Free will (reprise) [Archive]

hypnagogue

Sep4-03, 01:41 PM

Since the original thread on fate vs. free will has been lost, I'll try to duplicate my contribution to the discussion here. Basically, I'm not sure that the concept of free will is actually meaningful in any special sense, if we define a free choice in the conventional sense, as follows: given a choice made by an individual under a certain set of circumstances, the choice could have been made differently by that individual, even under precisely the same set of circumstances. More simply put, free choices are not fixed or determined insofar as they could have been made differently.

Let's consider for the sake of argument two ideal beings, one whose actions are fixed in the deterministic sense (D) and one who possesses free will (F). Let's further presume D and F live in independent parallel universes and that up to this particular point in time, D and F have lived absolutely identical lives in absolutely identical universes-- they have had the same experiences, memories and thoughts, had identical interactions with identical people, and made the same choices. (Note that D could not have made his choices any other way, whereas F just happens to have made his 'free' choices such that, to this present moment in time, they perfectly overlap with every decision D has made.) Now let's pick up the story in the present, when D and F are about to choose whether to eat chocolate or vanilla ice cream. Let's call the moment when D and F have made their respective decisions t0. Leading up to t0, we know that D and F both favor (say) chocolate to the same degree. That is, the sum total of their thought, actions, and experiences to this point have acted on both D and F such that they both experience the same inclination to choose chocolate. As a consequence of D's nature, D will inevitably choose the chocolate. However, given that F's choice is not fixed, we cannot predict what F will choose. For instance, if we could enact this scenario arbitrarily many times, we might find that D chooses chocolate 100% of the time whereas F chooses chocolate 70% of the time and vanilla 30% of the time. (Assume that F, like D, has already made up his mind that he will indeed eat one ice cream or the other.)

We note that F's inclination to choose chocolate is expressed by his 70% likelihood of choosing chocolate over vanilla. But what accounts for the 30% of the time when F chooses vanilla? It CANNOT be that F has suddenly changed his mind on a whim, since if that were the case, D would have also changed his mind on a whim at the last instant and chosen vanilla (remember that D and F are identical up to t0). In fact, any meaningful explanation for why F sometimes chooses vanilla can be ruled out by the same logic. If by "meaningful explanation" we mean an explanation made sensible in terms of events, thoughts, feelings, etc. leading up to t0, then any meaningful explanation for why F chooses vanilla in a particular scenario must necessarily also apply to D. A free will advocate might say that at precisely t0, F has a spontaneous, non-deterministic thought that (in some scenarios) changes his mind and compels him to choose vanilla. But we have seen that this spontaneous thought cannot have any meaningful explanation; if it did, this meaningful explanation would also have applied to D. It therefore seems that there is no explanation other than that F's decision making has an inherent element of randomness to it, as if (for instance) some part of F's decision making depended on the outcome of quantum events in his brain. What good is F's free will if its agency is random and essentially meaningless?

Now let's focus on D. A free will advocate might say that although we have been speaking of D as if he has a choice, he actually has no such choice since his decisions are already determined. I say this is nonsense, the result of a common misconception in the free will discussion. Let's first firmly establish what it means to "choose."

From Merriam-Webster (http://www.m-w.com):
choose
1 a. to select freely and after consideration <choose a career>
1 b. to decide on especially by vote; elect <chose her as captain>
2 a. to have a preference for <choose one car over another>
2 b. decide <chose to go by train>

freely
in a free manner: as a : of one's own accord <left home freely> b : with freedom from external control <a freely elected government> c : without restraint or reservation <spent freely on clothes> d : without hindrance <a gate swinging freely> <currencies are freely convertible> e : not strictly following a model, convention, or rule <freely translated>

From dictionary.com (http://www.dictionary.com):
choose
1. To select from a number of possible alternatives; decide on and pick out.
2 a. To prefer above others <chooses the supermarket over the neighborhood grocery store>
2 b. To determine or decide <chose to fly rather than drive>

I see nothing in the above definitions that implies that D has no choice over whether to choose chocolate or vanilla. He is selecting from a number of possible alternatives: chocolate or vanilla. After some consideration, he decides to act on his preference, and he selects the chocolate. This choice is made freely, since it is made of D's own accord and with freedom from external control (there is no one holding a gun to D's head telling him he'd better pick the chocolate). I believe the crux of the common misconception lies with this last point, namely that D's choice is indeed made freely. Now, D's decision is in some sense determined, i.e. by the laws of physics. But the agency through which the laws of physics determine D's choice is precisely D's brain itself, in other words, that which is responsible for his rationality and sense of identity. D's choice is determined, not externally but internally, in other words, D's choice is determined by D himself. It is not as if D exists outside of the laws of physics and that these laws impose their determination on him from the outside. Rather, it would be more correct to say that the laws of physics simply describe that agency through which D himself makes his own choices.

This might make D's existential situation seem demeaning or puppet-like to some, but I see no reason for this sentiment. Even though the agency through which D makes his decisions is ultimately the same as everyone else's, D's distinct set of genetics, brain structure, and personal experience ensure that he is a unique and special guy whose agency (decision making) is essentially his and his alone, even if it is built upon the common ground of the laws of physics.

So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

Mentat

Sep4-03, 02:00 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

Yes, it is irrelevant to him (part of the reason that we can't prove or disprove predestination), however it is not irrelevant altogether. You see, you quoted the dictionary as defining "choose" as "to select from a number of possible alternatives". In the case of the pre-determined one, there were no possible alternatives. Of course, he will never know this, so - again - it is irrelevant to all parties involved, but the fact remains that he did not really "choose" anything (because there were no possible alternatives).

hypnagogue

Sep4-03, 02:42 PM

This is indeed a sticky point, but I would contend that vanilla exists as a possible alternative to chocolate before D's brain has settled into the state where it has definitively made its choice to select chocolate. That is, if we consider the condition of D's choice before it has been made, it exists in a sort of nebulous state that has not settled on one alternative or the other, even though it will inevitably settle on chocolate. If we have perfect deterministic knowledge of D's brain and can predict that he must choose chocolate, all we are doing is projecting the resolution of this nebulous state into some point in the future. In the moments when D is still actively considering his choice, there is not yet a definitive answer. In this sense, vanilla is still a 'possible' alternative.

Mentat

Sep4-03, 03:02 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is indeed a sticky point, but I would contend that vanilla exists as a possible alternative to chocolate before D's brain has settled into the state where it has definitively made its choice to select chocolate. That is, if we consider the condition of D's choice before it has been made, it exists in a sort of nebulous state that has not settled on one alternative or the other, even though it will inevitably settle on chocolate. If we have perfect deterministic knowledge of D's brain and can predict that he must choose chocolate, all we are doing is projecting the resolution of this nebulous state into some point in the future. In the moments when D is still actively considering his choice, there is not yet a definitive answer. In this sense, vanilla is still a 'possible' alternative.

