View Full Version : All Real Scientists Unite !!!
This is a message to all real scientists : this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work, according to them phillo's... :biggrin:
RetiredMD, thanks for your concern. You may be right that more immediate moderator action was warranted here. If anything, I felt that letting the conversation take its course was productive.
The kind of anti-philosophy sentiment expressed in this thread seems to be somewhat common attitude among 'hard-nosed' scientist types, and as this is first and foremost a science site, I imagine there are a number of such people here. So perhaps it is of more value to let them air out their views against philosophy and then make the case for philosophy, or even in some instances point out where their conceptions are outright false, than to squash the argument before it begins. I readily acknowledge that some of marlon's ideas about philosophy are not just disparaging but outright false. However, I think that they may be common misconceptions about philosophy, especially at a site such as this. If that is the case, then Les and cogito have done a great service to battle against such ignorance of the discipline, a service which could not have been fully realized had the conversation been immediately halted. That said, I fully recognize your concerns here and fully accept the brunt of any criticisms you might have.
I apologize if it appears as if I've left Les or anyone else out to dry. I agree with you that Les is a valuable member of PF, and that our community is better off for having him. While none of the recent posters in this thread are entirely without fault in terms of how they have conducted themselves, I don't mean to give the impression that they are all equally to blame either (although I can see how it might appear that way). Les's last post in this thread has been deleted in an effort to remove any trace of marlon's unacceptable ad hominem attack more than anything else. Suffice it to say that appropriate action has been taken behind the scenes.
Any comments ???
Let me tell, philosophy has some utility when it is to be understood as a branch of science, then helping to develop the theoretical mechanism, instead of just trying to catalog and "historyze" its development.
matt grime
Nov1-04, 05:52 AM
I'm sorry to disappoint, Marlon.
I've no real intention or wish to read that whole thread on semi-scientists in the philosophy forum. I skimmed the first and last two pages or so.
As (currently) a professional mathematician I am far nearer philosophy than solid state mechanics, and I think that there are many interesting facets of philosophy that can shed light on (meta-)mathematics. Yes, there are aspects of philosophy that I find distasteful, but then there are people similarly abusing science.
We can all agree the Sokal incident shed useful light on a misleading use of philosophy (though properly it was social science misusing mathematics, and not philosophy stating something misleading about mathematics). However, we also have the brothers Bogdanov in "our" side of the camp.
Here is a link that you may find interesting (since medals seem to be important in that discussion, shall we have a Fields Medallist involved?)
http://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/philosophy.html
I believe that I read a paper/preprint by Jon Baez last year on higher dimensional algebra (n-categories) and string theory in which he called for more philosophers to think about the implications of string theory (after all, there is no empirical evidence for this, so in what sense is it a hard-science?).
Then there are subtleties such as the axioms of choice and constructibiity that lead on to some odd happenings (I will not call them paradoxes: they aren't).
I don't suspect this is the answer you wanted, but philosophy is useful and unnecessary at the same time to a mathematician, at least that is the argument Gowers proposes, and I agree in the main.
Incidentally, I'm sure that at some point someone metioned quantum entanglement, penrose and consciousness, since that seems to be a current favourite. Can I suggest that anyone who wants to say anything about this, as if Penrose agreed with them,
read, preferably, his books and papers and this interesting article
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/penrose.html
I don't suspect this is the answer you wanted, but philosophy is useful and unnecessary at the same time to a mathematician, at least that is the argument Gowers proposes, and I agree in the main.
Hi matt,
As a matter of fact it is. Thanks...
You are quite right here. Philosophy is useful and necessary at the same time. I pointed out the exact same point in the semi-scientists-thread. The problem is that there is no clear boundary that defines what philosophy really is. I think it needs to be seen as a science when it is "done" by mathematicians or physicists themselves, thinking over the results and implications of REAL scientific results. The string-theory-example is a very good point you made. Though there are no experimental results (yet), string theory is to be regarded as a real science because it is born out of QFT and Special relativity and general relativity. The development of this science is based upon checking and comparing theoretical results by real scientists all over the world. Ofcourse it is still speculative to some extent, yet some theoretical consensus is gained because QFT and GTR cannot be denied or interpreted in thousand different ways. Philosophy can, that's the point here in my opinion.
Don't mind that you did not read the entire semi-scientist-thread,... it is a useless sequence of insulting posts...
regards
marlon
Let me tell, philosophy has some utility when it is to be understood as a branch of science, then helping to develop the theoretical mechanism, instead of just trying to catalog and "historyze" its development.
Indeed you are right arrivero, thanks for the reply...
Philosophy belongs to the physicsts and mathematicians and all other real scientists. It is no science on itself...
marlon
The problem is that many, probably most philosophers do not know enough about science to offer any insight on it, the bets people to talk about the philosophical implications of science are scientists otherwise you not only risk highly subjective statements but statements that are objectively wrong.
The question is can you name one person whose sole domain is philsophy (i.e. not a physicist or mathematician) who has made any contribution of note to modern physics (i.e. quantum physics and relativity)?
I don't object to philsophy in genral, what i do object to is modern academic philsophy. There are some worethwile parts such as the study of symbolic logic which can help us to understand physical and mathematical theories, but in the main the moden academic subject of philosophy contians very little of value. This is as many valuable subjects that were formally in the domain of philosophy have now become academic subjects in their own right leaving the modern philospher to pick over the scraps.
matt grime
Nov1-04, 07:41 AM
There are philosophers who have made useful contributions to mathematics in the meta- sense. However if any philosopher were to prove a usefultheorem in mathematics surely we'd regard them as a mathematician, and their sole domain of philosophy would no longer be sole? The foundations of mathematics benefit greatly from philosophy.
Besides, why do you pick modern physics?
Prof J. Mayberry has just published a book about the foundations of maths for instance. He is a philosopher in a mathematics department, or a mathematician in a philosophy department. Either, or both, or neither? Is Russell and Whitehead mathematics or philosophy. What about the mathematical arguments in Wittgenstein?
Okay I suppose in some sense I was being to limting as Russell was trained as a philospher and logican rather than an out-and-out mathematician, but still these days it is a real rarity for someone with who is the sole product of a philosphical background to contribute to mathmatics. Interestingly Wittgenstein had a mathematics-haevy engineering background.
Howver this is really about the natural sciences rather than matehmatics, I picked modern physics as this is one of the areas that philosophers (that is philsophers in the snese of those direct;ly involved in the acadmeic subject) seem to make the most noise about, yet fail to produce any work of substance.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 08:10 AM
Not only physics or mathematics are "real" sciences but also biology/psychology/economics. But the traditional scientific method doesn't work very well for some of these important sciences. For example, in macro economics it is impossible to construct controlled experiments in order to evaluate socialism, effects of increasing the money supply or different patent rights. One can only look at the effects of many uncontrolled historical examples and the "beauty" of the theory proposed. One can dislike the inexactness of this, but the theories guide extremely important real-world decisions that must be made. So here the questions asked today in the philosophy of science are extremely important. To quote cogito,
And, again, please learn to read closely. I didn't say that philosophers constructed current scientific theories, I claimed that philosophers of science and epistemologists understand better than you (and, in general, better than practicing scientists) how scientific theories are confirmed. I bet you don't know the first thing about inferences to best explanation, or the debates about the purported criteria for justified inferences to the best explanations (i.e., simiplicity, elegance, explanatory depth, predictions, fecundity, coherence with established theory, etc.). So, what do you know about the different models of scientific theory confirmation? What's the hypothetico-deductive model, and what its criticisms? What is the deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation? You don't know a damn thing about the normative dimension of scientific practice; about how it justifies belief, and how theories are themselves confirmed. This is why you are nothing more than a glorified mechanic. Perhaps you should spend a day researching what philosophers actually do, and what the areas of expertise are for philosophers of science, before you toss off your allegations concerning something of which you know not what.
Also, it seems that in string theory, physicists have also abandoned the traditional scientific method of testable, falsifiable, controlled predictions. And instead are arguing on the grounds of elegance and the other factors mentioned above.
I did not want to participate in this orgy anymore (notice I have stopped responding in the thread in question in the philosophy section). However, a couple of your points require to be addressed. I will start with the last point you made:
Also, it seems that in string theory, physicists have also abandoned the traditional scientific method of testable, falsifiable, controlled predictions. And instead are arguing on the grounds of elegance and the other factors mentioned above.
I will not disguise my uneasiness about String theory and its variatons. And I'm not the only one either. Robert Reardon, in his op-ed piece in Physics today a few months ago, reflected a similar sentiments. Even in Brian Greene's fabulous TV documentary on The Elegant Universe, you would have heard several times the caution that if String theory cannot produce measurable consequences, it isn't physics, but rather a philosophy. So I have no defense to counter all the attacks against String theory since I have been known to be on the offensive myself.
Secondly, I will need to address the quote you attributed to cogito:
And, again, please learn to read closely. I didn't say that philosophers constructed current scientific theories, I claimed that philosophers of science and epistemologists understand better than you (and, in general, better than practicing scientists) how scientific theories are confirmed. I bet you don't know the first thing about inferences to best explanation, or the debates about the purported criteria for justified inferences to the best explanations (i.e., simiplicity, elegance, explanatory depth, predictions, fecundity, coherence with established theory, etc.). So, what do you know about the different models of scientific theory confirmation? What's the hypothetico-deductive model, and what its criticisms? What is the deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation? You don't know a damn thing about the normative dimension of scientific practice; about how it justifies belief, and how theories are themselves confirmed. This is why you are nothing more than a glorified mechanic. Perhaps you should spend a day researching what philosophers actually do, and what the areas of expertise are for philosophers of science, before you toss off your allegations concerning something of which you know not what.
If this is true, then these philosphers should not want any of us "practicing physicists" from participating in their discussions, since we are nothing more than a "glorified mechanic". We have no clue on the "criteria for justified inferences....", and we have no idea on how scientific ideas are confirmed.
If all of these are true, then it is certainly an amazing venture we physicists are doing. We meander through our work like zombies, discovering new things, expanding the boundaries of our current knowledge, without actually needing to know how these things are finally accepted to be valid. Are we actually working just on auto-pilot, where we go on confirming this and that, without actually bothering to philosophize why such things actually occur? More importantly, does that mean philosophizing about such things are really not necessary, since we can still do physics without understanding them? After all, we really don't ".. know about the different models of scientific theory confirmation", and yet, we do continue to confirm and disprove theories all the time. How are we able to do all that, and yet still be ignorant of all the epistemiology associated with it?
Strangely enough, the last part of cogito's quote reflects the sentiment that I have always stressed upon : how is one able to analyze and criticize something without knowing clearly what it is? Is it sufficient to have simply a superficial idea of something to make one able to make judgement calls out of it? I have taken a couple of philosophy of science classes as an undergraduate. Does that make me competent to make judgments about philosphical issues? Is someone who majored in philosophy of physics and has taken several physics classes can be considered competent enough to know about physics to make an accurate analysis of it?
It all boils down to the "distrust" of philosophers analyzing physics and physics practice, and physicists espousing philosophical issues. I am not competent enough, nor do I pretend to know much about philosophy. Thus, based on cogito's argument, I have decided that my "lack of understanding" of the complex "epistemiology" of my profession isn't welcome there, and that's why I have withdrawn my participation from the philosophy section.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 09:37 AM
First, I do not have an advanced understanding of the philosophy of science like cogito. But it is my understanding that there have recently been a revolution in this area with many new insights. Many people seems to think that the field died with Popper and his followers, while in reality today his ideas have lost most influence. Today it seems to associate quite closely with mathematics in areas like Bayesian probability and algorithmic information theory.
My point regarding string theory is not to criticize it. It is that the best way to find support for it and decide which variant is correct may be in questions now discussed in philosophy of science. It may never be possible to prove it using the traditional criteria, but maybe with new criteria like improved versions of Ockham's razor.
For some examples of the current discussion in the philosophy of science, look at "understandable papers" on the homepage of Chaitin:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/#UnderstandablePapers
I don't object to philsophy in genral, what i do object to is modern academic philsophy. There are some worethwile parts such as the study of symbolic logic which can help us to understand physical and mathematical theories, but in the main the moden academic subject of philosophy contians very little of value. This is as many valuable subjects that were formally in the domain of philosophy have now become academic subjects in their own right leaving the modern philospher to pick over the scraps.
I totally agree with your words on this one,...It seems quite the truth to me because every time you speak these words of wisdom to a "real philosopher", you will get the most angry words back as a reply...Seems to me you are then touching some sensitive "part" in the philisopher's "constellation"...
regards
marlon, and thanks for the reply...
My point regarding string theory is not to criticize it. It is that the best way to find support for it and decide which variant is correct may be in questions now discussed in philosophy of science. It may never be possible to prove it using the traditional criteria, but maybe with new criteria like improved versions of Ockham's razor.
I guess this is where you and I disagree. If what you meant by "traditional criteria" is experimental verification, then I do not see any substitution for that (or maybe I'm just protecting my job?) :)
I think this is what makes physics different than many other "non-physical science" field of studies.
Zz.
RetiredMD
Nov1-04, 12:02 PM
I will just put in my little opinion and then leave everyone to their own thoughts. I am an MD and hold a PhD in sociology. I have always been a proud and intellectually demanding man. In my field I was a genius, or so I thought. I was head of the psychiatry department at a med school and taught sociology at the same time (“Science and Society” was my theme). I was a “successful” man.
Then I would go home. It is not easy for me to admit that there I gave my hapless children anxieties and wore out three wives with my insistence on cerebral perfection. Was I still successful or a genius?
It is a shame that it took a stroke and the face of death to wake me up. I survived but it turned me into an invalid and stole some of my brain power. Typing this post took most of the morning and a great deal of pain.
Here is something I have learned. When we go home to our families we are not physicists or biologists or doctors or university professors. Actually the truth is bigger even than that: we are NEVER what we “do.” We are always human first. But if we let what we do give us our identity or puff up our egos or be such intellects we can’t feel, then we’ve subordinated our humanity to our talents.
There is no reason to be against philosophy as it is practiced here. Let it represent our humanity. By not recognizing other fields and other peoples accomplishments, all it will do is disillusion the public with science, and confirm the negative stereotypes many people already have of scientists (as you probably know doctors aren't faring too well in the reputation department either).
If society is going to prosper, there has to be a blending of the different areas of understanding just as LWSleeth has been suggesting. Don’t try to make everything science or mathematics because everything isn’t. Bring your understanding to all discussions but be just as willing to listen to that which you know nothing about as you are eager to contribute what you know. I do not believe I am being overly sentimental to put forward the idea that intellectual charity and mutual respect can help us all work together to make the world a better place.
Thank you and have a good day.
Morris
My personal view is that:
1)By forcing yourself to express your ideas in quantifiable/mathematical form enable others to pick out (possibly subtle) logical flaws in your arguments/pet theory.
2) By forcing yourself to express your ideas as experimentally falsifiable predictions allows nature to kick your butt occasionally, no matter how elegant and appealing your theory might be.
Physics is perhaps the only human endeavour in which we try to achieve both of these goals.
(Maths, as such, try to satisfy 1) whereas sciences like chemistry/biology/medicine strive to achieve 2) ( 1) being hopelessly out of reach, due to the complicated subject matter))
Hi Morris,
Thanks for the reply but there is nothing wrong with discussing our visions on the "usefulness" and "definition" of philosophy and all that comes with it. Every real scientist like a physicist or mathematician or biologist or MD will recognize the fact that not everything in live is science and facts. Nobody here is denying the major influence that "emotions" can have on human behavior and even on an entire society. However this has little to do with a comparative study of real exact science and philosophy. I agree with statements like "though psychology may not work like math, it is a real science". Nobody is gonna say that the study of human behavior isn't a science...the point is philosophy isn't a science for many reasons that already have been quoted here and in other threads.
regards and many thanks for your input
marlon
My personal view is that:
1)By forcing yourself to express your ideas in quantifiable/mathematical form enable others to pick out (possibly subtle) logical flaws in your arguments/pet theory.
2) By forcing yourself to express your ideas as experimentally falsifiable predictions allows nature to kick your butt occasionally, no matter how elegant and appealing your theory might be.
Physics is perhaps the only human endeavour in which we try to achieve both of these goals.
(Maths, as such, try to satisfy 1) whereas sciences like chemistry/biology/medicine strive to achieve 2) ( 1) being hopelessly out of reach, due to the complicated subject matter))
arildno,
AMEN TO THAT :approve: :approve: :approve:
thanks for your reply...
marlon
Morris:
I completely agree with you reply; humans are never, ever, reducible to a single activity they might pursue, or, for that matter, ideals they uphold/cherish.
In fact, this shows to me the need for something which "overarches" our particular disciplines, points of view which to some extent enables us to integrate our various personas/pursuits.
In particular, something which cannot be said to be science, but valuable nonetheless.
In my humble opinion, though, this is basically the area of the arts&writers; I find more of personal value in a good novel than in a philosophical essay.
In my humble opinion, though, this is basically the area of the arts&writers; I find more of personal value in a good novel than in a philosophical essay.
Sorry for jumping in again, but once again AMEN TO THAT.
I find personal value in classical music...especially the many beautiful "opere grandi" of W A Mozart. Like Die Zauberflöte or Don Giovanni for example...just my personal opinion and taste...
marlon
RetiredMD
Nov1-04, 12:41 PM
...the point is philosophy isn't a science for many reasons that already have been quoted here and in other threads.
This is the last thing I will say on the subject because I don’t have the ability to keep up with the young lions. Why do you keep insisting philosophy has to be science? It is not science. Science is science and philosophy is philosophy. Each does things differently.
The entire point of my former post was the importance of learning to appreciate domains for what they are, and not to look at them in comparison to science. It seems like you are trying to make a competition between two disciplines which have distinctly different approaches. It is a disservice to philosophy or any other human endeavor to maintain that usefulness be judged only by what science achieves.
Enjoy your science! If you so desire, enjoy philosophy! If you are not inclined philosophically, then it doesn’t mean you must demean philosophy to fully take pleasure in science.
Thank you and good day,
Morris
Why do you keep insisting philosophy has to be science? It is not science. Science is science and philosophy is philosophy. Thank you and good day,
Morris
This is the point i am trying to make, that's all...
thanks again for taking the effort to reply here, much appreciated
marlon
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 12:59 PM
Some interesting philosophy for physicists:
"The search for a `Theory of Everything' is the quest for an ultimate compression of the world. Interestingly, Chaitin's proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem using the concepts of complexity and compression reveals that Gödel's theorem is equivalent to the fact that one cannot prove a sequence to be incompressible. We can never prove a compression to be the ultimate one; there might be a yet deeper and simpler unification waiting to be found."
—John Barrow, essay on "Theories of Everything" in Cornwell, Nature's Imagination, 1995, reprinted in Barrow, Between Inner Space and Outer Space, 1999
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/bonn.html
In fact, this shows to me the need for something which "overarches" our particular disciplines, points of view which to some extent enables us to integrate our various personas/pursuits.
In particular, something which cannot be said to be science, but valuable nonetheless.
In my humble opinion, though, this is basically the area of the arts&writers; I find more of personal value in a good novel than in a philosophical essay.
It will be hard to find something valuable that cannot be studied scientifically. The arts and beauty, it can be studied. A beautiful face very symmetrical. The great painters and architects were very careful to follow the golden ratio. Identical twins reared apart often have remarkably similar tastes in art. Religious experiences can be induced by stimulating the temporal cortex. Economics is the study of how to maximize value with scarce resources. The biochemical and anatomical pathways of pleasure and reward can certainly be studied.
hypnagogue
Nov1-04, 01:03 PM
This is a message to all real scientists : this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work, according to them phillo's... :biggrin:
I don't see anything in my post implying that scientists are 'just mechanics.' You happened to extract what was, to you, the most offensive argument made in that thread, and somehow presented my rather general post as if I were endorsing that specific claim. This is what a philosopher would call an 'invalid inference.' :wink:
For the record, I wouldn't go as far as cogito did to say that scientists are 'just' mechanics; they obviously have some idea of what constitutes epistemic justification of theory creation and so on. However, I would venture to say that a philosopher whose sole purpose is to study the epistemic issues involved in science would have a deeper understanding of all the issues involved than the 'average' scientist himself. The average scientist, perhaps, knows all that he needs to know in a practial sense in order to shape the trajectory of his work within the bounds of what is accepted to be good science. But perhaps the average scientist does not understand exactly what makes it good science-- what really justifies an inductive claim, what counterarguments and such exist and why they ultimately do not win the day, and so on-- to the extent that a philosopher of science does. This need not be taken as an insult to scientists in general, nor as a claim of intellectual superiority on the part of philosophers.
As for the issue of philosophy being a science, I would straightforwardly claim that it is not a science (and likewise for mathematics), because it is primarily not about empiricism (although it may have a rich and even indispensible interdisciplinary 'conversation' with the sciences and other empirical methods). And although not all philosophy proceeds this way, it is not uncommon to see a rigorous argument put forth in terms of clearly stated axioms and derivations of further statements using well-defined logical laws (eg modus ponens). To the extent that philosophy must be scripted in natural language it is unavoidably going to be at least somewhat 'fuzzy,' but there are rigorous methods for logical inference not unlike those of mathematics. Contrary to what some might believe, rigorous rules of inference are not the sole property of mathematics.
Some interesting philosophy for physicists:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/bonn.html
It will be hard to find something valuable that cannot be studied scientifically. The arts and beauty, it can be studied. A beautiful face very symmetrical. The great painters and architects were very careful to follow the golden ratio. Identical twins reared apart often have remarkably similar tastes in art. Religious experiences can be induced by stimulating the temporal cortex. Economics is the study of how to maximize value with scarce resources. The biochemical and anatomical pathways of pleasure and reward can certainly be studied.
Studied, yes; scientifically..hmm.
First off, this being the scepticism forum, it exist serious doubts whether ANY so-called "identical twins reared apart"-experiments can be regarded as science at all.
1) How MANY such twin pairs is born each year?
2) How have the researchers ENSURED that their objects of study fit that category, for example by:
3) How did the so-called scientists gain access to confidential adoption papers?
Unless solid facts&numbers on these issues are provided by the scientists, their "results" should better be regarded as sheer fabrication of data (which HAS been proven to be the case, in several instances).
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 01:48 PM
Studied, yes; scientifically..hmm.
First off, this being the scepticism forum, it exist serious doubts whether ANY so-called "identical twins reared apart"-experiments can be regarded as science at all.
1) How MANY such twin pairs is born each year?
2) How have the researchers ENSURED that their objects of study fit that category, for example by:
3) How did the so-called scientists gain access to confidential adoption papers?
Unless solid facts&numbers on these issues are provided by the scientists, their "results" should better be regarded as sheer fabrication of data (which HAS been proven to be the case, in several instances).
In essence you are accusing all the twin researchers of fraud. There may have been individual cases of fraud, as in other sciences. This doesn't mean that all the research done is invalidated.
Regarding your questions, from one twin register:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/helthrpt/stories/s892403.htm
Some interesting philosophy for physicists:
"The search for a `Theory of Everything' is the quest for an ultimate compression of the world. Interestingly, Chaitin's proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem using the concepts of complexity and compression reveals that Gödel's theorem is equivalent to the fact that one cannot prove a sequence to be incompressible. We can never prove a compression to be the ultimate one; there might be a yet deeper and simpler unification waiting to be found."
—John Barrow, essay on "Theories of Everything" in Cornwell, Nature's Imagination, 1995, reprinted in Barrow, Between Inner Space and Outer Space, 1999
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/bonn.html
First of all, I think you may need to do a bit of background info on my stand on the fallacy of "TOE". If you care to waste a few minutes, you may want to read one of my Journal entries titled "The Theory of Everything?". I discuss the connection that many condensed matter physicists make of "TOE" with "Reductionism". Now talk about philosophizing there!! :)
It will be hard to find something valuable that cannot be studied scientifically. The arts and beauty, it can be studied. A beautiful face very symmetrical. The great painters and architects were very careful to follow the golden ratio. Identical twins reared apart often have remarkably similar tastes in art. Religious experiences can be induced by stimulating the temporal cortex. Economics is the study of how to maximize value with scarce resources. The biochemical and anatomical pathways of pleasure and reward can certainly be studied.
You cannot scientifically study something that has no clear definition. You may say something "beautiful" as being "symmetric", but is this the ONLY criteria for something to be beautiful? If you can narrow down a set of properties that are universally agreed upon, then I'd say you have a valid starting point to study it scientifically. In fact, once you have that starting point, the definition of what it is may even expand as you understand that thing even more, or even discover other things that are "beautiful" but yet, do not share the same set of attributes.
I am hesitant to want to call other aspects of study in fields such as "economics", etc. as being 'scientific'. I know you do. To me, it has to be more than just "stamp-collecting". The resemblence of a "scientifically sound method" does not make it a science, because science is more than just a collection of data or facts.
Zz.
selfAdjoint
Nov1-04, 01:59 PM
There are philosophers who have made useful contributions to mathematics in the meta- sense. However if any philosopher were to prove a usefultheorem in mathematics surely we'd regard them as a mathematician, and their sole domain of philosophy would no longer be sole? The foundations of mathematics benefit greatly from philosophy.
Liebniz is the great example of someone who made important contributions to both mathematics and philosophy.
In essence you are accusing all the twin researchers of fraud. There may have been individual cases of fraud, as in other sciences. This doesn't mean that all the research done is invalidated.
Regarding your questions, from one twin register:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/helthrpt/stories/s892403.htm
The article merely substantiates my suspicions:
1) All in all, it is only about 450 couples which might come into consideration.
2) As is clearly stated, the way in which this "separation" occurred, was that an uncle or aunt took them in, that is a RELATIVE.
3)At the time when such "adoptions" happened, families/relatives tended to live in much closer proximity to each other than what is the case today.
4) By 2)+3), we really have no basis for claims that these twins grew up in ISOLATION from each other; that is, in situations where similar environmental influences can be neglected.
5) But ISOLATION from each other, is a CRUCIAL component in any argument whick seeks to determinethe "purely genetic" component.
When this isolation factor cannot be regarded as securely established, twin studies of this kind is basically WORTHLESS.
Clausius2
Nov1-04, 02:34 PM
Errr...To add my ingnorance to the pool, I have something to say:
In former ages Philosophy was beyond Physics and Mathematics. The orientation of the science targets were established by famous philosophers. One only has to remind Aristoteles and the concept of "Physis" or Nature (have I written that right?), Pitagoras, Platon, Zenon, Socrates...etc.
