0, 1, all."

It is sophistry rather than logic to redefine your terms when you get caught out.

apeiron

Oct29-09, 02:11 AM

( robert nozick, derek parfit, and some guy i can ` t remember).

Full references please.

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 04:39 AM

Full references please.

Nozick, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_Explanations

Parfit,http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil3600/parfit.pdf

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 04:53 AM

But not everything is a contingent concrete object in any proper definition. And if it were, then posing the question in terms of something is what would be redundant.

Curious, but what exactly do you think the question "why something..." refer to? It refers to every single concrete contingent thing that exist. What is not included? Ghost? Should i include batman& robin as well ?

The existence of some thing does not then necessitate the existence of all possible things. But the existence of every possible thing does then also necessitate the existence of some thing.

This has nothing to do with what i am saying at all! When i say "everything", i am not at all saying "all possible worlds exist". I am not at committed to the existence of possible worlds, or anything of that sort. The "everything" here refers to all concrete contingent thing.
The description in terms of conrete contingent things are more general. It would apply whether or not possible worlds exist.

Perhaps that is why Nozick (Invariances p148) says: "Philosophers of modality count with three number: 0, 1, all."

It is sophistry rather than logic to redefine your terms when you get caught ou

Not at all, but this is unrelated to the topic. Something personal about youself, so you can believe whatever you like.

apeiron

Oct29-09, 06:32 AM

This has nothing to do with what i am saying at all! When i say "everything", i am not at all saying "all possible worlds exist". I am not at committed to the existence of possible worlds, or anything of that sort. The "everything" here refers to all concrete contingent thing.
The description in terms of conrete contingent things are more general. It would apply whether or not possible worlds exist.

Weasel away. You either are talking about mere somethingness or you attempt some clear and honest definition of everythingness. This is not a race where you are allowed to back both horses.

For example, the Parfit cite you supplied.....

"Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every
possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis....."

So Parfit is rightly attempting to distinguish mere somethings from some true conception of everything. And your concrete contingent things would have to be a subset of even a many worlds view.

Then....

"This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained."

So here Parfitt is treating everything and nothing as limit states of possibility. Then the actual, that which obtains, is taken as gaining support from being aligned with one limit rather than the other. The maximal is serving as fact C to favour A over B.

Then winding up for his conclusion.....

"According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely
happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view."

Which is the Peircean approach I've argued but which you clearly don't get.

Parfit continues....

"Suppose, for example, that reality is as full as it could be. On
the Brute Fact View, this fact would have no explanation. On
the Maximalist View, reality would be this way because the
highest law is that what is possible is actual. If reality were as
full as it could be, this Maximalist View would be better than
the Brute Fact View, since it would explain reality’s being this
way. And this view would provide that explanation even if it
merely happened to be true. It makes a difference where the
brute fact comes."

So Parfit, as far as he goes, generally is following my path closely. But he does not continue on down the line to even deeper ideas about the true nature of "everythingness" - the better ontic possibility of vagueness. Nor does he have a story on the selector itself, which I argue is the dichotomy.

But that is by the by. My point here is you don't appear even to understand your own sources. Or maybe you filter out all the dangerous "new age" aspects of what appears in your course work.

apeiron

Oct29-09, 06:53 AM

Then what Nozick actually argues in the cite you pick....

"Nozick concludes by linking explanatory self-subsumption to reflexive self-reference, in order to explain why one version of LF holds rather than others that might hold. The apparent insufficiency of its holding in virtue of its holding, which would have been true of any of the others if they had held, marks the fundamental principle as reflexive: A reflexive fundamental principle will hold merely in virtue of holding, it holds true 'from the inside'."

Again, the only path is bootstrapping internalism. A teological approach where the ends explain the means.

Nothingness is considered and then rejected as some version of everythingness + selection must be the case. A case for fact C is at least roughed out in these two philosophers' view.

Nozick actually comes much closer to my arguments in Invariances p163. Treating everythingness as infinite dimensionality. Then extracting the actual world by some kind of averaging or a sum over histories.

Real new age stuff I guess.

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 07:30 AM

Weasel away. You either are talking about mere somethingness or you attempt some clear and honest definition of everythingness. This is not a race where you are allowed to back both horses.

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

For example, the Parfit cite you supplied.....

"Consider next the All Worlds Hypothesis, on which every
possible local world exists. Unlike the Null Possibility, this
may be how things are. And it may be the next least puzzling
possibility. This hypothesis is not the same as – though it
includes – the Many Worlds Hypothesis....."

So Parfit is rightly attempting to distinguish mere somethings from some true conception of everything..

"Merely something from some true conception of everything"? What the hell? Does this statement make any sense at all? What is "mere somethings" and "true conception of everything..."?

And your concrete contingent things would have to be a subset of even a many worlds view

Can you say this in a sentence? Are you saying the set of all concrete contingent things are a subset of the set of all possible universes in the many world view? If this is what you are saying then, then the answer is no.

Then....

This special feature need
not be that of being best. Thus, on the All Worlds Hypothesis,
reality is maximal, or as full as it could be. Similarly, if
nothing had ever existed, reality would have been minimal, or
as empty as it could be. If the possibility that obtained were
either maximal, or minimal, that fact, we might claim, would
be most unlikely to be a coincidence. And that might support
the further claim that this possibility’s having this feature
would be why it obtained."

So here Parfitt is treating everything and nothing as limit states of possibility. Then the actual, that which obtains, is taken as gaining support from being aligned with one limit rather than the other. The maximal is serving as fact C to favour A over B

Unlike you, i actually read the whole paper. What is "limit states of possibility" suppose to mean anyway? Parfit never at all say the "alll world hypothesis" is true, nor does he draw from it your conclusion.

"According to the Brute Fact View, reality merely
happens to be as it is. That, I have argued, may not be true,
since there may be some Selector which explains, or partly
explains, reality’s being as it is. There may also be some
higher Selector which explains there being this Selector. My
suggestion is only that, at the end of any such explanatory
chain, some highest Selector must merely happen to be the one
that rules. That is a different view."

Which is the Peircean approach I've argued but which you clearly don't get.

Give me references that shows this is what peirce say, ok?

So Parfit, as far as he goes, generally is following my path closely. But he does not continue on down the line to even deeper ideas about the true nature of "everythingness" - the better ontic possibility of vagueness. Nor does he have a story on the selector itself, which I argue is the dichotomy.

I don ` t believe you, but you can believe whatever you want. I suggest if you want to make this productive. You should list the properties of partfit` s selectors by yourself. Just a thought.

But that is by the by. My point here is you don't appear even to understand your own sources. Or maybe you filter out all the dangerous "new age" aspects of what appears in your course work.

