Virginia US Earthquake -- Nuclear Plant

[QuantumPion]

The earthquake that just hit the east coast was centered on Mineral, VA, right where North Anna nuclear power plant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Anna_Nuclear_Generating_Station) is. :uhh:

[elektrownik]

The earthquake that just hit the east coast was centered on Mineral, VA, right where North Anna nuclear power plant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Anna_Nuclear_Generating_Station) is. :uhh:
From reuters:
Traffic lights were knocked out throughout Washington, and units at a nuclear power plant in Virginia went off line by the quake.

[~kujala~]

The earthquake that just hit the east coast was centered on Mineral, VA, right where North Anna nuclear power plant (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Anna_Nuclear_Generating_Station) is. :uhh:

It was 5.9:

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsus/Quakes/quakes_all.php

Edit: I am 100 % sure it was 5.9 a while ago. Just seconds ago they have updated it:
MAP 5.8 2011/08/23 17:51:04 37.936 -77.933 6.0 8 km ( 5 mi) SSW of Mineral, VA
So it's now 5.8.

Edit 2: And back to 5.9:
MAP 5.9 2011/08/23 17:51:03 37.975 -77.969 1.0 6 km ( 4 mi) SSE of Louisa, VA

The Operating Basis Earthquake for North Anna is 0.06 g (5.4 on
the Richter Scale) and the Design Basis Earthquake for North Anna is 0.12 g (5.9 on the Richter Scale).
(year 2003)

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0334/ML033440194.pdf
http://www.expertglossary.com/definition/operating-basis-earthquake-obe
http://www.expertglossary.com/water/definition/design-basis-earthquake-dbe

This means there could be some damage but not for components important for safety.
(fingers crossed) :smile:
(If they have updated their earthquake parameters since 2003 the situation could be even better.)

[QuantumPion]

North Anna has upgraded the event from an unusual event to an alert. They are currently running on diesels.

They upgraded to an alert due loss of offsite power and having to shut down 1 out of 4 diesels. Everything else appears to be working normally.

[shadowncs]

from CNN (http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/23/virginia.quake.nuclear/) about North Anna quote:
"Amanda Reidelbach, an emergency management spokeswoman for Louisa County, said the plant vented steam, but there was no release of radioactive material."

Why are they venting steam? WTH? I hope it's just a misreporting.

[QuantumPion]

from CNN (http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/23/virginia.quake.nuclear/) about North Anna quote:
"Amanda Reidelbach, an emergency management spokeswoman for Louisa County, said the plant vented steam, but there was no release of radioactive material."

Why are they venting steam? WTH? I hope it's just a misreporting.

It's secondary steam, that is a normal occurrence with trips from full power. All the steam that was going to the turbine has to go somewhere! Here's a youtube clip of what it looks like (at Surry, same design as North Anna):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ItIfVXYvKg

[ChernobylMary]

I am curious about the spent fuel pools. They are not required to have back-up power and North Anna has some 1200 tons of spent fuel.

[shadowncs]

...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ItIfVXYvKg

Thanks, makes sense. That video is awesome and without you explaining would have been scary as hell.

[QuantumPion]

I am curious about the spent fuel pools. They are not required to have back-up power and North Anna has some 1200 tons of spent fuel.

Don't know where you heard that but it is incorrect. The spent fuel pool coolers run off the same backup power as every other safety-related system.

[jim hardy]

""Why are they venting steam? ""

The steam generators are vented to atmosphere through relatively small valves in order to carry away decay heat when the turbine and condenser are unavailable as when you are starting up or shutting down the plant , or when the grid goes away.
They're called " Steam Dump to Atmosphere" valves and they're a normal means of temperature control when plant is in between cold shutdown and power operation - a state often called "hot shutdown".. it's very normal.

Another source of steam is the exhaust pipes from the Terry Turbines that supply the makeup water to the steam generators. Ours were adjacent the Steam Dump to Atmosphere silencers.


The water in the steam generators is ultra purified. It is separated from the reactor coolant water by the steam generator tubes.
You could drink that condensed steam except that ultra pure demineralized water gives you a tummy-ache because it is so mineral free it depletes your electrolytes.

Steam is normal. Do not be alarmed by that. The plant is capable of impressive displays of it, and shouild a steam generator relief valve have opened as a result of grid going down - well - that's quite noisy..
The diesels started, they're dumping steam, sounds like they're doing fine.
But a loss of grid doesn't happen every day - so i'm sure it's a bit hectic there just now. Pray everything goes smooth for them.

When you lose grid the turbine piping has to cool down without help of main condensate pumps and that's sometimes a bit noisy. If you've ever heard an old steam heating radiator creak and clank - imagne one with twenty inch pipes.

oops i see it's been handled... that youtube looks to me more like a relief valve than steam dump to atmosphere.. but i dont know that plant.

old jim

[ChernobylMary]

Don't know where you heard that but it is incorrect. The spent fuel pool coolers run off the same backup power as every other safety-related system.


http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2011/08/north-anna-nuclear-reactors-designed-to-withstand-59-61-magnitude-earthquake.html

Is this report incorrect?