To say that it is a "possible alternative", is to say that it was possible for D to choose vanilla. This is not the case.

Also, in a less semantic light, we haven't really defined what it is that predetermines D, we have merely taken for granted that he is predetermined. I think that the nature of the "predeterminer" has much to do with the nature of the "predetermination" itself.

For example, if some omnipotent God were the one that predetermined D, then D would have no choice but to choose chocolate, even though the possibility would appear to present itself to him - but, in this case, an outside force is involved, which inclines D in the way that it wants. However, if it is just an intrinsic nature of the Universe, that D is predetermined to choose chocolate, then D will choose chocolate, and there was no force necessary to incline him toward it and away from vanilla, since vanilla will never even present itself as an apparent alternative.

You're right, it is rather sticky.

wuliheron

Sep4-03, 04:09 PM

Excellent thought experiment Hypna, but a bit too much. I think you might wish to simplify it more for the sake of clarity. Tackle one issue at a time.

For example, your original assertion concerns two simple parallel universes, but then you wander off into a discussion of Quantum Indeterminacy. It's best in my opinion to seperate the discussion on the logic train from that of speculation on the reality of our existence.

As far as the logic train goes, the issue arises that neither D nor F can tell whether or not they have free will. Although your scenario does not mention it, for all we know both are ardent fatalists. The real trick in attempting such thought experiments is to think outside our own personal habitual boxes, to do a bit of lateral thinking. Implicitely what your argument assumes is that we somehow have the God-like ability to just know all these things.

As for Indeterminacy and Relativity, neither has been reconciled fully to date and we do not have that God-like ability to decide if our existence is fatalistic, deterministic, or if we possess free will. Hence, the importance of addressing the thought experiments clearly and succinctly.

Zantra

Sep4-03, 04:31 PM

Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

We may PERCIEVE our lives as free will, but in fact they are based on patterns established through our experiences, our intelligence, personality, interactions with other people and our environment, and a myriad of other variables that when combined, bring together the solution of chocolate ice cream. The variables could appear infinite, but if one could calculate them, it would all boil down to something that could have no other outcome without changing the equation. Logically it makes sense, and may one day be proven. That is when we have enough computing power to bring all the variables together to a solution.

By the way, I think we've split up the post in half..

russ_watters

Sep4-03, 05:38 PM

I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999....% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Mathematically, the two are equivalent.

So what does this mean? You have freewill.

One possible problem to my thesis: randomness. I don't beleive there is anything random about human behavior (I think psychologists would tend to agree). If for example you believe humans are 30% completely random, then you'd asymptotically approach 70% and not 100%. Originally posted by Zantra
You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. Heh. Interesting. The substance of our arguements was identical but the conclusions exactly opposite. I think we mathematically proved that freewill exists and you think we mathematically proved that freewill does not exist. So what's the difference?

The choice.

Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

wuliheron

Sep4-03, 07:50 PM

Originally posted by russ_watters
Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

Possession is ninetenths of the law only in a court of law. Among physicists, it is nothing special.

Owl

Sep4-03, 08:18 PM

It's more likly that D chooses both vanilla and chocolate considring that we all make the right and wrong choices before we act wheather we are aware of it or not. You can choose without action. I can freely choose to become a superhero but actually becoming one is unlikly.

Freewill. I am willing to do many things freely. But my actions have limits.

Zantra

Sep4-03, 09:20 PM

Originally posted by russ_watters
I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999....% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Mathematically, the two are equivalent.

So what does this mean? You have freewill.

One possible problem to my thesis: randomness. I don't beleive there is anything random about human behavior (I think psychologists would tend to agree). If for example you believe humans are 30% completely random, then you'd asymptotically approach 70% and not 100%. Heh. Interesting. The substance of our arguements was identical but the conclusions exactly opposite. I think we mathematically proved that freewill exists and you think we mathematically proved that freewill does not exist. So what's the difference?

The choice.

Freewill means having a choice. If there is chocolate and vanilla ice cream in your freezer, then you DO have a choice. The fact that your choice is predictable does NOT change the fact that the choice exists.

Mathmatically it can be proven, but in the physical world it is not an absolute. I'm not speaking purely in mathmatical terms. If we were to break down his decision into variables(and there would be billions I'm sure) then we would discover that yes he might choose a different flavor when face with decision multiple times, but ultimately it would be based on the changing of a variable, however minute. It could be something as small as him glancing over at someone eating a vanilla ice cream just prior to choice, but ultimately the variation in his selection would be based on variables, not congruity.

Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness. But ultimately the outcome of the throw CAN be calculated if you were able to ascertain things such as the position of the dice when they left the hand, the gravity, the degree of force when they left the hand, the vector, the angle at which they first contacted the surface thrown on, etc, etc. Granted those calculations would be extremely difficult and need to be done extremely fast to predict the outcome prior to the dice landing, but ultimately it could be predicted.

The same principal can be applied to the human side of the equation. Yes it would be infinitely difficult to predict a person's choice, because you would have to have all the person's experiences in order to determine outcome of a situation, but it is theoretically possible.

I've heard that the total sum of a human being's memories could be contained in 15 petabytes. Perhaps when we reach that level (not too far off) we can begin to calculate such things. It really comes down to perception. The scales on which these predictions are based, is a scale beyond our current ability to perhaps even understand, but it can't be discounted. What it comes down to is that when you break it down far enough, there cease to be any variables. Because with each specific item of data known, there are no variables, and that leads to a finite and unchangable solution.

I would also like to point out that you're describing trying to repeat the ice cream experiment over and over again. Well if time were in an infinite loop, it would be the same repetition over and over again. That moment would repeat in exactly the same way again and again on to infinity, unless a variable was introduced. Some kind of external influence would have to interact with the time loop in order to change the sequence of events. Otherwise, he always chooses chocolate, because that is the only conclusion he can come to in that loop.

Free will is only perception. We always try and 2nd guess our choices. We always say if we could go back we'd make a different choice. But If you COULD rewind time, you would still make the exact same decision, unless you knew of the future. Because the exact same events would occur, along with your exact same thought process and interactions, and history would repeat itsself... UNLESS you introduce a variable to change it, but that isn't free will- it's a decision based on a change in perception of events.

See where I'm going with this ?

The fact that you have a choice does not infer free will because the choice is already made for you. You just can't percieve it[;)] You say that there is a .0001 percent different. I disagree, because if all variables and information that are possible are known, then the variance is 0. I can see a computer one day running a scenario. Remember the movie war games" and how the computer kept running all possible outcomes? he was calculating variables. It's the exact same thing on a much larger scale. If all variables are known, then outcome can be calculated. If you put a deck of cards face down, then flip them over 1 by 1, noting each card, until you reach the last card, then you know what that card is. You don't need to turn it over because it is the only remaining card, and it is known because all others are already known. This is the concept I'm referring to, only on a much larger scale.