Honestly, i know the source well, and you don` t know anything at all about what you are saying. You draw superficial similars, and think the author support your view. Sadly, i think you believe it.

vectorcube

Oct29-09, 07:45 AM

Then what Nozick actually argues in the cite you pick....

"Nozick concludes by linking explanatory self-subsumption to reflexive self-reference, in order to explain why one version of LF holds rather than others that might hold. The apparent insufficiency of its holding in virtue of its holding, which would have been true of any of the others if they had held, marks the fundamental principle as reflexive: A reflexive fundamental principle will hold merely in virtue of holding, it holds true 'from the inside'."

Again, the only path is bootstrapping internalism. A teological approach where the ends explain the means.
.

This is funny. LF stands for limited fecundity. Refexive is a relation between explanations.

What the hell does this have to do with "bootstrapping internalism"( whatever this means)? teological approach? ???

Nothingness is considered and then rejected as some version of everythingness + selection must be the case. A case for fact C is at least roughed out in these two philosophers' view.

Nozick actually comes much closer to my arguments in Invariances p163. Treating everythingness as infinite dimensionality. Then extracting the actual world by some kind of averaging or a sum over histories.

Real new age stuff I guess

Honestly, you are not fooling me. Most of what you say here don` t even make sense.

apeiron

Oct29-09, 03:31 PM

Weasel away? How? What do you think the question that begins with "why something...?" mean? It means every single contingent concrete thing. Why is this so difficult to understand?

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit. Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things". Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

The fact that everything is being denoted is an extra fact about the state of affairs. It is a fact that we have many things, and then a further fact that this is definitely "everything" - either via limits or set approaches.

Some things must exist in a global context. Everything would have to include even the global context.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

But then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 04:20 AM

Supply some reference that actually supports this ludicrous position.

reference for what?

Something simply is not somethingness in the limit.

?

Nor did you specify that you were talking of something as "the set of contingent concrete things".

What do you think the original question "why something...?" mean? This something is the set of all contingent concrete things. Do you know what that means? i bet you don`t.

Itself a limit on somethingness, as it would seem you want to exclude possibility, potential, form, process, purpose - other legitimate metaphysical categories

When people ask "why something....?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

Whether we choose to denote the idea of everything as a limit state (maximal) or a set, it is still more "things" than just what the limits or set contains.

Sure, you can imagine anything you want that is not concrete objects, but the existence of those other things would not be in question here.

This is not a terrifically exciting point, because as I say, everythingness is only a halt on the path to a deeper framing of the "why anything" question.

?

So the thinking should run, why not nothing (thesis)? Well, we know there is something, so perhaps then everything (anti-thesis)? And we can see naturally that [Everything [Something]].

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

then why not the synthesis of Everything~Nothing? Which is the symmetry of vagueness. Anaximander's apeiron.

The word "Nothing" means the same as "there is no state of affair". If all possible worlds exist, then this means " All state of affair that is logically possible, exist". You see the problem?

qraal

Oct30-09, 04:40 AM

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

apeiron

Oct30-09, 04:50 AM

When people ask "why something....?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

qraal

Oct30-09, 08:15 AM

Realism about possible worlds is not a problem. If they do exist, then they would be part of the set of all contingent concrete objects.

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 05:30 PM

Only dogs bark at what they do not understand

---Heraclitus

Don` t beat yourself up for it.

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 05:33 PM

These "people" would not include Parfit and Nozick. Because as you made clear with the references you yourself supplied, abstract objects did concern them.

You see the problem?

No! Abstract objects is not in question at all. Their existence is "necessary". In the sense that they would be what they are even if there was no concrete things at all.

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 05:39 PM

A possible world is an object? "If they exist" is answered with "they could" which is why they're "possible" not "actual" worlds. Thus we have a non-binary option - if they're not existent and they're not non-existent, then they're 'possible'.

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

Does it matter in this case? If possible world is real, then they are all concrete worlds. This means each concrete worlds are made/composed of concrete things/objects. Thus, the set S of all concrete objects would include all concrete worlds for each such world are made of concrete objects. Obviously, if S includes all concretes, then it includes all the worlds. QDE

apeiron

Oct30-09, 06:35 PM

Still don't see how a 'world' can be an 'object' though.

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

qsa

Oct30-09, 07:26 PM

apeiron

Oct30-09, 08:37 PM

existence is about facts. only numbers and relations between them give rise to reality. sit in a dark room and ask yourself what is the only thing that is real and has no choice but to exist and nothing else can.NUMBERS.

Or is it the NUMBER-LINE?

Then if that, the number-plane (complex number)?

And we can skip trionions because division algebras - arithmetic as we know and love it - breaks down in three dimensions. The concrete objects no longer relate in the abstract space with such neat geometrical resonance.

But then, what about QUARTERNIONS? Now we have 4D numbers and the relations they give rise to (but hey, what gave rise to the 4D realm in which they are embedded).

Then we continue onwards in search of the embedding context in which point-like numbers, simple integers, are only the most local possible seeming events. Do we stop at octonions, at exceptional lie algebras?

These are island of regularity for sure, but the very fact they are tracking some kind of emergent path proves there is also a larger multidimension realm from which they emerge. A space of infinite dimensional numbers if we take a max limit approach, the most natural philosophical presumption.

Then, extrapolating from what we can already observe, it would be arguable that infinite-D numbers would have no arithmetically regular relationships. Division would long have gone out the window. InfiniteD nine-ness would no longer divide by infiniteD three-ness. But perhaps - interesting question - even addition, subtraction and multiplication would no longer be possible relationships.

If so, once you have everything (in the limit), you would also be getting nothing (in the limit). Or more properly, we have arrived at vagueness again.

One of the tactical questions I'm considering is whether to use vagueness to prove the loss of arithmetic at infinity, or whether an argument can be worked the other way round.

But anyway, yes, the case of numbers has been carefully considered here. And it is 21st century mathematics. To update Kronecker in a post-category theory age, we would have to say god made the integers and the "infinite-ion" - the total system of an infinite dimensional algebraic space that could have its internal resonance-based features.

Baez offers a wonderful introduction to the basics of division algebras and their regularities for the intrigued....
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/octonions/

qraal

Oct30-09, 09:26 PM

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

But the interesting question you raise is "what is a world"? Do you have a definition from your own readings?

A World has elements, a space, time and rules governing how it develops. A world is kind of like a cellular automaton at its simplest. But I think a world also needs an origin even if its future might be endless.

I would take the systems approach and argue that a world is a system. It is not just a collection of objects (concrete, abstract, possible, necessary, or otherwise). It has to be always both its events and its contexts, its local and its global. So it is not even about "the largest scale". It is about how large and small are the system, the process~structure, about the relations from which everything forms.