[ChernobylMary]

To clarify, the link says that the spent fuel ponds are not required to have back up power, which is not the same as saying they don't have back-up power.

[Astronuc]

To clarify, the link says that the spent fuel ponds are not required to have back up power, which is not the same as saying they don't have back-up power. That's not entirely correct. That POGO article is a bit misleading.

The pools were originally designed for less fuel, but they re-racked to increase capacity. Originally, the US government was going to take the spent fuel and reprocess. Well, that didn't happen. Then the US DOE was going to build a final repository, and that hasn't happened. Now, utilities like the one operating North Anna put spent fuel in dry storage pending some government resolution.

The site is required to main coolability of the spent fuel pool. That pretty much guarantees that the pool cooling system has backup power. They aren't required to have an exclusive (independent) back up power system - but that doesn't mean that they don't have back up power.

Also, the steam turbine is part of the secondary system which does not contain radioactive water, unless the steam generator tubes leak. North Anna replaced steam generators, Unit 1 in 1993 and Unit 2 in 1995, in order to remove the original SG tubing, which was prone to IGSCC.

[rmattila]

Off-site power appears to have been restored.

http://dom.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1015

[Astronuc]

FYI

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS DUE TO SEISMIC EVENT
At 2:22 p.m. (EDT) on August 23, 2011, NRC entered the Monitoring Mode following the declaration of an ALERT at the North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, located in Virginia, at 2:03 p.m. The emergency was declared following a seismic event near the North Anna station. Both North Anna units experienced reactor trips and a loss of all offsite alternating current (AC) power (LOOP) to the emergency buses. The cause of the reactor trips and LOOP are being investigated. The on-site emergency diesel generators (EDGs) initially started and powered the station emergency buses. Subsequently, one of the EDGs was shutdown due to a diesel coolant leak. Another diesel generator was started and all emergency buses continue to be powered.

from - http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML112360103.pdf

See also - http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/en.html#en47181

[QuantumPion]

oops i see it's been handled... that youtube looks to me more like a relief valve than steam dump to atmosphere.. but i dont know that plant.

old jim

For a trip where condenser vacuum is lost, full steam flow has to be vented to atmosphere. Condenser vacuum was lost because they lost offsite power.

[mheslep]

For a trip where condenser vacuum is lost, full steam flow has to be vented to atmosphere. Condenser vacuum was lost because they lost offsite power.Sounds like that's another possible accident problem and offsite dependency that could be avoided with a nuclear plant design based on the Brayton cycle? Yes I know the traditional PWR/BWR doesn't generate high enough temperatures, but other designs could.

[QuantumPion]

Sounds like that's another possible accident problem and offsite dependency that could be avoided with a nuclear plant design based on the Brayton cycle? Yes I know the traditional PWR/BWR doesn't generate high enough temperatures, but other designs could.

It's not an accident problem, it's simply the design of the system.

A gas cooled reactor using the Brayton cycle would still have to have a way to dump decay heat on a trip, which would involve venting gas or steam to the atmosphere.

I don't understand your comment about LWR's not generating high enough temperatures for a Brayton cycle. You may be confusing with rankine cycle with superheated steam, which is true that most LWR's cannot produce superheated steam.

[rmattila]

Sounds like that's another possible accident problem and offsite dependency that could be avoided with a nuclear plant design based on the Brayton cycle? Yes I know the traditional PWR/BWR doesn't generate high enough temperatures, but other designs could.

The reason for having to use the atmosphere as a heat sink is the fact that the ordinary heat sink (=sea / cooling tower) is lost due to stoppage of the condenser cooling pumps. The same goes for any nuclear plant no matter what the cycle used: if you lose the power needed for utilizing the normal heat sink, you need to use an alternative one. In a PWR, the most straightforward alternative heat sink is to blow secondary steam out to the atmosphere and refill the steam generators with fresh water; in a BWR the primary steam is blown to the containment suppression pool and the primary circuit is refilled with fresh weater. An isolation condenser in a BWR makes it possible to use the same decay heat removal method as a PWR.

Needing power for emergency feedwater pumps to replace the lost inventory is not "another" offsite dependency: that's exactly the reason power is needed after the shutdown at all.

[mheslep]

It's not an accident problem, it's simply the design of the system.

A gas cooled reactor using the Brayton cycle would still have to have a way to dump decay heat on a trip, which would involve venting gas or steam to the atmosphere.The issue here, as I think I understand it, is that with the Rankine a condenser is required and that when the condenser stops the system has no way of continuing to transfer heat to the turbine and removing energy (decay heat) from the system. I don't see the need for a condensor in a Brayton. Thus such a system could could continue running turbine at lower power and bleeding off energy after a reactor trip through the normal path.

I don't understand your comment about LWR's not generating high enough temperatures for a Brayton cycle. You may be confusing with rankine cycle with superheated steam, which is true that most LWR's cannot produce superheated steam.Well IIRC 300K above ambient is typical for an LWR, where as a practical Brayton might run 700K above ambient. And I'm assuming, most likely, He as the gas. Under what trip circumstances He in a Brayton need to be vented?