Nowadays, the Philosophy runs behind Physics and Mathematics. Philosophers want to understand physical processes and explain it. But the majority of modern philosophers do not have the technological and scientific knowledge to be able to do that. In fact, no physicist, mathematician or engineer asks to a philosopher what is his opinion about some technological dealing, because surely his words are unpractical and far away from actual scientific thinkings.
The age of Philosophy has ended. The age of the Philosophy of Sciences has just started.
Some interesting philosophy for physicists:
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/CDMTCS/chaitin/bonn.html
Actually the notion that Goedel has no TOEs is quite controversial, but John Barrow is a physicist anyway............
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 02:59 PM
The article merely substantiates my suspicions:
1) All in all, it is only about 450 couples which might come into consideration.
2) As is clearly stated, the way in which this "separation" occurred, was that an uncle or aunt took them in, that is a RELATIVE.
3)At the time when such "adoptions" happened, families/relatives tended to live in much closer proximity to each other than what is the case today.
4) By 2)+3), we really have no basis for claims that these twins grew up in ISOLATION from each other; that is, in situations where similar environmental influences can be neglected.
5) But ISOLATION from each other, is a CRUCIAL component in any argument whick seeks to determinethe "purely genetic" component.
When this isolation factor cannot be regarded as securely established, twin studies of this kind is basically WORTHLESS.
Your accusations of fraud have failed. Regarding how the study is done, it is of course impossible to have totally separated pair. For exampel, all people in the same nation are affected similarly by the overall culture. Twin studies usually have a controll group reared together to solve this problem. The only difference will between the groups will be that the twins reared apart will have a greater environmental difference than the twins reared toghether. In this way, any difference will be due to the environment.
For example,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12603642&dopt=Abstract
I don't see anything in my post implying that scientists are 'just mechanics.' You happened to extract what was, to you, the most offensive argument made in that thread, and somehow presented my rather general post as if I were endorsing that specific claim. This is what a philosopher would call an 'invalid inference.' :wink:
My dear friend, i think you have become the victim of your own "posh" vocabularium. I never said that the term "just mechanics" was derived out of your post. I meant it as a reference to the words of cogito (i believe that's his name). This is what a real scientist would call a 'false statement' or a 'lie' :wink: :wink:
I also don't think you can compare math with philosophy just because they are not constructed following empirical rules. Though this is true i think every one here will agree that math is NOT constructed in the same way as philosophy and math has a lot more value to other sciences then philosophy will ever have...Math is a language, the language of physics and so on...
Your statement about "average" scientists not knowing what makes good science is a real insult. In the semi-scientists-thread i posted a text on how real exact sciences work. I suggest you check it out, i think you will find it most revealing. Basically the mechanism of real sciences is really easy and there ain't much to philosophy about. If any considerations on constructing science were to be made (which is ofcourse the case) then they will be done by real scientists and real scientists alone, because they have the knowledge and thus the justification to do so. No philosopher can really philosophy on physics are math because they do not have the knowledge of these fields of study, at least not as thorough as a real scientist. The argument (not made by you btw but by cogito and the other one) that we only construct theories but we donnot know how they work the the best joke i heard this week. I would like to thank my two philosophical friends for giving me such a nice time...
regards
marlon
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 03:35 PM
You cannot scientifically study something that has no clear definition. You may say something "beautiful" as being "symmetric", but is this the ONLY criteria for something to be beautiful? If you can narrow down a set of properties that are universally agreed upon, then I'd say you have a valid starting point to study it scientifically. In fact, once you have that starting point, the definition of what it is may even expand as you understand that thing even more, or even discover other things that are "beautiful" but yet, do not share the same set of attributes.
I am hesitant to want to call other aspects of study in fields such as "economics", etc. as being 'scientific'. I know you do. To me, it has to be more than just "stamp-collecting". The resemblence of a "scientifically sound method" does not make it a science, because science is more than just a collection of data or facts.
Regarding beauty, I have only to let people rate faces with different symmetry for beauty. If my prediction is right, there will be a correlation between beauty and symmetry. If the correlation is very strong, it is unlikely that studying other factors not correlated with the first will be useful.
And why should not economics be science? Let restrict ourselves to macro economics, since controlled experiments are difficult here. Still, it has theory, correlations and causality. Much more than a collection of facts. If you think otherwise, what is wrong with these studies (you can find most of them on the author's homepage using google):
http://www.freetheworld.com/papers.html
Billions of people will suffer if wrong decisions are made. How should decisions be made regarding economics if there is no science?
Your accusations of fraud have failed. Regarding how the study is done, it is of course impossible to have totally separated pair. For exampel, all people in the same nation are affected similarly by the overall culture. Twin studies usually have a controll group reared together to solve this problem. The only difference will between the groups will be that the twins reared apart will have a greater environmental difference than the twins reared toghether. In this way, any difference will be due to the environment.
For example,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12603642&dopt=Abstract
Nonsense.
There is simply not sufficient degree of separation if the kids run to and fro their parents' and aunties' house.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 04:08 PM
Since some physicists here are the outstanding authorities on the scientific method, I have some questions:
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory fail?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 04:17 PM
Nonsense.
There is simply not sufficient degree of separation if the kids run to and fro their parents' and aunties' house.
You have given no proof that they live very close together. Or that they who do are in the studies.
However, let's assume that they are all next door neighbors. No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed.
Do you think that something this obvious would have been missed by the reviewers in some the world's most prestigious medical journals?
"No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed."
Fanciful overinterpretations to suit one's preconceptions.
Besides, it is not me who should supply detailed data about twins in order to ensure that environmental influence can be discarded. It is, as a matter of fact, the duty of honest researchers.
If you are to have a really solid basis to come to the conclusion of significant genetic influence, you must ensure:
1) The twins are reared apart, in order to:
a) Hinder families from producing similar environmental influence
b) Hinder the twins from forming bonds between themselves, and developing their traits in unison
2) Have sufficiently DIS-similar social environments in order to gauge:
a) To which extent do the twins take on the values of their social equals?
b) To which extent are there surprising similarities in the twins' behaviour across social strata.
Conjuring up so-called "control groups" is easy, to make good choices, and pertinent criteria for judgment is not.
"Twin studies" is a bastardization of science; it does NOT fulfill sufficiently rigourous criteria to be taken seriously.
As for the "prestigious journal"-argument, look at some of the articles of socio-biology admitted into Nature. Sheer crap.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 04:47 PM
"No matter you twist it, there is no denying that the twins reared apart have a greater difference in environment than those who live together. And that is all that is needed."
Fanciful overinterpretations to suit one's preconceptions.
Besides, it is not me who should supply detailed data about twins in order to ensure that environmental influence can be discarded. It is, as a matter of fact, the duty of honest researchers.
If you are to have a really solid basis to come to the conclusion of significant genetic influence, you must ensure:
1) The twins are reared apart, in order to:
a) Hinder families from producing similar environmental influence
b) Hinder the twins from forming bonds between themselves, and developing their traits in unison
2) Have sufficiently DIS-similar social environments in order to gauge:
a) To which extent do the twins take on the values of their social equals?
b) To which extent are there surprising similarities in the twins' behaviour across social strata.
Conjuring up so-called "control groups" is easy, to make good choices, and pertinent criteria for judgment is not.
"Twin studies" is a bastardization of science; it does NOT fulfill sufficiently rigourous criteria to be taken seriously.
As for the "prestigious journal"-argument, look at some of the articles of socio-biology admitted into Nature. Sheer crap.
Regarding journals, are you attacking the whole process peer review? Or just the whole of medical science? The only crap here is the crackpot argument that you somehow know more than medical researchers who have spent their lives doing research.
The only thing needed in twin research in order to study the role of environment apart from genetics, is to have a different environment and the same genetics. Not a completely different environment which is not possible or needed, just a different.
If your theory that the environment is too similar was correct, there would be no difference between the twins reared apart and together.
Of course there would be differences: they're different INDIVIDUALS.
If you are to find significant genetic influence, you must show that there are traits which persevere across different social strata.
hypnagogue
Nov1-04, 04:53 PM
My dear friend, i think you have become the victim of your own "posh" vocabularium. I never said that the term "just mechanics" was derived out of your post. I meant it as a reference to the words of cogito (i believe that's his name). This is what a real scientist would call a 'false statement' or a 'lie' :wink: :wink:
If you need a reminder, you said:
this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work
If you did not mean to imply "This extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists share their view that we are the 'mechanics' ... etc" then you just did a poor job wording your statement.
I also don't think you can compare math with philosophy just because they are not constructed following empirical rules. Though this is true i think every one here will agree that math is NOT constructed in the same way as philosophy and math has a lot more value to other sciences then philosophy will ever have...Math is a language, the language of physics and so on...
I merely pointed out some similarities between philosophy and math which obviously obtain. They are both primarily non-empirical in that they are both primarily based on reasoning and inference. Philosophy also has rigorous systems of formal logic not unlike the rigorous formalisms of mathematics. That's all I claimed, nothing more. But apparently you are more interested in arguing with a strawman.
Your statement about "average" scientists not knowing what makes good science is a real insult.
Let's review my statement.
But perhaps the average scientist does not understand exactly what makes it good science-- what really justifies an inductive claim, what counterarguments and such exist and why they ultimately do not win the day, and so on-- to the extent that a philosopher of science does.
The key words here are "to the extent that." I did not imply the average scientist does not know what makes good science. I claimed that the average scientist doesn't know what justifies the criteria we have for good science to the extent that a philosopher of science does. There's an enormous difference here.
In the semi-scientists-thread i posted a text on how real exact sciences work. I suggest you check it out, i think you will find it most revealing. Basically the mechanism of real sciences is really easy and there ain't much to philosophy about.
Perhaps the application of the mechanisms is easy, and perhaps the prima facie justification for these mechanisms is easy to grasp as well. That doesn't imply that there aren't deeper issues to think about. If you believe that there is nothing at all problematic about (e.g.) how to justify inductive claims, perhaps that is just because you have never been exposed to such problems in your academic career. And again, I don't mean that as an insult, so please don't take it that way. I don't doubt that you know enough of what you need to know to do good science. All I'm saying is that there are deeper issues here than there might appear to be, and some people dedicate themselves to studying those deeper problems. As a rough analogy, I know that there is more to understand about number theory than what I know, but I also know that I know enough to do basic calculus.
If any considerations on constructing science were to be made (which is ofcourse the case) then they will be done by real scientists and real scientists alone, because they have the knowledge and thus the justification to do so. No philosopher can really philosophy on physics are math because they do not have the knowledge of these fields of study, at least not as thorough as a real scientist
That's an easy claim to make, but can you justify it? What is the relevant knowledge that requires one to be a dedicated scientist or mathematician in order to grasp? How is such knowledge critical to epistemic considerations, such that one who does not have such knowledge cannot make a contribution to an epistemic framework of science?
The argument (not made by you btw but by cogito and the other one) that we only construct theories but we donnot know how they work the the best joke i heard this week.
cogito didn't claim that you don't know how scientific theories work. He claimed that you don't have a full understanding of all the epistemic considerations that go into justifying the creation of such theories. (And again, needless to say, that is not to imply that you don't have any understanding of any such epistemic considerations.) Do you see the difference?
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 05:08 PM
Of course there would be differences: they're different INDIVIDUALS.
If you are to find significant genetic influence, you must show that there are traits which persevere across different social strata.
Social strata? Are you talking about class differences? The only thing needed is a difference in environment. Not that one in the pair was transported to Mali to live as a slave and the other was adapted by Bill Gates.
Yes, they are individuals. But the twins have identical genes. In these studies, the only way to explain differences between the twins reared apart and together is a difference in environment. And how large the relative differences for different traits are indicates the relative role the environment has on these traits.
To repeat again, if your theory that the environmental difference was to small was correct, there would be no difference between the two twin groups. I think you don't understand what is studied here. It not primarily the differences between the twin reared apart, but the differences between the groups of twins reared apart and together.
There's no need to establish the existence of environmental influence. That is trivially present for ALL humans.
What is needed is to determine to which extent purely GENETIC traits mold individuality.
Your missing one major diffence between maths and philosophy; maths does not claim to say anything about the real world so it would be downright absurd if it had an empirical foundation, philosphy on the other hand does claim to say something about the real world.
Few scientist would regard philosophers as any sort of authority on the formulation of scientific theories.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 05:22 PM
There's no need to establish the existence of environmental influence. That is trivially present for ALL humans.
What is needed is to determine to which extent purely GENETIC traits mold individuality.
What is your point? Twins studies shows result like that height are relatively mostly genetic, intelligence somewhat less, happiness and personality somewhat less, political views the least.
Well, then you obviously have read some other twin studies than the crap I've seen and which, possibly, have made me prejudiced against the whole lot.
Shall we say: You win, I lose? :smile:
If you did not mean to imply "This extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists share their view that we are the 'mechanics' ... etc" then you just did a poor job wording your statement.
Maybe, yet keep in mind that i was referring to a description used by some one else, not you. This ugly word appears in the extract you wrote but we both know where it came from originally so let's not pretend...
I merely pointed out some similarities between philosophy and math which obviously obtain. But apparently you are more interested in arguing with a strawman.
No i am not, :wink: , i was just responding to your statements...
The key words here are "to the extent that." I did not imply the average scientist does not know what makes good science. I claimed that the average scientist doesn't know what justifies the criteria we have for good science to the extent that a philosopher of science does. There's an enormous difference here.
I totally disagree with this easy claim for which i really would like to see some justification.
Perhaps the application of the mechanisms is easy, and perhaps the prima facie justification for these mechanisms is easy to grasp as well. That doesn't imply that there aren't deeper issues to think about. If you believe that there is nothing at all problematic about (e.g.) how to justify inductive claims, perhaps that is just because you have never been exposed to such problems in your academic career. And again, I don't mean that as an insult, so please don't take it that way. I don't doubt that you know enough of what you need to know to do good science. All I'm saying is that there are deeper issues here than there might appear to be, and some people dedicate themselves to studying those deeper problems. As a rough analogy, I know that there is more to understand about number theory than what I know, but I also know that I know enough to do basic calculus.
Please, give me one example of these deeper issues that might appear and that are or have been valuable to the development of physics...
That's an easy claim to make, but can you justify it? What is the relevant knowledge that requires one to be a dedicated scientist or mathematician in order to grasp? How is such knowledge critical to epistemic considerations, such that one who does not have such knowledge cannot make a contribution to an epistemic framework of science?
This is what i would call a fancy over-consideration...like I stated before, you need to read my post on how physical models are constructed, in the semi-scientists-thread. The answer is as easy as the claim.
cogito didn't claim that you don't know how scientific theories work. He claimed that you don't have a full understanding of all the epistemic considerations that go into justifying the creation of such theories. (And again, needless to say, that is not to imply that you don't have any understanding of any such epistemic considerations.) Do you see the difference?
I see the difference and i see your point, yet first of all you are incorrect in your statement on "cogito's words". He clearly stated that we do not fully grasp how theories work. The epistemic considerations you are referring to are indeed an interesting point. Now, no real scientist will ever be debating these issues in the way you are bringing them up. Once again i say that doing science is not inventing some field of study and then proclaim to be a specialist in it. Considerations with respect to epistemology and ontology are indeed made in real science but by real scientists only and they play a secondary role in the development of science in itself because they do not depend on real facts but on interpretations. I mean, we look at facts, experimental backup and mathematical rigour. Yes indeed, speculations are made, but with some clear goal in mind. Besides the first thing a real scientist will do is prove or try to prove these speculations in some way (experiments or reproducing already known results in some regime) and this is a big difference with philosophy. Philosophy deals with imaginary situations and one can speculate on all possible outcomes as much as one desires. Yet there is not real valuable backup and that is the big flaw here...
regards
marlon
I try to stay away from the philosophy forum, because the ideas expressed are too vague,... Whatever is the human mind, is something that is difficult to control. If it were easy, then all the people would be a great scientist! I mean, I believe that if you are able to control your mind and channel its capacity towards the absorbance of scientific ideas, and then you are able to play with these ideas, you can elaborate theories, and you can discover the laws of the universe. Not all the people is able to do it. I mean, you're not going to discover the laws of the universe by lying in your bed thinking about what is bad and what is good... So I would say that science should be defined as the systematic investigation of the laws of the universe... This requires experimentation, and very important, a knowledge of the accumulated amount of discoveries that people like Newton, Maxwell,Einstein have made. They have made theories that work, so science is dedicated to the improvement of these theories. I always fear to involve myself in philosophy discusions because they usually involve religious ideas, or metaphysical speculation,... It's something that is not satisfactory for me.
I'm really interested in the history of science, I have read about Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend,... I would say that philosophy of the science is the only part that interest me of the philosophy business.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 06:06 PM
Well, then you obviously have read some other twin studies than the crap I've seen and which, possibly, have made me prejudiced against the whole lot.
Shall we say: You win, I lose? :smile:
Sounds good to me. :smile:
I don't doubt there have been many bad twin studies.
Aquamarine
Nov1-04, 06:12 PM
I really would like some answers to the following questions that are studied by the philosophy of science. Since philosophy is proclaimed useless or better known by physicists, those suggesting this should have some answers or justification for not answering.
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
selfAdjoint
Nov1-04, 07:02 PM
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
We don't need no lousy induction.
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What works, works.
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
Never heard of 'em, never missed 'em
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Ockham is a useful first-cut search strategy. You shouldn't push it too far. The algorithmic people can make their case or not the same as anybody else.
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
Shalizi showed Bayesian approaches might reverse entropy, if simple assumptions are accepted. Something for the philosophers to do at last!
I really would like some answers to the following questions that are studied by the philosophy of science. Since philosophy is proclaimed useless or better known by physicists, those suggesting this should have some answers or justification for not answering.
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
1. What makes you think the majority of physicsts would even know what these are? I will remind you that philosophy of science is NOT a required course in the training of being a physicist. So most of these things mean nothing to a physicist. Only those who have a personal interest in the philosophy of science would have any clue on what they are.
2. Physicists continue to make progress in expanding the body of knowledge of physics.
3. What does Point 1 and Point 2 imply if both of them are correct? It means that physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things. In this aspect, I fully agree with hypnagogue. It also implies that knowing the epistemiology is not required in the practice of physics. We don't sit down, look at the "rules" within the philosophy of science, and then do a checklist of all the things we have statisfied. This is also not the way that a theory or an experimental observation is validated or accepted. How the existence of the top quark is accepted goes through a very different path than how the existence of high-Tc superconductors is verified. If you think we sit around and apply popper's falsifiability, or any other rules, to what we do, then you have a very distorted view of what physicists do.
4. *I* have never proclaimed that philosophy is "useless" - although I may have said that in jest. I have said, and so have several other prominent physicists including Sheldon Glashow in an essay I cited earlier, that physicists very seldom refer to philosophers in their everyday practice. You may not like this, but this is what it is! I apologize for not refering and citing all those giants in the world of philosophy when I write my papers for publication. Maybe philosophy does have a role to play in other areas - it has been mentioned that it could bridge the understanding of physics among the "general public". But you need to be clear in this that the very fact that most physicists are either ignorant, or maybe not conscious, of the espistemiological aspect of what they do, it means that in their everyday professional endeavor, such things play NO role. Maybe they become amateur philosphers when they leave their work place (they may also participate in a poetry slam-fest), but in their work? Unless there are tons of closeted philosophers in physics, I do not see this happening.
Zz.
Les Sleeth
Nov1-04, 07:23 PM
We don't need no lousy induction.
You are kidding, right?
Les Sleeth
Nov1-04, 08:23 PM
1. What makes you think the majority of physicsts would even know what these are? . . . Physicists continue to make progress in expanding the body of knowledge of physics. . . . physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things.
Possibly you will consider this idea. An oceanologist dedicates his life to saving the oceans. He applies technology developed by specialist chemists for bioremediation, who relied on principles discovered by physicists throughout the centuries. The oceanologist when working doesn't want to get bogged down by excessive details of the science behind bioremediation, he just wants to use the principles and products that help him do what he wants to do. He is a scientist, but he uses other specialists' work to build his own specialty.
What you said in your statements above seems to say something similar to that situation. The empirical methods science relies on everyday were worked out by philosophizing humans, some of whom were scientifically experimenting too. I don't believe anyone is saying scientists need to study philosophy. Why should anyone if they don't want to? Mostly we are talking about (or are supposed to be) the potential value of a philosophy area at PF, and in that respect I'd say the philosophy side of our discussion has been supporting the value of thinking about thinking.
I hope we aren't talking about a "class" of people, but rather a human endeavor. I am not a "philosopher," I am a human being who, among other things, finds it valuable to understand the reasons behind why we do what we do, or why it is something like empirical thinking "works." Why? Often a general principle can be taken from specific things that "work," and applied to other things.
So some people prefer to think about developing technologies or understanding the physical nature of reality, and others like to think about what kind of thinking can help in that regard (as well as in other areas of human thought). Is there any inherent reason we need to be at odds over this?
selfAdjoint
Nov1-04, 08:41 PM
You are kidding, right?
On the square. Does a scientist when contemplating a new theory or designing a new experiment, think or care about what some philosopher may say about induction?
Les Sleeth
Nov1-04, 09:01 PM
On the square. Does a scientist when contemplating a new theory or designing a new experiment, think or care about what some philosopher may say about induction?
From the way you wrote your comment, it seemed like you were saying scientists don't rely on induction, and that's what I asked if you were kidding about.
Yes you are right that to use induction it isn't necessary to understand where our insights about it came from or what anyone today has to say about it. As I wrote to Zapper, I still don't see why anyone would object to others who might want to see what else they might figure out about thinking that could be useful, or to helping those less accomplished at thinking empirically than science-types learn why it is so effective?
I don't object to philsophy in genral, what i do object to is modern academic philsophy. There are some worethwile parts such as the study of symbolic logic which can help us to understand physical and mathematical theories, but in the main the moden academic subject of philosophy contians very little of value. This is as many valuable subjects that were formally in the domain of philosophy have now become academic subjects in their own right leaving the modern philospher to pick over the scraps.
Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?
It will be hard to find something valuable that cannot be studied scientifically. The arts and beauty, it can be studied. A beautiful face very symmetrical. The great painters and architects were very careful to follow the golden ratio. Identical twins reared apart often have remarkably similar tastes in art. Religious experiences can be induced by stimulating the temporal cortex. Economics is the study of how to maximize value with scarce resources. The biochemical and anatomical pathways of pleasure and reward can certainly be studied.
How do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically that which we ought to value. How should you go about establishing scientifically what type of character you ought to cultivate, or what type of life you ought to live, or what acts are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden? In short, how do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically the answers to the normative questions that confront every human who finds himself in the world?
Clausius2
Nov2-04, 02:43 AM
Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?
I would say YES. Where is the ethic of the people nowadays?. I don't see it anywhere. Why did they spend so much time thinking in that dreams instead of being more practical?. People and Politics today are the proof of the invalidity of that old theories.
Aquamarine
Nov2-04, 02:53 AM
How do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically that which we ought to value. How should you go about establishing scientifically what type of character you ought to cultivate, or what type of life you ought to live, or what acts are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden? In short, how do you think you ought to go about establishing scientifically the answers to the normative questions that confront every human who finds himself in the world?
I can certainly study scientifically what, how, where and why we value.
And I think the theory of descriptive hedonism is the best available theory of value. In short, given enough pain, all humans will abandon whatever other morals or ethics they may have, if this will lessen this pain.
The question of if and what we ought to value is strange and wrong. Given existence and goal-oriented behavior, our goal is to increase value. Which may well mean actually changing the very genes deciding what gives us value. For example, eliminating the very neural architecture giving us our current feeling of pain. And that this is goal of science, to help us maximize our pleasure, to levels beyond what any of us can understand or conceptualize today.
I can certainly study scientifically what, how, where and why we value.
And I think the theory of descriptive hedonism is the best available theory of value. In short, given enough pain, all humans will abandon whatever other morals or ethics they may have, if this will lessen this pain.
The question of if and what we ought to value is strange and wrong. Given existence and goal-oriented behavior, our goal is to increase value. Which may well mean actually changing the very genes deciding what gives us value. For example, eliminating the very neural architecture giving us our current feeling of pain. And that this is goal of science, to help us maximize our pleasure, to levels beyond what any of us can understand or conceptualize today.
First, studying what we value and why we do doesn't answer the normative questions I asked above.
Second, you mischaracterize descriptive hedonism. Descriptive hedonism is the claim that all human action is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure/minimize pain. If you'd like to see two decisive refutations of this view about human motivation, please read Joel Feinberg's "Psychological Egoism", and Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine".
You claim that the question "what ought we value?" is strange and wrong, but your argument seems to assume that we can do nothing other than value our own pleasure and pain, and that, moreover, these are the only things we can value. What evidence do you have for this view concerning human motivation? Please note that on this view of human motivation, it is never possible to truly desire that another person be happy for that person's own sake. On this view, desiring the happiness of another is only possible for S if S thinks that the other's happiness is instrumental for S's own happiness. Although that entailment should really be sufficient reason for you to jettison this view, I'll wait for you to check out the articles I mentioned.
Cheers.
I would say YES. Where is the ethic of the people nowadays?. I don't see it anywhere. Why did they spend so much time thinking in that dreams instead of being more practical?. People and Politics today are the proof of the invalidity of that old theories.
You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?
Aquamarine
Nov2-04, 03:43 AM
What happened to this noble goal:
1)By forcing yourself to express your ideas in quantifiable/mathematical form enable others to pick out (possibly subtle) logical flaws in your arguments/pet theory.
Given the below, one should expect amazing quantifiable and logical knowledge from the "real" scientists on the philosophy of science.
Basically the mechanism of real sciences is really easy and there ain't much to philosophy about. If any considerations on constructing science were to be made (which is ofcourse the case) then they will be done by real scientists and real scientists alone, because they have the knowledge and thus the justification to do so. No philosopher can really philosophy on physics are math because they do not have the knowledge of these fields of study, at least not as thorough as a real scientist.
But what answers are given when taken to the test? For example
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.
Science is democracy? :smile:
It means that physicists very seldom (if at all) think about the epistemiology of what they do. They don't try to analyzie or over-analyze their methodology. In fact, most of them either are ignorant, or don't care, of such things.
But wasn't the "real" scientists those with logical and quantifiable theories? It seems that "real" scientists should conduct their experiment based on gut feeling and majority opinion? Is this the additional knowledge that physicists have that philosophers of science don't?