Yes. A world evolves, by my definition. States endlessly change, else the world halts/ends. We can't have a billiard ball universe if there's not some means for them to appear in the first place. Thus a flow from "simplest" to more complex

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

This becomes very clear in a process view. If worlds do not simply exist but must arise by some kind of development, some kind of shaping selection mechanism, then that process would have to be common across all worlds at some level.

Quite so. I think even our sparring partner would agree.

Always if there is a figure, so must there be a ground. Even atoms require a void to express their relational properties such as shape, size, position. So if we do want to treat worlds as atomistic objects, we then just shift the discussion of the world context, the "void" which allows these multiple worlds to be distinguished, to a meta level.

Regress is the preferred option (escape?) for some. They don't know how to handle space-time or the Void. I have an idea I'm working on which you might like, but need more information (ironically) before I can articulate it fully.

apeiron

Oct30-09, 10:11 PM

Precisely. It's a bit like the argument over where the laws of physics came from. If they evolved, then what laws govern their evolution etc. One could chose an infinite regress, but that seems kind of like an endless tower of turtles... silly and pointless.

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

Galteeth

Oct30-09, 11:13 PM

I think this question reflects a fundamental limit of human understanding.

Let's go back to Descartes' famous Cogito.

It is certainly impossible to deny that one thinks. But contained in the structure of the cogito are other fudamental elements of human conscioussness that are intrinsic to experience. "I think therefore I am" or the more basic "It thinks" imply a linear structure to thought. In order to even form this basic undeniable thought there is an implicit linear order. Even without direct causality, the linear order remains. No matter how many times we reduce things to simpler components, there remains a follow up "well why that?" or a "what is before x?" even as we reach the limits of what is knowable.

Apply this to the big bang. There remains the question "why the big bang?" or "what came before?" There have been proposed speculative answers, but these have the same problem. This is a fundamental irresolvable paradox of human thinking. It seems to me the only conclusion one can reach at this present time is that human understanding of the nature of existence, being bound by thoughts requiring a linear structure, is inherently limited.

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 11:24 PM

This is why vectorcube has been so entertaining. He reminds that philosophy departments still crank out people with a religious belief in this scholastic guff. Though vectorcube is a little fundamentalist even for an impressionable student.

<< personal insult deleted by Mentors >>

Real philosophers like Nozick, Searle, and a few others I have time for, attempt to reason their way to strong conclusions using modal approaches. But there is common sense in the background usually guiding their efforts. With others like Lewis and David Chalmers, they build careers on taking logic to its illogical limits. And they certainly attract a certain kind of follower.

Another impression. Great!

The modal logic approach of talking about worlds as an atomistic collection - a collection of isolate objects - is clearly wrong on this view. If there were multiple worlds in any correct sense, it would have to then constitute the local elements in a global "world system". We would have to take the further step of spelling out how these separate worlds relate.

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements? :confused:

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 11:28 PM

I'm still not sure why vectorcube is so angry. S/He has a very angry writing style.

I guess the word "ontological" is too big for me.:redface:

vectorcube

Oct30-09, 11:31 PM

There would seem to be three general possible views here on how realities could be caused - could have a development.

1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

2) fundamental largeness --------> led eventually to what is.

3) Both these in interaction --------> led eventually to what is.

So either the small grew large (construction). Or the large became limited (constraint). Or both of these things happened synergistically.

The "from smallness" hypothesis is expressed in ideas like atoms, number, substance, information, fluctuations - the maximally specific and local.

The "from largeness" hypothesis is expressed as form, horizons, relations, voids, laws, selection, gods, meanings, purpose - the maximally general or universal.

The "both" hypothesis would seek to make use of both kinds of limit. And show how both emerge together out of something that is really fundamental - a purest possible symmetry.

A fourth approach is to claim reality just is what it is (no development, no causes) and so is eternal and unchanging.

4) what was -----------> is still the same as what is.

The thing to notice is how the search for the fundamental always reduces to the search for some fundamental scale. We exist either as a composition of smallest possible stuff or a subsumption of some meta-scale.

Except to combine both, we then have to find a direction that points somewhere else except to scale. Which taking scale to be about aysmmetry, broken symmetry, means towards foundational symmetry.

Is there any other ontic possibility that could intelligibly be added here?

Unrelated to the topic!

apeiron

Oct30-09, 11:58 PM

Are you sure it is not the global world system that is an element in the set that constitute the local elements? :confused:

Yes. I already said that from a systems perspective, the local elements are what would contruct the global forms. And the global forms are what create the local elements by constraint. Then the two sources of action together are "the system".

apeiron

Oct31-09, 12:06 AM

Unrelated to the topic!

I thought the topic was "why something?"

This is the way to unpack the question. You were trying to answer it purely in terms of option 1. So I am making clear the full range of options for you.

apeiron

Oct31-09, 12:17 AM

"I think therefore I am" or the more basic "It thinks" imply a linear structure to thought. In order to even form this basic undeniable thought there is an implicit linear order. Even without direct causality, the linear order remains. No matter how many times we reduce things to simpler components, there remains a follow up "well why that?" or a "what is before x?" even as we reach the limits of what is knowable.

I agree with this epistemic position. We have no direct access, we only model.

But even here, you can see how you are thinking in terms of some preferred scale when you talk about "an implicit linear order". You are asserting there is some chain of causal actions all of the same scale.

But then you add that this linear path has a direction in scale. It reduces towards "simpler components". So this is adopting (1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

And I would agree that, being a limit, we can only approach fundamental smallness, not reach it. The trajectory would be asymptotic - infinite and yet also curving ever closer to a finite limit.

Now is it so unreasonable to think that the direction you need to take is in fact the opposite one - backwards towards ever greater generality? So instead of simpler components, we head towards simpler principles?

Then if both of these directions of reduction seem eminently reasonable, why not find a way to combine both directions in one larger ontic framework?

Galteeth

Oct31-09, 12:33 AM

I agree with this epistemic position. We have no direct access, we only model.

But even here, you can see how you are thinking in terms of some preferred scale when you talk about "an implicit linear order". You are asserting there is some chain of causal actions all of the same scale.

But then you add that this linear path has a direction in scale. It reduces towards "simpler components". So this is adopting (1) fundamental smallness --------> led eventually to what is.

And I would agree that, being a limit, we can only approach fundamental smallness, not reach it. The trajectory would be asymptotic - infinite and yet also curving ever closer to a finite limit.

Now is it so unreasonable to think that the direction you need to take is in fact the opposite one - backwards towards ever greater generality? So instead of simpler components, we head towards simpler principles?

Then if both of these directions of reduction seem eminently reasonable, why not find a way to combine both directions in one larger ontic framework?