[mheslep]

The reason for having to use the atmosphere as a heat sink is the fact that the ordinary heat sink (=sea / cooling tower) is lost due to stoppage of the condenser cooling pumps. The same goes for any nuclear plant no matter what the cycle used: if you lose the power needed for utilizing the normal heat sink, you need to use an alternative one.But not necessarily an active one, i.e. active heat removal via pumps. With a molten salt (MS) reactor the idea upon trip is to simply gravity feed the MS to a dump tank, where because of the high temperature (~1000K) it dissipates heat to ambient rapidly and passively. A MSR may have other problems, but a passive, independent shut down is not one of them.

[swl]

Thanks for all the great information.

If my understanding is correct, the ground acceleration exceeded the operational basis and this can account for the damage which caused the loss of offsite power.

The area that I know lacks clarity in my mind is the acceleration relative to design basis. It is my understanding that the design basis was only slightly exceeded, and since safety systems are typically over-engineered, there was probably no dangerous structural damage (though I have read of small cracks in the containment building that are not leaking radiation).

furthermore, it is my understanding that this was the strongest quake ever measured in the area, so such an event could not have been predicted by the NRC or the plant designers.

However, now that such a powerful quake is known to be a certainty in the area of the North Anna plant, will it be necessary to either retrofit or decommission the plant?

[gmax137]

... the ground acceleration exceeded the operational basis and this can account for the damage which caused the loss of offsite power...

I'm pretty sure that 'ground acceleration' as a single value is not meaningful (in the context of the damage it can cause) without the corresponding frequency. In other words, a high acceleration at a high frequency may be much less damaging than a lesser acceleration at a low frequency. The seismic design is developed from a ground response spectrum, not a single 'g' value. Maybe someone with seismic design expertise could chime in here.

[QuantumPion]

I'm pretty sure that 'ground acceleration' as a single value is not meaningful (in the context of the damage it can cause) without the corresponding frequency. In other words, a high acceleration at a high frequency may be much less damaging than a lesser acceleration at a low frequency. The seismic design is developed from a ground response spectrum, not a single 'g' value. Maybe someone with seismic design expertise could chime in here.

Yes, it turns out the plant was designed to withstand earthquakes with a long wavelength which are characteristic of west-coast earthquakes. However this earthquake was a short wavelength one, which is why the concern over design basis limits. Note that it is only the aux building sensors which may have exceeded the design basis earthquake, not the whole plant.

Another interesting tidbit: the dry storage casks moved several inches. Or from what I've been told, the casks remained stationary while the ground underneath them moved!

Here is a video in the Richmond Times Dispatch showing a brief tour inside the plant, if you've ever been curious what it looks like:

http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/news-video/2011/sep/02/2/a-post-earthquake-tour-of-north-anna-nuc-99830-vi-30316/

[mheslep]

I've been water skiing in lake Anna, adjacent North Anna. It is remarkable how un-intrusive a couple GW of nuclear plant is to lake recreation.

[Argentum Vulpes]

I've been water skiing in lake Anna, adjacent North Anna. It is remarkable how un-intrusive a couple GW of nuclear plant is to lake recreation.

So how do you like the lake that wouldn't of been if not for the North Anna NNP?

[swl]

So how do you like the lake that wouldn't of been if not for the North Anna NNP?

More, or less than the wildlife, valleys and forests submerged by the lake?

[zapperzero]

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/story/2011-09-07/Quakes-jolts-were-double-nuke-plants-design/50304434/1

[mheslep]

More, or less than the wildlife, valleys and forests submerged by the lake?Valleys? The lake is 13K acres, mostly shallow and 80' at its deepest. The area is in the Piedmont of Virginia. A large colony of beavers might have accomplished half as much 500 years ago. Still, the lake should be credited to the total area required by the NA plant.

[NUCENG]

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/story/2011-09-07/Quakes-jolts-were-double-nuke-plants-design/50304434/1

I will be listening in on the public meeting today. Then I will be able to evaluate the article you posted. Sounds pretty sensational to me.

[mheslep]

http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/story/2011-09-07/Quakes-jolts-were-double-nuke-plants-design/50304434/1

Every design spec concerning shock that I've seen includes duration; none are given in the article. For instance, humans can tolerate hundreds of g's for a micro or millisecond duration; but 10-15 g's over tens of seconds can cause loss of consciousness or be fatal.

[QuantumPion]

You can watch it live here: http://video.nrc.gov/

[NUCENG]

nteresting meeting.

Dominion results show that the single values of 0.06g OBE and 0.12g DBE were exceeded at points along the frequency spectrum of the earthquake. Further their CAV limit was also exceeded (I'm goiung to need to look that up).

Based on the nature and number of questions raised by NRC staff, Dominion is going to be hard pressed to get Unit 1 up and running in the immediate future. NRC still has no idea what form of submittal or documentation they will require from ominion as a prerequisite to restart.

