what is consciousness? [Archive]

hypnagogue

Sep21-04, 08:53 AM

Additionally, the human level of consciousness is determined in precisely the same manner... stimuli impinge upon our various sensory receptors. It is from these myriad of "collisions" from solid molecules triggering olfaction and taste, photons striking our retina for sight, touching or being touched, hearing sound waves, speech from air molecules passing over our vocal chords.

There is unquestionably a link between physical and subjective phenomena, but it's not quite that simple. Sound waves may strike my ears, but if I am in a state of deep sleep I won't hear them; photons may strike my retina, but if a certain portion of my visual cortex is damaged I won't see them. The precise nature of the relationship between physical phenomena and human consciousness has not yet been deduced with certainty, but all the viable candidates for physical correlates of human consciousness seem to have a certain level of structure and complexity above and beyond the relatively simple types of interactions you suggest.

It's worth noting that a comprehensive theory of consciousness very well may attribute some kind of primitive conscious event to even such simple physical events as the collision of two rocks. However, such a theory would ascribe this 'awareness' on the basis of well-formed principles rather than on a linguistic ambiguity.

The problem is found in the question, what IS consciousness? Helen Keller provided the best historic example of this problem by way of her psychological/physiological evolution from a human being who could not see, hear or speak due to sensory deficiencies in her physiological compliment to one who LEARNED to interact with the outside world. Her "awareness" or "consciousness of the world around her was further expanded by other ways of circumventing her non existent senses. She was "aware" or "conscious" by way of touch, taste and smell. With these as her sensory baseline she expanded her awareness of the world about her. This is a clue worthy of consideration toward a working definition. Human consciousness has the demonstrated capacity to bring about expansion of its inherent sensory apparatus. What IS consciousness must first be answered. I have yet to arrive at a conclusion that I find entirely satisfactory.

'Awareness' in general is not a good word to equate with consciousness. The word 'consciousness' itself is a relatively ambiguous word with many meanings, but the most interesting and most intractable sense of the word picks out a distinct concept. Philosophers call this phenomenal consciousness, a phrase which refers to the purely experiential aspects of consciousness. This is sometimes synonymously referred to as subjective experience, raw feels, or qualia-- all these terms refer to the visceral feel of the world around you, as it is felt by you. It's not so much about what you know, but how you experience.

Thus the example of Hellen Keller is instructive here only insofar as it helps us assert why awareness is not a good term to conflate with phenomenal consciousness. Keller certainly increased her awareness of the world, insofar as she gradually constructed a larger and more detailed mental model of the world around her. However, Keller certainly never experienced redness or visual motion or A sharp minor. She may well have studied pianos to the extent that she knew the precise layout of the keys and the precise frequencies that each key produced-- thus increasing her knowledge of the world-- but nonetheless, she never had the phenomenal, subjective experience of what it sounds like to hear A sharp minor played on a piano-- the nature of her phenomenal consciousness never changed throughout her life.

Rothiemurchus

Sep22-04, 10:27 AM

I read the paper about the explanatory gap previously.
I think it would help if you can define for me what is meant
by the "qualitative aspect of consciousness."
If this means an "experience" then we experience something
over a period of time, so time must then be a factor.

hypnagogue

Sep22-04, 11:32 AM

I read the paper about the explanatory gap previously.

It should be relatively clear, then, that no theory with the flavor of conventional physics will provide the explanatory traction needed to explain phenomenal consciousness. Any theory that starts with talk of particles, waves, or whatever and their interactions and winds up at phenomenal consciousness will have the feel of a sleight of hand. By way of analogy, no way of describing the mechanics of rubbing a lamp would seem to entail the emergence of a genie-- there appears to be no conceptual link, or bridge principle, between the former and the latter.

We can couch this dichotomy in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic properties. Extrinsic properties are properties that are defined functionally and structurally, and thus ultimately in terms of systems of relationships. All of physics deals with extrinsic properties. For instance, a complete description of an electron in physics tells us about its mass, charge, and the like-- that is, how it tends to attract and repel other particles-- and its location in space and time, both of which themselves are relational concepts. Thus an electron in physical theory is characterized entirely as a conglomeration of relational, extrinsic properties.

Intrinsic properties are properties that are defined not with respect to other properties, but (in a sense) with respect to themselves. Thus, while extrinsic properties presuppose the existence of other extrinsic properties, intrinsic properties seem to enjoy a kind of 'bottom line' existence. It appears that the elements of phenomenal consciousness are just such kinds of properties. For instance, take the color red: this. Phenomenologically, what defines redness? Nothing but itself. A visual field composed entirely of a uniform red surface appears to be just as red as an apple in a diversely colored visual field, even in the absence of other colors with which to compare it. (Compare this to an electron's charge in a perfect vacuum, which would be undetectable in the absence of other charges with which it could functionally relate.)

The explanitory tension between objective physics and subjective experience, then, seems to hinge on the kinds of relationships that could obtain between extrinsic and intrinsic properties. It's not at all clear that any combination of extrinsic properties could account for intrinsic properties. How can we derive the existence of an entirely self-contained entity (phenomenal consciousness) in a system that speaks only of relationships between entities (physics)? It appears to be a logical impossibility.

If anything, it appears that extrinsic properties presuppose the existence of intrinsic properties-- it's not clear that a system of relationships that lacks fundamental 'things' to be related is even conceptually coherent. If so, it makes more sense to derive relationships from fundamentally self-contained units than the other way around-- thus, perhaps we should not try to derive phenomenal consciousness from physical processes, but rather place some form of phenomenal consciousness into our fundamental conceptual framework and then use this intrinsic basis to firmly support the heretofore free-hanging system of relationships described by physics.

This is the fundamental idea put forth by Gregg Rosenberg in his newly released book, A Place for Consciousness. I strongly suggest you read this work if you are interested in the philosophy of consciousness as it pertains to physical reality.

I think it would help if you can define for me what is meant
by the "qualitative aspect of consciousness."

The qualitative aspect of consciousness is what makes the world look, sound, feel, and generally seem a certain way to you. We know that red and green light have different physical structures in an objective sense (green has a higher frequency), but there is also a sense in which we distinguish them based on their qualitative aspects. The qualitative aspect of red is this, as opposed to this. From the standpoint of your phenomenal consciousness, you know that the first instance of the word "this" in the previous sentence is distinct from the second not because you know the exact wavelengths of the light that has struck your retina, and not because you have performed a brain scan on yourself-- you know they are distinct because they have distinct qualitative appearances to you.

Make no mistake: your ability to discriminate these colors is underlied by physical brain processes. I am not refuting that. I am just illustrating an example of phenomenal consciousness in action. Suppose a clever alien scientist who has no visual sense faculty decides to scan your brain as it processes two visual inputs, A and A. The alien should in principle be able to deduce that you have distinguished these two inputs just by analyzing how they differentially stimulate your brain. However, what our blind alien scientist will not be able to deduce is precisely the qualitative aspect of your experience of the inputs. He knows that you have decided that they are different on the basis of their different frequencies, but he does not know what it is like to qualitatively experience this or this.

Rothiemurchus

Sep22-04, 01:57 PM

Hypnagogue:
However, what our blind alien scientist will not be able to deduce is precisely the qualitative aspect of your experience of the inputs. He knows that you have decided that they are different on the basis of their different frequencies, but he does not know what it is like to qualitatively experience this or this.

Rothie M:
But if THIS and this have two different properties, or the same property but of a different magnitude, the alien could detect two different sets of particles that cause consciousness, because they would have different effects on normal matter.
I do not agree with the idea of intrinsic properties because if I destroyed all my neurons so I could expect to see only THIS,for example,and experience no sounds smells feelings and so on,I actually would experience nothing.Sense-experiences do not live in isolation.Show me an example where they do.

hypnagogue

Sep22-04, 02:22 PM

But if THIS and this have two different properties, or the same property but of a different magnitude, the alien could detect two different sets of particles that cause consciousness, because they would have different effects on normal matter.

The alien could detect that you process the inputs differently, but he could not actually access your qualitative experience of them. Introducing new sets of particles into the mix does nothing to change this.

I do not agree with the idea of intrinsic properties because if I destroyed all my neurons so I could expect to see only THIS,for example,and experience no sounds smells feelings and so on,I actually would experience nothing.Sense-experiences do not live in isolation.Show me an example where they do.

It's difficult to address this without going into too much detail about Rosenberg's thesis. But in broad terms, there is nothing that suggests that qualitative experiences cannot exist in isolation. There is no reason to suspect that deaf people experience colors any differently than normally functioning people, nor any reason to believe that a red/green colorblind person experiences blue any differently than I do.

In Rosenberg's framework, the universe is suffused with what he calls protophenomenal properties. These are analogous to the kind of phenomenal properties that humans experience only insofar as they are intrinsic and experiential in nature. But in terms of their actual qualitative aspects, they are probably vastly alien to our own in every conceivable way. The idea isn't that this is just floating around. Redness is a property of human phenomenal consciousness, and in Rosenberg's framework properties of human phenomenal consciousness arise from certain special ways in which smaller networks of intrinsic properties and their extrinsic relationships combine in the brain (roughly similar to the actual neural correlates of consciousness that are being proposed in the literature-- so there is a sense of theory agreeing with experiment here, even if empirical studies of consciousness are notoriously slippery beasts). Thus the framework has a natural way in which human consciousness can be seen to be dependent on physical processes, while simultaneously avoiding the trap of conceiving phenomenal (intrinsic) properties in purely physical (extrinsic) terms.

I cannot provide an example of any protophenomenal properties anymore than I can peer into your own qualitative consciousness. The very intrinsic nature of such phenomena is what makes it impossible to demonstrate them via extrinsic means, as we are accustomed to demonstrating phenomena in physics. The only way to observe the intrinsic aspects of a system is to be that system. Note that although this is the historically documented problem of other minds, the same kind of epistemological asymmetry arises when we consider intrinsic/extrinsic properties from a purely logical point of view, abstracted away from concepts such as physical reality and subjective mind.

Rothiemurchus

Oct1-04, 10:37 AM

Rothie M:
Sense-experiences do not live in isolation.Show me an example where they do

Rothie M:

What I meant by this is that we never have a conscious experience in which,for example,a coloured spot exists independently of any other area of colour,any sound,
any smell,any sense of touch,feeling etc.
And it is also interesting to note that when we fall asleep and lose consciousness,
all our senses die simultaneously - from our own point of view - whatever an ECG of the brain may say the neurones are doing (the fact that we can remember this simultaneity is possibly relevant too).One aspect of consciousness that I find particularly intriguing is that if I shut my eyes I see darkness in front of me but nothing exists behind me.And nothing exists behind me when my eyes are open.
This nothing is clearly independent of the colour we see in front of us - it has an absolute and not a relative existence.

hypnagogue

Oct1-04, 10:54 AM

The apparent unity of consciousness is compelling, but cases of damaged or lesioned patients tell us that it isn't always as fluid and unitary as it seems to us. The separation of cross-modal perceptions is no problem: perhaps a normally functioning human never sees colors without having at least the faintest sense of an auditory percept at the same time, but surely deaf people do. Dealing within a single sensory modality is trickier, but for instance patients with blindsight report not being able to see a certain portion of their visual field. We can also distinguish our visual perception of color and shape to some extent-- if you cut a red ping pong ball in half and place the halves over your eyes, you will visually experience a uniform red field of color but you will not perceive shapes, so there is a sense in which a color percept can exist without a shape percept (but perhaps not the other way around).

Rothiemurchus

Oct3-04, 06:00 AM

People speak of "a wall of sound" so this suggests that we can have a shape without colours defining it.And it also suggests that sound and colour have something in common.Perhaps it is that to define a shape - something that exists in space AND time - we must use things that exist in space AND time - sounds and colours
(of course, in my opinion,anything that exists in soace and time is particle like in nature).Physicists talk of SPACETIME with regard to inanimate atoms,photons etc.
Consciousness could be the existence of particles in space AND time i.e
out of the realm of relativity theory.Particles moving faster than light would certainly be out of the realm of relativity theory.

olde drunk

Oct3-04, 10:11 AM

ah, the speed of light! that is definitly true relative to the physical universe.

what if consciousness and the communication between two consciousnesses is instantaneous in the non-physical????

why would the non-physical be limited by the laws of physics??

isn't QT introducing us to that possibility??

love&peace,
olde drunk

Oct3-04, 11:17 AM

Consciousness:
we know it occurs when there is electrical activity in our
brains, but what is this thing "consciousness" that is associated with electrical activity?

Electrical impulses?

When we are asleep and unconscious we are not aware of space or time.
So consciousness involves awareness of space and time,

In which we are aware I believe.

Perhaps we all have souls made from a unique combination of masses and charges.

I agree, but then again we're all different and so are the masses and charges.

We all think about it, are we really alive? thinking? what is thinking? what about seeing? the vision is perhaps the most doubtful consiousness of it all.

You sleep on the same bed for 50 years.

You emigrate = new house = new bed included.

In the morning you wake up, your brain becomes confused because you still thinking of the old house, walls, colours etc....

Your brain immediately adjusts this confusion.

There is conscious, no doubt about it.

Good topic!

PIT2

Oct3-04, 01:30 PM

what if consciousness and the communication between two consciousnesses is instantaneous in the non-physical????

why would the non-physical be limited by the laws of physics??

I agree. And if the consciousness is non-physical and isnt limited by space and time, then it could all exist in a single point. Perhaps this whole universe is one consciousness that came out of that single point and still is inside the single point, experiencing itself with the laws of physics in space and time.

selfAdjoint

Oct3-04, 01:53 PM

Now all you have to do is demonstrate that this isn't just a pipe dream. Because if it is, then I have a counter-proposal. What if consciousness is transferred by Carrol's snarks, which you can only detect if they happen to be boojums, but of course if they are boojums and you detect them you will silently fade away. So that explains why science does not detect them.

Rothiemurchus

Oct3-04, 03:39 PM

There is no reason to believe that consciousness is non-physical.
It is undoubtedly closely linked to the physical behaviour and nature of the brain.
But whether or not we can explain how is another matter.

main argument is that we must all have a unique collection of particles in part of our brain that defines us - otherwise their is no good reason why I should not be looking out of your body now and experiencing your feelings!
This also would put an end to the idea of a copy of me living now, in the past or future somwhere or somehow - I am not having two sets of conscious experience at the same time and nor are you.Also,what defines the distances and angles at which I see everything - a location somewhere inside my head.
This is why,without realising why, we say "point of view."
I would say that this "point of view" is a unique collection of particles which,
could be called the soul.It is the positon in space relative to which all
the colours,sounds ,smells and so on that I experience, exist.
And there must be a lot of ways of combining these particles if all living things with nervous systems on our planet (and perhaps elsewhere) are to
each have a unique soul.

Oct3-04, 05:27 PM

I noticed certain people use the word soul.

Do you believe in God?

Or is it just a theory?

PIT2

Oct3-04, 05:51 PM

There is no reason to believe that consciousness is non-physical.

I disagree with that, because there are plenty of things that give a clue that consciousness might be non-physical, such as telepathy, Near Death Experiences and other such things. They may not prove it, but they do give some strong clues.

main argument is that we must all have a unique collection of particles in part of our brain that defines us - otherwise their is no good reason why I should not be looking out of your body now and experiencing your feelings!

You might actually be experiencing my life as me. You and me could be the same consciousness that experiences reality from multiple perspectives! Its possible and you wouldnt realise it if it was the case.

graffix

Oct3-04, 11:12 PM

>>>You might actually be experiencing my life as me. You and me could be the same consciousness that experiences reality from multiple perspectives! Its possible and you wouldnt realise it if it was the case.

If it is the same consciousness that is experiencing reality from multiple perspectives then it in essence stretches the definition of consciousness; however I agree strongly to your statement!. If we stick to the defintion of consciousness as a "sense of one's personal or collective identity" and if my consciousness and Your consciousness are the same, it would have to be at different times, because we know for sure it's not happening at the same time (I can't see through your eyes). I can't prove that anyone is at this time (time that I am in now) is experiencing the same type of consciousness that I am experiencing, and most likely in my version of reality no one else is, (people are hollow robots!). I subscribe to the idea of "my version of reality" and that my reality is actually the collapsing of wave functions that I perceive as "time". I think that our consciousnesses (realities) are actually stacked on top of one another, each independent yet connected, and they interact with all of them. This (sort of) can be supported by quantum mechanic's principles of non-locality. If you believe in reincarnation then you won't mind the suggestion that death probably only means a move to another consciousness, yet at the same time it's all the same "big" consciousness to begin with. There probably are infinite versions of your self that actually exist as well, but you are you now, your consciousness. So reality, really, is an infinite web of events (possibilities) ever molded/changed by decisions made by the collection of consciousnesses. This is basically the theory of the Many Worlds Interpretation (if I interpreted correctly). Reality may not even be real as we think it is. It could just be a collection of ideas (in a computer?) that can't be disputed, since everything contained in it follows the laws of physics (a video game!). What I mean by "not disputed" is that no one can say "that reality is not possible" since our realities are infront of us, it has to be possible!

Oct4-04, 06:10 AM

What I mean by "not disputed" is that no one can say "that reality is not possible" since our realities are infront of us, it has to be possible!

Couldn't agree more.

The obsurdity of linking consciousness with unrealism is chaotic.

Pain is by far the strongest proof that we will ever possess to approve realism and existence of consciousness.

In any doubts of consciousness being real, plunge yourselves into a ball of fire and feel the excruciating pain all over your bodies.

Rothiemurchus

Nov1-04, 05:25 PM

The fact that we try to avoid pain is an evolutionary response:avoid pain and usually you avoid serious injury and survive.Pain like any other conscious experience is "real"
in the sense that it has a certain magnitude for a certain time - just like ,for example, the mass of an energetic particle.Pain could just be a propery of matter,like mass, that exists with a certain magnitude for a certain time at a certain place.
I would guess that conscious experiences like pain colours sounds and so on are properties
stitched into the fabric of space whereas things we don't experience consciously like atoms have properties such as charge that can move through space.Dark energy fron the realm of cosmology is a property of space
and so could be associated with consciousness.Because there are many
more dimensions in string theory than just 3 space and 1 time dimension,
I wouldn't be surprised if these extra dimensions are connected to conscious experience which would require at least 5 dimensions - one for each sense.
So I would expect string theory to be the ultimate theory of the cosmos.

RingoKid

Nov1-04, 06:47 PM

I have reckoned for a while now that

consciousness is a place/dimension we as living entities have the ability to tap into and project onto a fabric of spacetime that then sustains the universe. A collective illusion based on percievable sensory input.

Due to us all being in different times, places, dates of inception and genetic makeup, we experience differently but it all makes up the collective human experience which we feedback into the consciousness domain possibly when we sleep or dream.

It makes it easier for me to think of my dead loved ones still having a consciousness that exists someplace else that i can interact with when my time in this universe is done.

RingoKid

Nov1-04, 06:58 PM

when you see a light in the distance is it the light hitting your retina or are you projecting a wave of thought towards the light ???

you are conscious of the light but is it consciousness on an absolute reality level of perhaps strings changing to accomodate the movement of the universe and your projection of consciousness on to it or is it just the light travelling as a wave/particle towards you on a superficial reality level that limits our perceptions to the sensory ???

If light and consciousness propagate exclusive of our 4d universe as strings/extra dimensions and we are locked in the system forever the goldfish in our mirrored bowl then how would you know what is "really" moving and what is "really" real if we can only "see" within a limited spectrum and to certain extent ???

babsyco

Nov3-04, 10:12 AM

Why are you looking to physics to explain consciousness? We don't try to explain why two books tell different stories in terms of the phsyical makeup of particles and their relationships, and why? because the particle makeup is irrelevant to the information they carry. Magic particles is no explanation for consciousness, and as Hypnagogue said, is completely unsupported by scientific data. Linking the extra dimensions of string theory to consciousness? WHY?

Consciousness I think, will be eventually explained by the physiology of the brain, nothing supernatural or phenomenal as far as physics principles go. Why look outside what we know about physics already. We don't explain thoughts or base desires or any 'unconscious' brain activity in terms particle physics, so why do it with consciousness? Of course you COULD say that if it were based on the physiology of the brain then that would mean that it is possible for two identical consciousnesses to exist. To that I say, for anything of substance to be exactly the same as something else, they not only have to share all properties and aspects, but must inhabit the same place at the same time, meaning that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies. Aside from this, the likeliness that two consciousnesses (is that right?) WOULD be the same is ridiculously small, considering that they would have to have the same physical composition down to a tee, and also have to have shared the exact same past in order to have been exposed to the exact same sensory input.

And come on, that's not what was originally meant by the term 'point of view', it wasn't a reference to a certain point in our brain that contains a unique particle bar code for us. It was simply a reference to viewing anything from a particular vantage point that effected what we saw. How can a discussion on consciousness have so little scientific evidence? I think there is more reason to talk about consciousness in terms of information processing-the principle our brains and minds operate on, NOT particle physics. As I said, we don't analyse novels in terms of the particle composition, and why? because those particles are irrelevant to the information carried by the arrangement of letters into words, sentences, etc.

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

Fliption

Nov3-04, 04:19 PM

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

There is quite a bit of philosophical credibility to the idea that physics, as it exists today, CANNOT explain consciousness. The problems of consciousness run much deeper than just "we haven't had time to figure it out yet but soon we'll link it all to effects of the brain."

selfAdjoint

Nov3-04, 09:01 PM

Les Sleeth

Nov3-04, 10:02 PM

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

Yes the research goes on, but the research hasn't yet found the secret of consciousness. One needn't be a "philosopher" to observe exceptional events and refrain from assuming a priori what the explanation is.

babsyco

Nov4-04, 06:05 AM

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I (in my infinite and always consistent knowledge-[joke]) disagree with them. I cannot say it WON'T be the case, but I CAN say I have seen absolutely no reason to think it will so far, and doing things like linking it to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either. What on earth is the basis for links like that? If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

Thanks, Babsyco.

anuj

Nov4-04, 06:20 AM

Anyone trying to understand consciousness may have to read a little about the Hindu philosophy. I myself do not understand the meaning of consciousness fully but I do not reject it too just because it is difficult to explain it scientifically. To make our society more progressive, peaceful and prosperous we need both science as well as religion. Science for the materialistic development and religion for the control of our own mind, which if left uncontrolled can turn the benifits of science into great disasters.

This is where I think we need to sit quitely and explore the world within ourself, reason out who are we, me, myself etc. In short explaining consciousness. Recently I came across an article in an Indian newspaper which I found quite interesting. I think, the contributors to this thread may like to read.

Check this site: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/902912.cms

babsyco

Nov4-04, 06:55 AM

I think you need to look at some of the atrocities that religion has caused before you say that we need it to in some way keep our minds or scientific discovery in check. Beliefs work both ways: cause good and bad.

Thanks, Babsyco.

olde drunk

Nov4-04, 08:10 AM

hypnagogue

Nov4-04, 10:18 AM

doing things like linking [consciousness] to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either.

I absolutely agree with you on this point. Don't take such wild speculations as representative of the general argument that physicalism can't account for consciousness.

If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

David Chalmers has a number of good papers online about the argument. Check out Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html) and Consciousness and its Place in Nature (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html) for starters. Chalmers also has a couple of books on consciousness (The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory and Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem) if you are interested in a more in-depth discussion.

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

Les Sleeth

Nov4-04, 12:00 PM

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I . . . disagree with them. . . . (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

A favorite argument is David Chalmers’ zombie analogy and qualia model, which has been discussed at length here in the past. I see Hypnagogue beat me to it, but I’ll give you a site anyway where you can find links to articles both for and against Chalmers’ argument:
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophers/C/Chalmers,_David/

Speaking for myself, I am unenthusiastic about physicalist theories of consciousness for other reasons. Leaving my personal experiences out it (which I admit is the main reason for my skepticism), and instead just relying on what is observable by everyone, then I believe at least one physicalist conclusion drawn from observations is what's called in philosophy the fallacy of composition. I’d think this fallacy in physicalist theory would fit your complaint of being “put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.”

An example one of my philosophy dictionaries gives of the fallacy of composition would be to conclude that because all members of a baseball team are married, the baseball team as a whole therefore must have a wife. I’ve used an artist’s painting in the past to describe the fallacy. It goes something like this:

Say a research probe arrives here from another planet and finds Leonardo da Vinci’s painting of Mona Lisa. The probe takes samples of the paint and analyzes its chemistry; it takes samples of the canvas and records its composition; the probe analyzes the wavelengths of light reflected by the paint; it weighs the painting; it describes how all these factors are interconnected. Finally when every possible measurable factor is listed, it sends a report back to its home planet.

Question: do the planet’s inhabitants fully understand that painting? Has the painting been completely described by its list of components, its chemistry, its physics, and the interrelationships involved in all that? Is it logical to conclude that the whole is solely defined by the parts? This is what physicalist theory is. No more and no less. It is a description of the parts, their relationships, and their functions. That’s why physicalists now say they’ve explained life (ha!), and why they say they will eventually explain consciousness.

But just like that type of description of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting didn’t account for the creative organization present there, so too does physicalist descriptions of consciousness fail to account for why consciousness behaves in creatively organizing ways that are not observed in any non-living physical situation.

Buckminster Fuller once wrote, “Life is antientropic. It is spontaneously inquisitive. It sorts out and endeavors to understand.” Why isn’t consciousness entropic if it is matter-created? Why should survival be so important to matter-created consciousness? Shouldn’t it instead be just like its parent and behave disintegratively? Yet when a consciousness is like that, we consider it unhealthy or even psychopathic.

So I say physicalist theory is just as “unsupported” as supernatural creationist theories or wild mixes of quantum, string, etc. theories to form exotic metaphysics. I believe an unbiased mind must admit we don’t understand what causes the organizational drive and quality found in life and consciousness, and so would be open to the possibility there’s other unrecognized force(s) present in our universe causing that organization and consciousness's desire to manifest it.

hypnagogue

Nov4-04, 12:33 PM

Les Sleeth

Nov4-04, 01:23 PM

I'd just like to point out quickly that Les's arguments here aren't representative of kinds of arguments against physicalism given by Chalmers or Rosenberg. That is to say, one can reject Les's above arguments above but still accept the ones put forth by Chalmers/Rosenberg, because they are based on different principles.

Quite true. I was actually trying to contrast the two approaches.

I myself do not find anything troublesome for physicalism when it comes to accounting for life, or paintings, or the way a mind functions; I believe that a proper physicalist perspective can answer all of these questions satisfactorily, at least in principle.

Well, here we strongly disagree then. I would like to see how you explain the organizational quality found in life and consciousness with physical principles. I've challenged many people here to do it, and no one has yet. If Chalmers were participating here, I'd question him too for conceding to a physicalist theory of life.

Nonetheless, I do not believe that any physicalist perspective can even begin to account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. . . . My objective here isn't to argue against Les, but just to establish the scope and flavor of the problem. The core dilemma (as propounded by Chalmers/Rosenberg) revolves around how we can account for experiential consciousness, and consideration of this dilemma does not entail that life, mind (in the purely physical/functional sense), etc. should also be problematic phenomena for physicalism (although one may find these phenomena problematic for physicalism on different grounds).

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

RingoKid

Nov4-04, 05:04 PM

If consciousness exists as it must for us to rationalise the universe we live in then where does it exist. Solely in the brain or outside of it ???

I say outside in line with dualist schools of thought. That would make the best candidates for this dimension of consciousness we have so far being wrapped up in every point of 4d spacetime and we by the nature of our vibrational makeup tap into it.

Does a string have to vibrate in all dimensions to have an effect on 4d spacetime ???

No, if it vibrates in any less than our 3, forget time for a minute cos we only want a snapshot, then it probably only registers as an effect like gravity or light/heat.

so why not apply the effect of strings vibrating in an extra dimension of conciousness but not fully in our 4d universe and open up the possibility on a true theory of EVERYTHING ???

I mean neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; sounds like vibrational string activity when applied to a living entity.

Haven't you ever known something without knowing why or made an intuitive leap without knowing how ??? Where does such "knowledge" originate ???..collective memory ???

To me it seem the simplest explanation and in line with current physical speculation especially if we have these extra dimensions anyway. Subjective experience can be accounted for by virtue of no 2 entities being exactly a like due to time and spatial variations at the time of conception.

If consciousness is a "state of awareness" and that state exists physically but not in our 4d universe then it exists elsewhere and can be blanketed to include consciousness/awareness in all multiverse scenarios.

Do to consciousness what big bang does to matter and rewind it back to it's genesis and what do you get, where do you end up and what do you think ???

We experience the universe

If this view is right, then in some ways a theory of consciousness will have more in common with a theory in physics than a theory in biology. Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness to it; but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance. The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple. If a theory of consciousness also involves fundamental principles, then we should expect the same. The principles of simplicity, elegance, and even beauty that drive physicists' search for a fundamental theory will also apply to a theory of consciousness.

hypnagogue

Nov4-04, 06:55 PM

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

Les Sleeth

Nov4-04, 07:03 PM

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

Yes, I should have assumed that. Since you've been here you have been a most charitable sort. :smile:

P.S.
Is it just me or have the Smileys been rearranged?

StatusX

Nov5-04, 12:18 AM

one indication that it may be beyond science is that it is impossible to test, something fundamental to the scientific method. i can make a simple program that simply prints the words "I am conscious." then I could make an advanced AI program that is capable of carrying on a conversation about art or love or something, and then when i ask it if its conscious, it says "I am conscious." is the second program any more conscious than the first?

there is nothing i can say or do that would convince you i am conscious, and yet it is completely obvious to me. if you could scan my brain as i was being asked the question, it is conceivable you would be able to tell that i would say yes, seemingly independent of whether it was actually true. that is to say, there is a place in our brain that we go to for the answer to that question, just like theres a place where we get our height or age if someone asks. so whats different between me and the programs? is consciousness an illusion? if this is the answer science will give us in the end, can we conclude that science was not adequate for that question, or do we accept it?

edit: i took my theory about memory out, i realized it doesnt really address experience.

Canute

Nov5-04, 07:22 AM

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.
I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

hypnagogue

Nov5-04, 12:36 PM

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Rosenberg observes that many of the conceptual problems involved with phenomenal conscious revolve around questions of causation (eg interactionism which denies causal closure of the physical, vis a vis epiphenomnalism which denies P-consciousness any causal powers at all, etc.). In order to place consciousness into the natural order in a non-ad hoc way, he re-examines our theories of causality, finds them lacking, and constructs a new one. His new account of causation introduces receptivity, which is roughly a system's capacity to be affected, and characterizes effective causation as an operator of constraint on a given domain of possible states. He develops the theory formally by creating a directed graph notation.

He goes on to argue that physical theory ultimately describes a schema composed of bare differences, and finds such a schema ontologically lacking. In other words, he characterizes physics as an entirely extrinsic theory, and finds extrinsic phenomena to be incoherent in the absence of some kind of bottom-line intrinsic phenomena that can instantiate and realize such extrinsic/schematic relationships. He proposes phenomenal and experiential properties to be the perfect sort of intrinsic candidate to do the job. So he winds up with a panexperientialist theory where physical phenomena are just the set of functional relationships that phenomenal properties engage in.

In elaborating this idea within his detailed theory of causation, he

* assigns P-consciousness causal relevance without slipping into interactionism or epiphenomenalism,
* manages to neatly solve a number of paradoxes surrounding consciousness such as the boundary problem,
* comes to a sort of functionalist view on consciousness that avoids the usual observor-relative and ontological problems associated with it,
* avoids falling into the usual pitfalls associated with panexperientialism/panpsychism,
* and more.

You might also find the following brief summary helpful: http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~anand/html/Rosenberg.html

StatusX

Nov5-04, 03:41 PM

hypnagogue

Nov5-04, 04:06 PM

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldnt we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

A very pertinent question. You are essentially invoking the hypothetical philosophical entities called zombies, which are much discussed by both physicalists (eg Dennett) and anti-physicalists (eg Chalmers). My position on this question is that, yes, we would still have the same discussions, because our discussions are driven by physical causal mechanisms. Of course, our discussions would not be meaningful, because we would not really be referring to phenomenal consciousness, since by definition in this thought experiment we would not have it.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

Depending on your metaphysical outlook, there are subtler points to be raised. For example, in Rosenberg's framework (which I favor) one could say both that this place in the brain is all there is to consciousness and that it is in direct contact with the metaphysical phenomena responsible for consciousness. But we need to make some qualifications. 'This place in the brain' is all there is to consciousness, but a purely physical account of this place in the brain is not all there is to the brain (on Rosenberg's view), so physicalism fails here. And the purely physical structure of the brain is in contact with phenomenal consciousness not in the sense that it is affected by it, but rather in the sense that the physical structure literally is just the effective causal content of the phenomenal consciousness. So these two are directly related in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way that the abstract structure of a building is directly related to the material that instantiates that structure.

Rothiemurchus

Nov5-04, 05:45 PM

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

hypnagogue

Nov5-04, 06:49 PM

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.

That's not what the terms mean, or at least, I've never seen them used this way in philosophy. Nor have I meant them in this way when I've used the terms.

Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness? If you suppose that these new particles have some sort of ad hoc property that magically produces consciousness, you might as well transfer that ad hoc property to the accepted particles.

gerben

Nov5-04, 07:08 PM

Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?
I do not think this is a question that needs to be answered for a scientific understanding. We also do not know the answer to such questions about theories that are supposed to be very successful like:
why do masses attract other masses?

(the following does not matter at all for the philosophical question, but to be more conform with modern physics I should have said something like this: Why do masses curve space-time and why do masses follow geodesics in curved space-time?)

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

StatusX

Nov6-04, 01:46 PM

If there was some parellel universe where these zombies lived, they might be able to answer any problem of science, but no matter how hard they try, they'll never understand consciousness. Why? Because it isn't really there for them. It's a "defect" of their brain that they think its there, and no matter how hard you try to convince them otherwise, they'll just say "But I'm looking right now, I see that red apple. Why can't science tell me why red looks the way it does?" It's a really tough problem, because there is really nothing different between us and these zombies, except we presume that we really are consciouss and they aren't.

I think the premise is flawed, and that if there were beings with the exact same physical brain structure as us, we couldn't be different. One possibility is that we are both conscious, and any system whose components interact the way our neurons do, whether its made of protein, silicon, wood, or whatever, would also be conscious. If you were to slowly take pieces of our brain away, somehow still keeping us alive, it seems that our consciousness would in some sense fade away gradually. If a retarted human had the same basic brain structure as a chimpanzee, how could one be conscious and not the other? So basically what I'm saying is, all animals with brains would be conscious, to some degree. Maybe other systems would be too. I read that article by Chalmers, and his idea that a thermostat could have some extremely simple form of consciousness is appealing physically, because it doesn't resort to the religious idea that life is anything other than a collection of atoms obeying physical laws (his idea simply altering these laws slightly), but its hard to swallow.

The other possibility is that there is no consciousness. This is hard to accept, obviously, since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious. We could, like the zombies, spend hundreds of years searching futilely for something that isn't there. In other words, consciousness isn't something fundamental to the universe or outside physics, it is simply a biological property that we have a hard time dealing with because we can't get "outside the system."

It's also interesting to note that, presumably, everything about the world can be explained purely by the physical methods we have now (or will soon possess, once a unified theory is formed), except consciousness. We can, in principle, start from the laws of quantum mechanics and work all the way to explain why we have philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness. But consciousness itself would remain unexplained. On the other hand, maybe a unified theory will not fall into place until we accept consciousness as something fundamental and work towards incorporating it into a true theory of everything.

Damn, how many times did I say conscious? Is there another word I could use?

RingoKid

Nov6-04, 07:35 PM

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

I think we should call them "imagyons" and they need a place to exist for a start like a different dimension, the system is us and the universe in general, the particles behave according to observation of the human race across a broad spectrum taking into account cultural, geograhical and spatio temporal differences.

I and others here really should put in the legwork to develop the idea and help the rest of the planet get up to speed so we can move onwards and upwards.

It would be simple, elegant and beautiful. Noble values to aspire to

peace

Canute

Nov7-04, 07:37 AM

StatusX

... since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious.
I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

StatusX

Nov7-04, 11:40 AM

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption, but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc. When I talk about consciousness, I mean the subjective experience of what its like to be you, to see red, to feel happiness. This is something fundamentally different than anything science has explained in the past, becuase it is not a functional relation between things, but an absolute. For example, quantum mechanics explains how one measurement relates to another one, but it doesn't explain what an electron is. Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something. I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist. This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us. But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious. They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could. Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness. Now these are both materialist views, so if you disagree with materialism, then you will have a different opinion. But it is entirely possible, and very common, for a non-materialist to still think that every functional property of the brain can be explained by physical laws, so that isn't where the argument breaks down.

anuj

Nov8-04, 03:08 AM

To understand consciousness, we first need to understand how do we ourself work. Human brain is that biological body part which drives our life with the feedback received from other sensor organs such as nose, tongue, eye, ear and sensation received from skin. The body as a whole trains itself with experience from the surroundings/ environment.

Our life starts as soon as we are born. I presume we are born with zero thoughts in our mind (empty memory cells). Is it posible to figure out what a newly born baby would be thinking after his birth. Because this is the least disturbed state of human mind and more closer to an attempt to understand what is consciousness.

hitssquad

Nov8-04, 03:41 AM

Our life starts as soon as we are born.Apparently not (http://www.google.com/search?q=babies+hear+womb).

anuj

Nov8-04, 04:44 AM

Apparently not (http://www.google.com/search?q=babies+hear+womb).

If the life (the thought activity of our brain) does not start with its birth, we need to know at what stage it starts. I mean the evolution of our thought process starting from zero thought in the begining.

Canute

Nov8-04, 07:31 AM

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption,...
I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.

but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc.
Now that's what I call an assumption.

Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.
I agree completely. However it's a tricky one. According to most scientists it doesn't do anything at all, so studying what it does is not possible. Unfortunately scientifically-speaking it's existence has not yet been verified, so studying what it is is also a problem.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something.
Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.

I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge.
Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist.
This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.

This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us.
Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?

But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious.
If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.

They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could.
Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?

Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.
Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness.
I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

StatusX

Nov8-04, 09:50 AM

I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.
...
Now that's what I call an assumption.

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself. The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical. However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.

Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.
...
Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.
...
This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.
...
Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?
...
If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.
...
Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?
...
Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldnt be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different. When he woke up, he would also have written in his memory that he was recently sleeping, and could tell us that. Consciousness is not necessary, and would not change anything we could observe about him.

I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

I mentioned that. These are the two possible materialist viewpoints. Materialism is the view that the physical properties of something completely describe it. That is, two systems that are physically identical can't be different in any possible way.

Canute

Nov8-04, 11:53 AM

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself.
You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical.
You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.
Quite agree. I find Occam's razor applicable in this situation. It would be a needless complication to assume that they are not conscious. However, you're right, this does not prove that they are.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.
Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.
I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.
Again, you are entitled to your opinion. But if you want to influence anybody else's you're going to have to find some evidence. Personally I believe that it is unreasonable to say that one can argue about consciousness without being conscious.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldnt be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.
Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different.
But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

StatusX

Nov8-04, 01:16 PM

You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point. If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...

You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

True, and this may be the main place our opinions diverge. I'll explain why I feel this way in a minute.

Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like theres no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious. However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.

I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed. And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more. If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws. This could only be true if either consciousness (ie, experience) is causal or if there is some property of the brain besides consciousnes that cant be explained in physical terms.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true. While this is only my opinion, it is also widely held even by the philosophers who are not materialists.

Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.

But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.

EDIT:
I realize Im not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.

If the first case is true, then whether consciousness is causal or not is debatable. In the context of the zombies argument I had to assume it wasn't for coherence, because by the premise, zombies are beings that influence the physical world exactly as we do. If consciousness is causal, zombies are not logically possible, and I think this may be your position. Looking back, I see that our disagreements were because you were just assuming this to be true from the start, and trying to consider the zombies from this perspective, which is impossible. You might want to at least consider the other views and see where you think yours succeeds where they fail. Your position is actually appealing in that consciousness may be the mechanism that causes wave collapse in QM, and thus does play a significant causal role. However, when I argued against a causal role for consciousness, I meant that in principle, consciousness does little to influence our macroscopic behavior. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.

olde drunk

Nov8-04, 01:45 PM

When i access a data memory file on my computer i see the code, etc.

Has anyone even suggested that we have a physical cell (or whatever) that we encode to have a memory? is this cell hung on a synapse?

take a brain slice and put it into the most powerful e-microscope, show me a memory cell or the residue of an abstract thought, please.

love&peace,
olde drunk

RingoKid

Nov8-04, 07:26 PM

gerben

Nov8-04, 09:10 PM

information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ???

You propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains.

ok

and then?

RingoKid

Nov8-04, 10:43 PM

yup...

...in as much as branes and hidden dimensions wrapped up in each point particle sized co ordinate in 4d spacetime are completely separated from the physical world.

It's not so much that this dimension comes into contact via brains as i believe it permeates every fibre of our being accounting for genetic memory. The contact is always present but we decode the contact using our brains.

and then???

...we try to make sense of the data according to the accumulation of knowledge from the collective human experience across a broad spectrum of subjects from metaphysics to religion to quantum mechanics and cosmology, irrespective of culture, geographical and temporal traditions.

the collective consciousness now has a place to exist

We unify the human experience into a consensus reality with or without God. It doesn't matter cos it's all about us and how we percieve ourselves and the universe we inhabit.

i just found this on the net and haven't even read it yet but it appears i am not alone. I may the first to associate hidden dimensions of string theory to repositories of consciousness and by association memory, knowledge and truth...

Time will tell.

RingoKid

Nov8-04, 10:46 PM

oops forgot to post the link...

http://www.meta-religion.com/Physics/Consciousness/physics_of_collective_consciousness.htm

gerben

Nov9-04, 02:51 AM

RingoKid, what I was doing was summarizing your post in language that I could understand, leaving out anything that I (and I assume most of the other readers) did not understand.

So now for your new post:
You propose that this totally separate realm (called consciousness) contacts everything in the physical world.

That is it for this time I did not understand the rest.

I do not understand why you say our brain "decodes" something from a separate realm (called consciousness). I think it simply "decodes" (interprets) sensory input coming from the physical world, and we are somehow conscious of this interpretation.

abbott

Nov9-04, 09:56 AM

Observation is the core necessity of an existence that operates as a balance of opposites. Our powers of observation will always end in unpercieveability (time or space "before" the big bang, the meaning of time or space in the face of the infinity we observe them approach).

We (classical philosophy "who am I?" and "what is everything?") must be the knowable universes understanding of itself, after all what is anything we have observed other than a reflection of the energies we've used to detect it. And what is a living thing? A converter of energies, we sustain ourselves by in-taking things and changing them into other things (sounds like a process of observation to me).

Canute

Nov9-04, 10:52 AM

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point.
I can't see why you would believe that discussions about consciousness can happen in the absence of consciousness, unless it is to protect an underlying physicalist theory. Human beings don't normally talk about things whose existence they have no evidence for, why would zombies do it? Can you imagine finding a distant planet where nothing is conscious, but whose inhabitants spend their time discussing consciousness? I don't buy it.

If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...
Yes, it is debatable.

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like theres no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious.
We know that people who are unconscious (asleep, knocked out etc.) do not say yes to the question of whether they are conscious. If you asked a zombie they'd say no, since they are zombies. They would therefore not behave like human beings. If they answer yes, as we would, then either they are not zombies or they are lying.

However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.
I realise that, but it is a conjecture.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed.
Hang on, if zombies are intelligent and consciousness is scientifically explicable then why can't zombies succeed in explaining consciousness? I would have thought they were the ideal entities to do it. If they can't succeed in doing this it can only be that they are not conscious, in which case human beings are not zombies.

And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more.
That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws.
It's not quite so straighforward. There's an issue here about whether physical laws are sufficient or necessary to detirmine behaviour. That is, we can say that human consciousness is not capable of breaking any physical laws, but still argue that human behaviour cannot be explained only by reference to those laws.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true.
Ok. But there is no scientific evidence that it is not true and I take the other view. I base this on non-scientific evidence, my own experience of consciousness.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.
So for a zombie to behave like a human it must think that it is conscious? But if it can think it is conscious then it is conscious, at least according to Descartes.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.
What would a zombie answer if you asked it how it is feeling today?

EDIT: I realize Im not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.
Ok, I see where you're coming from. But don't forget that there are other possibilities.

. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.
All experiences are incommensurable, incommunicable etc., so we cannot describe red in words. If a zombie could explain the colour red (by which I take it you mean 'the experience of seeing the colour red') then it would be nothing like a human being. In any case I suspect that a zombie would not be able to explain what the colour red is like, since a zombie would not be able to experience seeing red. There would be nothing that it is like to see it. A zombie would merely register some particular frequency of light waves that correspond to what those quirky humans call 'red'.

Canute

Nov9-04, 11:03 AM

Hypnagogue

Thanks for your note and link on Rosenberg. I don't see what he is getting at so will do some further exploring.

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.
Yes, point taken. I was wondering whether the book was worth reading.

RingoKid

Nov9-04, 08:27 PM

Gerben

String theory would have all matter, charges and field/wave effects as being vibrations of bands of energy vibrating across up to 10 dimensions and encompassed in a larger 11th dimension of which we can only detect 4, the 4 being our 3d universe and time.

The shape of the string, it's rate of vibration and the number of dimensions it vibrates in determine it's elemental or field properties. The accumulation of which in 4d format forms atoms, molecules, objects and entitites.

So for a collection of strings such as a sentient life form to have consciousness then it must at some stage of it's vibrational traverse through a dimension or combination thereof acquire a consciousness ie an awareness of it's own existence.

This would allow for say a rock to not be aware of it's existence due to it's lack of vibration in a dimension of consciousness.

The alternative is to assign intrinsic properties of consciousness to all strings.

The separateness of the hidden dimensions is not really separate because they exist at every 4d co ordinate in physically detectable spacetime.

So what we see as reality is merely our 4d sensory perception of it. Our awareness of the underlying reality is what we are all searching for albeit in a multitude of disciplines. Our brain decodes what our senses tell it in the physical world but it also allows us to project our consciousness to the non physical world implied by black holes, multiverses and hidden dimensions.

Fliption

Nov9-04, 10:12 PM

That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

Rader

Nov10-04, 12:51 AM

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

So you do not think life is that aspect of human behavior?

Did you ever see a human not acting like, it was alive and have consciousness? Or better yet ask yourself the question.

Are you looking for a discussion or do you really believe that?

gerben

Nov10-04, 01:58 AM

Ringokid

I agree that string theory assumes that there are many dimension. I also agree that we experience only 3 spatial dimensions and 1 temporal dimension. What I do not see is, why it would be useful, or how it would further understanding, to associate consciousness with another dimension. Of course you can do so, but it does not make anything clear. In string theory the multiple dimensions are used to explain how the "4d spacetime world" that we experience behaves (this also includes rocks). If you only say that consciousness is another dimension then that statement in itself is empty.

Canute

Nov10-04, 06:57 AM

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.
Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

selfAdjoint

Nov10-04, 07:47 AM

What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

Fliption

Nov10-04, 10:14 AM

Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

Fliption

Nov10-04, 10:22 AM

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

It's an interesting dilemma. It doesn't seem likely that a zombie would ever believe in a hard problem. It seems as if you really have to have P-consciousness to see the hard problem. But the belief in a hard problem itself can be completely explained with A-consciousness and doesn't require P-consciousness. To me, this just makes the hard problem a personal private hell for each of us who really do have P-consciousness :eek:

StatusX

Nov10-04, 11:35 AM

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

This is exactly what I was trying trying to explain before, and I completely agree with everything said here.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

Now here you lose me. I thought you said all behavior could be explained? What makes this behavior special? My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is interesting, because it suggests a pleasing symmetry between the mental world and the physical world. If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

Fliption

Nov10-04, 12:17 PM

My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie.

I'd make one change to this statement above. Instead of saying "would also be exhibited by a zombie", I'm saying "could also be exhibited by a zombie. There is a difference. The new sentence isn't making a statement one way or the other about what a zombie would believe or how it would behave. It simply says that no behavior is "out of scope" for a zombie. This includes believing in the hard problem.

In the zombie illustration, many times it is claimed that the zombie "would" believe it is conscious. This is simply because one of the assumptions of the illustration is that the zombie has identical A-consciousness as someone who has P-consciousness. That assumption is made for the sake of illustrating the problems of consciousness. Not because a zombie really would have identical A-consciousness.

I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is true and is the essence of the hard problem. How can P-consciousness exists and not be explained by the physical facts?

Rothiemurchus

Nov12-04, 04:14 PM

Rothie M:
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

Hypnagogue:

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

Rothie M:

What is experiential consciousness?
Someone's definition of what they think consciousness is.
This definition could be wrong.
I think the root cause of our inability to understand consciousness
is that people think it is something unphysical.Why should this be so?
A colour exists at a certain place for a certain time with a certain intensity and hue.What is so unphysical about this?
Our brains certainly categorize consciousness differently from other phenomena.But that is probably because our brains have evolved to enable us to survive and they categorize to aid survival - not to give deep philosophical insight.

Rothiemurchus

Nov13-04, 05:42 AM

If I see an area of colour, the area is continuous with no gaps in it.This can't be explained by saying that the area is made of lots of waves or particles.But space is continuous and so we would suspect an area of colour to be an area of space or some continuous property associated with that continuous area of space.Dark energy
is considered to be a property of space, so perhaps there is an association between consciousness and dark energy.We would suspect that we can have conscious experiences anywhere in the universe and we would also suspect that space exists everywhere in the universe,whereas waves and particles might not.I mention all this because it is my belief that space-time exists in space and time.In other words space-time is particulate in nature and this is why gravitational force carriers (which can be particles) can alter space-time.
One kind of particle influences another.
According to quantum mechanics the vacuum should have a colossal energy density of 10^120 Joules per cubic metre.This figure is at odds with experiment.However if the vaccum energy does not have a gravitational field
perhaps we could say that space is made from it - we would not expect space to have a gravitational field either.So, in this scenario,particles of which space-time is constituted, exist in a medium of vacuum particles called
space.And it is the vacuum particles which have a continuous distribution which allows the areas of colours, we consciously experience, to be continuous.

StatusX

Nov13-04, 09:18 PM

Rothiemurchus

Nov14-04, 06:19 AM

What I meant was that the area of colour is not made from photons.
It has to be made from something else that is continuous.

douglas

Nov14-04, 10:04 AM

There is apparently an underground paper that explains consciousness but I haven't read it. Someone told me that there are plans to publish it next year. Has anyone heard of this paper? All I know is that the author's initials are MD and only a few people have a copy.

Please email me if you know anything about this paper.

Les Sleeth

Nov14-04, 12:27 PM

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually travelling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

StatusX

Nov14-04, 12:58 PM

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

Les Sleeth

Nov14-04, 02:41 PM

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

Yes, I just read over your other posts in this thread and I can see you understand the arguments. Sorry, I should have done that first.

Regarding your point about if "experience could arise without any real objects," it certainly can. Consciousness can experience itself, as any reasonably accomplished meditator can attest to.

Canute

Nov15-04, 07:06 AM

... My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.
Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.
This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

The question of whether our consciousness in its entirety comes into existence when we are born as mortal beings remains moot. As yet there is no scientific evidence that points either way. Those who research consciousness as opposed to brain generally assert that there's a lot more to consciousness than meets the eye.

StatusX

Nov15-04, 09:19 PM

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas). These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas. You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red. These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft) Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity. We aren't yet close to such an explanation, and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states." But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome. The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well. Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted? I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to acheive certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

Canute

Nov16-04, 09:39 AM

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas).
Hmm. How does one turn an electro-chemical signal into an idea in the absence of consciousness? What is an 'abstract idea'? Is there any other sort? Or are you suggesting that ideas are physical? Does the idea of an elephant take up more brain space than the idea of a mouse?

These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas.
This is a sleight of hand. An electro-chemical signal is a physical thing, an idea is not, (even if you believe that ideas have neural correlates). If these signals 'represent' ideas then who or what is decoding the representation and turning them into ideas? That is, how does your e-c signal become a non-physical idea?

You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red.
What do you mean 'represent' the colour red? I thought you were arguing that the signals were the colour red.

These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft)
Are you saying that 'red' is not real? Why are you trying to explain our experience of it then?

Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity.
OK. But I'll bet you can't find any evidence to prove it.

We aren't yet close to such an explanation,
I wonder why not.

and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states."
I'd say a brain state was not abstract. This is the problem, it is not possible to argue from brain states to states of consciousness. This is why so many arguments against the notion that the neural correlates of consciousness are consciousness have been published. I like neurophysiologist Karl Pribram's remark that looking for consciousness in the brain is like digging to the centre of the earth to find gravity.

But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome.
Hold on, I didn't suggest that there was anything mystical about consciousness, and both of us are arguing that it is non-physical, me on the basis that is does exist, you on the basis that it doesn't.

The whole basis of your argument is that something that is non-phsyical cannot exist, and that therefore consciousness is physical insofar as it exists and non-physical insofar as it doesn't. This forces you into the incoherent view that ideas are physical, despite the fact that they have no physical extension.

The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?
'Mystical' is your word, not mine. What forces me to conclude that consciousness (or, more properly, conscious experiences) is not physical is that the brain can be observed in the third-person and consciousness cannot be.

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well.
There is no doubt that as human beings our states of consciousness are affected by the states of our brains. However the states of the tides are affected by the state of the moon. It does not follow that water is made out of moons.

Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted?
Whose to say there isn't a teapot in orbit around Mars?

I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to acheive certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)
Yes, but this is just a restatement of your opinion. I'm arguing that there is no evidence for your opinion. Can you think of any? There's none yet in the literature.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration."
In a way I agree. It depends how you use the term 'prove'. If I say 'it appears to me that it's raining' I can know that this is true. I can 'prove' its truth to myself by a simple act of introspection, (and the statement remains true whether or not it is raining). But I cannot demonstrate a proof of it. Perhaps you wouldn't consider my introspective evidence a 'proof', but this doesn't really matter. What is known directly is certain but not provable by demonstration, (e.g. 'I think therefore I am'), whereas what can be proved by demonstration can always be falsified (Goedel et al) and is therefore never certain. This is one of the odd consequences of the nature of consciousness and of formal reasoning.

If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.
I cannot demonstrate that I am conscious. However it doesn't follow that I cannot be sure whether I am or not. Are you suggesting that we could be not-conscious yet think we are, or be conscious yet think we are not? If so then we better just agree to disagree.

Fliption

Nov16-04, 10:07 AM

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain.

I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal. But you seem to go to far with your arguments. If we say that we have no evidence that A causes or has an effect on B, we cannot then conclude that therefore B must cause(or is a byproduct of A). This idea is simply a belief and actually contradicts the whole premise you originally agreed with.

I still wonder if you understood me earlier when I said that a large part of the issue with consciousness is one of epistomology. The whole reason for the zombie illustration is to say that consciousness is beyond the study of a materialist paradigm. It does not claim anything about the causality of consciousness. It merely claims we cannot "know" these things using a materialist toolkit. So this includes making conclusions about it being the byproduct of anything.

You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

I agree with Canute here, although this could largely be semantic. To me all knowledge is personal and I think that's how Canute is using the term "knowledge" as well. The only thing I am certain of is that "something exists". I know this because I of aware of existence and something has to exists for this awareness to exists.

When Canute used "prove by demonstration", I interpret it to mean proving to others. Since I do not "know" that the external world really exists and this includes all those people that I might use to "prove by demonstration" to, "prove by demonstration" doesn't prove anything.

Rothiemurchus

Nov16-04, 02:50 PM

Fliption:
I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal.

Rothie M:
It has to be causal.Because consciousness is associated with the passage of time and
time passes when physical entities change from one spatial configuration to another.
Energy of some kind causes the configurations to change.

Burnsys

Nov16-04, 02:56 PM

i guess if we want to fin what counsiosnes really is, we have to research on dopamine and endorfines..... why dopamine in our brains make as feel good???? while other neurotransmisors make as feel bad??

it may sound stupid, but i think it's a good question, if it doesn't have an answer yet..

Les Sleeth

Nov16-04, 03:05 PM

It has to be causal.Because consciousness is associated with the passage of time and time passes when physical entities change from one spatial configuration to another. Energy of some kind causes the configurations to change.

It may be causal, but the point was that no argument or set of facts can show it is caused. So far, the subjective element of consciousness is unexplainable by any known principles associated with biology or physics.