I find it amazing that scientists willingly reveal this ignorance. And not only that, in their arrogance take pride in this fact. And that at the same time that a whole generation physicists/psychologists/economists/biologists have in reality abandoned the old paradigm. Don't you see the need to establish new improved criteria for science, where the old criteria is a subset?
Aquamarine
Nov2-04, 04:56 AM
First, studying what we value and why we do doesn't answer the normative questions I asked above.
Second, you mischaracterize descriptive hedonism. Descriptive hedonism is the claim that all human action is motivated by a desire to maximize pleasure/minimize pain. If you'd like to see two decisive refutations of this view about human motivation, please read Joel Feinberg's "Psychological Egoism", and Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine".
You claim that the question "what ought we value?" is strange and wrong, but your argument seems to assume that we can do nothing other than value our own pleasure and pain, and that, moreover, these are the only things we can value. What evidence do you have for this view concerning human motivation? Please note that on this view of human motivation, it is never possible to truly desire that another person be happy for that person's own sake. On this view, desiring the happiness of another is only possible for S if S thinks that the other's happiness is instrumental for S's own happiness. Although that entailment should really be sufficient reason for you to jettison this view, I'll wait for you to check out the articles I mentioned.
Cheers.
I don't see anything wrong with desiring happiness for other due to the fact that this will increase our own happiness. People care most for their children, less for their friends and diffusely for the whole of humanity. That this may be because it affects our own happiness does not make it objectionable.
Regarding the experience machine experiment, it is constructed wrongly. Those people refusing to hook up to the machine may well belive that this will not give long-term pleasure. For example, that they will go to hell or they belive that the machine can never provide genuine feelings. Instead, it should be constructed as I mentioned before. Given the maximum possible pain, people should be given the choice of escaping this at the cost of breaking any other ethical or moral obligation. The prediction is that when human are thus unambiosuly given the choice between hedonism or not, they will choose hedonism.
Regarding Feinbeg, he seems to make many questionable assumptions. Like that pleasure can be divided into that of the body and that of the mind. Here are some answers to his objections:
http://projectparadox.f2o.org/thoughts/hedonism.php
You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?
Clausius, don't mind these words, questioning your knowledge of secondary facts is the speciality of this cogito-person. You are totally right and i would like to add that ethics has no value what so ever to the development of any real science...
regards
marlon, and thanks Clausius, for your reply, muchos gracias amigo...
We don't need no lousy induction.
What works, works.
Never heard of 'em, never missed 'em
Ockham is a useful first-cut search strategy. You shouldn't push it too far. The algorithmic people can make their case or not the same as anybody else.
To be decided interactively by the community over time. Meanwhile sociology rules.
Shalizi showed Bayesian approaches might reverse entropy, if simple assumptions are accepted. Something for the philosophers to do at last!
amen to your wise words selfAdjoint and thanks for participating in this thread. It was my intention that some of the real science authorities would step up and discuss this philosophy mumbo jumbo. Let's do this once and thoroughly and then continue with the real science and leave these semi-scientists behind... molto grazie amico...
regards
marlon
metacristi
Nov2-04, 06:19 AM
This is a message to all real scientists : this extract clearly shows how the semi-scientists (also referred to as philosophers) share their view on us. We are the "mechanics" or the "technicians" and though we construct the theoretical models, we donnot know how they work, according to them phillo's... :biggrin:
Any comments ???
Well,from my own experience on different Internet sites,I'm afraid that the average scientist knows very little philosophy of science.Probably this is why enough of them believe that philosophy (of science) has no relevance to their work.The vast majority of them are aware of 'empiricism' and 'falsificationism' but without being aware of the big epistemological problems that still remain.I was in the same position once,immediately after graduating.The fault,I think,is mainly of the academy itself,unfortunately we can talk of 'scientific indoctrination'...
Happily philosophy is very good against all sorts of dogmatisms (its first meaning is to question all our alleged 'certainties' in different problems before attempting to give a more detailed account...).In what regards science well, Feyerabend's philosophy of science is very good against the 'myths' existing around the so called 'scientfic method' (that it is the only possible 'right way',that we have sufficient reasons to think that science can at least approach truth and so on).And against the arrogance of some 'religious' scientists,basically having science as their 'religion' (even without being aware,indeed it's not enough to merely say that science is 'fallible').
The reality is that we do not even have now sufficient reasons to think that a rigid scientific method is the 'right way' enabling science to approach 'truth' (fecundity alone does not suffice,the bayesian approach has also many 'technical' problems,not to mention its intrinsically subjective status).
Moreover even if we do not make reference to 'truth',as the history of science proves plenty,a too rigid method (of the type advocated by many hardliners) could harm scientific 'progress' (in what fecundity is concerned) at least by delaying possible scientific 'breakthroughs'.
All we are entitled now (based also on logical grounds,empiricism alone is not enough) is to grant a provisional epistemological privilege (that is openly accpeted as fallible) to a minimal scientific method,we can still indicate a positive heuristic on what programmes should scientists devote more efforts (by trying to develop them further).
I taked of a positive heuristic but it should be mentioned that we have to go well beyond the 'naive' empiricism of Popper (how Lakatos named it) falsificationism has a lot of problems.Sometimes,history show this,ad hoc hypotheses proved to be very helpful,sometimes it did pay to spend the most time by trying to make progressive programmes which openly contradicted the 'normal science' of the day (yes maverick hypotheses might be very serious in spite of the fact that such programmes could be stagnant,even degenerating at a certain moment).
Thus it is safer to talk of different degrees of confidence (of scientists) in different programmes than to talk of a clear difference between science and pseudo-science (Laudan even talk of the impossibility to make a clear difference in front of the existing problems).For example scientists have a greater degree of confidence in GR than in,let's say,the standard inflationary theory and a greater degree of confidence in the standard inflationary theory than in Guth's M[ulti]verse theory (making reference to the existence of different physical laws in other universes or not).
Indeed even the so called 'normal science',no matter how well corroborated, can,at most,be viewed as the most promising program at certain time,thus all we can propose (in my opinon) is a minimal scientific method,an 'official' heuristic,involving a clear ladder of preferences,that is on what programmes should scientists devote most of their time (by trying to make them theoretically and empirically progressive).This in no case limit the possibility for scientists to pursue mainly maverick programmes (to have a 'private' ladder of preferences).
Clausius2
Nov2-04, 06:23 AM
You think the subject of ethics is supposed to train people to be moral? Weird. Have you ever taken a class in ethics, or read a work on ethics?
Yep, You're the unique person in the world that has read a pair of ethics books. And how many books have you written?. It would be nice to know how many so that I'm forewarned and won't read anyone.
Part of the Antique Philosophe has deteriorated into nowadays politics. We see them talking, talking, speeching, meeting.... :zzz: :zzz: without doing
ANYTHING
Words, words, words, well sounding but without any substance....
Our nowadays society wants....
FACTS
and Science is giving it.
The fact is the age of handling words up and down is ENDED.
Tell me about practical things and do not try to answer the question: why am I here?. what is the soul? what is the Nature? Which is my vital mission?, because today's philosophers haven't got the knowledge enough to answer that. They are OFF-SIDE (If you have watched a soccer match, you will know what the hell that word mean).
metacristi, thanks for your reply and sharing your thoughts with us...
regards
marlon
humanino
Nov2-04, 06:38 AM
Any comments ???
I feel sad. I think most of physicists consider they serve philosophy first. Philosophy without science is masturbation of the mind. We experimentalist try to figure out which road can lead us to the outside of Plato's cave.
I want to add that most physicists I know are well educated and respectable persons, eager to learn about philosophy. As for myself, I am meeting on thursday a philosophy student friend of mine, both of us have much considerations for the other's occupation. We were together studying math in kindergarden :wink: He wants to discuss his views on relativity, and I intend to deepenth my understanding of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason".
Remember the beginning of the century : philosophers were aware of and understanding the current open problems of physics. Louis de Broglie himself was only Maurice's little brother, and Louis first wanted to go for litterature. Today, philosophers are not afraid of claiming "I do not get it at all ! No matter..." when it comes to quantum stuff. This is very sad.
metacristi
Nov2-04, 06:45 AM
double post
metacristi
Nov2-04, 06:46 AM
metacristi, thanks for your reply and sharing your thoughts with us...
regards
marlon
Thanks marlon.What I forgot to add is that in any case the epistemological problems that still exist are enough to advocate pure relativism...
By the way if you are interested at least by the philosophy of science try this very good site (I do not entirely agree with Hugo Holbling-but it is an excellent site):
http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewforum.php?f=13
[We 'reconciled' on another site,by the way,if you read what I've written here and there :-) ]
all the best
metacristi
Clausius2
Nov2-04, 06:49 AM
Anybody wants a proof?
Here are the titles of the last threads published in the General Philosophy Forum:
- time and consciousness
- What is the purpose of Life ?
- What if we are all wrong ?
- Universe is expanding?
- Natural Law
- Does Our Creator Have A Creator Itself?
- cloning human--pros and cons
- Do you believe in Destiny?
- What is energy?
- Are we ever in the present time?
- Does it require a god to create the physics rule?
NONE of that questions can be answered by a classic philosopher. He does not have knowledge about the reality as a physicist, chemist, mathematician, biologist, physician, and engineer have. In past times, a philosopher could answer those questions. Nowadays his words are not worth of listening.
The reality is constructed by geometrical figures and mathematical signs (as Galileo Galilei said once). If you don't have knowledge about that, please give your opinion just only inside the toilet.
humanino
Nov2-04, 06:50 AM
Thus it is safer to talk of different degrees of confidence (of scientists) in different programmes than to talk of a clear difference between science and pseudo-science (Laudan even talk of the impossibility to make a clear difference in front of the existing problems).I very much agree with this statement. However,
For example scientists have a greater degree of confidence in GR than in,let's say,the standard inflationary theoryright, but we are also aware that GR probably owes its elegance to a coincidence. GR might very well not be "true" only efficient, and this is very different (and unfortunate, when one thinks the way Albert did : his marvelous insight would fail !)
...a greater degree of confidence in the standard inflationary theory than in Guth's M[ulti]verse theory (making reference to the existence of different physical laws in other universes or not).IMHU, Guth's Multiverse is not even classified in science !
I feel sad. I think most of physicists consider they serve philosophy first. Philosophy without science is masturbation of the mind. We experimentalist try to figure out which road can lead us to the outside of Plato's cave.
I want to add that most physicists I know are well educated and respectable persons, eager to learn about philosophy. As for myself, I am meeting on thursday a philosophy student friend of mine, both of us have much considerations for the other's occupation. We were together studying math in kindergarden :wink: He wants to discuss his views on relativity, and I intend to deepenth my understanding of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason".
Remember the beginning of the century : philosophers were aware of and understanding the current open problems of physics. Louis de Broglie himself was only Maurice's little brother, and Louis first wanted to go for litterature. Today, philosophers are not afraid of claiming "I do not get it at all ! No matter..." when it comes to quantum stuff. This is very sad.
Hi Humanino, it's been a while, thanks for the reply. However I share a different view than yours. In my opinion the philosophy of science can only be done by the very scientists that construct the very theoretical models which describe nature. I have been reading posts containing an "expensive" vocabularium, yet they don't say anything real. The point i wanna make is that philosophers (let's say 99,9% of them) tend to invent some field of study and then claim to be experts in it. Just read the post in which selfAdjoint replyed to cogito. It contains many over-considerations on stuff like implications and empirical laws. Basically those semi-scientists just keep on twisting facts and replacing them into a different perspective so that the actual value is totally lost. We work with real facts and experimental backup. You know, i hate the discussions in which philosophers state that QM for example is not well understood because of the probabilistic nature or the measurement problems (you know decoherence and so on). I am not denying these problems, but the point is they tend to approach these subjects in the wrong non-scientific way. People shouldn't say QM isn't exact or inaccurate because of these very specific reasons. I mean, they do trust the electronics
they use every day : computers, and so on.... Even QM saves lives in the medical industry, just look at the MRI-instruments which are broadly used there...
regards
marlon
Multiverse is not even classified in science !
Beware of statements concerning multi-universes. They are just a way of interpreting the results of QM. They certainly do not belong to philosophy, they belong to QM.
marlon
Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?
False. I've made it clear that I'm talking about the modern academic subject.
metacristi
Nov2-04, 07:07 AM
I very much agree with this statement. However,
right, but we are also aware that GR probably owes its elegance to a coincidence. GR might very well not be "true" only efficient, and this is very different (and unfortunate, when one thinks the way Albert did : his marvelous insight would fail !)
Having 'confidence' in no way means dropping fallibilism...
IMHU, Guth's Multiverse is not even classified in science !
marlon is right when says that scientists themselves are the most entitled to say what is science and what's not.If you'll ask Guth or Linde (or a leading cosmologist) they will say that it is science,the most promising existing program...only that it fails,at least momentarily,to comply to all the popperian requirements.But,as Guth says very well in his 'The inflationary Universe',who can say that it will never exist at least more logical reasons in favor of Multiverse theory (even accepting that the predictions involving other universes will never be corroborated)?
After all we make from the good beginning the difference between realism and epistemological/ontological idealism entirely on logical grounds (as Russell points well in his 'The problems of philosophy' (you can find it also online).Unfortunately the rigid heuristic you are intrinsically implying does not justify entirely scientific practice,as history proves,and moreover falsificationism has big logical problems (the theory ladeness problem,weak and strong underdeterminism and so on).
But wasn't the "real" scientists those with logical and quantifiable theories? It seems that "real" scientists should conduct their experiment based on gut feeling and majority opinion? Is this the additional knowledge that physicists have that philosophers of science don't?
I find it amazing that scientists willingly reveal this ignorance. And not only that, in their arrogance take pride in this fact. And that at the same time that a whole generation physicists/psychologists/economists/biologists have in reality abandoned the old paradigm. Don't you see the need to establish new improved criteria for science, where the old criteria is a subset?
Y'know, I wish you'd stop associating what I wrote with what you are trying to bash others with.
We don't take pride in the fact that we are not aware of the epistemiology of what we do. It is just that it is obvious that such knowledge plays no role in our function! That's a FACT! You seem to have twisted what I wrote into something else.
And we didn't abandon any "paradigm". The ultimate paradigm is still intact - that Nature is the only source that dictates what we listen to, as stated by Glashow. And since when are "old paradigm" should be obeyed to perpetually? Who made such rules?
Can you point out, for example, in the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where exactly is the instance where following "old paradigm" of the philosophy of science played a role? I mean, we are all here simply blowing things based on vague generalities. Let's stop pussyfooting around and look at specific examples. I had almost a front-row seat to the discovery and development of high-Tc superconductors. I want to know WHERE exactly (i) philosphy of science played a role and (ii) did the physicists involved aware of the epistemiology of what they were doing and the philosophical implications.
Philosphy of science is useful for those outside science to have some graps on the meaning of what scientists do? Sure, I might be persuaded to buy that concept. But is it consciously practiced within science, or within physics in particular? I would unhesitantly say no. Show me what you think is the epistemiology we should follow, and I will show you examples in science where it isn't followed. Your insistence that we all should learn, understand, and follow some "old paradigm" of a philosophy of science, IN SPITE of the fact that we have continued to do science successfully without it, sounds rather hollow.
Zz.
What you said in your statements above seems to say something similar to that situation. The empirical methods science relies on everyday were worked out by philosophizing humans, some of whom were scientifically experimenting too. I don't believe anyone is saying scientists need to study philosophy. Why should anyone if they don't want to? Mostly we are talking about (or are supposed to be) the potential value of a philosophy area at PF, and in that respect I'd say the philosophy side of our discussion has been supporting the value of thinking about thinking.
I hope we aren't talking about a "class" of people, but rather a human endeavor. I am not a "philosopher," I am a human being who, among other things, finds it valuable to understand the reasons behind why we do what we do, or why it is something like empirical thinking "works." Why? Often a general principle can be taken from specific things that "work," and applied to other things.
So some people prefer to think about developing technologies or understanding the physical nature of reality, and others like to think about what kind of thinking can help in that regard (as well as in other areas of human thought). Is there any inherent reason we need to be at odds over this?
That's the entire point though isn't it, you seem to have a false idea of the relationship between philosphy and science. Scientists in general are not remotely interested in what your modern philsopher has to say, they do not regard him as an authority on empircal methods, they regard scientists as the authority in that area (after they develop these methods and empriricism should be devloped empirically). So while they ceratinly do philosphize on empricism etc, this philsophizing does not contribute to the scientifc process.
Unfortunately the rigid heuristic you are intrinsically implying does not justify entirely scientific practice,as history proves,and moreover falsificationism has big logical problems (the theory ladeness problem,weak and strong underdeterminism and so on).
Concepts like undeterminism are of no value in the development of real science. Look, what i am trying to say is that philosophy is a "field of study" that uses these vague terms in order to criticize the way real science evolves and is developed. I really don't see the need for such an approach. I have been reading lot's of nice terms like this underterminism, yet where is the use. I am asking for some real explanations yet i have never received them. Talking in a posh meaningless language is very easy. Ofcourse in physics for example there are a lot of difficult terms referring to all kinds of processes or definitions. the big difference is that these terms have a real practical value and they help us advance as a species. This is why i say that physics, mathematics, biology ,... are real sciences and philosophy is NOT. This implies that philosophy CANNOT judge real science, only real science itself can. So if you wanna use the term philosophy then it needs to be stated that only real scientists can philosophy on real science...
regards
marlin
metacristi
Nov2-04, 09:52 AM
marlon
Is it so?No one claims that philosophy is a science but the basics of science lie in philosophy (epistemology) no matter if we want it or not.To call something knowledge needs justification,sufficient reasons if possible.The problem is not how conjectures are 'discovered' (everything goes) but how to justify them (as being knowledge).It is the epistemology which deals with this at the most basic level,a part of philosophy.Finally all scientific theories are sets of enunciations + (very often) a mathematical formalism needing scrutiny using (at least) formal logic (for we expect nature to be non contradictory-one of the basic axioms of science is that nature can be understood).
Now it is true that the most appropriate to be philosophers of science are scientists themselves due to the huge specialization we witness (we are far from the time of Hume,Descartes or Kant when philosophy and science were more or less united).But this does not really change the essence of the problem,they criticise science as...philosophers.
As regarding the alleged 'inutility' of underdetermination well probably you have not read too much on philosophy of science.I do not intend to teach here,there is a rich literature,I'll only say few words.Even if we talk only in terms of pure pragmatism,science 'works'.
Duhem's thesis (weak underdetermination) clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.It is rather rare when single enunciations or whole theries can be soundly,unequivocally,falsified.In other words not only we do not have sufficient reasons to think that the 'branch' we are following now will ever be 'progressive','successful',but also there are no good reasons to think that other 'branches',potentially more fecund,do not exist.
Indeed even the results of experiments are mere interpretations,based on auxiliary premises,so we might even corroborate many predictions before arriving at a deadlock,when no further 'breakthrough' is possible.In such cases we have to return at a 'lower level',possible renouncing altoghether even at some theoretical entities which we considered previously as fecund,thought as indirectly verified to exist.So we could even have the surprise to see that some conjectures,considered previously as non reasonable,are in fact the science of tomorrow (in the sense of being the most successful programmes).
On the other hand the possibility of strong (quinean) underdetermination shows that basically no one of the currently accepted scientific enunciations have their place assured forever,in the standard of knowledge of science.Basically nothing can be 'reliable verified'.
This is important if we refer at a scientific method for it does make rational to pursue,sometimes,ad hoc programmes as the first choice (at least so they seem at a certain moment because do not comply to all requirements of the popperian heuristic).
And even to consider them as giving us fallible scientific knowledge sometimes in case of 'natural' candidates.Exactly this is the case of the Multiverse hypothesis (with other universes having different laws) where we base also on the objective interpretation of probability,widely used in science.Indeed there are different levels of ad hocness,we can still make a logical difference among them,though no empirical difference is possible.
In the light shed by the lessons of history,the difficulties of falsificationism (this does not mean we have to renounce it) and the situation at the borders of science I think it's safer to talk of different degrees of confidence in our theories instead of talking of scientific and metaphysical programmes.
Of course the programmes which fully comply at certain moment to all popperian requirements are to have priority but in any case is it justified to call the other approaches as being non reasonable (I assume that they have internal consistency and also power of explanation).As matter of fact scientists should follow other paths,as secondary choices,even in the periods of the so caled 'normal science' instead of only trying to accomodate the existing puzzles within the existing paradigm,being a maverick is not at all a sign of being not serious.Of course as much as no claim of epistemological priority is made (without proper justification).
I think there is a clear cultural difference here as can be seen in the current style of interactons. For example:
Duhem's thesis (weak underdetermination) clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.It is rather rare when single enunciations can be soundly,unequivocally,falsified.In other words we have no certitude that the 'branch' we are following now will ever be 'progressive','successful' and that other 'branches',potentially more fecund,do not exist.
For many of us who are "philosophically-challenged" (I refer to me in particular), such descriptions are rather vague because they involve a lot of linguistic gymnastics. May I suggest that each time one tries to make a point, that one illustrates such a point with a specific, concrete example? I mean, in science and math, we illustrates a principle via an example, simply because the principle or idea itself cannot be well-understood until it is applied to a particular situation. Thus, if one claims
"...clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.
... can we at least illustrate this with an example? What particular area of physics did this happen? Are we refering to the "falsification" of Newtonian laws, for example, where we now realize the boundary of applicability of such concepts? Without such example, these things are mere words (confusing words too) without justification that such point of view is even valid.
Zz.
ZapperZ makes an important observation here:
While the "groups/clusters of premises"-argument has a certain intuitive appeal, it really has no justification unless you can come up some concrete example.
metacristi
Nov2-04, 10:47 AM
Zapper Z
Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).
Zapper Z
Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).
Maybe I don't read things very well, but I am having a bit of a problem trying to understand your point.
Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.
Refresh my memory. "Wave theory" of what? What is "waving" that the "Foucault's apparatus" is measuring?
Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.
Er... "common sense observation" need not correspond to "scientific observation". What exactly is the thing that we "cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on"? We cannot decree that the concept of the sun rotating around the earth is impossible? I find that rather odd. Does this mean at some point, someone is going to make a better measurement to prove that the sun DOES orbit the earth?
Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).
I'm not sure how my "suggestion" in my previous posting hinted at anything. I asked that you illustrate your point with concrete examples that I can understand as a physicist. I am not trained as a philosopher. However, since we ARE talking about "philosophy of science", it is imperative that any philosophical ideas be based on actually scientific examples. Is this not a reasonable request? I wasn't defending nor questioning any particular philosophical ideas, as apparently what you seem to think I was doing.
Ironically, if you think that philosphy of science has gone way above "naive falsificationism" of Popper, I would also say that "science" has gone way above and beyond Copernicus and other classical physics examples. So let's pick more "recent" scientific examples, or at least out of 20th Century physics.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov2-04, 11:38 AM
There has been no serious answers to my questions. I will post them again and include somewhat more concrete questions since the critiques seem unaware of even the problems presented. For those asking for examples, they are relevant in all of science. That many scientists answer them with gut feeling and majority opinion is not a solution, just ignorance similar to giving God as an answer to all questions.
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ (See critical evaluation)
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
What is the justification for assuming that current physical laws will continue to function the same way in the future? Or that they will function in different place from where tested? How is the limits of generalization decided?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What are the ultimate statements that provide justification for all other statements?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
Why is a theory ever abandoned, it is always possible to resurrect any theory by adding ad hoc exceptions?
Les Sleeth
Nov2-04, 12:06 PM
That's the entire point though isn't it, you seem to have a false idea of the relationship between philosphy and science. Scientists in general are not remotely interested in what your modern philsopher has to say, they do not regard him as an authority on empircal methods, they regard scientists as the authority in that area (after they develop these methods and empriricism should be devloped empirically). So while they ceratinly do philosphize on empricism etc, this philsophizing does not contribute to the scientifc process.
No, I definitely do not think that is even remotely the point. I think the issues of this debate need to be made more clear. I read what one side says and it seems irrelevant to what the other side is pointing out.
This little war originally got going because I offered a debate. From my side of it, I wanted defend the potential value of the philosophy section here at PF to be beneficial to members, and not as a necessary to practicing science!
To be clear: I have not said nor do I believe philosophical concerns should be involved in the practice of science. That would be a disaster! (Doesn’t that seem a bit too close to those days of the Church’s interference?) I don’t know how that got to be part of the discussion because I don’t believe any philosopher type here would suggest such a thing. The only connection I see is not to on-going science, but to science students who might be interested in learning the history of thought that led to the empirical method.
Beyond that I’ve said that the philosophy area at PF could be helpful in encouraging participants to think more empirically (and I don’t mean established scientists!) if the PF staff were committed to that.
Okay, so scientists should be free to practice empiricism unfettered by philosophy. Throw the silly idea of interference or participation by philosophers in scientific research out of the debate.
If it isn’t inside the laboratory where philosophical issues arise, where might they? Well, I say it is outside of the laboratory and in the social situations where we all live, including scientists. Take a look at where the most posts are at PF and you will see it is in General Discussion, with Politics being a big chunk of that. In the main index, after General Physics at 56k is General philosophy at 29k posts. (By the way, would you suggest getting rid of General Discussion and Politics since they are not “exact sciences”?)
What that says to me is that people are attracted to PF not just because of the science they can learn and teach, but they also because they are thinking about what goes on in the world, why they are alive, how to be happy, what “truth” is, is war ever justified, should teenage lovers be accused of rape, how to find a girl/boy friend . . .
It is a good thing to have people come to a science site looking for answers, even if some of the questions science can’t directly answer. In my opinion, when trying to think, it is always better to want whatever facts are available. In contrast to that approach to thinking, do a Google search on philosophy sites that are available for someone and you will see there are many choices. Much of the discussion that goes on is ghastly, with little if any reference to facts about how reality works.
In addition to the everyday matters of living (which I think is what most people ponder) I believe there are also a couple of huge philosophical issues up for grab in the world arena. Metacristi has mentioned the idea of “epistemological privilege,” and the idea of scientism dogma. The questions involved there are no less than a battle for the mind of humanity (or an important part of it).
Some say empiricism can reveal all revealable truths about reality. Because science so far only has given us physical facts, many conclude existence is entirely physical. I feel safe saying that most of the science thinkers at this site are of that physicalist opinion.
But there problems with the theory, one of which is explaining the presence of consciousness in the universe (we humans). Now, devoted physicalists may assert they will get the answer one day, just give them time. But some of us counter that claim by saying their faith is due to already believing physicalistically, not because there is enough encouragement from the evidence yet to believe consciousness is purely physical.