Basically Dominion made a case for restart after they complete inspections and surveilance tests based on the following points:


The earthquake was of short duration and the total energy was low compared to what would be seen from a full OBE or DBE earthquake spectrum

The actual event spectrum was at a level where they believe that simple non-commercial structures would have a safety margin factor of 3 before damage to stuctures would be expected.

Industrial buildings and seismically qualified systems structures and components would have even greater margins. Therefor, they would expect no damage.

Their inspections and tests have not detected any functional damage in non-safety or safety systems.

They have seen no damage in non-safety equipment which would be considered at the lowest levels of standards such as building codes that cover domestic plumbing and waste systems. Dominion believes this gives credence to believe there is no hidden damage in safety systems.

Unit 2 is off line for refueling now and will undergo a complete set of physical and surveilance tests for 100% of the systems and a complete civil engineering assesment of the structures. They believe this will allow restart of Unit 1 pending the same level of testing in 2012 during the next refueling outage.


Dominion managemment and NRC management at the table were talking in terms of restarting unit 1 in a matter of weeks or a few months. The staff that asked questions sounded like they were gearing up for a review that could take much longer. The KK plant in Japan actually had visible damage from an earthquake and was off line for years. Several of the NRC technical staff came to the microphone giving out there wishlists for information that sounded like licensing a new plant. North Anna may be held ransom to resolve the GSI-199 issue and the Fukushima lessons learned.

Only one member of the public spoke - Paul Gunther for those who know the intervenors out there. He raised the issue of buried piping.


Did anyone else listen in? What was your take?

[mheslep]

...North Anna may be held ransom to resolve the GSI-199 issue and the Fukushima lessons learned...I can't see how this NRC action can resolve either beyond the specific case of Dominion's North Anna. US new plant construction is dead, and I can't imagine any major NRC action against the existing 104 US plants.

[shadowncs]

I listened for a while although I didn't get many of the jargon (what is level 4 / level 6 status?)
It really sounded to me like there is no damage that would prevent it to go online... one of the important things they proved is that the fuel is undamaged using the chemistry of primary coolant.

There were some issues that were probably not handled very confidently, like they kept on stating that because the non-security related piping was checked and found problem-free then the security related piping was assumed to be problem-free. In an ideal world it makes sense but how about the stress that was in the pipes while earthquake hit?

I also noticed that NRC stated they don't (yet) have a set of requirements for approving online status after a beyond-design-basis event and one of the NRC guys said that the proposed timeline for restarting No1 is too short for them to come up with the proof that No1 can be restarted safely which sounded right to me.

Oh and one more thing - the diesel generator was manually shut down after a coolant leak from a gasket and they felt it's better to shut it down. It is assumed that a torquing technique was misused for that gasket and the other generators didn't exhibit the issue.

Apologies for any mistakes, I was multitasking...

[NUCENG]

I can't see how this NRC action can resolve either beyond the specific case of Dominion's North Anna. US new plant construction is dead, and I can't imagine any major NRC action against the existing 104 US plants.

It happens all the time. NRC is a large group of very smart and educated scientists and engineers. If a staff reviewer has a pet project it can be very difficult to keep them from making a mountain out of a molehill (or in government bureaucracy - an atom into a galaxy). They are very effectively protected by the NRC Differing Professional Opinion process. It goes along with another abusive tactic of "Regulating by Inspection." It is not uncommon for one plant to be forced into taking drastic actions to get a license amendment approved or a restart permission as in the case of North Anna. Once one plant is forced to submit to this blackmail it tends to be easier to force others to fall in step because the "precedent" has been set.

This may sound like sour grapes, but abusive regulation can actually divert attention and resources from other priorities. NRC has not yet concluded the processing of GSI-199 and there is a lot of the cause and lessons from Fukushima that we don't know. I will say for the record that seismic qualification issues needs to be at the top of the priority list, but that may not be good news for North Anna.

[NUCENG]

I listened for a while although I didn't get many of the jargon (what is level 4 / level 6 status?)
It really sounded to me like there is no damage that would prevent it to go online... one of the important things they proved is that the fuel is undamaged using the chemistry of primary coolant.

There were some issues that were probably not handled very confidently, like they kept on stating that because the non-security related piping was checked and found problem-free then the security related piping was assumed to be problem-free. In an ideal world it makes sense but how about the stress that was in the pipes while earthquake hit?

I also noticed that NRC stated they don't (yet) have a set of requirements for approving online status after a beyond-design-basis event and one of the NRC guys said that the proposed timeline for restarting No1 is too short for them to come up with the proof that No1 can be restarted safely which sounded right to me.

Oh and one more thing - the diesel generator was manually shut down after a coolant leak from a gasket and they felt it's better to shut it down. It is assumed that a torquing technique was misused for that gasket and the other generators didn't exhibit the issue.

Apologies for any mistakes, I was multitasking...

Nope, those are good points. I didn't hear "level4/level6", probably because it made sense in context, do you remember anything about what they were discussing?