Rothiemurchus

Nov16-04, 05:02 PM

Les Sleeth:
no argument or set of facts can show it is caused

Rothie M:
I disagree.
If, one day, particles are detected at a region in space where ,for example ,an area of colour exists,and these particles are detected for the same length of time as a conscious observer says he can see the area of colour,that would be convincing evidence.

StatusX

Nov16-04, 06:11 PM

selfAdjoint

Nov16-04, 06:49 PM

Les Sleeth

Nov16-04, 07:52 PM

A great post.

The only reply the others could make is pretty weak:

We can't build that computer right now.
We might never be able to build it.
Until you can show us the computer being conscious (and we will be the judges of whether it is conscious or not), we can continue to believe in our fairyland.

I'd respectfully submit that those aren't the only replies others can make, and neither are all of those replies "weak."

I think it is ironic you seem to downplay an argument you yourself are likely to make. You say, "Until you can show us the computer being conscious (and we will be the judges of whether it is conscious or not), we can continue to believe in our fairyland." Well, do you not use that exact same argument against God? You say, "Show me that God! Until you do (and we will be the judge if it is really God or not) we will continue to believe in our physicalist fairyland."

It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith. Empiricists are the ones who insist a hypothesis is to be confirmed by experience, which means by your own rules you are held to different standards. Isn't it reasonable to expect empirical physicalists to produce that computer consciousness they say is possible? And until you do, isn't your theory just another unsubstantiated physicalist "fairyland."

Les Sleeth

Nov16-04, 08:11 PM

I'll keep this short. Imagine a computer so powerful, it could simulate the physical human brain in every aspect. Every neuron would be modelled to incredible precision. All the sources of input would have to be supplied to it (eg, the data from a video camera could be translated into the appropriate data an eye would send it). The output would be translated into some form we could understand. For example, the data it sends to the virtual "vocal cords" could be tanslated into text. Is this possible?

Maybe. Since it hasn't been done, no one knows. You might say it is possible, I will disagree. The only possible solution is for those who assert it is possible to actually do it.

If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas. There would be no way to "see" these ideas, they wouldn't take up space, but they would be inherent in the pattern of 1s and 0s in the computer memory. As I have already emphasized, it would tell us it was conscious. Just like a virtual pendulum "swings" back and forth, a virtual brain acts the same as a real brain, and a real brain "tells" the world it is conscious.

You are modelling a zombie, which everyone agrees is possible.

[If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas] If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why? Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument. If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true. And Fliption, to me, the zombies exist in an alternate universe where the rules are different. They just illustrate logical possibilities.

Where in your explanation is the "you" that is making decisions, changing your mind, willing your body to go here or there? You can easily account for all computing functions of the brain, and all behavior, but you cannot account for self awareness, subjectivity, qualia experience, or whatever you want to call it. Your focus seems to be the quantum steps, the discrete, the parts . . . what you don't see is the continuous, the undivided, the whole . . .

If someone sees either ONLY the discrete, or ONLY the continuous, then in this reality where we exist at least they are going to miss something.

harvey1

Nov16-04, 08:43 PM

If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why? Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument. If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true. And Fliption, to me, the zombies exist in an alternate universe where the rules are different. They just illustrate logical possibilities.

Well, the problem here is that you are reasoning based on "what we know not". Every so often someone comes along with a 'scientific theory' that they say predicts all the equations of physics, and therefore is the 'right' theory (and they are usually not the humble types in their proclamation). Of course, ask them to produce equations that are not known which we can experiment, they are usually mum. What they have done is predict the past successes of science, and even though it is an admirable task if done correctly, such kind of 'theories' do not tell us that a revolutionary theory has been discovered. Rather, all we can do is look at them and say "does it make butter too?".

Well, I think this is a very similar situation to your thought experiment. What are we supposed to do with such computational results other than scratch our heads and pick up our discussion right before we were interrupted? The fact of the matter is, a theory might be right, but if it does not show us how it is right or if it is right in experiments that we can perform, such a theory is generally not useful to science.

In the case of a super computer having all these abilities, all we can ask at the end of the day is whether it is simply under the spell of Searle's Chinese room thought experiment. You might recall in that thought experiment that a person who does not know a lick of Chinese is put inside a room (we don't know that he doesn't know Chinese). While in the room, someone comes along and slips through the door a question written in Chinese characters. A few minutes later out spews the answer in English. Now, to most of us, we would assume that the person in the room is fluent in Chinese. But, we would be wrong. If we could look inside we would see that the person has a pretty substantial filing system that they can match the Chinese characters, stroke by stroke, until find a file that contains the answer in English for that question written in Chinese. The 'translator' has no understanding of Chinese, but everyone on the outside is confident that the guy is fluent in Chinese.

What this thought experiment shows is not that AI is impossible, rather it shows that to know that AI is possible we must have a much better philosophical understanding of language, theory of learning, theory of meaning, and a theory of truth (among a few others). We need to demonstrate how a proposition can be encoded into symbols and then decoded such that no information is lost (or very little information). We can translate the contents of a sentence into 1' & 0's, but we cannot translate the meaning. Without demonstrating how it is possible, we might just as well be talking Chinese to the guy in a Chinese room.

BoulderHead

Nov17-04, 07:43 AM

It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith.
Faith does not constitute a proof and is not related to evidence. Those relying on it may share a commonality, but by definition faith is not related to possession of evidence for some fact.

Empiricists are the ones who insist a hypothesis is to be confirmed by experience, which means by your own rules you are held to different standards. Isn't it reasonable to expect empirical physicalists to produce that computer consciousness they say is possible?
Not really, so long as it is being held as a possibility.

And until you do, isn't your theory just another unsubstantiated physicalist "fairyland."
If someone is holding it on faith to be a proof for something not yet know to be factual then, yes.

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 09:50 AM

Faith does not constitute a proof and is not related to evidence. Those relying on it may share a commonality, but by definition faith is not related to possession of evidence for some fact.

Right, that's exactly what I was trying to say, and did say when I said, "It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith." Faith, at least as described by Paul and applied to God, is something one has without proof. It is an inner feeling, not an external process as proof is. So I still think that, in terms of credibility, the empirical physicalist has an entirely different standard to meet than people of faith.

Not really, so long as it is being held as a possibility.

True. However, the attitude of the physicalist who believes in and/or entertains speculative ideas like computer consciousness, life self-organizing from chemistry, time travel, universes bubbling up from nothingness, and so on seems to be harboring a double standard when he recommends situating in Fairyland those of us who suspect some sort of consciousness might have been involved in creation. Personally, I think certain aspects of creation can be explained much easier and make more sense if consciousness was involved in their creation.

Must it be that anyone who claims to "feel" something more than the universe's mechanics is deluded? Maybe its the mechanics who are suffering from a deadened feeling nature, and who then are projecting that problem onto everybody who can still feel.

selfAdjoint

Nov17-04, 11:39 AM

True. However, the attitude of the physicalist who believes in and/or entertains speculative ideas like computer consciousness, life self-organizing from chemistry, time travel, universes bubbling up from nothingness, and so on

To equate computer consciousness and the chemical origin of life, for which there is weak but valid evidence, with time travel which has no evidence, is a misconstruction which prevents collegial discussion. I might as well characterize your thought as coming from the Land of Oz (and I don't mean Australia!).

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 12:12 PM

To equate computer consciousness and the chemical origin of life, for which there is weak but valid evidence, with time travel which has no evidence, is a misconstruction which prevents collegial discussion. I might as well characterize your thought as coming from the Land of Oz (and I don't mean Australia!).

Fair enough. I withdraw time travel from the list. I might add that the Wizard of Oz was my favorite childhood book, so watch it there. :smile:

StatusX

Nov17-04, 01:45 PM

Canute

Nov17-04, 01:55 PM

(from Fliption) You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.
That seemed worth reposting. It's easy to make that mistake whichever side one is on.

I'll keep this short. Imagine a computer so powerful, it could simulate the physical human brain in every aspect. Every neuron would be modelled to incredible precision.
But I can't imagine it, so the rest of your thought experiment means nothing to me. Roger Penrose would almost certainly be in the same position. Your computer would have to model the brain all the way down to the quantum level, where, quite possibly, as far as we know, consciousness and brain are related via quantum coherence in microtubles, a process that begins at the level of the absolutely fundamental substrate of matter, in micro-units of mass and energy. If the relationship between brain and mind is rooted at such a fundamental level then how can it modelled by a computer. It seems an unscientific idea.

All the sources of input would have to be supplied to it (eg, the data from a video camera could be translated into the appropriate data an eye would send it). The output would be translated into some form we could understand.
Pardon me? Who is this 'we' that you mention here? I thought your computer was supposed to understand its own data.

For example, the data it sends to the virtual "vocal cords" could be tanslated into text. Is this possible?
It seems quite possible. After we have have taken the output from a video camera, translated it into the sort of data a human eye, which is part of the brain by the way, would send to the brain, and then we had translated it back into a something we could understand, like the output of a video camera, it shouldn't be too hard to translate the data we've encoded to send to its vocal chords back into text that we can understand.

If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas.
Perhaps you need to think about this some more. If if it was this easy to solve the 'problem of consciousness' then the early Greeks would have done it. You can't say 'heap together some bunch of components that may or may not be equivalent to a human brain, assume that it exists, and this shows that physicalism is true'. It just isn't that easy. If it was that easy then every sane person would be a physicalist.

There would be no way to "see" these ideas, they wouldn't take up space, but they would be inherent in the pattern of 1s and 0s in the computer memory.
There is no evidence that ideas can exist in a pattern of 1s and 0s. Until you can show that they can this is science fiction.

As I have already emphasized, it would tell us it was conscious. Just like a virtual pendulum "swings" back and forth, a virtual brain acts the same as a real brain, and a real brain "tells" the world it is conscious.
It is true that as conscious beings we tell each other that we are conscious. It's also true that if a hypothetical virtual brain is defined as behaving precisely like a real one then it must, just like a real one, report that it is conscious when it is. Nothing follows from this. It's an ontological argument for the existence of the hypothetical.

If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why?
That's what I'd much rather discuss, rather than arguing with you about zombies and the like. It's a question that cannot be answered using our usual methods of reasoning. If you look at it closely it's a metaphysical question. As such it must be distinguished from scientific questions and thought about in a different way.

It is impossible to show that consciousness is epiphenominal on the physical, and this means that it might not be. It does not mean that is not, but equivalently it does not mean that it is. This is Fliption's point. For this reason I do not argue that I can show you are wrong, I argue that you can't show that you are right. But I can't show that I'm right either.

To me the real question to ask is this; why it is that neither of us (and nobody else) can prove our case about the relationship between consciousness and brain? And also perhaps, and as many philsophers have suggestedis the case, does our inability to do this have something to do with the particular way we reason.

Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument.
Sorry about that. :smile:

If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true.
That's not quite a fair challenge. How can I reason logically if I'm not allowed to use my common sense?

I think we should stop arguing and simply accept the obvious, that the truth about consciousness cannot be known by reason alone, as so many people have asserted over the millenia, and accept that it cannot even be shown to exist by formally logical means, let alone to be this or that.

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 02:04 PM

I don't think the burden of proof is on me. I am saying that any finite physical system can, in theory, be simulated. There is no evidence to doubt this, and none of you seem to disagree with it for most systems. So the burden is on you to explain what is different about the particular arrangement of atoms in our brain that makes simulation impossible, even in theory? No one has addressed this.

It would be like me claiming that every physical object has a mass. I can't prove this, but you would be the one who would have to make a compelling argument if you thought it wasn't true.

I do not think anyone is saying the "arrangement of atoms in our brain that makes simulation . . . " can't be achieved. The bigger issue is whether that arrangement is responsible for self-awareness. The idea is that one can account for all human behaviors and brain functions with brain physiology, but the brain physiology we know would only produce a zombie (something that can mimic all human behaviors, but doesn't have a personal experience of what it's doing).

So at least the self-aware part of consciousness might be the result of something other than physiology. For example, possibly there is a general pool of consciousness that's evolved with the universe which is manifested in the CSN. Such a panpsychic theory suggests the brain shapes, organizes and individualtes a "point" of that general consciousness, and the self-aware part is an essential part of the panpsychic realm.

StatusX

Nov17-04, 02:55 PM

The only compelling argument that such a simulation would be impossible that I've seen so far was Canute's claim that the operation of the brain is significantly affected by quantum processes that can't be simulated, and I'll try to argue it here.

No one is saying QM can't be modelled, and in fact many simple QM systems have been computer simulated. The confusion arises because people hear that there is "uncertainty" in QM, and assume this means there are no rules. There are strict rules. The problem is that when a wave function collapses, it does so randomly, and we only know the probability it will collapse into certain states. We can't create a virtual system that would act exactly the same as a given real one for the same reason that two real, identical QM systems will not act exactly the same: there is inherent randomness. But we can create a virtual system that would behave in a way that an identical real one could. We would just have to have some kind of random number generator for the wave function collapse.

One way around this is to say that these random collapses aren't truly random, but are affected by our consciousness. This is a very interesting idea, and I definitely accept it as a possibility. Another is to say the variables in question(eg, the position, velocity, mass, etc. of every particle being modelled) are continuous, and therefore any rounding we would do so that a computer could work with the numbers would be the source of error. I'm not sure about this, but I remember reading that a given volume of space contains a finite amount of information, something like 1 bit per square planck unit of its bounding surface, and this would refute such a claim. For now, I'm just gonna have to claim that we can get so close to the real values that any deviation from reality would not cause a significant difference in observed behavior. But I can't prove this.

However, this whole idea is in opposition to the view that neurons are the basic components of the brain. A crude explanation of this model is that a neuron acts by outputting a signal if it inputs are above a certain threshold, and the interaction of many, many such neurons can give rise to complicated behavior. In computer science, neural nets attempt to replicate this function, and have acheived such impressive results as handwriting and facial recognition. I cant claim that the human brain could be modelled exactly by an extremely sophisticated neural net, but many researchers believe it could be. Well just have to wait and see.

And by the way, I am not claiming this simulation would be consicous. It might be, and it might not be. But whichever it is, how could it be different than whichever we are? Getting back to the zombie argument, a society of these simulations would attempt to explain consciousness. They wouldn't know they were just simulations, and we dont know that we aren't.

StatusX

Nov17-04, 03:27 PM

Sorry for posting so much, but I just thought there were some things in here I really should address.

You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.

That seemed worth reposting. It's easy to make that mistake whichever side one is on.

It is logically possible that a being could exist with the same physical brain structure as us and not be conscious. But my argument, and yes it is a materialist one, is that in this universe, any beings with the same physical brain structure will have the same conscious state. That is, theyre either both conscious or both unconsious. This is not inconsistent.

But I can't imagine it, so the rest of your thought experiment means nothing to me. Roger Penrose would almost certainly be in the same position. Your computer would have to model the brain all the way down to the quantum level, where, quite possibly, as far as we know, consciousness and brain are related via quantum coherence in microtubles, a process that begins at the level of the absolutely fundamental substrate of matter, in micro-units of mass and energy. If the relationship between brain and mind is rooted at such a fundamental level then how can it modelled by a computer. It seems an unscientific idea.

I address this in my last post.

Pardon me? Who is this 'we' that you mention here? I thought your computer was supposed to understand its own data.

What the computer subjectively understands is irrelevant. I'm not making a claim one way or the other about whether it is conscious. I'm saying it will behave the same as us, and to see how it behaves, we must have a way of transmitting its signals into physical actions the way our muscles do it for us. Since it doesn't have muscles to move its vocal cords, a subprogram must translate these signals into text for it.

It seems quite possible. After we have have taken the output from a video camera, translated it into the sort of data a human eye, which is part of the brain by the way, would send to the brain, and then we had translated it back into a something we could understand, like the output of a video camera, it shouldn't be too hard to translate the data we've encoded to send to its vocal chords back into text that we can understand.

You are missing the point entirely. Of course it would be hard. It would be harder than anything weve done up to this point. I'm not even sure it would be practically possible at any point in the future. All I'm saying is that it it is theoretically possible, and how complicated it is does not matter for this.

Perhaps you need to think about this some more. If if it was this easy to solve the 'problem of consciousness' then the early Greeks would have done it. You can't say 'heap together some bunch of components that may or may not be equivalent to a human brain, assume that it exists, and this shows that physicalism is true'. It just isn't that easy. If it was that easy then every sane person would be a physicalist.

Ok? So you disagree? I don't see an argument here.

There is no evidence that ideas can exist in a pattern of 1s and 0s. Until you can show that they can this is science fiction.

What about the ones and zeroes representing that sentence? That sentence represents an idea. So what if this computer doesn't "understand" the sentence? I say a smarter one could.

It is true that as conscious beings we tell each other that we are conscious. It's also true that if a hypothetical virtual brain is defined as behaving precisely like a real one then it must, just like a real one, report that it is conscious when it is. Nothing follows from this. It's an ontological argument for the existence of the hypothetical.

We must have different definitions of consciousness. What I call consciousness is experience. It is difficult to explain exactly, but its basically what its like to do things. To see red, have an idea, feel an emotion. It is difficult to imagine the functions associated with these experiences without consciousness, but it is not logically impossible. There is no logical reason a non-conscious entity couldn't talk to us about its ideas. None whatsoever. There would just be no first person experience of the ideas.

That's what I'd much rather discuss, rather than arguing with you about zombies and the like. It's a question that cannot be answered using our usual methods of reasoning. If you look at it closely it's a metaphysical question. As such it must be distinguished from scientific questions and thought about in a different way.

It is impossible to show that consciousness is epiphenominal on the physical, and this means that it might not be. It does not mean that is not, but equivalently it does not mean that it is. This is Fliption's point. For this reason I do not argue that I can show you are wrong, I argue that you can't show that you are right. But I can't show that I'm right either.

To me the real question to ask is this; why it is that neither of us (and nobody else) can prove our case about the relationship between consciousness and brain? And also perhaps, and as many philsophers have suggestedis the case, does our inability to do this have something to do with the particular way we reason.

Because science hasn't gotten there yet. Just like no one could understand magnetism or the sun going across the sky hundreds of years ago. I know this argument has probably been beaten into the ground, but you have to put yourself in those ancient peoples shoes. They were sure there was no scientific explanation for these pheonomena, just like many today are sure there is none for consciousness.

Sorry about that. :smile:
...
That's not quite a fair challenge. How can I reason logically if I'm not allowed to use my common sense?

When I say you shouldn't use common sense as an argument, I mean you can't use it as your only argument. You need logic to back it up. The sun looks like its going around us, but it isn't.

I think we should stop arguing and simply accept the obvious, that the truth about consciousness cannot be known by reason alone, as so many people have asserted over the millenia, and accept that it cannot even be shown to exist by formally logical means, let alone to be this or that.

Um... I say it can be. Thats where we disagree. You want me to just stop arguing and accept the obvious that youre right? That's a compelling argument, but no.

Pavel

Nov17-04, 04:09 PM

StatusX

Nov17-04, 04:27 PM

Status, I want to be more specific about what Les said about "human activities", as I'm also struggling to understand how you would simulate them, at least conceptually.

Very simple: let’s say I’m holding a fork and all of a sudden I make a decision to drop it. Let’s examine this decision making process. My brain must be in a certain state before the drop, say state A. You can brake down this state to a quantum level, to anything you want. The bottom line is there is a physical state that can be expressed in a matrix of certain values for each neuron, synapse, electron, photon, etc. Now comes the point in time when the decision making neuron must fire to cause the “drop the fork” reaction chain. My question is what specifically causes that neuron to fire? Yes, you can reduce that cause to a quark spin or a wave function, if you will, but that’s just begging the question. The ultimate question is what causes the system to be transformed from state A to state B (firing of the fork dropping neuron). I can think of only two causes. First, randomness / spontaneity. Whether it’s the electron’s undetermined position in the carbon atom, nuclear decay, gust of wind in your face, other natural random phenomena, whatever it is, the prime mover is random. (that’s assuming spontaneity exists, of course, which is a subject for another thread). The other cause is determinism. The transformation from state A to state B is strictly determined by natural laws. Whether the neuron will fire or not completely depends on the current state, state A, all incoming input from other neurons, and the rules (brain fabric which determines thresholds etc.) which dictate what to do. Without going into metaphysics, is there anything else?

Whether you choose randomness or determinism, there’s a problem. If the neuron firing is caused by a random act, all our decisions are nothing but a roll of a dice. I find it hard to swallow since it would make this very idea an outcome of randomness in someone’s mind….. Determinism doesn’t make things better. If my decision making is the outcome of strict deterministic rules, we’re nothing but a cog in a huge machine following the rules, we don’t really think or make decisions. I find it also hard to believe because, again, that would mean your very idea of determinism is not the outcome of your independent thinking, it’s the outcome of some physical state and some rules, you couldn’t “think” otherwise, you’re programmed to say “we’re determined”. The third option is the combination of the two of course, but again, the same criticism applies. So, how, conceptually, would you simulate the transformation from one state to the next?

Regards,

Pavel.

The most concise way to phrase your argument is the following:

If you do something for a reason, it was determined, and there was no free will.
If you do something for no reason, it was random, and there was no free will.

I don't know where I heard it, but its a great way of putting it. So are you saying there is no free will? If so, I don't see a problem in my simulation.

It is an oversimplification to say your brain popped from state A to state B. It is constantly evolving. Say you dropped the fork because you were thinking about free will, and this caused you to decide to drop a fork "randomly" to prove you had it. That's not really random at all, and since the simulation would "think" the same way, (maybe it wouldn't experience its thought, but the thought would have consequences), it would drop the fork too. If it was for some "random" reason, and by that I mean it was caused by some deterministic process other than the normal evolution of brain states, like a nuclear decay, then any good simulation would have to include virtual nuclear decays to qualify as an accurate simulation.

If you are saying there is free will, then I disagree. You say you have a problem with both randomness and determinism. So what do you suggest is going on?

Pavel

Nov17-04, 04:56 PM

I suggest there's something else is going on. Whichever it is, metaphysical, emergent, epiphenomenal, I don’t know, but determinism and randomness just don’t cut it on their own, the way I see it. There is a reason why I made the argument so long. When summarized in your manner, you treat the argument on a high level of abstraction and don’t see the detail, where the real problem lies. When you program your computer, you don’t just tell it “think” or “make the decision”. You tell it specifically what you want it to do. And no, I was not asking for pseudo code either. It doesn’t even have to be a computer. Whatever your simulator is, I wanted to see how, specifically, you were planning on transforming from one state to the next. You said “evolution”, but that’s exactly my point – it’s too abstract; clearly, how do you evolve the simulator? Do you create deterministic rules with random variables? Do you really believe such evolution will produce brain capable of novelty, so inherent to the human kind?

Thanks,

Pavel

juju

Nov17-04, 05:02 PM

Hi,

Consciousness is awareness, feeling and understanding, whatever its physical manifestation in this reality might be.

juju

StatusX

Nov17-04, 05:02 PM

Pavel

Nov17-04, 05:46 PM

It is a digital model of the physical atoms in the brain. They are subject to the normal forces an atom feels. I don't explicitly program "thinking", it arises as a consequence of the structure and the rules relating its constituents, just like a real brain.

are you saying it's an emergent property? If so, how do you know that your simulation hit the target? After all, you're not creating an artificial brain, you're assigning interpretation to a digital model. If the model comes up with a novelty, how do you know it's not a screw-up?

If you don't agree this is possible, that this simulation would act just like a real brain, then tell me, what is the difference between a brain and a clock that allows you to simulate a clock but not a brain? Theyre both just matter. And youre argument that determinisim "just doesn't cut it" does not convince me. I don't like it either, but its the conclusion I've arrived at logically.

That they're both matter is still an assumption. I believe there's a problem with asserting that brain is purely matter, and that's been my argument. I'm not sure why it's difficult to see the problem with the determinism. Let's say I have a guy standing by me with a gun who threatened to shoot me if I answer "YES" to anything. You, observing all of this, ask me "do you cheat on your wife?" I say "NO", would you believe me? My analogy might be lame, but I hope you see the point. If you're programmed to believe we're determined, then your statement asserting it has little truth value, if any. You can't jump out of the system, say "oh, look, I'm determined", and hten jump back in.

Thanks,

Pavel.

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 06:21 PM

This isn't complicated. It is a digital model of the physical atoms in the brain. They are subject to the normal forces an atom feels. I don't explicitly program "thinking", it arises as a consequence of the structure and the rules relating its constituents, just like a real brain. If you don't agree this is possible, that this simulation would act just like a real brain, then tell me, what is the difference between a brain and a clock that allows you to simulate a clock but not a brain? Theyre both just matter. And youre argument that determinisim "just doesn't cut it" does not convince me. I don't like it either, but its the conclusion I've arrived at logically.

I want to check to see if I understand you correctly, and if you understand the implications of what at least a couple of us are saying. When you say, "I don't explicitly program 'thinking,' it arises as a consequence of the structure and the rules relating its constituents, just like a real brain [my emphasis]," that sounds like you are trying to make points by assuming your side of what we are debating is true. I think some of us are at least open to the possibility that the brain is not "creating" consciousness, just the way a switch that turns on a light bulb does not "create" light.

StatusX

Nov17-04, 07:02 PM

Pavel, if you assert the brain is more than just matter, you'll have to provide a reason. Which part of its formation allowed a non-physical substance to creep in? And I'm not sure I understand your analogy about determinism. Are you suggesting that if we have no free will, we are destined to have a certain opinion, right or wrong? If so, I have to agree with you, but this doesnt mean we have opinions that are wrong and we'll never know it. We are constantly changing, and logical reasoning can cause us to see our error. Determinism does not mean we don't have the power to change our minds, it means that these changes can be predicted by the laws of physics.

Les, as I've mentioned before, I don't claim this thing is conscious. All I claim is that it tells us it is conscious. It doesn't even know that its just a simulation. And just to be clear, it is not a contradiction to say that its not conscious but still knows things. If you think it is, you aren't fully realizing the difference between the experience of knowledge and the function of knowledge.

Jeebus

Nov17-04, 07:14 PM

… I think some of us are at least open to the possibility that the brain is not "creating" consciousness, just the way a switch that turns on a light bulb does not "create" light.

Les you bring up an interesting point. Do you think that, going off of the switch idea, consciousness is always present or can it have absence?

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 08:13 PM

. . . if you assert the brain is more than just matter, you'll have to provide a reason.

The zombie argument is the reason that's been offered. You may not be giving enough consideration to it. You can explain every function of consciousness with brain physiology, but you cannot account for how the self-aware aspect of consciousness has come about with brain physiology. You right now are calculating, measuring, weighing, computing . . . just what the brain seems set up to do. But what is the physical basis of the "you" which is controlling, observing, and understanding that?

Les, as I've mentioned before, I don't claim this thing is conscious. All I claim is that it tells us it is conscious. It doesn't even know that its just a simulation.

If you don't claim it is conscious, then what is your point? I do not understand only arguing zombie consciousness is possible since we have computer programs right now that are nothing but zombies. Can a zombie program get so sophisticated it can fool genuinely conscious human beings into believing it is conscious? Possibly. But so what? Such a program still isn't self-aware awareness, and that is the only thing that's at issue when we are talking about if physicalness alone can produce consciousness. At this time, all we can prove is that physicalness can produce zombie-awareness, which leaves the door open to the possibility that something in addition to the brain is involved in establishing consciousness.

And just to be clear, it is not a contradiction to say that its not conscious but still knows things. If you think it is, you aren't fully realizing the difference between the experience of knowledge and the function of knowledge.

I believe it is a contradiction. I say there is no possible way to know anything without being conscious. To have a hard drive full of information which is "functioning" to achieve things is not the same as conscious knowing; but of course, if one degrades the meaning of "knowing" then one might get away with saying it is.

The experience of knowledge is precisely what we are talking about. Not some dumb machine operating according to its programming. Besides, where do you think even the programming for the dumb machine comes from? It doesn't figure out anything by itself, conscious humans figured it out and program it into systems.

Which part of its formation allowed a non-physical substance to creep in?

How do you know the development of the central nervous system was driven by only physical factors? There isn't a single, solitary example outside of living systems where chemistry and physics have organized themselves to the extent and quality that we find in living systems. Until someone demonstrates physical principles alone can be shown to produce something like consciousness, then the conservative and objective thinker has to wait for more information before assuming physicalness can do it.

Les Sleeth

Nov17-04, 08:28 PM

Les you bring up an interesting point. Do you think that, going off of the switch idea, consciousness is always present or can it have absence?

I am not sure what you mean by consciousness being always present. Do you mean in us, or in the universe, or in some other way. If you mean in us, then my view is that our conscious presence varies from fully present to present but unconscious (like when someone is in a coma). Sleep seems pretty unconscious, yet people are known to detect things going on around them while they sleep, so during sleep I think consciousness is present but not fully turned on. Some people believe they or others can leave the body (which would suggest one can be not-present), but I don't know enough from personal experience to have a strong opinion about that.

Fliption

Nov17-04, 10:22 PM

Wow, two more pages since I last looked here. I've read all of the comments and I'm not sure I understand the point that StatusX is making. I think I understand it but then once I have it, I don't see what the big deal is.
Let me see if I can state it

Statement 1 - It is conceivable that a very powerful computer/machine could be built and simulate all the functions of the brain.

Ok, I got that one and I have no problem with it.

Statement 2 - Once this machine is built we cannot know whether it is truly conscious or not.

Absolutely I agree with this.

Is this it? Do I have it all? Because I have to ask, "What's the big deal?" Nothing here is new or astounding. Nothing can be concluded from any of these statements; Certainly not materialism. So why is there so much debate?

Have I missed a point StatusX?

Now if you were claiming that this machine would indeed be conscious, then we have a big problem but that's not what you're claiming. Nothing here supports a physicalist view in any way so it seems things have gotten unnecessarily stirred up here.

StatusX

Nov17-04, 11:53 PM

Ok, I realize I've been unclear on my point. I had forgotten this myself, but the reason I brought up the whole supercomputer thing was because the argument had shifted to whether consciousness was causal or not. Now I'm glad you've gotten this far, as I've been having trouble convincing people such a computer could exist. (I'll still try to explain why to whoever doesn't agree) Now assuming it could, what would that mean? Keep in mind, this computer behaves EXACTLY the same as us, even if we don't know whats going on "inside its head." There are two possible interpretations of such a machine:

1. It is not conscious, but still behaves exactly as we do. The conclusion? Consciousness is not causal. Easy, right?

2. It is conscious, and behaves exactly as we do. This says nothing about the causal nature of consciousness.

Now the following represents the two main possibilities I accept as a "physicalist." (I use that term a little loosely, since the second view would probably be more considered dualism, but I'll explain that):

1. Consciousness is an illusion. I don't particularly like this idea, but it is not as dismissable as it sounds. Because if the first case above is true, that computer would be trying to understand its own, non-existent consciousness. It would not only disagree with you if you claimed it was unconscious, or that consciousness was an illusion, but would also disagree if you told it it was just a simulation and not a real person. So how do we really know we aren't just simulations, or zombies, or some other non-conscious entities that believe we are conscious?

2. Consciousness is real, and it exists everywhere there is a complex system to sustain it. I obviously don't know what they are yet, but I assert that there are strict rules that relate some aspect of the configuration of matter to consciousness. Just like hooking up a battery to a circuit gives rise to current, hooking together the right components, whether theyre neurons, computer chips, or whatever, gives rise to conscious experience. This is usually called dualism, but I've extended the terminology to call any theory of reality in which everything obeys derivable rules a physicalist theory.

Now is consciousness causal in this view? I don't know yet. There are two variations that result:

a) If it is causal, I say it is only at the quantum level. Maybe it causes random wavefunction collapse, maybe it influences the result of the collapses, or maybe it does something entirely different. I don't believe it is causal at an observable level because then there would be a way to observe it's effect on the physical. This is not a rigorous argument, and I'll get back to it some other time, but its late now.

b) If it isn't causal, then we're just sort of "along for the ride," with everything we do being controlled by our physical and deterministic brains, and all we do is experience it.

So my point is, if you believe the supercomputer argument, and you believe physicalism, in the broad sense I've defined, then you are pretty much limited to the three views above. Of course you can arbitrarily claim the rules are different for brains than for anything else, but I find such a claim inelegant and unsupportable. I'm not yet prepared to decide among these three.

Pavel

Nov18-04, 12:33 PM

Pavel, if you assert the brain is more than just matter, you'll have to provide a reason. Which part of its formation allowed a non-physical substance to creep in?

It is the same reason why the standard atomic framework was replaced by Niels Bohr’s model, and later by Schrodinger’s concepts of how atoms really work - they failed to explain certain behavior and therefore were modified to make the conceptual framework more consistent. Similarly, the random / deterministic model of consciousness is also weak in its explanatory power. It produces, as Les has adequately put it, zombies, not conscious beings. That’s the reason for something else to creep in.

In order to continue, I’d like to stick with the specific thread of thought in question, and not try to discover quantum mechanics, human art, and mysticism at the same time. Every time you deviate, you open up a Pandora’s box and we’ll never be able to come to any conclusion. Let’s stick with the question at hand, and if we reach an impasse, we’ll know exactly where we disagree. If there’s a way to resolve the disagreement through empirical observations or logical methods, good for us; if not, at least we’ll know what it all comes down to (I’m sure it’ll be something in the realm of metaphysics).

First, it seems like we really need to agree on what we mean by “conscious being”. I don’t like your behavioristic interpretation of it, as anything which behaves like human consciousness. If I didn’t know anything about electromagnetic waves and electronics, I’d definitely conclude that my radio is very conscious and intelligent (well, depending on the station I tune in). However, we both know that’s not the case. Besides, you’re comparing it to something we’re trying to define in the first place. I think the aspect of subjectivity is necessary in defining a “conscious being”. I’m not sure I like the self-awareness aspect, even though I agree with it, because it’s too vague and hard to define. What, specifically, is aware? So, to call something “conscious”, I think it needs to have subjective qualities. For example, intention. I intend to drop the fork. My radio cannot intend, even though it exhibits other conscious properties. “I think” would be another. When I think, I manipulate objects in my mind in such a manner that I assign qualitative, subjective attributes to them, and I operate on them without restrictions. Zombie, on the other hand, does not have this privilege, even though it might be self-aware, it is bound by restrictions in what attributes it can assign to objects. So, before moving on, do you agree with this notion of “conscious being”? As soon as we agree on the definition, we’ll see if we can build a device, which would be governed by deterministic rules, and yet satisfy our notion of “conscious being”.

The other thing we need to be clear on is the kind of simulator you’re building. Are you building a replica of the human brain that will exhibit similar physical properties on its quantum level, or are you simulating it through interpretation of 1’s and 0’s in a digital model? There’s a big difference between the two and we should be clear about it.

I’ll comment on my determinism analogy as soon as we agree on the terminology. By the way, coming from a different country, the experience of two different cultures made me a strong believer in the cultural relativism and social conditioning in general. You throw genetics and the whole biology on top of it, and I’m convinced our consciousness is 99% determined. But there’s that 1% that crept in and made things so mysterious, at least for me. I know you disagree with the existence of this 1% and I’d like to make that the focus of this discourse.

Thanks,

Pavel.

Les Sleeth

Nov18-04, 02:16 PM

I think the aspect of subjectivity is necessary in defining a “conscious being”. I’m not sure I like the self-awareness aspect, even though I agree with it, because it’s too vague and hard to define. What, specifically, is aware? So, to call something “conscious”, I think it needs to have subjective qualities.

I like the way you make your points. I suppose you are referring to my use of the term "self-aware" since I am mainly the one who uses that around here. I'll explain why I tend to use that to characterize subjectivity, and why now thinking about it I can imagine a better term.

In past threads I've argued that if we examine consciousness, it seems to do several very basic things which are more fundamental than thinking. One is consciousness is sensitive to stimulation, which is pretty obvious. A second basic trait I call retention, which is that consciousness not only senses, it holds patterns of what has been sensed. These patterns range in permanance from simple impressions and memory, to a third basic quality I've called integration. Integration is retention too, but it seems more permanent. An example would be understanding, where a collection of related events suddenly produce a singular sort of result in consciousness. Suddenly "getting" how to ride a bike is like that, but there also intellectual understanding of course.

It seems to me that this integrative quality of consciousness is what most establishes self, or subjectivity. (A computer can do all the rest, but not that.) Examining humans, it seems there is a very high realization of the integrative thing because we can function single-pointedly doing complex tasks. It's like all that's integrated into consciousness is right there guiding the focused human even though he might not be thinking about everything that's contributed to his knowing pool.

I've looked at animal life from amoebas all the way up, and it seems to me that as the integrative aspect improves, so does the sense of self. So I started saying "self aware" to describe that because I believe it is the most defining thing there is about consciousness. You are right that it doesn't communicate other qualilties that are present, such as volition, or as some like to say "what its like" to sense something.

Possibly a better term for me to use would be self-forming or self- establishing or something like that.

Canute

Nov18-04, 03:16 PM

It is logically possible that a being could exist with the same physical brain structure as us and not be conscious.
How do you know that?

But my argument, and yes it is a materialist one, is that in this universe, any beings with the same physical brain structure will have the same conscious state.
How do you know that?

What the computer subjectively understands is irrelevant. I'm not making a claim one way or the other about whether it is conscious. I'm saying it will behave the same as us,
So you say. I don't know why you believe it. There's certainly no evidence. Hell, we've been looking for evidence since the nineteenth century and there still isn't any.

and to see how it behaves, we must have a way of transmitting its signals into physical actions the way our muscles do it for us. Since it doesn't have muscles to move its vocal cords, a subprogram must translate these signals into text for it.[quote]
I thought this thing was supposed to behave like a human being.

[quote]You are missing the point entirely. Of course it would be hard. It would be harder than anything weve done up to this point. I'm not even sure it would be practically possible at any point in the future. All I'm saying is that it it is theoretically possible...
How do you know that?

What about the ones and zeroes representing that sentence? That sentence represents an idea. So what if this computer doesn't "understand" the sentence? I say a smarter one could.
No, the sentence is a re-symbolisation of the ones and zero's. It contains no more and no more less information than the string of ones and zeros. It is certainly not an idea. An idea is defined (in my dict.) as 'any content of the mind, esp. the conscious mind'. So a computer can have an idea only if it has mind. So far you've failed to show that it can.

We must have different definitions of consciousness. What I call consciousness is experience. It is difficult to explain exactly, but its basically what its like to do things.
Yes, I'm ok with 'what it is like' as a working defintion.

It is difficult to imagine the functions associated with these experiences without consciousness, but it is not logically impossible.
I'd say it was. I don't want to convince you, but just point out that your certainty is misplaced. Your arguments have been made by many fine scientists and one or two philosophers. They have been shown not to stand up to analysis. If they did then your ideas would be widely held.

There is no logical reason a non-conscious entity couldn't talk to us about its ideas. None whatsoever. There would just be no first person experience of the ideas.
I don't think everyone shares your view of what is logical.

Because science hasn't gotten there yet. Just like no one could understand magnetism or the sun going across the sky hundreds of years ago. I know this argument has probably been beaten into the ground, but you have to put yourself in those ancient peoples shoes. They were sure there was no scientific explanation for these pheonomena, just like many today are sure there is none for consciousness.
You do our ancestors a disservice, and misunderstand the nature of metaphysical questions.

When I say you shouldn't use common sense as an argument, I mean you can't use it as your only argument. You need logic to back it up. The sun looks like its going around us, but it isn't.
There is this ridiculous idea going around that if one uses ones common sense then one is bound to conclude that the earth goes around the sun. I take no notice of it.

Um... I say it can be. Thats where we disagree. You want me to just stop arguing and accept the obvious that youre right? That's a compelling argument, but no.
Ok. Demonstrate by use of reason alone that consciousness exists and I'll withdraw my comment. If you can't do this then you ought to wonder why not.

juju

Nov18-04, 03:38 PM

Hi,

From my own experiences, I must conclude that consciousness (in terms of self awareness, perception,etc) does not only reside in a physical vehicle. I have had out of the body experiences, and experiences of alternate realities, that are as vivid and as real (if not more so) than this physical reality.

juju

StatusX

Nov18-04, 04:29 PM

Canute,
"How do you know?" and "I don't think so" are not very convincing arguments. All I'll say is that it is DEFINITELY logically coherent to imagine a non-conscious being acting as a conscious one because we don't know anyone else is conscious, and yet they act just like us. "Logical" doesn't mean "consistent with your preconceptions."

StatusX

Nov18-04, 06:56 PM

It is the same reason why the standard atomic framework was replaced by Niels Bohr’s model, and later by Schrodinger’s concepts of how atoms really work - they failed to explain certain behavior and therefore were modified to make the conceptual framework more consistent. Similarly, the random / deterministic model of consciousness is also weak in its explanatory power. It produces, as Les has adequately put it, zombies, not conscious beings. That’s the reason for something else to creep in.

Those models where changed because they couldn't explain the outcomes of certain experiments. What experiments show a problem with the random/deterministic model of choice (I think you are confusing this with consciousness)? Just because the idea is unsettling to you doesn't mean its incoherent, or even wrong. And by the way, zombies refer to the hypothetical beings who are identical to us in every physical way but lack consciousness. We talked about them alot earlier in this thread. Just to reiterate, when I talk about consciousness, I mean the subjective experience of what its like to see a color, feel pain, etc. Choice is something different.

In order to continue, I’d like to stick with the specific thread of thought in question, and not try to discover quantum mechanics, human art, and mysticism at the same time. Every time you deviate, you open up a Pandora’s box and we’ll never be able to come to any conclusion. Let’s stick with the question at hand, and if we reach an impasse, we’ll know exactly where we disagree. If there’s a way to resolve the disagreement through empirical observations or logical methods, good for us; if not, at least we’ll know what it all comes down to (I’m sure it’ll be something in the realm of metaphysics).

I'm trying to make my arguments as rigorous as possible. If someone claims they are false because of incomplete knowledge of some other subject, like quantum mechanics, I need to try to correct them. But,I agree, let's try to stay on topic.

First, it seems like we really need to agree on what we mean by “conscious being”. I don’t like your behavioristic interpretation of it, as anything which behaves like human consciousness. If I didn’t know anything about electromagnetic waves and electronics, I’d definitely conclude that my radio is very conscious and intelligent (well, depending on the station I tune in). However, we both know that’s not the case.

Consciousness is experience, as I just described. I don't know where I claimed it was behavioral. I actually explictly described two beings that behaved indentically but one was conscious and the other wasn't, so I don't understand where you got this idea.

Besides, you’re comparing it to something we’re trying to define in the first place. I think the aspect of subjectivity is necessary in defining a “conscious being”. I’m not sure I like the self-awareness aspect, even though I agree with it, because it’s too vague and hard to define. What, specifically, is aware? So, to call something “conscious”, I think it needs to have subjective qualities. For example, intention. I intend to drop the fork. My radio cannot intend, even though it exhibits other conscious properties.

I'm gonna have to flat out disagree with you here. Intention is not consciousness. We can see that other people have intentions, but we know nothing of what they experience. The subjective feeling of what its like to want to do something is an aspect of consciousness, but they are not the same thing.

“I think” would be another. When I think, I manipulate objects in my mind in such a manner that I assign qualitative, subjective attributes to them, and I operate on them without restrictions.

This is getting closer. The actual mental images are a result of consciousness. However the attributes you assign them are not. There is clearly a place in your brain where you store the attributes of objects. These are called schema, and I have little doubt psychology will provide a scientific explanation for them.

Just on a side note, those of you who claim all these functions of the brain, like knowledge, thought, etc., are a result of non-physical consciousness: what is the brain for? It's there, it is obvisouly important, and we understand only a tiny fraction of what it does. Are you claiming its superfluous, and that it only does whatever our "consciousness" tells it to?

Zombie, on the other hand, does not have this privilege, even though it might be self-aware, it is bound by restrictions in what attributes it can assign to objects.

Again, your notion of a zombie is unclear, and not the same as the one the rest of us use.

So, before moving on, do you agree with this notion of “conscious being”? As soon as we agree on the definition, we’ll see if we can build a device, which would be governed by deterministic rules, and yet satisfy our notion of “conscious being”.

Look over what I've typed above and see what you agree with and what you would change.

The other thing we need to be clear on is the kind of simulator you’re building. Are you building a replica of the human brain that will exhibit similar physical properties on its quantum level, or are you simulating it through interpretation of 1’s and 0’s in a digital model? There’s a big difference between the two and we should be clear about it.

I assume you mean by the second description a machine where I try to program in the functions of the brain without worrying about the actual physical structure of it. If that's what you mean, then my simulator is the first description, accurate down to the atom. It's not practical, but if we had a computer the size of a galaxy, I think it could be done, and could be is whats important.

I’ll comment on my determinism analogy as soon as we agree on the terminology. By the way, coming from a different country, the experience of two different cultures made me a strong believer in the cultural relativism and social conditioning in general. You throw genetics and the whole biology on top of it, and I’m convinced our consciousness is 99% determined. But there’s that 1% that crept in and made things so mysterious, at least for me. I know you disagree with the existence of this 1% and I’d like to make that the focus of this discourse.

I'm not sure what you mean by "our consciousness is 99% determined."

Fliption

Nov18-04, 07:29 PM

Excellent post StatusX.

There are two possible interpretations of such a machine:

1. It is not conscious, but still behaves exactly as we do. The conclusion? Consciousness is not causal. Easy, right?

2. It is conscious, and behaves exactly as we do. This says nothing about the causal nature of consciousness.

Yep

1. Consciousness is an illusion.

So how do we really know we aren't just simulations, or zombies, or some other non-conscious entities that believe we are conscious?

I agree with the two possibilities you have posted. This first one, however, is not my favorite. First of all, the fact that I cannot know whether this machine is conscious or not does NOT mean that I cannot know whether I am conscious. This I know to be the case. Which leads to the first point about consciousness being an illusion. I've never liked this one because it doesn't really explain anything. If we cannot explain how the brain produces consciousness then how the hell are we going to explain the how the brain produces the illusion of it? I'm not even sure what the difference is. It seems the same problems remain. I always thought certain aspects of illusions were a function of consciousness to begin with. How can you have an illusion without consciousness? Who is it that is experiencing the illusion? And how do they experience it if consciousness is just an illusion? This one just seems messy to me.

2. Consciousness is real, and it exists everywhere there is a complex system to sustain it. I obviously don't know what they are yet, but I assert that there are strict rules that relate some aspect of the configuration of matter to consciousness. Just like hooking up a battery to a circuit gives rise to current, hooking together the right components, whether theyre neurons, computer chips, or whatever, gives rise to conscious experience. This is usually called dualism, but I've extended the terminology to call any theory of reality in which everything obeys derivable rules a physicalist theory.

This one I like much better. My only comment here is that your use of the word physical may not be consistent with others posting here. I have come to similar conclusions as you and I don't consider myself a physicalist.
I can make the argument that everything obeys rules at some level and I have always argued that if everything is physical by definition then what good is the word? It doesn't distinguish anything from anything else. But this is all semantics. Maybe some of the other people participating here can tell us what they think a physicalists is. You may find that you are not one based on their definitions. This might explain some of the heated debate happening here for no apparent reason.

I personally believe the distinction between physical and non-physical is the method one uses to gain knowledge of it. This is why people claim that the scientific method as it current exists, cannot explain consciousness.

Now is consciousness causal in this view? I don't know yet. There are two variations that result:

a) If it is causal, I say it is only at the quantum level.

b) If it isn't causal,

I agree with these as the possibilities. Don't have a clue which one is closer to truth.

So my point is, if you believe the supercomputer argument, and you believe physicalism, in the broad sense I've defined, then you are pretty much limited to the three views above. Of course you can arbitrarily claim the rules are different for brains than for anything else, but I find such a claim inelegant and unsupportable. I'm not yet prepared to decide among these three.

Again, I will say that I agree with all your choices and I don't believe in physicalism. I think we just need to make sure we're all using the same definition.

Pavel

Nov18-04, 07:50 PM

Possibly a better term for me to use would be self-forming or self- establishing or something like that.

Les, I'm of the opinion that it doesn't matter what you call it, as long as it's clear what you mean by it, which you well explained. I suspect that it could be argued that sensitivity to stimuli, retention, and integration can be exhibited in neural networks. When you train a net, you provide feedback to it, which could be viewed as stimulation in some context. The retention of “memory” is the adjusted weights which consequently allow to recognize patterns. On some level of abstraction, that’s being “smart” and possibly conscious. I will not argue that’s the case, I’m merely saying it’s easier to debate those qualities. I want to pick something very obvious and yet challenging for a materialist to handle. For the sake of progress in this argument, I want to stick with one apparent quality that we all attribute to consciousness, agree on the criteria that will allow us to apply it to an instance and say “yeap, that one is conscious”, and finally simulate the property and see if it satisfies our condition or criterion. If StatusX or anybody will be able to demonstrate such simulation, so be it, I’ll be glad I learned something new. If not, I’d like to discuss possible accounts for this “mysteron” in our brain that couldn’t be simulated by randomness or deterministic rules.

I think “intentionality” is a very good candidate, what do you think? When I say “I intend to graduate from college”, you know precisely what I mean. It’s not “I will graduate”, it’s not “I’m thinking about graduation”, it’s just that - intend. It’s hard to explain it in other terms, and yet you have no problems understanding my state of mind. StatusX, if you’re willing to play along, do you accept that “intention”, as illustrated, is an inherent quality of a human mind, which is we define as conscious. If so, I’ll offer criteria which we can use to determine if somebody is in the state of “intending”. I probably won’t be able to offer any reductionistic criteria, because inability to do so is the precise point of the argument, but I think there are plenty of reasonable ways that allow us to observe somebody being in the state of “intention”.

In a nutshell, where we are. StatusX, or anybody with similar views, claims that all human conscious activities can be reduced to particles governed by natural deterministic laws, and some random quantum events. Such view would allow us to simulate consciousness. We, whoever doesn’t buy it, claim there is something unaccounted in that picture. As a proof, I offer a specific quality of consciousness that I will challenge you to reduce and simulate in principle.

Thanks,

Pavel.

I’m sorry if I’m being too particular, detailed, and slow in my approach. This is because it’s very easy in these conversations to digress and jump all over the place without getting anywhere. I just want to stick to the point and make this productive, not a waste of time. I hope you share the same feeling. :smile:

Pavel

Nov18-04, 08:17 PM

Status, I didn't read your post before posting my own....... So, you don't like intention as the pick. Very well, let's stick with experience, as I have similar doubts in that area as well. Let's define the criteria that will allow us to conclude that the thing, whatever it is, is experiencing color, or better yet, pain. The only way I see to do it is to believe the "experiencer" of his experience and being able to relate it to your own experience. After all, color is not the frequency of light when I get hit on the head and see blue spots (no, it doesn't happen too often :) ). You can also put electrons through my brain and cause me to experience red, but I'm not experiencing electrons, I'm experiencing RED. Similarly, if say, an alien with different physiology is pleading for help because he's in pain. How can I verify that he's not faking it and is indeed in a state of pain? Even if I study his physiology, how do I know it's the same type of experience? How do I know that his own pattern of neuron firing causes PAIN?

Thanks,

Pavel.

BTW, when I said our consciousness is 99% determined, I meant that I strongly believe that our decisions about choices we make in our lives are almost completely determined by social conditioning, biological and physical laws. Almost! :)

Canute

Nov19-04, 08:23 AM

Canute,
"How do you know?" and "I don't think so" are not very convincing arguments.
I agree. The first is a question and the second a simple observation. I note that you always dodge my questions. You state your opinions and expect everybody to agree. Unfortunately your arguments do not hold water, which you'd know if you read the scientific literature on consciousness. When I ask you how you know all these things you assert you don't answer. This leaves me unable to say very much in reply except to point out that you're guessing.

All I'll say is that it is DEFINITELY logically coherent to imagine a non-conscious being acting as a conscious one because we don't know anyone else is conscious, and yet they act just like us. "Logical" doesn't mean "consistent with your preconceptions."
Well, here you go again. It isn't logically coherent as far as many people, including many scientists and philosophers, are concerned until someone has shown that it is. You won't acknowledge that the idea of non-conscious beings behaving like conscious ones is an ad hoc conjecture. What you are doing is making an assumption and then using it as an axiom from which to derive the truth of your assumption. That doesn't work. You need to come up with some reason why you or anybody else should believe that a non-conscious being would behave like a conscious one. Obviously you believe it, but as yet I don't know why you do. I don't want to just argue about your opinions, it won't get us anywhere.

Fliption

Nov19-04, 08:33 AM

You need to come up with some reason why you or anybody else should believe that a non-conscious being would behave like a conscious one.

Canute, I have interpreted StatusX to mean that there is no reason to believe why a non-conscious being wouldn't act like a conscious being. And he is right about this. If there were a reason to believe that, then there would be no hard problem.

But if he is saying that a non-conscious being would indeed act like a conscious being then obviously he cannot know this for the very same reasons. I may have misunderstood StatusX but it sounds like he is claiming the first and not the latter. StatusX am I correct?

Canute

Nov19-04, 11:41 AM

Pavel

Nov19-04, 01:45 PM

Canute, I have interpreted StatusX to mean that there is no reason to believe why a non-conscious being wouldn't act like a conscious being. And he is right about this. If there were a reason to believe that, then there would be no hard problem.

Of course there is no reason to believe that a non-conscious being wouldn’t behave as conscious, because you haven’t provided a clear definition on either of those. We can argue till the blue in the face in that manner. As I said, and StatusX actually agreed, let’s leave behaviorism out of this. There’s no point debating whether it can act. Yes, it can, my radio talks and sounds intelligent, yet nobody would argue it’s non-conscious.

Instead, I don’t mind adopting a suggested notion of experience by Status, that renders necessary to being qualified as “conscious”. So, my question remains, tell me how you would determine if your artificial silicon child is in fact experiencing pain. To be more articulate, your plastic creature complains that it is experiencing pain and asks you to terminate its existence because of it. You check the circuitry, voltages, blah blah blah, and to your amusement you find that artificial neurons that responsible for pain are firing properly… what do you do, is you child faking it?

Thanks,

Pavel.

StatusX

Nov19-04, 03:27 PM

My only comment here is that your use of the word physical may not be consistent with others posting here. I have come to similar conclusions as you and I don't consider myself a physicalist.
I can make the argument that everything obeys rules at some level and I have always argued that if everything is physical by definition then what good is the word? It doesn't distinguish anything from anything else. But this is all semantics. Maybe some of the other people participating here can tell us what they think a physicalists is. You may find that you are not one based on their definitions. This might explain some of the heated debate happening here for no apparent reason.

I personally believe the distinction between physical and non-physical is the method one uses to gain knowledge of it. This is why people claim that the scientific method as it current exists, cannot explain consciousness.

To be more specific, I believe there is something that explains both the physical world and the mental world in terms of rules. Maybe this is something we don't have yet, and maybe its just a different way of looking at the physical theories. But the reason I call myself a physicalist is because I believe that a system is completely described by its physical state. This obvisously means either zombies aren't possible or theyre the only thing possible. Looking at a system, you should be able to predict whether or not it's conscious.

Status, I didn't read your post before posting my own....... So, you don't like intention as the pick. Very well, let's stick with experience, as I have similar doubts in that area as well. Let's define the criteria that will allow us to conclude that the thing, whatever it is, is experiencing color, or better yet, pain. The only way I see to do it is to believe the "experiencer" of his experience and being able to relate it to your own experience. After all, color is not the frequency of light when I get hit on the head and see blue spots (no, it doesn't happen too often :) ). You can also put electrons through my brain and cause me to experience red, but I'm not experiencing electrons, I'm experiencing RED. Similarly, if say, an alien with different physiology is pleading for help because he's in pain. How can I verify that he's not faking it and is indeed in a state of pain? Even if I study his physiology, how do I know it's the same type of experience? How do I know that his own pattern of neuron firing causes PAIN?

Well now that you see what I mean by consciousness, you're free to go back over any of the old posts in this thread, because that definition was the one I was using all along. However, I know thats alot to go through, so I'll sumarize some of my arguments briefly here, and you can go back and find where they were first brought up for more detail. Theres some new stuff here too.

First of all, the whole reason I'm even talking about zombies is because of the possibility we could be them. Zombies, just to be clear, are hypothetical beings that have the same exact physical makeup as us, but are not conscious. I assert that because there physically identical, they would behave identically, and thats why I've been mentioning behavior. This may be a controversial stance, and I know that Canute, for one, probably disagrees. Before I get into why I think behavior is entirely physically explainable, I'll just wrap up the zombies with the point from my first or second post in this thread, which was this: Zombies would try to understand consciousness just like us, but they would fail because it isn't really there or them. So how can we know that its really there for us and that well succeed? Keep in mind, a zombie behaves exactly like us, so he can explain what he's experiencing, he can argue about consciousness, and he will claim till the day he dies that hes a conscious being, but there would be no substance to these statements.