Meanwhile, the human world is watching and listening. In an issue of Scientific American, Michael Shermer, writing in his regular column Skeptic, pointed out that, “being the Age of Science, it is scientism’s shamans who command our veneration.” Yet while people are listening to science specials on TV, the vast majority are also going to church at other times.
So what is the truth about creation, and our presence here? Can science really answer all the knowable questions, or is there “something more”? If you look at some of the best debates we’ve had in philosophy area at PF, in my opinion it is that issue of physicalism versus “something more.” Maybe the scientism devotees here want to get rid of everyone who questions empiricism’s claim to epistemological privilege. But even if they do, the question will still be a most important one for humanity.
Should we let it be fought out only at rationalistic philosophy sites, pseudoscience sites, in local bars? Or can we provide a format here where intelligent people who disagree can argue such controversial subjects with facts, and within standards of sound debating rules?
Aquamarine
Nov2-04, 12:22 PM
Les Sleeth, I agree with what you are saying. But a large problem is that many of the questions that most concern humans like happiness, relationships, money and welfare cannot be studied if one follows Popper's paradigm. It is usually impossible to conduct falsifiable, controlled experiments in evolutionary psychology or macro economics. Using the criteria for science advocated by some here, these questions cannot be answered. It essentially removes physics, chemistry and some medicine from the rest of world, leaving other areas to be decided by instincts or chance.
Les Sleeth
Nov2-04, 12:48 PM
Les Sleeth, I agree with what you are saying. But a large problem is that many of the questions that most concern humans like happiness, relationships, money and welfare cannot be studied if one follows Popper's paradigm. It is usually impossible to conduct falsifiable, controlled experiments in evolutionary psychology or macro economics. Using the criteria for science advocated by some here, these questions cannot be answered. It essentially removes physics, chemistry and some medicine from the rest of world, leaving other areas to be decided by instincts or chance.
I have to admit I am not quite sure of your stance in all this, so if my answer isn't a good fit to what you mean, then that is why. :tongue2:
If your point is that falsifiability is not a standard that can be applied to all areas of humanity science wants to investigate, then I would agree. I would say just contribute what facts are possible, and then do the best we can do figuring out how something "works" that is unavailable to falsification.
But I would also add that it isn't necessarily true that all aspects of existence can be scrutinized by science whether falsification is part of it or not. I am content for science to look at consciousness, for instance, and tell me what it sees, and to also have it be there is "something more" there which science can't see. Science can do what it can do, and what it can't answer I'll look elsewhere for that.
metacristi
Nov2-04, 01:44 PM
Maybe I don't read things very well, but I am having a bit of a problem trying to understand your point.
Refresh my memory. "Wave theory" of what? What is "waving" that the "Foucault's apparatus" is measuring?
Er... "common sense observation" need not correspond to "scientific observation". What exactly is the thing that we "cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on"? We cannot decree that the concept of the sun rotating around the earth is impossible? I find that rather odd. Does this mean at some point, someone is going to make a better measurement to prove that the sun DOES orbit the earth?
I'm not sure how my "suggestion" in my previous posting hinted at anything. I asked that you illustrate your point with concrete examples that I can understand as a physicist. I am not trained as a philosopher. However, since we ARE talking about "philosophy of science", it is imperative that any philosophical ideas be based on actually scientific examples. Is this not a reasonable request? I wasn't defending nor questioning any particular philosophical ideas, as apparently what you seem to think I was doing.
Ironically, if you think that philosphy of science has gone way above "naive falsificationism" of Popper, I would also say that "science" has gone way above and beyond Copernicus and other classical physics examples. So let's pick more "recent" scientific examples, or at least out of 20th Century physics.
Zz.
Well what can I say more other than elegantly advise you to read directly what Duhem,Kuhn,Lakatos and Feyerabend have to say...I am not a teacher and anyway it is not my goal to teach here.All I can tell you is that,indeed, they have strong reasons for their views.All unbiased researches into the subject can easily see this (having also the necessary baggage of philosophical knowledge of course).We are wasting our time,honestly.
Not that I agree entirely with them,no I have my own vision somewhere between Lakatos and Feyerabend.That is I still support the 'method' stance,nonwithstanding that a minimal method,the 'reliabilist' account does vindicate such a view (based on fecundity,the fact that new paradigms does unite facts considered previously as unconnected and not lastly the fact that the vast majority of accepted knowledge inferred using Mill's methods are very stable in time).In other words I advocate the view that we are still having,currently at least,more 'positive' reasons (including purely logical ones) pro method though only a very flexible one.
This in spite of the fact that nontrivial changes do occur,we have clear historical examples,sometimes even contradicting scientific knowledge inferred using the most reliable 'tool' we have had so far,namely Mill's methods.Empiricism alone might be not enough but,as I said,we still have more positive reasons to prefer a 'weak' form of realism and generally to grant a fallible epistemological privilege to a (minimal) method stance.
The reality is that science (no matter the account of the method minimal or not,falsificationist or inductivist) is not the unassailable monolith in which some like to believe,it is merely our best 'tool' so far to make sense of the observed realities.Moreover the strong,popperian,fallibilism has problems,this is long ago accepted by all serious philosophers of science.At most we are entitled to talk of a weak form of fallibilism,but I'd rather talk only of the capacity of theories to make novel predictions apart from accomodating all existing anomalies and,preferably,existing 'puzzles'.Finally if the hypothetico-deductive method were so compelling then no would still bother now to revitalize the old inductivist account.Not successful yet,so far at least.
Well what can I say more other than elegantly advise you to read directly what Duhem,Kuhn,Lakatos and Feyerabend have to say...I am not a teacher and anyway it is not my goal to teach here.All I can tell you is that,indeed, they have strong reasons for their views.All unbiased researches into the subject can easily see this (having also the necessary baggage of philosophical knowledge of course).We are wasting our time,honestly.
Not that I agree entirely with them,no I have my own vision somewhere between Lakatos and Feyerabend.That is I still support the 'method' stance,nonwithstanding that a minimal method,the 'reliabilist' account does vindicate such a view (based on fecundity,the fact that new paradigms does unite facts considered previously as unconnected and not lastly the fact that the vast majority of accepted knowledge inferred using Mill's methods are very stable in time).In other words I advocate the view that we are still having,currently at least,more 'positive' reasons (including purely logical ones) pro method though only a very flexible one.
This in spite of the fact that nontrivial changes do occur,we have clear historical examples,sometimes even contradicting scientific knowledge inferred using the most reliable 'tool' we have had so far,namely Mill's methods.Empiricism alone might be not enough but,as I said,we still have more positive reasons to prefer a 'weak' form of realism and generally to grant a fallible epistemological privilege to a (minimal) method stance.
The reality is that science is not the unassailable monolith in which some like to believe,it is merely our best 'tool' so far to make sense of the observed realities.Moreover the strong,popperian,fallibilism has problems,this is long ago accepted by all serious philosophers of science.At most we are entitled to talk of a weak form of fallibilism.Finally if the hypothetico-deductive method were so compelling then no would still bother now to revitalize the old inductivist account.Not successful yet,so far at least.
I'm sorry, but I don't think I am smart enough to decipher what you said, especially when you refuse to include concrete examples to illustrate what you are trying to get across. So I won't take up anymore of your time.
Zz.
metacristi
Nov2-04, 02:09 PM
I'm sorry, but I don't think I am smart enough to decipher what you said, especially when you refuse to include concrete examples to illustrate what you are trying to get across. So I won't take up anymore of your time.
Zz.
Fair.But ignorance alone never justify a stance,though.I have never claimed I am 'smart',I only presented some of the results in the philosophy of science and some purely personal views which,it happens,due to my lack of proficiency in english I'm sure,you cannot understand from my account.Period.Thus I invited you elegantly to read some primary sources directly in english.This is the best way for you to understand better,simply contradicting me without really understanding is of no use.For both.
all the best
metacristi
No, I definitely do not think that is even remotely the point. I think the issues of this debate need to be made more clear. I read what one side says and it seems irrelevant to what the other side is pointing out.
I'm not syaing scinec is the be all and end all, what I am saying is that philsophy is highly subjective, and because it is so subjective I see no objective great difference between a professor of philsophy and an armchair philospher like Rab C. Nesbitt ( obscure refernce to an incomphrenhisble Scottish sitcom). I also wonder what the value is of much (though though as I said before not all) of the modern acadmeic study of philsophy.
Fair.But ignorance alone never justify a stance,though.I have never claimed I am 'smart',I only presented some of the results in the philosophy of science and some purely personal views which,it happens,due to my lack of proficiency in english I'm sure,you cannot understand from my account.Period.Thus I invited you elegantly to read some primary sources directly in english.This is the best way for you to understand better,simply contradicting me without really understanding is of no use.For both.
all the best
metacristi
Put the words of Zz in the right perspective. What he meant was that you need to be more clear. When reading your post i felt the same thing. I stated many times that it is real easy to take in expesive terms that can be interpreted in various ways. What is your point and what do you mean ??? Explaining something difficult in difficult terms is easy
explaining something difficult in easy terms is difficult.
I am not saying the explanation cannot be difficult yet it needs to be clear and instructive, which most of the philosopher-posts are NOT.
regards
marlon
Les Sleeth
Nov2-04, 03:48 PM
I'm not syaing scinec is the be all and end all, what I am saying is that philsophy is highly subjective, and because it is so subjective I see no objective great difference between a professor of philsophy and an armchair philospher like Rab C. Nesbitt ( obscure refernce to an incomphrenhisble Scottish sitcom). I also wonder what the value is of much (though though as I said before not all) of the modern acadmeic study of philsophy.
Your opinion that philosopohy is "highly subjective" may or may not be true depending on how philosophy is practiced. Over and above that I think there is a question about the value of subjectivity. If you are talking about being subject to the forces of past conditioning or one's own likes and dislikes, passions, mental defects, etc. then most of us agree that that sort of subjectivity is undesirable in the pursuit of knowledge.
But what about sincerity? Sincerity is a subjective property of consciousness, and anyone who lacks it cannot be trusted in epistomological endeavers whether scientific or philosophical. Just how much of our own being do we undervalue and remain ignorant of? Well, Socrates long ago suggested that knowing oneself is a path to wisdom. Does that really make any sense or was he just talking through his hat (or whatever they wore then)?
I wish we could throw out the term "philosophy" and just talk about what we want here at PF. If someone only wants to study the structure of the universe, I don't think anyone around here will object. But you must realize that the average person is thinking and wondering about other things. And if they are going to wonder, wouldn't it at least be nice to be able to encourage them to wonder with as many facts as possible, as well as not to wonder something for long which facts clearly contradict.
It is a great thing to see someone start to think more clearly, I love it. And I love the idea of a dedicated crew committed to that. The kicker is, to encourage such thinking you can't narrow people to only mechanistic stuff and that which can be proven beyond all doubt. Unless it is open, and more open than the hard core empiricist probably feels comfortable with, creative thinkers won't participate. Besides, as some have been pointing out lately even scientists don't mind entertaining a bit of science exotica such as time travel (which I personally believe is nonsense), bubbling multiple universes, computer consciousness . . .
The negative generalizations about philosophy I've heard over the last few days is a little discouraging to someone like me who does want to keep the traditional rationalistic approach of philosophy out of PF (the same thing you dislike), and who had hopes of gradually the turning the focus toward encouraging fact-based thinking and learning good logic. Oh well. :cool:
russ_watters
Nov3-04, 10:45 AM
Just my $.02 (I'm not going to get into the nitty gritty of this): I participated in a long thread in another forum entitled "Is Science a Belief System?" You can imagine how it went, but what I got out of it was the thread starter, a philosopher, was bitter about the fact that much of what at one time was the domain of philosophy has been taken over by science. He percieved a conflict between the two, much like the science/religion conflict, over which discipline should be answering which questions. Like the science/religion conflict, its largely one sided: scientists don't care about such boundaries, they simply answer questions they can answer. As science progresses more questions can be answered, and the domain of science increases. Philosophers (some, not all) are fighting to keep a division that scienists don't even think exists. Its a battle only they are fighting and one they can't win.
Please do not construe this post as an attack on philosophy: as I said, the fight is largely one-sided. My personal opinion is that philosophy has a place, but the domain is shrinking (it will never disappear) as science progresses. Philosophers need to accept that.
Les Sleeth
Nov3-04, 04:36 PM
Please do not construe this post as an attack on philosophy: as I said, the fight is largely one-sided. My personal opinion is that philosophy has a place, but the domain is shrinking (it will never disappear) as science progresses. Philosophers need to accept that.
I don't think anything you said is offensive. But I also don't believe you or anyone else I've been debating has really understood my point about philosophy either. I don't want to be disrespectful to academic philosphers who might be participating at PF, but I can't help but agree with you that traditional philosophy is not only shrinking, it's virtually dead. The traditional areas that are still relevant are logic, and the epistomological successes that helped establish empirical methods.
So I think the common complaint in this debate has been about the aspects of traditional philosophy which are now irrelevant. The thing is, I personally agree about that! So what the heck am I talking about then? I will try to find time in the next few days to start a new thread proposing a modernized philosophy that is more relevant to what we now know "works." I hope you and others disenchanted with philosophy will offer constructive opinions about it.
misogynisticfeminist
Nov4-04, 05:40 AM
I may not know much philosophy nor much of science but here's what I think of the whole issue.
I personally don't think that philsophy should intrude on the basic scientific method and should not be involved in the forumulation of any scientific theory. I don't think that that is in the realm of philosophy, and i only think that philosophy should come into play only when after a theory is formulated and then philosophy comes in and puts in place what this theory means for our existence and our place as human beings in the cosmos.
The thing also, which I find a little flawed in philosophy is that logic is often mistaken as intuition. The scientific method is indeed an intuitive one, the process of doing the calculus, the math, the experimentation is definitely and intuitive one, but the conclusions may not always be so. Things such as QM especially, it tells me alot, that there is indeed a certain part of the cosmos which are simply not part of our understanding (ie. intuition).
Which is why i see the physical sciences as a better link to the secrets of our universe, it is because that it is hardly bound by the limits of our experiences and current perceptions of reality. It sounds abit on the positivist side, but I'm not advocating that the physical sciences is an entirely objective pursuit.
Of course, i'm not discounting the usefulness of philosophy, I'm saying that as much as the physical sciences is not all-encompassing, neither is philosophy. And as much as the physical sciences does a pretty decent job in telling us about why a ball moves the way it does, philosophy too tells us about the meaning of our life here, among others.
And neither do I think that just because philosophy disagrees among itself a fair bit, it does not mean that it is not an entirely reliable study either. I believe that all of us as scientists one way or another, we live with a certain amount of uncertainty in our life, and realize that we don't know the answers to everything.
therefore, i don't think that philosophy should dictate how stuff actually works, but rather provide meaning to the answers which the physical sciences have given.
Thanks for your reply miso....
marlon
Ivan Seeking
Nov4-04, 09:33 AM
This is your philosophy
Critical Point: April 2002
When Physics World ran a special poll last year to find out how physicists think philosophically, more than 500 readers replied. Here are the results.
Everybody - including scientists - makes seat-of-the-pants practical judgements about what's real and what's not. The common-sense assumptions underlying these judgements can be unrecognized, inconsistent and even untenable; they can be home-grown, inherited and absorbed from others. But when someone is engaged in an activity as complex as science, it is almost impossible to avoid making such practical judgements. No matter how implicit and readily revised these judgements may be, they are based on preconceptions of what the world consists of and what the world's most important distinctions and categories are - in other words of how it all hangs together. [continued with results]
http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/15/4/2/1
http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/15/4/2/1
Except that there is ONE important factor that is left out - that the "seat of the pants" and other methods of figuring out what to do does NOT necessarily equate to what is eventually excepted! Each one of us pursue the line of inquiry or reasoning based on what we perceive to be correct. During the process of inquiry of something that is not yet known, there can be MANY lines of inquiry. The mechanism of high-Tc superconductor is a prime example. There are groups that are pursuing magnetism/spin fluctuations as the leading candidate, while other are pushing for phonons. There are groups that are pointing to "stripes", while others are sticking by BCS-like mechanisms, etc. Things like these are NOT uncommon on a research front area.
However, the final acceptance and consensus are NOT based on preferences, "seat of the pants" decisions, inherited ideas, preconceptions, etc. Nature still is the ultimate dictator, and this is independent of one's preconception or philosphy on anything.
Zz.
hypnagogue
Nov4-04, 01:04 PM
However, the final acceptance and consensus are NOT based on preferences, "seat of the pants" decisions, inherited ideas, preconceptions, etc. Nature still is the ultimate dictator, and this is independent of one's preconception or philosphy on anything.
I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory. Perhaps nature can dictate formulaic relationships to us fairly straightforwardly, but it can't dictate what these things mean on a deeper level. I imagine that 100% of physicists agree how to describe kinetic energy mathematically and the role that it plays in physical dynamics and so on, but apparently only 67% of the physicists polled for this article can venture to say that kinetic energy is 'real.' Thus, while the functional role of KE in physics may be beyond dispute, its ontological nature is undecided.
In general, every scientist should agree on the validity and utility of theoretical constructs that can accomodate existing empirical results and faithfully predict new ones, but not every scientist will agree on how to interpret what those theories are telling us about the 'ontological furniture' of reality. These kind of second order ontological interpretations, I believe, are the things that the article states are based on preferences, inherited ideas, etc.
I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory. Perhaps nature can dictate formulaic relationships to us fairly straightforwardly, but it can't dictate what these things mean on a deeper level. I imagine that 100% of physicists agree how to describe kinetic energy mathematically and the role that it plays in physical dynamics and so on, but apparently only 67% of the physicists polled for this article can venture to say that kinetic energy is 'real.' Thus, while the functional role of KE in physics may be beyond dispute, its ontological nature is undecided.
In general, every scientist should agree on the validity and utility of theoretical constructs that can accomodate existing empirical results and faithfully predict new ones, but not every scientist will agree on how to interpret what those theories are telling us about the 'ontological furniture' of reality. These kind of second order ontological interpretations, I believe, are the things that the article states are based on preferences, inherited ideas, etc.
If you ask anyone this question "Is it impossible for me to take these pieces of a broken vase, throw it on the ground, and have it spontaneously reformed back into the orginal vase?", you will get the definite answer "Yes, it is impossible". But ask a physicist that question, and you will get "Improbable, but not impossible" as an answer.
Now, how does that related to that question you cited? This is because the question was asked to a bunch of physicists to related something that is well-defined (kinetic energy), to something that isn't ("real"). Philosphers LOVE things like this. They can talk about "real" and "reality" ad nauseum without needing to come to any kind of closure. We don't! When a philospher ask me if so-and-so is "real", I would be VERY hesitant to answer, because I have no idea what he/she means as "real". Would it be the same as what *I* would consider to be real as in qualitatively and quantitatively verfied?
Ask that question again to high school physics students, or even undergraduates, and you will probabily get a definite "Yes, KE is real!". When one doesn't know any better, it appears simplistic and obvious. However, when one learns a lot more and in detail, then even a vase that has been broken into a million pieces still has a chance to be reassembled back into the original object simply by throwing it onto the floor! The lack of an answer on the "reality" of KE isn't because "ontological nature is undecided", it is because it is a question that is vague and has no quantitative, testable value!
But here's the kicker! Even if you are correct, and that the ontological nature of KE is undecided, I will then ask "why does this matter"? It is obvous that physics can function AND work, without having the need to know such things. This is consistent with what I have been trying to say since the very beginning of this mess - that physicists and the working of physics are not in dire need to answer and address these things. It has worked without it. This is a fact, not a conjecture. Now maybe you, other philosphers, and the general public do. Then I would say, go at it!
Zz.
Ivan Seeking
Nov4-04, 08:56 PM
I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory.
Implicit philosophies also play a large role in determining the next question asked; given what we "know" right now. The next question may be the most important question ever asked.
Also, right now, string theorists proceed on a philosophical, not an empirical basis.
Finally, this discussion is philosophical. Therefore philosophy plays a role in science.
Implicit philosophies also play a large role in determining the next question asked; given what we "know" right now. The next question may be the most important question ever asked.
Also, right now, string theorists proceed on a philosophical, not an empirical basis.
Finally, this discussion is philosophical. Therefore philosophy plays a role in science.
I must be dense. Somehow, there is a big leap between "this discussion is philosophical" and "therefore, philosophy plays a role in science". I do not see a logical connection between these two statements.
Zz.
Fliption
Nov4-04, 11:35 PM
Put the words of Zz in the right perspective. What he meant was that you need to be more clear. When reading your post i felt the same thing. I stated many times that it is real easy to take in expesive terms that can be interpreted in various ways. What is your point and what do you mean ??? Explaining something difficult in difficult terms is easy
explaining something difficult in easy terms is difficult.
I am not saying the explanation cannot be difficult yet it needs to be clear and instructive, which most of the philosopher-posts are NOT.
regards
marlon
And Metacrista has given you some links to read that will be more clear. Has anyone read them?
hypnagogue
Nov4-04, 11:44 PM
Now, how does that related to that question you cited? This is because the question was asked to a bunch of physicists to related something that is well-defined (kinetic energy), to something that isn't ("real"). Philosphers LOVE things like this. They can talk about "real" and "reality" ad nauseum without needing to come to any kind of closure. We don't! When a philospher ask me if so-and-so is "real", I would be VERY hesitant to answer, because I have no idea what he/she means as "real". Would it be the same as what *I* would consider to be real as in qualitatively and quantitatively verfied?
From the article: "Realism is the view that things in the world exist that are not of our own making - independent of human perception and thought - and that scientific theories are true if they faithfully correspond in some way to these things."
I haven't scoured the rest of the article to find a specific definition of "real," but from the definition of realism it seems safe to say that something is "real" if it exists independent of human thought and perception. So the question "is X real?" would seem to be just "does X exist 'out there,' or is it just a theoretical or perceptual construct 'in the head'?" It's unclear to me after browsing the article again whether the author actually defined the term 'real' in this way for his respondents, or just let them put their own spin on the word. Obviously if it was the latter, then we can't tell much from the poll results. But if it was the former, I think the term is well-defined enough to begin to tell us something legitimate about the physicists' varying ontological stances.
But here's the kicker! Even if you are correct, and that the ontological nature of KE is undecided, I will then ask "why does this matter"? It is obvous that physics can function AND work, without having the need to know such things. This is consistent with what I have been trying to say since the very beginning of this mess - that physicists and the working of physics are not in dire need to answer and address these things. It has worked without it. This is a fact, not a conjecture. Now maybe you, other philosphers, and the general public do. Then I would say, go at it!
I don't get why you're so militant about this. I don't say that because I disagree with you, but rather because I completely agree! Physics is in no dire need to answer metaphysical questions, of course not (sounds rather obvious in those terms). Physics gets along fine without any major contributions from philosophy-- agreed. I'm not trying to point out a major flaw in physics or advocate a renovation of how it's done.
As to the question "why does it matter," the simple answer is that some people are curious and want to know what the world is like! Even if it doesn't matter a whit to the practical applications of quantum mechanics, some people are just genuinely curious to know what it all means for how the world is and how it works. Could it really be that something like the many worlds interpretation is true? Perhaps we can't conclusively answer such a question, but that doesn't necessarily make it uninteresting or not worth inquiring about.
metacristi
Nov5-04, 05:59 AM
hypnagogue
Physics is in no dire need to answer metaphysical questions, of course not (sounds rather obvious in those terms). Physics gets along fine without any major contributions from philosophy-- agreed. I'm not trying to point out a major flaw in physics or advocate a renovation of how it's done.
Well the majority of the philosophers of science (by the way almost all have scientific training being physicists and so on at base) are no more so sure that the difference between science and metaphysics is so clear cut as Sir Karl thought once and how many scientists still believe even now.
The reality is that the history of science,what happens now at the frontiers of science and even logic itself have shown that popperian falsificationism is at least not satisfactory.Any unbiased course in philosophy of science point to this,presenting also the logical difficulties of falsificationism (as happened once with logical positivism-totally unsatisfactory on logical grounds).
Even if we accept the revised version of falsificationism,which require the unity of the theories (in the Ayer's sense,but without making any reference to weak 'verification' or meaning) we still have the problem of key unobservables in very successful otherwise scientific theories.
Even if we could 'verify' them somehow indirectly in a crucial experiment (of the type of that of Rutherford which finally convinced even physicists to accept the existence of atoms) we still have the problem of theory ladeness.
Logically it is still possible that some very fruitful otherwise theoretical concepts (such 'entities' are not testable in isolation) do not exist in reality.Thus is conceivable,as a possibility,that further developments would require to renounce at them altoghether in future theory making (not only at some minor attributes attached to them)!This 'mere' possibilty (toghether with the possibility of Quinean underdetermination) and the Duhemian underdetermination (which is a fact in spite of some here failing to understand it's importance) is more than enough to not be able to talk of a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics.
Neither are we allowed to grant to a scientific method based on fallibilism and falsificationism (even methods going well beyond the mere popperian falsificationism) a perpetual epistemological privilege.Moreover if strong Quinean underdetermination (irrespective [of] data) were proved to be more than a mere possibility then we would not be even entitled to talk of epistemological privilege of science (based on fallibilism and intersubjectivity)...
Some feyerabendists take the strong underedetemination as granted by I argue that we do not have yet sufficient reasons to believe this (finding an alien civilisation would be very instructive for,if the strong underdetermination thesis is right,then we should expect that their set of scientific-in physics at least-enunciations are totally different,anyway very different,from our's,after the 'translation' in a human language of course).
Now all this does not mean that modern philosophers of science want the demise of falsificationism,no.Popper's version of falsificationism involve a methodological choice,counting only as a mere logical argument,favorizing falsifiable hypotheses.Based on the common sense,logical,expectation that a good model of the universe must have internal unity and coherence,must make novel,testable,predictions and resist severe attempts at potential falsification ('corroboration' of the theory).It [has problems] but is,still,a good criterion,though in itself insufficient.
The idea is that falsificationism alone is one of the [key] criterions we should use but this in no way should restriction the freedom of movement (in the light shed by the clear limits of falsificationism).Indeed sometimes ad hoc hypotheses deserve to be part of science,to be the first choice program more exactly (though such ad hoc hypotheses are metaphysical in the popperian methodology).
Not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level of rationality,in spite of the fact that we might have problems even here we can still define a clear ladder of rational preferences (whilst still taking in account all proposals,even those who seem not reasonable at a certain moment).