Iacchus32

Sep4-03, 10:30 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness. But ultimately the outcome of the throw CAN be calculated if you were able to ascertain things such as the position of the dice when they left the hand, the gravity, the degree of force when they left the hand, the vector, the angle at which they first contacted the surface thrown on, etc, etc. Granted those calculations would be extremely difficult and need to be done extremely fast to predict the outcome prior to the dice landing, but ultimately it could be predicted. And yet with human beings, you have a "choice" in the way that you handle the dice. Of course the guys running the test may "ask" you to handle them a certain way, but who says you "have" to? And if they try to "coerce" you into doing it, then you're probably better off not participating in their tests.

Ever consider that free choice exists out of the equilibrium which exists between two opposing extremes? And, that once an equilibrium is achieved, and functionality exists (in a holistic sense), that it's pretty much up to the individual to decide?

russ_watters

Sep4-03, 11:24 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
The fact that you have a choice does not infer free will because the choice is already made for you. That is contradictory. If the choice is already made for you then the choice isn't yours. If you have a choice, then you can make a choice. Thats axiomatic. You can't have it both ways.Let's try a different example. Dice. Basic representation of probability. One might say in a sense the dice have "free will" because of randomness. Sounds good except for one thing: Dice are inanimate objects governed purely by probability. They don't make choices either real or imagined. You have consciousness. You CAN make choices. The fact that you chose chocolate doesn't mean that you couldn't have chosen vanilla if you wanted to.

You say that there is a .0001 percent different. No actually, I was saying that its 100% freewill. That .0000....1% variance is randomness going to zero.

Zantra, how many times have you seen The Matrix and The Matrix Reloaded? They are the best discussions of fate and freewill since Sophoclese:

"as you adequately put it, the problem is choice."

Gawd, I can't wait for The Matrix III.

hypnagogue

Sep4-03, 11:30 PM

Originally posted by wuliheron
Excellent thought experiment Hypna, but a bit too much. I think you might wish to simplify it more for the sake of clarity. Tackle one issue at a time.

For example, your original assertion concerns two simple parallel universes, but then you wander off into a discussion of Quantum Indeterminacy. It's best in my opinion to seperate the discussion on the logic train from that of speculation on the reality of our existence.

I just threw the quantum indeterminancy thing in there to make it comprehendable in physical terms how F's decision making could have an element of randomness to it, although it's not a key component of my argument.

As far as the logic train goes, the issue arises that neither D nor F can tell whether or not they have free will. Although your scenario does not mention it, for all we know both are ardent fatalists. The real trick in attempting such thought experiments is to think outside our own personal habitual boxes, to do a bit of lateral thinking. Implicitely what your argument assumes is that we somehow have the God-like ability to just know all these things.

Well, you are right in saying that if we actively consider our choices to be pre-determined or free, this will ultimately have an effect on how we make our decisions, regardless of whether we actually do have free will or not. However, from a theoretical standpoint, even if F considers himself to be a fatalist, there is still a nonzero chance that he will choose vanilla; if there was not, that would imply that he could not have chosen otherwise-- so he would effectively be devoid of free will, contradicting our initial definition. Likewise, even if D considers himself to have free will, he will always choose chocolate due to his deterministic nature.

edit: Also, I'm not saying we have the ability to discern whether a given being has free will or not. I take it as axioms for my argument that F has free will and D does not, for the purpose of exploring precisely what it means to have 'free will.' My argument basically amounts to a proof by contradiction that the 'free' component of F's decision making cannot be meaningful in any physical sense, only an element of randomness.

Zantra

Sep4-03, 11:35 PM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet with human beings, you have a "choice" in the way that you handle the dice. Of course the guys running the test may "ask" you to handle them a certain way, but who says you "have" to? And if they try to "coerce" you into doing it, then you're probably better off not participating in their tests.

Ever consider that free choice exists out of the equilibrium which exists between two opposing extremes? And, that once an equilibrium is achieved, and functionality exists (in a holistic sense), that it's pretty much up to the individual to decide?

No you're misunderstanding me. You're saying that we can control the person throwing the dice. We cannot change that. He will inevitably throw the dice in the manner he was meant to. various factors such as his mood, alertness, physical makeup, agility, nerve response and other things will contribute to the outcome of the roll. All of those factors can be traced back and calculated to predict the outcome. Instead of trying to control the throwers actions, we must view all the factors which contribute to the way he throws the dice.

Iacchus32

Sep4-03, 11:44 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Well, you are right in saying that if we actively consider our choices to be pre-determined or free, this will ultimately have an effect on how we make our decisions, regardless of whether we actually do have free will or not. However, from a theoretical standpoint, even if F considers himself to be a fatalist, there is still a nonzero chance that he will choose vanilla; if there was not, that would imply that he could not have chosen otherwise-- so he would effectively be devoid of free will, contradicting our initial definition. Likewise, even if D considers himself to have free will, he will always choose chocolate due to his deterministic nature.
Another problem here is that we can't go on doing things "habitually" before we expire. Or, let's say as a result of eating so much ice cream we eventually develop diabetes, and our doctor tells us to moderate "our habits" or else? That kind of throws the whole experiment out the window as well doesn't it? The fact that the variables needed in order to keep the tests predictable have changed? And, that with change comes a "new choice?"

hypnagogue

Sep4-03, 11:50 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

This is basically what I was getting at. I assumed free will exists at the outset of my argument only to get a handle on exactly how we could distinguish a being with free will from a being without it. My conclusion is essentially the same as yours. Because D and F are identical in every way-- except for our assumption that for any decision F makes, he could have made it differenly-- we cannot trace the degrees of freedom in F's decision making to any physically meaningful variable. But this in itself does not imply that D = F. The ONLY room for variation in this thought experiment, ie the only way it can be that F chooses differently from D, is if part of F's decision making involves an element of randomness. Thus, I conclude that if free will exists, it is only by virtue of randomness. Hence, even if we do have free will, it is not really meaningful for us anyway, since we cannot control these degrees of freedom (the random processes) that exist in our decision making.

edit: For the sake of consistency and clarity, I should say that D and F are precisely identical except for whatever difference exists in F that gives him his free will. If you accept my argument, this statement is equivalent to saying D and F are identical, except for the extra random processes that account for F's 'free will.'