Now this argument only holds water if you believe my assertion that our behavior is physically explainable. Surely, you'd say, our decision to do something or our experience of pain is a mental event, and can't be explained in terms of atoms and forces. Well maybe that's true, but the fact is we have an extremely powerful physical computer in our head, and it must be doing something. I say that every decision we make, and every color we see has a direct correlation in the physical brain to something like a set of neurons firing. These are what really cause all the physical results of our actions, and our experiences are just by-products.

To make this more clear, think about the physical process that leads up to you deciding to randomly drop a fork. Work it backwards. The muscles in your hand moved. This must have been in response to neurons in your spinal cord firing. This was caused by some signal from your brain which coordinated the various signals that caused your fingers to move fluidly. But what caused this signal? A non-physical mental event? So particles just started spontaneously moving in our brain? What about conservation of momentum? I say that a physical event caused it, and we just had an experience of this event. There have been experiments where people's brains were scanned, and they were told to tap there finger at a random time. About a third of a second before the conscious experience of the decision to tap, activity began in the unconscious regions of the brain. What caused this activity? It isn't yet known, but it wasn't conscious thought, and I believe it is still physically explainable.

I agree. The first is a question and the second a simple observation. I note that you always dodge my questions. You state your opinions and expect everybody to agree. Unfortunately your arguments do not hold water, which you'd know if you read the scientific literature on consciousness. When I ask you how you know all these things you assert you don't answer. This leaves me unable to say very much in reply except to point out that you're guessing.

I'm sorry you feel that way. I try my best to respond to any valid arguments I see, but I do seem to be alone in this corner, and it gets tiring to rebut every argument myself. That being said, this is philosophy. Obviously I have no proof of anything I've said. It is based on a combination of evidence from experience and experiments and my own opinions. I try to explain why I feel the way I do, but I can't convince you if your opinion is fundamentally and irrevocably different. And when you say, "how do you know" or "I don't think so" I just don't feel a need to respond. Explain why you think my arguments are wrong, or what you think is right.

Well, here you go again. It isn't logically coherent as far as many people, including many scientists and philosophers, are concerned until someone has shown that it is. You won't acknowledge that the idea of non-conscious beings behaving like conscious ones is an ad hoc conjecture. What you are doing is making an assumption and then using it as an axiom from which to derive the truth of your assumption. That doesn't work. You need to come up with some reason why you or anybody else should believe that a non-conscious being would behave like a conscious one. Obviously you believe it, but as yet I don't know why you do. I don't want to just argue about your opinions, it won't get us anywhere.

Canute, I have interpreted StatusX to mean that there is no reason to believe why a non-conscious being wouldn't act like a conscious being. And he is right about this. If there were a reason to believe that, then there would be no hard problem.

Fliption is right. All I was saying is that it is coherent (ie, not an inherent contradiction) to talk about non-conscious beings which behave exactly as we do. I am making no claim about whether they really do or could exist.

Les Sleeth

Nov19-04, 03:39 PM

I’m sorry if I’m being too particular, detailed, and slow in my approach. This is because it’s very easy in these conversations to digress and jump all over the place without getting anywhere. I just want to stick to the point and make this productive, not a waste of time.

Not at all. I appreciate anyone’s efforts to keep things on target (unless the target is boring, and then diversions are welcome :smile:).

I want to pick something very obvious and yet challenging for a materialist to handle. For the sake of progress in this argument, I want to stick with one apparent quality that we all attribute to consciousness, agree on the criteria that will allow us to apply it to an instance and say “yeap, that one is conscious”, and finally simulate the property and see if it satisfies our condition or criterion.

That’s what I’m after as well. Some who post here seem to prefer what I consider a more rationalistic type of argument (e.g., Chalmers). It appears you believe you can make “intention” challenging to the physicalist. I have another approach, which I’ll elaborate on more below.

I suspect that it could be argued that sensitivity to stimuli, retention, and integration can be exhibited in neural networks. When you train a net, you provide feedback to it, which could be viewed as stimulation in some context. The retention of “memory” is the adjusted weights which consequently allow to recognize patterns. On some level of abstraction, that’s being “smart” and possibly conscious.

I noticed you accounted for sensitivity and simple retention with the neuronal model of consciousness. In my post I acknowledged that was possible too. However, you did not offer a neurological explanation for integration.

I think “intentionality” is a very good candidate, what do you think? When I say “I intend to graduate from college”, you know precisely what I mean. It’s not “I will graduate”, it’s not “I’m thinking about graduation”, it’s just that - intend. It’s hard to explain it in other terms, and yet you have no problems understanding my state of mind. . . . do you accept that “intention”, as illustrated, is an inherent quality of a human mind, which is we define as conscious. If so, I’ll offer criteria which we can use to determine if somebody is in the state of “intending”. I probably won’t be able to offer any reductionistic criteria, because inability to do so is the precise point of the argument, but I think there are plenty of reasonable ways that allow us to observe somebody being in the state of “intention”.

We are about to have our first disagreement ( :cry: . . . just kidding, I’m sure you will welcome an opportunity to defend your ideas, or to change your mind if you agree with my view).

To me, intentionality seems perfectly explainable by brain physiology. Remember the movie “The Terminator”? He was rather intent wasn’t he? And he was from being programmed to be so. In fact, it seems to me intent is one of the easiest traits of consciousness to account for with a computer model of consciousness because that’s pretty much what programming is (i.e., giving intent to an otherwise intentless piece of equipment). If by “intent” you mean free will, that’s better but will can still be explained as only appearing “free” because so many programming choices are available.

Subjectivity is a great counterargument to physicalism, and the zombie analogy has proven effective. The weak spot in that approach, in my opinion, is that it doesn’t offer a model of it’s own. The physicalists have science on their side, and through that they are tendering a lot of facts about the brain. At least they have a model that non-physicalists can take potshots at, and in a way that makes their case more substantial than simply making a strong argument against functionalism.

That’s why I like to refute the physicalist model with an alternative model, one which explains the presence of subjectivity in consciousness. I believe the concept of retention is a consciousness trait with the potential to explain subjectivity, and thereby give us a model which better fits how consciousness works. I have argued this model quite a bit both at the old Physics Forums and here, and I realize there is a problem with it. The problem with my model is that to understand it, a person needs to contemplate his own consciousness, and not many people seem to have done that.

Just think about how your own consciousness works for a second. Doesn’t it seem like your body is surrounded by a field of sensitivity, sensitivity to light, sound, pain, smells, tastes, heat, cold, etc. Now, all that offers the potential to perceive tons of information that is in your environment every instant, and also to remember it. Do we remember it all? No, we only “retain” certain information. Why? Try out this little contemplation of retention I recently posted in another thread.

Say someone takes a walk in the woods to think about something important. The majority of sense data which peripherally floods his perception – the environmental sights, sounds, smells, etc. of where he is walking – is usually only retained briefly; although his subjective aspect of consciousness is present, he is not paying attention to all that info. But if he concentrates on something like a beautiful tree showing of its Autumn colors, then he will usually retain that perception more strongly. If we do something that requires a variety of elements to do well, say ride a bike, and we do it often, that may be retained in a way I’ve described as “integration.” In other words, the more what we sense/feel is concentrated upon and/or repeated, the more it “integrates.” I believe as experience integrates, it establishes a non-intellectual certainty with past events we call knowing.

Now, you have to stop here to reflect carefully on the integrated aspect of consciousness. We all rely on it incessantly, but few people I’ve talked to actually have looked squarely at it in themselves to see how it functions. Consequently, when I talk about it mostly I get a sort of “huh?” response.

If you are reading this now and comprehending it, that is because of integration. You don’t have to think about how to read before you perceive each word, and if you are familiar with my ideas, you don’t have to think about them again for comprehension to happen. You hear your cat at the door, get up and let her in, collect the mail, grab a banana to eat, and return to reading without having to think about how to walk, or use your hands, or why the cat wants in, or how to eat, etc. A HUGE amount of ability and understanding is present in your consciousness right now, and much of it is merged into a “singular” part of consciousness that is interacting with the world.

I am suggesting that the “self” has come about in consciousness exactly through that route. When information integrates, in a very important way it becomes distinct from the multifaceted aspects of consciousness. It is unified, it is “one,” while all the rest are “parts” that feed it new information it can integrate (I also believe the integrated aspect is centered within the multipart aspects that occur on the periphery of consciousness). The integrative function is absolutely the most crucial factor of consciousness because it creates the singular aspect which comes to control, oversee, know . . . and one of the things it “knows” is that it exists! That is what self/subjectivity is: self knowing. That is why the oneness aspect of consciousness cannot be reproduced by a physical thing made of zillions of atoms or 1s and 0s.

In case you found any this interesting, I am posting a drawing representing the retention-integration model of subjectivity.

See Diagram 1

The picture represents a disembodied consciousness. The idea is that the most outer aspect of consciousness is outward-oriented sensitivity; it detects by being impressed with information. It is counterbalanced by a more inward concentrative aspect which when initiated causes the impressions sensed to be drawn deeper into consciousness where they will be embedded (memory); how deeply embedded depends on the strength of concentration, repetition, etc. With more experience information may integrate into the singular aspect. Since existence was our first, is our longest-running, and is a non-stop experience, in this model that knowledge is what has integrated at the very center of consciousness to become the "self."

Pavel

Nov19-04, 05:53 PM

We are about to have our first disagreement ( :cry: . . . just kidding, I’m sure you will welcome an opportunity to defend your ideas, or to change your mind if you agree with my view).

To me, intentionality seems perfectly explainable by brain physiology. Remember the movie “The Terminator”? He was rather intent wasn’t he? And he was from being programmed to be so. In fact, it seems to me intent is one of the easiest traits of consciousness to account for with a computer model of consciousness because that’s pretty much what programming is (i.e., giving intent to an otherwise intentless piece of equipment). If by “intent” you mean free will, that’s better but will can still be explained as only appearing “free” because so many programming choices are available.

Hehe, no problem, I've always been a strong believer that it's through the disagreement that you learn the most. In fact, you convinced me that “intention” might not be a good example. I perceive the state of intention as a modal attribute, not merely as the overall [desired ?] goal, which would seem to me to be the case with the Terminator. But I’m afraid trying to show this aspect of “intention” and then reducing it would shift the conversation into a different direction. But some time, I’d like to get back to it, as I suspect modality brings a lot of trouble to materialism as well.

Subjectivity is a great counterargument to physicalism, and the zombie analogy has proven effective. The weak spot in that approach, in my opinion, is that it doesn’t offer a model of it’s own. The physicalists have science on their side, and through that they are tendering a lot of facts about the brain. At least they have a model that non-physicalists can take potshots at, and in a way that makes their case more substantial than simply making a strong argument against functionalism.

I like this point, didn't think about it. Although, when a physicalist can't explain a phenomenon resorting to the science, a non-physicalist can offer an explanation just as rational. If you can't provide a physical explanation for my experience of pain, introduction of a metaphysical component might not be the best, but it is just as rational as attributing the pain to something physical under the presumption that it's physical. Unfortunately or not, such component is ruled out a priori by a physicalst with the only answer as "we'll give a physical explanation in the future". Isn't that a metaphysical statement as well?

Anyhow, I want to take some time and think about what you said wiht regards to "intergration". It sounds interesting, but I need to chew on it for a bit and see how it settles with me. Thank you for your time explaining it!

Pavel.

Pavel

Nov19-04, 06:15 PM

Les Sleeth

Nov19-04, 06:23 PM

Unfortunately or not, such component is ruled out a priori by a physicalst with the only answer as "we'll give a physical explanation in the future". Isn't that a metaphysical statement as well?.

Yes, absolutely. That's why some of the debates here with physicalists are so frustrating. They understand the physics, but they don't realize they are arguing from a priori metaphysical assumptions.

StatusX

Nov19-04, 07:18 PM

Status, yes, I'm sorry I haven't read your previous posts, as there were a LOT of them. I figured I'd read the last few before I jump in and be up to speed. Thank you for the summary though.

Unfortunatelly, you're still arguing on a highly abstract level involving a lot of questionable assumptions every time you make a point. Of course your argument makes sense then, but again, that's because you involve quite a few concepts at once that you presume to be true, but you avoid digging into them. I asked you a specific question about reducing the quality of pain and you start talking about zombies again. I accepted your notion of experience as a necessary condition for being conscious. Now, please explain to me, specifically, how you would verify that an artificial being in fact is experiencing pain. Note, you didn't build a human, you built an artificial "conscious" thing, call it Status Junior.

Thanks,

Pavel.

All I intended to do is summarize what I've said so far, with a couple of new illustrations to back up my arguments, so that we'd have a common ground to work from. Now your question was how could we determine what a being is subjectively experiencing. This is a tough one, and there is obviously no real answer at this point. However, like I said, I think there are laws that relate conscious experience to a configuration of matter, and we could use these laws to predict the conscious experience that a given body is feeling.

It seems odd to say "a given body," like were talking about projectile motion problems or something. But Chalmer, for one, argues that consciousness may be a result of information, and that any system which contains information has some kind of conscious experience, with the complexity of the experience corresponding to that of the information. The human brain is one of the most complex information processing systems in the universe, and is probably one of the most conscious. Other animals are less conscious, down to single celled organisms which have a more basic experience than we can imagine. Even a thermostat, (Chalmers example) has some extremely limited form of experience. His ideas are hard to accept at first, but I find them really appealing. They assert that there are simple rules that relate consciousness to some aspect of the physical. Here is a link to the article, which someone had provided earlier in the thread:

http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)

But how could we be sure something has a conscious experience? At first, it seems that we can't be. The rules about where consciousness arises may turn out to be so simple they compel us to believe them, but you can't prove anything about the external world. But think, for a minute, about the reason you can't experience what someone else is. If you could get inside their head, you would have access to all the information in it. But clearly, there is no physical link from their brain to yours. But what if you could create some kind of link, so that you could access any part of their brain, and they could do the same to you? I think any separate individuality would disappear, and the consciousnesses would merge into one. This is highly speculative, and I don't expect anyone to buy it with what little argument I've provided here, but I just thought of it and I'm still working it out. Basically the conclusion is, there is only one consciousness, but it is divided up among the different systems. If you could join the information flow of two systems, the separate consciousnesses would disappear, and if you could somehow join all systems, there would be one consciousness remaining. Well thats all I have for now. I'll try to build on this (or realize how wrong it is) later.

Canute

Nov20-04, 08:34 AM

First of all, the whole reason I'm even talking about zombies is because of the possibility we could be them. Zombies, just to be clear, are hypothetical beings that have the same exact physical makeup as us, but are not conscious.
Sorry, but I still find this argument rather muddled. Zombies are useful in thought experiments but it's another thing entirely to suggest that they can exist. We are conscious, ergo we are not zombies. If we were not conscious then there would be no need to define zombies as being 'like us physically but not conscious'. That is, if we are not conscious then we can just say zombies are like us. Why add the 'but not conscious' bit?

I'm sorry you feel that way. I try my best to respond to any valid arguments I see, but I do seem to be alone in this corner, and it gets tiring to rebut every argument myself. That being said, this is philosophy. Obviously I have no proof of anything I've said. It is based on a combination of evidence from experience and experiments and my own opinions. I try to explain why I feel the way I do, but I can't convince you if your opinion is fundamentally and irrevocably different. And when you say, "how do you know" or "I don't think so" I just don't feel a need to respond. Explain why you think my arguments are wrong, or what you think is right.
Fair point. I was asking 'how do you know' in order to highlight the fact that it is pure conjecture to suppose that a non-conscious being can behave like a conscious one. Because you were being a bit dogmatic I hadn't realised that you already accepted this. My mistake.

Fliption is right. All I was saying is that it is coherent (ie, not an inherent contradiction) to talk about non-conscious beings which behave exactly as we do. I am making no claim about whether they really do or could exist.
I'd say that if this idea is logically coherent then there's no reason that non-conscious beings which behave exactly like conscious ones could not exist. However, the question remains - is the idea logically coherent?

I feel that if you want to say that it is then you have to give an explanation of how and why a non-conscious being would conduct research into consciousness. A zombie could have no evidence that consciousness exists. Also I find it hard to imagine that it could conduct such research into consciousness without knowing that it is conducting it. Perhaps a simpler question would be why would they go 'ow' when they stick their hand in a fire?

Many human philosophers have espoused philosophical idealism. It's hard to imagine how a being without a mind could conclude that mind is more fundamental than matter. As for a zombie becoming a Taoist or Buddhist and concluding that consciousness is more fundamental than mind, it seems hard to imagine. Surely it would be sent back to the repair shop by its colleagues.

Pavel

Nov20-04, 12:35 PM

Here is a link to the article, which someone had provided earlier in the thread:

http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)

Nice! Seems like a very beneficial article for me to read. Thanks for ruining my weekend. Did you have to do it on a Friday night? Hehe, seriously though, thank you for the reference, I'll definitely read it. :cool:

Pavel.

shintashi

Nov20-04, 01:08 PM

Being conscious is not 'consciousness'. Consciousness includes being both conscious and unconscious.

To me, my consciousness is that part of my persona I use to observe a given reality. I assume that we exist on many, many levels (dimensions) of the greater reality. I use my consciousness to focus my attention on any of the given levels. It seems quite possible, even probable, that for one nano-second it is focused on what I am seeing, the next on what I communicate to myself, the next on what I communicate to others and the next funneling the information to my mind, etc ....

Consciousness is the ability focus my mind and or spirit on my experiences.

love&peace,
olde drunk

ps: awareness is being able to understand the experience, information.

I agree. What I find sad today is the fact that the manyof greatest minds of the old world, Such as Abraham, Moses, Socrates, Plato, Krsna, Plotinus, and Lao Tsu, for example, all believed and studied on the precept of a source of "me" or "I" that was more than the material element.
There is no scientific fact proving or non disproving the corporeality and materiality of the human mind, for in every experiment, there is a counter experiment to create a different result. Nevertheless, I broke it down, for my own use, in this way:
Assume for a minute only three processions... from top to bottom.

At the top you have ideas & philosophy, Thought, and Intelligence, Truth.
The Second layer directly beneath it is Spiritual, Musical, Geometric, Harmony.
The third layer is Physical, Material like Democritus and obvious as Aristotle.

Assume each layer is a triangle of equal size in a directly linear observation. The triangles are all pointing down. The can go up and down, but not side to side.

now the bottom layer represents science: that being "the study of the physical universe"

The middle layer represents Theology and Religion, Music and Art.

The top layer represents dialectic, consciousness, Intelligence, wisdom, Truth, the root of philosophy, mysteries of Ethics and Imagination.

So here we have three groups, Scientists, theologians, and Philosophers; Doctors, priests, and psychics; all trying to understand what's going on.

But what if I told you that from a view point, in this 2D geometry, that science can never know the truth without going through the spiritual?
That a philosopher will never have an understanding of the physical world without the application of musical theory and geometry?

Science tries to reach for the Truth of the First world, it tries to reach the secret of philosophy, and empower its creator as a would be "Q" or "Akira" literally trying to take upon itself the reins to define what God is, completely devoid of any measure of spirituality, saying, as the Nihilist, and the Buddhist, that there is no soul, there is no atman, there is no afterlife.

"Meat Machines" as Tesla would say.
When science attempts to do this - attempts to bypass truth to create its own, it is no longer "Physic" as outlined by Thales, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Parmenides, down through Socrates and Plato. No. It becomes bastardized and turns into a religion.

Such people will try to hide behind the scientific method, scientific facts, and scientific proofs. These methods themselves are also nothing but rituals of a religion. They are the mantras of the believers. The Lab coats are merely the ceremonial robes.

As I sat in my friends house weeks ago, he asked me to prove that a certain social group existed. He said that I could not prove it to him. He wanted evidence, in the most scientific of terms. I walked out of his house, looked up at the cloudy night sky, and said "Prove to me that the sun exists. For certainly I do not see it, and it will not be around for another 12 hours...Come on, in the same time you have given me to prove this, with the materials available, prove to me there is a Sun"

He couldn't do it. He knew he couldn't do it. Next time you are in a forrest, camping, and its night time, when you think you know there is no real consciousness, only meat machines... try to prove to yourself there is a sun before it starts to rise.

Les Sleeth

Nov20-04, 01:18 PM

Even a thermostat, (Chalmers example) has some extremely limited form of experience. His ideas are hard to accept at first, but I find them really appealing. They assert that there are simple rules that relate consciousness to some aspect of the physical. Here is a link to the article, which someone had provided earlier in the thread:

http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)

My take on Chalmers' meaning there was that a theromstat has some form of awareness, not experience. At one point in the paper he suggests subjectless sensing, or the easy problem of consciousness, may be generalized as "awareness." But he clearly distinguished "experience" from awareness.

But how could we be sure something has a conscious experience? At first, it seems that we can't be. The rules about where consciousness arises may turn out to be so simple they compel us to believe them, but you can't prove anything about the external world. But think, for a minute, about the reason you can't experience what someone else is. If you could get inside their head, you would have access to all the information in it. But clearly, there is no physical link from their brain to yours. But what if you could create some kind of link, so that you could access any part of their brain, and they could do the same to you? I think any separate individuality would disappear, and the consciousnesses would merge into one. This is highly speculative, and I don't expect anyone to buy it with what little argument I've provided here, but I just thought of it and I'm still working it out. Basically the conclusion is, there is only one consciousness, but it is divided up among the different systems. If you could join the information flow of two systems, the separate consciousnesses would disappear, and if you could somehow join all systems, there would be one consciousness remaining. Well thats all I have for now. I'll try to build on this (or realize how wrong it is) later.

It's a pretty good point to say that if everyone had access to everyone else's information, it would seem to diminish individuality.

But I would like to suggest to you that while you are intensely looking at the mechanisms and functions of the brain, you don't seem to understand how you yourself "work" as consciousness. When you say, "you could access any part of their brain, and they could do the same to you," what is that "you" to which you refer?

Here's how I see the problem. Consciousness is something that goes around doing things, and when you decribe consciousness you mush together the doer with the things done. They are not the same! Many people define themselves by what they do. That's why someone says "I'm a physicist" or "I'm a lawyer" or "I'm a parent." And quite often they are so focused on what they do, they have never stopped to check out what it is about them that "does." So far, no model you have offered accounts for the self, the doer. That's why it is called the "hard problem" of consciousness.

Les Sleeth

Nov20-04, 01:36 PM

He wanted evidence, in the most scientific of terms. I walked out of his house, looked up at the cloudy night sky, and said "Prove to me that the sun exists. For certainly I do not see it, and it will not be around for another 12 hours...Come on, in the same time you have given me to prove this, with the materials available, prove to me there is a Sun" ... try to prove to yourself there is a sun before it starts to rise.

Without commenting on the rest of your post, I would argue that you did not prove anything, one way or the other. You don't know if the sun will rise in the future, you only know it has risen in the past. Unless one is experiencing something in the moment, there is no proof it exists.

Of course, there is common sense, so we rely on text books and other sources to say "even though we can't see how reality is somewhere, it's been such and such a way consistently long enough to conclude reality is likely the same as it's been in the past." We consider that kind of evidence "proof" even though technically it isn't.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 02:14 PM

“The Soul” you are talking about does not exist, consciousness / awareness “is” the chemical reaction going on / in your biological brain hardware. Actually it’s very simple to test, just give yourself some SSRIs; citalopram, fluoxetine, fluvoxamine, paroxetine and or sertraline and see how your soul reacts. LOL! But I do believe the energy (biological energy, energy found in cells) is not just simple energy this energy actually has memory. As for multiple existences, to me they are more like “memories carryovers” …
only occur in very rear instances, else we will all be copies of mommy and daddy, remembering all what they did and saw up till conception and then a branch off from that.

The antidepressants you mentioned are ****. The most effective one is MDMA or (C11H15NO2) or (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine), but it is illegal in most places. But i think it causes neuron damange if used often.

See what THAT dos to your "soul".

I agree with your version of the soul, i don't think there is such thing as a spirit or soul that transcends material reality. If it did, currenly all theory is speculation, since we have not yet discovered any hint of any universe which does not function according to laws of phyisics. That does not mean any such thing may not be discoverd in the future, so i keep my mind open.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 02:28 PM

Fliption:Do you not think that there is electrical activity in your brain when you are asleep? I think we know very little about consciousness.

Rothie M:
Dreams can be seen as a form of consciousness because we are aware of space and time in them.I would say that the correct definition of consciousness is an awaremess of space and time.Electric pulses in the brain are not continuous phenomena but magnetic fields in the brain are.So one can imagine a magnetic field
being the brain's creation of continuous conscious experiences such as
a straight line - electric fields could only produce a dotted line.
In other words the space and time we experience is created by our brains.
It reflects what the atomic world around us really looks like but can never
give us a true experience of that world.We are probably conscious because
our brains are producing particles of very small mass which differ from the
particles found in normal physics.For example they could be moving faster than light.
We have five senses so we need five groups of particles.For a sense like colour where humans can experience 16000 different colours,there will have to be lots of different particles with lots of different properties in one group.So in my view particle physicists have got rather a lot of work to do!They speak of quarks and leptons:in future they will need to speak of a lot more categories.
If the brain produces particles that create consciousness then what we are seeing may exist in our brains and not outside them.For example,the human eye can see a galaxy at a distance of 10^23 metres and it takes about 10 seconds to focus on it properly. .So if we are to see the galaxy where it is, the particles that create consciousness have to travel from our brains to the galaxy in ten seconds.This means they need to have a speed of 10^22 metres per second - at least.This is way faster than light.I do not think consciousness is so mysterious if you accept that a soul
with mass exists in each of us and that the brain creates new kinds of particles that
exist in space and time relative to a soul particle.When we are dead or unconscious we are "soul inactive" when we are dreaming or awake we are "soul active."

That is the craziest theory if i ever did see saw a crazy theory. Hmm, I think current science has a few things to argue against your theory. First, we don't know that the brain, or anything, creates samaller particles than the currently discovered ones, so you seem to be speculating a lot, and well, if there is no proof how can i believe you? That is not to say science know all or best, it just means that i'm not sure that you know best either.

On the topic of far off galaxies, i imagine you speack of staring at the sky, and focusing on the least visible star you can see.

It is know that those stars or galaxies you see are seeable because they emit light, this light travels a long distance and because it is bound by the laws of physics, it is an outdated image of the galaxy, so what you see is in effect and old verison of the galaxy, not an image of how it today, for all reasonable purpose, it may not even exist anymore, yet, its light keeps on traveling unitl it reaches its last photon. So, there is no need to invent faster than light magic.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 02:34 PM

"Perhaps we shouldn't boil vegetables."

That's ok, we do not associate feelings or pain to things we do not visibly see responding to us. So, in theory you could boil a paraplegic blind mute person without having any remorse... except that it has a physical resemblance to humans and thus you associate an entity to it which is similar to yourself meaning: you may be able to "feel for" the unlucky boiling man.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 03:06 PM

"Sense-experiences do not live in isolation.Show me an example where they do."

Well, depends, here memory leaps in to help. Lets say one is not able to experience anything but one stimuli. he will know what that is because he has experienced it in the past, or not and he will be able to copare with memories of past experiences similar or different. Thus you will have to specify that memory should also be nonexistent in a person which is only able to feel one stimuli in order for your theory to have a ground. But then, if we have no memory what are we? If we have to memory we do not perceive time. And if we consider ourselves as time-space entities, we would be practically dead if we cannot perceive time. In fact, this theory of time expoerience can be taken to further inquiry, one can say that there is differene between subconsicous time perception and conscious time perception. For example, one canot consciously (directly) control a hearbeat, yet the heart has a tremendous timing mechanism which coordinartes itself depending on needs of the body, it is in constant adjustment. Time can also be said to exist subconsciously through training, if a person is alwasy trianed to wake up at a certain time, that person will experience that during unconscious sleep, the mind will bring itself to consciouslness at the exact moment that it knows it would have been woken up by the clock. Thus, i think there is a subconscious timing mechanism which operates on many differen tlevels and directs many different human nctions, and thus time affects consciousness. Yet, time is also relative. Dream time may be differen than wakinglife time - yet both are part of consciousness, as in the case of lucid dreaming, or dreaming where you remember what you dreamt after you wake up.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 03:18 PM

Electrical impulses?

In which we are aware I believe.

I agree, but then again we're all different and so are the masses and charges.

We all think about it, are we really alive? thinking? what is thinking? what about seeing? the vision is perhaps the most doubtful consiousness of it all.

You sleep on the same bed for 50 years.

You emigrate = new house = new bed included.

In the morning you wake up, your brain becomes confused because you still thinking of the old house, walls, colours etc....

Your brain immediately adjusts this confusion.

There is conscious, no doubt about it.

Good topic!

Good example, i have experienced New Immigrant Phenomena myself, when i first immigrated to Canada, I was sometimes lost when i woke up, forgetting where i was, but of course after a few dazed seconds memory kicks in and one is able to transpond expectations of old world reality to expectations of new world reality.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 03:20 PM

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 03:41 PM

"To that I say, for anything of substance to be exactly the same as something else, they not only have to share all properties and aspects, but must inhabit the same place at the same time, meaning that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies. Aside from this, the likeliness that two consciousnesses (is that right?) WOULD be the same is ridiculously small, considering that they would have to have the same physical composition down to a tee, and also have to have shared the exact same past in order to have been exposed to the exact same sensory input."

Agreed.

Grade 10 Math will show you exactly why two identical consciousnesse may exist, but are actually inseparable.

Take this equasion:

2y = 6x+4

and

y = 3x+2

They are different, yet when graphed, the lines overlap, thus while they are separate lines, they are identical and thus indisctinguishable when projected in time and and space.

One can certainly argue that identical consciousnesses may esist, but what they may not realize is that these same consciousnes are all one. There are an infinite numbers of me, yet you count tell, because all me's overlap and thus are indistinguishable form each other, thus do not affect time and space separately, but as one, thus its pointless to talk about multiple self consciousness or out of body experiences as they are as good as nonexistent.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 03:57 PM

I have seen arguments on this topic which side with physical explanations of the conscious and arguments which side with the metaphysical explanation of consciousness (and everything in between)

I think these arguments boil down to arguments of the parts defining the whole or the whole is more than its parts.

Currently i belive the whole is more than its parts. But its parts define how the whole works. The mechanism for consciousness may well be similar among all humans, and i belive they are, this doesn't mean the everyone is the same. A bike can be ridden up the hill, or down the hill, or left or right or not ridden at all, yet all bikes are basically the same. So the two theories are not contradictory at all.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 04:15 PM

StatusX

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

Would someone who is autistic be similar to the general definition of a zombie?

"A rare syndrome, appearing in childhood, characterized by a withdrawn state, a lack of social responsiveness or interest in others, serious communicative and linguistic impairments, and a failure to develop normal attachments, all frequently accompanied by a variety of bizarre ways of responding to the environment, usually including a fascination with inanimate objects and an insistence on routine, order, and sameness. Onset prior to 30 months of age. Sometimes the term is only used to refer to autistic disorder but more often it refers to all of the autistic spectrum or as a general term for developmental disorders in the pervasive developmental disorders category of the DSM-IV."

http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=deskbar&q=define:autism

I have heard that it is believed that autists are not able to associate a personality to another living thing.

I would really like to know how the consciousness of someone who is autistic works, or if perhaps autistic people are humans in everyway but perhaps they do not have consciousness? Hmm...

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 04:26 PM

If the life (the thought activity of our brain) does not start with its birth, we need to know at what stage it starts. I mean the evolution of our thought process starting from zero thought in the begining.

It seems to me that you equate life with consciousness, which is false. Life starts at the creation of the first cell, eg, sperm and egg meet. Consciousness (self-consciousness) starts after birth, and is not something which just "clicks" in place as soon as you exit your mothers womb. It is a gradual development. Memory has nothing to do with consciousness. The mind is made up of many different (if apparently similarly looking) mechanisms for processing stimuli, both internal and external. I can see and i can imagine, the first is an external experience and the second internal, yet both use the same vision consciousness engine. consciousness is nothing more than the amalgamated processes of the brain which have been put together in order that we make decisions on them. The subconscious is part of the conscious, but i think that we are falling into many miss-understanding traps if we do not decide what kind of consciousness we should discuss. Self consciousness, subconsciousness, etc. So what's it gonna be?

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 04:55 PM

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 05:08 PM

Well, the problem here is that you are reasoning based on "what we know not". Every so often someone comes along with a 'scientific theory' that they say predicts all the equations of physics, and therefore is the 'right' theory (and they are usually not the humble types in their proclamation). Of course, ask them to produce equations that are not known which we can experiment, they are usually mum. What they have done is predict the past successes of science, and even though it is an admirable task if done correctly, such kind of 'theories' do not tell us that a revolutionary theory has been discovered. Rather, all we can do is look at them and say "does it make butter too?".

Well, I think this is a very similar situation to your thought experiment. What are we supposed to do with such computational results other than scratch our heads and pick up our discussion right before we were interrupted? The fact of the matter is, a theory might be right, but if it does not show us how it is right or if it is right in experiments that we can perform, such a theory is generally not useful to science.

In the case of a super computer having all these abilities, all we can ask at the end of the day is whether it is simply under the spell of Searle's Chinese room thought experiment. You might recall in that thought experiment that a person who does not know a lick of Chinese is put inside a room (we don't know that he doesn't know Chinese). While in the room, someone comes along and slips through the door a question written in Chinese characters. A few minutes later out spews the answer in English. Now, to most of us, we would assume that the person in the room is fluent in Chinese. But, we would be wrong. If we could look inside we would see that the person has a pretty substantial filing system that they can match the Chinese characters, stroke by stroke, until find a file that contains the answer in English for that question written in Chinese. The 'translator' has no understanding of Chinese, but everyone on the outside is confident that the guy is fluent in Chinese.

What this thought experiment shows is not that AI is impossible, rather it shows that to know that AI is possible we must have a much better philosophical understanding of language, theory of learning, theory of meaning, and a theory of truth (among a few others). We need to demonstrate how a proposition can be encoded into symbols and then decoded such that no information is lost (or very little information). We can translate the contents of a sentence into 1' & 0's, but we cannot translate the meaning. Without demonstrating how it is possible, we might just as well be talking Chinese to the guy in a Chinese room.

Actually your thought experiment falls appart right here:

"The 'translator' has no understanding of Chinese, but everyone on the outside is confident that the guy is fluent in Chinese."

What makes you think that i could not assume that there is a translating system in the room and thus the person was able to translate the writing? It's a silly experiment proving nothing.

The experiment assumes that everyone reacts the same way to the person translating the characters. In reality this experiment can easily be proven wrong, such is the issue with thought experiments, they assume too much.

siliconhype

Nov20-04, 05:27 PM

Status, I want to be more specific about what Les said about "human activities", as I'm also struggling to understand how you would simulate them, at least conceptually.

Very simple: let’s say I’m holding a fork and all of a sudden I make a decision to drop it. Let’s examine this decision making process. My brain must be in a certain state before the drop, say state A. You can brake down this state to a quantum level, to anything you want. The bottom line is there is a physical state that can be expressed in a matrix of certain values for each neuron, synapse, electron, photon, etc. Now comes the point in time when the decision making neuron must fire to cause the “drop the fork” reaction chain. My question is what specifically causes that neuron to fire? Yes, you can reduce that cause to a quark spin or a wave function, if you will, but that’s just begging the question. The ultimate question is what causes the system to be transformed from state A to state B (firing of the fork dropping neuron). I can think of only two causes. First, randomness / spontaneity. Whether it’s the electron’s undetermined position in the carbon atom, nuclear decay, gust of wind in your face, other natural random phenomena, whatever it is, the prime mover is random. (that’s assuming spontaneity exists, of course, which is a subject for another thread). The other cause is determinism. The transformation from state A to state B is strictly determined by natural laws. Whether the neuron will fire or not completely depends on the current state, state A, all incoming input from other neurons, and the rules (brain fabric which determines thresholds etc.) which dictate what to do. Without going into metaphysics, is there anything else?

Whether you choose randomness or determinism, there’s a problem. If the neuron firing is caused by a random act, all our decisions are nothing but a roll of a dice. I find it hard to swallow since it would make this very idea an outcome of randomness in someone’s mind….. Determinism doesn’t make things better. If my decision making is the outcome of strict deterministic rules, we’re nothing but a cog in a huge machine following the rules, we don’t really think or make decisions. I find it also hard to believe because, again, that would mean your very idea of determinism is not the outcome of your independent thinking, it’s the outcome of some physical state and some rules, you couldn’t “think” otherwise, you’re programmed to say “we’re determined”. The third option is the combination of the two of course, but again, the same criticism applies. So, how, conceptually, would you simulate the transformation from one state to the next?

Regards,

Pavel.

Good argument, a similar discussion was posed by a character in the phylosophical movie "Waking Life".

"The ultimate question is what causes the system to be transformed from state A to state B (firing of the fork dropping neuron)."

My resonse, first, the two theories you mention are both invalid. And also, i think you question is incorectly posed, which explains its unaswerability. Thought isnever a neuron simply firing and creating a cascade which eventually results in an effect on the body. Thought is a continuous process which never stops since the creation of the first neuron in the human embrio. Thus there is no State A, there is only a continuation of thought. The system transformation from state A to B does not exist, transformation is continuous. But to sort of answer the question, which i said beofore cannot be clearly answere the wasy it was posed, and thus i should reword it:

What is the difference between state A and state B and how did the mind get there.

Well, the neuron which created the cascade to drop the fork is unidentifiable, there is no one neuron associated with the command "drop fork". In other words a process created the action to drop the fork. Once this is assumed to be the case, the question is more easilly answerable. The process is an evaluation of thought, to evaluate thought more processes must be taken into consideration, some baing external stimuli. in essence there are many reasons why one would let go of a fork. One could find the fork too hot to hold. Or the fork too heavy, or one may have simply made a decision to let the fork go. The result in essence was created by a process not by a state. The decision to drop the fork may have well been thought over many times. One may have though, "when" to drop the fork, so then where can you pinpoint the neuron to cause the dropping of the fork? You can't; there is no neuron that thinks, thougth is a process. i'll stop here because im starting to sound repetitive.

evagriselda

Nov20-04, 09:46 PM

Conciousness is the interface of the mind.
Hi Smurf: In physical chemistry or computer science?

StatusX

Nov20-04, 11:53 PM

Sorry, but I still find this argument rather muddled. Zombies are useful in thought experiments but it's another thing entirely to suggest that they can exist. We are conscious, ergo we are not zombies. If we were not conscious then there would be no need to define zombies as being 'like us physically but not conscious'. That is, if we are not conscious then we can just say zombies are like us. Why add the 'but not conscious' bit?

We are conscious, ergo we are not zombies? If this isn't using your conclusion as a premise, I don't know what is. And the only way to talk about zombies is to emphasize how they are different from the way we perceive ourselves. Obviously its just a matter of semantics that I say that theyre like us but not conscious. My conclusion was that whatever they are, theyre the same as us. But you can't start from this point.

I'd say that if this idea is logically coherent then there's no reason that non-conscious beings which behave exactly like conscious ones could not exist. However, the question remains - is the idea logically coherent?

I feel that if you want to say that it is then you have to give an explanation of how and why a non-conscious being would conduct research into consciousness. A zombie could have no evidence that consciousness exists. Also I find it hard to imagine that it could conduct such research into consciousness without knowing that it is conducting it. Perhaps a simpler question would be why would they go 'ow' when they stick their hand in a fire?

Many human philosophers have espoused philosophical idealism. It's hard to imagine how a being without a mind could conclude that mind is more fundamental than matter. As for a zombie becoming a Taoist or Buddhist and concluding that consciousness is more fundamental than mind, it seems hard to imagine. Surely it would be sent back to the repair shop by its colleagues.

Again, you have to understand that I believe that all behavior is explainable in purely physical terms. What you're talking about is just behavior (responding to pain, writing books about buddhism, meditating). I've already explained why I believe this, but just to reiterate: how can a "mental world" influence the physical world? If it did, there would be some experiment we could perform where we would see physical events that arent physically explainable (eg., a neuron spontaneously fires). The physical realm wouldn't be causally closed. I don't like this idea, and there isnt any evidence for it.

My take on Chalmers' meaning there was that a theromstat has some form of awareness, not experience. At one point in the paper he suggests subjectless sensing, or the easy problem of consciousness, may be generalized as "awareness." But he clearly distinguished "experience" from awareness.

I'm glad you've read that paper, and I'd like to talk about it. To start, I'm not sure I understand the difference between experience and awareness. Awareness seems to require the ability to reason, that to be aware is to understand whats going on around you, where as experience could conceivably take place in the absence of it. But maybe I've misinterpretted these terms.

It's a pretty good point to say that if everyone had access to everyone else's information, it would seem to diminish individuality.

But I would like to suggest to you that while you are intensely looking at the mechanisms and functions of the brain, you don't seem to understand how you yourself "work" as consciousness. When you say, "you could access any part of their brain, and they could do the same to you," what is that "you" to which you refer?

Here's how I see the problem. Consciousness is something that goes around doing things, and when you decribe consciousness you mush together the doer with the things done. They are not the same! Many people define themselves by what they do. That's why someone says "I'm a physicist" or "I'm a lawyer" or "I'm a parent." And quite often they are so focused on what they do, they have never stopped to check out what it is about them that "does." So far, no model you have offered accounts for the self, the doer. That's why it is called the "hard problem" of consciousness.

Would a conscious being have a sense of identity in the absence of rational thought? Could a thermostat know it was separate from everything else? I think self-awareness is just a aspect of consciousness present in intelligent beings, and not something fundamental to it. The hard problem is how to explain experiences. The experience of red, the experience of fear, the experience of self. Its called the hard problem because it can't be explained functionally. But I think that self-awareness could be.

You know you aren't someone else because you don't have access to their thoughts. This is a deduction youve made, even if its at an extremely basic level. I know I'm saying "you know" again, but this is hard to avoid because the experience of self is so central to our existence, and so also to our language. A frog would, in my opinion, have conscious experiences, but I don't think it would understand it was separate from the rest of the world. This is all just my take on it, and I haven't really read much about the self-identity aspect of consciousness. If you know any other articles that go into this kind of stuff more, I'd love to read them.

StatusX

Nov21-04, 12:08 AM

Yes, photons are discrete, but there are so many of them per cell that we couldn't possibly make out individual ones, and so light appears continuous.

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually travelling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

I don't agree, take a baby, would you be able to have a discussion with the baby about consciousness? According to you you would because consciousness is not effected by external stimuli. Yet, in reality we know that you can't have a discussion with a baby on consciousness because of many reasons. One of them being that the baby cannot speak.

You answered your own question. You can't talk with a baby about consciousness because it can't talk, and even if it could, it wouldn't understand it. I don't really understand what you were trying to say.

I have another question, can anyone remember a memory before one was able to speak? I believe speech or communication, not necessarily through words, is a throughout process without which self consciousness could not exist, simple because the means of defining it or describing it do not exist.

Consciousness is very much defined by external stimuli and experience, while the mechanism does exist independent of external stimuli, consciousness is a process which relies on both being present.

Once enough external stimuli has effected the mind, so that the mind can perceive itself as an independent entity and thus attribute itself self consciousness, then if all stimuli is removed, consciousness could still exist, as you say, independent of external factors. It will only exist in the mind of the individual, and may yet evolve independently of any external factors through various processes such as imagination, etc. These are internal stimuli, which have been defined by external stimuli, without initial external stimuli they could not exist.

I think you misinterpretted my argument. One thing Ill respond to right away is that I don't think speech is at all necessary for consciousness. For one thing, some people do have memories from before they learned to talk, and there are conscious people who never learn any form of communication.

But when you say that "consciousness could exist, as you say, independent of external factors," that's not what I was talking about at all. When I said you could electrically stimulate the brain to have experiences, I meant experiences identical to the ones we have in ordinary life. My point was to refute a ridiculous claim about "color particles." These are not necessary because color could conceivably exist without any real object, ie, if you just stimulated you brain so you thought you were looking at a colored object. Actually, this isn't far fetched at all, and all you have to do to disprove the "color particle" theory is eat some acid. That is, unless you claim that acid has some spiritual connection to the rest of the universe, and causes color particles to come from nowhere. But then I wouldn't really want to talk to you any more.

Mohsen

Nov21-04, 08:03 AM

In my view, consiuosness is a seperate entity from central nervous system and all of the physiologic processes which is happening in it. To make it more clear, look at the analogy of motion and legs. Motion is a seperate entity but we can adopt it because we have moving organs. The more advanced organ we have the more complex motions we can perform.
Although this belief is as old as Plato's time or even older, more and more scientific evidences are appearing to support it.

Les Sleeth

Nov21-04, 10:33 AM

And the only way to talk about zombies is to emphasize how they are different from the way we perceive ourselves. Obviously its just a matter of semantics that I say that theyre like us but not conscious. My conclusion was that whatever they are, theyre the same as us. But you can't start from this point.

I know this wasn't addressed to me, but since you are trying to understand Chalmers . . . his zombie argument is meant to show what's missing from physicalist theory. When you create your consciousness program, you think "they're the same as us," but that's not correct. The point of the argument is, you cannot create subjectivity with a computer program. Now, you might say one day it will be done, and then that will prove the computing model of consciousness was correct all along. But as of now, all that can be created are zombies . . . which is something that can mimic behaviors, but has no sense of "self" while it does it. There is calculation ability, but no understanding; there is sensing ability, but no actual appreciation; their is detection of the the color red, but no personal sense of what red "is like."

Again, you have to understand that I believe that all behavior is explainable in purely physical terms. What you're talking about is just behavior (responding to pain, writing books about buddhism, meditating).

Above you accused Canute of using his conclusion as his premises, but you are guilty of that in every point you make. You have assumed consciousness is epiphenomenal, yet that is what we are arguing. Neither you nor anyone else knows if subjectivity or advanced consciousness ability such as "writing books about buddhism, meditating" arises from physical causality. What we do know is that nobody can reproduce subjectivity with physical processes. Until someone does, then the question of all the causes of consciousness is open.

. . . how can a "mental world" influence the physical world? If it did, there would be some experiment we could perform where we would see physical events that arent physically explainable (eg., a neuron spontaneously fires). The physical realm wouldn't be causally closed. I don't like this idea, and there isnt any evidence for it.

There you've done it again, used your conclusion as a premise. Of course all the physical steps of a physical event is explainable in physical terms. What you do not know is what is setting those physical events in motion. You cannot assume it is another physical event!

I'm glad you've read that paper, and I'd like to talk about it. To start, I'm not sure I understand the difference between experience and awareness. Awareness seems to require the ability to reason, that to be aware is to understand whats going on around you, where as experience could conceivably take place in the absence of it. But maybe I've misinterpretted these terms.

Yes you did misinterpret. What he said was just the opposite. The ability of, say, a motion detector can be said to be "aware" of motion, but it has no understanding, as you say, that it is detecting motion. Chalmers called that awareness which understands, or (using Nagal's approach) has a sense of what motion "is like" as having conscious experience (and then Chalmers said, "or experience, for short.) So experience is what we are talking about that defines consciousness, while awareness is simply the ability to detect information.

Would a conscious being have a sense of identity in the absence of rational thought?

In my opinion, yes. I've described in other threads how in meditation I achieve a no-thought experience almost every morning (for awhile at least). Instead of a loss of identity, I am very much MORE aware of my existence. I find non-stop thinking takes one away from self. And believe I see the sense of identity in most all lower life forms too.

I think self-awareness is just a aspect of consciousness present in intelligent beings, and not something fundamental to it. The hard problem is how to explain experiences. The experience of red, the experience of fear, the experience of self. Its called the hard problem because it can't be explained functionally. But I think that self-awareness could be.

Experience/self awareness . . . you are talking about the same thing. Experience is self awareness, that is the definition of experience. That's what you can't explain functionally, physically, etc.

I know I'm saying "you know" again, but this is hard to avoid because the experience of self is so central to our existence, and so also to our language.

YES!!!!!!! Now you've got it.

A frog would, in my opinion, have conscious experiences, but I don't think it would understand it was separate from the rest of the world. This is all just my take on it, and I haven't really read much about the self-identity aspect of consciousness. If you know any other articles that go into this kind of stuff more, I'd love to read them.

I agree. One of the things that evolving consciousness seems to do is develop a stronger and stronger sense of self, or what I call "individuate." Read more of Chalmers, it's his big point.

As for me, I have learned more about self by looking at my own consciousness. I would recommend contemplating one's "self" in silence to anyone.

selfAdjoint

Nov21-04, 03:12 PM

The point of the argument is, you cannot create subjectivity with a computer program.

This is why I think these philosophers are misunderstanding AI. They assume that subjectivity is something that, in order to have it, you must deliberately program in. But the AI view, or anyway mine, is that subjectivity will happen when the "perfect" consciousness porgam executes. Similarly the perfect simulation of a bat will experience "what it's like to be a bat" when it runs. Thus my definition of consciousness: The experience of being a running consciousness progam.

Paul Martin

Nov21-04, 03:42 PM

"information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ???"
I think that it could be so simple, Ringo. Although I don't necessarily agree with some of your details or descriptions.
" To me the real question to ask is this; why it is that neither of us (and nobody else) can prove our case about the relationship between consciousness and brain?"

I think it is because we are making some false, implicit, unacknowledged assumptions. Some of you assume that there is nothing in reality outside of the physical world, and most of the rest of you assume that consciousness, if not actually seated in the brain, is associated in a more-or-less one-to-one relationship with the brains of live humans as well as maybe some, or many, other animals.

I propose that we consider both of these assumptions to be suspect, deny them, and then try to come up with a hypothesis that might offer answers to all the questions you have been debating in this thread. I have made a modest attempt to do that and I'll try to explain it here.

Along the lines of Ringo's proposal, I propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains. (I am indebted to Gerben for this particular wording.)
" You propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains.

ok

and then?"
And then we proceed to flesh out the hypothesis. In order to be clear about what it means to be separate from the physical world, we must be clear about what we mean by 'the physical world'. For the purposes of this post, let me define the physical world to be the familar 4D space-time continuum which is more-or-less accessible to our senses and instruments, along with its contents of fields and/or particles which might be there. Now, if string theory is correct, and there are additional dimensions, then we would have to discuss whether or not the extra space-time which comes with them is also part of the physical world.

This is strictly a semantic question. If we say that all those extra dimensions are part of the physical world, then if indeed consciousness were seated in those extra dimensions but not present in our 4D space-time, then we would have Ringo's conditions, consciousness would be inaccessible to conventional experiments, and yet consciousness would still be part of the physical world.

If we say that those extra dimensions are not part of the physical world, then we are denying the truth of string theory without any real justification for doing so.

Either way, my proposal is that consciousness is seated, i.e. resides or exists, wholly outside of our 4D space-time continuum in some sort of space-time environment spanned by extra dimensions. (Incidentally I think that those dimensions are astronomically large and that there is no cogent reason to suppose that they are curled-up, as they are commonly considered to do. I have discussed this point in another thread and received no convincing rebuttal.)

Next, I propose that consciousness comes into contact with brains in a way similar to the way in which a human listener comes into contact with a human speaker. Or in a way similar to the way in which two cell phones come into contact when a call is established between them.

In all these cases, the contact is established via some sort of wave that propagates information transfer between the two parties to the communication. In the case of speech, the waves are compression waves in air; in the case of the cell phones the waves are EM waves; in the case of communication between consciousness and the brain I can only guess. My guess is that, in the environment offered by those additional dimensions, there may be additional fields, analogous to electric, magnetic, or gravitational fields, which serve as the medium for the waves. The analogy doesn't have to be very close but instead it might be something completely new, just as the probability density waves of QM aren't very much like the familiar EM or sound waves.

In short, I see the brain as analogous (try to imagine a diagonal frog) to a cell phone. Cell phones these days can produce not only sounds from a distant source, but also images. It's not much of a stretch to suppose that the cell-phone-brain can not only transmit perceptions to the remote consciousness, but also receive willed instructions from consciousness which initiate and drive physiological processes such as muscle movement and hormone secretions.

In other words, living bodies are physical vehicles which are driven by a remote consciousness with a two-way communication path allowing for the consciousness to perceive the sensory impressions of the body and for the consciousness to deliberately cause willful and purposeful activity of the body.

I think this proposal suggests answers to nearly all the hard questions being discussed here. What I would like to solicit is any cogent reason why this proposal could not be true. In the meantime, let me take on some of those questions.
"What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why?"
The same thing that prevents the simulation of a cell-phone by, say, a Martian who might have taken one of ours back to Mars to investigate it. Without the working cell-phone system of towers, transponders, relay stations, and EM field, not to mention another cell-phone on the other end with someone to talk to, the Martian investigator would get nowhere examining that cell-phone in all its detail down to the quarks and leptons.
" take a brain slice and put it into the most powerful e-microscope, show me a memory cell or the residue of an abstract thought, please."
Good point! Take a cell-phone slice and examine it the same way and show me a sound or the residue of a conversation, please.
" Just on a side note, those of you who claim all these functions of the brain, like knowledge, thought, etc., are a result of non-physical consciousness: what is the brain for?"
The brain is a communication device that connects consciousness with a body. It performs the same vital function as the transponder and computer inside a UAV (I think that's what they call those remote controlled airplanes) that enable a pilot many miles away to "fly" the airplane and be aware of what the airplane is doing and what the environment looks like from the perspective of the airplane.
"All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness."
I don't think that's "All that happens". I think you will have trouble trying to explain the "gives rise to" part. I think that looking only at the brain to explain consciousness is like looking only at one cell-phone in order to explain its function and capability.
"If we cannot explain how the brain produces consciousness then how the hell are we going to explain the how the brain produces the illusion of it? I'm not even sure what the difference is. It seems the same problems remain. I always thought certain aspects of illusions were a function of consciousness to begin with. How can you have an illusion without consciousness? Who is it that is experiencing the illusion? And how do they experience it if consciousness is just an illusion? This one just seems messy to me."
I think my proposal clears up the mess completely. First, we cannot explain how the brain produces consciousness because it doesn't. Now the brain probably (in fact I think almost certainly) can produce illusions simply by distorting some of the sensory perceptions before transmitting them to consciousness. As you point out, only consciousness can experience an illusion. In my view, the illusion that is going on here is that consciousness, in some circumstances, has the illusion that it is seated in a human brain. In the same way, I suppose that the remote pilot of a UAV during a period of intense concentration on an intricate maneuver might seem to be actually seated in the airplane.
"Consciousness is the ability focus my mind and or spirit on my experiences."
I agree. In my view, however, we have to be careful about the use of the word 'my'. In my scheme, mind, spirit, and consciousness are all remote, not only from the body and brain but from the physical world itself. The experiences, on the other hand, happen to the physical body but are known only to the consciousness.
"I believe as experience integrates, it establishes a non-intellectual certainty with past events we call knowing. "
I agree. It is the consciousness which knows the past events of experience.
"So experience is what we are talking about that defines consciousness, while awareness is simply the ability to detect information."
Not quite -- in my scheme. I haven't yet defined 'consciousness', but I would say that experience is the history of a body as reported to, and perceived by, consciousness. Awareness is the ability of consciousness to know that history, and, yes, consciousness acquires that knowledge by detecting information transmitted by the brain.. (I deliberately left out the word 'simply' because I consider this ability to be profound.)
"Experience is self awareness, that is the definition of experience. That's what you can't explain functionally, physically, etc."
I agree that you can't explain experience or self awareness functionally, physically, etc., but using self awareness as a definition of experience begs the question of what we mean by 'self'.
" It seems to me that this integrative quality of consciousness is what most establishes self, or subjectivity. (A computer can do all the rest, but not that.) Examining humans, it seems there is a very high realization of the integrative thing because we can function single-pointedly doing complex tasks. It's like all that's integrated into consciousness is right there guiding the focused human even though he might not be thinking about everything that's contributed to his knowing pool."
I agree. I think you put it well. In my view, however, keep in mind that the integrative quality and consciousness itself are outside the brain and the physical world.
"I say there is no possible way to know anything without being conscious....The experience of knowledge is precisely what we are talking about."
I agree. In fact, if I had to pick the one attribute which I think most completely describes consciousness, I would say it is the ability to know.
"The integrative function is absolutely the most crucial factor of consciousness because it creates the singular aspect which comes to control, oversee, know . . . and one of the things it "knows" is that it exists! That is what self/subjectivity is: self knowing."
I agree completely. I like the way you put it. I especially like your choice of the word 'singular'. It suggests what I think is an important question: How many distinct consciousnesses are there? Is there one for each living brain? Is there one for each brain that ever lived? My answer is that, no, there is only ONE consciousness in all of reality. That one consciousness drives all the bodies of all organisms and always has.
"But what if you could create some kind of link, so that you could access any part of their brain, and they could do the same to you? I think any separate individuality would disappear, and the consciousnesses would merge into one. This is highly speculative, and I don't expect anyone to buy it with what little argument I've provided here, but I just thought of it and I'm still working it out. Basically the conclusion is, there is only one consciousness, but it is divided up among the different systems. If you could join the information flow of two systems, the separate consciousnesses would disappear, and if you could somehow join all systems, there would be one consciousness remaining. Well thats all I have for now. I'll try to build on this (or realize how wrong it is) later."
I think you're close here, StatusX. In my view, your first sentence would make sense if by "you" you mean the one consciousness, and by "their" you mean individual human bodies. Then the answer to your "What if" question is that you would get something very like my proposal. You would get a single, non-physical consciousness accessing and communicating with organic brains via some kind of link. And, with this mechanism, the consciousness would be in a position to deliberately drive each organism through its history of physical experiences.
In this case, as you say, any separate individuality would disappear, not that "consciousnesses would merge into one", because there is only one consciousness. There would still be individuality among the various human bodies, but there would only be one self if by 'self' we mean qualities or attributes of consciousness.
"To understand consciousness, we first need to understand how do we ourself work. Human brain is that biological body part which drives our life"
I agree with both assertions. I'm not saying that I understand how our self works, but I think that my proposed hypothesis provides a way to come up with a logical and believable explanation.