The key factor is that ad hoc hypotheses should solve some key 'puzzles' or anomalies.Additionally we can define an orientative 'official' ladder of preferences,that is what programmes ought to be pursued as the first choice and so on (if exist more proposals).But this 'official' list (based on previous experience) in no way reastrict the freedom of scientists who can have their 'private' list of preferences.The idea is that finally to obtain a program which fully comply with the standard popperian requirements.In enough many cases ad hoc hypotheses initially did lead to full programmes,as history of science do prove plenty.
This was the case with the quanta hypothesis or with the neutrino hypothesis at their time (from what I've read Pauli writes somewhere that even if he and his colleagues were '[embarassed]' first of the totally ad hoc character of the neutrino hypothesis they still thought that it was much more than mere 'metaphysics').
Sure it is possible that some of those might not prove capable to help the conjectures they are part of to become theoretically and empirically evolving on medium term.However there is no need to keep them inside science on long term (or continuing to prefer them as the first choice program) if we have sufficient reasons against this (the program is stagnant,degenerative or other programmes are progressive,much more successful).
There is no mistake to proceed so for anyway in the light of what I said before (the 'normal science' itself is a mere program on which scientists spend more of their efforts trying to develop it further).Basically nothing is indispensable.
Let me explain my point of view from a different perspective (above what I said before).Well all (at least in physics,but this is valid in broad lines for science in general) all existing scientific programmes counting as 'normal science' have at least puzzles (facts not accomodated yet within theory,the 'problems' of Popper) if not anomalies (but much more often they have).
The first task of scientists,in the scientific tradition,is the accomodation of those puzzles within the existing system,paradigm.Thus even in cases that a paradigm considered as 'normal science' become degenerative (more and more puzzles,at least,do accumulate) scientists still try to stick to the letter with the existing paradigm,still try to accomodate all those puzzles or anomalies inside the existing normal science.
This does not really let enough space for creativity,scientists tend to not follow more variants in the same time and devise potentially new hypotheses (whilst still spending their most efforts by trying to accomodate the puzzles within the existing paradigm).On the contrary they tend to grant to the existing paradigm the capacity to explain those puzzles later,in the vrtue of scientific tradition and epistemological conditioning during the years of learning.
This could lead at least to important detours.I'd argue that instead of attaching to the existing paradigm and not trying to devise alternatives until much later (by pursuing the existing program until much later as the main choice,the only choice in many cases) it would be much more useful from the good beginning (at all times as a matter of fact) to devise as many as possible alternatives (as I've argued before we can define a ladder of preferences for them) though they seem totally unreasonable at a certain moment.
I argue that is a legitimate action sometime to prefer other programmes,as the primary choice,in the process of theoretical development,which solve a certain 'puzzle',by using new theoretical concepts if 'puzzles' begin to pile up,even when there exist only few.The first choice on that ladder of preferences among different ad hoc hypotheses (as the main choice only,without renouncing to implicate actively on other paths) is the addition of new 'constructs',totally coherent with previous knowledge.
They might seem ad hoc at a certain moment but further theoretical and empirical work could prove that they represent indispensable constructs,enabling a greater fecundity for the theories incorporating them.It deserves sometime to follow such paths,especially when such ad hoc constructs 'fit' naturally with the other parts of the existing accepted enunciations.
In the latter cases scientists might accept those constructs as part of the existing normal paradigm itself.As such not only that they try to find further direct or indirect empirical support for that construct [in a key experiment] (or merely theoretical support),that is try to make them 'reliable concepts' within that paradigm,but they USE THEM (even when still ad hoc) together with other enunciations,in other,TOTALLY UNRELATED,'problems' (in other,higher level,sciences for example).
There is no mistake to do so since scientists use indispensable nonobservables in certain successful theories to explain 'puzzles' in other sciences even though those entities could be only some constructs which happen to 'work'.This is possible we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise,unfortunately the 'no miracle' argument is,still,not sound.
I mean that those unobservables do make testable predictions in conjunction with other enunciations but they are not testable in isolation-there is no known separate experiment which to 'confirm' directly or indirectly their existence.Anyway indirect confirmation involve an inductive process,using often Mill's methods,and might [also] be theory ladden.Nothing impedes the possibility that intial ad hoc hypotheses could lead to huge 'leap' ahead.What is clear for all unbiased philosophers is that the history of science proves plenty that a too rigid method is not the fastest way toward 'success' (understood as mere fecundity).
And Metacrista has given you some links to read that will be more clear. Has anyone read them?
I am just wondering why you guys are always referring to links and articles for clarification. Why can't you just post some clear explainatory answers to our questions whithout us having to read articles. The real scientists here do not make reference to some article in order to make a point in this thread. I do not bore you with articles on QFT or GTR in order to make my point. Please, don't hide behind someone else by quoting some article or some other socalled philosopher. The intention of this thread was to discuss personal opinions on philosophy and clear out the most common misconceptions of philosophy...YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN TO US, not the other way around...
just my opinion though...
regards
marlon
It's unclear to me after browsing the article again whether the author actually defined the term 'real' in this way for his respondents, or just let them put their own spin on the word. Obviously if it was the latter, then we can't tell much from the poll results. But if it was the former, I think the term is well-defined enough to begin to tell us something legitimate about the physicists' varying ontological stances.
Unfortunately, without knowing such things, this whole discussion is moot. We might be arguing a point that isn't "real". Ivan Seeking should not have brought it up in the first place.
I don't get why you're so militant about this. I don't say that because I disagree with you, but rather because I completely agree! Physics is in no dire need to answer metaphysical questions, of course not (sounds rather obvious in those terms). Physics gets along fine without any major contributions from philosophy-- agreed. I'm not trying to point out a major flaw in physics or advocate a renovation of how it's done.
However, it appears that the issue seems to not want to go away, maybe not due to you, but due to others who seem to want to keep resurrecting this. If we agree on the point above, then stick a fork in me because I'm done!
As to the question "why does it matter," the simple answer is that some people are curious and want to know what the world is like! Even if it doesn't matter a whit to the practical applications of quantum mechanics, some people are just genuinely curious to know what it all means for how the world is and how it works. Could it really be that something like the many worlds interpretation is true? Perhaps we can't conclusively answer such a question, but that doesn't necessarily make it uninteresting or not worth inquiring about.
I should have made it clearer. When I asked "why does it matter", it was within the context of physics and the working of physics. I have ZERO problem with people wanting to know more and asking questions. What I do have a problem with is people who do not know any better foolishly presuming that the superficial knowledge that they have learned about physics (or on anything for that matter) accurately reflects the body of knowledge physics and the practice of physics. Just go ahead and skim through your Philosophy section and tell me that this does not happen. And I'm not just referring to quackeries either, which occurs everywhere no matter how vigilant one is.
Assuming that the issue of the role (or non-role) of philosophy in science, and in physics in particular, is settled (could you try to convince metacristi of this? I can't do anything about it because he/she still refused to illustrate his/her esoteric prose with specific, concrete examples that I requested), then let me be clear that I have no issues with discussing physics "philosophically" to one's content. Maybe that's a good thing, I don't know (is this better than discussing physics with physicists?) However, one should not fool oneself into thinking that one has had a true picture of the actual content. Analogy, metaphors, sybolism, etc. cannot convey what physicis is. Only when people consciously realize this, then they won't be so quick to build and extrapolate what they think they understand.
Zz.
The reality is that the history of science,what happens now at the frontiers of science and even logic itself have shown that popperian falsificationism is at least not satisfactory.
Back this up with solid evidence, please.
... the revised version of falsificationism,which require the unity of the theories (in the Ayer's sense,but without making any reference to weak 'verification' or meaning)....
Concrete examples of what you are taslking about, thank you.
we still have the problem of key unobservables in very successful otherwise scientific theories.
Solid evidence, please.
Even if we could 'verify' them somehow indirectly in a crucial experiment (of the type of that of Rutherford which finally convinced even physicists to accept the existence of atoms)
What are you talking about?
we still have the problem of theory ladeness.
What does this mean?
Logically it is still possible that some very fruitful otherwise theoretical concepts (such 'entities' are not testable in isolation) do not exist in reality.
Please come up with examples.
Thus is conceivable,as a possibility,that further developments would require to renounce at them altoghether in future theory making (not only at some minor attributes attached to them)!
Your problem being?
This 'mere' possibilty (toghether with the possibility of Quinean underdetermination) and the Duhemian underdetermination (which is a fact in spite of some here failing to understand it's importance) is more than enough to not be able to talk of a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics.
This does not follow from what you have said.
Neither are we allowed to grant to a scientific method based on fallibilism and falsificationism (even methods going well beyond the mere popperian falsificationism) a perpetual epistemological privilege.
Who are you to say this?
Moreover if strong Quinean underdetermination (irrespective by data)
Concrete examples of what you mean.
were proved to be more than a mere possibility then we would not be even entitled to talk of epistemological privilege of science (based on fallibilism and intersubjectivity)...
If this "follows" "underdetermination" (whatever that is), is simply false.
I could go on and on..
Fliption
Nov5-04, 09:33 AM
I am just wondering why you guys are always referring to links and articles for clarification. Why can't you just post some clear explainatory answers to our questions whithout us having to read articles. The real scientists here do not make reference to some article in order to make a point in this thread. I do not bore you with articles on QFT or GTR in order to make my point. Please, don't hide behind someone else by quoting some article or some other socalled philosopher. The intention of this thread was to discuss personal opinions on philosophy and clear out the most common misconceptions of philosophy...YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN TO US, not the other way around...
just my opinion though...
regards
marlon
This is silly. This discussion called for further clarification. He has told you that english is not his primary language and was therefore pointing you to a site where the same explanation can be found in much better english. Seems perfectly reasonable to me.
Also, unfortunately, some people don't know near as much as they think they do. I refer people to outside links all the time so that they can get at least an understanding of the concepts I'm using. People are a bit more open minded and can come to trust an outside source before they can some guy named "Fliption" on the internet. But until they actually read the links, the discussion in this forum becomes exactly what this one is...a useless exchange of personal perspectives with no intention or possibility of understanding the other perspectives.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 09:40 AM
What I do have a problem with is people who do not know any better foolishly presuming that the superficial knowledge that they have learned about physics (or on anything for that matter) accurately reflects the body of knowledge physics and the practice of physics. Just go ahead and skim through your Philosophy section and tell me that this does not happen. And I'm not just referring to quackeries either, which occurs everywhere no matter how vigilant one is.
I've seen this in the physics forum as well. Tis the nature of humanity to speak in ignorance. You should probably get used to it.
metacristi
Nov5-04, 09:52 AM
Back this up with solid evidence, please.
Concrete examples of what you are taslking about, thank you.
Solid evidence, please.
What are you talking about?
What does this mean?
Please come up with examples.
Your problem being?
This does not follow from what you have said.
Who are you to say this?
Concrete examples of what you mean.
If this "follows" "underdetermination" (whatever that is), is simply false.
I could go on and on..
No.It only follows that you (and many others) do not have even the slightest idea of the problems raised by the philosophy of science.What to explain,my goal is not to teach here.Because I should teach you basically everything...No offense a basic course in (modern) philosophy of science is urgently needed by many so called 'serious scientists' here.You'll see plenty of examples there,though,from a purely logical point of view,Duhem's thesis and others,do not need them as justification.
Try this,as a good introduction in philosophy (of science included):
http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewforum.php?f=13
As regarding the value of philosophy,as an introduction only,I find Russell's account very good (with the observation that some of the views advocated there are no more 'en vogue';for example,relevant for the topic here,being the inductionist approach of Russell-upon him induction is [rather] 'apriori' and needs no justification,[edit to add][he talks however of a weak,probabilistic,justification;unfortunately,eve n now,neither the objective interpretation of probabilities nor bayesianism has managed to offer a sound argument in favor of a general inductive method][/edit to add]):
http://www.popular-science.net/books/russell/chapter15.html
(but try reading all book)
Indeed the first role of philosophy is to 'rummage' among everything we think we know in order to show which of our 'certitudes' and prejudices must be put first under doubt before hoping to affirm something more precise...
There is no science without philosophy,we should always be able to think way beyond the mere popperian methodology,especially because we already know it is very limited...Moreover philosophy has a great importance even when we 'work' inside the popperian account;indeed,as even Popper do recognize,metaphysical reasearch programmes do have a great impact over science,what seems now metaphysical (in the popperian heuristic) could be,potentially,the science of tomorrow.I would have liked if science had been the unshakable monolith some think it is even now,unfortunately it is not the case...A position entirely justified on rational grounds (it needs some basic grasp of logic and philosophy,of course,to really understand).
Since you obviously don't know a thing about PHYSICS, you are no authority upon whether the practices of physicists are false or not. (Since you are ignorant of what they are actually doing)
You can sit in a seminar-room all day phantasizing about what physicists do; your activity is still worthless and irrelevant to knowledgeable individuals.
Good bye.
metacristi
Nov5-04, 10:03 AM
Since you obviously don't know a thing about PHYSICS, you are no authority upon whether the practices of physicists are false or not. (Since you are ignorant of what they are actually doing)
You can sit in a seminar-room all day phantasizing about what physicists do; your activity is still worthless and irrelevant to knowledgeable individuals.
Good bye.
Thanks for your proclamation,but of course,how all rational people do realize,this does not really count as a justification.Incidentally what justification have you,for example,when you say that 'you do not know anything about physics'?
By the fact that you don't bolster up your statements with solid, concrete examples from physics.
I've seen this in the physics forum as well. Tis the nature of humanity to speak in ignorance. You should probably get used to it.
Well, yes, I have gotten used to it (I have to, having been on the 'net this long), but I don't have to tolerate such mediocrity, and neither should anyone else. The fact that you don't and shouldn't tolerate when someone, be it a self-proclaimed scientist, or some Joe Schmoe, make incorrect characterization of philosophy, neither should I when someone makes an incorrect characterization of physics and the practice of physics. Here, we have people telling me what I AM doing, and believing in THAT rather than what I tell them what I am actually doing. You will understand if I find that rather incredible.
I have put out my challenge several days ago, and NO ONE took up on the offer. I asked for anyone to specifically point to me, in the case of the develoment (and still developing) of the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where EXACTLY was and is the role of philosophy and philosphy of science in particular? This is an appropriate case study because (i) it is still on-going (ii) practically ALL of the major characters involved are still alive and we can ASK them if such-and-such are true, rather than having to deal with "dead philosophers" and "dead scientists", and (iii) most importantly, at least for, me, it is still fresh in the minds of many people. This is not Copernicus battling the church with fuzzy historical accounts and news coming down after several translations. This is DIRECT, VERIFIABLE, and clear accounts.
... so I'm still waiting.
Zz.
P.S. I would like to clearly state that this challenge isn't directed at hypnagogue, because we both have the same understanding that philosophy plays no major role in the development of physics.
... so I'm still waiting.
Zz.
And so am I..
(I don't know if we're going to get any solid facts out of these people, though)
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 12:50 PM
Just one question. Why is a theory ever discarded? It is always possible to resurrect any theory with ad hoc exceptions.
So in the end physicists are forced to use criteria like "simplicity" and "elegance". But they generally have no definition for this except gut feeling and majority opinion.
Regarding falsification, here are many concrete examples that it is not how science works:
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
And so am I..
(I don't know if we're going to get any solid facts out of these people, though)
And so am i... :wink:
marlon
A very interesting article written by a clearly knowledgeable man (Martin Gardner)
Thanks, Aquamarine.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:06 PM
I have put out my challenge several days ago, and NO ONE took up on the offer. I asked for anyone to specifically point to me, in the case of the develoment (and still developing) of the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where EXACTLY was and is the role of philosophy and philosphy of science in particular?
That's like asking what the role of a CEO is on his company's assembly line. The relationship is a bit more complex than this question makes it out to be.
And as in all cases like this, of course the answer is different depending on who you ask! If you ask a worker on the assembly line, he'll tell you the CEO does nothing to help them out. Yet an outside investor who understands all the relationships and the big picture would say the CEO does indeed have an impact.
That's like asking what the role of a CEO is on his company's assembly line. The relationship is a bit more complex than this question makes it out to be.
And as in all cases like this, of course the answer is different depending on who you ask! If you ask a worker on the assembly line, he'll tell you the CEO does nothing to help them out. Yet an outside investor who understands all the relationships and the big picture would say the CEO does indeed have an impact.
Fliption,
You are just trying to avoid the question here. Please, give some specific answers to Zz's question and stop phillibustering here...This is not at political thread...
marlon
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:18 PM
Fliption,
You are just trying to avoid the question here. Please, give some specific answers to Zz's question and stop phillibustering here...This is not at political thread...
marlon
There is no answer to the question you are intending to ask. Insisting on one shows a lack of understanding of the relationships involved. Just like the assembly line worker has no idea how anything works outside his own world.
There is no answer to that question. Insisting on one shows a lack of understanding of the relationships involved. Just like the assembly line worker has no idea how anything works outside his own world.
So basically what you say is that when one someone asks you "what is the role of philosophy of science into the development of science?", there is no answer ??? I am sure your buddies cogito and LesSleeth are gonna disagree.
Nevertheless if you cannot come up with anyhting good here, then what are you doing here? What are the statements you are defending, what is your point??? Basically why do you post here ???
Don't take this the wrong way, but i am really wondering about these questions to which there certainly IS an answer, as there is an answer to Zz's question. Let me answer it for you : NONE WHAT SO EVER !!!!!!!!!!!
marlon
Fliption:
Just remember the following.
It is simply bad form to masturbate in public; neither is it productive.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:31 PM
So basically what you say is that when one someone asks you "what is the role of philosophy of science into the development of science?", there is no answer ??? I am sure your buddies cogito and LesSleeth are gonna disagree.
Nevertheless if you cannot come up with anyhting good here, then what are you doing here? What are the statements you are defending, what is your point??? Basically why do you post here ???
Don't take this the wrong way, but i am really wondering about these questions to which there certainly IS an answer, as there is an answer to Zz's question. Let me answer it for you : NONE WHAT SO EVER !!!!!!!!!!!
marlon
I figured you would misunderstand so I modified my words. Apparently not soon enough. I'm saying that the answer you seek does not exists. The true answer to the question would require you taking some courses in philosophy. You don't understand what you're asking if you actually expect someone to tell you in a thread on the internet the relationship between philosophy and science! My god this could fill a library.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:32 PM
Fliption:
Just remember the following.
It is simply bad form to masturbate in public; neither is it productive.
I always appreciate it when people share their personal lessons learned with me. Thanks for the advice.
That's like asking what the role of a CEO is on his company's assembly line. The relationship is a bit more complex than this question makes it out to be.
And as in all cases like this, of course the answer is different depending on who you ask! If you ask a worker on the assembly line, he'll tell you the CEO does nothing to help them out. Yet an outside investor who understands all the relationships and the big picture would say the CEO does indeed have an impact.
So, show me how that CEO makes an impact here, Mr. Outside Investor! All I have been getting are analogies, vague inference, esoteric generalization, etc. I'm trying to pin someone down to a specific case! Are philosphers who hold such idologies incapable of applying their principle to something that is REAL and can be verified to be true or false? Or are they only capable of upholding their point of view only on something that is waaaay back in history, can't be double-checked, and would be involved in a long, protracted discussion that sees no end?
I didn't pick some trivial, non-important example either. The mystery of high-Tc superconductors is one of the few phenomena that is generally listed as THE big mysteries in physics. Surely something as significant as that, if there were to be any coat-tailing by philosphers of science, THIS would be a very juicy one! So where are they?
Zz.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:40 PM
I didn't pick some trivial, non-important example either. The mystery of high-Tc superconductors is one of the few phenomena that is generally listed as THE big mysteries in physics. Surely something as significant as that, if there were to be any coat-tailing by philosphers of science, THIS would be a very juicy one! So where are they?
Zz.
Since my analogy is not even close to being vague(Note how you correctly identified me as an outside investor :approve: ) then I think another one is in order. Actually, I see your point. I now no longer believe that ecomonics is worth studying. Economics is useless because it has no role in explaining the mystery in high-Tc superconductors!
Either I am correct about economics in this case, or I have no idea what economics is. Take your pick.
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 01:43 PM
I have put out my challenge several days ago, and NO ONE took up on the offer. I asked for anyone to specifically point to me, in the case of the develoment (and still developing) of the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where EXACTLY was and is the role of philosophy and philosphy of science in particular?
I answered this but will make the answers even clearer. I will do this in spite of that I don't know the details of the theory (I am assuming there is a theory and not merely empirical observations).
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ (See critical evaluation)
So if falsification is not the answer, what did you use?
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
What is the justification for assuming that current physical laws will continue to function the same way in the future? Or that they will function in different place from where tested? How is the limits of generalization decided?
How do you know the theory will hold in the future and in other places?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What are the ultimate statements that provide justification for all other statements?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
Why is a theory ever abandoned, it is always possible to resurrect any theory by adding ad hoc exceptions?
Why was earlier theories discarded?
Probably the answer is gut feeling and majority opinion. I am not arguing that this gut feeling is wrong and cannot produce correct result. People can be trained to produce correct results without knowing any theory. Especially in similar situations. But if the situation changes to unfamiliar where prior experience will not help, theory will be useful.
So I am not arguing that the philosophy of science is particularly useful in this instance. It is possible to use instincts gained from experience in similar scientific situations before. But if the situation changes, for example to those questions studied in string theory, a knowledge of the philosophy of science might be very useful. It might ultimately be algorithmic information theory that decides if loop quantum theory or string theory is correct.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 01:43 PM
"I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today -- and even professional scientists -- seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is -- in my opinion -- the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth. (Einstein to Thornton, 7 December 1944, EA 61-574) "
Since my analogy is not even close to being vague(Note how you correctly identified me as an outside investor :approve: ) then I think another one is in order. Actually, I see your point. I now no longer believe that ecomonics is worth studying. Economics is useless because it has no role in explaining the mystery in high-Tc superconductors!
Either I am correct about economics in this case, or I have no idea what economics is. Take your pick.
You misinterpreted what I asked. Recall that you said
And as in all cases like this, of course the answer is different depending on who you ask! If you ask a worker on the assembly line, he'll tell you the CEO does nothing to help them out. Yet an outside investor who understands all the relationships and the big picture would say the CEO does indeed have an impact.
So then I want to know from whoever this "outside investor" is (it could be you, or anyone that fits into your analogy), to tell me exactly how the CEO plays his/her role! Or is the outside investor simply thinks the worker on the assembly line is simply beneath him to be able to understand the whole thing?
So show me the equivalent of the "outside investor" in the high-Tc superconductor case. Explain to me how this "CEO" is truly affecting the physics of superconductivity of these materials.
This is NOT A TRICK! I have already explained waaaay back when of a possible cultural difference in how physicists understands and comprehend principles and ideas, and how it appears philosophers on here convey their ideas. Since this is about science/physics, and about the practice of science/physics, most of us who are in this want to know in specific terms, how philosophical ideologies, principles, and what-not applies on what we do and how we do it. It is the surest way our limited and simplistic brain can comprehend something into a tangible idea, by seeing it in action first hand!
Zz.
hypnagogue
Nov5-04, 01:55 PM
I think what Fliption is trying to say is that while a real link may exist between philosophy of science and the practice of science, trying to sort out the nature of this link may be intractable. I think that's a defensible claim.
Hopefully, we've already established that much productive scientific work can be done, and is done, without the explicitly considering issues of epistemological justification to the extent that philosophers of science do. In other words, there is typically no explicit or direct link between the practice of science, as done by scientists, and the philosophy of science, as propounded by philosophers. Scientists do not use a checklist of epistemic qualifications afforded to them philosophers, and their methods may come under legitimate scrutiny by philosophers, but nonetheless the practice goes on and continues to be viable and productive.
Does this imply that philosophy of science exerts no influence upon the practice of science? Not necessarily. Perhaps such an influence exists, but is so subtle and indirect or acts over such a long period of time that it appears to be non-existant, and is practically impossible to tease out of the complicated knot of societal interaction over time. Perhaps the mimetic zeitgeist of a Popper really has swayed things in some non-obvious way.
I say 'perhaps.' But is it really the case? I honestly don't know enough about philosophy of science or the changing epistemic trends in science over time to even make an educated guess. But the sheer complexity of the issue may make it impossible to say one way or the other even for an expert on these topics. In that sense, even if some sort of influence does exist or has existed between the two disciplines, it may be impossible to answer the questions of who, what, when, where, how, why.
I answered this but will make the answers even clearer. I will do this in spite of that I don't know the details of the theory (I am assuming there is a theory and not merely empirical observations).
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ (See critical evaluation)
So if falsification is not the answer, what did you use?
I want to ask you this first. Why and how did Popper's falsifiability got into this? As far as I can remember, it was metacristi who were OBSESSIVELY presenting a thesis on such a thing. Why am I being made to answer to something we didn't bring up nor propose, nor espouse, nor pledge our allegance to? Can we get over this already?
Probably the answer is gut feeling and majority opinion. I am not arguing that this gut feeling is wrong and cannot produce correct result. People can be trained to produce correct results without knowing any theory. Especially in similar situations. But if the situation changes to unfamiliar where prior experience will not help, theory will be useful.
So I am not arguing that the philosophy of science is particularly useful in this instance. It is possible to use instincts gained from experience in similar scientific situations before. But if the situation changes, for example to those questions studied in string theory, a knowledge of the philosophy of science might be very useful. It might ultimately be algorithmic information theory that decides if loop quantum theory or string theory is correct.
"gut feeling" and "majority opinion"?? On high-Tc superconductors?!! I'm sorry, but this is highly insulting. You picked a "generic" scenario and applied it to something which you yourself didn't hesitate to acknowledge you know nothing about. And we physicists get accused of yapping about things we don't know of when we "intruded" into philosophy?
And since when is the criteria of a theory or idea in physics being correct entirely based on "algorithmic information theory"? Can you point ONE single theory in physics, today, that is accepted to be correct that is just based on "algorithmic information theory"?
Zz.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 02:07 PM
You misinterpreted what I asked. Recall that you said
So then I want to know from whoever this "outside investor" is (it could be you, or anyone that fits into your analogy), to tell me exactly how the CEO plays his/her role! Or is the outside investor simply thinks the worker on the assembly line is simply beneath him to be able to understand the whole thing?