[shadowncs]

Nope, those are good points. I didn't hear "level4/level6", probably because it made sense in context, do you remember anything about what they were discussing?

I've seen them on a slide, I think unit 2 would be in leve 6 (can't remember when) and unit 1 in level 4 meaning ready to restart.

[mheslep]

It happens all the time. NRC is a large group of very smart and educated scientists and engineers. If a staff reviewer has a pet project it can be very difficult to keep them from making a mountain out of a molehill (or in government bureaucracy - an atom into a galaxy). They are very effectively protected by the NRC Differing Professional Opinion process. It goes along with another abusive tactic of "Regulating by Inspection." It is not uncommon for one plant to be forced into taking drastic actions to get a license amendment approved or a restart permission as in the case of North Anna. Once one plant is forced to submit to this blackmail it tends to be easier to force others to fall in step because the "precedent" has been set. ...Oh? Can you name such an instance? I'm not referring to NRC policy updates are universally mandated all the time but have little cost relative the plant itself. This time we are talking about major seismic upgrades of plants and/or spent fuel storage. Universal implantation of such a policy will force some of the marginal operators to simply close. Since 3-Mile Island, when has there been a similar case?

[Astronuc]

It happens all the time. NRC is a large group of very smart and educated scientists and engineers. If a staff reviewer has a pet project it can be very difficult to keep them from making a mountain out of a molehill (or in government bureaucracy - an atom into a galaxy). Or making a career out of an issue. :uhh:

[NUCENG]

I've seen them on a slide, I think unit 2 would be in leve 6 (can't remember when) and unit 1 in level 4 meaning ready to restart.

OK, now I remember.

They initially kept Unit 1 in hot standby to keep steam driven safety systems available and the steam generators as a cooling path took Unit 2 to cold shutdown. If I recall they took Unit 2 down further because they had to shut down one of the two diesels. They also needed to enter the Unit 2 containment to retrieve the seismic scratch plates. Later when they discovered they had exceeded design basis peak ground acceleration they were required to take Unit 1 to cold shutdown as well.

[NUCENG]

Oh? Can you name such an instance? I'm not referring to NRC policy updates are universally mandated all the time but have little cost relative the plant itself. This time we are talking about major seismic upgrades of plants and/or spent fuel storage. Universal implantation of such a policy will force some of the marginal operators to simply close. Since 3-Mile Island, when has there been a similar case?

Okay, Millstone spent millions of dollars doing a complete reconstitution of instrument setpoints beyond anything eventually appklied to the rest of the licensees because they were under a confirmatory action letter. The entire control room habitability issue a few years ago cost the industry millions of dollars for an issue that was demonstrably of such low risk that it was ridiculous. NRC is holding up license amendments for BWR plants due to concerns over an issue known as "containment overpressure" that they have granted to other plants previously. And now North Anna may have stepped up to take one for the team. I could probably come up with more examples. It is inevitable when there is a difference of opinion whether the safety improvement is really necessay or justified.

Don't misunderstand me, in each of these cases the industry was asked to perform analysis, conduct tests, or modify the plant in a way that was more conservative than previous requirements. But nuclear plants are not research institutes. They are businesses and have customers who need energy at affordable prices and shareholders that deserve a fair return on investment. There is some truth in the old story that an elephant is a mouse that was designed to the Code of Federal Regulations.

These are not anywhere near the kinds of issues like Fukushima ignoring tsunami data or Davis Besse ignoring the boric acid caked on the RPV head or Maine Yankee modify a safety analysis code to get the results they wanted. Those are clear safety issues that must be remedied and also involve non-compliance with existing regulations and maybe even criminal laws. I am talking about arguments that come down to a question of "better" vs "good enough."

And remember, I repeat - seismic qualification is a legitimate high priority. North Anna is in the sights at a time when we don't yet know what needs to be done.

[jim hardy]

""Oh? Can you name such an instance? ""

Long ago in a galaxy far away,,
some agressive NRC staffer got a pet project called "Pressurized Thermal Shock".
He asserted that if a pressurizer were ever allowed to compeltely fill it would fracture from the sudden insurge of cold water.
Soo,,, Three Mile Island's operators were directed to never let their pressurizer fill.
Soo,,, that fateful morning when the pressurizer started to fill
the operator obediently shut off the pump.

The Three Mile Island accident lies squarely on the shoulders of that NRC staffer.

Is that why you asked
"Since 3-Mile Island, when has there been a similar case?"



old jim

[mheslep]

The case I'm looking for is one where the NRC has mandated that all US reactors make an in place plant change costing on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars or more, which a seismic withstand upgrade, or a fuel storage upgrade is likely to require.

[NUCENG]

The case I'm looking for is one where the NRC has mandated that all US reactors make an in place plant change costing on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars or more, which a seismic withstand upgrade, or a fuel storage upgrade is likely to require.

Post 9/11 security, estimates are $2 BILLION.

[zapperzero]

Post 9/11 security, estimates are $2 BILLION.

Peanuts. 4 (count'em, four) B-2 bombers. Also, why would a national security problem get solved with the money of private companies, isn't that what the military is for?