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 12:04 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
No you're misunderstanding me. You're saying that we can control the person throwing the dice. We cannot change that. He will inevitably throw the dice in the manner he was meant to. various factors such as his mood, alertness, physical makeup, agility, nerve response and other things will contribute to the outcome of the roll. All of those factors can be traced back and calculated to predict the outcome. Instead of trying to control the throwers actions, we must view all the factors which contribute to the way he throws the dice. Yes, and we can look back and say, "That must have been the way it had to be, because what's done is done and it therefore couldn't have happened any other way." Hmm ... And yet, if we had chosen differently, it would have happened another way. In which case choice represents "the potential" that we might do things differently.

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 12:15 AM

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 12:43 AM

What's that Dirty Harry used to say? "A man's got ta understand his limitations." [;)]

And, so long as he works within the boundaries of his limitations, then he's free to choose.

While people don't just do stupid things like throwing themselves off of buildings if they want to live. [:)]

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 12:47 AM

Originally posted by Mentat
To say that it is a "possible alternative", is to say that it was possible for D to choose vanilla. This is not the case.

From Merriam-Webster (http://www.m-w.com):
possible
1 a. being within the limits of ability, capacity, or realization
1 b. being what may be done or may occur according to nature, custom, or manners

2 a. being something that may or may not occur
2 b. being something that may or may not be true or actual <possible explanation>

I believe you are using "possible" in the sense expressed in 1a and 1b, and I am using it in the sense expressed in 2a and 2b. It is indeed beyond the limits of D's capacity to choose vanilla. However, before we know what D's decision is, we can say that vanilla is a possible choice insofar as it may or may not be the case that D chooses vanilla; we're just not sure yet.

Anyway, even though I concede that vanilla is not a possible alternative in the sense you're using the word, I don't think this tears down my whole argument by implying that D has no choice. The situation is simply that D must decide between vanilla and chocolate, and D makes his decision based on his own thought processes before ultimately selecting chocolate. If you contend that D has no choice in this situation, you are essentially saying that D has no decision to make either. But clearly he must roll the question around in his mind and finally decide on chocolate; this is nothing but the process of deciding, or choosing. Again, the fact that it could not have been otherwise is irrelevant.

Also, in a less semantic light, we haven't really defined what it is that predetermines D, we have merely taken for granted that he is predetermined. I think that the nature of the "predeterminer" has much to do with the nature of the "predetermination" itself.

For example, if some omnipotent God were the one that predetermined D, then D would have no choice but to choose chocolate, even though the possibility would appear to present itself to him - but, in this case, an outside force is involved, which inclines D in the way that it wants. However, if it is just an intrinsic nature of the Universe, that D is predetermined to choose chocolate, then D will choose chocolate, and there was no force necessary to incline him toward it and away from vanilla, since vanilla will never even present itself as an apparent alternative.

This is basically the internal/external distinction. When I said that D has a choice even though he could not have chosen otherwise, I have assumed that D is indeed self-determined, i.e. his actions are controlled by his brain/mind/self (albeit through the agency of the laws of physics). It could be that there is some demiurge determining D's actions for him, in which case he really wouldn't have a choice-- but that's besides the point. Most people automatically equate pre-determination with lack of choice, regardless of whether the determining is done internally or externally. I simply want to establish that even a deterministic being has a choice, so long as the outcome of his choice is determined internally (ie, by that being itself).

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 01:00 AM

Originally posted by russ_watters
That is contradictory. If the choice is already made for you then the choice isn't yours.

I think there is some confusion going on here with time. It's not so much that the choice is already made for you as it is that the sum total of everything that is "you" will inevitably lead you to make a certain choice. Also, note that the decision is not "made for you"-- you are the one making this choice! (So long as we presume your choice isn't determined externally by some demiurge, or somesuch.)

To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet. [:D]

wuliheron

Sep5-03, 01:16 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue

edit: Also, I'm not saying we have the ability to discern whether a given being has free will or not. I take it as axioms for my argument that F has free will and D does not, for the purpose of exploring precisely what it means to have 'free will.' My argument basically amounts to a proof by contradiction that the 'free' component of F's decision making cannot be meaningful in any physical sense, only an element of randomness.

This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 01:47 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet. [:D] And yet what is there to understand if everything has been predetermined? In which case basically all you can do is what you're told to do. But that doesn't makes sense either because you still have to "choose" to follow orders -- or, suffer the reprisals. If, on the other hand you were merely a machine, and were not "conscious," then that might be a different story. [;)]

Zantra

Sep5-03, 01:48 AM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Yes, and we can look back and say, "That must have been the way it had to be, because what's done is done and it therefore couldn't have happened any other way." Hmm ... And yet, if we had chosen differently, it would have happened another way. In which case choice represents "the potential" that we might do things differently.

But the point is that things can only happen once, and in one form. The perception of what he "might do" is overriden by the fact that he can only make one choice, and that choice he will eventually make will be determined by things which are all calculable. What is possible is unimportant. It's the end result that counts, and that end result can be calculated.

russ_watters

Sep5-03, 01:54 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think there is some confusion going on here with time. It's not so much that the choice is already made for you as it is that the sum total of everything that is "you" will inevitably lead you to make a certain choice. Also, note that the decision is not "made for you"-- you are the one making this choice! (So long as we presume your choice isn't determined externally by some demiurge, or somesuch.)

To think of it in terms of Matrix terminology, if you do not have free will then in some sense you have already made all your future choices; you just can't understand them yet. [:D] I think thats absolutely perfect. And thats freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.Anyway, if we did have the ability to predict F's choice with 99.999999...% precision, that would imply that F really could not have made his choice differently, and this contradicts our initial assumption that F has free will. Why? Just because which alternative will be chosen is predictable to a high degree of precision does NOT mean there isn't still a choice.The difference between F's and D's behavior cannot be accounted for by any deterministic physical variable (such as, "F has a preference for never eating vanilla twice in a row"), since by definition D's decision already demonstrates the sum total influence of all such deterministic variables. Thus, the only possible way F can make a different decision is if some part of his decision making is not deterministic, i.e. random. Any psychologist will tell you that human behavior is NOT random. Besides, randomness doesn't imply control over the choice any more than predictability. In fact, I think randomness implies a LACK of control over the choice.Most people automatically equate pre-determination with lack of choice, regardless of whether the determining is done internally or externally. I simply want to establish that even a deterministic being has a choice, so long as the outcome of his choice is determined internally (ie, by that being itself). This is a good way to look at it. Pre-determined or not, external = fate, internal = freewill.

By the way, we may be missing something here. Sophoclese argued (as devil's advocate I think) that fate means more than just the individual choices being pre-determined. Its events themselves. It means that even if you could make the choices on your own (if you knew of your fate and tried to escape it) fate would override your choices and the events of your life would happen the way they are fated to.

By corollary, freewill isn't the just the decisions themselves, its the effect of those decisions. Causality.

So by this definition, fate would violate causality.