I understand the question. My response to it is the same as my response to Marlon. You're asking for an explanation about the relationship between philosophy and science and you want a one page answer? This is impossible(for me at least). Hypnagogues response is a fair representation of what I feel about the subject. But when Hypnagogue ask the question "But Is it really the case?", I believe the answer is "yes". I provided a quote from a prominent historic scientist who claims that it is. If Einstein thinks philosophy of science helped him in his endeavers in physics then who are we to disagree?
I think what Fliption is trying to say is that while a real link may exist between philosophy of science and the practice of science, trying to sort out the nature of this link may be intractable. I think that's a defensible claim.
Hopefully, we've already established that much productive scientific work can be done, and is done, without the explicitly considering issues of epistemological justification to the extent that philosophers of science do. In other words, there is typically no explicit or direct link between the practice of science, as done by scientists, and the philosophy of science, as propounded by philosophers. Scientists do not use a checklist of epistemic qualifications afforded to them philosophers, and their methods may come under legitimate scrutiny by philosophers, but nonetheless the practice goes on and continues to be viable and productive.
Does this imply that philosophy of science exerts no influence upon the practice of science? Not necessarily. Perhaps such an influence exists, but is so subtle and indirect or acts over such a long period of time that it appears to be non-existant, and is practically impossible to tease out of the complicated knot of societal interaction over time. Perhaps the mimetic zeitgeist of a Popper really has swayed things in some non-obvious way.
I say 'perhaps.' But is it really the case? I honestly don't know enough about philosophy of science or the changing epistemic trends in science over time to even make an educated guess. But the sheer complexity of the issue may make it impossible to say one way or the other even for an expert on these topics. In that sense, even if some sort of influence does exist or has existed between the two disciplines, it may be impossible to answer the questions of who, what, when, where, how, why.
Strangely enough, I actually agree with most of what you said here! :)
<hiding from the rest of the physicists>
I would even go a step further by saying that careful attention to espistemiology is a great advantage in the TEACHING of physics. Students understand things a lot faster and clearer when there is a systematic explanation on why things are done certain way, and why it is a good idea to have a clear methodology in attacking and solving a certain problem.
However, in the real practice of physics (and how many here can truly say they are familiar in the day-to-day workings of physics?), I don't EVER remember us stopping and pondering the philosophical ideologies of so-and-so figure and then reacting to that in ways that affect our work. I know this is not what you are saying, but this is what some are implying. I just want to know, if they truly believe that, to show me specific example of where this actually happens ....................... so that I can stop it!! :) :)
Zz.
I understand the question. My response to it is the same as my response to Marlon. You're asking for an explanation about the relationship between philosophy and science and you want a one page answer? This is impossible(for me at least). Hypnagogues response is a fair representation of what I feel about the subject. But when Hypnagogue ask the question "But Is it really the case?", I believe the answer is "yes". I provided a quote from a prominent historic scientist who claims that it is. If Einstein thinks philosophy of science helped him in his endeavers in physics then who are we to disagree?
No, I do not want the "relationship between philosophy and science". I fully accept there is a "relationship"... in may instances, philosophy follows what science has to say!! :) <ducking again>
I want to know where, exactly, in science, and in the specific example that I brought up, that philosphy AFFECTED the science. This is not for my own cultural benefit. This is to clarify the repeated claims that philosphy affects science and plays an important role in science. I want to know WHERE and HOW! I do not want pages and pages of answer. Just pick ONE specific way in which philosphy affected the discovery and development of our understanding of high-Tc superconductors.
Again, the reason why I picked this example is because we can DOUBLE-CHECK if so-and-so figure really meant it the way we are interpreting his or her quote! I can't double check with Einstein to see if his quote was taken out of context, the very same way his "Imagination is more important than knowledge" quote has been bastardized so often. Einstein is known to go by his "gut feeling" on a lot of things... he was right a lot of times (Special Relativity, General Relativity, Bose's theory, etc.) and he was also wrong a lot of times (cosmological constant, EPR paradox, etc.). So to make him a diety he isn't is simply naive.
Zz.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 02:20 PM
However, in the real practice of physics (and how many here can truly say they are familiar in the day-to-day workings of physics?), I don't EVER remember us stopping and pondering the philosophical ideologies of so-and-so figure and then reacting to that in ways that affect our work. I know this is not what you are saying, but this is what some are implying. I just want to know, if they truly believe that, to show me specific example of where this actually happens ....................... so that I can stop it!! :) :)
Does anybody ever get the feeling that you're involved in a huge debate and that everyone actually agrees? I thought most everyone had already acknowledeged that philosophy has no role in the day to day workings of a speciifc scientific endeaver. If anyone is arguing against this then they are doing a poor job. The responses I've seen from Metacrista and Aquamarine don't seem to be claiming this either. They are simply arguing that philosophy of science has a role to play in general. Not in a specific experiment. (Maybe I've misunderstood them.) It's easy to see why they would be so militant with this defensive view of philosophy in general given the title of this thread is not just a claim that philosphy has no role in high-Tc superconductors. It's claiming philosophy is pseudo-science. Perhaps Zapper and Marlon don't agree on this point?
Fliption
Nov5-04, 02:23 PM
Again, the reason why I picked this example is because we can DOUBLE-CHECK if so-and-so figure really meant it the way we are interpreting his or her quote! I can't double check with Einstein to see if his quote was taken out of context, the very same way his "Imagination is more important than knowledge" quote has been bastardized so often. Einstein is known to go by his "gut feeling" on a lot of things... he was right a lot of times (Special Relativity, General Relativity, Bose's theory, etc.) and he was also wrong a lot of times (cosmological constant, EPR paradox, etc.). So to make him a diety he isn't is simply naive.
Zz.
In those instances where he guessed right, is this not your example of where philsophy impacted science? Or have you conveniently "bastardized" philosophy by labeling it a "guess"?
Also, for context, here is where the quote came from. You'll see this whole paper is about Einsteins emphasis on philosophy in science.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/#1
Does anybody ever get the feeling that you're involved in a huge debate and that everyone actually agrees? I thought most everyone had already acknowledeged that philosophy has no role in the day to day workings of a speciifc scientific endeaver. If anyone is arguing against this then they are doing a poor job. The responses I've seen from Metacrista and Aquamarine don't seem to be claiming this either. They are simply arguing that philosophy of science has a role to play in general. Not in a specific experiment. (Maybe I've misunderstood them.) It's easy to see why they would be so militant with this defensive view of philosophy in general given the title of this thread is not just a claim that philosphy has no role in high-Tc superconductors. It's claiming philosophy is pseudo-science. Perhaps Zapper and Marlon don't agree on this point?
Fine, then we can stop this.
1. Philosophy has no role in the day to day working of a specific scientific endeaver
2. Philosophy of science has a role to play in general(?).
Who agrees with Point 1? I do.
Who agrees with Point 2? I don't know, since I have no idea what "in general" means... and I'm too scared to ask for an example of what it means since I might get dumped on a long dessertation on Popperian's falsificationism.
Zz.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 02:31 PM
Who agrees with Point 2? I don't know, since I have no idea what "in general" means... and I'm too scared to ask for an example of what it means since I might get dumped on a long dessertation on Popperian's falsificationism.
It simply means there isn't the direct relationship with specific experiments. Like a prof of physics that does nothing but teach. He isn't involved in any actual research but definitely has an effect on science in general.
Putting all the opinions of Einstein aside, considering that the very creation of the scientific method is a philosophical act, then I find it hard to disagree with number 2.
In those instances where he guessed right, is this not your example of where philsophy impacted science? Or have you conveniently "bastardized" philosophy by labeling it a "guess"?
No I haven't, unless you are calling his "intuition" as his "philosophy", which would be strange since last time I checked, the ability to understand the problem with Maxwell equation not being covariant under galilean transformation is physics and not philosophy.
Zz.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 02:37 PM
No I haven't, unless you are calling his "intuition" as his "philosophy", which would be strange since last time I checked, the ability to understand the problem with Maxwell equation not being covariant under galilean transformation is physics and not philosophy.
Zz.
Then please follow the link and take it up with Einstein. Not me.
Tom Mattson
Nov5-04, 02:49 PM
There are two broad classes of conflicting ideas on the metaphysics of space and time: The absolutist theory and the relational theory.
One is that space exists independently of the things in it, and that space is a sort of container for physical objects. Time also exists independently of (moving) physical objects, according to this view. Take away all matter, and the container remains and the instants of time continue to flow. This is the absolutist theory of space and time, and it was the one held by Newton. Not coincidentally, the spacetime of Newtonian mechanics was of this type.
Another view is that space and time have no existence independent of moving matter, and that they are merely relationships between objects in various states of motion. An analogy might help clarify this. Take two brothers, the only children of their parents. A relationship exists between them called "brotherhood". But if one of brothers is killed, the other brother remains but the relationship of "brotherhood" no longer exists. Similarly, take away all matter from the universe, and the spatiotemporal relationships between the (now nonexistant) objects cease to exist. This is aptly named the relational theory of space and time, and it was held by Leibniz, and later by Mach, and then by Einstein. Now it is the case that it is possible to hold to both the absolutist theory of space/time and to special relativity, but general relativity puts the nail in its coffin. Space and time are relationships between physical objects.
Now you may argue that the relational view of space now belongs to science via GR, but the fact remains that it is doubtful that Newton or any of his followers could ever had arrived at GR with their deeply flawed spacetime metaphysics.
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 02:54 PM
"gut feeling" and "majority opinion"?? On high-Tc superconductors?!! I'm sorry, but this is highly insulting. You picked a "generic" scenario and applied it to something which you yourself didn't hesitate to acknowledge you know nothing about. And we physicists get accused of yapping about things we don't know of when we "intruded" into philosophy?
And since when is the criteria of a theory or idea in physics being correct entirely based on "algorithmic information theory"? Can you point ONE single theory in physics, today, that is accepted to be correct that is just based on "algorithmic information theory"?
I know next to nothing about this field and theory and still have given many questions that you have not been able to answer. I do not doubt that these problems have been solved successfully, in this case, through intuition based on prior experiences without a deeper formal knowledge.
Regarding algorithmic information theory, it can been seen as a formal restatement of Ockham's razor. And Ockham's razor is of major importance. It not a screening tool or curious observation or a crutch. I would argue that Ockham's razor is the scientific method. All theories in physics are based on Ockham's razor. They have been accepted since they best fulfill this criteria. There is an infinite number of theories that can incorporate all empirical evidence. But there is only one theory that passes Ockham's razor.
So if algorithmic information theory is the correct formal restatement of Ockham's razor, and as is claimed precisely trades model complexity for goodness of fit, it is the foundation of all of science.
The modern academic subject Philosophy especially metaphysics has very little to no impact on physics people like fliption and metacristi are more than anything else showing their ignornace. Infact the term 'metaphysics' is used as an insult more than anything else by physicsts, yet we are to believe that these philosophers who are viewed with derision by many physicists are infact directing and controlling the whole process!
Fliption
Nov5-04, 03:19 PM
The modern academic subject Philosophy especially metaphysics has very little to no impact on physics people like fliption and metacristi are more than anything else showing their ignornace. Infact the term 'metaphysics' is used as an insult more than anything else by physicsts, yet we are to believe that these philosophers who are viewed with derision by many physicists are infact directing and controlling the whole process!
Directing and controlling the whole process? Who said this? I may be ignorant about many things but my club on this topic is a big one and, as I've shown, includes Einstein. Yours is a club that argues against an ill constructed strawman. The reason you can't argue against what has been suggested by many here(as opposed to this strawman you've presented) is because you don't understand it. But then why should you attempt to understand anything except science right?
And just because a group of poor philosophers all think metaphysics is an insult doesn't make it so.
I figured you would misunderstand so I modified my words. Apparently not soon enough.
Maybe you should have done a better job at writing down what you really meant. Besides i still don't see it.
I'm saying that the answer you seek does not exists. The true answer to the question would require you taking some courses in philosophy.
So you are unable to explain this to me? What the hell do you think all the real scientists are doing on this forum here when they are helping people out,hmmm???
I am beginning to wonder if you would even know what you are talking about...
You don't understand what you're asking if you actually expect someone to tell you in a thread on the internet the relationship between philosophy and science!
hahahah, ohh my god...you really believe this??? You are gonna have to do a lot better then this man...
My god this could fill a library.
Well in that case, i am sure you can provide me with at least three concrete examples and answers, wouldn't you say ???
marlon
Fliption
Nov5-04, 03:59 PM
Maybe you should have done a better job at writing down what you really meant. Besides i still don't see it.
So now you're having to resort to attacks on mistakes and typos? This is sad Marlon. There is no topic worth ruining your objectivity over to this extent. Just relax. People will disagree with you all your life. And some of them will be right.
So you are unable to explain this to me? What the hell do you think all the real scientists are doing on this forum here when they are helping people out,hmmm???
I assume you mean the people participating in the science forums? I would hope they are pointing to relevant text when the only other option is to write 600 pages of explanations.
I am beginning to wonder if you would even know what you are talking about...
Sometimes my cat wonders the same thing. Maybe you two could have a discussion about it.
hahahah, ohh my god...you really believe this??? You are gonna have to do a lot better then this man...
Good one. How can I possibly counter such strong arguments. Maybe if I use "hahaha" a little more, that would help the strength of my arguments?
Well in that case, i am sure you can provide me with at least three concrete examples and answers, wouldn't you say ???
marlon
Three concrete examples of what? Libraries full of explanations on how philosophy and science relates? If you're still looking for examples along the lines of "high Tc superconductor etc etc then you have been left behind. We have moved beyond this. You'll have to catch up with Zapper and ask him what you guys are going do next.
Regarding algorithmic information theory, it can been seen as a formal restatement of Ockham's razor. And Ockham's razor is of major importance. It not a screening tool or curious observation or a crutch. I would argue that Ockham's razor is the scientific method. All theories in physics are based on Ockham's razor. They have been accepted since they best fulfill this criteria. There is an infinite number of theories that can incorporate all empirical evidence. But there is only one theory that passes Ockham's razor.
Sorry, but there's an "infinite" number of theories that can incorporate ALL emprical evidence? Did you just made this up?
You still have failed to show me ONE such theory in which Ockham's razor is the criteria of acceptance, and not "screen tool", or "curious observation", or " crutch". You have given nothing, no examples, other than lip service here.
Zz.
Les Sleeth
Nov5-04, 04:03 PM
The modern academic subject Philosophy especially metaphysics has very little to no impact on physics people like fliption and metacristi are more than anything else showing their ignornace. Infact the term 'metaphysics' is used as an insult more than anything else by physicsts, yet we are to believe that these philosophers who are viewed with derision by many physicists are infact directing and controlling the whole process!
Fliption mentioned strawman, do you know what a “strawman” argument is? It is when one misrepresents an opponent one is debating, usually portraying their views as stupid, illogical, evil, irrelevant, etc. so that what appears to be a justified attack can be mounted against their opinions.
Is my computer missing posts that would explain why at least four participants keep claiming “we are to believe that these philosophers . . . are infact directing and controlling the whole process”? The point has been conceded several times that philosophy does NOT play a role during research. So why are you making arguments against it? I can find nothing Metacristi said, or Hypnagogue said, or I said, or Cogito said, or Fliption said . . . Who said it, who implied it, whose brain did you psychically detect it loitering in the recesses of?
Such discussions are not being held in your lab are they? Has anyone come knocking on your door like a Philosophy Witness trying to contaminate your science? Are philosophy propaganda leaflets being dropped from the sky all over your neighborhood? What are you so paranoid about? If I hear anyone demand again to know how philosophy is used in active research I am going to start wondering if Rainman is your brother.
Besides offering my personal opinion on how philosophy might benefit PF, we on the philosophy side have been ONLY saying there may still be potential value in continuing to contemplate the epistemology behind science, not during the ongoing practice of science in the laboratory (duhhhhhh :rolleyes:), but apart from that by thinkers who are interested in the subject. In case you don’t know it, that’s how humanity came up with empiricism in the first place. Those who want to understand why empiricism works, to what extent it works, what if any useful adjustments could be made to areas such as inductive theorization or interpretation of results . . . are not interested in intruding into your practice science! Geez Louise :cool:.
Then please follow the link and take it up with Einstein. Not me.
I have read the link (quickly) and I've read at least 3 different biographies of Einstein. His ideas and vision of what the physical universe should be cannot be entirely attributed to a "philosophy". Saying this would be insulting to the way he has developed his ideas and diminished his understanding of physics!
It is why I brought up the High-Tc case. Almost everyone in it is still alive!
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 04:35 PM
Sorry, but there's an "infinite" number of theories that can incorporate ALL emprical evidence? Did you just made this up?
You still have failed to show me ONE such theory in which Ockham's razor is the criteria of acceptance, and not "screen tool", or "curious observation", or " crutch". You have given nothing, no examples, other than lip service here.
As I have said, all theories in science are accepted by using Ockham's razor. Let's take the Ptolemaic theory. It is possible to modify this so it fits all empirical evidence. One example is add a rule to the theory that says that all seemingly contradictory empirical evidence is caused by Satan who creates hallucinations. Thus, only supporting evidence should be considered. Or that all who give contradictory evidence is part of a giant conspiracy. Or that the evidence is real but is created by God temporarily and that he immediately restores the Ptolemaic system whenever one stops observing. Or that all the evidence is created by faulty equipment, atmosphere phenomena, madness or visual hallucinations.
Thus there is an infinite number of theories that fits the empirical data. But only one theory that passes Ockham's razor.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 04:43 PM
I have read the link (quickly) and I've read at least 3 different biographies of Einstein. His ideas and vision of what the physical universe should be cannot be entirely attributed to a "philosophy". Saying this would be insulting to the way he has developed his ideas and diminished his understanding of physics!
It is why I brought up the High-Tc case. Almost everyone in it is still alive!
This seems a bit picky. Einstein's ideas and visions have no more or less credibility then "philosophy". Are you suggesting they do? It is all metaphysics.
As I have said, all theories in science are accepted by using Ockham's razor. Let's take the Ptolemaic theory. It is possible to modify this so it fits all empirical evidence. One example is add a rule to the theory that says that all seemingly contradictory empirical evidence is caused by Satan who creates hallucinations. Thus, only supporting evidence should be considered. Or that all who give contradictory evidence is part of a giant conspiracy. Or that the evidence is real but is created by God temporarily and that he immediately restores the Ptolemaic system whenever one stops observing. Or that all the evidence is created by faulty equipment, atmosphere phenomena, madness or visual hallucinations.
Thus there is an infinite number of theories that fits the empirical data. But only one theory that passes Ockham's razor.
OH...... MY...... GOD!!!!!!!
It is obvious that, while you espouse the "Scientific Method", you have absolutely no clue what it is, and what a "scientific evidence" is. I mean, what other explanations can there be for you to put on the SAME level "Ptolemic theory", and "empirical evidence caused by Satan", and etc... Are you one of those who can't tell the difference between the theory of evolution and the so-called intelligent design? And considering that you keep talking about "modern philosophy of science", how about finding an example from within "modern physics" of the last century, for heavens sake!
If this is the kind of logic that I'm faced with, then I give up. You win! And if this is the kind of "philosophical logic" that we depend on to inform of others about science, then hey, who needs enemies?
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 04:54 PM
OH...... MY...... GOD!!!!!!!
It is obvious that, while you espouse the "Scientific Method", you have absolutely no clue what it is, and what a "scientific evidence" is. I mean, what other explanations can there be for you to put on the SAME level "Ptolemic theory", and "empirical evidence caused by Satan", and etc... Are you one of those who can't tell the difference between the theory of evolution and the so-called intelligent design? And considering that you keep talking about "modern philosophy of science", how about finding an example from within "modern physics" of the last century, for heavens sake!
If this is the kind of logic that I'm faced with, then I give up. You win! And if this is the kind of "philosophical logic" that we depend on to inform of others about science, then hey, who needs enemies?
Zz.
You have not explained why my alternative explanations of the empirical evidence is worse than the current one. My explanations fit all the empirical evidence. Now, you are correctly rejecting these explanations based on intuition and on the majority opnion of other scientists. But until now you probably didn't know why. The answer is Ockham's razor.
This seems a bit picky. Einstein's ideas and visions have no more or less credibility then "philosophy". Are you suggesting they do? It is all metaphysics.
I'm not sure what you are asking. Are you saying that he developed Special Relativity out of a "philosophy"? What would this philosphy be, then, and how did this played a role? I, on the other hand, argue that he arrived at his postulates because he (and a lot of other physicists at that time) were driven to it due to the problems of non-covariant of Maxwell Equations. Without this, I don't care what philosphical ideas he adopts, there will never be Special Relativity.
In any case, I thought we have SETTLED the issue of whether philosphy plays any significant role (or not) in the development and day-to-day workings of physics. Maybe I made this assumption wrongly with regards to your view. But if I haven't, what in the world are we debating now? That philosophy DID play a major role in Einstein's body of work?
It's getting confusing. On one hand, I keep reading people claiming I'm fighting an imaginary battle.. that no one is disagreeing with me on this point. And yet, I keep coming up with this bits and pieces of "evidence" that seems to want to claim that, yes, philosophy DID contribute to that and that physics theory and idea.
I must be halllucinating again.....
Zz.
Tom Mattson
Nov5-04, 05:01 PM
I mean, what other explanations can there be for you to put on the SAME level "Ptolemic theory", and "empirical evidence caused by Satan", and etc...
I think that you completely missed the point. Aquamarine made the alternative theory ridiculous on purpose. He isn't saying that one is wrong to reject the theory, he's trying to get you to understand why people reject it. But I think you dismissed his post as nonsense just by seeing the word "Satan".
If you don't like what he said, then consider a less dramatic example (I'm borrowing this from an former PF member named Ambitwistor). You have 100 data points that look very much like they fall along a straight line, but they don't quite all fit it exactly. In fact, none of them actually touches the best line at all. So what do you do? Do you fit the line to the curve? Or do you fit a 100th degree polynomial so that every single data point is on the curve?
Most scientists choose the first option, and they do so because of Occam's razor.
Directing and controlling the whole process? Who said this? I may be ignorant about many things but my club on this topic is a big one and, as I've shown, includes Einstein. Yours is a club that argues against an ill constructed strawman. The reason you can't argue against what has been suggested by many here(as opposed to this strawman you've presented) is because you don't understand it. But then why should you attempt to understand anything except science right?
And just because a group of poor philosophers all think metaphysics is an insult doesn't make it so.
Ok how is that a strawman !!?? Is there any other way to take your CEO analogy? Your obscuring the fact that it's the academic subject of philosphy that's being argued against (and I believe Einstein was a physicist).
Fliption mentioned strawman, do you know what a “strawman” argument is? It is when one misrepresents an opponent one is debating, usually portraying their views as stupid, illogical, evil, irrelevant, etc. so that what appears to be a justified attack can be mounted against their opinions.
Is my computer missing posts that would explain why at least four participants keep claiming “we are to believe that these philosophers . . . are infact directing and controlling the whole process”? The point has been conceded several times that philosophy does NOT play a role during research. So why are you making arguments against it? I can find nothing Metacristi said, or Hypnagogue said, or I said, or Cogito said, or Fliption said . . . Who said it, who implied it, whose brain did you psychically detect it loitering in the recesses of?
Such discussions are not being held in your lab are they? Has anyone come knocking on your door like a Philosophy Witness trying to contaminate your science? Are philosophy propaganda leaflets being dropped from the sky all over your neighborhood? What are you so paranoid about? If I hear anyone demand again to know how philosophy is used in active research I am going to start wondering if Rainman is your brother.
Besides offering my personal opinion on how philosophy might benefit PF, we on the philosophy side have been ONLY saying there may still be potential value in continuing to contemplate the epistemology behind science, not during the ongoing practice of science in the laboratory (duhhhhhh :rolleyes:), but apart from that by thinkers who are interested in the subject. In case you don’t know it, that’s how humanity came up with empiricism in the first place. Those who want to understand why empiricism works, to what extent it works, what if any useful adjustments could be made to areas such as inductive theorization or interpretation of results . . . are not interested in intruding into your practice science! Geez Louise :cool:.
Ohh you've done it now! Come the revolution philsophers will be swinging from the lamp posts! (after I've dealt with the Trots and the art critics). :wink:
You have not explained why my alternative explanations of the empirical evidence is worse than the current one. My explanations fit all the empirical evidence. Now, you are correctly rejecting these explanations based on intuition and on the majority opnion of other scientists. But until now you probably didn't know why. The answer is Ockham's razor.
Thank you for educating me on that. Till now, I thought what I had was just indigestion.
Zz. :yuck:
Fliption
Nov5-04, 05:11 PM
I'm not sure what you are asking. Are you saying that he developed Special Relativity out of a "philosophy"? What would this philosphy be, then, and how did this played a role? I, on the other hand, argue that he arrived at his postulates because he (and a lot of other physicists at that time) were driven to it due to the problems of non-covariant of Maxwell Equations. Without this, I don't care what philosphical ideas he adopts, there will never be Special Relativity.
In any case, I thought we have SETTLED the issue of whether philosphy plays any significant role (or not) in the development and day-to-day workings of physics. Maybe I made this assumption wrongly with regards to your view. But if I haven't, what in the world are we debating now? That philosophy DID play a major role in Einstein's body of work?
Did Einstein's science teacher have anything to do with relativity? Not directly , no. But did this teacher have an impact? Perhaps.
It's getting confusing. On one hand, I keep reading people claiming I'm fighting an imaginary battle.. that no one is disagreeing with me on this point. And yet, I keep coming up with this bits and pieces of "evidence" that seems to want to claim that, yes, philosophy DID contribute to that and that physics theory and idea.
Zz.
I'm confused as well. You said you understood and even agreed with what Hypnagogue wrote but then whenever someone tries to say that philsoophy has had an impact on science, you freak out as if someone is claiming you have to insert a philosophical step into your laboratory experiment.
Fliption
Nov5-04, 05:13 PM
Ok how is that a starwman !!?? Is there any other way to take your \EO analogy? Your obscuring the fact that it's the cademoic subject of philosphy that's being argued against and I believe Einstein was a physicist.
Claiming that I said that Philosophy directs and controls the whole process is a strawman because I did not say that. That didn't stop you from attacking it, however. I don't understand the rest of your post.
earlier you compared a philospher to a CEO and a physicist to a production line worker, how were we meant to take this analogy then?
I think that you completely missed the point. Aquamarine made the alternative theory ridiculous on purpose. He isn't saying that one is wrong to reject the theory, he's trying to get you to understand why people reject it. But I think you dismissed his post as nonsense just by seeing the word "Satan".