[NUCENG]

Peanuts. 4 (count'em, four) B-2 bombers. Also, why would a national security problem get solved with the money of private companies, isn't that what the military is for?

Most of us have been asking that for over ten years.

A couple of thoughts come to mind.

If you have flown recently and seen TSA in action would you want that group in charge of security, We'd be very well protected if terrorists used grandmothers, nuns, and children for the attack.

There is some evidence that the anti-nuclear lobby believes if they can make nuclear energy more expensive they can get rid of it. Unfortunately it simply increases power costs to customers.

Beyond some point iy is a waste, because the security is already going to make the chance of success unappealing for the terrorists. There are many easier softer targets out there.

[zapperzero]

Most of us have been asking that for over ten years.

A couple of thoughts come to mind.

If you have flown recently and seen TSA in action would you want that group in charge of security, We'd be very well protected if terrorists used grandmothers, nuns, and children for the attack.

There is some evidence that the anti-nuclear lobby believes if they can make nuclear energy more expensive they can get rid of it. Unfortunately it simply increases power costs to customers.

Beyond some point iy is a waste, because the security is already going to make the chance of success unappealing for the terrorists. There are many easier softer targets out there.

I do not live in the US. This has advantages and disadvantages, in that I am never subjected to the gropings of the erstwhile unemployable (most of Europe actually has professionals working airport security), but I WAS herded without comment or recourse to the new X-ray machine on Schipol. Whenever I pass through airports these days, I think of Domodedovo and nothing else. I am actually less scared of flying commercial than pre-9/11, but more scared of the embarkation line, the security check line, the ticketing line, the taxi line. Sitting ducks.

I hope the TSA is not running the NPP security show, I really do.

Re anti-nuclear activists: those that I know of, at least, do believe exactly that. It's not a bright tactic, but it has potential to work great in the long term, unlike most other accessible ones. Some of these guys eat breathe and sleep leftist/anarchist revolutionary warfare. To them all war is economic war. The rising cost of energy actually plays into their hand. Dissent rises, revolution becomes possible. In the meantime, less people are born and more die because of the higher cost of everything.

Re: the point beyond which security is a waste. Unknown, unknowable. We can make fancy guesses wrt economic efficiency of an attack, speculate on likely threats, but it's all smoke and mirrors. Nuts come in a million flavors.

[mheslep]

Post 9/11 security, estimates are $2 BILLION.$19M/plant. That's far less the seismic hardening might cost.

[NUCENG]

$19M/plant. That's far less the seismic hardening might cost.

And your point is?

Has this sort of expenditure been applied to other industries? Has parking been moved back from sports stadii by 100 yards? Are bridges and tunnels being fortifird? Does the security force at chemical plants outnumber their operating staff?

The point is that nuclear plants are frequently subjected to costly modifications and that is what you asked for examples. The industry has done what was required and still produces competitive power. My point is simply that NRC has never been afraid to regulate, unlike, Japan, apparently.

[mheslep]

And your point is?

Has this sort of expenditure been applied to other industries? Has parking been moved back from sports stadii by 100 yards? Are bridges and tunnels being fortifird? Does the security force at chemical plants outnumber their operating staff?

The point is that nuclear plants are frequently subjected to costly modifications and that is what you asked for examples. ...No, I made my point clear above in 44; cost imposed on NPs and not other industries was not it; small costs were not it.
http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3493268&postcount=44

[QuantumPion]

The case I'm looking for is one where the NRC has mandated that all US reactors make an in place plant change costing on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars or more, which a seismic withstand upgrade, or a fuel storage upgrade is likely to require.

Look up GSI-191. NRC study claimed that insulation in the containment would clog sump strainers in event of a LBLOCA. Subsequently most plants had to redesign their containment and construct new sump strainers. It was a multi-year project costing tens of millions per reactor.

[NUCENG]

No, I made my point clear above in 44; cost imposed on NPs and not other industries was not it; small costs were not it.
http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3493268&postcount=44

No, you established a threshold value of "hundreds of millions" I have given you several examples of large expenditures mandated by NRC, some justified, others overblown, and at least one totally unjustified. Every one who has worked in the nuclear industry can probably add to tahat list. If you add these post-construction and post licensing up your threshold has probably been exceeded for individual plants.

So what was your point? You claim that "hundreds of millions" iwill be needed to comply with seismic upgrades. That is probably about 10% or more of the value of an operating nuclear plant. I agree if that is what it takes some plants nearing end of life which haven't received lcense renewals would probably end up being shutdown. There just would be no way to amortize that cost over the remaining life withould pricing themselves out of business.

My take is that if any plant requires that level of expense to comply with justifiable seismic standards, then they already should be shutdown under existing standards. North Anna proved that the existing standards actually may need to be clarified, but actually were still less than the design margins of the plant.