Do you mean both in regards to components and principles, or in regards to simplicity and generality?

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 02:26 AM

Yes. I already said that from a systems perspective, the local elements are what would contruct the global forms. And the global forms are what create the local elements by constraint. Then the two sources of action together are "the system".
The statement you quoted on me does not even make sense. Thus, the irony.:biggrin:

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 02:27 AM

I thought the topic was "why something?"

This is the way to unpack the question. You were trying to answer it purely in terms of option 1. So I am making clear the full range of options for you.

You are off topic, again.

apeiron

Oct31-09, 04:10 AM

Do you mean both in regards to components and principles, or in regards to simplicity and generality?

The systems approach would require two axes to map everything here. So it does get complicated.

One axis would be that of developed scale. Worlds as they become. And that is realms where there are local components in interaction with global principles. Or equivalently, we could also use some other familiar dichotomies that mean the same thing. So substance~form, particulars~universals, atom~void, initial conditions~boundary conditions. You can see how all are ways of talking about something that is maximally located and component-like - stuff you can freely add together. Then matched with complementary things which are maximally global and act as general constraints.

Then having divided our description of how things end up, we need a second orthogonal axis to talk about the process or history of development itself. Which is the journey from the vaguely possible to the crisply produced. This could be called other things, like a developmental axis that runs from simplicity to complexity. But there are reasons why this is not very good.

So I was talking about the synchronic view - a slice across a system at a certain late stage of its development. That is when we will find that all things seem strongly divided towards local and global limits - what could be called the dichotomy of components~principles. Or better yet, substance~form. Or best of all, because now we are getting properly mathematical, local~global, a scale distinction.

And you would be right if you are pointing out that in separating off the description of development, I would be re-introducing a linear or time-like aspect of some sort. The path from the vague to the crisp, from potential to developed, would seem to be a one way trip. There would be an arrow of progression.

So yes, there is now a story of how we would step backwards. Except it would be stepping back towards something called vague potential rather than a journey in the usual notion of time.

Each step backwards would not take you towards either the fundamentally small, nor the fundamentally large. Rather, it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish these two possibilities.

tauon

Oct31-09, 01:45 PM

@vectorcube...

you first stated the general case as "why A and not B?" where A,B=different states of affairs (as you put it).
but then you mentioned (somewhere in this thread) that nothing is not a state-of-affair (a something) -I am certain we can agree on this- so "why is there something rather than nothing?" is then not a particular instance of "why is there A and not B?"... this is the first error in your argument.

As for the supposed proposition that there is a C, and C leans the odds towards either A or B, you can just as easily ask "why is there a C instead of not being a C?" so your so called "general form" of the answer isn't that much of an answer either, furthermore this C-A,B system works only for "somethings"...something which you also noticed -albeit, from a different perspective- noticed (quote: "This is absurd, because C is part of something"), but the conclusion (evidently) does not follow:

that there is no way a C can support an A over B does not mean that "that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact"- for one, the structure of the argument is inconsistent: nothing is not a B, a state-of-affair. saying "why is the A and not B?" is equivalent to saying "why is there this something and not that something?"... but nothing is not a something, so you're asking the wrong question (or rather, you're looking at the question from an erroneous point of view) and you're embarking on the wrong train...

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 03:42 PM

you first stated the general case as "why A and not B?" where A,B=different states of affairs (as you put it).
but then you mentioned (somewhere in this thread) that nothing is not a state-of-affair (a something) -I am certain we can agree on this- so "why is there something rather than nothing?" is then not a particular instance of "why is there A and not B?"... this is the first error in your argument.

Why is it a contradition? If nothing means "there is no state of affair", and i am using it show that the original question is not applicable for the template question ( why A rather, than B?), then there either there is something wrong with the original template, or that there is something wrong with supposing that "nothing" is a state of affair.

Let me be more clear for you:

Suppose for a contradition that:

1. The template "why A rather than B?" is true, and that it applies to all A, B that are state of affairs.

2. The original question applies to form/template 1.

3. "nothing" is a state of affair( from 1& 2).

4. "Nothing" means "there is no state of affair".( definition).

Since, 3& 4 contradict one another, there there much be something wrong with the premises. We can:

a. reject 1.
b. reject 2.
c. reject 1 and 2.

Intuition tell us that we ought to opt for 2, and say the original question is not a valid question.

As for the supposed proposition that there is a C, and C leans the odds towards either A or B, you can just as easily ask "why is there a C instead of not being a C?"

Why is the shy blue instead of pink? Well, there is "the conditions in the atmosphere is just right. The properties of water molecules, and the properties of light. The laws of nature etc".( called this facts).

You can ask "why these facts?" You can ask this, but it would not be the same same form as "why A rather than B?". It would be "Why the facts C obtain obtain in the world, and why C has the properties that it does?".

that there is no way a C can support an A over B does not mean that "that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact"- for one, the structure of the argument is inconsistent: nothing is not a B, a state-of-affair. saying "why is the A and not B?" is equivalent to saying "why is there this something and not that something?"... but nothing is not a something, so you're asking the wrong question (or rather, you're looking at the question from an erroneous point of view) and you're embarking on the wrong train...

No. To suppose that the original question applies to the template leads to the realization that nothing is both a state of affair, and not does not necessary imply that the reasoning fails if the intented purpose is only to show that assumption is false, and that the original question does not fit into the stardard template.

qraal

Oct31-09, 04:00 PM

Why is it a contradition? If nothing means "there is no state of affair", and i am using it show that the original question is not applicable for the template question ( why A rather, than B?), then there either there is something wrong with the original template, or that there is something wrong with supposing that "nothing" is a state of affair.

If you can explain all this so eloquently and in good humour, why can't you get what apeiron is saying? You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque. It makes perfect sense when discussing existence as a whole, especially when determining what makes for "a whole" and the total system. The real problem with your little syllogism is you seem to take "something" to mean "any old thing" but in fact - in this type of question - it means "every damned thing" including the possible and the laws of logic themselves.

tauon

Oct31-09, 05:53 PM

Why is it a contradition?

because "nothing" is not a "state of affair"... look:

If nothing means "there is no state of affair",

then

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

(2) implies not(1) (since there is at least 1 state of affair: "nothing", hence if there is nothing there is not-nothing=at least 1 something) q.e.d.

to make it more clear to you (even though, the contradiction is actually quite obvious), let's replace "state of affair" with "eagle" (you know, the bird :P):

(1)"there are no eagles"=nothing
(2)nothing is an eagle

so if there are no eagles than there is at least one eagle etc etc etc.
so yeah, there is indeed "something wrong with supposing that nothing is a state of affair"

You can ask this, but it would not be the same same form as "why A rather than B?".

no it would be EXACTLY like asking "why A rather than B?", since it's like asking "why C and not C' ?"

the original question does not fit into the stardard template.

well, yeah: that's what I said. thank you for repeating that for me. -_-

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 07:47 PM

because "nothing" is not a "state of affair"... look:

:bugeye:

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

(2) implies not(1) (since there is at least 1 state of affair: "nothing", hence if there is nothing there is not-nothing=at least 1 something) q.e.d.