I'll try to make sense of this explanation. Just as in a cell-phone, there is some specific part of the structure which generates the EM radiation which encodes outgoing information, and another specific structure which can detect incoming information from EM waves, there are probably corresponding structures in the brain. And, just as in a cell-phone where you would be able to locate and identify those specific circuits without the involvement of EM radiation, I think it should be possible to locate and identify specific structures in the brain which generate outgoing signals and which detect incoming signals. In my view, Hammeroff and Penrose have suggested the most promising possibility. I think the "antennas" are the dimers in the microtubules in the neurons. These little things can flip between two stable states in response to the local state of nearby dimers, but more importantly, in response to supposedly random quantum events. In my humble opinion, and I think this is in line with what Einstein thought, these events are not truly random but instead can be influenced by some hidden variable. I propose that the hidden variable is the deliberate action of the one consciousness which causes certain waveform collapses to occur in such a way as to start a cascade of classical particle interactions starting with the subatomic constituents of the dimer atoms, and ending with the flexing of muscle cells. Of course, it continues beyond that to, say, the pressure applied to the accelerator pedal, but those consequences are well known.
[QUOTE=StatusX]" One way around this is to say that these random collapses aren't truly random, but are affected by our consciousness. This is a very interesting idea, and I definitely accept it as a possibility."
Hmmm. Sounds like there is a possibility you might buy into part of my proposal, StatusX.
"Here's how I see the problem. Consciousness is something that goes around doing things,"
I would change that only to say, "Here's how I see the solution. Consciousness is something that goes around doing things."

I would appreciate any comments, especially those that point out my errors.

Les Sleeth

Nov21-04, 04:28 PM

This is why I think these philosophers are misunderstanding AI. They assume that subjectivity is something that, in order to have it, you must deliberately program in. But the AI view, or anyway mine, is that subjectivity will happen when the "perfect" consciousness program executes. Similarly the perfect simulation of a bat will experience "what it's like to be a bat" when it runs. Thus my definition of consciousness: The experience of being a running consciousness program.

I think I remember Mentat arguing that the perfect consciousness algorithm will create subjectivity. Myself, I always assumed AI enthusiasts and epiphenominalists believed something synergistic happens which causes “self” to rise up above programming or physical processes.

Les Sleeth

Nov21-04, 04:50 PM

Not quite -- in my scheme. I haven't yet defined 'consciousness', but I would say that experience is the history of a body as reported to, and perceived by, consciousness. Awareness is the ability of consciousness to know that history, and, yes, consciousness acquires that knowledge by detecting information transmitted by the brain.

First off, welcome to PF Paul. Yours was a thoughtful post.

In terms of my description of "experience" and "awareness," I was trying to explain how Chalmers seemed to define them in the article StatusX referenced. He appears to make awareness synonomous with simple detection. I admit I use the term "awareness" the same way myself.

However, I am not sure I can agree that experience is "history" (unless you are talking about being "experienced"). The actual present moment of conscious experience is what we have been debating about.

I agree that you can't explain experience or self awareness functionally, physically, etc., but using self awareness as a definition of experience begs the question of what we mean by 'self'.

I meant, awareness that knows it is aware (as opposed to awareness that doesn't, like a motion detector). You have to admit, the idea of subjectivity is VERY difficult to translate into concepts.

In my view, however, keep in mind that the integrative quality and consciousness itself are outside the brain and the physical world.

I suspect that is true myself, but I don't believe anyone can demostrate it is true. Until someone can, I am not sure you can make that statement any other way than as an opinion.

I especially like your choice of the word 'singular'. It suggests what I think is an important question: How many distinct consciousnesses are there? Is there one for each living brain? Is there one for each brain that ever lived? My answer is that, no, there is only ONE consciousness in all of reality. That one consciousness drives all the bodies of all organisms and always has.

Again, I suspect something like that myself. Let's assume there is ONE consciousness behind all the individual consciousnesses. Don't you think that the human body seems to be individuating, let's say, Points within that greater consciousness? If not, then I'd have to see my own conscious realization as illusory, and I don't believe that for a second. Isn't it possible for there to be both singularly conscious Points and for them to exist within a greater consciousness whole?

meteor

Nov21-04, 05:19 PM

This paper is interesting
http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin.AO/0303042
Towards a theory of consciousness: Proposal for the resolution of the homunculus fallacy with predictions
It argues thet any theory of consciousness must be able to deal with the "homunculus fallacy"

Mohsen

Nov21-04, 05:47 PM

Why do we need to suppose consiousness is in any kind of space-time at all? our thoughts are non-local and are not time bond.

Paul Martin

Nov21-04, 07:26 PM

Hi Les,

First off, welcome to PF Paul. Yours was a thoughtful post.
Thank you. Thank you.

In terms of my description of "experience" and "awareness," I was trying to explain how Chalmers seemed to define them
Yes, I understand that and I'm sorry. I quoted quite a few of you out of your contexts and tried to fit them into my context. I hope it was obvious that I did not intend to try to put words in your mouths nor to try to distort what you wrote. What I tried to do was to suggest that your thinking on a particular point might be close to what I was thinking. By quoting you directly, I hoped to elicit either an agreement or a disagreement, but at least to try to help each of us understand the other. If it came across any other way, I apologize.

I am not sure I can agree that experience is "history" (unless you are talking about being "experienced"). The actual present moment of conscious experience is what we have been debating about.
Actually, I was trying to expand the notion of experience into the past and so the past tense would be appropriate. I understand that the crux of the debate is what goes on in the present moment and I don't want to diminish or water down that idea. So rather than use the term 'experience' to refer to the past (as is common in vernacular when we ask, "Do you have experience?") I chose to use the word 'history'.

So I am not asking you to agree that experience is "history". Instead what I said was "that experience is the history of a body as reported to, and perceived by, consciousness". In the present moment, consciousness perceives whatever stimuli are being reported by the body at that instant. That is the experience you are talking about. But, since there seems to be a flow of "time" over the course of which these experiential moments follow one another in a "stream of consciousness", I wanted to expand the scope to include a set of experiences over a period of time. I think there are some significant relationships among the present moment, that stream of consciousness, the flow of time, and the notion of time in the physical world in which there is no such thing as "now" or the present moment. I have some ideas on how those things might be related in reality that maybe we can discuss sometime.

[By 'self'] I meant, awareness that knows it is aware (as opposed to awareness that doesn't, like a motion detector). You have to admit, the idea of subjectivity is VERY difficult to translate into concepts.
I think we agree. I certainly agree that the idea of subjectivity is VERY difficult to translate into concepts. And for the first part, in my view, the ability to know is the most essential aspect of consciousness or self, so I have no argument with what you said.

Paul: "In my view, however, keep in mind that the integrative quality and consciousness itself are outside the brain and the physical world."
I suspect that is true myself, but I don't believe anyone can demostrate it is true. Until someone can, I am not sure you can make that statement any other way than as an opinion.

I agree. That's why I prefaced my remark with "In my view".

Paul: "one consciousness drives all the bodies of all organisms and always has."

Again, I suspect something like that myself. Let's assume there is ONE consciousness behind all the individual consciousnesses. Don't you think that the human body seems to be individuating, let's say, Points within that greater consciousness?

I'm not sure I have a good grasp of what you mean by "individuating Points within consciousness". It is obvious that human bodies are separate and distinct individuals. Making the natural assumption that human bodies are one-to-one with individual consciousnesses, one could conclude that consciousnesses are also individual. If you assume that a greater consciousness somehow fractionates into individual pieces which seem to be autonomous then that would explain how a single consciousness drives all these apparently individual bodies. The problem is, how could it fractionate like that?

I think that a hundred years ago, the suggestion that one consciousness is driving all these bodies would have seemed unimaginable. But now, it is easy to imagine. We have time-sharing computers which host many individual, seemingly separate and unrelated, simultaneous threads of activity. At the risk of suggesting another diagonal frog, I think it is easy to imagine how a single consciousness could drive all these organisms "simultaneously" using some sort of time-sharing algorithm. I put "simultaneously" in quotes because I don't think they are really simultaneous. This probably should wait for another discussion at another time, but I think that in addition to multiple extra spatial dimensions, there are multiple extra temporal dimensions as well. This would open up several new possibilities for the illusion that all of us organisms are thinking and acting simultaneously when we may not be. A crude analogy would be a movie film with its own dimension of time as represented by the succession of frames. That dimension would be completely different from and separate from the time dimension in which the film was made or shown, or the time dimension in which the story of the film takes place. There are lots of possibilities.

If not, then I'd have to see my own conscious realization as illusory, and I don't believe that for a second.
Maybe we could work on that. If you accept my premises, then your own conscious realization would be illusory. You would be under the illusion that your consciousness belonged to the body of Les Sleeth when in fact you would actually be the one and only consciousness in reality. The illusion would be just like that of a user at a time-sharing terminal who thinks that the activity going on at that terminal is the only thing the host computer is doing. I admit that this proposition leads to staggering and sobering consequences. And I can understand that it might take several seconds for you to reflect on it and agree. But unless someone can point out to me why it cannot be true, the logic and simplicity of it compel me to consider it as a strong possibility.

Isn't it possible for there to be both singularly conscious Points and for them to exist within a greater consciousness whole?
Again, depending on how I interpret your question, I think I have described a way in which that can happen. I think that what you are calling singularity is explained by limitations on consciousness imposed by the act of driving an organism. It would be like the limitations on you if you put on goggles and gloves connected to a VR game. You would have the illusion that you were in the VR game environment, but your sensory inputs and your actions would be limited by the capabilities of the VR equipment. If you really got engrossed in the game, you might actually (if only for a second) imagine that you were that virtual player inside the game and nothing more. A friend once described this to me as the experience of a race car driver who is so focused and pre-occupied with the demands of high-speed driving, that all thoughts of his home or family or of anything outside that race car at the moment are completely absent. I think that driving a human being during waking hours is like that. I have a hunch that in sleep, and even in successful meditation, consciousness can access information from outside the body and its environment. Now I'm rambling and speculating so I'll stop.

Good talking to you, Les.

Paul Martin

Nov21-04, 07:52 PM

Why do we need to suppose consiousness is in any kind of space-time at all? our thoughts are non-local and are not time bond.
Let's talk about space and time separately. I think time is easiest.

I think thoughts are time bound. Thoughts change from time to time, and there is a distinct ordering. That is if you think of a red maple leaf, and then think of a pink panther, you can't reverse that sequence. You can think those two thoughts in a different order later, but by doing so later you have made them into new and different thoughts. And they will both be later than those original thoughts. By introspection, I think we can observe that thoughts change in a dimension of time.

Space might be a little trickier. First of all, if consciousness were indeed resident in the brain, then it would be pinned to the locations in space in which the brain was located. So, for the physicalists among us, consciousness would definitely be tied to space.

But for those of us who think consciousness is outside of our 4D space-time continuum, we have a hard time even making the case that consciousness is the type of thing that could be localized at a point in space-time. Maybe that's what you are getting at. If so, maybe we see eye-to-eye.

Here's how I see it. I see consciousness as primordially fundamental. That is, I see consciousness as not only the very first thing that ever existed in the cosmos, but I see it as the only thing that ever existed even up to the present moment. I agree with Bishop Berkeley that what we think of as physical reality is nothing more than a very complex set of some of the thoughts of this consciousness. So, in this view, consciousness would be outside of space and our space-time continuum of however many dimensions is nothing but a set of concepts held in that consciousness.

Just one man's opinion.

RingoKid

Nov22-04, 03:19 AM

Now, if string theory is correct, and there are additional dimensions, then we would have to discuss whether or not the extra space-time which comes with them is also part of the physical world.

What extra spacetime ???

Incidentally I think that those dimensions are astronomically large and that there is no cogent reason to suppose that they are curled-up, as they are commonly considered to do. I have discussed this point in another thread and received no convincing rebuttal.)

which thread man ???..I'd be well keen to check out how you come to think that. As far as I understand it, the all encompassing 11th dimension is the only astronomically large one, a virtual field of strings or sea of energy. The quantum foam which changes to accomodate the universe as it passes over it like a ripple in a spherical pond.

Canute

Nov22-04, 08:23 AM

Paul Martin

In regard to consciousness as one or many I don't think it's right to say that we could not imagine it being one until recently, even for those with a scientific bent. Here's Erwin Schroedinger on the topic:

"How does the idea of plurality (so emphatically opposed by the Upanishad writers) arise at all? Consciousness finds itself intimately connected with, and dependent on, the physical state of a limited region of matter, the body… Now, there is a great plurality of similar bodies. Hence the pluralisation of consciousness or minds seems a very suggestive hypothesis. Probably all simple ingenious people, as well as the great majority of western philosophers, have accepted it.

It leads almost immediately to the invention of souls, as many as there are bodies, and to the question whether they are mortal as the body is or whether they are immortal and capable of existing by themselves. The former alternative is distasteful, while the latter frankly forgets, ignores, or disowns the facts upon which the plurality hypothesis rests. Much sillier questions have been asked: Do animals also have souls? It has even been questioned whether women, or only men, have souls.

Such consequences, even if only tentative, must make us suspicious of the plurality hypothesis, which is common to all official western creeds. Are we not inclining to much greater nonsense if in discarding their gross superstitions, we retain their naïve idea of plurality of souls, but "remedy" it be declaring the souls to be perishable, to be annihilated with the respective bodies?

The only possible alternative is simply to keep the immediate experience that consciousness is a singular of which the plural is unknown; that there is only one thing and that, what seems to be a plurality, is merely a series of different aspects of this one thing, produced by a deception (the Indian MAYA); the same illusion is produced in a gallery of mirrors, and in the same way Gaurisankar and Mt. Everest turned out to be the same peak, seen from different valleys.

... Yet each of us has the undisputable impression that the sum total of his own experience and memory forms a unit, quite distinct from that of any other person. He refers to it as "I". What is this "I"?

If you analyse it closely, you will, I think, find that it is just a little bit more than a collection of single data (experiences and memories), namely, the canvas upon which they are collected. And you will, on close introspection, find that what you really mean by "I," is that ground-stuff on which they are collected. You may come to a distant country, lose sight of all your friends, may all but forget them; you acquire new friends, you share life with them as intensely as you ever did with your old ones. Less and less important will become the fact that, while living your new life, you still recollect the old one. "The youth that I was," you may come to speak of him in the third person; indeed, the protagonist of the novel you are reading is probably nearer to your heart, certainly more intensely alive and better known to you. Yet there has been no intermediate break, no death. And even if a skilled hypnotist succeeded in blotting out entirely all your earlier reminiscences, you would not find that he had killed you. In no case is there a loss of personal existence to deplore.

Nor will there ever be."

Erwin Scrödinger
The I That Is God

The illusion would be just like that of a user at a time-sharing terminal who thinks that the activity going on at that terminal is the only thing the host computer is doing. I admit that this proposition leads to staggering and sobering consequences. And I can understand that it might take several seconds for you to reflect on it and agree. But unless someone can point out to me why it cannot be true, the logic and simplicity of it compel me to consider it as a strong possibility.
I agree completely, but I have to admit it took me a few decades longer than several seconds to make sense of the idea.

Fliption

Nov22-04, 10:18 AM

First of all, the whole reason I'm even talking about zombies is because of the possibility we could be them.

You may be a zombie but I am not. There is nothing that I am more certain of than this. This point you keep making is the one point that I just don't see. The only evidence that I have of consciousness is my own experience. The zombie illustration is pointing out a problem of epistomology about what we can know outside of our own consciousness and that it seems to be relegated to subjective knowledge only. It doesn't come close to questioning our own consciousness. You're taking this illustration too far I think.

Like Canute, I would argue that a planet of zombies would never contemplate the concept of consciousness. But because of the inability to functionally study consciousness, we have to concede that a zombie could find itself in the physical states required to discuss this topic.

Les Sleeth

Nov22-04, 10:52 AM

Actually, I was trying to expand the notion of experience into the past and so the past tense would be appropriate. I understand that the crux of the debate is what goes on in the present moment and I don't want to diminish or water down that idea. So rather than use the term 'experience' to refer to the past (as is common in vernacular when we ask, "Do you have experience?") I chose to use the word 'history'. So I am not asking you to agree that experience is "history". Instead what I said was "that experience is the history of a body as reported to, and perceived by, consciousness".

I suppose I’d say that the history of our experience is what establishes knowing, and is the basis of memory of course.

In the present moment, consciousness perceives whatever stimuli are being reported by the body at that instant. That is the experience you are talking about.

Mostly, yes. I also believe consciousness can experience itself, apart from any external stimuli. In fact, I’d even go so far to say that the more self experience consciousness has, the more conscious the human being.

I think there are some significant relationships among the present moment, that stream of consciousness, the flow of time, and the notion of time in the physical world in which there is no such thing as "now" or the present moment.

As far as I can tell, there is nothing but “now.” It has always been now, and it will always be now.

I'm not sure I have a good grasp of what you mean by "individuating Points within consciousness". It is obvious that human bodies are separate and distinct individuals. Making the natural assumption that human bodies are one-to-one with individual consciousnesses, one could conclude that consciousnesses are also individual. If you assume that a greater consciousness somehow fractionates into individual pieces which seem to be autonomous then that would explain how a single consciousness drives all these apparently individual bodies. The problem is, how could it fractionate like that?

There is no need for the greater consciousness to fractionate. Imagine the ocean is consciousness, and let’s say a “point” in the ocean is a molecule of H20. At first the ocean is generally conscious “as a whole.” Then it finds a way to create little ice brains in its waters that one of its molecules of water can live in temporarily, until the ice brain melts. What being consciously separated (i.e., not essentially separated) from the whole does for the point is to make it individually conscious within the greater whole. When the ice brain melts, the molecule realizes that it has been part of the ocean the entire time, and that its temporary participation in the ice brain helped to “wake it up” to what and where it is.

I think that a hundred years ago, the suggestion that one consciousness is driving all these bodies would have seemed unimaginable. But now, it is easy to imagine.

I am guessing you mean unimaginable to science thinking. I am sure you know this is basis of the mystical aspects of all the major spiritual paths.

Maybe we could work on that. If you accept my premises, then your own conscious realization would be illusory. You would be under the illusion that your consciousness belonged to the body of Les Sleeth when in fact you would actually be the one and only consciousness in reality. The illusion would be just like that of a user at a time-sharing terminal who thinks that the activity going on at that terminal is the only thing the host computer is doing. I admit that this proposition leads to staggering and sobering consequences. And I can understand that it might take several seconds for you to reflect on it and agree. But unless someone can point out to me why it cannot be true, the logic and simplicity of it compel me to consider it as a strong possibility.

We have plenty of time to discuss this, but I disagree that individual consciousness must be illusory. If one, for example, has experienced and realized his place in the greater consciousness continuum, then that person is under no illusion that he is the consciousness of this body. Using the ocean-molecule analogy above, let’s say the water molecule learned a technique where instead of looking through his brain all the time, he turned his attention inward and experienced his connection to the ocean. After years of practicing this everyday, the water molecule “wakes up” and merges consciously with the ocean, but also experiences that greater aspect as an individual molecule, or "point" as I like to call it.

I think that what you are calling singularity is explained by limitations on consciousness imposed by the act of driving an organism.

Although I think the brain does help teach consciousness singularity, what you’ve depicted isn’t what I am talking about. Singularity is what I use to describe how the integrative aspect of consciousness functions. Watch a talented musician sing and play the guitar, and you know a great many understandings are all operating together as he exerts his will to achieve singing a song. He does that without having to think about each and every element that goes into his expression. That integrative aspect of consciousness is what I’ve been postulating is the basis of subjectivity.

It would be like the limitations on you if you put on goggles and gloves connected to a VR game. You would have the illusion that you were in the VR game environment, but your sensory inputs and your actions would be limited by the capabilities of the VR equipment. If you really got engrossed in the game, you might actually (if only for a second) imagine that you were that virtual player inside the game and nothing more. A friend once described this to me as the experience of a race car driver who is so focused and pre-occupied with the demands of high-speed driving, that all thoughts of his home or family or of anything outside that race car at the moment are completely absent. I think that driving a human being during waking hours is like that. I have a hunch that in sleep, and even in successful meditation, consciousness can access information from outside the body and its environment.

Yes, those are similar to the well-known analogies used to describe the illusion of thinking this body is the whole deal. The mistake I think a lot of people make is to believe either we must be nothing but the whole, or we must be the individual. From my own personal experience and studying the rich history of “self-realized” individuals, I am quite certain that both whole and individual consciousness are simultaneously possible if one learns the secret of the experience.

StatusX

Nov22-04, 01:07 PM

since you are trying to understand Chalmers . . . his zombie argument is meant to show what's missing from physicalist theory. When you create your consciousness program, you think "they're the same as us," but that's not correct. The point of the argument is, you cannot create subjectivity with a computer program. Now, you might say one day it will be done, and then that will prove the computing model of consciousness was correct all along. But as of now, all that can be created are zombies . . . which is something that can mimic behaviors, but has no sense of "self" while it does it. There is calculation ability, but no understanding; there is sensing ability, but no actual appreciation; their is detection of the the color red, but no personal sense of what red "is like."

That isn't the point of the argument at all. It is impossible to know whether a computer program had conscious experience or not. For all we know, windows media player has a subjective experience. Chalmers never says what you just did. What I was talking about was that, given a system, it either has consciousness or it doesn't; two physically identical systems can't be different in any way.

Above you accused Canute of using his conclusion as his premises, but you are guilty of that in every point you make. You have assumed consciousness is epiphenomenal, yet that is what we are arguing. Neither you nor anyone else knows if subjectivity or advanced consciousness ability such as "writing books about buddhism, meditating" arises from physical causality. What we do know is that nobody can reproduce subjectivity with physical processes. Until someone does, then the question of all the causes of consciousness is open.

I think there is a big difference between what he said and what I said. He used "we are conscious" as a premise to conclude that "we are conscious." I argued that if consciousness was causal, there would be physically unexplainable events, like particles in the brain moving spontaneously in response to no physical force. I can't prove this is impossible, but I've done as much as I can with philosophy. Just to make this clear, are you saying that physical events like this do happen? Are there at least rules for when the physical laws do and do not apply?

There you've done it again, used your conclusion as a premise. Of course all the physical steps of a physical event is explainable in physical terms. What you do not know is what is setting those physical events in motion. You cannot assume it is another physical event!

Just to reiterate, you need to start somewhere in philophical arguments. I start from the point of view that there are physical laws that are unbreakable. I can't prove this, but I use it to make arguments, just like you use whatever your base philosophy is to make your arguments.

Yes you did misinterpret. What he said was just the opposite. The ability of, say, a motion detector can be said to be "aware" of motion, but it has no understanding, as you say, that it is detecting motion. Chalmers called that awareness which understands, or (using Nagal's approach) has a sense of what motion "is like" as having conscious experience (and then Chalmers said, "or experience, for short.) So experience is what we are talking about that defines consciousness, while awareness is simply the ability to detect information.

These are very vague terms, and I'm going to try to find another article by Chalmers to see if he gets more specific. But from what I've read so far, his main conclusion was that systems, like thermostats, are either aware or have experience, depending on your terminology. If you took this as meaning that they could detect information, then what did you think was the point of his paper? Thats trivially true.

As for me, I have learned more about self by looking at my own consciousness. I would recommend contemplating one's "self" in silence to anyone.

Maybe, but I think that we can't really figure ourselves out without getting outside the system. It would be like sitting in a windowless room and trying to figure out where it came from by staring at the walls.

This is why I think these philosophers are misunderstanding AI. They assume that subjectivity is something that, in order to have it, you must deliberately program in. But the AI view, or anyway mine, is that subjectivity will happen when the "perfect" consciousness porgam executes. Similarly the perfect simulation of a bat will experience "what it's like to be a bat" when it runs. Thus my definition of consciousness: The experience of being a running consciousness progam.

Exactly. That's what Ive been trying to say. If you build a brain from scratch, atom by atom, will it be conscious when your done? If so, then consciousness automatically arises as a byproduct of certain physical systems. If not, what is it about the process of being born that endows a chunk of matter with some mysterious, non-physical property?

StatusX

Nov22-04, 01:32 PM

I think it is because we are making some false, implicit, unacknowledged assumptions. Some of you assume that there is nothing in reality outside of the physical world, and most of the rest of you assume that consciousness, if not actually seated in the brain, is associated in a more-or-less one-to-one relationship with the brains of live humans as well as maybe some, or many, other animals.

I propose that we consider both of these assumptions to be suspect, deny them, and then try to come up with a hypothesis that might offer answers to all the questions you have been debating in this thread. I have made a modest attempt to do that and I'll try to explain it here.

Along the lines of Ringo's proposal, I propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains. (I am indebted to Gerben for this particular wording.)

And then we proceed to flesh out the hypothesis. In order to be clear about what it means to be separate from the physical world, we must be clear about what we mean by 'the physical world'. For the purposes of this post, let me define the physical world to be the familar 4D space-time continuum which is more-or-less accessible to our senses and instruments, along with its contents of fields and/or particles which might be there. Now, if string theory is correct, and there are additional dimensions, then we would have to discuss whether or not the extra space-time which comes with them is also part of the physical world.

This is strictly a semantic question. If we say that all those extra dimensions are part of the physical world, then if indeed consciousness were seated in those extra dimensions but not present in our 4D space-time, then we would have Ringo's conditions, consciousness would be inaccessible to conventional experiments, and yet consciousness would still be part of the physical world.

If we say that those extra dimensions are not part of the physical world, then we are denying the truth of string theory without any real justification for doing so.

Either way, my proposal is that consciousness is seated, i.e. resides or exists, wholly outside of our 4D space-time continuum in some sort of space-time environment spanned by extra dimensions. (Incidentally I think that those dimensions are astronomically large and that there is no cogent reason to suppose that they are curled-up, as they are commonly considered to do. I have discussed this point in another thread and received no convincing rebuttal.)

Next, I propose that consciousness comes into contact with brains in a way similar to the way in which a human listener comes into contact with a human speaker. Or in a way similar to the way in which two cell phones come into contact when a call is established between them.

In all these cases, the contact is established via some sort of wave that propagates information transfer between the two parties to the communication. In the case of speech, the waves are compression waves in air; in the case of the cell phones the waves are EM waves; in the case of communication between consciousness and the brain I can only guess. My guess is that, in the environment offered by those additional dimensions, there may be additional fields, analogous to electric, magnetic, or gravitational fields, which serve as the medium for the waves. The analogy doesn't have to be very close but instead it might be something completely new, just as the probability density waves of QM aren't very much like the familiar EM or sound waves.

In short, I see the brain as analogous (try to imagine a diagonal frog) to a cell phone. Cell phones these days can produce not only sounds from a distant source, but also images. It's not much of a stretch to suppose that the cell-phone-brain can not only transmit perceptions to the remote consciousness, but also receive willed instructions from consciousness which initiate and drive physiological processes such as muscle movement and hormone secretions.

In other words, living bodies are physical vehicles which are driven by a remote consciousness with a two-way communication path allowing for the consciousness to perceive the sensory impressions of the body and for the consciousness to deliberately cause willful and purposeful activity of the body.

I think this proposal suggests answers to nearly all the hard questions being discussed here. What I would like to solicit is any cogent reason why this proposal could not be true. In the meantime, let me take on some of those questions.

This is an interesting idea, and definitely the kind of explanation I would look for. Like I said, I think consciousness is physically explainable, albeit with a kind of physics we have never seen before.

That being said, I don't know what real content your theory has. Often people say things exist in "other dimensions" without really addressing what that means. Are these dimensions of space, or time, or something else? What else could there be a dimension of? And what about the fact that our conscious seems to travel in one direction in time?

I think that whatever the explanation is, I doubt it will agree much with our common sense, to an even worse degree than quantum mechanics. Most physics problems we deal are related to events we see everyday, and have seen everyday throughout the course of our evolution, so it is not surprising that our brains can deal with them. But there is no reason to assume our brains have evolved to be able to comprehend the real explanation of consciousness. Maybe theres even some kind of applicable form of Godel's incompleteness theorem that states that we physically can't understand it. But that doesnt change my opinion that there are definite rules that govern it. Maybe the only way we'll find out is to create some kind of AI that is capable of understading it, and when it figures it out it can explain it to us in some simplistic way we can comprehend.

You may be a zombie but I am not.

I was waiting for someone to say this.

There is nothing that I am more certain of than this. This point you keep making is the one point that I just don't see. The only evidence that I have of consciousness is my own experience. The zombie illustration is pointing out a problem of epistomology about what we can know outside of our own consciousness and that it seems to be relegated to subjective knowledge only. It doesn't come close to questioning our own consciousness. You're taking this illustration too far I think.

Like Canute, I would argue that a planet of zombies would never contemplate the concept of consciousness. But because of the inability to functionally study consciousness, we have to concede that a zombie could find itself in the physical states required to discuss this topic.

I agree, and I'm starting to doubt the possibility that we aren't really conscious. Its what makes things real. This is far from my only opinion, and in fact I've been mentioning it less and less. Now I'm trying to focus on consciousness as something non-causal that arises as a byproduct of a physical system. However, I'm not completely abandoning the idea, and I'm gonna read some of Dennett's work to see what his arguments are. And I disagree that they wouldn't study consciousness. As I've said again and again, thats just behavior, and I think its physically explainable.

Fliption

Nov22-04, 02:45 PM

I agree, and I'm starting to doubt the possibility that we aren't really conscious. Its what makes things real. This is far from my only opinion, and in fact I've been mentioning it less and less. Now I'm trying to focus on consciousness as something non-causal that arises as a byproduct of a physical system. However, I'm not completely abandoning the idea, and I'm gonna read some of Dennett's work to see what his arguments are.

Dennett will simply get around the hard problem by defining it away. His views seem desparate to cling to a classical universe and they're no where near some of the ideas you have proposed yourself. So be prepared to be disappointed.

And I disagree that they wouldn't study consciousness. As I've said again and again, thats just behavior, and I think its physically explainable.

Read my words very carefully. This is a tricky subject. I agree that the behaviour demonstrated by a zombie who claims he is conscious can be physically explained. However, I do not believe that a zombie would ever casually find itself in such a physical state. It's like saying, it is possible for me to win the lottery. But I don't believe it will ever happen. :smile:

I believe some of the problems we're having is again with the way you are using the word physical. In an earlier response you said:

two physically identical systems can't be different in any way.

It's obvious from your conclusions from this statement that everything is physical to you. This is what Les SLeeth was trying to get across earlier I believe. By defining everything as physical from the beginning, you have no choice but to conclude that .......everything is physical! and therefore consciousness is a byproduct of a physical process. Of course you have already admitted this by saying that you believe everything follows determinable rules and that makes it physical. I just don't believe that's the definition that many here are using.

Fliption

Nov22-04, 03:06 PM

Originally Posted by selfAdjoint
This is why I think these philosophers are misunderstanding AI. They assume that subjectivity is something that, in order to have it, you must deliberately program in. But the AI view, or anyway mine, is that subjectivity will happen when the "perfect" consciousness porgam executes. Similarly the perfect simulation of a bat will experience "what it's like to be a bat" when it runs. Thus my definition of consciousness: The experience of being a running consciousness progam.

Exactly. That's what Ive been trying to say. If you build a brain from scratch, atom by atom, will it be conscious when your done? If so, then consciousness automatically arises as a byproduct of certain physical systems. If not, what is it about the process of being born that endows a chunk of matter with some mysterious, non-physical property?

Selfadjoints comment seems like a cop-out to me. Can you think of any scientific concepts where a satisfactory explanation is "If we mix A with B we magically get C" with no reductive explanation as to how or why that happens? You have said yourself that in order for this to happen, there would need to be some rules that are being followed. What are these rules? What Chalmers arguments claim is that these rules cannot be determined by materialism. So either they are not there or there are rules of engagement beyond materialism.

Chalmers arguments would claim that we can't reductively explain consciousness, not because we are ignorant. Rather, it is because there is no reductive explanation to be had. This would mean there are no "rules" that lead to consciousness as a by-product of brain processes. If the rules existed then there should be a way to describe them. Chalmers and others claim this can't be done, in principle.

So I think selfadjoints theory is fine to agree with. But he has a "hard problem" to solve before it will be convincing. And that will be quite a task. There's a reason Dennett chooses to ignore the problem by defining it away.

Les Sleeth

Nov22-04, 03:12 PM

I argued that if consciousness was causal, there would be physically unexplainable events, like particles in the brain moving spontaneously in response to no physical force.

I can't see your point at all. How does consciousness being causal lead to physically unexplainable events?

I, at least, am not saying consciousness isn't causal. I am saying I don't believe it is caused by any known physical factors.

Just to make this clear, are you saying that physical events like this do happen? Are there at least rules for when the physical laws do and do not apply?

I doubt it, and there certainly are rules for when physical laws do and do not apply . . . but I don't see what relevance any of that has to this debate.

Just to reiterate, you need to start somewhere in philophical arguments. I start from the point of view that there are physical laws that are unbreakable. I can't prove this, but I use it to make arguments, just like you use whatever your base philosophy is to make your arguments.

Assuming physical laws are unbreakable doesn't mean physical laws are all there are, it doesn't mean the consciousness realm is 100% physical, and it doesn't mean that the physcial and the non-physical aspects of consciousness (if they exist) can't interact. You don't just "start somewhere" that's physical -- your start, middle, and end are physical! Don't you understand we are debating if consciousness is purely physical?

If you are going to argue everything is physical, that's fine. But you can't argue that point by saying "if it isn't a physical attribute then it doesn't exist." That's like arguing if the Bible is the absolute truth with somebody who only believes in the Bible, and to every point you make he answers, "well, if it is not in the Bible, it cannot be true." The whole point of the debate is to decide if there is reason to give the status of "absolute truth" to the Bible. So how can he use the Bible to justify itself?

These are very vague terms, and I'm going to try to find another article by Chalmers to see if he gets more specific. But from what I've read so far, his main conclusion was that systems, like thermostats, are either aware or have experience, depending on your terminology. If you took this as meaning that they could detect information, then what did you think was the point of his paper? Thats trivially true.

You haven't understood him, and when you do you will find out he isn't in your corner. I think you'll find Dennett more to your liking.

Look, this idea can be simplified. Consciousness has aspects which CAN be explained by physical factors. Simple detection ability is one of them, even a thermostat can do that. The computing aspects of thinking and emotional states can be too. Chalmers talks about all the things that CAN be explained with physiology as the "easy problem" of consciousness. With the easy or physical aspects of consciousness all you get is a zombie.

Yet we know there is a subjective aspect to human consciousness too. Since there are no known physical qualities that can cause that, it leaves the door open to the possibility that there is something also non-physical about consciousness. Someone like Dennett might argue that conscious experience really is a potential of physicalness, it's just one never seen before it was manifested for the first time by a brain. Okay, maybe he is right. If anyone produces conscious experience through AI, I'd say the chances are that Dennett is right. Personally I don't believe AI will produce conscious experience.

Maybe, but I think that we can't really figure ourselves out without getting outside the system. It would be like sitting in a windowless room and trying to figure out where it came from by staring at the walls.

Sounds like the voice of experience. :rolleyes: But you are right, that is exactly what you are doing, staring at the walls instead of looking at that which is staring! :wink:

StatusX

Nov22-04, 04:16 PM

Read my words very carefully. This is a tricky subject. I agree that the behaviour demonstrated by a zombie who claims he is conscious can be physically explained. However, I do not believe that a zombie would ever casually find itself in such a physical state. It's like saying, it is possible for me to win the lottery. But I don't believe it will ever happen. :smile:

But getting into that state is a physical process too. A zombie from birth who has all the "experiences" a human does (I'm using that word differently here) will manifest the same behavior as that person. And anyway, when I say "the same physical structure" I'm including whatever state the brain were copying is in. But we're getting off track.

I believe some of the problems we're having is again with the way you are using the word physical. In an earlier response you said:

two physically identical systems can't be different in any way.

It's obvious from your conclusions from this statement that everything is physical to you. This is what Les SLeeth was trying to get across earlier I believe. By defining everything as physical from the beginning, you have no choice but to conclude that .......everything is physical! and therefore consciousness is a byproduct of a physical process. Of course you have already admitted this by saying that you believe everything follows determinable rules and that makes it physical. I just don't believe that's the definition that many here are using.

The physical world, to me, is anything that follows rules. This isn't restricted to space, time, matter, or energy. I'd be thrilled if we could find a new fundamental "substance" and rules it obeys that explains these aspects as well as consciousness.

Selfadjoints comment seems like a cop-out to me. Can you think of any scientific concepts where a satisfactory explanation is "If we mix A with B we magically get C" with no reductive explanation as to how or why that happens?

Every theory makes assumptions at the bottom. Mix space-time and matter with these rules and you get gravity. I can only assume the most fundamental rules that we'll find will make some kind of assumption. But at least once we know what it is, we'll be in a much better position to question the truth behind the rules with philosophy.

You have said yourself that in order for this to happen, there would need to be some rules that are being followed. What are these rules? What Chalmers arguments claim is that these rules cannot be determined by materialism. So either they are not there or there are rules of engagement beyond materialism.

Again, I'm not sure what you mean by materialism. Does this mean we'll never know them? Or that they won't follow the basic rules of logic? Or that we'll never verify them experimentally, but we could conceivably come to them by rational reasoning alone?

Chalmers arguments would claim that we can't reductively explain consciousness, not because we are ignorant. Rather, it is because there is no reductive explanation to be had. This would mean there are no "rules" that lead to consciousness as a by-product of brain processes. If the rules existed then there should be a way to describe them. Chalmers and others claim this can't be done, in principle.

Can you point me to where he explains why the rules can't be found, even in principle? I'm not saying your wrong, I just don't remember reading that in this article.

I can't see your point at all. How does consciousness being causal lead to physically unexplainable events?

I, at least, am not saying consciousness isn't causal. I am saying I don't believe it is caused by any known physical factors.
...
I doubt it, and there certainly are rules for when physical laws do and do not apply . . . but I don't see what relevance any of that has to this debate.

I think you're misunderstanding me. By causal, I mean having an observable, physical effect on the world. And I know I'm getting confusing now, but by physical here I mean just the atoms, forces, etc.

This isn't a contradiciton with what I said before. There may be new laws we find that reference the mental world, and maybe the first of these is the wave collapse I mentioned earlier. But I think Newtonian laws and the laws of relativity, at least, can never be violated. And if consciousness had an effect on the physical world, they would have to be. (again, unless this effect is only at the quantum level, but then I can't see how it would affect our macroscopic behavior.)

Assuming physical laws are unbreakable doesn't mean physical laws are all there are, it doesn't mean the consciousness realm is 100% physical, and it doesn't mean that the physcial and the non-physical aspects of consciousness (if they exist) can't interact. You don't just "start somewhere" that's physical -- your start, middle, and end are physical! Don't you understand we are debating if consciousness is purely physical?

If you are going to argue everything is physical, that's fine. But you can't argue that point by saying "if it isn't a physical attribute then it doesn't exist." That's like arguing if the Bible is the absolute truth with somebody who only believes in the Bible, and to every point you make he answers, "well, if it is not in the Bible, it cannot be true." The whole point of the debate is to decide if there is reason to give the status of "absolute truth" to the Bible. So how can he use the Bible to justify itself?

I want to make sure you understand that I believe consciousness can be real. I'm not saying it isn't. I'm saying it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, because if it did, we would be able to observe particles moving spontaneously under no force, and similar violations of the laws of physics.

You haven't understood him, and when you do you will find out he isn't in your corner. I think you'll find Dennett more to your liking.

I don't have a corner. I'm open to any plausible ideas.

Look, this idea can be simplified. Consciousness has aspects which CAN be explained by physical factors. Simple detection ability is one of them, even a thermostat can do that. The computing aspects of thinking and emotional states can be too. Chalmers talks about all the things that CAN be explained with physiology as the "easy problem" of consciousness. With the easy or physical aspects of consciousness all you get is a zombie.

Yet we know there is a subjective aspect to human consciousness too. Since there are no known physical qualities that can cause that, it leaves the door open to the possibility that there is something also non-physical about consciousness. Someone like Dennett might argue that conscious experience really is a potential of physicalness, it's just one never seen before it was manifested for the first time by a brain. Okay, maybe he is right. If anyone produces conscious experience through AI, I'd say the chances are that Dennett is right. Personally I don't believe AI will produce conscious experience.

We'll never know if it does. And also, Chalmers does talk about the thermostat when he is addressing the hard problem. He does want to assign some kind of experience to it. Here's are a few quotes from the article. First, how he defines experience (the same way I do):

"The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience."

The main thesis of his paper, as I took it:

"... that information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This has the status of a basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the physical. Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical processing."

And next, the famous thermostat quote:

"perhaps a thermostat, a maximally simple information processing structure, might have maximally simple experience?"

I really don't think I'm misinterpretting this. He is saying there would be something that its like to be a thermostat. This is, more or less, a panpsychic theory. It says that it should be taken as a basic law that, given the right information configuration, phenomanal experiences will arise. If I'm way off on my interpretation of the paper, please tell me, but even if I am, this is the stance I'm taking.

Sounds like the voice of experience. :rolleyes: But you are right, that is exactly what you are doing, staring at the walls instead of looking at that which is staring! :wink:

Way to be obnoxious and completely miss my point at the same time. Maybe its good that I don't have your "experience," that ideas aren't so firmly imbedded that I'm not open to the possibility they could be completely wrong.

Les Sleeth

Nov22-04, 05:00 PM

Way to be obnoxious and completely miss my point at the same time. Maybe its good that I don't have your "experience," that ideas aren't so firmly imbedded that I'm not open to the possibility they could be completely wrong.

I'll start with this. After I recommend self reflection, it seems to me you answered rather shallowly. So I was trying to tease you for having an opinion without really seriously considering my proposal. No insult intended. o:)

I think you're misunderstanding me. By causal, I mean having an observable, physical effect on the world. And I know I'm getting confusing now, but by physical here I mean just the atoms, forces, etc.

This isn't a contradiciton with what I said before. There may be new laws we find that reference the mental world, and maybe the first of these is the wave collapse I mentioned earlier. But I think Newtonian laws and the laws of relativity, at least, can never be violated. And if consciousness had an effect on the physical world, they would have to be. (again, unless this effect is only at the quantum level, but then I can't see how it would affect our macroscopic behavior.)

How do you know that? How do you know that Newtonian laws and the laws of relativity would be violated "if consciousness had an effect on the physical world"? All it might mean is that the core of consciousness operates a little differently than physical laws. But because we can see consciousness moving the body, it must also mean there is some sort of interface possible.

Before we knew about relativity, did it exist? If I proposed it as a theory to you, would you reject it because it violated Newtonian phyics? Actually, Newtonian physics works fine for certain situations, and relativity is needed for others. There's no "violation" necessary.

I don't have a corner. I'm open to any plausible ideas.

So far all you've shown is being open to any plausible physical ideas.

Chalmers does talk about the thermostat when he is addressing the hard problem. He does want to assign some kind of experience to it. Here's are a few quotes from the article. . . .

"perhaps a thermostat, a maximally simple information processing structure, might have maximally simple experience?"

I really don't think I'm misinterpretting this. He is saying there would be something that its like to be a thermostat. This is, more or less, a panpsychic theory. It says that it should be taken as a basic law that, given the right information configuration, phenomanal experiences will arise. If I'm way off on my interpretation of the paper, please tell me, but even if I am, this is the stance I'm taking..

Okay, he confuses me too sometimes. If you were right, you'd think he would agree with his arch rival, Dennett, yet the two disagree regularly. However, if it's your position that phenomenal experience arises from information configurations, then as an empiricist, all you have left to do is demostrate this truth, right? I'll be waiting for your test results. :smile:

Canute

Nov22-04, 05:44 PM

What I was talking about was that, given a system, it either has consciousness or it doesn't; two physically identical systems can't be different in any way.
Physically they can't be any different, I agree. Not if they're defined as physically identical. And when you can show that your consciousness is made out of matter you'll have clinched your argument. However, as it is not possible to show that matter is made out of matter, a well known problem, or to show that consciousness exists, this won't be easy.

Maybe, but I think that we can't really figure ourselves out without getting outside the system. It would be like sitting in a windowless room and trying to figure out where it came from by staring at the walls.
Yes, or chained to a bench in a cave, staring at the shadows. I didn't expect you to hold this view, and I couldn't agree with you more. But there's a contradiction between this and your other views. If consciousness is matter then there is no way for us to transcend the system. It is only by allowing consciousness to be more fundamental than matter - than the appearances, the shadows, the walls of the room etc. - that a reasonable resolution to this logical and practical problem, most clearly stated by Kurt Goedel, can be found. And it is only by personal practice, as Les was saying, that its truth or falsity can be detirmined. After all, you'll never be able to explore anyone else's consciousness.

Pavel

Nov22-04, 06:09 PM

Les, I can see your description of the integrative function quite well and it certainly makes perfect sense to me, but it doesn’t explain what I perceive to be the cornerstone of consciousness. When I say subjectivity is a necessary component, I’m not referring to a collection of individual experiences nicely organized and retained. While I can see how such collection gives rise to the atomicity or unity of one state that you refer as the “self”, or “self-awareness”, I don’t see the subject, or the driver that filters, connects, and finally transcends or contemplates over those experiences. The process of accumulating those experiences is still in the realm of object manipulation, if that makes any sense. Why, in your example, is a good looking tree retained more firmly than other objects? It’s either because “the driver” chooses to retain it, or it’s because the biological neural network is structured/conditioned to react that way to a give stimulus. If it is the former, then the driver has to be accounted for, if it is the latter, then we’re back to zombies and artificial neural networks which can also retain external stimuli differently, but yet unable to transcend them. It is this transcendental quality that makes me believe there’s the “I” that cannot be viewed as an object or a collection of experiences. I think we’d be committing a logical fallacy if we reduce the entity that does manipulation to an object being manipulated upon. It’s the same type of fallacy that determinists commit when they assert “what we think is completely determined”. The statement is transcending the system of which it is part of, but that system is determined by definition, so how can it transcend it? I know my terminology is horrible here and I apologize for it, as I’m not up to speed on all of the philosophical jargon or the buzz words. But I hope I’m articulate enough to be understood. The point is, the way I read your account for consciousness explains how the constituents come together but I don’t see how it gives rise to a facility that transcends, infers, and most importantly generalizes experiences or even better, some abstract forms. You do mention what creates the facility:

The integrative function is absolutely the most crucial factor of consciousness because it creates the singular aspect which comes to control, oversee, know . . . and one of the things it “knows” is that it exists! That is what self/subjectivity is: self knowing. That is why the oneness aspect of consciousness cannot be reproduced by a physical thing made of zillions of atoms or 1s and 0s.

But I think it’d be fair to ask to explain how it creates it. In your statement, there’s a jump between retention and the singular aspect which knows itself. To me, a pretty big jump, and because of how I perceive the subjectivity of consciousness, I don’t think that kind of “object -> subject” jump is even possible. Or maybe, again, that’s just because I totally missed what you were trying to say :confused:

StatusX and somebody else suggested the subject springs into existence epiphenomenally, or even better, as an emergent property when you turn on the whole system of neurons. I’d like to address the emergent property in a separate post, but for now, isn’t that an ad hoc explanation? It is as rational to suggest that there are brain controlling green men being born as an emergent property when you turn on the system. So, do we allow metaphysics in the explanation for consciousness or not??? I can solve a lot of mysteries with an emergent property explanation.

Thanks,

Pavel.

Pavel

Nov22-04, 06:11 PM

If consciousness is matter then there is no way for us to transcend the system. It is only by allowing consciousness to be more fundamental than matter - than the appearances, the shadows, the walls of the room etc. - that a reasonable resolution to this logical and practical problem, most clearly stated by Kurt Goedel, can be found. And it is only by personal practice, as Les was saying, that its truth or falsity can be detirmined. After all, you'll never be able to explore anyone else's consciousness.

Heh, Canute, you read my mind why I was trying to formulate my post. Maybe there's one consciousness after all :smile:

Pavel

Nov22-04, 06:20 PM

"The ultimate question is what causes the system to be transformed from state A to state B (firing of the fork dropping neuron)."

My resonse, first, the two theories you mention are both invalid. And also, i think you question is incorectly posed, which explains its unaswerability. Thought isnever a neuron simply firing and creating a cascade which eventually results in an effect on the body. Thought is a continuous process which never stops since the creation of the first neuron in the human embrio. Thus there is no State A, there is only a continuation of thought. The system transformation from state A to B does not exist, transformation is continuous. But to sort of answer the question, which i said beofore cannot be clearly answere the wasy it was posed, and thus i should reword it:

What is the difference between state A and state B and how did the mind get there.

Well, the neuron which created the cascade to drop the fork is unidentifiable, there is no one neuron associated with the command "drop fork". In other words a process created the action to drop the fork. Once this is assumed to be the case, the question is more easilly answerable. The process is an evaluation of thought, to evaluate thought more processes must be taken into consideration, some baing external stimuli. in essence there are many reasons why one would let go of a fork. One could find the fork too hot to hold. Or the fork too heavy, or one may have simply made a decision to let the fork go. The result in essence was created by a process not by a state. The decision to drop the fork may have well been thought over many times. One may have though, "when" to drop the fork, so then where can you pinpoint the neuron to cause the dropping of the fork? You can't; there is no neuron that thinks, thougth is a process. i'll stop here because im starting to sound repetitive.

Wait a second, slowly and clearly :smile: . First of all, please define “thought” in your argument. I get an impression you’re talking about some abstract form that transcends the physical brain, in which case you defeat your argument with your own premise - thought is immaterial. If it’s physical, then what exactly do you mean by “Thought isnever a neuron simply firing and creating a cascade which eventually results in an effect on the body”. Then what is it, and how does it affect the body, physically? Please elaborate.

Second of all, I’d like to see some more meat behind your continuity argument. I don’t see a problem of creating a snap shot of the brain at any given point of time. Yes, technologically it’s impossible, but conceptually, just like I can pick a point on a continuous function, I think I can pick a point on a time line at which I can record values of all the subatomic particle-constituents of the brain. Now I’m not going to debate the continuity hypothesis and the whole Cantor set with real vs rational numbers problem (because I'm not good at it), but I'm sure of one thing - your assumption that time and matter transformation are continuous is just that – an assumption. Besides, if you successfully argue that they are, in fact, continuous, then, by implication, you effectively kill all the AI hopes of replicating consciousness with 1’s and 0’s, do you not?

So, until further clarification, I still think it’s fair to ask what causes the brain to be transformed from one state to another. The deterministic rules + random quantum events have been suggested. If that’s the case, I don’t buy into a single word you said about it for one simple reason – you said so because the it was a rainy day which obviously made you depressed, which made you conclude “we’re determined”, in a crude manner of speaking. Had it been a shiny day, you’d theorize that we’re all free and immortal. If you add randomness on top of that, then I’d have to calculate how many days in a year you’d come to the deterministic conclusion, and how many to something else, given the precipitation statistics, of course :smile:

Thanks,

Pavel

Canute

Nov22-04, 06:30 PM

A zombie from birth who has all the "experiences" a human does (I'm using that word differently here) will manifest the same behavior as that person.
Could you cite a reference or two in support of this hypothesis?

The physical world, to me, is anything that follows rules. This isn't restricted to space, time, matter, or energy. I'd be thrilled if we could find a new fundamental "substance" and rules it obeys that explains these aspects as well as consciousness.
You seem to have a non-standard view of what constitutes the physical. If your definition is that anything that follows rules is physical then you need to make that very clear to avoid confusion. It'd probably better if you used a different term entirely.

Mix space-time and matter with these rules and you get gravity.
Lol. What are the rules made out of by the way?

This isn't a contradiciton with what I said before. There may be new laws we find that reference the mental world, and maybe the first of these is the wave collapse I mentioned earlier. But I think Newtonian laws and the laws of relativity, at least, can never be violated. And if consciousness had an effect on the physical world, they would have to be.
I'm not sure Newton's were a good choice of inviolable laws.

I want to make sure you understand that I believe consciousness can be real. I'm not saying it isn't. I'm saying it doesn't have an effect on the physical world, because if it did, we would be able to observe particles moving spontaneously under no force, and similar violations of the laws of physics.
It is perfectly possible to suppose that consciousness is causal without supposing that it violates any laws of physics. All it violates is the metaphysical assumptions of some, but by no means all, physicists.

I don't have a corner. I'm open to any plausible ideas.
It's no good just saying that.

We'll never know if it does. And also, Chalmers does talk about the thermostat when he is addressing the hard problem. He does want to assign some kind of experience to it.

"perhaps a thermostat, a maximally simple information processing structure, might have maximally simple experience?"

I really don't think I'm misinterpretting this. He is saying there would be something that its like to be a thermostat."
I think this is taken a bit out of context. If I remember right he was saying that this was a consequnce of a certain way of thinking, rather than arguing that thermostats were conscious. Also, he talks of minimal consciousness, which may be taken to mean that matter/energy at even the most microscopic level level embodies consciousness. I don't think he holds this view (it's known sometimes as microphenomenalism) but it's a more sensible way of thinking of conscious thermostats than as if they could be conscious as thermostats.

Microphenomenalism is quite popular by the way, with an excellent paper in a recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

StatusX

Nov22-04, 06:56 PM

OK. I'm gonna try to put my views aside for a minute and ask some unbiased questions. I'm not gonna say my answer to them yet, I'm just curious what others think, if anyone cares enough to respond.

1. If you took a person, scanned their every atom, and then assembled an exact copy atom by atom, would this copy be conscious?

2. If so, would it, in any sense, be the same consciousness as the first person?

3. Say you decide to snap your fingers at a random instant. Could this have been predicted in advance by someone else with sufficient knowledge of the physical state of your brain a few seconds prior?

4. If not, does this necessarily mean that some particles or fields acted in a spontaneous way, in violation of the laws of physics as we know them? (eg., a neuron fires with no physical cause)

5. Could a computer ever have conscious experiences, in any sense of the word?

StatusX

Nov22-04, 07:16 PM

Could you cite a reference or two in support of this hypothesis?

I'm claiming that two physically identical systems in physically identical enviroments will physically behave identically. (at least qualitatively, since quantum mechanics introduces randomness) This is the basis of physics. If you disagree, it is your burden to provide evidence why the brain should be any different.

You seem to have a non-standard view of what constitutes the physical. If your definition is that anything that follows rules is physical then you need to make that very clear to avoid confusion. It'd probably better if you used a different term entirely.

Any suggestions? Maybe, the "natural world"?

Lol. What are the rules made out of by the way?

I was explaining how a theory can't explain why its correct. All general relativity does is define terms and give us equations relating them. I'm not saying its all there is to gravity, its all there is to our current theory of gravity, and they'll probably be similar limitations to any theory.