NRC was already working through a Generic Issue (199) process for seismic qualification upgrades prior to the Mineral Virginia earthquake. The result will be new standards for evaluating earthquake risk and ground motion spectra for design analysis. The safety/risk assessment is here:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1002/ML100270582.html

The conclusion was that existing plants are have no significant risk but some minor increases in risk goals. I interpret that to mean that most plants will be able to demonstrate adequate margin in existing structures systems and components. This leads me to conclude that your threshold of "hundreds of millions of dollars" is unfounded. North Anna does not bring that conclusion into doubt.

Does this help your concern. Would you like to reconsider the threshold you have set?

[mheslep]

No, you established a threshold value of "hundreds of millions"Per plant, as in what North Anna may face for seismic hardening.

[NUCENG]

Per plant, as in what North Anna may face for seismic hardening.

And based on the fact that North Anna did not experience significant damage in the earthquake, what is the basis for your WAG that even they will have to expend "hundreds of millions?" Your threshold is so far beyond reality that it is difficult to believe you are trying to discuss realistic consequences from the earthquake.

[mheslep]

And based on the fact that North Anna did not experience significant damage in the earthquake, what is the basis for your WAG that even they will have to expend "hundreds of millions?" Your threshold is so far beyond reality that it is difficult to believe you are trying to discuss realistic consequences from the earthquake.??? I agree, from reports so far, that N. Anna had no significant damage. I'm reacting to your earlier post that none the less the NRC is holding N. Anna for "ransom" to "resolve" the seismic issue.

[NUCENG]

??? I agree, from reports so far, that N. Anna had no significant damage. I'm reacting to your earlier post that none the less the NRC is holding N. Anna for "ransom" to "resolve" the seismic issue.

Maybe I misunderstood your point then. I said there was a potential for NRC to hold North Anna hostage based on previous experience. I have no idea how that morphed into "hundreds of millions."

I was explaining that in the past NRC has held a licensee hostage to apply leverage to the industry. That may be a useful tactic, but it can be pretty expensive for the hostage and can rise to regulatory abuse. (Cost of replacement power can be much greater than the cost of resolving the issue depending on how long the issue is unresolved. NRC has not issued their final regulatory analysis on GI-199 so if the hold North Anna's two units in shutdown until the issue is resolved it becomes completely unfair to North Anna, and potentially, any other plant that needs a license amendment or restart permission in the meantime. I say unfair, because first. the NRC is already on record saying that GI-199 does not rise to the level where they could order plants to shutdown to resolve the issue, and second, North Anna design worked during the earthquake.

The politics of restarting North Anna may become more deterministic that the engineering and safety issue. What I heard in the public meeting sounded like a bunch of staffers setting up to do exactly that. North Anna needs to complete their inspections and surveillances and issue the root cause report. NRC needs to issue guidance on what documentation from North Anna for restart. Then NRC needs to prevent piling on issues not related to the earthquake, including final resolution of GI-199 and the Fukushima Task Force recommendations. Those side issues should not be used to delay restart.

Unfortunately, "should" and "shall" are not the same. NRC management at the public meeting weakly agreed that revision of design basis seismic design spectra for North Anna was not a prerequisite for restart. We'll see.

Again, if I misunderstood your point, hopefully we are closer to mutual understanding each other now, even if not in agreement

[Caniche]

The industry still produces competitive power.

Not in the UK it doesn't. 2010 taxpayers subsidy amounted to £3 billion for the nuclear power providers ,and that's without any provision for waste management/storage.
How does this compare with other states?

[DoggerDan]

Not in the UK it doesn't. 2010 taxpayers subsidy amounted to £3 billion for the nuclear power providers ,and that's without any provision for waste management/storage.
How does this compare with other states?

So that's £48 per capita?

[zapperzero]

Look what Google gave me :)
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=lN9LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=G4sDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3052,3343436&dq=north+anna&hl=en

[QuantumPion]

Look what Google gave me :)
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=lN9LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=G4sDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3052,3343436&dq=north+anna&hl=en

Hah that's awesome.

[NUCENG]

Hah that's awesome.

zz and QP

Before the onslaught of inane one-liner comments gets too obnoxious, isn't it reassuring that in spite of the state of the art THIRTY SIX YEARS AGO being a little weak on forecasting the earthquake, they still managed to build a plant that produced power without undo risk to the public? Perhaps we should take an unintended lesson from Arnie Gundersen and go back to using slide rules, because what they designed, seems to have worked rather well.

Thank you zz, for finding this evidence of successful design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a nuclear power plant.

[zapperzero]

zz and QP

Before the onslaught of inane one-liner comments gets too obnoxious, isn't it reassuring that in spite of the state of the art THIRTY SIX YEARS AGO being a little weak on forecasting the earthquake, they still managed to build a plant that produced power without undo risk to the public? Perhaps we should take an unintended lesson from Arnie Gundersen and go back to using slide rules, because what they designed, seems to have worked rather well.

Thank you zz, for finding this evidence of successful design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a nuclear power plant.

Hey. Sorry for not providing a summary. I know it's an obnoxious habit, I was on the run.

You may have a very good point wrt slide rules.