No! the word "nothing" means 1, and that is what i am saying all along, 2 implies that there is at least one state of affair, namely nothing. That is the whole point in the argument when i use it to deny the assumption that the original question fits with the template. 2 is false, 1 and 2 contradict, and the original question is invalid.

no it would be EXACTLY like asking "why A rather than B?", since it's like asking "why C and not C' ?"

Then there is a fact D that makes C rather then C'. So your point being...?

well, yeah: that's what I said. thank you for repeating that for me. -_-

What you said was wrong, and obviously, you have zero to no experience with proves.

A true, but unjustified belief

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 07:52 PM

If you can explain all this so eloquently and in good humour, why can't you get what apeiron is saying? You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque. It makes perfect sense when discussing existence as a whole, especially when determining what makes for "a whole" and the total system. The real problem with your little syllogism is you seem to take "something" to mean "any old thing" but in fact - in this type of question - it means "every damned thing" including the possible and the laws of logic themselves.

How many times do i have to say this? Everything here means " Every contingent concrete objects".

You seem to be arguing past each other, yet what apeiron says isn't that weird, strange or opaque.

Don` t worry. You are not too bad yourself.

apeiron

Oct31-09, 08:33 PM

:bugeye:

(1)"there is no state of affair"
(2)nothing is a state of affair

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

Which was the point. Modal approaches just don't give us the tools to do the job. It is a non-reflexive logic and therefore cannot be used to say anything true about reflexive questions.

But it is a little troll-like that you first persisted in defending the conclusion, we must accept "why something?" as brute fact, rather than just accept the logic itself has blue screened.

What was your reason for not coming clean sooner?

How many times do i have to say this? Everything here means " Every contingent concrete objects".

Again, you did not state this at the outset and only added this constraint belatedly. It is not as if we should take this to be part of the modal approach - something that does not even need stating explicitly.

Your own references for Nozick and Parfit demonstrated that they had to distinguish the contingent from the necessary, the concrete from the abstract.

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 08:47 PM

Which was the point. Modal approaches just don't give us the tools to do the job. It is a non-reflexive logic and therefore cannot be used to say anything true about reflexive questions.

There is no modal logic here. Maybe a bit metaphysics about propositions and facts.

But it is a little troll-like that you first persisted in defending the conclusion, we must accept "why something?" as brute fact, rather than just accept the logic itself has blue screened.

I don ` t see how logic is wrong here. I am using logic to show certain conclusions right? Namely, the orignal question is invalid, or do you miss that entirely in your impression?

"What was your reason for not coming clean sooner?"

Coming clean? I am either clean, and not clearn, but not both. The logic is right. The question is wrong.

tauon

Oct31-09, 08:49 PM

nothing means 1, and 1&2 are contradictory.

YES, that's what I said!

No! the word "nothing" means 1,

I never said otherwise thank you very much. All along I argued assuming 1 as a [quasi]definition of "nothing" (all at your little request in the OP).

and that is what i am saying all along, 2 implies that there is at least one state of affair, namely nothing. That is the whole point in the argument when i use it to deny the assumption that the original question fits with the template.

THAT'S WHAT I WAS SAYING!!!
what are you even arguing against here?

2 is false, 1 and 2 contradict, and the original question is invalid.

nope, the assumption 2 is false because 1 and 2 contradict. the original question P is independent of this.
furthermore, since 2 is false than you cannot push P into a "why A and not B?" A,B=state of affair system!

Then there is a fact D that makes C rather then C'. So your point being...?

why is there D rather than D' ?
INFINITE REGRESS!

What you said was wrong, and obviously, you have zero to no experience with proves.

A true, but unjustified believe.

what I said was trivially correct. the manner of your mistakes is incredibly naive. sometimes I wonder if you're even serious about the discussion...

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 08:53 PM

Again, you did not state this at the outset and only added this constraint belatedly. It is not as if we should take this to be part of the modal approach - something that does not even need stating explicitly.

Your own references for Nozick and Parfit demonstrated that they had to distinguish the contingent from the necessary, the concrete from the abstract
.

Well, perhaps to the less than informed, but the original questions obvious talks about contingent concrete objects.

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 09:04 PM

YES, that's what I said

You want a star?

I never said otherwise thank you very much. All along I argued assuming 1 as a [quasi]definition of "nothing" (all at your little request in the OP

Ok.

THAT'S WHAT I WAS SAYING!!!
what are you even arguing against here?

because you seem to not get the argument from the original post?

nope, the assumption 2 is false because 1 and 2 contradict. the original question P is independent of this.

indep?

furthermore, since 2 is false than you cannot push P into a "why A and not B?" A,B=state of affair system!
Which is why i have to repeat myself( so please don` t ask me why, again).

I first show that the assumption of P, and "P applies to template" implies a contradiction. I then turn back, and ask what was wrong with the premises, and i reject "P applies to template" is false. Which is my argument.

why is there D rather than D' ?
INFINITE REGRESS!

So? Perhaps you need to be reminded that i am not talking about the problem of regress( which i don` t really see as a problem). I ONLY point out that nothing is not a state of affair, here. Your only problem is that you don` t understand.

"The manner of your mistakes is incredibly naive. "

Suriously?

Where did i make a mistake? You misinterpret the original post, and i am being a good enough person to help you out with the details.

tauon

Oct31-09, 09:16 PM

apeiron

Oct31-09, 09:32 PM

When people ask "why something....?". They are puzzled by the existence of concrete contingent things. I highly doubt that they are thinking about abstract objects, santa claus, intensionality etc.

Again, who are these people?

What puzzles philosophers is thingness itself. Not particular things, or even particular worlds, but any thing in any sense. And that includes what you would call abstract objects. And I would call global constraints.

As you say, we know there is thingness so already we are reasonably disposed to the idea that nothingness - a true absence of thingness in all its senses - probably comes with a good reason why it is the case. We already have accepted there was a possible fork in the road between thingness and nothingness.

We also have a better working definition of no-thingness if it is the absence of both objects and categories, contents and containers. It is not just - in your parlance - an absence of concrete objects, but also abstract objects as well.

So we know that no-thingness in the full reflexive sense is not possible (that being the inverse of Descartes cogito).

So the natural next question to pose is to go in the other direction. Why not thingness rather than everythingness?