I'm not sure Newton's were a good choice of inviolable laws.

Maybe not, but that avoids the question.

It is perfectly possible to suppose that consciousness is causal without supposing that it violates any laws of physics. All it violates is the metaphysical assumptions of some, but by no means all, physicists.

If you mean the traditional laws of physics, as in QM and GR, then I disagree. These are deterministic, and causally closed.

I think this is taken a bit out of context. If I remember right he was saying that this was a consequnce of a certain way of thinking, rather than arguing that thermostats were conscious. Also, he talks of minimal consciousness, which may be taken to mean that matter/energy at even the most microscopic level level embodies consciousness. I don't think he holds this view (it's known sometimes as microphenomenalism) but it's a more sensible way of thinking of conscious thermostats than as if they could be conscious as thermostats.

Well I don't think it was. If you do, are there some quotes from the article that support this?

Microphenomenalism is quite popular by the way, with an excellent paper in a recent issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

This is interesting, and I think basically what I'm saying. I'll look into it.

Fliption

Nov22-04, 07:50 PM

But getting into that state is a physical process too. A zombie from birth who has all the "experiences" a human does (I'm using that word differently here) will manifest the same behavior as that person. And anyway, when I say "the same physical structure" I'm including whatever state the brain were copying is in. But we're getting off track.

The experience of a zombie isn't in the definition of a zombie. A zombie is defined as a being that is physically identical to a conscious being but it is not conscious. The point of this illustration is not whether or not this is possible or whether or not we are really zombies. It is simply trying to illustrate one thing of epistomology:

1) I cannot know whether a being is conscious by studying the physical makeup of that being.

Couple that with this:

2) I know consciousness exists because I am conscious.

And there's the dilemma. It appears that consciousness does exists and it isn't physical.

I do not believe that a conscious being would ever find itself questioning it's consciousness because it CANNOT have the same experiences of a conscious being. But to me none of this is relevant once you understand the point of the illustration.

Every theory makes assumptions at the bottom. Mix space-time and matter with these rules and you get gravity. I can only assume the most fundamental rules that we'll find will make some kind of assumption. But at least once we know what it is, we'll be in a much better position to question the truth behind the rules with philosophy.

OK perhaps I misunderstood what you meant the first time. I can see another interpretation of your comments that I may can agree with. I could entertain a theory that says when certain physical processes are activated then it becomes possible for the property of consciousness to occur. I distinguish this view from one that says these physical processes create consciousness. My earlier remarks apply to this latter view(which is probably what selfadjoint really believes). Which one did you mean?

As long as we're inserting assumptions why not just make consciousness a fundamental element of reality(like Chalmers suggests) and all the problems are solved?

Again, I'm not sure what you mean by materialism. Does this mean we'll never know them? Or that they won't follow the basic rules of logic? Or that we'll never verify them experimentally, but we could conceivably come to them by rational reasoning alone?

It simply means that the current method of science which is to reductively explain everything as a consequence of interactions of energy, matter, etc etc cannot, in principle, explain "what it's like to be". So the suggestion is that consciousness should become a fundamental element of nature. This would not be materialism and would require some changes in the way we look at things. The current materialist paradigm is attempting to build a hammer out of houses.

Can you point me to where he explains why the rules can't be found, even in principle? I'm not saying your wrong, I just don't remember reading that in this article.

The rules I was referring to are the rules that direct matter to create consciousness. To know these rules is the same thing as having a reductive explanation for consciousness. Claiming this cannot be done is what Chalmers is all about.

I wasn't really referring to the set of rules that would govern the interface between consciousness and matter. I, like you, suspect that those rules DO exist and Chalmers does NOT make any claim on these rules that I am aware of.

Les Sleeth

Nov22-04, 08:28 PM

Les, I can see your description of the integrative function quite well and it certainly makes perfect sense to me, but it doesn’t explain what I perceive to be the cornerstone of consciousness.

I am impressed you took the time to think about it. I respect that. I don’t know if my model is correct, but I can tell you haven’t quite understood it. So let’s straighten that out and see if the model then makes better sense.

First, keep in mind that the model as I am presenting it to you is being taken from reflection on my and other consciousness (mostly my own). I am sticking as closely as possible to what I hope is perfectly obvious to anyone who will take the time to examine how their own consciousness is functioning. I am discarding all the grand metaphysical “problems” thinkers throughout history have come up with, and just looking. So for me, this is only a process of 1) looking at it, 2) describing what is seen, and 3) arranging what’s seen in the natural order they appear to occur.

When I say subjectivity is a necessary component, I’m not referring to a collection of individual experiences nicely organized and retained. While I can see how such collection gives rise to the atomicity or unity of one state that you refer as the “self”, or “self-awareness”, I don’t see the subject, or the driver that filters, connects, and finally transcends or contemplates over those experiences.

Here is the first misinterpretation, or lack of communication on my part. You’ve mixed up the singularizing integrating function with the many things that can be integrated. I didn’t say subjectivity was a “collection of individual experiences,” I said that in consciousness there is an aspect which integrates; it is an aspect that allows us to collect related experience and integrate for singular activity. I gave examples of how the integrating function works on other things so I could go on to say,this is the same aspect of consciousness which establishes subjectivity.

Before explaining further, do you see this? Again, I’m not theorizing, I am looking right at it at this very moment trying to describe what I see. Right now I am typing and it’s flowing and I am not thinking much, just letting what I understand come out. My typing, my knowledge of the computer, my life experience . . . all of it is at the ready and contributing to my single-pointed production of this explanation. I know for a fact that I am seeing this in myself, and that I have had it as long as I can remember. I also see it in others, even animals.

So if you can “see” the integrative thing in your own consciousness, the next question is how could that have first established, and continue to develop, subjectivity. But before we can do that, I have to clear up another question you raised.

Why, in your example, is a good looking tree retained more firmly than other objects? It’s either because “the driver” chooses to retain it, or it’s because the biological neural network is structured/conditioned to react that way to a give stimulus. If it is the former, then the driver has to be accounted for, if it is the latter, then we’re back to zombies and artificial neural networks which can also retain external stimuli differently, but yet unable to transcend them.

I did explain this before, but I realize it’s a new concept. Again, look at your own consciousness while you think about this to see if it jives with how yours works. Aren’t there “events” happening all around you right now, whose details you aren’t paying much attention to? My computer makes a noise, it has been since I’ve been typing this, but I do not remember every second of that noise. Yet right now, while I am paying attention to it, I DO remember it. I am not inventing this explanation, I am simply describing to you what’s going on. When I pay attention to information, I can see quite clearly that I remember it more than when I don’t, even though there is a lot of information crossing the paths of my senses. So clearly, paying attention to in info/stimuli strengthens retention.

If you want to say that because the “driver” decides to pay attention he “chooses” retention, then I suppose you are correct. But you’ve left the realm of function and entered the realm of intent or will. I am strictly talking about function or how consciousness “works.” Regarding the neural network consciousness is dependent upon to receive information, that isn’t relevant to this aspect. Yes, the neural network feeds conscious information from the outside world; I say that one can obtain information from the “inside” world too. But in either case, retention still works the same exact way which is, pay attention and retention increases.

It is this transcendental quality that makes me believe there’s the “I” that cannot be viewed as an object or a collection of experiences. I think we’d be committing a logical fallacy if we reduce the entity that does manipulation to an object being manipulated upon. It’s the same type of fallacy that determinists commit when they assert “what we think is completely determined”. The statement is transcending the system of which it is part of, but that system is determined by definition, so how can it transcend it? I know my terminology is horrible here and I apologize for it, as I’m not up to speed on all of the philosophical jargon or the buzz words. But I hope I’m articulate enough to be understood. The point is, the way I read your account for consciousness explains how the constituents come together but I don’t see how it gives rise to a facility that transcends, infers, and most importantly generalizes experiences or even better, some abstract forms. You do mention what creates the facility.

Okay, so we are back to the integrative function. You say, “It is this transcendental quality that makes me believe there’s the “I” that cannot be viewed as an object or a collection of experiences.” I agree with you totally, and as I said in the first part of this post, a “collection” is not what my model suggests. To reiterate, I didn’t say subjectivity was a collection, I said the trait of integration which allows a collection of experiences to singularize for a complex focused task, is the same integration that establishes self. Analogy time.

The sun is an awesome team of specific mass and gravity counterbalanced by the nuclear conversion of hydrogen into helium. That’s the main thing a star is. But it doesn’t mean that plants here on Earth can’t use radiation for photosynthesis, and over billions of years of evolution be responsible for billions of different life forms.

Similarly, the part of us which establishes “self” also seems to have been harnessed for more complex processes, like integrating experiences for “understanding.” What we are trying to see is how and why the integrative function creates the absolute most basic feature of consciousness, which subjectivity. It just so happens, that’s your next question!

But I think it’d be fair to ask to explain how it creates it. In your statement, there’s a jump between retention and the singular aspect which knows itself. To me, a pretty big jump, and because of how I perceive the subjectivity of consciousness, I don’t think that kind of “object -> subject” jump is even possible.

Here’s where I challenged StatusX to contemplate his own being, and why I said my model has a problem because apparently not that many people take a very deep look at themselves.

How can you tell you exist? I know the mind can go off into fantasy about this, and imagine Matrix scenarios or some trip derived from idealism. But, again, just look and feel yourself. Isn’t that how you know you exist? You can actually sense your own self, it’s really amazing!

Here’s what I am proposing. I am suggesting that the very first experience a being has, the absolute most basic experience a being has, and the most continuous, non-stop experience a being has from the moment of birth and through each every moment one is alive is that of existing. That’s what feeds the integrative function of consciousness earliest, most basically and continuously, and that is what integrates most deeply and centrally. It is what we come to know as “me.”

The other integrative stuff comes later and is peripheral to the central core, like the sun, of what defines and maintains a consciousness.

StatusX and somebody else suggested the subject springs into existence epiphenomenally, or even better, as an emergent property when you turn on the whole system of neurons. I’d like to address the emergent property in a separate post, but for now, isn’t that an ad hoc explanation? It is as rational to suggest that there are brain controlling green men being born as an emergent property when you turn on the system. So, do we allow metaphysics in the explanation for consciousness or not??? I can solve a lot of mysteries with an emergent property explanation.

Well, we are talking metaphysics, whether is physicalism or “something more.” Here, the objective is to offer models that account for the most characteristics without violating a single instance of what is known to be true, and/or discrediting models because of what they fail to account for or principles they violate.

anuj

Nov22-04, 09:23 PM

The mind disassociated with the body and having no thought what-so-ever except the one and only one that we still exist. Is it what we call consciousness?

Les Sleeth

Nov22-04, 10:29 PM

The mind disassociated with the body and having no thought what-so-ever except the one and only one that we still exist. Is it what we call consciousness?

I'd put it, consciousness (whether disassociated from the body or not) is minimully the awareness of one's own existence. Thinking isn't necessary to experience existence.

Canute

Nov23-04, 06:57 AM

1. If you took a person, scanned their every atom, and then assembled an exact copy atom by atom, would this copy be conscious?
Don't know, but personally I doubt it.

2. If so, would it, in any sense, be the same consciousness as the first person?
Same again.

3. Say you decide to snap your fingers at a random instant. Could this have been predicted in advance by someone else with sufficient knowledge of the physical state of your brain a few seconds prior?
There may not be a clear answer to this, since it may depend on the circumstances. I have no problem with the idea that many, perhaps most, of our actions are mechanical, and agree with Gurdjieff on this (who said that most people were machines, but that they didn't need to be if they woke up). Also, as Llibet's experiments slightly suggest, it may be that freewill consists in deciding not to do things rather than in doing them. (Also, it may be that consciousness is in part responsible for that previous brain-state).

There's an important issue here. It may be that brain processes are necessary to explain human behaviour, but not sufficient.

4. If not, does this necessarily mean that some particles or fields acted in a spontaneous way, in violation of the laws of physics as we know them? (eg., a neuron fires with no physical cause)
Believeing that consciousness is causal doesn't entail any violation of the 'laws' of physics as far as they are known. Don't forget that the doctrine of causal completeness is not a law, not yet anyway.

5. Could a computer ever have conscious experiences, in any sense of the word?
Don't know, but there's no evidence that we can manufacture consciousness, except the old fashioned way.

Canute

Nov23-04, 07:22 AM

I'm claiming that two physically identical systems in physically identical enviroments will physically behave identically. (at least qualitatively, since quantum mechanics introduces randomness) This is the basis of physics. If you disagree, it is your burden to provide evidence why the brain should be any different.
I don't feel any need to provide evidence. I'm arguing that there is no conclusive evidence either way.

Any suggestions? Maybe, the "natural world"?
Something like that. I doubt that anyone here is arguing that consciousness is not part of the natural world, and subject to its laws. The question is whether the natural world is exhaustively described by physics, or whether physics misses things out. It's not hard to show that physics cannot exhaustively describe the world, (as Stephen Hawkings says in his online essay 'The End of Physics').

I was explaining how a theory can't explain why its correct. All general relativity does is define terms and give us equations relating them. I'm not saying its all there is to gravity, its all there is to our current theory of gravity, and they'll probably be similar limitations to any theory.
I agree. Theories are not knowledge.

If you mean the traditional laws of physics, as in QM and GR, then I disagree. These are deterministic, and causally closed.
The physical world is conjectured to be causally closed. However there may be more to the world, and more laws operating in the world, than physics presumes. Don't forget that Buddhists and Taoists also say the world is governed by laws, and they are more extensive than the current list of the laws of physics. These are laws that operate across infinite numbers of universes for all time, not restricted to our little universe. That is to say, believing that there is more to reality than physics can describe does not entail giving up the idea of laws governing causation.

Well I don't think it was. If you do, are there some quotes from the article that support this?
Maybe you're right, I forget.

This is interesting, and I think basically what I'm saying. I'll look into it.
I can't give you a reference at the moment, can't find the paper, but you may find it listed at the JCS site. Quite often Chalmer's republishes JCS articles on his site. Related to this is Vol. 10 No 3, 2003, which is devoted to papers on panpsychism. Bear in mind this is a refereed scientific journal, so it might give you pause for thought that it should be devoting so much space to publishing papers on microphenominalism, panpsychism and other such 'unscientific' approaches to consciousness.

Rader

Nov23-04, 09:59 AM

http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs.html

http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs;jsessionid=ed89pcw7bl3l.victoria?

Paul Martin

Nov23-04, 11:14 AM

In regard to consciousness as one or many I don't think it's right to say that we could not imagine it being one until recently, even for those with a scientific bent.

I agree. What I meant to say was that familiar mechanisms which might serve as analogies (e.g. computers, multiplexors, time-sharing, virtual reality) are more abundant recently.

Here's Erwin Schroedinger on the topic:

Thank you. That was very encouraging to read. I don't feel so far out in left field with my ideas after reading it. Do you have a link to the entire essay?

Paul

Paul Martin

Nov23-04, 11:15 AM

I suppose I'd say that the history of our experience is what establishes knowing, and is the basis of memory of course.

You have circumscribed a lot of deep ideas in that statement in addition to the more trivial semantic choices of terms. Here's what I think you are saying: Knowledge is the information that is derived from the conscious experience of the present moment and which is accumulated over the course of time in some sort of memory. The conscious act of knowing occurs only in the present moment but it has access to this accumulation of information in addition to the present stimuli reported by the body and brain.

I think most people would agree that that describes what goes on in each human life. but here I think we are talking about what goes on in reality as a whole. The mystery we are exploring is how to explain the evident plurality of this process if it is indeed singular, as we suspect ( and as Schrödinger suspected) that it is. My time-sharing computer and your ocean of consciousness are simply analogies we are using trying to make sense of this mystery.

As far as I can tell, there is nothing but "now." It has always been now, and it will always be now.

Let me explain some of the relationships I was talking about wrt "now", "the stream of conscousness", "the flow of time", and "the physical world". In Brian Greene's "The Fabric of the Cosmos", he describes our 4D space-time continuum as a loaf of bread (by reducing our three spatial dimensions to two and by considering the long axis of the loaf to be our temporal dimension). Our world lines, then, wiggle through the loaf generally in the direction of the long axis. The notion of "here and now" would be a single point on a world line as we (the person traveling that world line) experience that moment. From that person's perspective, the universe at that moment would be a slice through the loaf which intersects the world line at that "now" point.

He points out that SR says that those slices will have different angles through the loaf depending on the speed of the person (i.e. the angle his world line makes with the time axis). Even small differences in the angles make huge differences at great distances from the world line. Furthermore, GR says that the slices are not planar but have bulges and bends. These facts force us to conclude that the entire loaf must exist at all times rather than "now" (a particular rather arbitrary slice) being all there is.

So, how do we reconcile that with your statements that "...there is nothing but "now." It has always been now, and it will always be now."?

Here's my suggestion. Greene's conclusion is that the entire past history of the universe is as real, and exists in the same sense, as the universe at the present moment. Not only that, the future also exists "now" and is real. This raises a couple questions: How much of the past are we talking about and ow much of the future?

My guess is that the past part of the loaf goes all the way back to the Big Bang. (In my view, the BB was the beginning of our physical universe (the 4D one) but not of all of reality (the 11D one, or whatever the dimensionality).) But as for the future, I think the universe is a work in progress and it extends only to some finite extent beyond the time of this writing on 11/23/04. That makes the entire thing finite in extent.

If you imagine the universe as that static, finite, loaf of bread laced with the world lines of all of us who have ever lived, there doesn't seem to be any special point you could call "now". Using your approach and calling the whole thing "now" doesn't help. The question is, What's so special about this particular point here in Seattle now on 11/23/04?

Well, I think it works like this. Since our loaf of bread is static, and the time axis in the loaf looks just like the other spatial axes, it makes the whole universe a static spatial structure. But since we know there is dynamism in reality, in virtue of our certain knowledge that our thoughts change, there must be a dimension of time which accommodates this dynamism and which is separate and distinct from that long axis on the loaf.

Given that cosmic dimension of time, and given the premise that there is exactly and only one consciousness, the possibilities are obvious for the consciousness to "travel" along any and all of those world lines in any sequence, or in either direction, and for any number of repetitions it wanted. By "traveling along a world line" I mean actually experiencing the life of the organism owning that world line. It would be analogous to one of us traveling from Seattle to Atlanta. You could represent the trip by drawing a wiggly line on a map of the US that would correspond to our loaf with its world line. Or you could talk about the moment to moment experience of the actual trip itself, which is the aggregate of all the "now" moments that occurred at each point on the itinerary.

Now, about the unfinished part. If the loaf is a work-in-progress, how is it changed and extended? I think it is done in two ways: First, there are the laws of physics which inexorably determine the evolution of the gross loaf. Second, there are deliberate, conscious, willful actions performed by organisms during these various "now" points on their respective world lines. These actions don't violate the laws of physics since they are done in a manner I described earlier. They are "under the radar" limits set by the uncertainty principle and they appear to be "random" actions.

The actual sequence and pattern (in the cosmic time dimension, of course) of the single consciousness visiting and acting through these many world lines remains a huge mystery we can only guess at. One possibility is, along the Many-Worlds line, that myriad new loafs are duplicated at each point of choice each with a different choice of a "random action".

Another possibility is that the one consciousness drives one body for a while, then hops to another for a while (these "whiles" are all in cosmic time, of course, but they may have corresponding traces as segments along particular world lines.) each time making choices that push the end crust of the loaf ever further on.

If this guess is close to being right, it would seem obvious that our intermittent periods of sleep and wakefulness might mark those segments on our world lines where the one consciousness "hopped in" and drove for a while before hopping back out to drive another organism. Keep in mind that this activity is done in cosmic time and not in the time represented as the long axis of the loaf -- our familiar time dimension. I favor this guess because it would explain sleep. (In my opinion, sleep is the most baffling mystery of biology. All other biological mysteries, such as origins, specieation, development, morphology, etc. have promising theories to explain them. Sleep has none. Not only does anyone have the faintest idea why animals sleep, the fact that they do seems to me to be an extreme counter-example for evolutionary development. Any animal that developed the habit of sleeping, with its dangerous attendant risks and no known reward, would have been selected against and gone extinct long ago. We see that this has not happened..)

That's probably enough elaboration on your point.

We have plenty of time to discuss this,

Yes, I suppose we do. I don't have a lot of time each day to respond but I do intend to live a long time. So if you can bear with my slow response, we will have plenty of time. Thank you in advance for your patience.

... but I disagree that individual consciousness must be illusory.

Yes, so do I. I hope I didn't claim that they must be. I would only say that it is a common illusion for people to think that their consciousness is separate and distinct from yours or mine or the one which we all are.

I am quite certain that both whole and individual consciousness are simultaneously possible if one learns the secret of the experience.

I agree with you even though I have not learned the secret. But in spite of that, I am quite certain, especially now that I know that Schrödinger agreed, that we can logically deduce the singularity of consciousness.

Paul

Paul Martin

Nov23-04, 11:15 AM

I don't know what real content your theory has. Often people say things exist in "other dimensions" without really addressing what that means. Are these dimensions of space, or time, or something else? What else could there be a dimension of? And what about the fact that our conscious seems to travel in one direction in time?

See my response to Les. I think it may answer your questions. If not, let me know.

Paul

Canute

Nov24-04, 06:05 AM

I agree. What I meant to say was that familiar mechanisms which might serve as analogies (e.g. computers, multiplexors, time-sharing, virtual reality) are more abundant recently.
Yes, fair enough. You might like to search for the 'Jewel Net of Indra' for an early holographic account of the universe. The Buddhist sutras also speak of the the whole universe being contained in each grain of sand. Regarding your discussion of time and the notion of what I seem to remember is called a 'block' universe try 'the noble' Nagaruna, who long ago presented a series of logical arguments denying the possibility of past, present and future except as illusions of consciousness.

Thank you. That was very encouraging to read. I don't feel so far out in left field with my ideas after reading it. Do you have a link to the entire essay?
Schroedinger stuck to his view of consciousness throughout his life, and writes about in various places. I believe his book 'What is Life' has most of it but I haven't got around to reading yet (disgraceful really). His usual publisher refused to publish it since ES concluded, in trying to reconcile freewill with physical detirminism, that he was God.

(Can someone tell me how to insert the double dots (uhmlats?) for Scroedinger, Goedel etc - my usual method doesn't seem to work here).

Les Sleeth

Nov24-04, 12:39 PM

Here's my suggestion. Greene's conclusion is that the entire past history of the universe is as real, and exists in the same sense, as the universe at the present moment. Not only that, the future also exists "now" and is real. This raises a couple questions: How much of the past are we talking about and ow much of the future?

Rather than bore everybody by repeating my views on time again, I will refer you to a thread in the Philosophy or Science and Mathematics area on where some of us were trading idea about what time is: http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=12100&page=1

I've listened to Greene's ideas and if you read my beliefs about time, then you probably can see why I have never been able to get excited by his concept. In my humble opinion, such theories of time are physicalist exotica. I think time is actually quite ordinary, nothing more than how we keep track change in the universe, and certainly not a dimension. True, relativity tells us (and atomic clock experiments have confirmed) that the rate of change can be affected, but that's it as far as we know.

In a strictly physical sense, there is of course lots of "past" currently present in everything from fossils here on Earth to microwave background radiation which scientists believe originated from the early period of the universe's formation. But the past itself? Or the future? It doesn't make any sense to me because I see time as nothing but a measurement of the rate of change.

I, as consciousness, can only experience the present. If there are remnants of the past still around, then I can experience them in the present. If there are signs of the future, like a star showing symptoms of going supernova, then I experience those future signs now and the event itself when it happens now. If the universe disappears after entropy runs its course, then there will be no time because there will be nothing left to change.

I don't think I see how any of this helps explain what consciousness is anyway. I know right now a popular idea is that after the universe got going, consciousness emerged as a new property of matter. To such thinkers, it is important to develop a theory which shows how that can happen. Personally I think it is easier to explain consciousness if it developed before the universe was initiated, which after eons of evolution, then helped initiate the universe and evolve the biological vehicles we currently find ourselves in.

Paul Martin

Nov24-04, 04:38 PM

What extra spacetime ???

The extra spacetime comprising those Calabi-Yau spaces.

which thread man ???..I'd be well keen to check out how you come to think that. As far as I understand it, the all encompassing 11th dimension is the only astronomically large one, a virtual field of strings or sea of energy. The quantum foam which changes to accomodate the universe as it passes over it like a ripple in a spherical pond.
http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=41012

Pavel

Nov24-04, 06:15 PM

Personally I think it is easier to explain consciousness if it developed before the universe was initiated, which after eons of evolution, then helped initiate the universe and evolve the biological vehicles we currently find ourselves in.

Hehe, oh noooo, that would imply there’s something beyond the physical world, maybe even God :biggrin:

Thank you for the time it took you to explain your model to me once again. What can I say, it sounds good. What I like about it is it’s real. When I contemplate about it or try to look inward, I can see what you’re talking about, it makes sense; as opposed to going off on a deep end and proposing some rather bizarre abstract nebula that sounds thought provoking and everything, but has as much appeal to me as a sci-fi movie. No offense to those who do philosophy for its artistic and creative aspect, I respect that, but I personally find more appeal in the analytical function of it, and you seem to be pretty darn good at both. Now, I will need more time to look “deeper” as you suggested, because I still haven’t quite sensed how the singularizing aspect of integration gives rise to a facility capable of conceptually transcending its own existence or being able to generalize. I can understand the functional account for consciousness, but when it comes to the “driver” and its volition, I’m just not there yet. Your analogy with the sun makes sense to me, but I get a feeling it makes consciousness some kind of side effect, epiphenomenon (?) or an emergent property, a result, if you will, rather than the cause of the experience which will be integrated. (consciousness is necessary for experience, is it?) In case I didn’t get what you were driving at again, my apologies, please don’t waste your time any longer. I’m reading Chalmer’s paper, which I’m loving, and having more time to think about what you had to say might open up a whole new view on the issue.

Meanwhile, I’d really appreciate your thoughts on some of the related points. If you think I’m absolutely making no sense and you don’t want to waste your time, please say so, it won’t bother me a bit. Otherwise, thanks in advance :smile:

1. I mentioned that I think there’s a modal aspect to the intent when we view in the context of a human mind. When I say “I intend to graduate from college”, I’m not merely saying my objective is to graduate. I’m expressing an attitude and possibility. It’s not the same type of possibility that I would use in a computer simulation model by invoking a random number generator. I’m not expressing that I’ll flip a coin, I’m expressing that I might change my mind. If I can clearly define this modality aspect of my consciousness, which I believe exists, I want to see if it can be explained in functional terms, and ultimately simulated, or is this another metaphysical phenomenon. Do I have a case here?

2. I also mentioned that I’m suspicious there is a logical fallacy every time when the facility that does the analysys is reduced to the facility that is analyzed. In other words, when you reduce consciousness to the same abstract level as its constituents, you’re committing a fallacy in an attempt to explain the former in terms of the latter. Just like you can’t prove certain statements in a consistent system by means of its own axioms (Godel’s incompleteness theorem), you can’t explain the phenomenon of consciousness in terms of its parts. As I mentioned before, a deterministic fallacy would be another example. What do you think?

3. Finally, this idea of consciousness as an emergent property. I have no problem seeing that there’s a fair analogy between the solidity of a metal and consciousness of the neurons. I can also overlook the fact that it’s a convenient way to explain anything, even though we have no clue HOW it becomes emergent, we can’t demonstrate it. I have a conceptual problem, most likely misunderstanding, with this explanation.

I suspect that while there are certain physical values associated with the solidity, it’s still an abstraction, or interpretation of the human mind. I see the metal as one chunk because of how I sense it, which is a function of my physical size, context, and sense perception facility. I interpret a collection of metal pieces to be something else than, in reality, it’s just that – a collection of metal atoms. One of the unique aspects of consciousness is to generalize and create new entities on different levels of abstractions. When we talk about countries, the countries don’t really exist, it’s a level of abstraction which we find convenient to operate on when we manipulate groups of people. These groups have certain attributes nevertheless, but we're the ones who assign them! It’s ultimately our perception and the ability to generalize that creates these physical characteristics. To take it even further, beyond the physical property of a metal chunk, take number Pi. Where does it exist? If I have a circle, I can measure it and see there’s a relationship between its diameter and circumference. But guess what, I don’t measure the next circle, I generalize. The question is then, is Pi purely the interpretation of our consciousness or does it exist on some level of reality. If the latter, it’s definitely not physical reality simply because I don’t see any Pi's running around, I see a circles only…… makes any sense?

Happy Holidays!

Pavel.

Paul Martin

Nov24-04, 10:35 PM

I've listened to Greene's ideas and if you read my beliefs about time, then you probably can see why I have never been able to get excited by his concept

I read your post on time and I think I understand your lack of excitement. But I have to disagree with you.

In my humble opinion, such theories of time are physicalist exotica.

I agree. But I don't think we should dismiss such exotica out of hand. Not that I think you should spend any time or energy investigating questions of time, but I think it is important that someone does. Such exotica are the stuff of science, and the progress of science has produced much that has made our lives better. Even though they study mere physicality, that physicality has allowed you and me to communicate, for example.

But the past itself? Or the future? It doesn't make any sense to me because I see time as nothing but a measurement of the rate of change.

On the question of the real existence of the past, I think your quarrel is with Einstein and not with Greene. Greene simply used the loaf of bread to illustrate the inescapable conclusion of SR that there is no way of consistently defining the concept of "now" in physics. Any reasonable definition of the concept from the perspective of one observer will be inconsistent with that of another observer who is not in the former's inertial frame. So if "now" is the only thing that exists, who's "now" is it? And what makes that observer and his inertial frame special? The logical conclusion is that there is no physical distinction between past, present, or future. They all exist at once.

The answer to this question makes a huge difference in ontology. If we ask, "What exists?", and we answer "The (physical) universe now", as big as the universe is, it is tiny compared to the alternative answer, "The entire past, present, and future of the (physical) universe". I parenthetically qualified the term 'universe' to be consistent with contemporary science. I think that in the view of most physicists, the qualification is redundant. But In my view, the physical universe (the 4D one we seem to live in) is a subspace, or manifold, in a larger space.

Then if we ask, "What do we mean by existence itself?" we introduce another complication. The commonsense answer is that to exist is to be, just like all these physical things we can see and touch. That's a useful answer, but it leaves open the question about things that might "be" but which are not just like familiar physical things. These might be things like gods, or platonic ideals, or the complete number pi, or extra dimensions, or the past states of the physical universe, or consciousness itself.

I think that if dismiss these latter candidates out of hand, we just might start down the wrong path and lose the very thing we are looking for. Therefore, I think we should open our minds to the possibility of some non-physical things existing, and then try to make a sensible explanation for what we experience.

In my personal view, I reject the existence of the physical universe (I agree with Berkeley) and claim that the only thing that exists, or has ever existed, is a single consciousness. Everything else that seems to exist is nothing more than patterns of thought (i.e. ideas or information) of that consciousness.

I went into all that so that I could explain how and why I agree with you that time does not exist. I agree that time does not exist as a dimension as we think spatial dimensions exist. But I also claim that spatial dimensions do not exist as we think they do either. All of the typical things that people think exist, like space-time, gravity, EM fields, strings, quarks, etc. essentially turn out to be nothing but sets of numbers. Fundamental particles are simply sets of quantum numbers associated with coordinates (numbers again) in space-time. Fields are simply vast arrays of numbers specifying the strength of the field at various coordinates in space-time.

And numbers are nothing but a special type of mental concept. So the things in the physical universe turn out to be nothing but mental concepts.

Some would argue that there are other, more fundamental "things" that exist that account for everything else. These might by principles, or symmetry, or rules, or laws, or "the word". But, here again, all of those things are mental concepts and they can't exist outside a consciousness.

It seems to make consistent sense to me to consider that consciousness is essential and primordial and in fact, sufficient to explain everything.

Now, back to our disagreement: I say that neither the universe's past, nor its present, exists in the fundamental ontological sense. I say that they exist as structures of concepts in the primordial consciousness. Or, looking at it more commonly, if those structures which make up what seem to be our universe are said to exist, then SR compels us to admit that the universe's past, and some of its future, exist in the same sense as the universe does right "now".

I don't think I see how any of this helps explain what consciousness is anyway.

Maybe this will help. In my view, consciousness is fundamental, primordial, and the only thing that exists. That of course does not explain what consciousness is but there are three silver linings:

First, in this view, everything else does have a sensible explanation. It is clearly understandable how a consciousness can imagine sets of numbers and rules for how those numbers can interact so that the sets evolve. Modern physics has almost shown how our universe (with the exception of conscious experience) can be explained on that basis.

Second, our experience of consciousness has a reasonable explanation if we consider that it is that single primordial consciousness that is operating in each of us.

Third, even though none of this explains what consciousness is, it doesn't matter. We know exactly what consciousness is because we experience it directly.

It's great talking to you, Les. Have a happy Thanksgiving.

Canute

Nov25-04, 07:25 AM

Personally I think it is easier to explain consciousness if it developed before the universe was initiated, which after eons of evolution, then helped initiate the universe and evolve the biological vehicles we currently find ourselves in.
Is this a slip of the pen Les? Can here have been aeons of time before spacetime existed?

2. I also mentioned that I’m suspicious there is a logical fallacy every time when the facility that does the analysys is reduced to the facility that is analyzed. In other words, when you reduce consciousness to the same abstract level as its constituents, you’re committing a fallacy in an attempt to explain the former in terms of the latter. Just like you can’t prove certain statements in a consistent system by means of its own axioms (Godel’s incompleteness theorem), you can’t explain the phenomenon of consciousness in terms of its parts. As I mentioned before, a deterministic fallacy would be another example. What do you think?
I agree that self-reference and the incompleteness theorem are relevant to the topic. (Related also is set-theory, and the paradoxical question of how consciousness can be the contents of consciousness and the container that holds them at the same time, reminiscent of the paradoxes relating to the empty set and the set of all sets). But I come at it from a slightly different angle.

If the physical universe can be described mathematically, as is widely assumed, then it seems to follow that any such description will contain contradictions in the form of undecidable questions - which is what I take 'metaphysical' questions to be - and also that the phenomenal universe has a meta-system. All metaphysical questions are about this meta-system, and none can be answered without contradicting formal reasoning. I include the 'hard problem' amongst these questions.

The only way to address these question is from the metasystem, just as we answer other G-sentences from the metasystem. From this perspective, from outside the system, metaphysical questions can be seen to be predicated on false assumptions, namely dual thinking, the assumption that what is ultimate can be 'idolised', and described using concepts and terms from within the system, (like 'exist', 'eternal', 'infinite', 'extended', 'caused', undifferentiated and so on). Such terms assume that this ultimate state or ultimate 'thing' has external properties of the same kind as terms/objects/concepts within the system, and that is it must be one thing or the other rather than transcending such distinctions, and questions predicated on this assumption have only logically incoherent answers.

This seems to to me to be the explanation for the existence of all the many questions about reality which we know we can ask, but which we know cannot have an answer according to reason.

This is related also to Paul point, with which I also agree, that most of what we call the phenomenal world is, on analysis, just a construct of human consciousness. (Countries, baseball, cepheids, democracy, money, etc., and everyday human consciousness or 'self')

But this view runs into logical difficulties unless one entirely drops dual thinking and accepts that it is not possible to represent or characterise the meta-system - which is what I take 'the Tao', 'emptiness' or the 'Unicity' of Advaita to be - from within the system unless one misrepresents or mischaracterises it. Thus 'the Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao', for to name it is to inevitably misrepresent it as having dual properties. It is this metasystem from which the universe arises, so that, as Lao-Tsu says, "Knowing the ancient beginnings is the essence of Tao."

Thus also this wonderful teaching tale from Sufism:

"A certain caliph, wanting to test an idea on an unsophisticated person, asked his guards to range into the desert and bring him a bedouin Arab. They surrounded the first one whom they met, who happened to be a Sufi. ‘The Commander of the Faithful requires your presence,’ said the captain of the guard. ‘Who are the faithful, and how do they come to have a Commander?’ he asked. The soldiers concluded that this was indeed an unsophisticated man, and they brought him before the Caliph.
‘I have been told,’ said the ruler, ‘that bedouins are so ignorant that they do not know the simplest things.’
‘Who has told you?’
‘It was during a discussion with my intellectual advisers’.
‘If it is intellect you want, the problem is easy enough. Ask me anything.’
The Caliph ordered a dish of porridge to be brought. The Arab sniffed it and began to eat. ‘What is that?’ asked the Caliph.
‘Something that can be safely eaten,’ said the bedouin.
‘Yes, but what is its name?’
‘Adopting the methods of formal logic, applied to the knowledge available to me, I say that this is pomegranates.’
There was a laugh from the assembled scholastics who had told the Caliph that the bedouins were fools.
‘And how, pray, do you come to that conclusion?’
‘By the same methods that your scholastics use. I have heard the phrase "Dates and pomegranates" used to describe tasty foods. Now I know what dates are, as I live on them. This is not dates. Therefore it must be pomegranates.’

From ‘Esoteric Research’ (Tahqiq-I-Batini).
Reputedly written by Sir-Dan (Knower of Secrets) Daud Waraqi.
From Idries Shah - 'Caravan of Dreams'

Les Sleeth

Nov25-04, 09:44 AM

Is this a slip of the pen Les? Can here have been aeons of time before spacetime existed?

If we define "time" as that change which leads to the disappearance of something (entropic change), then it no. But the sort of change we see here in our universe doesn't necessarily define all change in all situations.

For example, what if there is some primordial "stuff" which is dynamic (i.e., moves around) , and if those chaotic dynamics have the potential to accidentally shape the primordial stuff into some self sustaining orderly dynamic whose change, rather than being entropic, is evolutive. Now, although the evolutive "entity" had a beginning, it doesn't necessarily have an end because the sort of change that characterizes it is one that makes it evolve. So when I used the term "eon," I was trying to get around the idea of disintegrative change that we in this universe call "time." Such the nature of change of an evolutive dynamic would be integrative.

Les Sleeth

Nov25-04, 12:43 PM

Hehe, oh noooo, that would imply there’s something beyond the physical world, maybe even God :biggrin:

Who me????? o:) I usually think that people who believe in God, or “something more,” or whatever they choose to call it, do so because they feel it. Some of us trust our feeling nature, while others need for things to make sense first and foremost. Trying to make sense of what one feels isn’t always so easy! Personally I keep the two realms separate. I do agree that if “something more” is going to be talked about in philosophy, whatever we say should fit the facts as we know them. That’s why I like the philosophy at PF . . . because there are a lot of people here who demand facts. It really helps me think more carefully.

I still haven’t quite sensed how the singularizing aspect of integration gives rise to a facility capable of conceptually transcending its own existence or being able to generalize. I can understand the functional account for consciousness, but when it comes to the “driver” and its volition, I’m just not there yet. . . . In case I didn’t get what you were driving at again, my apologies, please don’t waste your time any longer. I’m reading Chalmer’s paper, which I’m loving, and having more time to think about what you had to say might open up a whole new view on the issue.

I probably have been too enamored with my own way of making sense lately. Just when I decided I was going to be more humble, you get me all excited again! Anyway, I hope I haven’t taken up too much of your brain. Just a couple of final points about the model I’ve been presenting, and the “introspective” method of formulating, it before leaving you to Chalmers. It will take a bit of explaining, but what I am going to attempt to do is account for what you call “a facility capable of conceptually transcending its own existence or being able to generalize.”

First, let me explain that a big part of my view is shaped by the fact that I meditate every day, and have for decades. Now, my success with that practice has been directly proportional to my increasing awareness of the “center” of my consciousness. When I started practicing, the center of my being is most definitely not where I maintained my “me.” Instead of the center, I was caught up in what I can now recognize as peripheral operations of my consciousness.

I am going to ask you to look at your own consciousness again, the same thing I pointed to before, except this time to notice something new. Before I pointed to how consciousness seems surrounded by a field of sensitivity. Next I asked you to notice how the more you concentrate on information detected by the sensitivity aspect, the more it was “retained.” If you look at what happens, detection will stay mostly in the outer sensitivity realm until you do concentrate on it, and then that info is pulled in deeper into your consciousness.

Okay, here is what I am getting at. Just looking at it now, doesn’t it seem that sensing is outward-oriented, and that concentrating is inward-oriented? And isn’t that the basis for some type of polarity? What if, for instance, we tentatively model our sensitivity and concentrative aspects as entwined in a counterbalanced relationship? Would it help to explain behaviors of consciousness we observe?

It would explain thinking, and why the left and right brain function as they do. The inside border of where sensitivity and concentration meet would allow a two-phased oscillatory dynamic, just like a computer relies on with 1 and 0. The extreme outer part of the sensitivity-concentration team is still dedicated to sensing, and the extreme inner part of the sensitivity-concentration team would still be dedicated to concentrating. But now we have a polar synthesisizing process possible between them, an “interpolar area,” that might be capable of developing complicated oscillatory operations which characterize thinking. I’ve revised my little “disembodied consciousness” diagram to reflect the idea of a polar process built into the structure of consciousness:

See Diagram.

If the brain is set up to accommodate that “back and forth” dynamic, the right side is working with sensitivity, and the left side is working with concentration (ever notice how someone’s eyes move left and right while they are thinking?).

So what does this have to do with a transcending facility, as you call it, and my opening comments about the “center” of one’s being? Well, I am suggesting that thinking goes on relatively peripheral to the center. Most people live in their thought world, so that tends to center them there. When they look at consciousness, what they see is where they themselves are, so their models reflect that. But if one is also aware of something that is more central to consciousness, then a model will reflect that too.

I say, your idea of a transcending faculty that generalizes cannot be explained without both peripheral operations of consciousness and the central integrating aspect. A computer will not leap on its own (i.e., without being programmed to) to generalizing types of mental operations because a computer can’t “integrate.” If you think about it, a generalization is an integrative function, as is understanding. If fact, those qualities are exactly what made me start wondering if there wasn’t an integrative aspect to consciousness.

I pointed to the center concept because of your use of the word “transcending.” I meant to say, maybe generalizing (and subjectivity) are rising above the operations of consciousness, maybe they are moving more central to consciousness. Then, what will we find at the absolute most central point, where it’s so integrated its “one”? I have suggested that is where we will find the true self which is absorbing all that the peripheral parts are feeding it.

Meanwhile, I’d really appreciate your thoughts on some of the related points . . . I mentioned that I think there’s a modal aspect to the intent when we view in the context of a human mind. When I say “I intend to graduate from college”, I’m not merely saying my objective is to graduate. I’m expressing an attitude and possibility. It’s not the same type of possibility that I would use in a computer simulation model by invoking a random number generator. I’m not expressing that I’ll flip a coin, I’m expressing that I might change my mind. If I can clearly define this modality aspect of my consciousness, which I believe exists, I want to see if it can be explained in functional terms, and ultimately simulated, or is this another metaphysical phenomenon. Do I have a case here?

I can’t help but explain this in terms of how I’ve been modeling consciousness since I claim that all functions of consciousness can be explained as sensitivity, concentration, retention, integration or a combination of any of the four. The central self has intentions, it knows what it wants, or it can decide to change its intent. And then that central subjectivity relies on the concentrative aspect of itself for the “will” to manifest those intentions as actions. The will is an act of concentration.

I also mentioned that I’m suspicious there is a logical fallacy every time when the facility that does the analysis is reduced to the facility that is analyzed.

I think you are correct. In fact, I cited a similar fallacy somewhere (earlier in this thread I think), and referred to it as a “fallacy of composition.” I wrote:

“An example one of my philosophy dictionaries gives of the fallacy of composition would be to conclude that because all members of a baseball team are married, the baseball team as a whole therefore must have a wife. I’ve used an artist’s painting in the past to describe the fallacy. It goes something like this:

Say a research probe arrives here from another planet and finds Leonardo da Vinci’s painting of Mona Lisa. The probe takes samples of the paint and analyzes its chemistry; it takes samples of the canvas and records its composition; the probe analyzes the wavelengths of light reflected by the paint; it weighs the painting; it describes how all these factors are interconnected. Finally when every possible measurable factor is listed, it sends a report back to its home planet.

Question: do the planet’s inhabitants fully understand that painting? Has the painting been completely described by its list of components, its chemistry, its physics, and the interrelationships involved in all that? Is it logical to conclude that the whole is solely defined by the parts? This is what physicalist theory is. No more and no less. It is a description of the parts, their relationships, and their functions. That’s why physicalists now say they’ve explained life (ha!), and why they say they will eventually explain consciousness.

But just like that type of description of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting didn’t account for the creative organization present there, so too does physicalist descriptions of consciousness fail to account for why consciousness behaves in creatively organizing ways that are not observed in any non-living physical situation.

Finally, this idea of consciousness as an emergent property. I have a conceptual problem . . . with this explanation. . . . One of the unique aspects of consciousness is to generalize and create new entities on different levels of abstractions.

I don’t think I see how you are relating emergence to the ability to generalize.

Les Sleeth

Nov25-04, 03:02 PM

On the question of the real existence of the past, I think your quarrel is with Einstein and not with Greene. Greene simply used the loaf of bread to illustrate the inescapable conclusion of SR that there is no way of consistently defining the concept of "now" in physics. Any reasonable definition of the concept from the perspective of one observer will be inconsistent with that of another observer who is not in the former's inertial frame. So if "now" is the only thing that exists, who's "now" is it? And what makes that observer and his inertial frame special? The logical conclusion is that there is no physical distinction between past, present, or future. They all exist at once.

Paul, I don’t have the slightest problem with SR; it’s theorizing too far from any observed properties of time that I have a problem with. Also, reading ahead to the end of your post, I think I can see why you want to link up past, present and future, but to me it undermines your argument. Let me try to explain.

I understand that time in any frame of reference is locally determined by the conditions of that frame. But what is time? Do you think it is some kind of ineffable presence that is altered by physical conditions? Or is it, as I have suggested, simply a mental construct humans have devised to keep track of the rate of physical change? In the twins paradox, after leaving Earth acceleration and movement alter the traveling twin’s physical frame of reference, but does it alter the nature of his consciousness?

I started a thread in the old PF asking if the traveling twin, after spending 30 years on Earth at its rate of time, zipping along for 5 years in a space ship near light speed, then returning to discover 100 years had passed on Earth, if the twin might not think that was the longest 5 years he’d ever lived.

The physicalists argued unrelentinly there would be no way he could tell because not just his clocks, but every aspect of his frame of reference, including his own body and brain, would be aging at the same rate. True I said, but the question I am really posing is if consciousness is physical, because if it isn’t, and if instead it is something not subject to aging (even if the brain is), then it would not necessarily be altered by relativity effects (keep in mind, the twin did have his first 30 years of life to compare his last five to).

Similarly, the fact that you are in conditions which are entropically changing faster than I am doesn’t alter the fact that we are both in the present, because that’s where existence always is. Physical change happens at different rates, it is true, but if you assign existential factors to that, then you are also saying there is nothing enduring behind all that change. Isn’t part of your idea that there is an uncreated “something” which endures behind what’s mutable? So I say, if we were those twins, even though our clocks will read differently, and our bodies are aging at different rates, in the realm of consciousness you and I would be fully one.

Now, my take from your overall concept is that this is what you are trying to get at. That is, the real reality is something conscious behind all the change. As I said, I think it could undermine your argument, and here is why:

In my personal view, I reject the existence of the physical universe (I agree with Berkeley) and claim that the only thing that exists, or has ever existed, is a single consciousness. Everything else that seems to exist is nothing more than patterns of thought (i.e. ideas or information) of that consciousness. . . . Now, back to our disagreement: I say that neither the universe's past, nor its present, exists in the fundamental ontological sense. I say that they exist as structures of concepts in the primordial consciousness. Or, looking at it more commonly, if those structures which make up what seem to be our universe are said to exist, then SR compels us to admit that the universe's past, and some of its future, exist in the same sense as the universe does right "now".

You might guess that Berkeley’s idealistic perspective isn’t too popular around here. In fact, a long-time and rather prolific poster was expelled from here because he didn’t give enough credit to the reality of physicalness (not that I’m implying you are doing that). Because of some of the epic battles we’ve had, I for one am quite gun shy about messing with physical explanations that work just fine without say, “primordial consciousness.” Those areas not explained by physical principles alone, of course, are up for grabs (debating that has been one my favorite pastimes). Otherwise, I have found it works better here at PF, communication-wise, to treat the physical realm as having its own unique place in reality.

It seems to make consistent sense to me to consider that consciousness is essential and primordial and in fact, sufficient to explain everything. . . . Maybe this will help. In my view, consciousness is fundamental, primordial, and the only thing that exists.

I used to think that way until I tried to model the origin of creation. I do believe it is easier to explain aspects of creation, especially life and consciousness, if some kind of greater consciousness developed before the universe. The problem I had when modeling was having that earlier consciousness be fully primordial. From what you’ve written, it seems you are saying that primordial consciousness is infinitely and eternally existent, which is also a popular concept of God with most religions.

However, if the primordial consciousness has always existed, then shouldn’t it know everything? Yet looking at creation, it appears to me to have been somewhat experimental. I mean, what’s the deal with viruses? Talk about something we can all do without! But even if you can make the case that creation isn’t experimental, I still have to look at my own consciousness, which you claim is part of that greater realm. I know at least I am learning, and that I don’t know everything. To me, that right there negates the possibility that the primordial consciousness knows everything because it grows in knowledge as I do.

If the primordial consciousness knows more now than it did last week, then tracing that back we can see it knows less and less the further back we go, until we reach that point where it doesn’t know anything. To me this suggests it had a beginning (though not necessarily an end), and that it is finite in size. I think that it implies there is something more fundamental than consciousness which is eternal and infinitely extended. Some sort of primordial existential ocean of “stuff” (I like to call it “illumination”) which wasn’t created, cannot not exist, and which has the dynamics present in it with the potential to accidentally evolve consciousness. With such a theory we can explain first cause as potential that has always existed, and thereby escape the problem of infinte regress and the contradiction of a learning creator who didn’t have a beginning.

RingoKid

Nov26-04, 01:21 AM

The extra spacetime comprising those Calabi-Yau spaces.

I don't think you can apply the term spacetime to an object/entity that isn't governed by 4d laws of physics. Calabi-Yau manifolds are supposedly one dimensional constructs touching 4d spacetime at right angles so there is no extra space or time.

Spacetime is only relative to our 4d percievable universe beyond that all bets are off.

Les...

I believe the "primordial consciousness" is all knowledge...ie the sum total of all there is to know and we only tap into as much as our personal intellects will allow given our current evolutionary state.

Evolution is just change over time. Nothing is perfect. Our goal then is to evolve towards perfection such that we become nothing again as it was in the beginning. Nothing being consciousness without form.

A dimension of pure thought.

Paul Martin

Nov26-04, 02:51 PM

Paul, I don't have the slightest problem with SR; it's theorizing too far from any observed properties of time that I have a problem with.
I don't understand. Do you mean you are not concerned with, or interested in, SR because its predictions are too remote from your experience? Or do you mean that you agree with the conclusions of SR?

Also, reading ahead to the end of your post, I think I can see why you want to link up past, present and future,
If you are really interested in my motives, check out http://www.paulandellen.com/essays/essays.htm

I understand that time in any frame of reference is locally determined by the conditions of that frame.
I don't understand what you mean here, Les. If you mean the rate at which, and the direction in which, it seems to move, then no, those appear to be constant regardless of the frame. Time always appears to move ahead one second per second. It is only from the point of view of another frame that these characteristics are different. But the important idea here is that of locality. You said that "...time is...locally determined..." If all you are concerned about is time in your locality, then it is natural to assume a frame such as the surface of the earth where you happen to be, and all clocks in that locality will register time in a sensible way.

But if you ask about time as it relates to your local time, in remote non-local regions of space, then SR says you get into trouble.

Extending your local notion of time to some galaxy, say Andromeda, will produce a different notion of time than that of someone in a different frame. The question is, what do you mean by "now" (in terms of your local time reckoning) in Andromeda? Do you mean the state of the galaxy as you see it "now"? Or do you mean the state of the galaxy some number of years beyond the state in which you see it "now" where those years make up for the travel time of the light?

Either definition of "now" in Andromeda from your perspective will be different from those of an observer in another frame. Or is there a third definition of "now" that you have in mind?

This feature of SR is what logically implies the real existence of the past universe. So my motives in "want[ing] to link up past, present, and future" are simply that I want to accept SR and I want to accept only ideas that are consistent with SR.

But what is time?
Time is a variable quantity which is one of the necessary components for locating or identifying an event. (This happens to be consistent with the mathematical definition of 'dimension'.)

Do you think it is some kind of ineffable presence that is altered by physical conditions?
I can't answer with a "yes" or "no" because I don't understand the question. It contains too many vague expressions.

Or is it, as I have suggested, simply a mental construct humans have devised to keep track of the rate of physical change?
I would agree completely if you replaced "humans have" with "the one-and-only consciousness has". If you agree with me that all of our putatively individual consiousnesses are identically one and the same, you should have no problem with this substitution.

In the twins paradox, after leaving Earth acceleration and movement alter the traveling twin's physical frame of reference, but does it alter the nature of his consciousness?
I don't know but I would guess that it might. Simply traveling to the moon seemed to have altered the nature of at least one of our astronaut's consciousness.

Similarly, the fact that you are in conditions which are entropically changing faster than I am doesn't alter the fact that we are both in the present, because that's where existence always is.
No, I don't agree with your presumption of "the fact". There is no such thing as "the present" in the physical world.

Physical change happens at different rates, it is true, but if you assign existential factors to that, then you are also saying there is nothing enduring behind all that change. Isn't part of your idea that there is an uncreated "something" which endures behind what's mutable?
I don't know what you mean by "assign[ing] existential factors", but I say that the only enduring thing behind all that change is the one-and-only consciousness. So, yes, that consciousness is the uncreated "something" which endures behind everything else.

So I say, if we were those twins, even though our clocks will read differently, and our bodies are aging at different rates, in the realm of consciousness you and I would be fully one.
I say you and I are fully one regardless of what our bodies do.

You might guess that Berkeley's idealistic perspective isn't too popular around here.
I understand that there has been a lot of objection to Berkeley's ideas ever since he wrote them down. However, I agree with him that the physical universe exists only as a set of thoughts in a conscious mind. I disagree with him, however, in his attribution of this mind to a God which is infinite, immutable, complete, perfect, omnipotent, or omniscient. I deny all those attributes to the one-and-only consciousness.

In fact, a long-time and rather prolific poster was expelled from here because he didn't give enough credit to the reality of physicalness (not that I'm implying you are doing that).
If that's a threat, and if I am expelled, then I will be sorry. I am delighted to have found you (and Canute, Pavel, and the others) and I would deeply regret losing you now. If I did, my only consolation would be that I didn't get burned at the stake like I might have not too long ago for the same infraction.

Because of some of the epic battles we've had, I for one am quite gun shy about messing with physical explanations that work just fine without say, "primordial consciousness." Those areas not explained by physical principles alone, of course, are up for grabs (debating that has been one my favorite pastimes). Otherwise, I have found it works better here at PF, communication-wise, to treat the physical realm as having its own unique place in reality.
I hope I can fit in here. I think consciousness is an area "not explained by physical principles alone" and it seems that many of you agree with Chalmers on this issue as well. If we dare to ask about first causes or ontological essence, then I don't see why it would be offensive or unacceptable to hypothesize that consciousness is primordial. Would that be an unpardonable sin at PF?

[Paul:] In my view, consciousness is fundamental, primordial, and the only thing that exists.

[Les:] I used to think that way until I tried to model the origin of creation. I do believe it is easier to explain aspects of creation, especially life and consciousness, if some kind of greater consciousness developed before the universe.
I don't see the difference. By "primordial consciousness" I mean a consciousness which developed before the universe started. The question of whether the universe "exists" is purely semantic. In my view it exists as a set of ideas, but not in the fundamental sense that consciousness exists.

The problem I had when modeling was having that earlier consciousness be fully primordial. From what you've written, it seems you are saying that primordial consciousness is infinitely and eternally existent, which is also a popular concept of God with most religions.
I can't imagine what I've written that gave you that impression. I consistently and adamantly deny anything infinite or eternal. Most religious people would call me an atheist for that, and I am sure that many of their forebears would have burned me at the stake for saying so.

However, if the primordial consciousness has always existed, then shouldn't it know everything?
Absolutely not. What would suggest this non sequitur anyway? I think the primordial consciousness is continually surprised and amazed at the consequences of the evolution of the universe, as well as at many other emergent ideas which may have nothing to do with our universe.