If you don't like what he said, then consider a less dramatic example (I'm borrowing this from an former PF member named Ambitwistor). You have 100 data points that look very much like they fall along a straight line, but they don't quite all fit it exactly. In fact, none of them actually touches the best line at all. So what do you do? Do you fit the line to the curve? Or do you fit a 100th degree polynomial so that every single data point is on the curve?
Most scientists choose the first option, and they do so because of Occam's razor.
No Tom, I actually DID understand the purpose of such examples. However, we don't need to go to such ridiculous extent to illustrate such thing. There's one going on right now! I picked the high-Tc example because of such "multiple scenario explanation" for the body of empirical evidence. There are at least two different camps fighting it out this very minute on the mechanism of high-Tc : the phonon picture, and the magnetic/spin fluctuation picture. Both side are claiming that all the body of empirical evidence support the scenario they "believe in".
Now, apply Occam's Razor there! If Aquamarine is correct, this is trivial! We apply it, and go home, and that's that. However, when there are two equally valid ideas on equal footing (which happens A LOT in physics), claiming that Occam's Razo solves everything is extremely naive and ignorant of what REALLY happens in physics more often than not! No one fits a 100th order polynomial when a 2nd order will do. I would give a month's salary to end up with this kinds of decisions to know which is correct. Throughout my professional career, I have NEVER been faced with this easy of a scenario in choosing which ones to use. Never! And I will challenge anyone else to point out where in physics currently is there a similar situation where simply by applying Occam's razor, we can pick the winner. Pick up this week's issue of Phys. Rev. Lett. and go at it.
It is only when we TEST these seemingly two theories on equal footing on areas where they DIVERGE will we finally able to select which is the one that's valid. This isn't occam's razor, it's pure, down and dirty experimental evidence.
Zz.
I'm confused as well. You said you understood and even agreed with what Hypnagogue wrote but then whenever someone tries to say that philsoophy has had an impact on science, you freak out as if someone is claiming you have to insert a philosophical step into your laboratory experiment.
Read my two questions earlier. Do you agree with Point 1?
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov5-04, 05:50 PM
No Tom, I actually DID understand the purpose of such examples. However, we don't need to go to such ridiculous extent to illustrate such thing. There's one going on right now! I picked the high-Tc example because of such "multiple scenario explanation" for the body of empirical evidence. There are at least two different camps fighting it out this very minute on the mechanism of high-Tc : the phonon picture, and the magnetic/spin fluctuation picture. Both side are claiming that all the body of empirical evidence support the scenario they "believe in".
Now, apply Occam's Razor there! If Aquamarine is correct, this is trivial! We apply it, and go home, and that's that. However, when there are two equally valid ideas on equal footing (which happens A LOT in physics), claiming that Occam's Razo solves everything is extremely naive and ignorant of what REALLY happens in physics more often than not! No one fits a 100th order polynomial when a 2nd order will do. I would give a month's salary to end up with this kinds of decisions to know which is correct. Throughout my professional career, I have NEVER been faced with this easy of a scenario in choosing which ones to use. Never! And I will challenge anyone else to point out where in physics currently is there a similar situation where simply by applying Occam's razor, we can pick the winner. Pick up this week's issue of Phys. Rev. Lett. and go at it.
It is only when we TEST these seemingly two theories on equal footing on areas where they DIVERGE will we finally able to select which is the one that's valid. This isn't occam's razor, it's pure, down and dirty experimental evidence.
Zz.
There has not existed, until maybe recently, a good formal restatement of Ockham's razor. So scientists have used Ockham's intuitively, essentially sticking with a prior theory until it becomes overwhelmingly clear that another theory is less complex while still fitting the data. It has not been possible to compare goodness of fit to complexity. So in many cases it has been impossible to decide which theory is more correct given available evidence.
Now this may be about to change due information theory. So it may no be possible today answer which of the two competing theories of the mechanism of high-Tc is most correct, given available empirical evidence. But maybe in the near future.
If so, it is one of the greatest scientific revolutions of all time. It has the potential to answer most or maybe all questions asked in the philosophy of science. And also destroying those aspects of philosophy many here find objectionable, like postmodernism.
hypnagogue
Nov5-04, 06:33 PM
Claiming that I said that Philosophy directs and controls the whole process is a strawman because I did not say that. That didn't stop you from attacking it, however.
To be fair, I think your business analogy with philosophy presumably as the CEO may have been misleading. I think I know what you were getting at, but I can see how others would interpret the analogy in a sense stronger than what you intended.
edit: oops, I see jcsd has already pointed that out. Apparently this thread sprouted yet another page while I wasn't looking. :tongue2:
Les Sleeth
Nov5-04, 07:15 PM
Ohh you've done it now! Come the revolution philsophers will be swinging from the lamp posts! (after I've dealt with the Trots and the art critics). :wink:
What sent you over the edge, the threat of that Rainman quiz? :biggrin: I deleted an earlier post because I wanted to include a scenerio where I walk into Zapper's lab and tell him he has to stop all experimentation until he admits God is light, and therefore prior to all EM experiments he has to prostrate himself on the floor before his equipment. Then I decided he wouldn't think it was funny, and even might find out about the Crystal Reading cult I just joined.
There has not existed, until maybe recently, a good formal restatement of Ockham's razor. So scientists have used Ockham's intuitively, essentially sticking with a prior theory until it becomes overwhelmingly clear that another theory is less complex while still fitting the data. It has not been possible to compare goodness of fit to complexity. So in many cases it has been impossible to decide which theory is more correct given available evidence.
Again, when you make statements such as this, you simply neglected to invoke any specific example to illustrate that what you are stating is what actually happened. In my view (and it is obvious that this view is shared by a few other physicists on here), this makes your statement carries NO WEIGHT.
Please note that when I claim something, I illustrate that with specific examples. When I say that there are now two competing theories with EQUAL WEIGHT in which you simply cannot apply Occam's Razor, I TELL you what they are! I don't just leave that statement hanging. I respect your intelligence enough to know there is no way you should buy what I have to sell without pointing out specific examples to prove that I'm not making this up!
Now, let's look at your claim that we "...have used Ockham's intuitively, essentially sticking with a prior theory until it becomes overwhelmingly clear that another theory is less complex while still fitting the data..." There are two issues that are wrong here:
1. We stick by things that have been shown to work, and work over a LARGE range of phenomena. If another theory comes along and purported to do the same, why would we abandone one that we KNOW already works? It isn't "Occam's Razor", it's verification. There have been many instances where a new theory comes in, and claim to show they "work", but is really untested in many areas that an old theory ALREADY have proven itself. I can't think of any instances where a new theory comes in with ALL the same set of phenomena already proven, and we reject it simply via Occam's razor. If you have one, I'd like to hear it.
2. It is wrong because of classical mechanics-quantum mechanics case. QM comes in, and let's face it, it is MORE complex, and MORE convoluted conceptually than classical mechanics. Yet, it eventually replaces clasical mechanics as the more fundamental principles. It is NOT due to Occam's razor, but due to experimental verification! Where CM and QM disagrees, QM ALWAYS wins via emprical evidence alone!
I have shown why your point of view is wrong.
Zz.
ZapperZ:
I agree with you that the "Ockham's razor" idea is all too easily, and inaccurately used to describe the practice of science.
However, I would like to say that, ON OCCASION, Ockham's razor is used, in particular when a NEW theory comes along and shows that an earlier theory had unnecessary/redundant assumptions present.
I'll take one example of this: The (kinematic) theory of atoms
The physics of the early 19th-century (exemplified by Fourier), introduced a quantity called "the caloric fluid" to explain how heat flowed from one object to another, and the "amount" of caloric fluid in an object was related to the temperature of that object.
They developed our familiar mathematics on this ground, however they were rather perplexed and dissatisfied with their working idea of a "caloric fluid":
1) They showed that they could not measure any difference in the WEIGHT of an object according to whether that object was hot or cold.
Hence, the grudgingly had to state that the "caloric fluid" was weightless.
2) They were never able to extract pure, caloric fluid, i.e, proving its existence.
The maths worked great, but they thought they had to assume a quantity they didn't like the face of.
Precisely for this reason, when the kinetic theory of atoms became developed in the middle 19th-century, and was able to explain heat flow&temperature WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY CALORIC FLUID, most physicists were overjoyed that they finally could kick out the caloric fluid from their set of working ideas.
In addition, of course, the new theory had VAST consequences on other areas of physics, that is:
The new theory had a much stronger predictive power than their earlier theories.
In particular, the new theory was finally able to account for the behaviour of (dilute) gases, something the earlier theories had had problems with.
ZapperZ:
I agree with you that the "Ockham's razor" idea is all too easily, and inaccurately used to describe the practice of science.
However, I would like to say that, ON OCCASION, Ockham's razor is used, in particular when a NEW theory comes along and shows that an earlier theory had unnecessary/redundant assumptions present.
I'll take one example of this: The (kinematic) theory of atoms
The physics of the early 19th-century (exemplified by Fourier), introduced a quantity called "the caloric fluid" to explain how heat flowed from one object to another, and the "amount" of caloric fluid in an object was related to the temperature of that object.
The maths worked great, but they thought they had to assume a quantity they didn't like the face of.
Precisely for this reason, when the kinetic theory of atoms became developed in the middle 19th-century, and was able to explain heat flow&temperature WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY CALORIC FLUID, most physicists were overjoyed that they finally could kick out the caloric fluid from their set of working ideas.
In addition, of course, the new theory had VAST consequences on other areas of physics, that is:
The new theory had a much stronger predictive power than their earlier theories.
In particular, the new theory was finally able to account for the behaviour of (dilute) gases, something the earlier theories had had problems with.
There are two separate issues here (I seem to be saying that a lot lately). First is the issues of "on occassion", so-and-so works. Let's assume that this is correct. I certainly would not go to the extent of Aquamarine and proclaim this rule as the standard de facto of how theories are accepted. I have just proven ONE example where this doesn't work. Thus, such "universal proclamation" is simply false.
Secondly, having had to write a whole term paper on the "Caloric theory of heat" while I was in a history of science class while I was an undergraduate, I must say that based on what I understand, and based on what you wrote, the acceptance of the Kinetic Theory over the Caloric Theory is anything but based on Occam's Razor. The caloric theory had fundamental problems even when they were accepted... simply because no one had found a "caloric"! They were tolerated simply because there were no other working models back then. Even the Kinetic Theory had some resistance when it was introduced - it wasn't in its full form till Boltzmann made the ultimate statistical formulation of its final form. This proves to be a better working model. But notice it wasn't "simpler". The concept of "atoms" still had resistance, so the Kinetic Theory was NOT simpler theoretically (it is layered with statistics) and conceptually than the caloric theory. So it is inconceivable that it was accepted simply by applying Occam's Razor between the two.
But thanks for pointing it out. This can be ANOTHER example of how, when one tries to make a point, one ILLUSTRATES it with a specific example that is tangible and can be thoroughly discussed.
Zz.
Thank you, ZapperZ:
As we both agree to (and which you know better of than myself) CONTEMPORARY physicists disliked the "caloric fluid"-idea, not the least because they never seemed to FIND it.
However, from a very formal point of view, I would say that an atomic theory IS somewhat simpler:
1) Everything became reduced to relationships between objects WITH mass; there was shown no need for an artificial object WITHOUT mass (i.e, the caloric fluid) as well.
This is what I had in mind when I meant the kinetic theory of atoms SIMPLIFIED the earlier theory, in that it was able to make do with fewer TYPES of "stuff".
I do not, of course deny that the actual mathematics had to be refined/complexified, in particular with statistics, but the crucial issue here, IMO, is that when we do this, we are able to make NEW and ACCURATE predictions in fields where the old theory either had no working model to develop predictions from, or where its predictions where KNOWN to be false.
That is, the new theory has a greater predictive power as well.
I won't insist upon the dominance of the use of Ocham's razor here; the CLINCHING issue remains, as you've said, the better performance of the new model:
perhaps the "simplicity" issue is more of an aesthetically appealing feature which spurs the scientist on to hammer out his model?
Aquamarine
Nov6-04, 09:47 AM
Here is a short description of Minimum Message Length induction, a good candidate for a formal replacement of Ockham's razor.
http://hawthorn.csse.monash.edu.au/mml
Examples of how it have already been used in real-world science:
http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~lloyd/tildeMML/Intro/
More on MML:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length
http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~lloyd/tildeMML/
But there are competing theories to MML. Malcolm R Foster have some overviews on his homepage.
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/default.htm
Some examples of how Ockham's razor have been important in physics in choosing between theories:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories/s118778.htm
But the claim that Ockham's razor is the scientific method is stronger than some anecdotes. As I showed in the Ptolemic example, any theory can be modified to fit all empirical data, at the cost of complexity. No arguments against this have been stated. And then the only way to choose between competing theories is Ockham's razor.
Regarding point 1, se above. And note that since falsification have already been proven false as an universal criteria, there is no competing theory with Ockham's razor for how science works. Regarding point 2, the modern versions of Ockham's razor may choose a more complex theory if it better fits the data.
So now you're having to resort to attacks on mistakes and typos? This is sad Marlon. There is no topic worth ruining your objectivity over to this extent. Just relax. People will disagree with you all your life. And some of them will be right.
Really ??? Thanks for this new insight...
I assume you mean the people participating in the science forums? I would hope they are pointing to relevant text when the only other option is to write 600 pages of explanations.
No, they are not. They are actually helping people out with specific solutions to real science problems and questions. Ofcourse we could refer to whatever text that there is out there on the web, but then what is the use of this Forum???
Sometimes my cat wonders the same thing.
Why am i not surprised ???
Good one. How can I possibly counter such strong arguments. Maybe if I use "hahaha" a little more, that would help the strength of my arguments?
Thanks, besides you don't have to counter anything. What arguments ??? Please be more specific. hmmm, i could have sworn i read that somewhere else...
Maybe you should be more silent instead of using hahaha more. Just a suggestions to you...i can be wrong ofcourse
Three concrete examples of what? Libraries full of explanations on how philosophy and science relates?
YES INDEED. Please don't tell me what i asked and use that as an answer. It makes you sound real credible and knowledgeable to all readers of this thread.
Besides, no need to bring in Zz., i am only asking this question to you and your immense library...
So please fill in : 1) 2) and 3)
Thanks in advance for the clear knowledge...
marlon
Here is a short description of Minimum Message Length induction, a good candidate for a formal replacement of Ockham's razor.
http://hawthorn.csse.monash.edu.au/mml
Examples of how it have already been used in real-world science:
http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~lloyd/tildeMML/Intro/
More on MML:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_message_length
http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~lloyd/tildeMML/
But there are competing theories to MML. Malcolm R Foster have some overviews on his homepage.
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/default.htm
Some examples of how Ockham's razor have been important in physics in choosing between theories:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories/s118778.htm
But the claim that Ockham's razor is the scientific method is stronger than some anecdotes. As I showed in the Ptolemic example, any theory can be modified to fit all empirical data, at the cost of complexity. No arguments against this have been stated. And then the only way to choose between competing theories is Ockham's razor.
Regarding point 1, se above. And note that since falsification have already been proven false as an universal criteria, there is no competing theory with Ockham's razor for how science works. Regarding point 2, the modern versions of Ockham's razor may choose a more complex theory if it better fits the data.
Other than the fact that at least ONE of your links is dead, NONE of what you have listed here applies to the selection of a THEORY. You have listed how DATA is analyzed! Now, unless you are claiming that physics is nothing more than simply a collection of data and unrelated set of disjointed information (a common misconception for anyone who has not studied physics), then what you have tried to present here is quite irrelevant.
I am still amaze that you make all these claims, and yet you cannot clearly, on your own, produce a distinct, clear example. The Ptolemic example isn't valid, because again are doing "data fitting", and comparing a carefully-formed idea based on the knowledge at that time, with a "made-up" idea. It is why, for example, Intelligent Design is NOT a science, while Evolution is! Intelligent design claims they can explain ALL of the very same observation that Evolution already can. But you will notice that ID is NOT considered to be a scientific theory to be considered on the same level as Evolution. ID is a MADE-UP theory that allows untested intrusions. You, on the other hand, would include it and use Occam's razor as the reason why it not accepted. This is false!
Again, how about finding something in physics within the past century? Explain to me clearly how Occam's razor was used there! I can't believe you cannot even find ONE, considering that you claim it is a universal "law", even when physicists did not realize they're using it. I tried giving you one, but it is obvious that while you insist that us physicists do our "homework" by reading up on all of these sites, you don't seem to think you need to even bother reading up on the what "high-Tc superconductors" and the issues surrounding it are.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov6-04, 11:02 AM
Other than the fact that at least ONE of your links is dead, NONE of what you have listed here applies to the selection of a THEORY. You have listed how DATA is analyzed! Now, unless you are claiming that physics is nothing more than simply a collection of data and unrelated set of disjointed information (a common misconception for anyone who has not studied physics), then what you have tried to present here is quite irrelevant.
I am still amaze that you make all these claims, and yet you cannot clearly, on your own, produce a distinct, clear example. The Ptolemic example isn't valid, because again are doing "data fitting", and comparing a carefully-formed idea based on the knowledge at that time, with a "made-up" idea. It is why, for example, Intelligent Design is NOT a science, while Evolution is! Intelligent design claims they can explain ALL of the very same observation that Evolution already can. But you will notice that ID is NOT considered to be a scientific theory to be considered on the same level as Evolution. ID is a MADE-UP theory that allows untested intrusions. You, on the other hand, would include it and use Occam's razor as the reason why it not accepted. This is false!
Again, how about finding something in physics within the past century? Explain to me clearly how Occam's razor was used there! I can't believe you cannot even find ONE, considering that you claim it is a universal "law", even when physicists did not realize they're using it. I tried giving you one, but it is obvious that while you insist that us physicists do our "homework" by reading up on all of these sites, you don't seem to think you need to even bother reading up on the what "high-Tc superconductors" and the issues surrounding it are.
Zz.
The links worked fine when I checked them again. And I suggest you read them, they are about how to select the best theory. One with examples of Ockham's razor this century, written by physicist. Foster have many example from physics this century in his articles. The Ptolemic example is correct, as others here have agreed. Regarding ID it fits the empirical evidence less well than a theory based on evolution, little need to invoke complexity.
The links worked fine when I checked them again. And I suggest you read them, they are about how to select the best theory. One with examples of Ockham's razor this century, written by physicist. Foster have many example from physics this century in his articles. The Ptolemic example is correct, as others here have agreed. Regarding ID it fits the empirical evidence less well than a theory based on evolution, little need to invoke complexity.
Again, you don't seem to understand the difference between "selecting the appropriate model for set of data" and "selecting a theory to be correct". I asked you if you think physics is nothing more than just a collection of data. You never answered. If you think it is, then it would be consistent to your persistent of "curve fitting" analogy. But it would also clearly reveal your faulty knowledge of what physics is. Maybe this is why you refused to answer.
Secondly, Foster is EXACTLY describing what I just mentioned, especially in quantitative analysis of data! (Note: I graduated from UW-Madison also where Foster is a faculty member). Not only that, *I* have done the very same thing in my analysis of my experimental data. This means that I just don't pay lip service about these things, I have DONE it. However, these things are done simply to create a phenomenological model that can be checked, tested, and eventually evolved into a theory that is derived from First Principles. It is NEVER done to SELECT which theory is "correct"! This is what I've been trying to get across!
Look, if I were to give you tons and tons of links to read about high-Tc superconductors (and trust me, I am able to do that), I bet you'll roll your eyes and let a few things fly over your head. I'm not asking for links. I am asking you to PICK ONE physics example (I don't care where you hijack that example from) and tell me clearly how Occam's Razor was applied in picking out which theory is correct. Pick one from within this past century, if you please, since you obviously do not care for the example I picked already.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov6-04, 11:31 AM
Again, you don't seem to understand the difference between "selecting the appropriate model for set of data" and "selecting a theory to be correct". I asked you if you think physics is nothing more than just a collection of data. You never answered. If you think it is, then it would be consistent to your persistent of "curve fitting" analogy. But it would also clearly reveal your faulty knowledge of what physics is. Maybe this is why you refused to answer.
Secondly, Foster is EXACTLY describing what I just mentioned, especially in quantitative analysis of data! (Note: I graduated from UW-Madison also where Foster is a faculty member). Not only that, *I* have done the very same thing in my analysis of my experimental data. This means that I just don't pay lip service about these things, I have DONE it. However, these things are done simply to create a phenomenological model that can be checked, tested, and eventually evolved into a theory that is derived from First Principles. It is NEVER done to SELECT which theory is "correct"! This is what I've been trying to get across!
Look, if I were to give you tons and tons of links to read about high-Tc superconductors (and trust me, I am able to do that), I bet you'll roll your eyes and let a few things fly over your head. I'm not asking for links. I am asking you to PICK ONE physics example (I don't care where you hijack that example from) and tell me clearly how Occam's Razor was applied in picking out which theory is correct. Pick one from within this past century, if you please, since you obviously do not care for the example I picked already.
Zz.
Of course science is more than a collection of facts.
Please give an exact quote from Foster that support your statement.
Regarding examples, exactly the same arguements that were used in the Ptolemaic example can be used in any scientific controvery this century. Take the probably most famous of them, Einstein against Newton.
Or from one of the lnks that you have not read:
Ockham’s Razor is also the motivation behind unification of physical theory. A good example of this came nearly 100 years ago. The German physicist Max Planck had invented an early version of the quantum theory that explained a baffling phenomenon: the speed of electrons that were thrown off when light is shone at a metal. His equations called for a new physical constant, a new constant of nature, whose value had to be found from the observations he made. But the same idea was then applied to explain the amount of radiation given off by a hot body, an electric fire, for example, and also to explain the wavelengths of light that are absorbed by hydrogen atoms. But of these further phenomena had been experimentally studied and each had required its own physical constant of nature to be set separately from the observations. The new idea related these two extra constants to Planck’s and accurately gave their values. Three supposedly separate phenomena had been shown to have the same underlying explanation. The quantum idea was rapidly accepted in consequence.
My last example is from cosmology. When Einstein worked out his general theory of relativity and gravity early in the 20th century, and improved on Newton’s venerable theory, there was room for an arbitrary constant, known as a parameter, in his equations. To keep things simple he was tempted to put it to zero, but another consideration weighed even more heavily: he believed on philosophical grounds that the universe was unchanging on the large scale. He believed it was unchanging in how the great clusters of stars, called galaxies, relate to each other. This meant that his number could not be zero, for technical reasons.
But some years later, it was found that the galaxies were in fact all rushing away from one another. In Einstein’s mind, an informal version of the Ockham analysis immediately took place and he reverted to the value zero for his number, which is called the ‘cosmological constant’ today. In this spirit, a translation of the Latin Ockham’s Razor, ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem’ would be ‘Parameters should not proliferate unnecessarily’. This particular plot has thickened though: the value of Einstein’s cosmological constant is once again in question. Is it zero, or is it very small, and should be chosen so as to best fit the data?
We don’t know yet. This is why these questions are exciting.
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories/s118778.htm
Of course science is more than a collection of facts.
Please give an exact quote from Foster that support your statement.
Regarding examples, exactly the same arguements that were used in the Ptolemaic example can be used in any scientific controvery this century. Take the probably most famous of them, Einstein against Newton.
Or from one of the lnks that you have not read:
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories/s118778.htm
I'm sorry, but this illustrates clearly why you do not understand the difference between applying Occam's Razor to a collection of data, and applying it to know what theory is correct. Forster's article on how one analyze the quantitative data is identical to this. This is what I stated as the phenomenological model.
Furthermore, do you really, seriously think that the reason General Relativity is considered to be more accurate than Newton's Gravitational theory simply due to Occam's Razor? Here's a hint: there are SEVERAL empirical data that show that Newton's Gravitational theory is less accurate than General Relativity. In other words, as I have replied to Tom earlier, it is pure down-and-dirty experimental verification that determined in the end which theory is more accurate over the other, and NOT Occam's Razor.
So now find me another one....
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov6-04, 12:50 PM
I'm sorry, but this illustrates clearly why you do not understand the difference between applying Occam's Razor to a collection of data, and applying it to know what theory is correct. Forster's article on how one analyze the quantitative data is identical to this. This is what I stated as the phenomenological model.
Furthermore, do you really, seriously think that the reason General Relativity is considered to be more accurate than Newton's Gravitational theory simply due to Occam's Razor? Here's a hint: there are SEVERAL empirical data that show that Newton's Gravitational theory is less accurate than General Relativity. In other words, as I have replied to Tom earlier, it is pure down-and-dirty experimental verification that determined in the end which theory is more accurate over the other, and NOT Occam's Razor.
So now find me another one....
Zz.
Regarding the empirical evidence in support of GR, this can be explained by fraud, mass psychosis, hallucinations, optical illusions, intervention by higher powers or madness. By adding all or some of this to Newton's theory, it can again fit all of the empirical evidence. But at the cost of complexity. Thus again, Ockham's razor is needed.
You have avoided answering the examples by Anthony Garret in my previous post. And failed to produce a quote by Foster. And ignore that MML is being used already to choose between theories. And failed to produce an alternative theory of how science works.
Regarding the empirical evidence in support of GR, this can be explained by fraud, mass psychosis, hallucinations, optical illusions, intervention by higher powers or madness. By adding all or some of this to Newton's theory, it can again fit all of the empirical evidence. But at the cost of complexity. Thus again, Ockham's razor is needed.
This is EXACTLY what I meant by you not knowing when an idea is legitimate to be considered as a viable theory. You think that GR is on the same par as "fraud" and mass psychosis. I have proven in one of my articles that the general public is oblivious to the difference between "scientific evidence" and "anecdotal evidence". They think anything one can think of, or anything one "sees" is sufficient to be considered on par with what is dealt with in science. This is bogus! The fact that you think we need Occam's Razor to be able to pick out GR from "fraud", "mass psychosis", "hallluciantions", etc is incredible!! I am in shock that this is the level of logic that I am dealing with, not to mention the level of ignorance of the workings of science.
You have avoided answering the examples by Anthony Garret in my previous post. And failed to produce a quote by Foster. And ignore that MML is being used already to choose between theories. And failed to produce an alternative theory of how science works.
Exactly! Because I am doing exactly what you are doing. And I don't need to produce an "alternative" of how science works. I am not the one who is silly enough to state that there IS a philosophy, or a "theory" on how science works. YOU DID. I never claim to be in possession of any such theory. All I'm doing is disproving what you want to claim: that simply by using Occam's Razor, one can PICK which theory is correct. You have failed to do this when I brought up the high-Tc case, and you have failed to do this when you brought up GR vs. Newtonian Gravity, needing to resort to comparing GR with... er.. "fraud" and "mass psychosis"? Come on now!