Of course, we could just chose to accept thingness and give up on questions about how it arose, how it could have developed. We seemed worried about it a moment ago when asking why something rather than nothing, but having disposed of that quickly because true nothingness is self-contradictory based on the dichotomisation that we know exists with thingness (the local~global division of the concrete~abstract as you call it) but now for some whimisical reason we have decided to just walk away from the question.

Or we can persevere and look at the inadequacies of everythingness as an alternative (as Parfit argues, it is "too much" and must get whittled down by a teleological selection mechanism).

Then once we get into issues of selection and self-organisation, we are into the territory of symmetry and symmetry-breaking. Which in metaphysics has its historic links with Anaximander's apeiron and Peirce's vagueness, to name two ways of talking about this kind of symmetry-breaking axis of development.

apeiron

Oct31-09, 09:43 PM

to quote you:

"It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact."

what exactly about your argument do I fail to understand? please enlighten me... -_-

Sounds like he is trying to say he knew this was the wrong answer all along and what he was in fact demonstrating was that this template argument cannot work on self-reflexive questions.

Which is obvious to everyone else, as all the responses show.

The interesting question then becomes, well what does work? Vectorcube is not going to help us here it seems.

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 09:59 PM

@vectorcube...

I don't get your argument?
isn't your argument that existence is merely a brute fact.

to quote you:

"It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact."

what exactly about your argument do I fail to understand? please enlighten me... -_-

It means that the original question do not following the usual template. The problem is with the inclusion of nothing as a state of affair.

The meaning is that nothing is not a state of affair, and the question should really be "Why something?", or "Why something exist?". Since there is no alternative of why there is something, because " nothing" is not a state of affair, thus not a possibility. The existence of something would be a brute fact.

vectorcube

Oct31-09, 10:03 PM

Again, who are these people?

The majority of people( non-philosophers and philosophers) that ask the question.

apeiron

Oct31-09, 10:24 PM

The majority of people( non-philosophers and philosophers) that ask the question.

But again, not the very philosophers you cited, so presumably not the academic community you had in mind whose views on these things could be taken as read.

Nor apparently the majority of those responding here on this forum. So that is a weak reply.

tauon

Oct31-09, 10:37 PM

It means that the original question do not following the usual template. The problem is with the inclusion of nothing as a state of affair. The meaning is that nothing is not a state of affair,

and with this part, as I so many times now said: I AGREE. however-

and the question should really be "Why something?", or "Why something exist?". Since there is no alternative of why there is something, because " nothing" is not a state of affair, thus not a possibility. The existence of something would be a brute fact.

that is incorrect! whether existence is a brute fact or not, does not follow from this reasoning.

the question does not fit only in the "why A and not B?" where A and B were both the same type-states of affairs.
however, the question is perfectly valid in a context of "why Q and not P?" where Q and P are different types (not both states of affair) or "why Q and not not-Q ?".

magpies

Nov1-09, 12:01 AM

What are is the probility that a universe doesnt exist aka nothingness... Would stay as nothingness from now till tomorrow and every tomorrows after that. Id say the chances of a universe that started as nothing and remained nothing would be zero.

The only problem with this idea is the religious dogma of science that says energy cant be created or destroyed. If you do away with that rule then a universe can come from nothing and at that point the question would be... Why/How does energy get made or unmade? Because I have a spiritual side I would answer that with this word... Choice.

qraal

Nov1-09, 01:25 AM

Well, perhaps to the less than informed, but the original questions obvious talks about contingent concrete objects.

*head-desk*

vectorcube

Nov3-09, 02:49 AM

But again, not the very philosophers you cited, so presumably not the academic community you had in mind whose views on these things could be taken as read.

Honestly, you don` t know what you saying here. Most philosophers that asked it had in mind contingent concrete objects. They include Parfit, and nozick. Are you honestly comparing yourself to me? You even misquote them! Seriously, all of you quotes from parfit, nozick are misinterpreted, and outright wrong.

vectorcube

Nov3-09, 02:53 AM

however, the question is perfectly valid in a context of "why Q and not P?" where Q and P are different types (not both states of affair) or "why Q and not not-Q ?".

For the 100 times. NO!

nothing is not a state of affair, and so the scheme does not apply. What you have here does not make any sense.

vectorcube

Nov3-09, 02:54 AM

*head-desk*

Is it too "ontological"?

apeiron

Nov3-09, 03:17 AM

Honestly, you don` t know what you saying here. Most philosophers that asked it had in mind contingent concrete objects. They include Parfit, and nozick. Are you honestly comparing yourself to me?

Yes but you gave two references where both these philosophers explicitly included what you dub abstract objects as part of the general question of what exists. They also seem as concerned about necessary objects as contingent ones. So you're just being weird about this.

Just happened to be reading something that made me smile....

One famous quote attributed to Buddha states: “Unity can only be
manifested by the Binary. Unity itself and the idea of Unity are already two.”

To talk about worlds, we have to talk about both the contents and the container. You insist that only contents is a natural thing to be concerned with. But you can never escape the equally necessary idea of a container no matter how you wriggle.

A state of affairs is - quite plainly - both a state and the affairs we deem to constitute it. Even your own terminology has to smuggle in the notion of context to justify the notion of events.

Furthermore, on nothingness, I think we all agree that it cannot actually exist. Even if there is no affairs, there is still the state level description.

But is this then merely a trick of the modelling - our habit of talking in state-based, set theoretic, terms? Perhaps in reality we can define the null set in such a way there is both no contents and no bounding brackets (the denoter of global state)?

That's where the questioning here actually becomes interesting.

Then further, if we take a limits approach to these kinds of questions rather than a set theoretic one, could we treat [null] as being almost no container, almost no contents - so an asymptotic approach that is bounded by actual, but non-existent, nothingness?

So issue 1) Can we treat the "state of affairs" as a two part story? How does this actually divide our concept of nothingness (as into an absence of affairs vs an absence of state)?

And issue 2) If set theoretic approaches are not helpful, could we do better with a limits approach? What would it mean to be infinitesimally close to nothingness? For a start it would turn the question from one about existence or structure into one about development or process.

vectorcube

Nov3-09, 03:27 AM

Yes but you gave two references where both these philosophers explicitly included what you dub abstract objects as part of the general question of what exists.

Where? reference? quotes?

You are amazing....

One more time. All the philosophers that ask the original question have in mind contingent concrete objects. It is the contingent objects that is most puzzling

The existence of abstract objects is not in question, because they exist necessaily even if there is nothing.

Many real philosophers agree here:http://www.closertotruth.com/topic/Why-is-There-Something-Rather-than-Nothing-/118

Galteeth

Nov3-09, 04:39 AM

Yes but you gave two references where both these philosophers explicitly included what you dub abstract objects as part of the general question of what exists. They also seem as concerned about necessary objects as contingent ones. So you're just being weird about this.