Yet looking at creation, it appears to me to have been somewhat experimental.
In spades!! I couldn't agree more.

...I don't know everything. To me, that right there negates the possibility that the primordial consciousness knows everything because it grows in knowledge as I do.
To me there is much overwhelming evidence that the primordial consciousness doesn't know everything. But since you apparently agree with me, I won't go into them.

If the primordial consciousness knows more now than it did last week, then tracing that back we can see it knows less and less the further back we go, until we reach that point where it doesn't know anything.
I agree.

To me this suggests it had a beginning (though not necessarily an end), and that it is finite in size.
I agree.

I think that it implies there is something more fundamental than consciousness which is eternal and infinitely extended.
Why?? for Heaven's sake? I think it implies nothing of the sort.

Some sort of primordial existential ocean of "stuff" (I like to call it "illumination") which wasn't created, cannot not exist, and which has the dynamics present in it with the potential to accidentally evolve consciousness.

Doesn't this run afoul of Occam? He admonished us to assume the minimum. This sounds like a very complex starting point.
With such a theory we can explain first cause as potential that has always existed, and thereby escape the problem of infinte regress and the contradiction of a learning creator who didn't have a beginning.
What problem of infinite regress??!!

What contradiction is there in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning??

I am happy finally to be discussing these very issues that I have longed to discuss with someone for 60 years. I hope I don't get expelled from this forum for my ideas or for my manners. If you think that is a risk for me, please give me another warning and some clues to the appeal or forgiveness process.

Thanks for all your thoughts.

Paul

Paul Martin

Nov26-04, 03:38 PM

Hi Ringo,
I don't think you can apply the term spacetime to an object/entity that isn't governed by 4d laws of physics.
I'm not familiar with that prohibition. In mathematics, it is fair game to assign any symbol to, or define any term to mean, any concept you like. You just need to be clear about your usage up front and then remain consistent in your usage. In science, there is a little less freedom. There, and even to a great extent even in mathematics, people are obliged to use the official terminology. If there is an official connotation of 'spacetime' meaning the 4D space-time continuum of Einstein and DeSitter, then I am unaware of it. On the other hand, I don't think I ever used the term 'spacetime' in any of my posts.

But clearly, string theorists posit the existence of additional dimensions of space, beyond the three of what you call "spacetime". Those are spatial dimensions, so it only seems reasonable to call the continuum spanned by them 'space'.

Calabi-Yau manifolds are supposedly one dimensional constructs touching 4d spacetime at right angles so there is no extra space or time.
I am glad you called them "manifolds" because in my opinion, that is exactly what they should be considered to be. It dismays me when writers like Brian Greene call them "Calabi-Yau spaces". I think a great deal could be gained if we viewed what you call "spacetime" to be a 4D manifold in a higher dimensional space-time continuum. If you checked out the thread you asked me to reference, you might have seen some of my arguments for this view.

Oh, and by the way, the Calabi-Yau "spaces" contain many more dimensions than one.

Spacetime is only relative to our 4d percievable universe beyond that all bets are off.
I'm not sure what you are insisting here, Ringo. If it is a specific connotation of 'spacetime' then I will be careful not to use that term in any other way. If you mean that we can't draw any conclusions from the supposition that there might be extra, astronomically large, nearly flat dimensions of space comprising a continuum in which spacetime (in your sense of the term) is embedded as a manifold, then I disagree. I think that by using mathematics, we can deduce many characteristics and features of this system. I think that is what the string theorists should be hard at work doing right now.

Thanks for writing,

Paul

Rader

Nov26-04, 04:08 PM

Simply traveling to the moon seemed to have altered the nature of at least one of our astronaut's conscious.

How?

I think the primordial consciousness is continually surprised and amazed at the consequences of the evolution of the universe, as well as at many other emergent ideas which may have nothing to do with our universe.

Why, do you have an example?

To me there is much overwhelming evidence that the primordial consciousness doesn't know everything.

Like what?

Why what evidence? You are implying that consciousness is learning, as it goes, it seems the other way around, physical entities seem to be doing the evolving, with a unending source of knowledge.

What contradiction is there in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning??

Only one this implies a child who had no parents. Or do you have another?

Paul Martin

Nov26-04, 06:37 PM

How?
I was referring to one of the Apollo astronauts who reported that after his experience, he felt that he related to the cosmos in some more profound way. I don't remember the details or even who it was, but he claimed that it was some sort of spiritual experience. Now, How you ask? I don't know that either, but it doesn't surprise me. I think it probably happened in the same way as any other profoundly religious experience, such as OBE, NDE, successful meditation, etc. I am convinced by some of my own experiences and by a lot of anecdotal evidence that we can under some circumstances become consciously aware of a greater reality than the physical one we share here on earth.

Why, do you have an example?
I'll give you two examples. First, since I believe there is only one consciousness, that means that the consciousness of any individual human is the same as the primordial consciousness. So any time a human is surprised at some new discovery, that would constitute an example. For example, I am sure Benoit Mandelbrot was surprised at the intricate complexity of the Mandelbrot set that was a consequence of his relatively simple algorithm.

The second example is for people who disagree with me about the primordial consciousness but who believe in the God of the Bible. Here God as much as says that He was surprised that the universe turned out to be "good". Then, later on, he seemed surprised to find that it wasn't so good after all and he took drastic measures to try to start over, at least with the fauna.

Like what?

Why what evidence?
The fossil record is replete with such evidence. The slow, halting, triial and error pattern of the development of the various life forms on earth seems like blind stumbling rather than a design produced by a designer who knows everything.

You are implying that consciousness is learning, as it goes, it seems the other way around, physical entities seem to be doing the evolving, with a unending source of knowledge.
You are mixing up a couple of things here, Rader. You are talking about consciousness and about physical entities. Of those two, I think you would agree that it is consciousness that can learn and know and not physical entities. Yes, a physical entity like a thermostat can "learn" or "know" what the temperature is, but surely you would agree that that is learning or knowing in a different sense than the way you learn or know things. The difference is that you are conscious and the thermostat is not.

In any case, learning is not the same thing as evolving. I agree with you that physical entities are what evolve. We could say that consciousness "evolves" in some sense, such as becoming aware of more and more, or of learning more and more, but surely you would agree that that is evolving in a different sense than the way in which a galaxy or a species of organisms evolve. Evolution is nothing more than a history of change.

So I would say that consciousness learns as it goes and physical entities evolve as they go.

Only one this implies a child who had no parents. Or do you have another?
Well if that's the only contradiction there is in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning, we can polish that one off right here and now. We don't have that problem as long as we don't claim that the learning creator started out as a child. I make no such claim.

Good talking to you, Rader,

Paul

Canute

Nov27-04, 06:29 AM

Rader

Nov27-04, 10:59 AM

I was referring to one of the Apollo astronauts who reported that after his experience, he felt that he related to the cosmos in some more profound way. I don't remember the details or even who it was, but he claimed that it was some sort of spiritual experience. Now, How you ask? I don't know that either, but it doesn't surprise me. I think it probably happened in the same way as any other profoundly religious experience, such as OBE, NDE, successful meditation, etc. I am convinced by some of my own experiences and by a lot of anecdotal evidence that we can under some circumstances become consciously aware of a greater reality than the physical one we share here on earth.

Yes I see what you mean now, that’s what I thought you meant. CEOTTK seems to do that also.

I'll give you two examples. First, since I believe there is only one consciousness, that means that the consciousness of any individual human is the same as the primordial consciousness. So any time a human is surprised at some new discovery, that would constitute an example. For example, I am sure Benoit Mandelbrot was surprised at the intricate complexity of the Mandelbrot set that was a consequence of his relatively simple algorithm.

Individual human consciousness seems to be a part of primordial consciousness, for the following reason, I have thoughts and know certain things before I know and are fully aware of them. So all knowledge would have to be somewhere and I, somehow tune in on it, for reasons that are not fully understood.

The second example is for people who disagree with me about the primordial consciousness but who believe in the God of the Bible. Here God as much as says that He was surprised that the universe turned out to be "good". Then, later on, he seemed surprised to find that it wasn't so good after all and he took drastic measures to try to start over, at least with the fauna.

Now you are making an assumption that primordial consciousness is not, that three letter word that you seem to dislike. Well whether we are in a Matrix or not I perceive the world as evolving in > this direction, that is natural perfection. I consider an increase in knowledge of what I know and awareness of good that I do, sufficient evidence that it is so. Well whether you use the word primordial consciousness or God, from what we know of the design of the world, neither are fools.

The fossil record is replete with such evidence. The slow, halting, trial and error pattern of the development of the various life forms on earth seems like blind stumbling rather than a design produced by a designer who knows everything.

You consider humans to then be an error in the wrong directions? You must examine your I, only it know how far along the chain of evolution it has gone. The design in the universe shows fine tuning to a set of unchangeable laws, that are governed by free will. I through my decisions can make changes to my life in a spiritual mental or physical way, that can be passed on to future generations. I know this when I look to the past or future generations on each side of me. If I observe this, then it is in everything.

You are mixing up a couple of things here, Rader. You are talking about consciousness and about physical entities. Of those two, I think you would agree that it is consciousness that can learn and know and not physical entities.

No I do not, physical things might be progressively more conscious but that’s only possible if primordial consciousness knows everything. That’s not to say that consciousness might not be able to know things without a body and that my body sure could not know anything if it had no consciousness. An individual self knows the world through the eyes of it consciousness. This knowing is only partial of all that is known. I think that the I, knows its conscious because it has a physical body but when it no longer has it, it might still know but in a way we know nothing of.

Yes, a physical entity like a thermostat can "learn" or "know" what the temperature is, but surely you would agree that that is learning or knowing in a different sense than the way you learn or know things. The difference is that you are conscious and the thermostat is not.

There most certainly is a difference between a light bulb and a human but there’s no way for you to know what that difference is. The only thing that you can assume is that, it is conscious on a level quite a bit lower than yourself. If brains do not produce consciousness and I am conscious there is no reason to assume anything else is not also conscious since we are all made of the same atoms, just arranged slightly different.

In any case, learning is not the same thing as evolving. I agree with you that physical entities are what evolve. We could say that consciousness "evolves" in some sense, such as becoming aware of more and more, or of learning more and more, but surely you would agree that that is evolving in a different sense than the way in which a galaxy or a species of organisms evolve. Evolution is nothing more than a history of change.
So I would say that consciousness learns as it goes and physical entities evolve as they go.

Learning is not the same as evolving but surely without out it there would be no evolving. There has to be awareness in order to make a change. To make that change, there must be decisions. What observes and makes the decision, is ultimately what experiences that action.
Physical entities learn and evolve within a given set of laws, if you rearrange the order of there atoms, they no longer evolve nor are they conscious of what thy were, that’s not to say arrangement of atoms makes something conscious. Its the use of the arrangement that makes the consciousness.

What I would say is, the last words typed on the program were seek >>> and you could only know what that means is if you understood the whole program.
Consciousness uses physical things to follow its programs progress. Did you ever notice that when you mess up the arrangement of human body it can no longer follow the program.
Well if that's the only contradiction there is in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning, we can polish that one off right here and now. We don't have that problem as long as we don't claim that the learning creator started out as a child. I make no such claim.

You said: What contradiction is there in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning??

Thats my interpretation, what are you getting at? Could you give me your explanation?

Rothiemurchus

Nov27-04, 11:02 AM

Since being conscious requires energy to be expended, I should think that consciousness is an integral part of evolution - expend too much energy and you die.

Les Sleeth

Nov27-04, 11:44 AM

If that's a threat, and if I am expelled, then I will be sorry. I am delighted to have found you (and Canute, Pavel, and the others) and I would deeply regret losing you now. If I did, my only consolation would be that I didn't get burned at the stake like I might have not too long ago for the same infraction.

Let’s clear this up first while I am working on answering the rest of your post. What I said wasn’t a threat! I am in no position to threaten anyway. I am just an ordinary member here like you. It might have been a “heads up” to be careful about mixing idealism with established physical principles. So far you seem to be pretty conservative in theorizing. Even though we are disagreeing about a couple of things, personally I am glad to have another person around who is open to consciousness being part of creation (two in fact . . . Pavel seems a thinker too). :!!)

Rader

Nov27-04, 12:16 PM

If consciousness is not causal then it does not evolve, and being conscious bestows no evolutionary advantage on an entity. This is not my view, and I mention it just to draw attention to the counter-intuitiveness of physicalism is in this respect. At present consciousness is thought by those who hold a 'scientific' view of it to be the only attribute of biological species that has not evolved but has just sort of appeared for no good reason. Darwin was cautious about consciousness, but Neo-Darwinists are clear on this. The human species would have evolved just the same if we had all been zombies. How they reconcile this with their common sense I don't know, but this seems to be the way things are.

If I am conscious and perceive the world evolving and it does not contradict the laws that I also perceive as not evolving, consciousness could be causal.
This would not contradict the scientific view, only that there is no way of knowing first cause, since consciousness is not physical. Hence there would be no way of measuring it or knowing if it evolves.

Les Sleeth

Nov27-04, 01:23 PM

This would not contradict the scientific view, only that there is no way of knowing first cause, since consciousness is not physical. Hence there would be no way of measuring it or knowing if it evolves.

I cannot see how you come to this conclusion. Can't you observe your own consciousness evolving? Are you sure something has to be measurable to be evolutive?

Paul Martin

Nov27-04, 02:37 PM

Hi Rader,

So all knowledge would have to be somewhere and I, somehow tune in on it, for reasons that are not fully understood.
Just as Socrates said.

that three letter word that you seem to dislike
To use Les Sleeth's words, I am gun shy about using that three letter word. In polite scientific company, I get raised eyebrows and several points shaved off my credibility score. In polite religious company, I get lowered eyebrows and scorn for using their word in an offensive way. I think it is only suitable for use in impolite company, and there I'd rather not mingle.

Well whether you use the word primordial consciousness or God, from what we know of the design of the world, neither are fools.
I agree completely. Either way, it is awesome beyond comprehension.

You consider humans to then be an error in the wrong directions?
Not at all. The exact opposite.

You must examine your I, only it know how far along the chain of evolution it has gone.
I have done that and I am impressed beyond words.

[Paul:] You are mixing up a couple of things here, Rader.

[Rader:] No I do not,?
After reading what you wrote, I agree. You are not mixing up anything. It's just that when discussing such deep subjects, the words we use can be interpreted many ways. You stated your position well; I just misinterpreted it.

You said: What contradiction is there in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning?

Thats my interpretation, what are you getting at? Could you give me your explanation?
Actually, I think Les started this by saying that there is a contradiction in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning (or some such wording). I responded by asking him what contradiction he was talking about. Then you came along with what I thought was an answer to my question. You said that the only contradiction you could think of was that you can't have a child without a parent. I responded that I didn't think that applied since I didn't consider the primordial consciousness to be a child.

Here's the way I see the primordial question:
As Leibniz pointed out, there is something and not nothing. (He wondered why.)
We notice that this "something" changes.
As Les (and many others) suggested, we can imagine tracing those changes backwards and ask ourself, (my word processor just flagged 'ourself' as misspelled. It evidently doesn't know yet that indeed while 'our' is plural, 'self' is singular.) what was that "something" at the very beginning?
Since we see progress in evolution, as you suggested, Rader, it seems to make sense that the "something" gets simpler as you go back toward its ultimate origin.
This, together with Occam's Razor, suggests that we look for the simplest thing possible as a guess for what that primordial "something" might be.
My guess is that is the simplest possible form of consciousness, since more complex and capable consciousness could have evolved from it simply by trying things and learning from the surprising results, and the physical world is completely explainable from this sort of starting point along the lines of John Wheeler's "It from bit". That is, physical things might be made of nothing but information, and information is nothing but thought or mental concepts.
So my guess for the nature of the simplest consciousness is simply the ability to know, but with nothing to know at the very beginning.

Good talking with you, Rader. BTW, what is CEOTTK?

Paul

Les Sleeth

Nov27-04, 02:41 PM

Paul, since your last post addressed to major points, I've split my answer into two posts.

I don't understand. Do you mean you are not concerned with, or interested in, SR because its predictions are too remote from your experience? Or do you mean that you agree with the conclusions of SR?

I do not question special relativity, but I don’t think Greene’s little model is to be treated as a fact either. It is one thing to accept SR, and another thing to extend an unsubstantiated theory from it and then treat that theory as an assumption in yet another theory. I used the term “experience” because that, in science, is what verifies a hypothesis. So when I say someone is “extending too far from experience,” I mean their theory’s assumptions are not adequately supported by experiential confirmation.

I don't understand what you mean here, Les. If you mean the rate at which, and the direction in which, it seems to move, then no, those appear to be constant regardless of the frame. . . . You said that "...time is...locally determined..." If all you are concerned about is time in your locality, then it is natural to assume a frame such as the surface of the earth where you happen to be, and all clocks in that locality will register time in a sensible way.

No I don’t mean that. I understand SR well enough to know how a frame of reference works. I was saying that every single spot in the universe where you might place yourself will be a new frame of reference, and the time (rate of change . . . explained more below) of that spot will be locally determined by the conditions present. If one of the twins instantly warps from Earth to a neutron star, time would pass more slowly for him there than his twin back on Earth because of the difference in gravity. If the neutron star suddenly blows up and he is still floating in the exact same spot where he was before it blew up, time in his frame of reference will now be faster than it was when the star was there. So time is totally determined by the local conditions of a frame of reference.

Extending your local notion of time to some galaxy, say Andromeda, will produce a different notion of time than that of someone in a different frame. The question is, what do you mean by "now" (in terms of your local time reckoning) in Andromeda? Do you mean the state of the galaxy as you see it "now"? Or do you mean the state of the galaxy some number of years beyond the state in which you see it "now" where those years make up for the travel time of the light?

Now is exactly the same in every single place in this universe for consciousness. It is always now. The same now you are experiencing is the same exact now someone living in Andromeda is experiencing. The physical aspects of their frame of reference might be changing at a different rate than yours, but that has nothing to do with the fact that conscious experience itself can never escape the present moment.

If I now see a supernova that happened in Andromeda 2.2 million years ago (i.e., before my “now”), what I am seeing is light record that still exists. I am not experiencing the past, and the past is not there.

Either definition of "now" in Andromeda from your perspective will be different from those of an observer in another frame. Or is there a third definition of "now" that you have in mind?

(I am not sure I get the meaning of your question, so if my answer doesn’t make sense, that’s why.) Every frame of reference has unique aspects that define the frame, even if it is only the fact that two consciousnesses cannot occupy the same place (i.e., position uniqueness). So everyone’s experience of their position is always unique. However, I think I might have a “third definition of now,” which I will explain shortly.

This feature of SR is what logically implies the real existence of the past universe. So my motives in "want[ing] to link up past, present, and future" are simply that I want to accept SR and I want to accept only ideas that are consistent with SR.

I do not believe I am saying anything inconsistent with SR. I just don’t think we are going to agree about this because of our different concepts of time. You say, “Time is a variable quantity which is one of the necessary components for locating or identifying an event. (This happens to be consistent with the mathematical definition of 'dimension'.)” You are talking about time like it is “something” because to me there is no possible way for the past or future to exist unless time is something. But I say time is absolutely nothing but an observation humans make about the changing universe. Time is a mental construct, it is a perspective some people project onto reality as though it is really “out there” somewhere, when actually it’s all in their heads!

How is the universe changing? It is flying apart, at ever greater speeds. It is radiating EM, and that radiation’s oscillation rate slows down with the expansion of universe. If the universe keeps going this way, maybe where it used to be will be one huge wave of light. (That’s just my little guess.) Anyway, we call this change direction from being more ordered and compact to less ordered and extended entropy, as I am sure you know (okay, I know I added “compact/extended” to the definition).

So one way to speak of time is to say the universe has so many entropic events left. How many it has is how much “time” the universe has before it’s time is up. Now if I compare the rate of entropy at two different spots it turns out the rates of disintegration can be different and the rates can even be affected (e.g., by acceleration) -- that’s what SR predicts.

I, as consciousness, am now present in the midst of the physical universe. Personally speaking, I’ve found something inside myself that doesn’t seem to change entropically, and experiencing that is what has made me more aware of how what disappears contrasts what continues to evolve. So here I am, temporarily in entwined in biology, which is situated in a disappearing universe. My “time” is one huge moment, the universe’s time is zillions of changes before it is gone.

There is nothing special about time, it is utterly ordinary. In my opinion, trying to make time a dimension someone can move around in is just a physicalist attempt to make materiality more interesting.

I don't know but I would guess that it might. Simply traveling to the moon seemed to have altered the nature of at least one of our astronaut's consciousness.

I was talking about the underlying, most fundamental nature of consciousness, not what someone learns or opens up to. Whether that astronaut went to the moon or not, he was still consciousness, and going to the moon didn’t change his basic nature one bit. What it did was simply make him conscious of things he wasn’t before.

Don’t you think that consciousness is “something” first before all the things it learns and does? What is the composition of consciousness? What makes me conscious as opposed to say, an electric field?

No, I don't agree with your presumption of "the fact". There is no such thing as "the present" in the physical world.

LOL! We are finally agreeing (I think :tongue2:). You, as consciousness, are the only thing “present.” It is the constancy and anti-entropic nature of consciousness juxtaposed against the insanely disorganizing universe that gives us the sense of “time.” We are always now, the universe never holds steady long enough to qualify.

I understand that there has been a lot of objection to Berkeley's ideas ever since he wrote them down. However, I agree with him that the physical universe exists only as a set of thoughts in a conscious mind.

Well, that’s your theory, and obviously there is no way to prove it wrong. That’s one of the big objections to idealism. We can see how well any theory explains what we observe to be true, which you’ve been doing pretty well. However, unless you are speaking metaphorically I don’t think saying the “physical universe exists only as a set of thoughts” is very useful. It doesn’t explain anything better than it can be explained now, and it doesn’t give us any means to test the theory. The physicalist can come back and say “I can explain a star with physical principles alone, so show me the ‘thought’ part of a star and what role it plays in the star’s existence.”

My own opinion is that to make any creator consciousness points around here one has to show where physicalist theory fails to account for something; or, if one is going to propose an alternative theory, then also build on some kind of evidence so the theory has an anchor to reality.

Les Sleeth

Nov27-04, 02:44 PM

I don't see the difference. By "primordial consciousness" I mean a consciousness which developed before the universe started.

1. I consistently and adamantly deny anything infinite or eternal.

2. What contradiction is there in positing a learning creator who didn't have a beginning??

3. What problem of infinite regress??!!

4. Doesn't this run afoul of Occam? He admonished us to assume the minimum. This sounds like a very complex starting point.

I grouped those quotes of yours together so I could try to explain why I don’t think part of your theory makes sense. Statement 1 and 2 at least appear contradictory. If the creator didn’t have a beginning, it always existed, and therefore is eternal.

Infinite regress is implied because we have a learning creator, but no explanation of what started it learning. What was it before it learned? If you say it has always existed, and always learned, then that should make the creator infinitely learned. Yet we can go backward and see a creator less learned. So if the creator is becoming more learned, there has to be a starting point. What was it?

Finally, your call for Occam’s razor is inapt since it’s only used to be rid of what’s superfluous. But not only do we not have a cause for a creator’s learning, we don’t have any essence property to explain what creator consciousness is made out of. Let’s use hydraulic fluid as a analogy. In a hydraulic device, we can see the fluid assists in exerting force on an object. While the fluid can “do” things, it has properties of its own too that are its constitution. In fact, you have to understand the properties of a fluid to help explain why it “works” to create hydraulics.

Similarly, right now you are proposing consciousness as the “doer” of everything that exists, yet do you think it has no essential properties? Are we going to say consciousness is nothing and it can do things? If it is something, then what? And where did that something come from, what is it like?

A solution to the problem is to have something more basic -- something like the “neutral monism” Bertrand Russell proposed -- a sort of “absolute essence,” which was never created and exists in an infinite continuum. If that most basic existential stuff has dynamics (for instance, compression-decompression dynamics, or wave dynamics, or vortex dynamics, etc.), then it could contain the potential to accidentally evolve into consciousness at some spot within the infinite continuum, and so could be the “first cause” of a creationary principle. Now we’ve explained where the creator resides, what it is made of, why it doesn’t seem infinitely big or knowledgeable or powerful, and what caused it (or at least that some set of continuum dynamics spontaneously manifested it).

Since I’ve said one should try to build a model on evidence, is there any to support the “absolute essence” concept? It so happens that one of the most consistent reports of people who have become adept at meditation is that consciousness appears bright and vibrant. Is the absolute essence some sort of vibrant luminescence? If creator consciousness is an evolved “form” of this stuff, is all else found in creation also a form of it shaped by creator consciousness? Of course, if the absolute essence is too subtle to be detected by equipment, then the only test we have for the concept is to study creation and see if literally everything (since everything must be a form or manifestation of the absolute essence) can be explained in terms of it.

Rader

Nov27-04, 06:10 PM

I cannot see how you come to this conclusion. Can't you observe your own consciousness evolving?

I could but would have no way of proving it to you, only by measure of physical things you observed in the world can you make that conclusion.

Are you sure something has to be measurable to be evolutive?

For all practical purposes if its physical yes, if its not, the question seems to be open for debate.

Paul Martin

Nov28-04, 02:45 PM

Hi Les,

It is sobering and humbling for me to discover what a poor communicator I have been in my posting here. I hope you did not take anything I wrote as an insult. I was only trying to be clear and I apologize if anything I said sounded insulting. That goes for anything I might say here too.

It still seems to me that there is an inconsistency in your thinking: On the one hand, you say that you do not question special relativity. On the other hand, you don't seem to accept, or at least acknowledge, what I think is a fundamental consequence of SR. That is that there is not, and cannot be, a consistent definition or notion of the concept of "now" in the physical universe. In other words, there is no such thing as simultaneity in the physical universe.

You said you "don't think we are going to agree about this because of our different concepts of time." I say that if we can't agree on this it will have nothing to do with our respective concepts of time. My concept of time plays no part in this particular issue (I'll talk about my concept a little later on.) As I see it, if we can't agree it will be because you won't accept the impossibility of simultaneity.

This impossibility was discovered by Einstein and was not something Brian Greene came up with. Greene only presented his "little model" in an attempt to show how one can visualize and convince oneself of the truth of this consequence.

Since you brought up the effects of the gravity of a neutron star, "position uniqueness", increasing entropy, the twins paradox, the question of whether time is a dimension, and the conscious experience of the present moment, -- none of which has anything to do with the question of simultaneity, -- and since you didn't comment on the effects of the difference between two different inertial frames, I can only conclude that you missed the point. Let me try to present it more clearly.

It is clear that, as an observer of the physical universe, I experience the present moment which I call "now". Let's suppose that you and I are in the same inertial frame, say we happen to be sitting on benches in a railroad station. If we compare notes, e.g. if we ask one another what time the clock on the station wall is displaying "now", we can reasonably conclude that our respective experiences of the present moment, or what we call "now", are the same.

Let's say that while sitting on those benches, we get into a discussion about astronomy and I tell you that I had just come from an observatory and had seen the start of a supernova in a galaxy 10 billion light years away. You are amazed at the coincidence and say that you had also been to the observatory and seen the same thing. Then one of us asks "What do you suppose is going on in that galaxy "now"?" We don't really know, but it seems for sure that it will be whatever goes on in that galaxy exactly 10 billion years after that supernova occurred.

Now let's say that our wives are on a train that happens to be moving past the station at 10 mph. We call them on our cell phones and tell them about our discussion. They are both experts in SR and know how to do the calculations. They tell us that from their point of view, what is going on "now" in that galaxy is exactly 10,000,000,150 years after that supernova. It is 150 years off from our "now" out there in that galaxy. (I took these numbers from Greene's "The Fabric of the Cosmos" p136. They assume that the galaxy is just setting in the west and the train is moving due east.)

The point is that by simply moving at 10mph, the moment experienced as "now" when extended out 10 billion light years changes by 150 years! So to claim that "Now is exactly the same in every single place in this universe..." is not consistent with SR.

I realize that I didn't quote you exactly here. What you said was, "Now is exactly the same in every single place in this universe for consciousness." What I hope I have pointed out is that your statement could be true for your consciousness and mine, provided we are in the same inertial frame. Bit it doesn't hold true if we include other consciousnesses in other frames, e.g. our wives on the train.

Now, in the circumstance of discussing ideas here at PF, I think that both of us want to accept all of the conclusions and current theories of modern science. I see no problem here. I think we can agree with SR that there is no such thing as simultaneity and still maintain our notion that consciousness is always in the present moment. I think we agree on that because that is what we experience. That doesn't contradict SR because SR says nothing at all about either the concept of "consciousness" or the concept of "now".

It is one thing to accept SR, and another thing to extend an unsubstantiated theory from it and then treat that theory as an assumption in yet another theory. I used the term "experience" because that, in science, is what verifies a hypothesis. So when I say someone is "extending too far from experience," I mean their theory's assumptions are not adequately supported by experiential confirmation.
What "unsubstantiated theory"? What are you referring to as "yet another theory"?

You say, "Time is a variable quantity which is one of the necessary components for locating or identifying an event. (This happens to be consistent with the mathematical definition of 'dimension'.)" You are talking about time like it is "something" because to me there is no possible way for the past or future to exist unless time is something. But I say time is absolutely nothing but an observation humans make about the changing universe. Time is a mental construct, it is a perspective some people project onto reality as though it is really "out there" somewhere, when actually it's all in their heads!
Isn't an observation something? I tried to be very careful with my answer to your question, "What is time?" I think my answer is consistent with science and I think that it is also consistent with your notion of time as well. Keep in mind that in my view, when you say "humans" I interpret that to mean human consciousness which I claim is identical with the one-and-only consciousness. I would, however, disagree when you say "it's all in their heads". In my view consciousness is not seated in human heads. That is a prevalent illusion that makes it easier to talk about a lot of things. I think consciousness is seated not only outside of our heads but outside of the entire 4D physical universe.

But I think you and I and science all agree in principle as to the nature of time. I say it is simply a mental concept in the mind (of the one consciousness). That concept happens to be consistent with the concept of a dimension in mathematics and it is the same as the concept of time as used in physics. I think we are all in agreement on the notion of time although we might have different views as to the essential ontological nature of reality.

In my opinion, trying to make time a dimension someone can move around in is just a physicalist attempt to make materiality more interesting.
Neither science nor I define a dimension as something one can move around in. A spatial dimension, yes, but not a dimension in general. Just like a length is not something you can cut with a saw, but a length of board is.

Don't you think that consciousness is "something" first before all the things it learns and does?
Yes. That's what I mean by "primordial".

What is the composition of consciousness?
It is the essence of being. It is ontologically fundamental. It has no finer constituent parts.

In any speculation about the constituents of reality, any guess can be challenged by the follow-up question, "Yes, but what is that made of?" We have seen science follow that pattern of questioning, first guessing there were atoms, then protons, then quarks, then strings, etc. The search, of course, is for what lies at the very bottom. I think John Wheeler's guess ("It from bit.") that at bottom there is nothing but information as the fundamental constituent is getting closer. But I would press it even further. I have a quarrel with Shannon's commonly accepted definition of 'information'. What I think Shannon overlooked, or dodged, is the necessary involvement of consciousness in his definition.

If you look carefully at what is required in order to have information as Shannon (or anyone else IMHO) defined it, you must first have a conscious mind. Ergo, I say that in guessing what might be the most fundamental of all constituents of being, or reality, if we choose consciousness then everything else falls out naturally.

Since we must stop somewhere in this progression of guesses, to ask "What is the composition of consciousness?" is, in my view, to ask an unanswerable question. I suppose the best one could do would be to wink and say, "It's consciousness all the way down!".

What makes me conscious as opposed to say, an electric field?
That is similar to the question, "Why can I get TV programs on my TV set and not on my refrigerator?" The answer is that because of its specific physical structure the TV set is able to convert patterns in EM radiation to images and sounds. The refrigerator does not have such a structure. In a similar way, your brain is constructed in such a way as to be able to communicate directly with the one-and-only consciousness. The electric field is not.

LOL! We are finally agreeing (I think ). You, as consciousness, are the only thing "present." It is the constancy and anti-entropic nature of consciousness juxtaposed against the insanely disorganizing universe that gives us the sense of "time." We are always now, the universe never holds steady long enough to qualify.
Well, you might be right that we are finally agreeing (except for your references to entropy which we can discuss sometime). But as you must know by now, in order for me to agree with your paragraph I must insist that what you refer to with the words 'We', 'I', 'You', and 'us' are all identically one and the same thing: the one-and-only consciousness. The universe, on the other hand, is a set of thoughts (i.e. ideas, concepts or information) in that consciousness.

...unless you are speaking metaphorically I don't think saying the "physical universe exists only as a set of thoughts" is very useful. It doesn't explain anything better than it can be explained now, and it doesn't give us any means to test the theory. The physicalist can come back and say "I can explain a star with physical principles alone, so show me the ‘thought' part of a star and what role it plays in the star's existence."
I am not speaking metaphorically. To the physicalist I would ask, just what are "physical principles" anyway? Are principles not mental concepts or mental constructs? And are they, in turn, not "thoughts"? And do thoughts exist apart from a conscious mind?

So the role thought plays in a star's existence is that the thought causes the star to exist.

My own opinion is that to make any creator consciousness points around here one has to show where physicalist theory fails to account for something; or, if one is going to propose an alternative theory, then also build on some kind of evidence so the theory has an anchor to reality.
In my opinion physicalist theory fails to account for the experience of consciousness. The rest of their theory is fine. I would simply adjoin consciousness to the bottom of their theory rather than find it emerging somehow at the top.

Good talking to you Les. I'll respond to the second part of your post later.

Paul

Les Sleeth

Nov28-04, 04:13 PM

It is sobering and humbling for me to discover what a poor communicator I have been in my posting here. I hope you did not take anything I wrote as an insult. I was only trying to be clear and I apologize if anything I said sounded insulting. That goes for anything I might say here too.

I don't feel anything negative about this discussion, I think you have been communicating just fine. I believe it is me who has not made himself clear because you think I don't understand the consequences of SR, and that I am arguing in favor of physical simultaneity (which I am not).

You yourself have designated consciousness as the bottom line. I believe there is something even more basic, and that is what consciousness is made of, but let's say for now consciousness is the base substance of all existence.

To me that means consciousness is the steady thing in and amongst all the physical happenings. My point is, wherever there is a human consciousness in this universe, that consciousness can only experience now. True, there is no universal physical now, but I've already admitted that. I said consciousness is always now, and that is all I am talking about. Every place and moment for consciousness is "now." If you say there is a past somewhere, I'll say take me to it. Once we get there guess when it will be . . . now.

If you and I observe a supernova, we will report we saw it now. When your wife sees it, she will report that she saw it now. Of course, when either of us experience the supernova has nothing to do with when the supernova actually happened; it has to do with when and how we receive information. The receipt of information is just another change factor affected by SR, it has no profound consequences to reality of consciousness.

In physical situations there is change, there are different rates of change, there are conditions that can affect when we receive information . . . but consciousness is always waiting in the now (that's why I believe anyone who suggests time travel is possible doesn't really understand the nature of consciousness). As far as I can see, physics does just fine without a creator when it comes to explaining time and relativity, so I continue to see no advantage in trying to bring in creationary consciousness to an explanation except where reality isn't explained by physical principles.

siliconhype

Nov28-04, 07:20 PM

First off, welcome to PF Paul. Yours was a thoughtful post.

In terms of my description of "experience" and "awareness," I was trying to explain how Chalmers seemed to define them in the article StatusX referenced. He appears to make awareness synonomous with simple detection. I admit I use the term "awareness" the same way myself.

However, I am not sure I can agree that experience is "history" (unless you are talking about being "experienced"). The actual present moment of conscious experience is what we have been debating about.

I meant, awareness that knows it is aware (as opposed to awareness that doesn't, like a motion detector). You have to admit, the idea of subjectivity is VERY difficult to translate into concepts.

I suspect that is true myself, but I don't believe anyone can demostrate it is true. Until someone can, I am not sure you can make that statement any other way than as an opinion.

Again, I suspect something like that myself. Let's assume there is ONE consciousness behind all the individual consciousnesses. Don't you think that the human body seems to be individuating, let's say, Points within that greater consciousness? If not, then I'd have to see my own conscious realization as illusory, and I don't believe that for a second. Isn't it possible for there to be both singularly conscious Points and for them to exist within a greater consciousness whole?

It seems like i did misunderstand you, i agree with your response.

siliconhype

Nov28-04, 07:56 PM

Wait a second, slowly and clearly :smile: . First of all, please define “thought” in your argument. I get an impression you’re talking about some abstract form that transcends the physical brain, in which case you defeat your argument with your own premise - thought is immaterial. If it’s physical, then what exactly do you mean by “Thought isnever a neuron simply firing and creating a cascade which eventually results in an effect on the body”. Then what is it, and how does it affect the body, physically? Please elaborate.

Second of all, I’d like to see some more meat behind your continuity argument. I don’t see a problem of creating a snap shot of the brain at any given point of time. Yes, technologically it’s impossible, but conceptually, just like I can pick a point on a continuous function, I think I can pick a point on a time line at which I can record values of all the subatomic particle-constituents of the brain. Now I’m not going to debate the continuity hypothesis and the whole Cantor set with real vs rational numbers problem (because I'm not good at it), but I'm sure of one thing - your assumption that time and matter transformation are continuous is just that – an assumption. Besides, if you successfully argue that they are, in fact, continuous, then, by implication, you effectively kill all the AI hopes of replicating consciousness with 1’s and 0’s, do you not?

So, until further clarification, I still think it’s fair to ask what causes the brain to be transformed from one state to another. The deterministic rules + random quantum events have been suggested. If that’s the case, I don’t buy into a single word you said about it for one simple reason – you said so because the it was a rainy day which obviously made you depressed, which made you conclude “we’re determined”, in a crude manner of speaking. Had it been a shiny day, you’d theorize that we’re all free and immortal. If you add randomness on top of that, then I’d have to calculate how many days in a year you’d come to the deterministic conclusion, and how many to something else, given the precipitation statistics, of course :smile:

Thanks,

Pavel

To the first question:

I think thought is material, but perhaps not in the sense that each thought can be found somewhere in the brain. What we think as thought is a process in the brain, the process of thinking, what our memories store are sensations, links, groups, semantics, not thoughts. I can say: I like red. and then say it again, I like red, so one could argue that the brain does indeed storer thoughts. My answer is yes, but not in the context of one neuron = I like red. But many neurons, in combination with mechanisms of thought, (deciding that you do like red, thinking about why you like red, wondering weather in fact you still like red, etc) all are part of coming to the conclusion that you like red. Yet, i cannot take a neuron in your mind and place it in another persons mind, then stimulate it and have the other person say "i like red". That is what i mean by thougths are process. there must be a system to come up with the thaght, and thus you cannot, unless you are aware of the path the electrical stimulation of the neurons must take, and how the system works find out "where" the physical Thought of "i like red" sits, and even then, the system must be embedded as a whole, and run, in order for it to produce the thought "i like red". I'm not done, if say you figure out the system, which will trigger a person to say "i like red", that system is also part of another system which processes other thoughts, thus you cannot isolate the system and everytime you trigger a neuron, have the system spit out the proverbial sentence.

Perhaps chaos theory can help my explanation, i don't say thought are random, i don't believe that, but, chaos theory is like this: In order to be able to predict the future of events (and thus trigger the process of thaught that says "i like red") you must know the initial state of all variables. Isolating a thought is like predicting weather, you can only do it if you know how the system works (weather system/mind system) and also if you know what the state of the variables affecting the system are. This will allow you to predict when i am going to say "i like red" but will not allow you to say "i like red" is here in the brain. You can freeze time, and say here is where he thought "i like red" , like you can freeze time and say here is where the rain is when it comes to weather. But to isolate the rain, and then say this is where there the rain is, is fallacy, tomorrow the rain will not be there anymore, and predicting its location will, again required you to know the state of all variables affecting the system and the way the system works. The mind, like the weather is mostly consistent, but it is also chaotic and changes.

Second, i agree with most of your points, and i also agree that you cannot make AI with ones and zeroes. What you can do with ones and zeroes, given enough computational power, is create a system which mimics the brain, but then it will be the system that mimics the brain and not ones and zeroes which will constitute thaugths, you would not be able to isolate the ones and zeroes of the computer and then extract thought from them, the system of the brain has its own language, it will be this language, a higher abstraction than ones and zeores which will let you see thaughts, but in the same context as i argue above.

third, to answer " I still think it’s fair to ask what causes the brain to be transformed from one state to another." you have to state the level of abstaction, it can be, chemicals, thoughts themselves, even the rain and sunshine, atoms, hormones, disease, whatever, clarify level of abstaction.

I'm not sure about the randomeness factor, my thoughts seem pretty coherent and logical (hopefully). I cannot argue in favor of randomness.

Shastry CVK

Nov28-04, 09:59 PM

"consciousness".I think it is an interesting topic raised by one of the members.My personal feeling od that the understanding of consciousness or explanation for the same will never come through the materialisitic explanations.As the consciousness is beyond the materialstic realm.I think the consciousness belongs to the realm of spirituality."Science ends where the spirituality begins".
Hope to hear comments from the members.

Shastry CVK

Nov28-04, 10:01 PM

"consciousness".I think it is an interesting topic raised by one of the members.My personal feeling is that the understanding of consciousness or explanation for the same will never come through the materialisitic explanations.As the consciousness is beyond the materialstic realm.I think the consciousness belongs to the realm of spirituality."Science ends where the spirituality begins".
Hope to hear comments from the members.

sourmonkey

Nov28-04, 11:17 PM

Is it possible that other (if not all) forms of life possess consciousness?

If the most basic function of "mind" serves to differentiate between the "outside" world and the "inner" world of the organism, than all of life might possess some form of consciousness. We shouldn't be so anthropocentric as to assume that humans alone possess "mind". We are animals, after all... even plants "react" to external stimuli be it the movement of the sun or cold weather.

I think the word "consciousness" remains ambiguously defined because we humans like to label our experiences often without seeking a deeper explanation. We all too often presume that a semantic symbol defines meaning, when in "reality" all of our semantic and mathematical symbols are creations of our own limited mind and only approximate or quantize meaning without providing the "big picture". These symbols are tools that we use to approximate the function of our "reality", but they are complete creations of our own "consciousness" and our bound by the limitations of our own understanding (sorry for the redundancy).

After observing insects, cats, Capuchin and squirrel monkeys, spiders, lizards, etc, I am convinced that "consciousness" is a by product of life and that "humans" (being the bipedal, quixotic, and domesticated primates that we are) are not the sole possessors of "mind". We're just a little bit more creative, and we accel at bending space and time within our minds to produce culture and project identity.

This doesn't really answer the initial question, but I think it's important to realize that much of our understanding of the universe is derived from cultural facets of the human imagination. Though we think highly of ourselves, our brains are still limited in perspective, and this handicaps any quest for "meaning".

What is consciousness?

The recognition of the current moment as it flows from future to past... ? maybe?

The ontological surfer riding the waves of entropy?

Les Sleeth

Nov29-04, 12:07 AM

Is it possible that other (if not all) forms of life possess consciousness?

Personally speaking, I think so, except I suspect that a life form needs a nervous system to experience individual consciousness (that would exclude plants from individualized consciousness).

If the most basic function of "mind" serves to differentiate between the "outside" world and the "inner" world of the organism . . .

The mind does seem to do that.

What is consciousness? . . . The ontological surfer riding the waves of entropy?

Nice image. I might add that your description is one of consciousness in biology. Once departed from that, the entropic surf might not be an issue.

anuj

Nov29-04, 03:19 AM

"As the consciousness is beyond the materialstic realm.I think the consciousness belongs to the realm of spirituality."Science ends where the spirituality begins".

No doubt, the consciousness is beyond the materialistic realm. However, it is incorrect to assume that science and sprituality are two milestones on the same road that explains the very existance of human beings. In all probablity, the science and religion both coexist as two seperate roads and both are likely to explain all the basic questions related to consciousness. There appears to be lack of understanding in both science as well as religion and that is why the two paths appear so different.

anuj

Nov29-04, 03:41 AM

Paul Martin

Nov29-04, 02:59 PM

...let's say for now consciousness is the base substance of all existence.

To me that means consciousness is the steady thing in and amongst all the physical happenings. My point is, wherever there is a human consciousness in this universe, that consciousness can only experience now. True, there is no universal physical now, but I've already admitted that. I said consciousness is always now, and that is all I am talking about. Every place and moment for consciousness is "now." If you say there is a past somewhere, I'll say take me to it. Once we get there guess when it will be . . . now.

If you and I observe a supernova, we will report we saw it now. When your wife sees it, she will report that she saw it now. Of course, when either of us experience the supernova has nothing to do with when the supernova actually happened; it has to do with when and how we receive information. The receipt of information is just another change factor affected by SR, it has no profound consequences to reality of consciousness.

In physical situations there is change, there are different rates of change, there are conditions that can affect when we receive information . . . but consciousness is always waiting in the now (that's why I believe anyone who suggests time travel is possible doesn't really understand the nature of consciousness). As far as I can see, physics does just fine without a creator when it comes to explaining time and relativity,...
After reading this carefully several times, I think I understand your views much better, and I agree with everything you said here.

...so I continue to see no advantage in trying to bring in creationary consciousness to an explanation except where reality isn't explained by physical principles.
I agree with this also. But there is an exception. Physical principles have not explained, and I believe they cannot explain, the experience of consciousness.

As I see it, there are two fundamental options for explaining conscious experience. One is to prove me wrong and come up with an explanation based on physical principles for how conscious experience emerges from the structure and function of brains. The second is to explain consciousness on the basis of something that is outside, or beyond, or in some sense not, physical reality. Since 4D space-time is part of physical reality, that explanation would have to be based on something outside, or beyond the space and time we experience. If we posit such a "something", a reasonable explanation can be imagined which would explain how the physical reality could be the result of the actions of whatever is the basis for the explanation of conscious experience.

In short, it seems we face a choice of believing that consciousness created the physical universe, or that the physical universe created consciousness. It seems clear to me that the former is simpler than the latter in the sense that there are fewer hard problems involved. That is the advantage that I see.

Les Sleeth

Nov29-04, 03:42 PM

I agree with this also. But there is an exception. Physical principles have not explained, and I believe they cannot explain, the experience of consciousness.

As I see it, there are two fundamental options for explaining conscious experience. One is to prove me wrong and come up with an explanation based on physical principles for how conscious experience emerges from the structure and function of brains. The second is to explain consciousness on the basis of something that is outside, or beyond, or in some sense not, physical reality. Since 4D space-time is part of physical reality, that explanation would have to be based on something outside, or beyond the space and time we experience. If we posit such a "something", a reasonable explanation can be imagined which would explain how the physical reality could be the result of the actions of whatever is the basis for the explanation of conscious experience.

In short, it seems we face a choice of believing that consciousness created the physical universe, or that the physical universe created consciousness. It seems clear to me that the former is simpler than the latter in the sense that there are fewer hard problems involved. That is the advantage that I see.

Right. I think this exactly where the physicalist-"something more" debate is right now. Personally I don't think consciousness will be produced through physical processes, but I also don't think that those of us who believe in something more will ever be able to prove it objectively either.

In my opinion, the very strongest case we will ever be able to make is with an inductive model that is supported by evidence in enough key places and accounts for enough important features of reality (i.e., those principles associated with life, consciousness and physicalness) that it outshines a purely physical model.

One thing I notice is that physicalist theory explains a lot of "how," but not so much "why." For instance, we know everything in the universe vibrates. We can explain how things do that, such as frequency or wave length, but who can answer why everything vibrates. Science can explain how chemistry works to sustain life, but no one can explain why chemistry organized to the extent it must to produce life. We can explain a lot about how the brain and consciousness interact, but we can't explain why consciousness has come about.

If a good inductive model could provide the whys behind the hows, then possibly there might be more openness on the physicalist side to "something more."

Rothiemurchus

Nov29-04, 04:52 PM

Les Sleeth:
One thing I notice is that physicalist theory explains a lot of "how," but not so much "why." For instance, we know everything in the universe vibrates. We can explain how things do that, such as frequency or wave length, but who can answer why everything vibrates

Rothie M:

Sometimes answering how gives the why.An electron vibrates in a vacuum because it is struck by vacuum particles.This is why it vibrates and how it vibrates.There is not always a clear cut distinction between how and why.I could ask why do I exist and because I know that there are forces holding atoms in my body together - how I exist - the how answers the why.Consciousness could not have created the physical universe because our conscious experience changes as our brains physically age - babies have blurred vision ,adults have sharp vision.If an adult has blurred vision
then this can be due to a damaged brain but not a process associated with consciousness.

Rader

Nov29-04, 05:11 PM

Here's the way I see the primordial question:
As Leibniz pointed out, there is something and not nothing. (He wondered why.)
We notice that this "something" changes.
As Les (and many others) suggested, we can imagine tracing those changes backwards and ask ourself, (my word processor just flagged 'ourself' as misspelled. It evidently doesn't know yet that indeed while 'our' is plural, 'self' is singular.) what was that "something" at the very beginning?

In the beginning there was only "I" so there were not any or many to cause a conflict of apparent evolution.

Since we see progress in evolution, as you suggested, Rader, it seems to make sense that the "something" gets simpler as you go back toward its ultimate origin.

Can we really know if it is primordial consciousness that changes? We know physical structures get simpler the farther back we go and through observation of behavior of simpler structure I assume they might be less conscious.

This,together with Occam's Razor, suggests that we look for the simplest thing possible as a guess for what that primordial "something" might be.
My guess is that is the simplest possible form of consciousness, since more complex and capable consciousness could have evolved from it simply by trying things and learning from the surprising results,

Or this could be an illusion that the individual self creates.

and the physical world is completely explainable from this sort of starting point along the lines of John Wheeler's "It from bit". That is, physical things might be made of nothing but information, and information is nothing but thought or mental concepts.

I agree that the evidence points to this possibility. If this is so, in essence, primordial consciousness, is the bits and all of it. Whys does it need to evolve? Is it not the interpretation of the bits, as seen through the I that thinks its evolving, where in reality, the physical complexity is evolving and its individual consciousness self interpreting it.

So my guess for the nature of the simplest consciousness is simply the ability to know, but with nothing to know at the very beginning.

I think you could consider this, as I am quoting you, when you answered a question from Les.

Originally Posted by Les Sleeth
What makes me conscious as opposed to say, an electric field?

That is similar to the question, "Why can I get TV programs on my TV set and not on my refrigerator?" The answer is that because of its specific physical structure the TV set is able to convert patterns in EM radiation to images and sounds. The refrigerator does not have such a structure. In a similar way, your brain is constructed in such a way as to be able to communicate directly with the one-and-only consciousness. The electric field is not.

I do no think primordial consciousness changes or evolves, it has no need to, if it is all knowledge, I think the I, individual consciousness, interprets it this way because physical structures evolve and consciousness uses a ever greater complexity to know itself through them.

Good talking with you, Rader. BTW, what is CEOTTK?

Close encounters of the third kind.

Les Sleeth

Nov29-04, 06:02 PM

Sometimes answering how gives the why.An electron vibrates in a vacuum because it is struck by vacuum particles.This is why it vibrates and how it vibrates.There is not always a clear cut distinction between how and why.

Sometimes, yes. But you've answered the vibration mystery superficially. Your explanation doesn't explain why an atom may vibrate a trillion times per second. Why does EM vibrate? Why is it you cannot prevent EM from vibrating? And why do atoms and EM vibrate rhythmically, why not chaotically?

I could ask why do I exist and because I know that there are forces holding atoms in my body together - how I exist - the how answers the why.

Nonsense. You've pushed off major mysteries by simply describing your existence as how atoms hold together. That doesn't explain where an atom comes from (if you say Big Bang, then explain originated that), why there are polar forces bound up in atomic structure, why you, as consciousness exist at all.

Consciousness could not have created the physical universe because our conscious experience changes as our brains physically age - babies have blurred vision ,adults have sharp vision.If an adult has blurred vision then this can be due to a damaged brain but not a process associated with consciousness.

That's a fine example of a non sequitur statement :yuck:, but I don't see how it translates into consciousness's inability to create the universe. Do you believe human consciousness defines the full potential of, say, universal consciousness? What if consciousness is something far more basic than physicalness, and what we see in humans is the barely even a molecule's worth on the scale of its potential?

Pavel

Nov29-04, 10:06 PM

Before I reply to some of your comments addressed to me, I had an observation that I wanted to share with you in hope that at least some of you might find it interesting. I was reading some stuff about the string theory over the weekend and I would like, very briefly, to highlight a part that I thought was interesting and relevant to our discussion. In summary, our space has 11 dimensions (some of which are microscopic). The region of space we live in is 3 dimensional because the open loop strings comprising all of our matter particles are attached to 3 dimensions only. All but one! The exception is the yet to be discovered graviton - the exchange particle accountable for the gravitational force. This particle is a closed loop string which is not attached to our 3D and thus can escape or leak into other spaces which are part of the overall 11D hyperspace. This explains why the gravitational force is so weak compared to other forces (we don't account for all of the gravity) and implies there are other worlds, [mem]branes, that are microscopic distances away from us, yet inaccessible through the matter that comprises our world, except for gravitons.

Now, assuming the string theory has some merit, I would think that for those of us who believe in the metaphysical nature of consciousness, it would be reasonable to expect our consciousness to be able to transcend our region of space and, just like gravitons, freely float into other branes. Alas, there is no evidence for such journeys.

Or is there? I suspect one could argue that the reason our consciousness is so 3D bound, is because it's heavily conditioned by our sense perception of the 3D world. Or, using Les's favorite word, has the integrative nature of consciousness shaped our mind to be so 3D bound that it'd be very difficult to "get out of the box"? Difficult, but possible? Some of us believe we do experience other worlds (and since we define experience to be a sufficient condition for consciousness, we can say our consciousness transcends the parallel universes). In fact, I remember reading some new teaching, an off-spring of theosophy, that states there are several layers of reality (7?) and we sense only the lower layers. There are two ways to sense the "thinner" layers; one - through meditation, spiritual development for which is a prerequisite; and the other - drugs, which is induced, or forced way, undesirable way, as you are not prepared to sense it and eventually "burn up". I don't do either, so I can't really comment, but there was only one time, without getting into details, when I thought I was definitely experiencing hyperspace. While I'm inclined to believe it was a trick of my brain, it doesn't matter whether my experience of RED comes from the retina of my eyes or internally induced by the configuration of my neurons - it's still the same nature of experience that we're trying to give an account for in the first place. Anyhow, I hope I made my point clear - assuming the string theory holds water and our consciousness has non-physical roots, should we be able to sense parallel universes predicted by the string theory?

And speaking of gravitons, Les, I vaguely remember reading one of your posts where you expressed your unhappiness with how scientists define "energy". I believe you didn't like how their mysterious description of energy fits into their reductionistic paradigm. I'm sure I didn't quite catch on with your thought, but I thought energy was pretty clearly explained in physical terms. In summary, as you know, there are 4 fundamental forces that are thought of as energy (gravitation, electromagnetic, strong and weak), 3 of which (the latter) actually become one superforce at very high temperatures. Gravitation is reduced to gravitons if you buy into the string theory, but I don't have a problem with a classical Einstein's interpretation of it either - gravitation is nothing more than curvature in space induced by mass (hmmm, why? because mass has gravitons? :rolleyes: ) Anyhow, the strong force is produced through the exchange of force particles (gluons). Again, I don't see any problem with that, as I can clearly picture how such exchange produces attraction or repulsion. The weak force is nothing but particle decay, i.e. transformation from higher generation quark to the lower one. While I can see how the electromagnetic force can be thought of as voodoo vibes, my understanding now is that, just like the strong force, the electromagnetic field is induced by the force particle exchange - photons. In fact, even the attraction of an electron to the nucleus is explained as an exchange of virtual photons, which exist for a very short period of time, so short that they violate the law of energy conservation and get away with it. (I swear I didn't come up with that :smile: ). So, out of curiosity, please clue me in on the mysterious part.

Thanks.

Pavel.

RingoKid

Nov30-04, 02:59 AM

I am glad you called them "manifolds" because in my opinion, that is exactly what they should be considered to be. It dismays me when writers like Brian Greene call them "Calabi-Yau spaces". I think a great deal could be gained if we viewed what you call "spacetime" to be a 4D manifold in a higher dimensional space-time continuum. If you checked out the thread you asked me to reference, you might have seen some of my arguments for this view.

Oh, and by the way, the Calabi-Yau "spaces" contain many more dimensions than one.