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 02:03 AM

Originally posted by wuliheron
This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

I don't quite see where you're coming from. Can you clarify for me? Specifically, I don't see how I am using statistical prediction to axiomatically imply anything. As far as I can tell it's more the other way around. I take two assumptions: F has free will, D does not. From these definitions it necessarily follows that if we can somehow repeat the decision made at t0 over and over (say, for instance, if we can observe infinitely many identical parallel universes each with their respective D or F), we will find variations in F's choice but not in D's choice. The stats don't prove the axioms, rather the stats are logically derived from the axioms.

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 02:04 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
But the point is that things can only happen once, and in one form. The perception of what he "might do" is overriden by the fact that he can only make one choice, and that choice he will eventually make will be determined by things which are all calculable. What is possible is unimportant. It's the end result that counts, and that end result can be calculated. But if we start thinking that way then we become apathetic, and when we become apathetic that affects the way we choose as well. So what it really boils down to is whether we choose to be apathetic -- or, complacent -- or not.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 02:14 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This is basically what I was getting at. I assumed free will exists at the outset of my argument only to get a handle on exactly how we could distinguish a being with free will from a being without it. My conclusion is essentially the same as yours. Because D and F are identical in every way-- except for our assumption that for any decision F makes, he could have made it differenly-- we cannot trace the degrees of freedom in F's decision making to any physically meaningful variable. But this in itself does not imply that D = F. The ONLY room for variation in this thought experiment, ie the only way it can be that F chooses differently from D, is if part of F's decision making involves an element of randomness. Thus, I conclude that if free will exists, it is only by virtue of randomness. Hence, even if we do have free will, it is not really meaningful for us anyway, since we cannot control these degrees of freedom (the random processes) that exist in our decision making.

edit: For the sake of consistency and clarity, I should say that D and F are precisely identical except for whatever difference exists in F that gives him his free will. If you accept my argument, this statement is equivalent to saying D and F are identical, except for the extra random processes that account for F's 'free will.'

ok ok I see the perception that you have, but here's the thing. What we're focusing on isn't the choices that they HAVE, but the one that they make. Regarless of 36 possible outcomes of a set of die, only one outcome is possible from a roll, and so we are focusing at the details of how we arrived at that outcome, not the variations of it.
Yes there are many POSSIBLE outcomes. But regardless of WHICh choice is made, only one outcome is possible, and it's HOW we arrive at that particular outcome which supports determinism. this person will make this choice freely, but it was through huge series of variables that he arrived at that particular choice. So free will, as it were, is actually an illusion when in actuality, only one choice was possible based on all the details.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 02:20 AM

Originally posted by russ_watters
[B]I think thats absolutely perfect. And thats freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.

But that signifies determinism. Yes he has a choice, and yes he's already made it, but that choice was already predetermined, so in actuality free will is imagined.

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 02:25 AM

Originally posted by russ_watters
I think thats absolutely perfect. And thats freewill. Neo doesn't like it because he thinks that means he doesn't have a choice. But the Oracle is right, he does have a choice - its just that he's already made it.

It's not free will. The classic definition I've seen of free will, and hence the one I have used here, is as follows: if A has free will, then for any choice A has made in the past, A could have made his choice differently. Thus, if you cannot have made your choices differently, you don't have free will. Equivalently, if for any future choice you make it is impossible for you to have chosen an alternative, you don't have free will. This isn't the same thing as not having a choice.

I realize that this definition of free will may not be the same as your definition, but as far as I can tell this is the definition most often used for the term. All of my claims about free will apply only to free will as I have defined it.

Why? Just because which alternative will be chosen is predictable to a high degree of precision does NOT mean there isn't still a choice.

No, it doesn't mean there isn't still a choice. But it does mean that there isn't free will. If you can predict a person's future choice with an arbitrary degree of certainty (e.g., 99.999...% as opposed to 99.99%), then, as you noted, you can essentially predict that person's choice with absolute certainty, since 99.999... = 100. (There is a proof of this posted in the math forum if anyone doubts it.) If you can predict a person's choice with absolute certainty, then that person must inevitably make that choice and cannot possibly make it differently, hence that person does not have free will.

Any psychologist will tell you that human behavior is NOT random.

This is besides the point. D and F are hypothetical beings. I think I have shown that in order for F to have free will, F's degrees of freedom in the decision making process must be random. The reasoning stops here. If you introduce the empirical fact (assuming it really is a fact) that human behavior is not in any way random, then all this tells us is that the existence of F is a logical contradiction; in other words, it is impossible for F to exist. Since (as far as we can tell) it is not impossible for D to exist, and since D and F are identical except that F possesses free will, it also follows that it is impossible for free will to exist.

Besides, randomness doesn't imply control over the choice any more than predictability. In fact, I think randomness implies a LACK of control over the choice.

Precisely. So if my argument is correct, then free will implies not some sort of absolute freedom on the part of the chooser, but rather some inevitable lack of control.

This is a good way to look at it. Pre-determined or not, external = fate, internal = freewill.

Not quite... again, choice ~= free will. I would say internal control implies choice, whereas external control implies no choice.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 02:25 AM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
But if we start thinking that way then we become apathetic, and when we become apathetic that affects the way we choose as well. So what it really boils down to is whether we choose to be apathetic -- or, complacent -- or not.

Never said the truth wouldn't hurt[;)] You're right- it can lead to apathy. But it's all on how you view it. Life is an experience, and it is a unique one. Just because we could at some future point know the path our life will take, does not mean that will will CHOOSE to know it. I for one like surprises;) So I would choose not to know. But that does not mean we should ignore the truth.

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 02:30 AM

Iacchus32

Sep5-03, 02:48 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
Never said the truth wouldn't hurt[;)] You're right- it can lead to apathy. But it's all on how you view it. Life is an experience, and it is a unique one. Just because we could at some future point know the path our life will take, does not mean that will will CHOOSE to know it. I for one like surprises;) So I would choose not to know. But that does not mean we should ignore the truth. I believe that ultimately there can only be one "obtainable future" and yet, it must be predicated upon the freedom of choice. How else would it come about then if we didn't choose? Or, at the very least, "behave" as if we did?

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 03:02 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
ok ok I see the perception that you have, but here's the thing. What we're focusing on isn't the choices that they HAVE, but the one that they make. Regarless of 36 possible outcomes of a set of die, only one outcome is possible from a roll, and so we are focusing at the details of how we arrived at that outcome, not the variations of it.

Yes there are many POSSIBLE outcomes. But regardless of WHICh choice is made, only one outcome is possible, and it's HOW we arrive at that particular outcome which supports determinism. this person will make this choice freely, but it was through huge series of variables that he arrived at that particular choice. So free will, as it were, is actually an illusion when in actuality, only one choice was possible based on all the details.