Just happened to be reading something that made me smile....

One famous quote attributed to Buddha states: “Unity can only be
manifested by the Binary. Unity itself and the idea of Unity are already two.”

To talk about worlds, we have to talk about both the contents and the container. You insist that only contents is a natural thing to be concerned with. But you can never escape the equally necessary idea of a container no matter how you wriggle.

A state of affairs is - quite plainly - both a state and the affairs we deem to constitute it. Even your own terminology has to smuggle in the notion of context to justify the notion of events.

Furthermore, on nothingness, I think we all agree that it cannot actually exist. Even if there is no affairs, there is still the state level description.

But is this then merely a trick of the modelling - our habit of talking in state-based, set theoretic, terms? Perhaps in reality we can define the null set in such a way there is both no contents and no bounding brackets (the denoter of global state)?

That's where the questioning here actually becomes interesting.

Then further, if we take a limits approach to these kinds of questions rather than a set theoretic one, could we treat [null] as being almost no container, almost no contents - so an asymptotic approach that is bounded by actual, but non-existent, nothingness?

So issue 1) Can we treat the "state of affairs" as a two part story? How does this actually divide our concept of nothingness (as into an absence of affairs vs an absence of state)?

And issue 2) If set theoretic approaches are not helpful, could we do better with a limits approach? What would it mean to be infinitesimally close to nothingness? For a start it would turn the question from one about existence or structure into one about development or process.

The existence of a null set, implies that which is not a null set. Zero implies 1, which implies all the properties of the rest of the numbers...

apeiron

Nov3-09, 06:52 AM

A state of affairs is - quite plainly - both a state and the affairs we deem to constitute it. Even your own terminology has to smuggle in the notion of context to justify the notion of events.

Vectorcube, please explain how your term "state of affairs" does not imply a dichotomy as stated.

vectorcube

Nov3-09, 07:41 AM

Vectorcube, please explain how your term "state of affairs" does not imply a dichotomy as stated.

"state of affairs" is another way of saying "facts". They have technical meaning.

apeiron

Nov3-09, 02:35 PM

"state of affairs" is another way of saying "facts". They have technical meaning.

And what are facts? Do they exist as facts qua a circumstance? Is there a context in which some facts are factual, others can be judged as counter-factual? Is there no conceal dichotomy in facts just as there is in any other philosophical term of any utility?

magpies

Nov3-09, 03:38 PM

Galteeth

Nov4-09, 01:25 AM

Yes facts are just opinions strongly held ones at that.

I do believe this question of why something rather then nothing is a good one but... I don't think anyone can really answer it. Its sorta like the what came before the thing that came before question. It might be better to instead ask what do we do now that we know about its complexity type of thing. In that case I would say learning how to better control ourselfs would be a good start. We would have to make some assumptions about what we are first and ignore the fact that we dont know the truth of what we are fully.

I got the "properties of zero thing" from David Pearce's website. The site is primarily about the philosophical impliations of genetic engineering (taken to the extreme of consciousness engneering) but he does have a section on this question, not giving an answer but analyzing the parameters of the question, and various ways in which the universe is related to nothingness by means of the concept of zero. This was written sometime ago, so a few things are a bit out of date (when taking about black holes, he doesn't mention the holographic principle at all)
http://www.hedweb.com/nihilism/nihilfil.htm This is page one, there are nine pages.

Galteeth

Nov4-09, 02:03 AM

Here is another philosophical paper, linked to at the end of the previous one, that discusses the human dimensions of the question in regards to various suppositions of its validity.

http://www.hedweb.com/witherall/existence.htm

vectorcube

Nov4-09, 06:37 AM

And what are facts? Do they exist as facts qua a circumstance?

If you taken any courses that introduces your to modern philosophy, they most certainly teachs you what facts is. I have also mention it many times in PF.

apeiron

Nov4-09, 03:28 PM

If you taken any courses that introduces your to modern philosophy, they most certainly teachs you what facts is. I have also mention it many times in PF.

I was asking for a justification of your position. I realise that is difficult.

vectorcube

Nov4-09, 06:33 PM

I was asking for a justification of your position. I realise that is difficult.

You ask me what "facts" mean, and i am telling you i am using it in the conventional way by philosophers. It makes no sense to ask for a justification of a definition. If you have problems with it, then your beef is not with me. You beef is with modern analytic philosophy.

apeiron

Nov4-09, 07:19 PM

It makes no sense to ask for a justification of a definition.

????

If you don't like the conclusion don't you always challenge the premises?

Certainly I agree that the failure to model "facts" correctly - as events in contexts - is a central problem in modern, largely anglo-saxon, analytic thinking.

You are defending this approach so it seems fair you should defend one of its essential elements.

vectorcube

Nov4-09, 10:32 PM

????

If you don't like the conclusion don't you always challenge the premises?

Like i said defore, i don ` t have a justification for the definition of the word "fact". It is given in any philosophical dictionary.

You are defending this approach so it seems fair you should defend one of its essential elements.

The word "facts" is defined by philosophers in a certain way, and i used it according to the standard convention. I am not at all committed to a particular view just because i use the word, and i don` t see why you would think so.

tauon

Nov7-09, 09:28 AM

For the 100 times. NO!

nothing is not a state of affair, and so the scheme does not apply. What you have here does not make any sense.

for the 1000th time: of course "nothing" is NOT a "state of affair"!

but as I said, the question fits in the pattern "why A and not Q?" where A is the fact of being a state of affair (existence, being: whatever you may label it) and Q is not a state of affair... -_-

it's like asking: why are the states of affair (gawd, this line is beginning to sound incredibly annoying) instead of not being any states of affair. the question "works". you just need to ask it right. whether it is answerable or not: that's a whole different matter altogether.

but of course, the pattern is merely symbolical. since we are somethings, we need something... so we use a something to inquire about not-something... like the symbol ∅ for the empty set etc. jeez what's so hard to get that? why are you so stuck in formalism? you confuse the term denoting the thing (or the lack of any thing) for the thing itself (or lack of).

tauon

Nov7-09, 09:34 AM

Like i said defore, i don ` t have a justification for the definition of the word "fact". It is given in any philosophical dictionary.

... ... a philosophical dictionary? hahaha
you're joking right? o_0

The word "facts" is defined by philosophers in a certain way, and i used it according to the standard convention. I am not at all committed to a particular view just because i use the word, and i don` t see why you would think so.

the word "fact" while it holds a relatively similar meaning/definition for almost everyone, it can be highly nuanced. furthermore, whether that definition correlates with "reality" is also something that different people while having a generally similar view of, may hold some divergent ideas for it.

as for you constantly touting "defined/said by philosophers" here and there, that it is meaningless and irrelevant- argumentum ad verecundiam -_-

apeiron

Nov7-09, 03:09 PM

Like i said defore, i don ` t have a justification for the definition of the word "fact". It is given in any philosophical dictionary.
.