I'm not sure what you are insisting here, Ringo. If it is a specific connotation of 'spacetime' then I will be careful not to use that term in any other way. If you mean that we can't draw any conclusions from the supposition that there might be extra, astronomically large, nearly flat dimensions of space comprising a continuum in which spacetime (in your sense of the term) is embedded as a manifold, then I disagree. I think that by using mathematics, we can deduce many characteristics and features of this system. I think that is what the string theorists should be hard at work doing right now.

Sorry Paul

been hella busy in real life to respond

So any way what I meant was if a Calabi-Yau manifold is a 6d construct that only touches in 1d of our 4d universe then for all intents and purposes it may as well only be a 1d construct especially when dealing with 4d concepts of space and time. There is nothing to suggest that they open up to larger dimensions especially if they don't overlap. Spacetime as it applies to our universe doesn't apply to CY manifolds. M theory with the all encompassing 11th dimension in which all multiverse scenarios take place is as far as i know (which isn't that much) is the only postulate for larger dimensions that has any creedence in the scientific community.

As far as the primordial consciousness learning, I think it is us that is continually learning to accomodate more of the prime consciousness as our intellect evolves. All knowledge already exists we just haven't learnt it yet or have forgotten what we already learnt by spending our lives unlearning it.

There's a few other interesting points being raised i'd like to chuck my 2cents in on but I'm a bit pressed for time at the mo

so in the words of the governator "I'll be Back"...

peace

Canute

Nov30-04, 10:10 AM

I agree with whoever said that we cannot ever demonstrate the existence of consciousness, and so can never prove that it is fundamental.

However, there is circumstantial evidence for it. It seems unlikely to be a coincidence that physicists find themselves with three major 'explanatory gaps' in their explanations of reality. The first is whatever it is that gave rise to the physical universe, the second is whatever it is that matter is made out of, and the last is whatever it is that mediates the relationship between mind and matter. It seems reasonable to suppose that there is just one substance that fills these gaps, a metaphorical 'God of the Gaps', and that these gaps exist simply because physicists cannot detect consciousness with pointers and dials. They must therefore appeal to metaphysics on these issues. I'd say this is equivalent to appealing to ignorance, but just sounds more professional. As Heidegger argued, western metaphysics does not address the issue of Being, and is thus left trying to deal with questions about reality with one hand tied behind its back.

Les Sleeth

Nov30-04, 10:50 AM

And speaking of gravitons, Les, I vaguely remember reading one of your posts where you expressed your unhappiness with how scientists define "energy". I believe you didn't like how their mysterious description of energy fits into their reductionistic paradigm. I'm sure I didn't quite catch on with your thought, but I thought energy was pretty clearly explained in physical terms. In summary, as you know, there are 4 fundamental forces that are thought of as energy (gravitation, electromagnetic, strong and weak), 3 of which (the latter) actually become one superforce at very high temperatures. Gravitation is reduced to gravitons if you buy into the string theory, but I don't have a problem with a classical Einstein's interpretation of it either - gravitation is nothing more than curvature in space induced by mass (hmmm, why? because mass has gravitons? :rolleyes: ) Anyhow, the strong force is produced through the exchange of force particles (gluons). Again, I don't see any problem with that, as I can clearly picture how such exchange produces attraction or repulsion. The weak force is nothing but particle decay, i.e. transformation from higher generation quark to the lower one. While I can see how the electromagnetic force can be thought of as voodoo vibes, my understanding now is that, just like the strong force, the electromagnetic field is induced by the force particle exchange - photons. In fact, even the attraction of an electron to the nucleus is explained as an exchange of virtual photons, which exist for a very short period of time, so short that they violate the law of energy conservation and get away with it. (I swear I didn't come up with that :smile: ). So, out of curiosity, please clue me in on the mysterious part.

Just to make sure we are using the right terms (and we don't get in trouble from any physics mentors o:) ), what you have described are the four fundamental forces of the universe, which is not the same thing as energy. Force is usually defined as any influence that changes a body's uniform motion or state of rest, expressed: F=ma. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. The two are related when, for example, a force is applied to a box that moves it, expressed: Energy=force x distance.

However, both force and energy are merely a means of measurement, and in that force like energy qualifies for what I was suggesting is absurd. The point of my little objection was that although we can see things moved by the team of force and energy, they are not assigned any existential qualities. If you try to talk about energy like it has an actual composition (like, say, the way one can say water is composed of H20), you will get a lecture for treating energy as a substance when it is simply an abstract concept used to measure and calulate.

Is energy something? Well, something is causing all the movement in the universe, but no one knows or seems very concerned about if it has any essential substance qualities.

One of my common themes here has been that it seems like existence can be better explained if we posit some absolute substance, of which everything is a form of (including energy and force, matter, consciousness . . .). This idea is called "neutral monism" and it suggests that the absolute existential "stuff" resides in an infinite ocean, has always existed, and cannot NOT exist. So my thread was me being a pest :tongue2: (my stated profession), and attempting to show in an indirect way why it seems absurd that something which is said to compose and move everything (energy) is not assigned any existential qualities.

RingoKid

Nov30-04, 02:28 PM

I think you have just described the string theorists fixed background dependence Les.

A "sea" of vibrating bands of energy flickering through 10 dimensions of which only 4 are detectable by current means and constitute our universe. All encompassed in a larger 11th dimension where other universes may be.

Imagine picking up a coffee cup. We see our hand extend, pick up the handle and move the cup. Now if all this action is made up of strings fixed in a static background, then maybe it's the strings that change to accomodate the movement of objects.

We percieve fluid motion at 25 frames per second but if matter is getting transformed by reconstituting basic strings at lightspeed then we would never know the difference between us picking up the cup and atoms, molecules changing their basic structure to accomodate movement.

What do you think that does to our perception of reality ???

anuj

Dec1-04, 02:31 AM

I'd put it, consciousness (whether disassociated from the body or not) is minimully the awareness of one's own existence. Thinking isn't necessary to experience existence.

To experience our own existence, what do we need if not our thinking?

Canute

Dec1-04, 09:46 AM

To experience our own existence, what do we need if not our thinking?
You'll know the answer to that when you're able to exist without thinking, but not before.

Les Sleeth

Dec1-04, 10:04 AM

To experience our own existence, what do we need if not our thinking?

There is a difference between thinking and experience. For one thing, you can tell experience is more basic because you can experience thinking, but you cannot think experience (obviously one can think about experience). A person might be able to think about love or skydiving, but that is not the experience of it.

A thought could be described as the result of an image and concept formulation process, concepts and images which can then be organized into patterns for "thinking." We might try to arrange our thoughts so that they represent reality, and then calculate with them to understand how something works; or we might just "imagine" possibilities, or dream . . .

What is experience? Well, we've been saying it is subjective awareness; in conscious experience there is a "me" present, and that "me" is not a thought (what causes the subjective aspect of consciousness is quite the mystery). I love music, and when I listen I do so with as little thinking as possible because thinking actually interferes with first my full apprehension (edit: whoops!, er, I mean . . .) comprehension of the music, and then my full appreciation.

So what about experiencing versus thinking about one's own existence? Yes you can think about it, as we have been doing in this thread. But if you can stop your mind, sit still, and just feel yourself, you will find something unavailable to thoughts. Personally I find experiencing my existence a lot more rewarding and knowledge-creating than merely thinking about it. :smile:

anuj

Dec1-04, 09:42 PM

So what about experiencing versus thinking about one's own existence? Yes you can think about it, as we have been doing in this thread. But if you can stop your mind, sit still, and just feel yourself, you will find something unavailable to thoughts. Personally I find experiencing my existence a lot more rewarding and knowledge-creating than merely thinking about it

For a moment, even if it is assumed that thinking isn't necessary to experience our own existence, what is that experience about. Is it having any shape, sound, taste or if not what else. Or is it just a void feeling like a singularity in the universe.

Les Sleeth

Dec1-04, 10:19 PM

For a moment, even if it is assumed that thinking isn't necessary to experience our own existence, what is that experience about. Is it having any shape, sound, taste or if not what else. Or is it just a void feeling like a singularity in the universe.

What can I say? If I say "it is like . . . " (i.e. anything whatsoever), then I've given you a thought, and not an experience. If you lived in the desert all your life, could you could know what an ocean is like through my description of it? Or would you need to go to the ocean and experience it?

Try this. If you have a closet handy, go into it and sit there. Turn your attention back on yourself and see what you feel. You will not experience a void. You exist and you can feel that.

anuj

Dec2-04, 01:38 AM

What can I say? If I say "it is like . . . " (i.e. anything whatsoever), then I've given you a thought, and not an experience. If you lived in the desert all your life, could you could know what an ocean is like through my description of it? Or would you need to go to the ocean and experience it?

If experience is something which need to be felt and cannot be explained, not even thought of, then how do we propose to link the consciousness with the 11 dimensional understanding of the physical universe.

Canute

Dec2-04, 07:05 AM

Les Sleeth

Dec2-04, 04:05 PM

If experience is something which need to be felt and cannot be explained, not even thought of, then how do we propose to link the consciousness with the 11 dimensional understanding of the physical universe.

I am not sure if you are kidding or not. First of all, the eleven dimensional concept is theory. Right now all we have to worry about is 3 spatial dimensions and time.

But how big a mystery is experience to you? Can't you see, hear, smell, feel . . . ? That's experience. There should be nothing unfamiliar about that to you. I am simply saying that experience is one thing and thoughts are another, and that one doesn't need to think to experience, or "feel," one's own existence.

Rader

Dec2-04, 04:20 PM

Ah, that's the big question. Experiences are 'incommensurable' and don't show up on meters and dials in the laboratory, so it's not clear there will ever be a scientific answer. Some would say, and I would agree, that it's clear there will never be a scientific answer. Science cannot detect, let alone explain, something that is assumed to have no physical effects and which is itself unobservable.

I do not understand this, then what shows up on the meter? If you test a brain for beauty and you have the same stimulus and different patients and the same part of the brain lights up. Statistics and logic indicate a thought is something and does something even if you can not hold it in your hand. Why is behavioral data useless evidence?

anuj

Dec2-04, 09:31 PM

I am not sure if you are kidding or not. First of all, the eleven dimensional concept is theory. Right now all we have to worry about is 3 spatial dimensions and time.

But how big a mystery is experience to you? Can't you see, hear, smell, feel . . . ? That's experience. There should be nothing unfamiliar about that to you.
.

I agree that at present we need to be worried about the 4 dimensions as we know. From your earlier replies I got the impression that experience has nothing to do with the five body sensors that is eye, ear, nose, tounge and skin. If I correctly understand your views, our experiences are all due to the feedback received from these sensor organs. Now the next question arises

I am simply saying that experience is one thing and thoughts are another, and that one doesn't need to think to experience, or "feel," one's own existence.

Do you intend to delink the sensor organs from the mind, our thinking process. I would like to differ here. Consciously or unconsciously, our mind is in constant link with these sensor organs. As soon as a human body part is delinked from the mind (i.e. no feedback to mind and no instruction acceptance), that body part becoms useless or paralysed. There is no way one can have an experience let us say about a desert or an ocean without involving thoughts. They are all the time there. The only possible way may be to switch off your thought process itself.

The consciousness as far as I can understand is beyond the reach of five body sensors that work in the four dimensions. The big question still remains. If we cannot understand or explain the consciousness in terms of all that we know till day then how can we explain it scientifically? What are our assumptions in an attempt to link consciousness with physics theories?

Canute

Dec3-04, 08:13 AM

I do not understand this, then what shows up on the meter? If you test a brain for beauty and you have the same stimulus and different patients and the same part of the brain lights up. Statistics and logic indicate a thought is something and does something even if you can not hold it in your hand. Why is behavioral data useless evidence?
All sorts of things show up on meters, but not experiences, and no amount of meter-based research into the brain will ever show that experiences exist. Generally the view of scientists, their public view anyway, is that thoughts, are not causal, at least in the sense that it makes no difference to our actions whether or not we are conscious of our thoughts. Behavioural data is not evidence of consciousness in this view, because consciousness does not cause behaviour. Behavioural data is only relevant to the study of consciousness if consciousness is assumed to be causal.

Rader

Dec3-04, 04:39 PM

All sorts of things show up on meters, but not experiences, and no amount of meter-based research into the brain will ever show that experiences exist. Generally the view of scientists, their public view anyway, is that thoughts, are not causal, at least in the sense that it makes no difference to our actions whether or not we are conscious of our thoughts. Behavioural data is not evidence of consciousness in this view, because consciousness does not cause behaviour. Behavioural data is only relevant to the study of consciousness if consciousness is assumed to be causal.

I understand the view > there view, what I do not understand, why anyone would think that way. What is it that they wish to deny?

If I am conscious, I would assume all humans are. My consciousness causally effects my actions and behavior. Is this then only my self illusion?

Les Sleeth

Dec3-04, 06:06 PM

From your earlier replies I got the impression that experience has nothing to do with the five body sensors that is eye, ear, nose, tounge and skin. If I correctly understand your views, our experiences are all due to the feedback received from these sensor organs.

Hmmmmm. This could get confusing if we aren't careful, I may not have spoken as precisely as I should have.

One can talk about experience as being the result of two aspects of consciousness. The first is that consciousness is sensitive. It seems like field that vibrates in response to information that reaches it. This central "sensitive" aspect is linked to remote sensory fields as well we call the senses. They maintain fields too which are sensitive to certain electromagnetic wavelengths, pressure, heat (or lack of), air vibrations, chemical stimulation, etc.

In addition to the sensitivity of consciousness is that most internal aspect which "notices" what is detected/felt by the sensitivity aspect (you, me). The sensitivity plus the "noticer" together is defined as conscious experience.

My mistake was implying the senses themselves are experience, rather than saying the senses provide information or stimulation to the sensitive aspect of consciousness.

Do you intend to delink the sensor organs from the mind, our thinking process. I would like to differ here. Consciously or unconsciously, our mind is in constant link with these sensor organs.

Right, I acknowledged that above.

As soon as a human body part is delinked from the mind (i.e. no feedback to mind and no instruction acceptance), that body part becomes useless or paralysed.

If you are talking physiology, I think you are wrong. To be correct you'd have to equate mind and brain, and that has not been proven. We know mind and brain are related, at least while a being is alive in biology. Whatever connection mind does have to the body, the influence doesn't appear to bflow both ways. Look at Stephen Hawking. There is a major disconnect from his body, but his mind is just fine. And then, consider, being lost in thought. The body may not be doing anything sensible, but we can still walk around (even if we are running into furniture and stepping on the cat).

There is no way one can have an experience let us say about a desert or an ocean without involving thoughts. They are all the time there. The only possible way may be to switch off your thought process itself.

You are just telling us what you can and cannot do. I know for a fact I can experience a desert or an ocean without thoughts. So can other accomplished meditators. That is exactly the purpose of the practice . . . to achieve 100% conscious experience and not have thoughts intrude on that.

The consciousness as far as I can understand is beyond the reach of five body sensors that work in the four dimensions. The big question still remains. If we cannot understand or explain the consciousness in terms of all that we know till day then how can we explain it scientifically? What are our assumptions in an attempt to link consciousness with physics theories?

That is what a lot of philosopy is about these days . . . that we cannot yet scientifically explain consciousness. We know the brain and consciousness are entwined, but we don't know how. You'll have to stick around for awhile until humanity figures it out. :wink:

loseyourname

Dec3-04, 06:30 PM

I understand the view > there view, what I do not understand, why anyone would think that way. What is it that they wish to deny?

If I am conscious, I would assume all humans are. My consciousness causally effects my actions and behavior. Is this then only my self illusion?

Fliption and I went over this for about six pages in the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. Just about every argument for and against can be found in there somewhere, if you can find the exchange.

magus niche

Dec3-04, 10:57 PM

>>>sensing can theoretically be done with any organ including the brain.
the five senses are really a broad generalisation of the most common inputs into (sub)consciousness. other inputs can be internal. there seems to be a feedback system in our brain-body-mind that gives rise to consciousness.

***so there is consciousness, and it has infinite degrees.
it seems to be a synthesis of forms of stuff like energy and matter.
it does not have any prerequisites, as it is a universal that we cannot know.
we can know our own version that is 'self' quite well though.
can we assume that our subjective 'self' is the highest form of consciousness? :smile:

-------stuff affects consciousness-------
-------consciousness affects stuff-------

both exoteric and esoteric knowledge are useful for these matters.

RingoKid

Dec3-04, 10:58 PM

We know the brain and consciousness are entwined, but we don't know how. You'll have to stick around for awhile until humanity figures it out. :wink:

So if I am correct and accumulations of strings acquire consciousness by vibrating in an omnipresent though compactified dimension of "thought" where all is known but we aren't evolved enough to know all there is...

ie...the brain is a 4d machine that interptets only a part a transcendent 10d consciousness then projects it onto it's 4d environment but only in a way that we can interptett being that we are always locked in the 4d system

...then how would i go about proving it ???

Rothiemurchus

Dec4-04, 05:43 AM

Les Sleeth:
In addition to the sensitivity of consciousness is that most internal aspect which "notices" what is detected/felt by the sensitivity aspect (you, me). The sensitivity plus the "noticer" together is defined as conscious experience.

Rothie M:

It is the noticing which separates us from machines which are merely detectors.
But the question is:can a bunch of electrical conductors be wired to notice.
Or is noticing something which goes beyond wiring.I wonder if noticing has
something to do with a unique effect the brain has on the geometry of space-time.
Perhaps noticing takes place outside space-time and somehow part of the brain does not affect the geometry of space-time.

Les Sleeth

Dec4-04, 10:20 AM

so there is consciousness, and it has infinite degrees.
it seems to be a synthesis of forms of stuff like energy and matter.
it does not have any prerequisites, as it is a universal that we cannot know.

I am not sure consciousness doesn't have prerequisites, if by that you mean processes that establish it. Some people here believe consciousness is a fundamental uncreated property of existence. I haven't been able to find a way for that to make sense. I can make sense of the idea that there is some sort of raw potentiality that exits in an infinite ocean, it's always existed, it always will; and that potentiality has within it certain dynamics that can result in consciousness forming. If that is true, then consciousness is caused and has prerequisites.

we can know our own version that is 'self' quite well though. can we assume that our subjective 'self' is the highest form of consciousness? :smile:

As I've argued before, we can find out what potential the subjective self has for higher consciousness. One can merely assume things about it, or one can learn to experience it and find out for sure. :wink:

Les Sleeth

Dec4-04, 10:25 AM

So if I am correct and accumulations of strings acquire consciousness by vibrating in an omnipresent though compactified dimension of "thought" where all is known but we aren't evolved enough to know all there is...

ie...the brain is a 4d machine that interptets only a part a transcendent 10d consciousness then projects it onto it's 4d environment but only in a way that we can interptett being that we are always locked in the 4d system

...then how would i go about proving it ???

I wouldn't know how you'd prove that. Strings first have to be shown to exist at all, which they haven't.

Even if you are correct, your model doesn't account for subjectivity does it?

Les Sleeth

Dec4-04, 10:42 AM

It is the noticing which separates us from machines which are merely detectors. But the question is:can a bunch of electrical conductors be wired to notice. Or is noticing something which goes beyond wiring.

I am guilty of describing the "noticer" simplistically. I don't see why electrical conductors couldn't be wired to merely notice. But the noticer of conscious learns, develops an identity, acquires desires, and exerts its will to get or do what it wants.

I wonder if noticing has something to do with a unique effect the brain has on the geometry of space-time. Perhaps noticing takes place outside space-time and somehow part of the brain does not affect the geometry of space-time.

A very interesting theory, one that I wonder about myself. But if the "self" of consciousness is outside space-time, then I don't see how it can be an effect of the brain (since the brain is a product of space-time). But possibly a much larger consciousness (outside space-time) has found a way to connect a "point" of itself to biology via the central nervous system. This remote self theory has the central core of consciousness always in the same place (abiding in the larger originating consciousnessj), and the point's peripheral operations like thinking and using the body taking place here on Earth through the brain.

Rothiemurchus

Dec4-04, 05:05 PM

Les Sleeth:
But if the "self" of consciousness is outside space-time, then I don't see how it can be an effect of the brain

Rothie M:
We do not know the brain exists in space-time.Its atoms may do so,but do all
its fields:in quantum mechanics there are virtual particles which can travel
at speeds greater than light between protons and electrons.Most physicists say they are calculational aids with no basis in reality but who knows...

Thinking of time in general:

we can define "now" as the moment between the immediate past and the immediate future.if I don't remember the moment from the immediate past "now" is no longer defined and since "now" becomes the past of the next moment,that should no longer be defined.However we still consciously observe a passage into the future.This means that the absolute passage of time is not affected by the part of our brain that stores memories.However, the relative passage of time is:as we age,we remember fewer
instants of time and time seems to have passed more quickly.

RingoKid

Dec4-04, 05:41 PM

I wouldn't know how you'd prove that. Strings first have to be shown to exist at all, which they haven't.

Even if you are correct, your model doesn't account for subjectivity does it?

actually strategic dependence on initial conditions at the time of an individual's conception would allow for different subjective perceptions. No two people are born in the same place at the same time by the same parents while the planets and universe are still in the same position so the fundamental strings would have changed to accomodate all such variations allowing for diffrering subjective interpretations of physical experience and that's not even taking into account genetics/hereditary streams of consciousness...

...besides God hasn't shown to be empirically proven either but that doesn't stop most people believing in a divine creator/intelligent designer

Tom Mattson

Dec5-04, 12:10 PM

so the fundamental strings would have changed to accomodate all such variations allowing for diffrering subjective interpretations of physical experience and that's not even taking into account genetics/hereditary streams of consciousness...

All you're doing here is attempting to explain something you don't know (consciousness) in terms of something else you don't know (strings). That could never qualify as an explanation.

Also, assuming for the sake of argument that strings are known, how would you derive subjective experience from them?

juju

Dec5-04, 12:48 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec5-04, 01:26 PM

Hi,

It appears that what you are calling consciousness is just a progression of attractor states of neuronal (and glial) path self-organization,

Verbal thought itself can be seen as a self-organization arising from the speech and hearing areas of the brain. Likewise visual thought from the visual processing areas.

The true self of being is not physical. It may become aware through a medium of physical experience but it exists essentially beyond the physical medium.

I arrived at this conclusion from experience, not from anything else.

juju

I personally agree with the last part of your post. But I don't think most of us are defining consciousness as "a progression of attractor states of neuronal (and glial) path self-organization." You might want to reread the discussions about subjectivity.

juju

Dec5-04, 04:53 PM

I personally agree with the last part of your post. But I don't think most of us are defining consciousness as "a progression of attractor states of neuronal (and glial) path self-organization." You might want to reread the discussions about subjectivity.

I didn't mean to imply that you were defining consciousness this way,

What I meant was that I see the physical aspects of what you are considering as being this way.

Sorry for the misunderstanding.

juju

pack_rat2

Dec5-04, 07:35 PM

"...When we are asleep and unconscious we are not aware of space or time."

I don't think we are EVER unconscious. In sleep labs, theyve awakened subjects during periods of the deepest sleep, to find that the people reported having had very nebulous dreams; but seconds later, those memories vanished. Also, I had an operation as a child, and had very vivid dreams while under the anesthesia. I think we're conscious at all times, but we often FORGET that we were conscious.

"So consciousness involves awareness of space and time, or perhaps
just the existence of space and time, relative to me."

One need not be aware of anything to be conscious.

"What do I mean by 'me' ? By 'me' I mean some entity,quantity,quality that is different from everything else in the world.A soul perhaps."

Or a "consciousness."...a sense of "I am," without necessarily an awareness of anything else.

Bobby R

Dec5-04, 08:23 PM

gptejms

Dec6-04, 04:27 AM

I have quickly read thru some of the discussions here.Is there a thing like consciousness without matter--i.e. a consciousness that does not need supporting matter?

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 03:00 PM

I have quickly read thru some of the discussions here.Is there a thing like consciousness without matter--i.e. a consciousness that does not need supporting matter?

That is what one of the theories is -- that possibly consciousness is something that developed before the universe, or at least before biology. One so-called "panpsychic" theory, for instance, is that consciousness is an omnipresent quality that coexists with the universe, as a property that developed with the universe; in that model, the central nervous system of biology could be seen as something which helps evolve an individual being in the general consciousness pool.

Another theory which I like is that consciousness developed before the universe and assisted with its development.

But of course, it's all theory. Right now nobody's got a disembodied consciousness they can study. :wink:

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 03:05 PM

Consciousness or being aware can be attributed to your brain’s central processing unit being on. As for having a soul, it’s like hitting your funny-bone! Once you do you know you have it.

Well, that's what we've been debating. At least one aspect of consciousness, subjectivity, doesn't seem explained by brain physiology. (I liked your soul and humor point. :smile: )

pack_rat2

Dec6-04, 06:04 PM

I have quickly read thru some of the discussions here.Is there a thing like consciousness without matter--i.e. a consciousness that does not need supporting matter?
I believe there is. But getting into the reasons would require a whole new, and very extensive, discussion topic.

graffix

Dec7-04, 03:11 AM

This is strictly an idea, but thinking about consciousness forces you to be creative, since it's really really hard to prove much of anything. Here goes:

Since no two persons (two consciousnesses) share the same 3d space at the same time, why do we necessarily assume that our consciousnesses should all share the same 4th dimensional space (time). In philosophy class I remember learning that you really can't prove anything other than your own existence (I think therefore I am). I can't prove that inside the body of you (that's reading my post) lies the same type of consciousness that I am experiencing. Would it be possible that you, (that's reading my post) is actually more like an NPC (like in computer or roleplaying games), and that I am allowed to see your reactions to my post (if we're in the same room), but there is not the EXPERIENCING of reading my post WHILE I have a consciousness? Your reaction that I would be able to see, if we were in the same room, is either 1) one of the probable reactions you will have or 2) a reaction that you experienced previously/will experience in the future? If you can imagine that, can you imagine that maybe, sometime in the future or in the past, I will eventually get to be you, the reader?

gptejms

Dec8-04, 04:11 AM

That is what one of the theories is -- that possibly consciousness is something that developed before the universe, or at least before biology. One so-called "panpsychic" theory, for instance, is that consciousness is an omnipresent quality that coexists with the universe, as a property that developed with the universe; in that model, the central nervous system of biology could be seen as something which helps evolve an individual being in the general consciousness pool.

Without the body, what would the consciousness be conscious of?With no sense organs,is there any role for consciousness?
I have not understood your last statement--'the C.N.S. of biology could be seen as.....'.Please elaborate.

Another theory which I like is that consciousness developed before the universe and assisted with its development.

If we assume that consciousness is non-physical(no supporting matter),then how can it develop or help develop the physical universe?

Canute

Dec8-04, 06:04 AM

That is what one of the theories is -- that possibly consciousness is something that developed before the universe, or at least before biology.
I think I agree with gpgejms here. The idea that something could develop outside of spacetime seems to embody a contradiction.

But of course, it's all theory. Right now nobody's got a disembodied consciousness they can study. :wink:
Ah, I was about to disagree - then I spotted the wink.

Rader

Dec8-04, 12:35 PM

If we assume that consciousness is non-physical(no supporting matter),then how can it develop or help develop the physical universe?

A way out of your dilemma is to consider consciousness, information. No physical system can function or evolve without information and energy.

allanpatrick

Dec9-04, 04:51 AM

Consciousness is awareness and comprehension of ideas and concepts that are readily at hand or within our circle of influence. Comprehension of ideas and concepts may include minute analysis of everyday mundane life processes like the simple awareness that one breathes. Consciousness is the mind absorbing the vast horizon of understanding that is reachable within the reality of a finite, physical nature. It is something physical because it is ultimately human; there is no other way of communicating consciousness but only through the bodies we have.

allanpatrick

Dec9-04, 04:55 AM

I once asked a teacher in Philosophy this question: if a tree falls in the forest and nobody heard it crash down, can anybody even say it made any noise? The answer is of course no. We would have no way of knowing; human consciousness is limited by the finite physical nature of our bodies. There is no such thing as being aware or conscious of the noise you have never heard. Consciousness moves within the realm of what human understanding permits.

gptejms

Dec9-04, 05:03 AM

A way out of your dilemma is to consider consciousness, information.

What would this information be---information about what?

allanpatrick

Dec9-04, 05:07 AM

Regarding the post of graffix on being sure only of one's own existence, Rene Descartes created that problem out of not regarding the body as the kernel of existence. Descartes' problem concerns finding a link between the cogito (literally, a cloud of thought) and the rest of the universe. Descartes deals with mind-body duality when in fact our we can only exist through our bodies and our bodies can only go about its normal function with the help of the mind. Yes graffix, you will always be another person (with emphasis on "another"). There is no means by which you can grasp my consciousness (we haven't developed the technology for that and even if we did, sharing the consciousness of another does not reduce us to that person---we cannot become completely like the other). To be completely like the other and to consider consciousness as something that can be shared is equating our body and consciousness to a list of genes that when combined properly to produce the exact same persons who think in the exact same way. A case in point would be identical twins; indentical twins can't even think perfectly alike! My consciousness which I enrich by what I experience with my body is ultimately something that will always be a mystery to another---to you. My awareness is something beyond what your body allows your mind to comprehend.

treat2

Dec9-04, 08:41 AM

Just gonna throw in what I do know, and leave it to those that wish to draw a distinction between humans and all other animals, to debate.

The driving force behind the continual redefinition of consciousness are the discoveries that we make, every few years, about the mental capabilities of apes and chimps.

From the point of view of Psychology, when looking back the past 40 or more years, consciousness is continually redefined by psychologists and behaviorists... which reminds me of what B.F. Skinner would have to say about the subject... I'll leave that for those that are interested to lookup.

We leave behind a trail of inadequate definitions of conciousness, beginning with tool making/planning, and ranging far and wide to self-awareness/self-consiousness (as in recognition of what one is seeing in a mirror), advancing to conceptualization & linguistic understanding, and even the ability to understand the concept of Zero (i.e. beyond the Greeks) and perform simple mathamatics.

All such definitions have fallen short of what chimps and apes are capable of. (Yes. It was shown (about 10 years ago) that chimps not only understand the concept of zero, they can also understand that a number can represent any object(s) they can manipulate, as well as, act as a conceptual representation of such objects).

Now, for some fool to jump in and define it as fear of one's own death! Hah! That's a joke!

I leave it to those that are interested to investigate the most recent definition of conciousness by psychologists and animal behaviorists, to research, if interested. I am not, anymore.

The definition of conciousness by such professionals has been advanced to an absurdity that is adequately unclear for most people to comprehend. That's an achievement, and should keep us safe from admitting to being as primative as an ape or a chimp.

I leave it to you all to debate such tactics. I lost the desire to do so, several decades ago.

Here's a site for starters on the subject:

assc.caltech.edu Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) at:

http://assc.caltech.edu/index.htm

Les Sleeth

Dec9-04, 10:22 AM

Without the body, what would the consciousness be conscious of?With no sense organs,is there any role for consciousness?
I have not understood your last statement--'the C.N.S. of biology could be seen as.....'.Please elaborate.

This is a difficult problem if you've not thought about it before. If you believe consciousness is the result of neural processes, and basically that boils down to electro-chemical complexity, then what I said won't make sense.

But what if consciousness is not created by the brain, but is made of some kind of primordial substance which associates with the brain. In previous threads I've proposed this primordial substance as a sort of vibrant "illumination" since people who've become skilled at meditation report that consciousness seems composed of something like that. There is an idea coined "neutral monism" by Bertrand Russell, which explains the most fundamental existence as just some kind of absolute stuff. The idea is that this fundamental existence stuff is uncreated and indestructible, and it exists in a infinite "ocean" or continuum. Everything from matter and energy to consciousness would be a "form" of the fundamental existence stuff. Now, say there are dynamics in the fundamental existence continuum that can cause some of this "stuff" to become conscious. Since its indestructible, maybe it evolves for an unimaginable period and develops abilities, including the ability to give its own fundamental existence stuff, now conscious, shapes. One of those shapes is matter, and a few billion years of development down the road is biology, then a central nervous system that can sort of "draw" in the raw conscious energy from the originating pool to be become an individual.

Even after explaining everything is one substance, some people still see the rough model I gave you as dualistic. I will explain about that when I answer your next question since you seem to see physical and non-physical as meaning dualism.

If we assume that consciousness is non-physical(no supporting matter),then how can it develop or help develop the physical universe?

In another thread where I've been debating, I attempted to explain why if there is some one most fundamental existent stuff, then it solves the problem of dualism. Here's how I answered there using water vapor as an analogy for the fundamental existent stuff, water for energy, and ice for matter (i.e., they are analogous in that they all three are "forms" of the same H20 "stuff"):

I’ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let’s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we’ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let’s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually “learns” to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

The “knowledge” of this is most realized in the vapor condition, because that is what defines fundamental existence. Interestingly, because “knowing” is present in the vapor, when it uses itself to form water, that water has a bit of “knowing” built into it too, though dulled by density; the same is true of the solid condition, except the knowing is even more dulled (because it’s more dense). Now, if a being were made up of vapor (consciousness) water (energy) and ice (matter), they all share a existential relationship (i.e., they are all made up of the same substance), and all share the “knowledge” that is built into them, but at different levels of knowing.

Because in this case “physical” is defined as when the fundamental stuff acquires structure, we call ice (matter) physical, and we also call water (energy) physical because (viewing from our physical perspective) it appears to be derived from ice (matter) as it “melts”; and because the vapor (spirit?) has no structure, we call it non-physical. Now, as for how vapor (as conscious fundamental existent stuff) could trigger energy to move matter, since the vapor naturally and always exists at a higher temp, when it “touches” ice, that causes a release of water. The vapor itself doesn’t give up water (energy) because that’s not the condition vapor is in. But the natural “warm” way it is will cause energy to flow. Since (returning to the reality of biology) there are huge neural networks set up to channel the flow of energy, all the “warm” consciousness has to do is touch the stored energy spots in the right place to trigger release and action.

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the “frozen” universe. If that’s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that’s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

I hope that was helpful. :smile:

juju

Dec9-04, 01:56 PM

Hi,

The real self is (or has) a body-like vehicle which contains its own capabilities for awareness and perception.

This is from my own experience.

juju

gptejms

Dec10-04, 04:52 AM

This is a difficult problem if you've not thought about it before. If you believe consciousness is the result of neural processes, and basically that boils down to electro-chemical complexity, then what I said won't make sense.

But what if consciousness is not created by the brain, but is made of some kind of primordial substance which associates with the brain. In previous threads I've proposed this primordial substance as a sort of vibrant "illumination" since people who've become skilled at meditation report that consciousness seems composed of something like that. There is an idea coined "neutral monism" by Bertrand Russell, which explains the most fundamental existence as just some kind of absolute stuff. The idea is that this fundamental existence stuff is uncreated and indestructible, and it exists in a infinite "ocean" or continuum. Everything from matter and energy to consciousness would be a "form" of the fundamental existence stuff. Now, say there are dynamics in the fundamental existence continuum that can cause some of this "stuff" to become conscious. Since its indestructible, maybe it evolves for an unimaginable period and develops abilities, including the ability to give its own fundamental existence stuff, now conscious, shapes. One of those shapes is matter, and a few billion years of development down the road is biology, then a central nervous system that can sort of "draw" in the raw conscious energy from the originating pool to be become an individual.

Even after explaining everything is one substance, some people still see the rough model I gave you as dualistic. I will explain about that when I answer your next question since you seem to see physical and non-physical as meaning dualism.

In another thread where I've been debating, I attempted to explain why if there is some one most fundamental existent stuff, then it solves the problem of dualism. Here's how I answered there using water vapor as an analogy for the fundamental existent stuff, water for energy, and ice for matter (i.e., they are analogous in that they all three are "forms" of the same H20 "stuff"):

I’ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let’s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we’ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let’s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually “learns” to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

The “knowledge” of this is most realized in the vapor condition, because that is what defines fundamental existence. Interestingly, because “knowing” is present in the vapor, when it uses itself to form water, that water has a bit of “knowing” built into it too, though dulled by density; the same is true of the solid condition, except the knowing is even more dulled (because it’s more dense). Now, if a being were made up of vapor (consciousness) water (energy) and ice (matter), they all share a existential relationship (i.e., they are all made up of the same substance), and all share the “knowledge” that is built into them, but at different levels of knowing.

Because in this case “physical” is defined as when the fundamental stuff acquires structure, we call ice (matter) physical, and we also call water (energy) physical because (viewing from our physical perspective) it appears to be derived from ice (matter) as it “melts”; and because the vapor (spirit?) has no structure, we call it non-physical. Now, as for how vapor (as conscious fundamental existent stuff) could trigger energy to move matter, since the vapor naturally and always exists at a higher temp, when it “touches” ice, that causes a release of water. The vapor itself doesn’t give up water (energy) because that’s not the condition vapor is in. But the natural “warm” way it is will cause energy to flow. Since (returning to the reality of biology) there are huge neural networks set up to channel the flow of energy, all the “warm” consciousness has to do is touch the stored energy spots in the right place to trigger release and action.

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the “frozen” universe. If that’s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that’s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

I hope that was helpful. :smile:

My objection is to the use of word 'consciousness' for something that's without the body or outside the body--because then you have to answer
the awkward question:-'what's consciousness without a body conscious of?'.
May be you can use the word life force in place of 'warm consciousness' that as you propose touches some energy spots in your body to activate the neural networks.You seem to assume that it's some kind of a battery which when connected to the body produces currents in our neural pathways.I don't agree with this.It's perfectly physical processes that are responsible for currents and potential differences within our body.
Having said the above,I am not proposing that the human body is just an organic matter machine.The kind of things a human being or even protozoa can do is not achievable by present day machines.Plus it's hard to imagine a computer or any other machine with consciousness in the forseeable future.But what really distinguishes a living machine from a machine is difficult to point out---very very difficult.

Les Sleeth

Dec10-04, 10:34 AM

My objection is to the use of word 'consciousness' for something that's without the body or outside the body--because then you have to answer the awkward question:-'what's consciousness without a body conscious of?'.

You might read up on those who've experienced sensory deprivation devices. Also, acomplished meditators withdraw from the senses and experience consciousness itself. If you have never experienced that, then you might assume consciousness requires the senses, and something "external" to be conscious of. It isn't so. The nature of consciousness itself can be experienced, and that might be all you'd have if consciousness were not in a body (i.e., self experience).

May be you can use the word life force in place of 'warm consciousness' that as you propose touches some energy spots in your body to activate the neural networks.You seem to assume that it's some kind of a battery which when connected to the body produces currents in our neural pathways.I don't agree with this.It's perfectly physical processes that are responsible for currents and potential differences within our body.

No, I am not saying that it's a kind of battery. I agree with you that the body produces its own neural, metabolic, etc. energy. I am saying that consciousness is something different, or in a different condition at least, than all the physical stuff. But I am saying too that the physical aspects of the brain are set up to be easily triggered by an act of will. It's like how easy it is to push a button on an elevator and be taken to the 100th floor. The elevator has all the poteniality for power built into it, all you are required to do is trigger the right circuit to get in to work for you.

gptejms

Dec10-04, 12:11 PM

You might read up on those who've experienced sensory deprivation devices. Also, acomplished meditators withdraw from the senses and experience consciousness itself. If you have never experienced that, then you might assume consciousness requires the senses, and something "external" to be conscious of. It isn't so. The nature of consciousness itself can be experienced, and that might be all you'd have if consciousness were not in a body (i.e., self experience).

How does the meditator know that it's consciousness itself that he's experiencing and not something else?

No, I am not saying that it's a kind of battery. I agree with you that the body produces its own neural, metabolic, etc. energy. I am saying that consciousness is something different, or in a different condition at least, than all the physical stuff. But I am saying too that the physical aspects of the brain are set up to be easily triggered by an act of will. It's like how easy it is to push a button on an elevator and be taken to the 100th floor. The elevator has all the poteniality for power built into it, all you are required to do is trigger the right circuit to get in to work for you.

Is an act of will not a physical process of the brain?

Are you now equating consciousness with will?

Les Sleeth

Dec10-04, 12:37 PM

How does the meditator know that it's consciousness itself that he's experiencing and not something else?

It's the way one knows anything: repeated experience. Some people argue that we can never know if we are brains in a vat, where everything merely appears to be real, or if we are experiencing what we believe we are. Personally I just accept that things are pretty much as they appear.

In your life if you repeatedly experience, say, the results of long-established cooking techniques, then you come to "know" using those techniques can be counted on to produce certain results. Someone who has never taken the time to learn cooking techniques (like my wife :biggrin: just kidding sweetie) might think good results are a matter of chance.

Similarly, if one practices meditation every day for a couple of decades, one comes to "know" (as best as anything can be known) certain things. One of them is that consciousness has innate characteristics which can be experienced. You, of course, as a skeptic can always say my experience is deluded or mistaken. But then, if you haven't practiced meditation and therefore have no personal experience with it, you don't really know if your evaluation is correct or not either.

Is an act of will not a physical process of the brain?

Are you now equating consciousness with will?

I believe an act of will is not first a physical process. There must be a physical counterpart to everything consciousness does that involves the body. The question is where does will originate. I think order is, consciousness wills, the brain responds, and then it depends on what's been willed if other parts of the body become involved. I wouldn't say I'm "equating" consciousness with will, but I am attributing will to consciousness.

magus niche

Dec13-04, 11:28 AM

nothing can be absolutely known. i believe we as humans love to construct elaborate stories using our intellect combined with our imagination. i believe what i am saying right here is a perfect example. this does not downplay knowledge though. knowledge gives meaning and motivation and ultimately provides one with his/her own subjective reality. of course, it can be a subjective reality that includes objects (ie. common truths/assumptions).

experiential consciousness is still dependent on analysis of memory using signs/symbols to represent the experience. ie. language, imagery, feeling etc. represent the past, even if one doesn't know what they represent. experiencing the 'now' is a worthy achievement, but one impossible without the past.

a fairly pure conscious experience is being constantly aware of ones awareness (in some forms of meditation), but one could theoretically keep adding to that: ie. aware of being aware of ones awareness etc. etc... and this could be an entrance to one form of multidimensionality, or maybe simply a loop of infinite complexity inevitably prone to madness? :smile:
anyway absolute awareness becomes useless in the physical world (not that this is a bad thing...)

each living body/vessel/vehicle is initially a unique sensing machine with memes (instinct) to help guide it (plus family/society that molds and directs it). as we develop throughout our life and experience/understand, this consciousness or awareness of our self also seems to develop in varying degrees and directions (especially with the help of certain external devices); as does the amount of choices become greater (free will). but there are always a certain amount of unknown influences governing our actions through energy fields, subconscious drives, subliminal communication etc. and so it is advantageous to become aware of them via learning and self experiment/analysis....

logic is useful but limited
imagination is infinite but useless
together the synthesis is magic
and the potential both tragic and grand

>>>>transmute the chaos into respectful (de)constructivity.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 11:56 AM

a fairly pure conscious experience is being constantly aware of ones awareness (in some forms of meditation), but one could theoretically keep adding to that: ie. aware of being aware of ones awareness etc. etc... and this could be an entrance to one form of multidimensionality, or maybe simply a loop of infinite complexity inevitably prone to madness? :smile:

My experience has been that it isn't a "loop of infinite complexity." Instead, consciusness simplifies in the sense of unifying. This unity occurs at two levels.

The first is, the multifuctionality of consciousness blends to become singular in focus. In other words, without thinking, one is still aware of what one knows and understands. It is a steady and quiet consciousness that views reality, not one incessantly chattering and thinking and imagining and worrying, etc.

The second level of unity is that not only is consciousness internally unified, it also seems to have joined with an aspect of greater reality which exists in a state of unity everywhere external to an individual consciousness.

In my opinion, the reports of enlightenment have come from the first level of unity, and the reports of God have stemmed from this second unity experience. It is also my opinion that the first level must be fully realized to fully experience the second level.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 05:25 PM

So do you believe Les that it is an individuals responsibility to achieve union or the collective human races with the objective being to evolve to a higher state whether it be biological, physical, spiritual or whatever ???

I wouldn't say it's a responsibility. I'd classify it as an opportunity.

graffix

Dec15-04, 02:42 AM

RingoKid:
>>...like in an omnipresent compactified Calabi-Yau dimension.

Ok, hitting spring theory... Could it be possible that our brains are sensitive to something (namely spring movements) in the higher dimensions (let's see.. we've got dimensions 5 to 10 open for the imagination). It could be possible that what seems like random triggering of neurons in the brain is actually its response to spring movements?

If so, does it listen to it or do springs listen to the brain? Maybe both. Maybe feeling the music with thousands of other fans at a rock concert could be what's like thousands of people influencing & experiencing springs (a feeback loop). A "vibe" in a room, etc.

Ok, back to describing what we know of consciousness, I would think my dog, my cat, even a rat, a bat, a lizard, even a spider probably have some type of consciousness that is closer to our own than we realize. They are able to process information, are never completely predictable, and all seem to have a place (we call consciousness) where neural events are Experienced. In this sense, psychological (our past, childhood, etc.) and biological (genetic makeup) angles to answering this question is irrelevant. Most of us can agree that things with Life probably have consciousness.

Ok, I need to repeat: all living things seem to have a place where neural events are Experienced. I say neural events because ultimately all our inputs from our senses get translated to neural activity. What is to Experience? To have a reaction. In another words, to Feel something. All living things seem to be able to feel pain, and to feel satisfied (when reproducing or eating). Is this ironic or nothing special? Now we are taught that this is an effect of evolution and that we needed a reward/punishment structure to survive, but what if these Feelings are actually higher dimensions that always existed, and because of these dimensions being part of our universe, we were allowed to have our evolution occur???
Perhaps each higher dimension is a fundamental type of Feeling that's experienced by all life forms, such as happy-sad (mentally content-noncontent), pleasure-pain (physcially content-noncontent), attentive-non attentive, etc. etc. etc.

allanpatrick: thanks for replying :)

gptejms

Dec15-04, 04:48 AM

You, of course, as a skeptic can always say my experience is deluded or mistaken. But then, if you haven't practiced meditation and therefore have no personal experience with it, you don't really know if your evaluation is correct or not either.

I'm not a skeptic, it's just that I'm not satisfied with the kind of explanations that are provided here(or anywhere else for that matter).The simple rule that :- matter(body) + soul/conciousness/life-force = living being appears too naive to me.May be this formula is given to the common man to give a semblance of something that's too difficult to comprehend.

I believe an act of will is not first a physical process. There must be a physical counterpart to everything consciousness does that involves the body. The question is where does will originate. I think order is, consciousness wills, the brain responds, and then it depends on what's been willed if other parts of the body become involved. I wouldn't say I'm "equating" consciousness with will, but I am attributing will to consciousness.

This reminds me of a book I read:-'Quantum healing' by Deepak Chopra.If I remember right,he talks of similar things:-a thought or a feeling is at first not a physical process,but it gives rise to chemicals in our neurons which travel all around affecting each and every cell in the body and hence our state of health.This conversion of a non-physical process into a physical one(i.e. release of chemicals) can not be understood and he calls this regime 'quantum'.Looks impressive but I'm not sure.The gap from a non-physical process to a physical one is too large.Besides,it may be totally unnecessary to invoke a non-physical process here.

Kerrie

Dec16-04, 08:38 AM

let's keep this topic clean of insults and back on track...i have had to delete several comments that are instigating arguments that have nothing to do with the subject.

gptejms

Dec16-04, 09:22 AM

Let me add the following:-
I find the idea matter(body) + soul = living being, wrong/inadequate because of the following reason.By its very definition, the soul is non-physical which when mixed with the body produces a living entity.Ok,so this soul has to be somewhere within the body:-so it has a size less than or equal to the body.Your soul is different from mine which is different from that of another person's soul:--so souls can be counted.If anything has a size and can be counted then how can it be non-physical.So there is a contradiction.
I won't say QED here.Soul could actually be infinite which powers each and every cell in the body---bodies of all living beings.I can't prove this wrong.
In any case,I find consciousness not the right word for what is being discussed here:-consciousness is just a property of the brain.

RingoKid

Dec16-04, 03:00 PM

I'd noticed that Kerrie :smile:

Most all major religions and eastern philosophies have consciousness extant of the body but very few will venture to state exactly where that is or how we acquire it in either the physical or non physical universe whatever you define that to be

It seems preferred to couch this oversight in mystical/ambiguous jargon while often assigning properties of personhood to this realm and state that it is everywhere and nowhere.

Though on reading a few things it seems that science/philosophy would have the solution to the domain of consciousness within the realms of physics.

I too agree and would argue that the best candidate model to date is within the compactified dimensions of string theory.

Tom Mattson on the other hand disagrees with me and rather than address the points/issues I have raised would rather attempt to belittle and insult me. A most immature means of getting one's point across

I would therefore challenge Tom to put up his best candidate model with some reasoning as to why he thinks it is or at least pull me up on issues with my model that he would like some clarification on.

cheers

Tom Mattson

Dec16-04, 03:21 PM

I too agree and would argue that the best candidate model to date is within the compactified dimensions of string theory.

You "would argue" it?

So then argue it already. All you've done is state it to be the case. And when people ask you to explain yourself, you simply declare that it's right because you know it subjectively, or something to that effect. That is not acceptable argumentation.

Tom Mattson on the other hand disagrees with me

Your reading comprehension skills need work. At no point have I ever denied your metaphysical propositions. I have explained this to you repeatedly, and no matter how many times I say it you just don't seem to get it. I can explain myself to you as clearly as I can, but I can't understand for you. That takes mental effort on your part.

Back to your claims: What I do deny is that you have any justification for holding forth your metaphysical claims. No one has ever extrapolated the most fundamental known physical entities and interactions to a model of consciousness. In fact, no one has ever given a satisfactory account of consciousness that is purely physical. And the connection between consciousness and quantum theory is something that exists only in pop science literature, and in the minds of those who only know science at the popular level.

and rather than address the points/issues I have raised

There's nothing to address. You haven't presented an argument.

would rather attempt to belittle and insult me.

A most immature means of getting one's point across

Look in the mirror.

I would therefore challenge Tom to put up his best candidate model with some reasoning as to why he thinks it is or at least pull me up on issues with my model that he would like some clarification on.

I hope you at least understand basic logic well enough to know that I do not need a competing argument to state what is wrong with your argument. In fact, to date you have not even presented an argument.

juju

Dec16-04, 05:09 PM

Hi,

Consciousness as relates the mind/thought area, is just another element of the perceptive matrix. Just another object of another sense mechanism. It is an awareness of the thought process produced by the neurons in the brain.

It is awareness in general that is the non-physical component of all the objective senses including consciousness.

juju

graffix

Dec17-04, 04:32 PM

Let's keep this topic clean of insults and back on track...i have had to delete several comments that are instigating arguments that have nothing to do with the subject.

I think that needs repeating.

I don't think it's that hard to be humble in here

Thanks

Humble
- Marked by meekness or modesty in behavior, attitude, or spirit; not arrogant or prideful.

puf_the_majic_dragon

Dec19-04, 02:36 PM

i've been reading a lot in here about explaining consciousness with physics. certainly any sane physicist must admit that we have not discovered everything. there are forms of energy and particles that we have not observed or catalogued. i think it's possible that consciousness could be based upon some of these forms of energy or particles that we have not yet discovered. but i also agree that there is no observation or data to support such a theory. but i think that's half the point, we haven't observed the particles yet, so of course we can't observe how they interact to cause consciousness.

on another venue, consciousness seems to be one of the most enigmatic words we seek to define. and i don't think anyone has yet given a satisfactory definition of consciousness. before we can hope to discover what causes consciousness, we need to define what it is we're looking for. this is where i can express my opinion, because i believe that consciousness is by its very nature indefinable. but maybe that's just the philosopher in me :)

in any event, we can't hope to find the root of consciousness soley in physics, nor soley in physiology. yes we know about neurons and neurotransmitters, but we don't know how electromagnetic fields might affect their interaction. how might a supernova in a distant galaxy 4 million years ago affect our consciousness? it's too incomplete a picture to say that it's all in the chemical reactions. there's a relationship between chemistry and physics, especially in living organisms, that i think most chemists and most phsyicists ignore. we need to think in terms of more than one science if we hope to explain some of the most complex events in the universe, such as consciousness.

and that's my rant on that :)

gather

Dec19-04, 03:40 PM

Pardon me for being at a complete loss when it comes to describing, in scientific terms, the nature of consciousness.

As some who have read my posts here from time to time know, I keep a small record of what I and many others believe that consciousness does.

I have remarked often about Prof. Kaku's Levels of Civilization, too. In the archives.

Please come by for a visit when you have the time. (Not a long visit—only one page—oh yes, there is a small opinion poll going on now, too).

I appreciate your interest and thank you in advance for checking this out:

Project Global Consciousness Organization (http://project-global-consciousness.org/)

Ken
(gather)

?

Hellburner

Dec19-04, 03:59 PM

Haven't read the whole thread, I'll work my way through it. Hope I'm not repeating anything or stepping on toes.

Consciousness is an emergent property of matter/energy of sufficient organizational complexity.

The entirety of the universe's computational potential in insufficient to completely model a single consciousness. A basic combinatorial explosion not to mention likely quantum effects. This leads to de facto free will.

Artificial intelligence/consciousness will likely emerge. If it's independently emergent it may be very alien, if it results from intelligence amplification it may share something of humanity...

Les Sleeth

Dec19-04, 04:50 PM

Haven't read the whole thread, I'll work my way through it. Hope I'm not repeating anything or stepping on toes.

Welcome to PF Hellburner.

Consciousness is an emergent property of matter/energy of sufficient organizational complexity.

A theory. You cannot demonstrate consciousness is emergent, and you cannot show it results from complexity. Until is proven, when you state it as a fact you are not being accurate in your communication.

The entirety of the universe's computational potential in insufficient to completely model a single consciousness. A basic combinatorial explosion not to mention likely quantum effects. This leads to de facto free will.

More theory. You might consider preceding such statements with "in my opinion . . ."

Artificial intelligence/consciousness will likely emerge. If it's independently emergent it may be very alien, if it results from intelligence amplification it may share something of humanity...

Well maybe. All the AI enthusiansts and programmers make big claims. As for me, I'll believe it when I see it.

Hellburner

Dec19-04, 04:57 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec19-04, 05:05 PM

Re: subjective experience.

I really have to turn it around and ask, how can you NOT have subjective experience?

Lets say each consciousness is a black box. Each box has a random seed from an effectively infinite set. Hence no consciousness can have the exact same experience.

You are correct. But that's not the point (accepting your confidence that mechanics/physicalness can explain it all). What set of physical circumstances can you put together which proves physicalness creates subjective conscious experience to begin with?

Hellburner

Dec19-04, 05:42 PM

A theory. You cannot demonstrate consciousness is emergent, and you cannot show it results from complexity. Until is proven, when you state it as a fact you are not being accurate in your communication.
Yes, a theory with some rather compelling foundational basis. Look at the animal kingdom, in general the more complex the brain structure the higher the consciousness. In the realm of artificial neural nets, more complex structures yield emergent properties generally related to the level of complexity.
More theory. You might consider preceding such statements with "in my opinion . . ."
Computational Capacity of the Universe (http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0110/0110141.pdf) The universe can have performed no more than 10^120 ops on 10^90 bits.
The Human Central Nervous System (http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/C/CNS.html) It is estimated that the human brain contains 100 billion (10^11) neurons averaging 10,000 synapses on each; that is, some 10^15 connections.
Assuming a purely binary synapse (most assuredly not the case), there would be what? 2^(10^15) states? How does that compare to the computational capacity of the universe?

Hellburner

Dec19-04, 05:54 PM

What set of physical circumstances can you put together which proves physicalness creates subjective conscious experience to begin with?
It's basically a biochemical cascade largely predicated by various environmental inputs and the synaptic weightings imparted by prior life experiences.

loseyourname

Dec19-04, 06:10 PM

Assuming a purely binary synapse (most assuredly not the case), there would be what? 2^(10^15) states? How does that compare to the computational capacity of the universe?