A particular roll of die can have only one outcome, depedent on the initial conditions of the system (i.e., the state of motion of the die just after they have been tossed). This is a deterministic process, insofar as perfect knowledge of the system will allow us to predict the outcome with absolute certainty. It's just that the system is so sensitive to variations in the initial conditions that it's very hard to make a prediction with 100% confidence, so the system takes on the appearance of randomness.

This kind of apparent randomness is not applicable to what I'm talking about. Any deterministic process that occurs in the decision making of F by definition must also occur in the decision making of D. So for instance, if F commits to making his decision of whether to choose chocolate or vanilla based on the outcome of rolling a set of die, then D will also base his decision on rolling an identical set of die in an identical way, and they will have made the same decision. (Recall that D and F are identical up to the moment of the decision at t0-- this roll of the die takes place before a decision has been made, so it takes place before t0.) So we have still not accounted for what is different about F such that his decision will not always match D's.

The only way around this is to introduce a truly random non-deterministic element, such that even with perfect knowledge of this random element we will not be able to predict its outcome. Just such a truly random element is the only thing that can differentiate D from F. For instance, in the above example, F could have decided at t0 to change his mind and reneg on his commitment to base his decision on the die roll. This last minute change of heart cannot have been the result of a wholly deterministic process, otherwise D would have undergone the same process and likewise would have changed his mind, and once again we'd have F's decision always agreeing with D's. So F's last minute change of heart must have been not apparently random, but truly random. Whether such a truly random process exists is another question altogether (although as far as we can tell individual quantum events are truly random); what is relevant here is that a truly random element is the only thing that can explain why F sometimes chooses differently from D. Again, I define a truly random element/event/process as one that cannot be predicted with 100% confidence even if we have perfect knowledge of the system.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 04:12 AM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
I believe that ultimately there can only be one "obtainable future" and yet, it must be predicated upon the freedom of choice. How else would it come about then if we didn't choose? Or, at the very least, "behave" as if we did?

I would have to reiterate the matrix analogy- You've already made your choice, you just don't know it yet. It's so difficult to seperate determinism and free will because of the correlation between the two, and it all depends on your point of view. You have the ability to make choices, but those choices, or "variables" have already been determined by your life path. We accept it as free will because we make choices, but those choices are influenced by unvaried factors in your life which you cannot control.

It's like you're on a train, and you are heading for the destination. And the decisions you make affect which direction you will eventually go on those tracks, but the choices you make now, affect the future direction you can't see yet. the track never splits off, but your choices made all the way back from where you started are what is determining the course of the train. You make a decision, but it's based on decisions made earlier in life, as well as external factors that are beyond your control. The key to understanding, is that you realize that all those decisions you've made have forged the path of that track, and it doesn't split off, only gets changed by decisions of the past. And those past decisions were made based on other decisions, and back, and back, and back, until you reach the very first decision, which may have determined the entire course of one's life. Thus we must conclude that free will is static, and that all our decisions take us on the path we were meant to follow, because we make that decision inevitably based on non-varied things. The past is not variable, nor can it be altered. So through cause and effect, our decisions are static, because they are based on events that are unchangeable.

As someone wise once said- Wherever you go, well there you are[:D]

Zantra

Sep5-03, 04:22 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue

A particular roll of die can have only one outcome, depedent on the initial conditions of the system (i.e., the state of motion of the die just after they have been tossed). This is a deterministic process, insofar as perfect knowledge of the system will allow us to predict the outcome with absolute certainty. It's just that the system is so sensitive to variations in the initial conditions that it's very hard to make a prediction with 100% confidence, so the system takes on the appearance of randomness.

This kind of apparent randomness is not applicable to what I'm talking about. Any deterministic process that occurs in the decision making of F by definition must also occur in the decision making of D. So for instance, if F commits to making his decision of whether to choose chocolate or vanilla based on the outcome of rolling a set of die, then D will also base his decision on rolling an identical set of die in an identical way, and they will have made the same decision. (Recall that D and F are identical up to the moment of the decision at t0-- this roll of the die takes place before a decision has been made, so it takes place before t0.) So we have still not accounted for what is different about F such that his decision will not always match D's.

The only way around this is to introduce a truly random non-deterministic element, such that even with perfect knowledge of this random element we will not be able to predict its outcome. Just such a truly random element is the only thing that can differentiate D from F. For instance, in the above example, F could have decided at t0 to change his mind and reneg on his commitment to base his decision on the die roll. This last minute change of heart cannot have been the result of a wholly deterministic process, otherwise D would have undergone the same process and likewise would have changed his mind, and once again we'd have F's decision always agreeing with D's. So F's last minute change of heart must have been not apparently random, but truly random. Whether such a truly random process exists is another question altogether (although as far as we can tell individual quantum events are truly random); what is relevant here is that a truly random element is the only thing that can explain why F sometimes chooses differently from D. Again, I define a truly random element/event/process as one that cannot be predicted with 100% confidence even if we have perfect knowledge of the system. [/B]

Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 04:36 AM

Originally posted by wuliheron
This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

wuliheron

Sep5-03, 10:26 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't quite see where you're coming from. Can you clarify for me? Specifically, I don't see how I am using statistical prediction to axiomatically imply anything. As far as I can tell it's more the other way around. I take two assumptions: F has free will, D does not. From these definitions it necessarily follows that if we can somehow repeat the decision made at t0 over and over (say, for instance, if we can observe infinitely many identical parallel universes each with their respective D or F), we will find variations in F's choice but not in D's choice. The stats don't prove the axioms, rather the stats are logically derived from the axioms.

You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Originally posted by Zantra
Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

Without a specific context the terms free will and predestination, real and illusory, have no meaning. When applied as absolutes and generalized to include life, the universe, and everything, they become so much meaningless verbage and the debate disolves into how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Is it random order or ordered randomness? Illusory reality or realistic illusion? Round and round we go.

metacristi

Sep5-03, 03:00 PM

hypnagogue

So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.The fact that our choices are limited by some external constraints does not limit our free will (the fact that I cannot fly using only hands does not limit my freedom of choice indeed).

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not (this is still an open question in spite of the claims made by the advocates of the Copenhagen Interpretation regarding the allegedly 'inbuilt' indeterminism of quantum events).

Does there exist the libertarian free will?This implies that at least some of our choices are totally free.Unfortunately we cannot establish that,at least now...Anyway I wouldn't say that it cannot exist,what if our consciousness do randomly select some 'fundamental' properties of our reality (more or less close to Chalmer's panpsychism)?Still there remain a huge doubt:is this really free will?Indeed since we do not 'direct' the random selection of the fundamental properties this could be seen rather as being a 'random will'.The same goes even if consciousness is related with quantum level+the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM (with its postulated 'inbuilt' indeterminacy)...