If you remember, what you were ducking was the request for a justification of your use of "state of affairs".

I pointed out that this is a dichotomistic term, one that signifies the global scale (state) and the local scale (affairs). I asked did you notice this fact and understand its logical significance?

So focus, as you keep demanding of everyone else.

vectorcube

Nov7-09, 04:09 PM

for the 1000th time: of course "nothing" is NOT a "state of affair"!

but as I said, the question fits in the pattern "why A and not Q?" where A is the fact of being a state of affair (existence, being: whatever you may label it) and Q is not a state of affair... -_-

QUOTE]

Here is what is wrong. A, and Q needs to be a state of affair for the scheme to work.

If G is a not a state of affair. I don ` t see why "not G" is a state of affair.

[QUOTE]it's like asking: why are the states of affair (gawd, this line is beginning to sound incredibly annoying) instead of not being any states of affair. the question "works". you just need to ask it right.

It does not work that way. *Something* that is NOT a state of affair do not fit into the scheme.

vectorcube

Nov7-09, 04:15 PM

... ... a philosophical dictionary? hahaha
you're joking right? o_0

Are joking by saying this? hahaha

I think a word when used that commonly within philosophy have a high probability of being in a dictionary. It is a very likely of being in a philosophy dictionary. Why is that surprising?
Why is that funny?

as for you constantly touting "defined/said by philosophers" here and there, that it is meaningless and irrelevant

Why? It is crazy. It is like talking about modality, and not knowing what "possible world" means. Don ` t you want to know what are "possible worlds" mean. Why can ` t i define it according to what philosophers conventional hold to be the case? You make no sense here.

vectorcube

Nov7-09, 04:25 PM

If you remember, what you were ducking was the request for a justification of your use of "state of affairs".

What is there to justify? I see a table in front of me is a state of affair. Do you really want a justification? weird...

I pointed out that this is a dichotomistic term, one that signifies the global scale (state) and the local scale (affairs).

Well, i have no idea what dichotomistic mean.

I asked did you notice this fact and understand its logical significance?

Don` t know anything about it. I was not really paying attention, because of 1.

apeiron

Nov7-09, 06:07 PM

Well, i have no idea what dichotomistic mean.

As you would say, are you crazy, what you mean, everyone know, look it up in the dictionary, etc.

ValenceE

Nov7-09, 06:28 PM

Vectorcube,

If you may, I’d like to get back to your OP…

P) Why is there something rather than nothing?

Analysis:

Take the general form of the question as: Why is there A rather than B?
Where A, and B stands for facts, or state of affair.

A general form of the answer would be something like the following:

There exist fact C such that C makes the obtaining of fact A more likely than the obtaining of fact B. So, when comfronted with "why A rather than B?". One need only to find this unique C that would make A more likely than B.

So, if we are to answer P, then we have to find a fact C such that C makes something more likely than nothing. This is absurd, because C is part of something, and thus, there is no fact of the matter that would make something more likely than nothing. What does this mean? It means that there is no underlying reason for why there is something rather than nothing. That the existence of something is a brute fact.

You start by asking why A rather than B and then give a possible answer by introducing C as a catalyst favouring A over B.

So far this makes sense. Where you go astray is when you assign SOMETHING to A and NOTHING to B, then apply your logical process…

In the initial proposition, BOTH A and B are ‘somethings’ since they are defined as facts, or state of affairs. So, why change the initial context in assigning NOTHING to B? This only brings about the nonsensical answer or explanation you’re trying to use as a thread starter. Furthermore this certainly doesn’t give any reason or proof that ‘something’ has no underlying favouring source.

And, by the way, it is my strong belief that, even if ‘nothing’ would have been, rather than ‘something’, it would still be infinite and able to give rise to mathematics, as it would be equal to Unity.

It then could probably evolve into 'something'. So, maybe we should look into the possibility and hopes of 'nothingness' to exist, or even survive... I don't think it can exist other than also being a state of affair, and, using your arguments, merge with C to become, in itself, the underlying reason for 'something' rather than 'nothing'

Regards,

VE

qsa

Nov7-09, 07:15 PM

As you would say, are you crazy, what you mean, everyone know, look it up in the dictionary, etc.

don't tell me, you name is John McCrone

the reviews for your books don't look all that great. But I for one still commend you.
I commend anybody who tries his best. You should have stated your website earlier so that we would have had more interseting debate.

apeiron

Nov7-09, 08:59 PM

don't tell me, you name is John McCrone

Sshhh! I am in enough trouble with the moderators here as it is.

the reviews for your books don't look all that great.

"John McCrone's Going Inside is far superior to the vast majority of recent tomes on cognitive neuroscience for the general reader. He rounds up the usual suspects, but at least he does so with some care."
John C Marshall, Nature 400, 132 (1999)

...but what does an Oxford professor reviewing in some flaky journal called Nature really know....

vectorcube

Nov7-09, 09:19 PM

As you would say, are you crazy, what you mean, everyone know, look it up in the dictionary, etc.

Must be one of those made up words, GREAT.

apeiron

Nov7-09, 09:32 PM

Must be one of those made up words, AGAIN.

Surely to be consistent with modal realism, every possible word must be actual. And indeed actually refer to some possible concept. So what is your objection exactly?

Anyway, seems to be an actual term in this actual world.....

di·chot·o·my
Pronunciation: \dī-ˈkä-tə-mē also də-\
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural di·chot·o·mies
Etymology: Greek dichotomia, from dichotomos
1 : a division into two especially mutually exclusive or contradictory groups or entities <the dichotomy between theory and practice>; also : the process or practice of making such a division <dichotomy of the population into two opposed classes>
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dichotomy

vectorcube

Nov7-09, 09:44 PM

Surely to be consistent with modal realism, every possible word must be actual. And indeed actually refer to some possible concept. So what is your objection exactly?

Anyway, seems to be an actual term in this actual world.....

di·chot·o·my
Pronunciation: \dī-ˈkä-tə-mē also də-\
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural di·chot·o·mies
Etymology: Greek dichotomia, from dichotomos
1 : a division into two especially mutually exclusive or contradictory groups or entities <the dichotomy between theory and practice>; also : the process or practice of making such a division <dichotomy of the population into two opposed classes>
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dichotomy

I have a feeling you would do that.

I never hear people say "dichotomistic term". I know what a dichotomy is. I don` t know what you are asking me.

modal realism variants are very popular. There are alot of following.