Human neural synapses are likely capable of receiving at least 10 different neurotransmitters, each of which produces a unique signal transduction cascade, which itself will vary according to the internal structure of each neuron (which is not standard for all neurons).

satya

Dec21-04, 07:40 AM

I don't know if there is anything absolute - realization might vary.
What I am writing here is all truth to me.
I practiced meditation from 1987 - I have a wierd experience once - It was december 2000 Austin, Seton centre pkwy.. at my apt.. I was meditating on the floor and no drug effect the time was 12:20AM - Its all about isolation - I was concentrating on a concept that:: "something that changes is not my soul - anything that changes is part of nature surrounding me" - I do not exist on the skin, neither on flesh or blood nor even Na+ ion movement across synapses communicating electrical pulses in my brain - I am beyond - I was trying to focus my mind little above my head - as if i am outside the body and just there 2 inches above my head - maybe couple of hours passed - and all what I got is a point of light - that gradually got enlarged and was all around me - then "consciousness" regained slowly - I still felt I have the body - I am sorry to say, for this was the first time I got scared - for I was unable to open my eyes - I was unable to move any of my limb - though I was wishing strongly I that I am breathing - but I was not sure that I was breathing or not - there was nobody else at the house - I was willing I have a hand a leg - LOL - slowly enough I got back myself as a breathing human being - but by that time it was already morning 6:30AM and I have my -dead-cold legs - you know, I felt like due to something I had no blood circulation on my legs and arms.
I concluded that consciousness is all about being in this space time.

Esnas

Dec23-04, 04:40 AM

sid_galt

Dec23-04, 09:13 AM

The existence of an electron depends on how and if it is observed. Besides the intriguing question "What is consciousness?" there is also the following question. Does consciousness exist because of some interaction in the material world or does the material world exist because of consciousness?

According to quantum physics, the properties of an electron depend on observation not the existence itself.

Consciousness is not a primary. Existence is is. Without existence, consciousness is not possible.

loseyourname

Dec23-04, 03:40 PM

The existence of an electron depends on how and if it is observed. Besides the intriguing question "What is consciousness?" there is also the following question. Does consciousness exist because of some interaction in the material world or does the material world exist because of consciousness?

You shouldn't state your interpretation here as if it is not contentious. By "observation," many researchers only mean the physical interaction of photon and electron. The relevance of conscious experience of the observation is not known and not even investigated as far as I know. You're relying on interpretation of data that are far from standard.

Fliption

Dec23-04, 05:09 PM

You shouldn't state your interpretation here as if it is not contentious. By "observation," many researchers only mean the physical interaction of photon and electron. The relevance of conscious experience of the observation is not known and not even investigated as far as I know. You're relying on interpretation of data that are far from standard.

Loseyourname is right that it is contentious. But only in this forum. It seems that some in this forum still seem to want to cling to the billiard ball physics of subatomic particles. Everything else I have ever read doesn't do this. I even saw a science program on television the other day ( I know, I know this is "pop science" blah! :yuck: ) and they explicitly claimed in this program that "measurement" was more than just interaction of sub-atomic particles. Here is a link to a long thread on this very topic.
http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=2971&page=1&pp=15

Note the original posters attitude toward anything other than "particle from measuring device interacts with particle to be measured and changes it." This is the uncertainty principle to him. But as I said, there is a lot of information out there claiming that uncertainty runs much deeper than this and this information isn't sponsored by the 'Mystics of America' as some would have you think.

RingoKid

Dec23-04, 05:42 PM

loseyourname

Dec23-04, 05:42 PM

Why not ask the people that actually know?

I think the Copenhagen doctrine is correct if we just say that the interaction "could" be known. QM does appear to be controlled by information or knowledge. For example, just knowing the location of a photon at one slit of the double slit experiment eliminates the interference fringe pattern, no matter how slight the photon is perturbed in the experiment. The location of the photon in this case is actually known, even if removed from the human observer by several layers of instruments and processing time. The interesting thing is that the waves know to collapse long before the human knows what they have done. It seems to happen instantly. Some try to argue that a cosmic consciousness is involved. But it is sufficient for scientific purposes to just extent the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM to 'could' observe.

In experiments the human often perturbs the environment by making a measurement of where the photon is. But in natural processes, very strong perturbations revealing the locations of the photons happen all the time, like at the detector screen, which usually absorbs the photon. But photons are constantly being absorbed by various surfaces and the interaction locates the photon. Sometimes humans get to know this, but almost all the time there is no human intervention, yet the Extended Copenhagen Interpretition would work.

That answer was given in the quantum physics forum, which would be the proper place to ask this question. Those of us here in the metaphysics forum really don't know what we're talking about. All uncertainty is to me is this:

Dp Dq > h / 4p

DE Dt > h / 4p

Let's say you measure the position of a moving electron with such great accuracy that Dq is very small. What happens to the precision of the momentum Dp, which you measure at the same instant? From the first relation, we have

Dp > h / 4 p Dq

You can see that the uncertainty in the momentum measurement, Dp is very large, since Dq in the denominator is very small. In fact, if the precision of the position measurement gets so great that the uncertainty Dq gets so small that it approaches zero, then Dp gets so large that it approaches infinity or becomes completely undefined.

From AIP (http://www.aip.org/history/heisenberg/p08a.htm)

I guess I don't see too much metaphysical relevance in this fact alone. In fact, there are literally thousands of measurements that can be made of quantities other than momentum, position, energy, and time that are not subject to these relations. Furthermore, the relations do not apply to macroscopic entities. Even if the subatomic particles that constitute all matter are subject to probabilistic modeling, when put together into human-size objects, the statistical aberrations cancel out and we get certainty. I can definitely know my own position and momentum, or Fliption's energy and time. Which brings me to the only metaphysical question I've ever had about the uncertainty principle: Why would a conscious observer be relevant if we've only been able to consciously observe entities subject to uncertainty for less than several decades?

Then again, by my own admission, I really have no idea what I'm talking about with respect to this matter. For that reason, I've linked Fliption's post to a thread in the Quantum Physics forum and, with any luck, someone who does know what she is talking about can help us out.

Here (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=410953#post410953) is the thread.

RingoKid

Dec23-04, 05:48 PM

strategic dependence on initial conditions allows for differing subjective experience by the observer...

...given that no two observers occupy the same space at the same time.

No two people have the same frame of reference...

graffix

Dec24-04, 11:40 PM

For example, just knowing the location of a photon at one slit of the double slit experiment eliminates the interference fringe pattern, no matter how slight the photon is perturbed in the experiment. The location of the photon in this case is actually known, even if removed from the human observer by several layers of instruments and processing time. The interesting thing is that the waves know to collapse long before the human knows what they have done. It seems to happen instantly. Some try to argue that a cosmic consciousness is involved. But it is sufficient for scientific purposes to just extent the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM to 'could' observe.

I'm not sure if this is accurate or maybe I'm not interpreting this correctly. If what I read about double slit experiments is true, you can do interesting things like:

Set up the experiment with 2 slits (=wave pattern) with light detectors (=particle pattern), shoot the particles, and afterwards do not look at the results for the light detectors (=???) and without examining the pattern on the wall, go take a lunch.

Once back from lunch, delete the light detector results (w/o looking at it) and when you examine the wall, you will get a wave pattern!

Of course if you read the detector results when you come back, you will have the particle pattern... But how does it know what you're going to do, or have you changed the past?

The main reason for debate with the double slit experiment is what exactly happens when we try to scale up the interpretations from particles to day to day objects. And the answer to that is really the answer to what exactly is reality. According to quantum theory all particles are in state of superpositions until a collapse in its wave function (by observation).. And scientiests can send protons, carbon atoms, helium atoms, etc. through the double slit with same results.

A way to describe the quantum collapse of superpositions (wave functions) by observors is to say that reality and our free will are different sides of the same coin. The closeness of the two is one such that no amount of space or time can separate their one-ness. I say no amount of space since we can already send information faster than speed of light (instantaneous) using quantum methods. In other words, their connection is above space time.

BTW I appreciated someone's post on meditation. I believe scientists, skeptics and everyone on this form can spend a life time trying to 'describe' and 'map-out' what this one-ness is when the actual Feeling of one-ness is actually very accessbile.

phoenixthoth

Dec25-04, 01:17 AM

Don't mean to sidetrack this thread but here's my "answer" to the question, "what is consciousness?" Please carry on with your discussion.

I think consciousness is one of those terms that either can't be well defined and/or not everyone will agree on a definiton.

But, then again, what is consciousness is not necessarily a question of definitons.

Continuing to interpret the question as of definiton, here's what I propose:

consciousness is that of a being which can process, can perceive, can react and can be 'silent'.

You'll prove my first statement right if you disagree with this definiton. I know Tom loves "proofs"... But we all know you can't prove a definiton; definitons are either useful or useless not right nor wrong.

Now interpreting the consciousness question as not about definiton... what isconsciousness? Well, the stupid answer is that consciousness is.

Consciousness is the quintessence of being.

There are different forms of consiousness; each person presumably has a different consciousness although they may be linked somehow or all different facets of one consiousness. In addition to the variation of consciousness among you humans there is the consciousness possessed by other beings (cats, computers, ETs, etc), which are all presumably different.

This definiton of consciousness does not (to my knowledge) imply that it is necessarily physically based/originated/propogated or necessarily non-physically based/originated/propogated. Agruments for the physicality (or nonphysicality) of consciousness that depend on the definiton of consciousness leading to that conclusion, and the two sides using different definitions to suit their desires, have no meaning for me.

Tom Mattson

Dec25-04, 03:12 PM

So am I the first then ???

No, because you haven't done it.

BTW I think you mean brains instead of minds. Connections have always been there but you probaly wouldn't recognize them if science is your God ...

No, I meant "minds".

It takes 2 to argue and no one seems to be arguing with me on my speculation of a repository for consciousness in a compactified dimension of string theory.

It only takes one person to present an argument: the claimant.

The only argument I'm getting is from you on the method in which I invite argument by stating what I believe to be true as a statement of fact.

The argument you're getting from me is that you present no reason whatsoever to believe that your statements are indeed factual.

I don't have to prove I'm right to anybody,

You have to argue your case if you want it to remain at Physics Forums.

however you seem to have to prove I'm wrong to everybody so just keep pissing in the wind Tom.

I can't believe you still don't get it.

I repeat:

Your reading comprehension skills need work. At no point have I ever denied your metaphysical propositions. I have explained this to you repeatedly, and no matter how many times I say it you just don't seem to get it. I can explain myself to you as clearly as I can, but I can't understand for you. That takes mental effort on your part.

Back to your claims: What I do deny is that you have any justification for holding forth your metaphysical claims.

Paul Martin

Dec25-04, 11:36 PM

No one has ever extrapolated the most fundamental known physical entities and interactions to a model of consciousness. In fact, no one has ever given a satisfactory account of consciousness that is purely physical. And the connection between consciousness and quantum theory is something that exists only in pop science literature, and in the minds of those who only know science at the popular level. I would appreciate any comments you might have on a hypothesis which makes sense to me. I think it has some similarities to Ringo's, and it has some similarities to Berkeley's, although I don't ascribe any of the attributes to God that Berkeley does. Here is my hypothesis along with definitions for some of the terms I will use.

Definition: 'Consciousness' is the personal experience that I (the author of this post) have of perceiving, conceiving, remembering and willing, along with the experience of knowing that I have the capability to experience those four things. To the extent that there may be others (in particular, you, Tom and other readers of this post) who might experience consciousness, it seems reasonable and acceptable to me for them to define 'consciousness' from their own personal points of view rather than from mine. I think it is safe to assume that the different experiences of consciousness we share are similar enough to consider them to be the same type of thing.

Definition: 'Thought' is any and all information available to consciousness and which is associated with perception, conception, recall, or intent.

Hypothesis: The only thing that exists in reality is a single finite consciousness with its thoughts.

Extrapolation to physical entities: We can account for the existence of physical reality as patterns in the thoughts of the single finite consciousness. The basic strategy for this extrapolation is given by John Wheeler's "It from bit". That is, the trend in the identification of the fundamental constituents of matter and energy seems to point in the direction of those constituents being nothing more than information, i.e. vector spaces with the characteristics of fields, and sets of numbers (coordinates within the vector spaces along with quantum numbers) with the characteristics of particles. Therefore, since thoughts are information, and since these constituents are information, it is no stretch to suppose that physical reality in total is nothing but thoughts in that consciousness.

Connection between consciousness and quantum theory: Being one who knows science only at the popular level, I will look to you to straighten me out on this, Tom.

From what I understand, the outcome of certain physical interactions is indeterminate within some range of uncertainty, and that the actual outcome of any such event is "random", meaning unpredictable by human minds or instruments.

If you assume my hypothesis, then what we call physical interactions actually take place in the single consciousness as transformations of certain information which is associated with the particles and fields involved in the particular interactions. The range of uncertainty of the outcome of a particular quantum interaction allows the possibility for at least two mechanisms: 1. The single consciousness may use some type of randomizing algorithm to determine the outcome (God playing dice, in Einstein's terms), and 2. The single consciousness may exercise some amount of deliberate choice in determining the outcome of a particular interaction. Both of these make sense to me.

The explanation of the appearance of consciousness in association with brains is fairly straightforward. In the direction of brain to consciousness, as required for perception of physical phenomena, the only required mechanism would be for consciousness to be able to access, or attend to, certain of the patterns of information (thought) already present. That would seem to be a given.

In the other direction, i.e. from consciousness to brain, as in the initiation and execution of willful acts, some cause for some physical actions must be induced by conscious thought. Those initial actions, then, could cause a cascade of further actions eventually resulting in a pattern of firing of certain neurons, thus causing muscle action and all the consequences of that. The only mystery is how deliberate thoughts could cause the initial actions without breaking the laws of physics. With my admittedly naive understanding of quantum mechanics, I would like to humbly suggest that those initial actions might be putative "random" quantum events, which in reality would not be random but instead deliberately and consciously chosen. Given my hypothesis, this mechanism would also be straightforward.

As for the specific initial physical actions which might precipitate the chain of events culminating in a free-will-induced action, I think Penrose and Hammeroff have suggested a good possibility: the "flipping" of bi-stable dimers which are the fundamental molecular constituents of the microtubules in the neurons. I will leave it to them to elaborate on the details of how this might work.

I would appreciate anyone who will point out errors in my discussion or who will show how the problems raised by this hypothesis are any more difficult than the "hard problems" of explaining how consciousness can emerge from physical structures or how any physical structures might come into existence in the first place.

Happy New Year to all,

Paul

graffix

Dec26-04, 05:51 PM

That is, the trend in the identification of the fundamental constituents of matter and energy seems to point in the direction of those constituents being nothing more than information, i.e. vector spaces with the characteristics of fields, and sets of numbers (coordinates within the vector spaces along with quantum numbers) with the characteristics of particles.Therefore, since thoughts are information, and since these constituents are information, it is no stretch to suppose that physical reality in total is nothing but thoughts in that consciousness.

I'm not sure about this explanation. We give them coordinates and numbers to describe what they are so information can be used to describe anything. I would think our thoughts on the other hand are memories stored inside neurons that reside in the physical world (our brain). Our thoughts about say a book on my desk is a very very rough approximations of what actually lies there. There is an endless amount of detail (information) that can extrapolated from what's inside this book and what's on my desk, ie the actual particles in it, etc. and i think it's a stretch to say 'since these constituents are information'. I realize as I write this I'm not in total disagreement =), but rather interested in finding out how you want go about filling some gaps. I do agree that reality probably resemble more close to what we think of information versus what we think of things existing physically.

1. The single consciousness may use some type of randomizing algorithm to determine the outcome (God playing dice, in Einstein's terms),

The only mystery is how deliberate thoughts could cause the initial actions without breaking the laws of physics.

It could be possible, as I've posted previously, that the unpredictable firing of neurons in our brains could be attributed by springs. Springs move in 10 dimesions so that's 6 more dimensions left to our imagination. They also have quantum jitters that's unpredictable (it seems that small things all got the jitters.. sit still damnit!). It's possible that our brains are sensitive to what goes on with very very tiny constituents of our universe.

But even if this was the case, I'm not sure if it explains why is it that I get to experience what I'm experiencing right now. I was just thinking isn't there a simpler answer to "What is Consciousness?" Someone should of just said, "what your experiencing right now" and closed this damn forum. jk jk jk

Esnas

Dec26-04, 06:23 PM

Esnas

Dec26-04, 07:14 PM

You shouldn't state your interpretation here as if it is not contentious. By "observation," many researchers only mean the physical interaction of photon and electron. The relevance of conscious experience of the observation is not known and not even investigated as far as I know. You're relying on interpretation of data that are far from standard.

Perhaps the interpretations that I made are a bit contentious but have certainly been talked about. This is especially true of those who have not simply accepted the Copenhagen interpretation (Neils Bohr). Some physicist see a need for a comprehensive theory which includes an understanding of consciousness if there is going to be a unified field theory which brings together quantum theory, relativity, quantum gravity, etc.(Roger Penrose). For some scientist who have a philosophical bent, we have come full circle if we try to use quantum reality to describe consciousness because consciousness ends up as a rather primitive component.

sid_galt

Dec27-04, 08:11 AM

[QUOTE=sid_galt]According to quantum physics, the properties of an electron depend on observation not the existence itself.

Can something exist and not have any properties? Existence implies properties. In order to make an observation something must have at least a quantitative property even if the qualitative property cannot be given. If the properties of the electron depend on observation, then it's existence depends also on observation (including measurement and methods of measuremnet). Heisenberg uses the term "potentia" for the electron before it exhibits a property. (Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Evolution in Modern Science.)

Sorry, I meant value of properties, not properties themselves. For e.g. in an atom, we may not be knowing the properties of an electron in the atom but the existence of that electron is not in question.
That is what I meant when I said that existence does not depend on observation or that the fact that we have observed an electron or not has no effect on whether it exists.

Note that I do not know a lot of quantum physics so I may be way of the mark here.

Fliption

Dec27-04, 09:21 AM

Why not ask the people that actually know?

Then again, by my own admission, I really have no idea what I'm talking about with respect to this matter. For that reason, I've linked Fliption's post to a thread in the Quantum Physics forum and, with any luck, someone who does know what she is talking about can help us out.

Here (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=410953#post410953) is the thread.

I hope you realize that I've already thought of this. I do understand that the philosophy forum isn't the place to get an understanding of Quantum Physics. I think what you'll find from your thread in the QM forum is more disagreement and no real concensus as it relates to what the word "observation" means. Even if a small concensus develops, it will not address results of various experiments. I've already been down this road. But I'll gladly follow along, in case I'm wrong.

Here's the latest link where I've had this conversation.
http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=24534

freep2

Dec27-04, 03:28 PM

Did Moses violate physics when he parted the Red Sea? Or is it that non earth based reality governs all? Was the big bang just an accident? If what we call God actually
Infinite Energy? Is it possible for a brain operating at the alpha frequency/voltage to perceive any of the higher vibrations/realities. A clue: Delta>Theta brain wave state
will lead you to these other realities. That is the interface. peace.

Astronuc

Dec28-04, 08:04 AM

This seems to be the most appropriate thread for this link:

Toward a Science of Consciousness

Mathematics: The Bridge to an Integral Science of Experience (http://www.integralscience.org/tucsonIII/tucsonIII.html)

by Thomas J. McFarlane

loseyourname

Dec28-04, 04:02 PM

I think what you'll find from your thread in the QM forum is more disagreement and no real concensus as it relates to what the word "observation" means.

Oh, I know. That was exactly my point about people drawing metaphysical conclusions from physics experiments. The metaphysical hypotheses formed are not themselves testable and so we end up with nothing but opinions being thrown back and forth, sometimes with relatively well-constructed arguments to back them up. What we don't get is any real knowledge.

armrecon123

Dec28-04, 10:24 PM

graffix

Dec29-04, 12:40 AM

armrecon123 wrote
~ Feeling is a Form of Thinking ~

Is it though? This would seem to depend on our definitions. I would draw the line that a potential A.I. can think but would never be able to feel.

Indraevyn

Dec29-04, 05:21 PM

Amir, when you stated"
"“The Soul” you are talking about does not exist, consciousness / awareness “is” the chemical reaction going on / in your biological brain hardware." did you ever take into consideration what might motivate the chemical reactions that are consciousness and awaerness which are essentially judgement. Without any internal motivation we simply would not judge and would be listless organisms. Our "Soul" is what motivates us to do right and wrong, if our judgement was simply based on chemical reactions taking place in the brain then there would be no point for a punishment system, we would just chemically alter the thoughts of a convict to cease doing wrong and to begin doing right. We cannot do that though, that is what our soul is, internal motivation to react to the rest of the world through judgement, consciousness and awareness.

juju

Dec30-04, 02:50 PM

Hi,

I pretty much know the source of my existence is not physical and has multi-demensional extent. Experience has provided the data for me. Although the experiences can be doubted and other explanantions provided, I am sure enough to state this as more than just a belief.

juju

Jeebus

Dec30-04, 03:01 PM

I pretty much know the source of my existence is not physical and has multi-demensional extent. Experience has provided the data for me. Although the experiences can be doubted and other explanantions provided, I am sure enough to state this as more than just a belief.

Eh. I do not believe there can be any absolute proof, as each person's experiences are subjective. The fact that you are aware of your own existence is enough proof for you to logically state "I exist". However, that is not proof that others that you interact with exist, or that the world with which you interact is real.

The point is, we cannot absolutely prove the reality of our own experiences. Not to ourselves, because we are by nature subjective, and therefore prejudiced towards our own viewpoint; nor to others because the experience itself is subjective, and further we have no absolute proof of the existence of anyone else. For more on this theme, read "The Mysterious Stranger" by Mark Twain.

A good example of subjective experience is color. How do we know that what we have been told is "red" and what we see is the same as the "red" that others see? They may choose the same crayon from the box, but only because that is what their experience has taught them to do. But is it truly "red" in an absolute sense? Do I know that the other person is not seeing what I perceive to be green? They could be daltonic, who knows. We cannot prove the reality of our experience of "red". That's that.

Les Sleeth

Dec30-04, 04:40 PM

Eh. I do not believe there can be any absolute proof, as each person's experiences are subjective. The fact that you are aware of your own existence is enough proof for you to logically state "I exist". However, that is not proof that others that you interact with exist, or that the world with which you interact is real.

I think you've created a strawman there. He didn't say anything about creating an absolute proof for you or others. He said nothing about others existing, or if the world is real. He said he was certain, for himself, that the "source of my existence is not physical and has multi-demensional extent."

The point is, we cannot absolutely prove the reality of our own experiences. Not to ourselves, because we are by nature subjective, and therefore prejudiced towards our own viewpoint; nor to others because the experience itself is subjective, and further we have no absolute proof of the existence of anyone else.

I am sure you know this, but even an "objective" proof is 100% subjective-dependent. It's just that we can compare notes when it comes to external reality, and we can't for what's internal to us.

The problem of prejudice never seems to go away, even in the science-minded. People tend to filter out things that don't support their world view. And if their world view happens to be physicalism, you can bet your bottom dollar plenty of them are being "subjective" as you are describing.

Yet you cannot assume everyone must be prejudiced. Most people are, but there are some who work hard to eliminate it. Your general assumptions about the "norm" have to be applied carefully when considering the claims of an individual.

A good example of subjective experience is color. How do we know that what we have been told is "red" and what we see is the same as the "red" that others see? They may choose the same crayon from the box, but only because that is what their experience has taught them to do. But is it truly "red" in an absolute sense? Do I know that the other person is not seeing what I perceive to be green? They could be daltonic, who knows.

Yes, but so what? He isn't talking about the accuracy of sense perception, or the distorted interpretations that can come from senses perceiving only part of the picture. He's talking about his experience of his own consciousness.

We cannot prove the reality of our experience of "red". That's that.

It doesn't matter about color, and it doesn't matter what he can "objectively" prove, for his statement to be credible. He is saying his experience, the same exact experiential ability which is the foundation of empiricism, has convinced him of something. Why does he need to be concerned if he can prove it to anyone else? I know I don't care one bit about proving my personal experience to others. I am content to experience and know for myself.

If I say turning my attention inward tells me something, I cannot possibly prove that. But you can try it yourself and investigate that way. You just can't investigate ME.

Of course, if I decide to communicate, then I do have an obligation, but it isn't to prove something that cannot be objectively proven. I believe it is to make sense and to support my statements with as much experience and evidence as possible.

juju

Dec31-04, 02:14 PM

Eh. I do not believe there can be any absolute proof

I didn't say anything about absolute proof. Just that what I have is more than just a belief.

There are no absolute proofs of anything. There is only experiential data that points in one direction or another. If the pointers are strong enough in one direction then the conclusion is more than just a belief.

On many questions the pointers can point in more than one direction at the same time. These cases require further data.

Absolute proof, for me at least, will have to wait until the death of my present physical body occurs, or I leave it permanently.

juju

Canute

Jan2-05, 04:45 PM

Jeebus

Sorry to do this to you but I also want to disagree with what you wrote. Much of it seemed to me well reasoned, but there were one or two serious flaws.

Eh. I do not believe there can be any absolute proof, as each person's experiences are subjective. The fact that you are aware of your own existence is enough proof for you to logically state "I exist". However, that is not proof that others that you interact with exist, or that the world with which you interact is real.
I'm afraid you'll find that your first sentence is the opposite of the truth. Philosophers have always concluded that absolute proof is precisely equivalent to subjective experience.

What JuJu said was that he knew, he did not say that he could demonstrate a proof. This is an important difference. By 'prove' we normally mean something like - demonstrate to be consistent with the axioms of some formal axiomatic system or other. But proving something to ourselves involves a quite different process. (That 'prove' has these two different meanings causes a lot of trouble in philosophical discussions).

It is perfectly easy to know things that we cannot demonstrate in this way. We do it in every moment of every day. You yourself do it in every moment of every day, and sometimes at night. You know that something exists, as you yourself say, even though you cannot prove this to me. And I know that you cannot prove it to me. I know this even though I cannot prove that I know you know it but cannot prove it to me, and so on into absurdity.

Knowing is not 'being able to demonstrate a proof', it is exactly the opposite. Equivalently, 'knowing is not being able to demonstrate a proof'.

Now, you might argue that this one piece of certain knowledge you have(that something exists) is an aberration, a single exception to a rule, but this again is the opposite of the truth. If you delve into the mathematics of the incompleteness theorem, into epistemology, metaphysics, formal logic, and other academic piqeon-holes, (and I don't mean after years of study, just after a bit of root around these things), you quickly see that what we know to be the case but cannot demonstrate to be true is the only form of knowledge that we can ever have, the only type of knowledge we can know. In a strong sense it is the only kind of 'knowledge' that there is.

(By 'know' here I mean as in having a certain knowledge that something is the case, in the strict philosophical sense of 'certain'. In linguistic form it might be the statement "I CANNOT POSSIBLY BE WRONG!!!" in relation to some assertion or other).

We can all make this statement in relation to the assertion "Something exists". We all seem to agree on this. But we cannot say that we cannot possibly be wrong when we are discussing the theory-laden evidence of our physical senses, nor when discussing the outcome of a demonstration within some formal system of symbols or other that some statement or other is true or false. Kurt Goedel proved this. All we are doing is showing that the statement (theorem, proposition or whatever) is consistent with our axioms. By definition our axioms are assumptions.

Now obviously all this places a limit on what can be known. JuJu's assertion came in under this limit. He said that he knows what he knows in just the same way that he knows that something exists. He knows by just, well, knowing, being aware of it, being conscious that it is the case, knowing because his own conscious experience proves that it is the case.

If we knew how people performed this feat of knowing then perhaps we might find away of testing whether people know things or not. However as yet there is no scientific or western philosophical explanation for how we know things, we just do. Direct experience can bring certain knowledge. That's it. That's all there is to say. Why? How? Unless you know then it just depends on whose explanation you want to believe.

But only direct experience can do this, bring certain knowledge, things that can be known. All philosophers and mathematicians agree on this. It may be the biggest and deepest scientific/philisophical mystery that there is, with the possible exception of why anything exists.

Your assertion that JuJU couldn't know what he knows, on the other hand, is very different to his. You cannot possibly know whether your assertion is true. How, after all, can you know that it is impossible for him to know from direct experience what he knows, when what we learn from our direct experience is known to be the only thing we can ever know?

By the way, nothing I say here is at all contentious in philosophical or mathematical circles, (not as far as I know). It's all fairly easy to prove, and often has been. (Not easy for me, I hasten to add, I can't do all that formal stuff, but easy for any decent mathematician or philosopher, someone like whoever Hypnogogue is).

We've known about all this since the early Greeks philosophers wrote about it. Aristotle put it "Certain knowledge is identical with its object", meaning that to know one must become.

In more Kantian terminology we might say that all that we can ever know is the noumenal, since we cannot ever know anything for certain of the phenomenal. The only noumenal thing of which we are capable of knowing anything at all is what we are, or can become.

I'm can't be sure that I agree with JuJu about reality, reality as JuJu says he knows it is. But I don't know that he doesn't know it. However my guess is that he does. While I can't be certain about it, or ever sure that I'm interpreting his words in the right way, it seems to me that he knows something rather like what I know, and others here, even if we may differ about some of the details.

It's not often I agree with Bertrand Russell on most things, although I'd give a lot to be able to write like him, but I agree completely with him on one issue.

"There is one great question," he writes in 1911. "Can human beings know anything, and if so, what and how? This question is really the most essentially philosophical of all questions."

From Buddhism comes this little gem.

Knowing Fish

One day Chuang Tzu and a friend were walking by a river. "Look
at the fish swimming about," said Chuang Tzu, "They are really
enjoying themselves."

"You are not a fish," replied the friend, "So you can't truly know
that they are enjoying themselves."

"You are not me," said Chuang Tzu. "So how do you know that I
do not know that the fish are enjoying themselves?"

From 'Zen Stories To Tell Your Neighbors'

The point is, we cannot absolutely prove the reality of our own experiences.
After the above I hope you can see that the reality of our experiences is the only thing we can ever know. For each of us nothing else exists except our own experiences. The reality of our experiences is the only thing that we can absolutely know, prove to ourselves, despite the fact that we cannot demonstrate a proof of their reality to anyone else.

Not to ourselves, because we are by nature subjective, and therefore prejudiced towards our own viewpoint; nor to others because the experience itself is subjective, and further we have no absolute proof of the existence of anyone else. For more on this theme, read "The Mysterious Stranger" by Mark Twain.
I agree, and I agree also that it's a relevant issue. In philosophy what you say here is equivalent to the assertion that solipsism is unfasifiable, a well established fact. And, as you say, we are prejudiced towards our own viewpoint. But then according to philosophers ours may be the only viewpoint that exists.

A good example of subjective experience is color. How do we know that what we have been told is "red" and what we see is the same as the "red" that others see? They may choose the same crayon from the box, but only because that is what their experience has taught them to do. But is it truly "red" in an absolute sense? Do I know that the other person is not seeing what I perceive to be green? They could be daltonic, who knows. We cannot prove the reality of our experience of "red". That's that.
I'd go along with that also. Equivalently, experiences are incommensurable. Again this is an established fact. We can only know what we experience, and when we know it we can really know it, whatever 'it' happens to be. But we cannot communicte our experiences to someone else, they have to had first-hand.

Don't ever let anyone tell you that you cannot know things. Yes, nothing can be proved. But this is one meaning of prove, there is another, and knowing is not the same thing as proving. Not only can you know things, and do you know things all the time, but in a sense you could say that it's the only thing that you can do, the only thing that your consciousness does, just know all the time what state it is in, and what other states it can be in.

I hope that mostly made sense. What it all means is that the original question ('What is Consciousness') has to be answered in the first-person. It can only mean 'What is My Consciousness', for I (or you) can never know that any other consciousness exists, and mine (or yours) is certainly the only one you or I can study.

All the best
Canute

magus niche

Jan3-05, 04:48 AM

g'day, I enter this obviously unsolvable void yet again because i feel there is an inherent ignorance of the fact that we 'human' observers keep using our language which we invented to state 'facts' about some external reality.

truth is not even experiential (although experience is as close as one can get), as our experience is influenced by external factors throughout our life. in this way to say one 'is' who one 'is' is questionable to say the least.

surely we must keep language concerning so universal a concept as mind/consciousness/matter/being etc. as simple as possible. everyone has their own subjective understanding of text, but slightly less abstract terminology is surely beneficial in conveying a message to others :-)

Consciousness seems to be linked to the energetic interactions between infinitely small entities within our body. It seems to have the paradoxical ability to affect and be affected by these entities and in fact entities outside the body also. I know dualisms and reductions are not fashionable at the moment, but the taoist metaphor of yin/yang is an excellent one for helping to articulate such a fundamental problem in philosophy.

opposites are often misunderstood as seperate and distant theoretical entities. the idea of consciousness/physicality is a perfect example. people keep seperating everything into distinct systems. at this point in my life the ideal of 'all is one' seems much more sensible. the yin/yang concept is useless if one thinks of one of the sides as being more important or 'causal' and the other as simply an inferior 'reaction'.

oh yes, any respectable 'theory of everything' or anything of this sort surely should be all inclusive including the antithesis of the theory itself. ie every theory is both true and false depending on the context.... but this is common knowledge, no? :smile:

Canute

Jan3-05, 03:29 PM

g'day, I enter this obviously unsolvable void yet again
It's not obviously unsolvable to everyone. Perhaps you can explain why you feel it is.

truth is not even experiential
Are you not certain, on experiential grounds, that it is true that something exists?

surely we must keep language concerning so universal a concept as mind/consciousness/matter/being etc. as simple as possible. everyone has their own subjective understanding of text, but slightly less abstract terminology is surely beneficial in conveying a message to others :-)
Terminology is inevitably abstract, it's the only sort of terminology there is. If you mean we should keep it simple I agree. The problem is that the topic is not simple, and if you put things simply often people mistake that for naivity.

Consciousness seems to be linked to the energetic interactions between infinitely small entities within our body.
What makes you say that?

I know dualisms and reductions are not fashionable at the moment, but the taoist metaphor of yin/yang is an excellent one for helping to articulate such a fundamental problem in philosophy.
I agree, but note that the Yin/Yang symbol does not denote dualism. It very specifically denotes non-dualism.

opposites are often misunderstood as seperate and distant theoretical entities. the idea of consciousness/physicality is a perfect example. people keep seperating everything into distinct systems. at this point in my life the ideal of 'all is one' seems much more sensible.
A fair point. But 'all is one' is dualism according to those who designed the Ying/Yang symbol. It just raises the old intractable philosophical problem of the one and the many.

oh yes, any respectable 'theory of everything' or anything of this sort surely should be all inclusive including the antithesis of the theory itself. ie every theory is both true and false depending on the context.... but this is common knowledge, no? :smile:
Absolutely. Theories are not knowledge, since their truth or falsity is relative. One cannot know anything about consciousness by theorising about it, a problem well illustrated by any brief perusal of the literature on it. Although that's not to say theorising can't help.

magus niche

Jan4-05, 11:46 PM

good points canute,

It's not obviously unsolvable to everyone. Perhaps you can explain why you feel it is.

yes, i was a little abrupt. what i mean is that i believe the time has come for humans to stop thinking they can 'solve' such abstract problems that, lets face it, we invented with our own imaginations. don't get me wrong, i am a problem solver just like the rest, but an awareness of the importance of the problems we invest large quantities of energy into, is surely beneficial.

the idea of consciousness is certainly* worthy of exploration though, and i suppose i was a little arrogant in suggesting the inquiry was a void... bad day :wink:

Are you not certain, on experiential grounds, that it is true that something exists?

*hmm certainty, truth, knowledge. all these words to describe some objective reality that is absolute. my opinion is that if there is such a reality (ie body/mind of god) it would be both expressable and it would also be inexpressable. say truth was absolutely non absolute. because if we start becoming obsessed with ideas, like you found in my argument, one contradicts ones self without even being aware of it.

nothing exists, as does everything.

so to 'transcend' contradiction and paradox one could incorperate these concepts into their philosophy. i think this is where the yin/yang stuff comes into it. yes i was not clear in suggesting Tao as dualistic, as it is more/less than that. :smile:

as far as pinpointing consciousness goes, i do not think it can be purely experiential, as the word itself implies something that is not conscious. now, how can one know that something else is not conscious without being it? i mean, dreams, altered states etc. are all forms of the same thing, as is being unconscious: there is still energy being communicated throughout a body, with/without one being aware. so awareness/memory is not a prerequisite, or is it???

hmm... is a rock conscious? i would argue yes, if consciousness is non-heirarchic. ie. to be conscious does one have to be a certain 'level' or 'quality' to be counted? so the rock has a level of consciousness that is completely different to our own. rock is often uniform in its inner construction, so maybe the rocks consciousness would be somewhat limited and uniform also...

any body of matter is a process in itself, and has an abundance of influences acting apon it, both internally and externally. i would say infinite influences infact. i think humans are a complex crystallisation of matter. ie. instead of being a rock subject to heating/pressure/water etc. that in time forms a purified crystal, we have become extremely complex but fundamentally the same: evolution over time via energy causes some form of purification/crystallisation. by pure crystal i simply mean concentrated energy in a certain direction.

it seems as though our direction is slightly self destructive at the moment though, would you not agree? :surprised

Absolutely. Theories are not knowledge, since their truth or falsity is relative. One cannot know anything about consciousness by theorising about it, a problem well illustrated by any brief perusal of the literature on it. Although that's not to say theorising can't help.

Knowledge is questionable in itself though. it is another paradox. to know something one must believe it, and demonstrate it, and then others must be able to demonstrate it to believe it, and know it. but one cannot be sure that what one is interpreting as the truth is the 'actual' truth as in 'as god intended'. this is very theoretical territory.

as far as i can tell most 'truths' in our society are discreet masks veiling our desire to use/exploit certain aspects of reality. this seems to be common among life forms with higher/broader levels of consciousness. i know this sounds dismal and uncomfortable, but it needs to be said. when i speak of truth i generally acknowledge that it is simply 'human objectivity' or human truth, not universal truth. comments?

catchya

magus niche

Jan5-05, 12:16 AM

Body:soul:spirit
Ice:water:vapour
Matter:energy:consciousness
Earth:water/fire:air
Past:present:future
None Is Better, None Is Worse
None Are Easy To Put In Verse

freep2

Jan5-05, 01:34 AM

It is good to learn acadaemia. Your consciousness is what pushes you learn, the
desire to KNOW. You must get into Spirit as this is the
Age of Aquarius. Hebrew is oldest recorded written human language going back
around 6000 years. Is anyone aware of any older written human language? The
Recent translation into English of the Kabbalah has many of the mysteries contained therin. The Kabbalah were the hidden teachings that only recently have become more widely available.
If you doubt consciousness, spirituality, or the Fact that a Being known as God actually created this vast expanse we inhabit, including the stars you see at night, then check out kabbalah for the DEFINITIVE answer.
There are many other places to learn to access your spirituality. Simply, ask Google for info. I hope
this helps some of you. Peace, Light & Extreme Joy! o:) o:) o:)

selfAdjoint

Jan5-05, 09:46 AM

. Hebrew is oldest recorded written human language going back
around 6000 years. Is anyone aware of any older written human language?

The 6000 year age of Hebrew is unsupported; the oldest surviving document in Hebrew is from -700 (I use a year system in which 1 BCE is labelled 0 and years before it with negative numbers and years after with positive).

Old Babylonian, aka Akkadian, is a Semitic language that goes back past -2000; so does Ancient Egyptian. The Oracle Bones from China are dated to the -2000's, and Sumerian, a non-semitic language, is older than all of them. Even in the Bible, "Sumer of Akkad" was a going concerned when Abraham migrated.

Fliption

Jan5-05, 04:40 PM

There are many other places to learn to access your spirituality. Simply, ask Google for info.

If I ask google, I can pretty much find whatever I want to hear. I'd rather just make it up myself. :biggrin:

Canute

Jan6-05, 09:04 AM

yes, i was a little abrupt. what i mean is that i believe the time has come for humans to stop thinking they can 'solve' such abstract problems that, lets face it, we invented with our own imaginations.
I don't agree but it's a reasonable point. The only problem is that we didn't invent our own imaginations, we invented science as a means of explaining them, by which means they turn our to be inexplicable. As you suggest, we may be wasting our time.

if we start becoming obsessed with ideas, like you found in my argument, one contradicts ones self without even being aware of it.
Couldn't agree more. I'd say that Goedel proved it.

so to 'transcend' contradiction and paradox one could incorperate these concepts into their philosophy.
For reasons to do with formal logic to transcend paradox it is necessary to transcend philosophy, which is basically mathematics.

as far as pinpointing consciousness goes, i do not think it can be purely experiential,
Maybe. But at present it is widely defined as 'what it is like'.

any body of matter is a process in itself, and has an abundance of influences acting apon it, both internally and externally. i would say infinite influences infact. i think humans are a complex crystallisation of matter. ie. instead of being a rock subject to heating/pressure/water etc. that in time forms a purified crystal, we have become extremely complex but fundamentally the same: evolution over time via energy causes some form of purification/crystallisation. by pure crystal i simply mean concentrated energy in a certain direction.
Makes some sense to me. I wonder, could consciousness be defined as 'the ability to do work'? That would be an interesting one to discuss.

it seems as though our direction is slightly self destructive at the moment though, would you not agree?
Yes. There seems little doubt that we are consciousness, but it's a lot less clear that we are intelligent.

Knowledge is questionable in itself though.
This is wrong. Knowledge is defined in philosophy as unquestionable.

to know something one must believe it, and demonstrate it, and then others must be able to demonstrate it to believe it, and know it.
I won't get into it but this is a serious misunderstanding. Aristotle is good on this one.

as far as i can tell most 'truths' in our society are discreet masks veiling our desire to use/exploit certain aspects of reality.
Completely agree.

Mostly what you say stands up imho, for what that's worth, but the relationship between knowledge, proof, truth and belief is not quite the way you say it is. However it's a big topic well covered in the lit. so I won't argue the point.

Regards
Canute

nasrin

Jan6-05, 05:16 PM

“The Soul” you are talking about does not exist, consciousness / awareness “is” the chemical reaction going on / in your biological brain hardware. Actually it’s very simple to test, just give yourself some SSRIs; citalopram, fluoxetine, fluvoxamine, paroxetine and or sertraline and see how your soul reacts. LOL! But I do believe the energy (biological energy, energy found in cells) is not just simple energy this energy actually has memory. As for multiple existences, to me they are more like “memories carryovers” …
only occur in very rear instances, else we will all be copies of mommy and daddy, remembering all what they did and saw up till conception and then a branch off from that.

“The Soul” you are talking about does not exist,

what do you mean by DOES NOT EXIST???
is it as such that whatever you don't see and whatever doesn't respond to you in your own ways, and whatever doesn't show up as you wish it to show up to you.... does not EXIST???

i am lost about these type of comments of you people.

just a question, i have headache now i feel the pain very much but i don't see it. does it mean that the pain thingy doesn't exist or so???
in the same way, i do feel soul, GOD within me very much, its power and so on but i don't see them though, does that mean those don't exist???

please explain. i am not genious here at all. just looking around to know.

thanks.

Rileywwwnewpath4com

Jan10-05, 04:58 PM

Consciousness and realization of Self apparently occurs after elapsing of time during which a baby has experiences and begins to draw his or her own conclusions. Drawing conclusions spurs speech formation to express thoughts such as: "Damn. This floor is hard." Once the dialogue begins the baby has to justify the dialogue by inventing a person it's talking to, in this case talking to theirself. Once the Self is acknowledged there's where you achieve consciousness. Sort of forming a mirror image of yourself to talk to, discuss things with. Otherwise we would just be another animal.

gather

Jan10-05, 10:32 PM

A Real Force in Nature
Measurable
Demonstrable
To be expected in Humanity's Future
A Force meant for us to be used to increase human understanding and brotherly love

Ken

Project Global Consciousness (http://project-global-consciousness.org/)

nameta9

Jan20-05, 08:31 AM

The only way to understand consciousness will be to directly and physically modify the neural circuits of our minds and see what happens. There is nothing metaphysical about the mind it is just a complex circuit with feedbacks and resonances etc. By modifying the circuits and the mind organization research will discover when and how awareness appears. We may even manipulate and change our mind organization and sense perceptions and memory systems and this may generate new minds and new peceptions and eventaully completely new realities and universes.

selfAdjoint

Jan20-05, 11:34 AM

nameta9

Jan21-05, 02:11 AM

The study of consciousness has the same problems of quantum mechanics. The observation interacts with what is being observed (heisenburg principle) creating a false observation or a limited observation in terms of accuracy. So a conscious mind studies its own consciousness or another mind but all the while USING its own consciousness therefore creating a distorted or subjective or false observation. Consciousness probably cannot understand itself without being outside itself or being something else. This is a HARD problem.

StatusX

Jan21-05, 04:30 PM

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't it logically necessary that the phenomenal has no explanatory role? That is, even if the material world isn't causally closed, any extra mechanisms proposed to fill in the gaps will only need to perform functional roles. Even if "qualions" are proposed because explanatory holes are found in current physics, and even if these are thought of as the carriers of experience, isn't it logically possible they could exist without experience, while still maintaining their functional role? If so, experience remains either non-existent or an epiphenomenon. Is there any way out of this?

Because if not, it is very unsettling. When I look at blue, and in doing so contemplate the hard problem of consciousness, it certainly seems to be the phenomenal that effects my behavior. And yet, a reductive explanation of the brain could conceivably explain even why we have a word "phenomenal." This seems to be more than counter-intuitive, it is a full blown paradox. Whatever final theory of conscousness we come up with, the same theory would be found in a zombie world. How could such a theory be said to explain anything?

Canute

Jan21-05, 04:52 PM

There are quite a few unsubstantiated claims being made here. There is no evidence that we have to learn to talk before we can be conscious of self, and that only then can we be conscious. This is what Dennet argues and its not hard to show that the idea is incoherent. Even if one thinks that it is not incoherent it is not difficult to show that there's no evidence to support the idea. To say that without internal dialogue we would by just another animal means little, since as far as we can tell we are just another animal. Nor can we say that consciousness is measurable. Clearly it is not.

To say that there is nothing metaphysical about consciousness, that it's just a complex brain process, is an opinion. At this time all the indications are that consciousness is metaphysical (beyond physics) since as yet it cannot be detected by physicists. Surprisingly, given the confidence of many scientists on this issue, it will never be detected by physicists, or anyone else come to that (except for their own), a limit to the scientific study of consciousness known as the other minds problem.

It is true that when we use apperception (minds perception of itself) we can be confused in various ways about what we are perceiving. However we cannot be mistaken about what we are experiencing. Rather, this is the only thing in our world that we cannot be mistaken about.

Not trying to be pedantic, but on this topic it's easy to make accidental assumptions and so set off in the wrong direction.

selfAdjoint

Jan21-05, 05:39 PM

its not hard to show that the idea is incoherent. Even if one thinks that it is not incoherent ...

Well if it's not hard to show, we don't care what anyone who thinks otherwise claims, do we.

Canute

Jan22-05, 08:50 AM

I suppose you could take that attitude. Seems a bit unhelpful though.

selfAdjoint

Jan22-05, 10:55 AM

Sorry, I was being sarcastic. You said Dennet's view was easy to show incoherent. If that was literally true how could any rational person disagree? And who cares what an irrational person thinks?

StatusX

Jan22-05, 01:15 PM

There are three ways I could see the problem of consciousness being "solved":

1. It is shown that there is no consciousness. I can't imagine how this could be, but I know there are people today who believe it. If they could somehow build their case, this could gain wide acceptance.

2. Mysterianism, the belief that consciousness is simply beyond our abilities to comprehend. This is very possible, as both other views have their serious problems, and there are definitely other questions we aren't capable of answering. But obviously, this is a last resort.

3. Now, if there is consciousness, there is only one way I can see to solve the various problems. However, it is deeply unsatisfying, at least to me.

If we could somehow show that it is the intrinsicness of the physical (eg., what an electron really is) that causes consciousness, we might be able to show that consciousness is logically necessary, and then we wouldn't have to worry about being zombies in denial. Because for any proposed new intrinsic properties, the further question of why they exist on top of their functional role needs explanation. But it is reasonable to assume intrinsic physical properties are necessary, since there has to be something for the physical laws to work on.

Here's what's so unsatisfying. We believe we are conscious. There is some circuit in our brain responsible for this. But if the physical world is causally closed under today's laws, consiousness couldn't have contributed to that circuit, neither during our lives nor over the course of evolution. "Coincidences" like this must be explained. The only potential explanation I can see at present is that the physical world isn't causally closed, and extra particles are needed to fill in the gaps. Some of these particles cause us to talk about experiences, and it is their intrinsic nature that we experience. But all indications are that this will not turn out to be the case.

Does anyone have any other ideas or corrections?

Canute

Jan22-05, 03:49 PM

Sorry, I was being sarcastic. You said Dennet's view was easy to show incoherent. If that was literally true how could any rational person disagree? And who cares what an irrational person thinks?
Yes, you're right. I see what you mean now. My post was out of order. Mostly I just meant to say that there was no evidence to support what was being claimed, but on the language/consciousness thing I was glib and dogmatic. My apologies.

To unpick this a bit. The poster I was contradicting stated confidently that language gives rise to consciousness. To say that it gives rise to 'self' must to some extent be true, but the idea that language gives rise to consciousness is like saying that dynamite is caused by explosions. I suppose in a way it is, since if it didn't explode it wouldn't have been invented, but it's a difficult argument to defend, and it certainly can't be just stated.

The trouble is also that I get very annoyed with Dennett. He seems determined to ignore common sense in favour of whatever view he happens to favour. I consider him to be irrational, but I do care what he thinks because people read him and take him seriously, outside the professsion at least. Gregg Rosenberg in another thread says that Dennett's views challenge his intellectual integrity. I tend to be less polite, because Dennett himself is insulting and desperately patronising to those who won't roll over and accept his arguments.

I said his arguments can be refuted, so I'll have a go. Here he is on language. (All this is from 'Consciousness Explained'). I'm not having a go at anyone here, just with DD.

"In other words, I am proposing that there was a time in the evolution of language when vocalisations served the function of eliciting and sharing useful information, but one must not assume that a co-operative spirit of mutual aid would have survival value, or would be a stable system if it emerged. Instead, we must assume that the costs and benefits of participating in such a practice were somewhat "visible" to these creatures, and enough of them saw the benefits to themselves as outweighing the costs so that communicative habits became established in the community." (195)

This is surely incoherent. It says that consciousness is causal, that being conscious impacts on our evolution as a species, and that the doctrine of causal completeness, on which physics is more or less predicated, is false. This from a physicalist.

Or does he mean that that vocalisation only gives the vocaliser the illusion that what it vocalises is understandable in a way that brings perceived benefits to its illusory concept of self, a self which it is deluded into believing it has by having an illusory conscious experience of understanding the meaning of what it is experiencing itself saying. Perhaps that’s it. It's nonsense. How can the benefits of vocalisation be 'somewhat visible' to creatures that are not conscious? How could they see the benefits to 'themselves' before selves existed?

Why is "visible" in inverted commas here? And what does ‘somewhat’ mean? Dennett’s use of language is worth paying very careful attention to as one reads him. He is ever so careful not to be too clear. One supposes that putting these words in inverted commas means that these are not words he wanted to use, since what they mean, shorn of their inverted commas, is that these creatures were consciously aware of the costs and benefits to themselves of communicating. If they do not mean this then it’s hard to see what they do mean. Yet somehow the inverted commas give them an ambiguity that at first glance avoids self-contradiction. It’s clever stuff.

The fact is that if these creatures were robot-replicators (as he suggests) then clearly the benefits of communicating would never be ‘somewhat visible’ to themselves. The idea is ridiculous. We can define robot-replicators as entities which have no selves to which anything at all would ever be somewhat visible, creatures which would never have any clue as to what might be of use to them or what would not.

But with self-assured self-contradiction this passage asserts that these creatures were not robots at all, but were in fact conscious beings, for otherwise they would have no ‘self’ to which communicating could have been known to be beneficial, no way of knowing that it was beneficial, and in fact no way of knowing anything at all. So, and despite all Dennett’s talk in his robot-replicator book on evolution (‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’, another gem), it turns out that consciousness must after all have played a part in our evolution, and that consciousness is causal.

He could have said ‘understood to be beneficial’, but this would be to give the game away. "Somewhat visible" is much more safely ambiguous.

Also, and although I’m no expert on neo-Darwinist theory, this passage seems to me to contradict that theory completely. For a start it implies teleology. It suggests that these creatures began to communicate on purpose, by intention, for the sake of the benefits that were somewhat visible to their ‘selves’. It suggests that the evolution of language was the result of teleological processes. As the language pathways in the brain which develop during the lifetime of these creatures cannot be passed on genetically without invoking Lamarck one wonders how they developed. As he states that these poor creatures could not think anything that they could not say, then one supposes they just sat around waiting for new words to biologically mutate so that they could start thinking them. He goes on;

"Then one fine day (in the rational reconstruction) (sic!), one of these hominids "mistakenly" asked for help when there was no helpful audience within earshot – except itself! When it heard its own request, the stimulation provoked just the sort of other-helping utterance production that the request from another would have caused. And to the creature’s delight, it found that it had just provoked itself into answering its own question." (195)

If I wrote this here in this forum everyone would fall about laughing. Perhaps then they would hear themselves laughing and realise that by they had provoked themselves by inadvertent auto-stimulation into finding something funny, and had thus invented humour. And what does "mistakenly" in quote marks mean? Does it mean mistakenly or not-mistakenly?

We can note that these hominids are capable of feeling delight, and were aware of themselves talking, so again consciousness is asserted to be causal, since this delight and awareness is assumed to lead to the repetition of the behaviour. We may also note that no explanation is provided of how they became capable of feeling delight or became aware.

It is very unclear what he means here by "rational reconstruction." He doesn’t define what he means by ‘rational’ at any point in his book. I suspect that most people define it differently. All this is to support his claim that:

"the practice of asking oneself questions could arise as a natural side effect of asking questions of others, and its utility would be similar."

Dennett’s thesis here is that talking comes before thinking. Sooner or later we quite accidentally say something, and then eventually, by a series of genetic mutations in our brains, evolve to be capable of thinking about what we are saying. Eventually the virtue of talking sotto voce to oneself is "recognised", and an internal dialogue begins, thus creating the illusion of consciousness.

Quite how these poor creatures ever became aware that they were talking, or became aware of what they were talking about, is not explained. Nor is it explained how or why a creature who is not aware of its own existence would care whether or not it was talking, nor whether talking is somewhat visibly useful to itself or not. It’s a muddle.

At some point these dumb creatures learn to think with their mouth closed. Or as he puts it, in the usual opaque language designed to disguise the naivety of the ideas -

"This innovation would have the further benefit, opportunistically endorsed, of achieving a certain privacy for the practice of cognitive autostimulation."

I really don’t know why anyone takes him seriously. Apparently the evolution of self-conscious thinking started with shouting loudly for help (accidentally and unknowingly) then by shouting more quietly, and eventually by learning to cognitively autostimulate in silence.

Of course if he is right then it follows that these creatures could not think anything that they could not say. As he puts it:

"If there were only fifty things one hominid could "say" to another, there would only be fifty things he could say to himself."

Note that "say" is placed in quote marks. And I wonder. Perhaps if we are not able to think things through internally before we have "said" them to other people this would explain much of what he says in his book. I remember one famous politician who, when asked what he thought about some issue or other answered, "how can I know what I think until I’ve spoken about it".

What he says is that these creature could know things, could feel delight, could be aware of what was useful and beneficial to themselves, and had self-awareness. They had language and they had a social structure built on communicating with each other. One wonders why he says this in such a complicated way.

"Once our brains (sic) have built the entrance and exit pathways for the vehicles of language, they swiftly become parasitized (and I mean that literally, as we shall see) by entities that have evolved to thrive in just such a niche: memes." (p200)

So, once we can talk we can start thinking about what we are going to say. Once we have done this then we can start having ideas, perhaps even ideas about what we are going to say. Apparently the pathways for the vehicles of language become parasitized by memes, which by definition can exist only in consciousness, thus causing the consciousness in which they exist, which by definition consists of memes. No wonder he states that:

"I don’t view it as ominous that my theory seems at first to be strongly at odds with common wisdom."

I presume by 'common wisdom' he means common sense. I'm afraid I find it extremely ominous that it contradicts this. It seems unsurprising that his book has had no impact in the profession beyond generating objections.

All this, and my general annoyance with Dennett, was what was behind my much too quick response to the suggestion made above that language caused consciousnesss. Maybe I've been unfair on Dennett, or missed his point somewhere, but I cannot see how his position can be defended.

Of course there are issues here worth discussing, and of course I might be wrong in various ways, but it cannot just be stated that without language we would not be conscious. There's no evidence for it, no rational argument for it (yet), and much evidence that's against it (studies with feral children for instance).

But you were quite right to be critical, I should have made a case and not just pontificated.