In my opinion our prospect to draw a clearer conclusion is directly linked with the scientific understanding of consciousness.The actual computational-emergentist theory of consciousness claim that quantum level is not involved,consciousness is entirely related to macroscopic events.Personally I am much more cautious but of course this could be even proved right with arguments beyond all reasonable doubt (still fallible this does not involve having certitudes):for example if the computational approach of consciousness (using boolean algebra) is proved beyond all reasonable doubt as being correct.

Here by arguments beyond all reasonable doubt I mean a detailed,'working',description of the dynamics of the brain,a 'holistic' view (even if we had the proof that all mental states correlate with physical states-anyway far from being achieved now-this would,simply,be not enough).Another chance is to emulate a human mind using technology:an android whose consciousness is indistinguishable from that of a human being for example.These experimental proofs do not imply certitudes,I remember here the philosophical problem of 'zombies' (are machines that show a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being really conscious?).

Anyway even in the case that the actual emergentist conjecture (I prefer to label it so we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise yet) will be supported by the above presented 'confirmations' I would argue that we still cannot say that reductionism (at the laws acting at macroscopical level) is true.The truth is that we would simply not know.Moreover consciousness could still be emergent in a much broader sense:the 'output' could be more than the initial conditions (previous thoughts+the laws of nature).

Sure to advocate such a position we would need a way to make the difference between simple emergentism of mind from dead matter (but totally determined by the previous brain states+the laws of nature-including external stimuli) and the 'extended' emergentist position.Unfortunately it is possible that we will never be capable of that if consciousness is at least a chaotic phenomenon...Anyway the 'extended' emergentist hypothesis would be totally compatible with the observed reality,though being more complex it cannot be eliminated using Occam's Razor...

Mentat

Sep5-03, 04:17 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
[B]Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

We may PERCIEVE our lives as free will, but in fact they are based on patterns established through our experiences, our intelligence, personality, interactions with other people and our environment, and a myriad of other variables that when combined, bring together the solution of chocolate ice cream. The variables could appear infinite, but if one could calculate them, it would all boil down to something that could have no other outcome without changing the equation. Logically it makes sense, and may one day be proven. That is when we have enough computing power to bring all the variables together to a solution.

But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occuring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

Mentat

Sep5-03, 04:22 PM

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 08:11 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 08:37 PM

Originally posted by wuliheron
You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Alright, let's add the condition that all observations on F and D are made in the same manner, in the same reference frame, and whatever else may be relevant to observational error. This is a theoretical argument, so all that matters is that it is theoretically possible to make observations of F and D such that there is no bias introduced by the observations. So unless there are good reasons to think that such a feat is impossible, we can proceed safely with our reasoning. (Besides, how could it be that if F was deterministic, and we always viewed F making his decision at t0 with the same observational methodology, and the initial conditions of t0 were always identical, that we would not always see F making the same choice?)

Again: If the statistical probability of the choices of F are not generated by a random element, then they must be generated by a deterministic element. But by definition, all the deterministic elements acting on F are also acting on D in an identical way. Therefore, if F's choices can ultimately be traced to purely deterministic elements, then F's behavior must be identical to D's. But this is not the case, so we have arrived at a contradiction; we conclude that there must be a non-deterministic element influencing F's decisions.

Zantra

Sep5-03, 09:36 PM

Originally posted by Mentat
But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occuring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

Ok I'm responding to everyone's threads in one post, so as not to have 10 seperate replies- so hang in there- and here we go!..

Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then. I say variables because at this time and point thier definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate. Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice. If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice. The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

hypnagogue

Sep5-03, 11:36 PM

Originally posted by metacristi
The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated.

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism. According to Wikipedia.org (http://www.wikipedia.org/):

Compatibilism, also known as "soft determinism" and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. Properly understood, according to Hume, freedom is not an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. Alternately, Hume maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but caused in the right way, i.e., by our choices as determined by our our beliefs and desires, by our characters.

I think there are some good points made here, but they all circumvent the determinism/free will clash by defining free will differently from how I have defined it in this thread. Hume equates free will with a person's capacity to act in accordance to his/her desires, which is essentially the same idea I've been using to justify the notion that deterministic beings have a choice even if one particular outcome of that choice is inevitable. This is why I don't think determinism necessarily makes us 'puppet-like' or detracts from the integrity of human life/nature/experience in any significant way. If we define free acts/free will as Hume has, then I agree that we have free will, in this sense. But however we define free will, it looks as if there is still no getting around the notion that the meaningful choices we make are deterministically fixed. If we define free will as freedom from the bonds of causal determination, then either such a thing doesn't exist or it's just an expression of randomness.

Zantra

Sep6-03, 12:28 AM

I think compatibilism pretty much sums up what I've been trying to voice, I just didn't know the theory existed. [;)]

hypnagogue

Sep6-03, 12:31 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

Again, I think you are either overlooking or misunderstanding the theoretical notion of a 'truly' random process. Define a 'truly' random (T-random for short) process as one whose behavior cannot be predicted with 100% certainty, even given perfect knowledge of the system. (Quantum events might be an example of truly random processes that actually exist in nature.) Rather than reiterate my argument, let us assume that the 'free-ness' of F's free will must be the result of T-random process(es). Let us go even further and presume that we have "perfect knowledge" of these T-random processes in F; even with this perfect knowledge, the process will still be unpredictable to some degree. Here's a further assumption: we have perfect knowledge of all the deterministic factors that influence F's decision, and we know how to do the relevant calculations with this data.

So we have perfect knowledge of F, including all the deterministic parts and all the T-random parts-- in other words, there is absolutely no limitation of knowledge here that's just waiting to be unmasked-- we know everything that there is to possibly know about F. But even though we have every single piece of the puzzle that exists, we still have to do some sort of guesswork. We cannot predict with 100% certainty what F's decision will be, since it somehow depends on an unknowable quantity, namely the T-random process. We can do statistics to calculate the probability of what F will decide, but that isn't the same thing as absolute prediction.

We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical.

No, that's the thing. There is a possibility that F makes a different choice than D, by definition-- that is why we say F has free will in the first place.

This misunderstanding is probably my fault for being too vague in the initial post and only clarifying the point several posts later, but let me try to clarify it again.

D and F live in identical worlds and have identical attributes, experiences, memories, etc. In fact, they are identical in every single way EXCEPT for the one thing that by definition distinguishes them: the fact that F has free will and D does not. Now, in this thought experiment we are examining what is going on with D and F while they are making a decision at "present" time t0-- every other event fixed in the past is identical. It did not HAVE to be this way-- since F has free will, then he COULD HAVE wound up in a state distinct from D at time t0. We are just examining the one particular situation where it just so happens that F's free choices happen to have been identical in every way to D's determined choices, up until t0. So strictly speaking, D ~= F, even though their histories are superficially impossible to tell apart.