An engineer friend of mine once told me that Roman buildings that have survived to this day did not survive because the Romans were engineering gods. Quite to the contrary, they survived because they are grossly overbuilt - Romans pretty much sucked at materials science, knew very little about static loads and nothing about dynamics so they just built'em as thick as they could afford, left ample room for the many unknown unknowns they were dealing with.

He also told me that safety standards evolve. The more you know, the finer you can cut it.

[NUCENG]

Licensee Event Report for North Anna Earthquake:

http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/IDMWS/ViewDocByAccession.asp?AccessionNumber=ML11299A018

[NUCENG]

News item from 1977 showing typical HUFPO bias:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/06/north-anna-nuclear-earthquake_n_1078870.html

The original story is perhaps a little more balanced because they actually included the NRC response:

http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/news/2011/nov/06/tdmain01-utility-and-federal-regulators-covered-up-ar-1438362/

Please, read the following 1977 DOJ memo carefully:

http://www2.timesdispatch.com/mgmedia/file/408/110511-nuke/

Note that the issue was reviewed and resolved before the Units 1 and 2 operating licesnses were issued and operation began in 1978 and 1980, respectfully. (Units 3 and 4 were cancelled after TMI2.) Another excellent example of why coverup is stupid.

[swl]

Dominion Restarts North Anna Reactor (http://www.dailypress.com/business/dp-nws-dominion-north-anna-20111114,0,7317172.story)

So, despite the fact that the recent Virginia earthquake exceeded the geological estimates for the site, and despite the fact that the quake exceeded the design basis, and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant, it has been 'determined' that the plant is safe to resume operation. Should we conclude that the recent quake was the 'new' largest possible for the region?

[Astronuc]

Dominion Restarts North Anna Reactor (http://www.dailypress.com/business/dp-nws-dominion-north-anna-20111114,0,7317172.story)

So, despite the fact that the recent Virginia earthquake exceeded the geological estimates for the site, and despite the fact that the quake exceeded the design basis, and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant, it has been 'determined' that the plant is safe to resume operation. Should we conclude that the recent quake was the 'new' largest possible for the region? North Anna Unit 1 started up this morning.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2011/20111114ps.html#r2

The plant staff did inspections regarding the various critical systems and determined that structural integrity was maintained. I expect they will to a relatively slow power ascension, with a few hold points.

One should not expect that the earthquake is the maximum possible. USGS and the utility will have to monitor the area.

[mheslep]

..., and despite the fact that the quake damaged the plant, I am aware there was incidental damage to support buildings. I am not aware of any damage to the reactor or its containment structure, nor to any waste storage. Do you have information to the contrary?

[QuantumPion]

I am aware there was incidental damage to support buildings. I am not aware of any damage to the reactor or its containment structure, nor to any waste storage. Do you have information to the contrary?

There wasn't any damage, period. The only issue was some cracking of some dry cask horizontal storage module concrete non-structural components.

Also, I think there is some confusion as to the definition of what a design basis accident is. A design basis accident is not the the worst case scenario which the plant can withstand. A design basis accident is the MINIMUM accident the plant MUST be able to withstand without any loss of safety function. The distinction lies in the fact that there is tons of margin and conservatism in the design.

Oh, and it was the NRC that "determined" the plant could start back up again.

[Astronuc]

Unit 1 was at 8% of full power, so they are taking it nice and easy.

[tsutsuji]

Among the points raised by the Group of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant after the 2007 earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, one question was whether "the force applied exceeded the elasticity limit of the materials of equipment" ( http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/kkscientist21aug07.html ). Even if there is no apparent damage, if the elasticity limit has been exceeded, the metal might have become more brittle and would not resist a future earthquake as well as fresh new metal coming right down from the furnace. I guess similar questions could be asked, or rather, I hope, have already been asked and given a satisfying answer, concerning the Virginia earthquake.

[QuantumPion]

Among the points raised by the Group of Concerned Scientists and Engineers Calling for the Closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant after the 2007 earthquake at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, one question was whether "the force applied exceeded the elasticity limit of the materials of equipment" ( http://cnic.jp/english/topics/safety/earthquake/kkscientist21aug07.html ). Even if there is no apparent damage, if the elasticity limit has been exceeded, the metal might have become more brittle and would not resist a future earthquake as well as fresh new metal coming right down from the furnace. I guess similar questions could be asked, or rather, I hope, have already been asked and given a satisfying answer, concerning the Virginia earthquake.

That sounds like 99% enriched weapons-grade-baloneyum to me.

[tsutsuji]

A few details about the margins against elasticity limits at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa are mentioned in Atsuyuki Suzuki, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Commission "Findings of and Lessons Learned from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Quake" INRA meeting, Seoul, Korea April 28-29, 2009 http://www.nsc.go.jp/anzen/sonota/kouenroku/20090430.pdf (9 pages)

[NUCENG]

Disposition of Thomas Sapporito 2.206 Petition on North Anna.

http://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber='ML11356A164'

Fairly lengthy discussion of all the review actions and Utility responses that went into decision that it was safe to restart the North Anna reactors.