Given two or more LEGITIMATE theories to explain the same phenomenon and NOT just to come up with a phenomenological model to fit some data, use Occam's razor and prove to me you can pick which one is correct. You want an example? Apply this Occam's Razor to tell me which one is correct: Newton's formulation of classical mechanics versus Lagrangian/Hamiltonian formulation of clasical mechanics. BOTH formulation can describe ALL of the classical dynamics! Both of them agree with each other. Both are LEGITIMATE theories with clear underlying mathematical description, unlike your hallucinations and mass psychosis. Yet, they both have distinctly DIFFERENT approaches, and some would say, different "philosphy" to how each view the classical universe. Now apply your beloeved Occam's razor and tell me which one is correct.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov6-04, 01:55 PM
You have no theory of how science works, using only gut instinct. Somehow, this tells you that some theories are automatically legitimate while others are not. That fraud or mass psychosis could be an explanation is automatically dismissed on no grounds. (at least concerning certain fields, which decided again by gut feeling. I guess you would be more open to this if ID researchers claimed to have proven their theory conclusively).
Also you seem somewhat fixated by high-Tc theories, probably because you know that the highly specialized area makes it impossible to discuss the details by those not experts. But note also that exactly the same arguments used on Einstein/Newton could be used here. If I wanted, I could make a lots of claims about highly specialized areas of medicine that you know nothing about, claiming that you know nothing about science. Instead, since this a general discussion about the philosophy of science, choose areas more commonly known.
I will again repeat this quote, the author is physicist:
Ockham’s Razor is also the motivation behind unification of physical theory. A good example of this came nearly 100 years ago. The German physicist Max Planck had invented an early version of the quantum theory that explained a baffling phenomenon: the speed of electrons that were thrown off when light is shone at a metal. His equations called for a new physical constant, a new constant of nature, whose value had to be found from the observations he made. But the same idea was then applied to explain the amount of radiation given off by a hot body, an electric fire, for example, and also to explain the wavelengths of light that are absorbed by hydrogen atoms. But of these further phenomena had been experimentally studied and each had required its own physical constant of nature to be set separately from the observations. The new idea related these two extra constants to Planck’s and accurately gave their values. Three supposedly separate phenomena had been shown to have the same underlying explanation. The quantum idea was rapidly accepted in consequence.
My last example is from cosmology. When Einstein worked out his general theory of relativity and gravity early in the 20th century, and improved on Newton’s venerable theory, there was room for an arbitrary constant, known as a parameter, in his equations. To keep things simple he was tempted to put it to zero, but another consideration weighed even more heavily: he believed on philosophical grounds that the universe was unchanging on the large scale. He believed it was unchanging in how the great clusters of stars, called galaxies, relate to each other. This meant that his number could not be zero, for technical reasons.
But some years later, it was found that the galaxies were in fact all rushing away from one another. In Einstein’s mind, an informal version of the Ockham analysis immediately took place and he reverted to the value zero for his number, which is called the ‘cosmological constant’ today. In this spirit, a translation of the Latin Ockham’s Razor, ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem’ would be ‘Parameters should not proliferate unnecessarily’. This particular plot has thickened though: the value of Einstein’s cosmological constant is once again in question. Is it zero, or is it very small, and should be chosen so as to best fit the data?
We don’t know yet. This is why these questions are exciting.
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/oc...ies/s118778.htm
Regarding Newton's or Lagrangian/Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics, is my understanding that the later is simpler in some aspects, which would speak in its favor if one where forced to choose. But I am not claiming that today there is an exact formulation of Ockham's razor that can decide this. My claim in only that scientists intuitively today choose when it is overwhelmingly clear which choice is simpler while still fitting the data.
I have attempted to answer all questions, while you repeatedly avoids answering mine. I repeat: You have avoided answering the examples by Anthony Garret in my previous post. And failed to produce a quote by Foster. And ignore that MML is being used already to choose between theories. And failed to produce an alternative theory of how science works.
You have no theory of how science works, using only gut instinct. Somehow, this tells you that some theories are automatically legitimate while others are not. That fraud or mass psychosis could be an explanation is automatically dismissed on no grounds. (at least concerning certain fields, which decided again by gut feeling. I guess you would be more open to this if ID researchers claimed to have proven their theory conclusively).
Let's get these VERY clear:
1. YOU were the one who claimed that there is this "universal theory" of how science works. Now, is this correct, or not?
2. *I* never make any such claim, that there is this "universal theory" oh how science works. Now, is this correct, or not?
Somehow, just because I question the validity of what you are claiming, it automatically implies that *I* have a theory that I want to push? What kind of twisted logic did you apply to get to this conclusion? So please STOP asking me for an "alternative". I didn't propose ONE (Note: there's a HINT there).
Also you seem somewhat fixated by high-Tc theories, probably because you know that the highly specialized area makes it impossible to discuss the details by those not experts. But note also that exactly the same arguments used on Einstein/Newton could be used here. If I wanted, I could make a lots of claims about highly specialized areas of medicine that you know nothing about, claiming that you know nothing about science. Instead, since this a general discussion about the philosophy of science, choose areas more commonly known.
Again, you proclaim that ALL of science follows such "rule". Now, correct me if I'm wrong. If I make a claim that the speed of light is a constant in vacuum all the time and in all cases, then anyone, from a ditch digger, to a "mechanic", to a surgeon, to anyone, can point out to me where, in their profession, this claim is violated. The speed of light is not a constant only for physicists! Now examined what YOU did. You claim that in ALL of science, the ONLY way to pick the correct theory is by just applying Occam's razor.
Now step back, and look at your claim from MY perspective. I look at what I do, and what I practice, and would you ever need to wonder why I would ask what I did? Let's get REAL here for a second. I see no such "rule" being applied, so I ASKED you to show how your "rule" is being applied, or have been applied, or WILL be applied to this case. It is current, still evolving, and still hot and important, with all the main characters still ALIVE! I would think you would jump at this opportunity to show that, yes, I can prove that my "rule" can make an accurate prediction of what's going to happen even BEFORE it happens (after all, we do that in physics all the time!). What could be MORE convincing than that?!
I NEVER denied the usefulness of Occam's razor, even when many physicists don't even know there's a name to what they practice. However, I claim that it is only useful in knowing how to do phenomenology. I claim and have shown examples where it is NOT used in selecting which theory is correct, and which isn't. This isn't a proposal of a theory. It is a contradiction via examples to what you want me to believe. The examples you have cited ALL contains the "rule" on how to look at a set of data, and extract the relevant information. NOWHERE, even in the one you cited here, was there a direct application of Occam's razor to select a correct theory. If you look VERY carefullly, there is ALWAYS an experimental observation that became the linchpin that distinguish two different theories. Somehow, this fact is completely overlooked!
Regarding Newton's or Lagrangian/Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics, is my understanding that the later is simpler in some aspects, which would speak in its favor if one where forced to choose. But I am not claiming that today there is an exact formulation of Ockham's razor that can decide this. My claim in only that scientists intuitively today choose when it is overwhelmingly clear which choice is simpler while still fitting the data.
There we go again, fitting the data. It is clear to me that you do not know the difference between phenomenology and theory. I cannot answer the rest of your questions to me if you are not able to comprehend the difference between those two.
Zz.
Quite a spirited exchange. But, passion does not embody the principles of empiricism, rationalism or skepticism [the three pillars of the scientific method]. Interestingly enough, the body of literature on the scientific method does not mention Ockhamism as essential to the scientific method. At least not by sources from people engaged in the actual practice of science. If you accept the premise that people who actually practice science have more expertise in the matter than those who philosophize about how it should be practiced, the choice is pretty clear. Attempting to apply Ockhamism to chose between competing theories is clearly not an empirical approach. Without empiricism there is no science, just opinions. This is not to say philosophy plays no role in science. Philosophers, by definition, are commited to rationalism — which means they must scrupulously avoid all forms of unproven beliefs, illogic, and especially self-contradiction. In other words, whatever is to be believed, must be believed for specific, fundamentally sound reasons. I fail to see how Ockhamism qualifies as a specific, fundamentally sound reason to believe or disbelieve anything. It is merely a lantern.
Les Sleeth
Nov6-04, 06:47 PM
. Philosophers, by definition, are commited to rationalism — which means they must scrupulously avoid all forms of unproven beliefs, illogic, and especially self-contradiction. In other words, whatever is to be believed, must be believed for specific, fundamentally sound reasons.
A philosopher is not required to subscribe to rationalism, at least if you mean one must in general prioritize it above being empirical. If you mean a philosopher by definition focuses on the rationality of ideas being proposed, then I suppose you are right. I myself believe a person is in general on the firmest ground when prioritizing experience first, reason second. You know, observe to find out what is true over using logic to say what is true.
A philosopher is not required to subscribe to rationalism, at least if you mean one must in general prioritize it above being empirical. If you mean a philosopher by definition focuses on the rationality of ideas being proposed, then I suppose you are right. I myself believe a person is in general on the firmest ground when prioritizing experience first, reason second. You know, observe to find out what is true over using logic to say what is true.I agree, Les. Despite all the formalisms and disputes concerning what leads to discovery, empiricism is the foundation of anything remotely related to science or philosophy. I only intended to object to Ockham's razor as necessary or relevant to the scientific method. While both sound and logical, it is inadequate. Philosophy without science is opinion, and science without philosophy is merely fact without meaning. In that sense, I would say philosophy is the lantern of science.
Aquamarine
Nov7-04, 06:38 AM
It seems that this discussion about the foundations of science stirs quite agitated feelings.:cool: In a way this is a strange since Ockham's razor as the scientific method is all that stand in the way of the postmodernistic explanations.
Let's take another approach. Ockham's razor is simple the statement that when curve-fitting, one should find the solution that best fits the data while avoiding overftting. Understand that a cuve is a theory, it is more than the data. Now, a objection is that this general goal is very vague and is not a description of how science is practiced today. This is true. The scientific method today follows one particular solution to this problem, namely cross-validation.
Cross-validation is essentially that the data should be divided into subsets and that the value of a theory is how well it predicts the data on "virginal" subsets. That is, subsets not used in making the theory.
Now this is a very powerful and robust solution of how to apply Ockham's razor. But it is in no way the only solution. And it has some great disadvantages.
One is the requirement for "virginal" data. Let's assume that an alien civilization sends a long message to Earth. The cryptographers solve this message, using all the data available. But according the cross-validation, "virginal" data never seen by the cryptographers is required to decide if this is the correct solution. So if one demands that only cross-validation should be used in science, then even if a solution if found that gives perfect meaning to a very long message, this is pseudoscience.
One other problem with cross-validation is the assumption that the subset will contain all the information of the whole set. But it may well be that the only way to find a solution is by looking at all the data available. Saving some data for "virginal" testing may make it impossible to find a solution.
Furthermore, even if cross-validation can find a solution, it is in not certain that it is more efficient at doing this compared to alternatives like MML, MMD, AIT or AIC.
So in the end, the critiques have mistaken one good solution of how to apply Ockham's razor with the whole scientific method. There may well be many different ways to apply Ockham's razor, with different ways having different efficiency depending on the particular situation.
It seems that this discussion about the foundations of science stirs quite agitated feelings.:cool: In a way this is a strange since Ockham's razor as the scientific method is all that stand in the way of the postmodernistic explanations.
Let's take another approach. Ockham's razor is simple the statement that when curve-fitting, one should find the solution that best fits the data while avoiding overftting. Understand that a cuve is a theory, it is more than the data. Now, a objection is that this general goal is very vague and is not a description of how science is practiced today. This is true. The scientific method today follows one particular solution to this problem, namely cross-validation.
But this is where you KEEP missing the point. Curve fitting is NOT a theory! What you fit, isn't a theory! I fit the tunneling density of states of a superconductor as part of my graduate work. The "curve fit" is NOT A THEORY. It is a phenomenological model designed to extract useful information when there isn't an acceptable theory already in place! It is why I keep repeating that you do not understand the difference between phenomenolgy and theory.
You seem to somehow have a very jaundice view of what scientists face everyday. You think that we are often faced with a situation where we have to choose between "Newton's gravitational Law" and "fraud" or "mass psychosis". I WISH we have that kind of a choice - it would make my job a whole lot easier. The REALITY is that we don't! I can't remember reading about, or being faced with, that TYPE of choices! So your examples or analogies are completely divorced from any reality of what is being practiced in science! What we are often faced with is the very type of example I gave in choosing between spin fluctuation or phonons in high-Tc superconductors, or between Newtonian versus Hamiltonian. These ARE the types of choices we have to deal with, so deal with it! It is meaningless to come up with ridiculous scenario the very same way it is ridiculous to fit a 96 order polynomial and a 2nd order will do!
What it boils down to is the complete lack of understanding of the practice of physics. Therefore, you end up making unrealistic scenario that none of us typically are faced with. The fact that in all the examples you gave, the deciding factor is a series of empirical evidence where two competing theories deviate, and NOT an application of Occam's razor, somehow gets overlooked. There is a difference in claiming that Occam's razor is used, and claiming that occam's razor is the "universal rule" that one uses in picking out which theory is correct. I assert that the latter is false. I have shown two separate REAL (and not ridiculously made up) instances where you have failed to apply Occam's razor and pick the "correct" theory. I can bring up even MORE examples.
But I won't. There is no point in explaining this, when you are still stuck with the idea that "fitting a curve" is all that we do and that this curve fit IS a theory. It explains why there are quacks in the Physics section who have the outrageous gall to claim that QM is nothing more than "curve fitting". One tends to make such claims when one is ignorant of what it is.
Zz.
Aquamarine
Nov7-04, 10:01 AM
:rolleyes: I recommend that you read Foster's "Philosophy of the Quantitative Sciences: Curve Fitting and Cross Validation".
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/
It is a great introduction to the philosophy of science. Read especially part two, about curve-fitting. And it should contain enough examples from physics to satisfy all. Although I don't accept his conclussions about cross-validation, due to problems stated above.
You have not given two examples where Ockham's razor have failed. Since most scientists think that the principles of cross-validation is the scientific method, and they are using it to evaluate theories, and cross-validation is in fact a valid application of Ockham's razor, then those scientists are using Ockham's razor. Including yourself. :biggrin:
You have not given two examples where Ockham's razor have failed. Since most scientists think that the principles of cross-validation is the scientific method, and they are using it to evaluate theories, and cross-validation is in fact a valid application of Ockham's razor, then those scientists are using Ockham's razor. Including yourself. :biggrin:
Read these carefully:
1. I have NEVER stated that this principle isn't used, even unconsciously.
2. I have shown that "curve fitting" is NOT the same as "theory".
3. I have shown where YOU can't use OR principle in picking out which of the two mechanism is valid for High-Tc superconductor. This proves that there has to be MORE than just applying one simple principle.
4. Your selection of which of the two to pick - Newtonian laws versus Lagrangian/Hamiltonian - shows clearly that there are no such thing as a clear-cut scenario where you can simply apply a simplistic principle and choose which theory is correct.
5. I am not out here to prove that OR is wrong! <shock!> I have never made such claim even if you are forcing me to. What I objected to was your insistence that, given a number of competing theories on EQUAL FOOTING (and not some ridiculously made up theories for comparison), you can simply use OR to pick out which theory is correct. YOU have proven this to be false yourself by your inability to apply this principle in picking out the "correct" theory of superconductivity.
Zz.
Fliption
Nov7-04, 10:23 PM
earlier you compared a philospher to a CEO and a physicist to a production line worker, how were we meant to take this analogy then?
I see what you mean now. I didn't mean that a philospher directs and controls the way a CEO does a company. I was merely drawing an analogy about the relationship between a CEO and a line worker. A CEO has no direct involvement in the line process, yet he/she does impact the operation on some level. I was just trying to get some people out of the linear thinking that can't seem to understand how anyone not working on the line could have an impact on the line.
Fliption
Nov7-04, 10:33 PM
To be fair, I think your business analogy with philosophy presumably as the CEO may have been misleading. I think I know what you were getting at, but I can see how others would interpret the analogy in a sense stronger than what you intended.
edit: oops, I see jcsd has already pointed that out. Apparently this thread sprouted yet another page while I wasn't looking. :tongue2:
Yes, I caught it. I forgot that most people participating here don't seem to be very competent at interpreting analogies. :blushing:
Les Sleeth
Nov7-04, 11:13 PM
I agree, Les. Despite all the formalisms and disputes concerning what leads to discovery, empiricism is the foundation of anything remotely related to science or philosophy. I only intended to object to Ockham's razor as necessary or relevant to the scientific method. While both sound and logical, it is inadequate. Philosophy without science is opinion, and science without philosophy is merely fact without meaning. In that sense, I would say philosophy is the lantern of science.
Nicely put Chronos.
Les Sleeth
Nov7-04, 11:29 PM
After careful consideration, the utterly objective judges have unanimously determined that the philosophy side of this debate has won. Congratulations to the Socratic wanna-bees team! The deciding factor? Well, what tipped the scales in favor of the wisdom fellows (otherwise known as wise asses) was that the leader of the science team spent a better part of the weekend participating in a debate concerning the epistemological value of Occam's Razor. Due to his deeply passionate involvement in a philosophical debate, and quite a lively one at that, the judges had no choice but to conclude he’s finally seen the light (which the philosophy side saw along), and realizes that philosophy and science are kindred spirits, like peas in a pod, forever and ever linked in the pursuit of Truth. Let’s raise our glasses to a more collaborative future!!!!!!!! :cool:
metacristi
Nov8-04, 03:11 AM
Regarding falsification, here are many concrete examples that it is not how science works:
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
Hm...Not a good link.The mere popperian falsificationism has problems but is still the best approach we have at disposal,it only needs some 'improvments'.I think Lakatos' has already done this with enough success,though of course there is,still,no methodology without problems.
The main problems of popperianism is the situation of nonobservables and of non testable in isolation physical laws.It has more or less the same problems that 'plague' Ayer's 'weak' principle of verification though under falsificationism the problems of meaning and 'reliable verification' are dropped.Basically the same logical arguments can be used against falsificationism too.
For example,a 'classical' one,under the mere popperian account Newton's first law (the law of inertia) is metaphysical for it is not testable in isolation and therefore should not be part of science!Thus we need 'improvments' (I've proposed some) without becoming extremists and claiming that strong realism is justified by the 'no miracle' argument (unfortunately not sound,not yet at least).
Returning at the main point well,Martin Gardner put the problem as if the inductivist approach (it is however the oldest methodology since Bacon at least),in 'new clothes' this time,has proved to be superior to falsificationism.This is not true,I do not think that inductionists are in a better position now than in the time of Hume and Kant (for they induction is apriori and does not need justification).Or the so called Cambridge school (Russell,Keynes before turning to economy and so on) and Vienna Circle (logical positivists such as Neurath,Carnap,Reichenbach).Or Ayer.Indeed there is no sound argument in favor of a general inductionist method,probabilistic approaches included.
At most we can combine falsificationism with inductionism in some cases where a bayesian approach seems to support induction.This means that in some cases,when we have a wide range of corroborations (and no exceptions) the bayesian approach does enable scientists to believe that a certain law or theory is approximatively true instead of merely preferring it to all other existing,alternative,proposals as in the usual falsificationist approach.
For example if we could prove somehow that there is possible only a single main approach,all other proposals being only variations of the main approach (coming from powerful and unifying principles).Unfortunately this happens very very seldom in practice and almost never in physics,which is 'plagued' by the underdetermination of theories.
[Anyway] accepting the bayesian approach (this is a correct stance in some cases),at least punctually,in no ways imply certitudes,the bayesian approach is subjective in nature,so scientists are still fully open even to nontrivial changes in the future (at least that some attributes assigned to scientific constructs dissappear altoghether and are replaced by other).So falsificationism is retained even in such cases.There are no certitudes in science (not to mention the problems with ontological and epistemological idealism).
For example,a 'classical' one,under the mere popperian account Newton's first law (the law of inertia) is metaphysical for it is not testable in isolation and therefore should not be part of science!Thus we need 'improvments' (I've proposed some) without becoming extremists and claiming that strong realism is justified by the 'no miracle' argument (unfortunately not sound,not yet at least).
Well, FINALLY you decided to use a concrete example, and an odd one too. If you think that Newton's First Law is.... er.... "metaphysical" and "... should not be part of science", do you feel the same way for Newton's 2nd and 3rd Laws also?
Zz.
metacristi
Nov8-04, 11:48 AM
Well, FINALLY you decided to use a concrete example, and an odd one too. If you think that Newton's First Law is.... er.... "metaphysical" and "... should not be part of science", do you feel the same way for Newton's 2nd and 3rd Laws also?
Zz.
Indeed ignorance is bliss...Honestly the feeling is that I speak with the winds.Anyway those who [are] prepared to understand will understand (puting also the hand on a book on philosophy of science,it is not my goal to teach here).The rest should maturize by themselves.
RetiredMD
Nov8-04, 12:05 PM
Indeed ignorance is bliss...Honestly the feeling is that I speak with the winds.Anyway those who [are] prepared to understand will understand (puting also the hand on a book on philosophy of science,it is not my goal to teach here).The rest should maturize by themselves.
I have enjoyed your insights Metacristi. I am not sure why ZapperZ is hostile to your input. It seems like you are more in agreement with his views than opposed to them.
Have a nice day,
Morris
RetiredMD
Nov8-04, 12:07 PM
After careful consideration, the utterly objective judges have unanimously determined that the philosophy side of this debate has won. Congratulations to the Socratic wanna-bees team! The deciding factor? Well, what tipped the scales in favor of the wisdom fellows (otherwise known as wise asses) was that the leader of the science team spent a better part of the weekend participating in a debate concerning the epistemological value of Occam's Razor. Due to his deeply passionate involvement in a philosophical debate, and quite a lively one at that, the judges had no choice but to conclude he’s finally seen the light (which the philosophy side saw along), and realizes that philosophy and science are kindred spirits, like peas in a pod, forever and ever linked in the pursuit of Truth. Let’s raise our glasses to a more collaborative future!!!!!!!! :cool:
Thanks for my daily laugh. You may be overly optimistic about future collaborations between science and philosophy.
Have a nice day,
Morris
Indeed ignorance is bliss...Honestly the feeling is that I speak with the winds.Anyway those who [are] prepared to understand will understand (puting also the hand on a book on philosophy of science,it is not my goal to teach here).The rest should maturize by themselves.
Yikes!
I asked a question to try to understand WHY you stated that Newton's First Law is considered to be "metaphysical" and "should not be a part of science", especially when implicitly, it appears that you have excluded the 2nd and 3rd law! This appears puzzling and inconsistent to me. And all I got in return were attacks for asking!
I'm sorry I asked!
Zz.
metacristi
Nov8-04, 12:15 PM
I have enjoyed your insights Metacristi. I am not sure why ZapperZ is hostile to your input. It seems like you are more in agreement with his views than opposed to them.
Have a nice day,
Morris
Maybe.But from what I've read from him I really doubt that he has really understood even the basics of the popperian approach.Thus I find futile to discuss with him the clear limits of [falsificationism],it's a waste of time and effort.
Maybe.But from what I've read from him I really doubt that he has understand even the basics of the popperian approach.Thus I find futile to discuss with him the clear limits of [falsificationism],it's a waste of time and effort.
Well you have proven yourself to be completely ignorant of physics; your condescending tone is that of an arrogant fool.
I have enjoyed your insights Metacristi. I am not sure why ZapperZ is hostile to your input. It seems like you are more in agreement with his views than opposed to them.
Have a nice day,
Morris
Honestly, I failed to see where I am being "hostile" towards the whole posting. I was infact happy that metacristi finally used some concrete example to illustrate a point. And if you think I am not in agreement with the claim that something is "metaphysical" and thus "should not be a part of science", then you are wrong.
However, why would this stop me from questioning a section of what is being said, especially when I find it rather strange. I didn't realize that I should be forced to accept it whole or none at all. The explanation given on why JUST the 1st law is "metaphysical" and not the 2nd and 3rd is vague. Is this not a legitimate question to ask?
Oy vey!
Zz.
metacristi
Nov8-04, 12:38 PM
Yikes!
I asked a question to try to understand WHY you stated that Newton's First Law is considered to be "metaphysical" and "should not be a part of science", especially when implicitly, it appears that you have excluded the 2nd and 3rd law! This appears puzzling and inconsistent to me. And all I got in return were attacks for asking!
I'm sorry I asked!
Zz.
I'm tired,this is the last time when I adress you.If you had been really interested you'd have tried at least to read something more on philosophy of science and tried a constructive approach (I'm not even sure if you knows the difference between the inductionist approach and falsificationism).You act as if you knew so well but in fact without really understanding...honestly the 'fun' you try to express with your words is a clear sign of your manifest ignorance on the subject,as someone more experienced in philosophy of science could easily indicate.Why should I waste my time with you?Anyway as I've already said you lack the basics in logic and philosophy of science.Obviously when someone,totally ignorant,challenge me to explain physics because otherwise he does not believe a scientific statement the wisest approach is not to do so.The best approach is that he should read by himself.Anyway there is too much to be said.
Try eblaforum suggested resources:
http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewtopic.php?t=22
You act as if you knew so well but in fact without really understanding...honestly the 'fun' you try to express with your words is a clear sign of your manifest ignorance on the subject....
Now that's funny, because I've been saying that when you make claims about science and physics in particular. It appears that the burden of "learning about things" only falls on me, but not on you.
Obviously when someone,totally ignorant,challenge me to explain physics because otherwise he does not believe a scientific statement
Pardon me, but what "scientific" statement did you just make? You said that Newton's First Law is a metaphysics and should not be considered as science. You call this a "scientific statement"? And you accuse me of being ignorant of things I'm talking about? Hello?
No, what is ignorant is the fact that you realize you are STUCK with making a statement that you cannot support. You do not want to answer my question because you cannot claim that Newton's 2nd and 3rd Laws are also "metaphysical". If it is, then you'd better get out of the building you're in, and not cross any bridges. By doing that, you automatically show (at least to anyone with a knowledge first year intro physics lesson) of the inconsistency of claiming that the 1st law is metaphysical.
Maybe you can get away with making unchecked statements like this elsewhere, who knows. But to turn this around and attack me for questioning what you just said... now that's a diversion tactic if I've ever seen one. You want me to read a philosophy of science book? Sure... only if you spend time learning Halliday and Resnick Intro Physics text.
Zz.
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