Zantra

Sep6-03, 05:05 AM

Ok then we must assume (for the sake of the argument) that the T-random process is knowable. I DO understand what you're trying to say. Basically that is always an element of randomness present that allows free will to occur. And I did admit earlier that free will was Mathamatically feasible. I'm not familiar with the aspects of QM pertaining to this(I guess it's time I learned) But in order for determinism to hold true, we must assume no variables, and no unknowns- even T-random process. This may not hold true, but considering we're discussing 2 exactly parallel timelines, you can induldge me[;)] So If we assuming perfect knowledge of EVERYTHING, not just from a superficial perpective, but a quantum, molecular, and thought process point of view. We are also making the assumption that we have such a complete knowledge of QM as to be able to determine the T-random process outcome. After all, there is pattern even in randomness (see chaos theory- and no I can't argue the fine points of chaos theory either- I'm not a PHD mathamatician). IF all of the things I just mentioned held true, then indeed D would truly equal F, and determinism would hold true.

Obviously there are a lot of fine points and issues that would have to be resolved in order for determinism to work, and it's not absolutely uncontestable, but compatibility theory works best for me, as contains most of what I've been spewing out.

metacristi

Sep6-03, 05:16 AM

hypnagogue

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated

An act of will (when making a decision) is linked with a specific moment of time (of course the physical act itself is consequent to the decision to act so),what I had in mind was exactly your point:at a certain moment of time D has free will exactly because there are not only immediate external influences which to lead to the decision made (as behaviourism claim).The fact that there might exist an unknown (by D) chain of purely deterministic causes that leads inevitably toward the decision made is irrelevant.

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not[B]

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism.

My idea was that though D does not know in what kind of universe does he exist he can still say that he has free will irrespective of whether his universe is deterministic or not ontologically.The freedom of choice he experiences is compatible with both.

Iacchus32

Sep6-03, 10:47 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
I would have to reiterate the matrix analogy- You've already made your choice, you just don't know it yet. It's so difficult to seperate determinism and free will because of the correlation between the two, and it all depends on your point of view. You have the ability to make choices, but those choices, or "variables" have already been determined by your life path. We accept it as free will because we make choices, but those choices are influenced by unvaried factors in your life which you cannot control. Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always [;)]) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."

Mentat

Sep6-03, 11:49 AM

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then.

It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

I say variables because at this time and point thier definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate.

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word [t)]; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

I just thought of something. I remember having started a thread about "A Universe Without Logic", or something like that... ah, here it is. (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=2740&highlight=Universe+without+logic) Anyway, you should read the first post on there (my own), since it deals directly with this concept of "causes", which you seem to believe in without a doubt.

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

Ah-ha!! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

Zantra

Sep6-03, 04:14 PM

Originally posted by Mentat
It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

So noted- we must make assumptions in order to prove determinism, but since the same applies to free-will, I'm just going down this particular evil path, and casting asumptions out. Of course it's the path I was meant to take

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

"the views expressed by this person are not necessarily the view of the forum, and the forum is not responsible for the views expressed in this post"- IOW, IMHO=)

That said, variables are logically solvable because we're assuming we know every element of the universe, including it's properties. So that means that even the variables are known. We know that someone will intersect the timeline to tell the person not to pick vanilla because it was anticipated. We saw that person's(time travellers) actions and realized he would time travel. We realized it would rain that day, causing the person to delay leaving the house because we observed the weather patterns, and accurately predicted the path of the storm.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word [t)]; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

But in fact they were not "choices" he made-I may have used that word in my haste to prove the point(ya somantics are killing me here;) But PATHS is a more accurate word. At each previous juncture the same rules would apply, and he had only one true path. Think of it in terms of a maze, and there is only one route to the end. It's as if we knew the way to the end, and did not make any dead-end turns. So he went down the chosen path, because it was the only one available to him.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

I believe that ultimately everything is solvable, given enough understanding of it. I can't PROVE that, but it's IMO a truth. I'm of course referring to physical properties of the universe.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

And my answer- No choice F did not. It was all predetermined. That was his path that led him to this point, there was no other "choice" really, it was just used as a designation-juncture would be a better word.(not going to nail me on somantics;)

Ah-ha!! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

Busted [:(] We have to discard this example- it's a bad one. It's difficult to retrain the mind to think in terms of determinism.. hehe
Instead we must say that I would not walk across the freeway because I know I would be in danger of death. Because I was not MEANT to die.(I'm simplifying here for the sake of space and to cut down on the CTS (carapal tunnel)

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

I agree that determism must eliminate all variables, but after all, we are talking about nearly, if not absolute onmipotence here, so it becomes possible. Can it ultimately be proven? No not until we can eliminate all variables- (looks at watch) I don't see that happening this week[;)]. But what determinism also does is highlight the fallibility of science, and it's limitations. We can't yet determine "clarity of mind" yet because we lack the understanding of the human mind. Of course I would point out that "clarity" is an abstract term, and that we may one day discover that the synapses are simply firing slower than normal because of multiple factors (what we ate for breakfast, exhaustion from mid-term cramming last night, etc, etc) So you see my point, that we don't have enough evidence to prove that variables can or cannot be eliminated. We must make assumptions in both perspectives (D and F) so the whole point becomes moot without better scientific understanding.

I think I've taken this discussion as far is it can be possibly taken. we could sit and argue all day over weather variables are solvable, and get nowhere. We just must accept that we need more info.[:D]

Zantra

Sep6-03, 04:25 PM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always [;)]) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."

Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature.

Iacchus32

Sep6-03, 06:52 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature. But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ... [;)]

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

hypnagogue

Sep6-03, 10:46 PM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos.

A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic?

Iacchus32

Sep7-03, 01:44 AM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic? Of course I'm obviously not speaking of either extreme, but of the equilbrium which exists in the middle. Whereby once an equilibrium is achieved, from the standpoint of "the device" (mind) being fully functional (holistically), the exertion of will becomes a matter of little or "no effort."

Or at least this is how it works with me, and to be honest, I don't have any idea of what's going to happen from one moment to the next. Neither do I really care, so long as I'm enjoying myself, and that, I equate with "free will." [;)]

Ever look at yourself doing something in the moment? There are way too many things going on -- on a subconscious level that is -- to suggest that the whole thing was predetermined, especially when all you're doing is something as basic as fulfilling a need as it arises which, has little or nothing to do with choice (like going to the bathroom).

While this is why I think science has a problem grasping the idea of free will, because it refuses to look at how the mind operates, in the "holistic sense." Neither can it handle it or, won't deal with it because it tends to wreak havoc on its whole system of analytical and "sterilized" (the key word here) procedure, amounting to "control" in other words.

Which leads me to wonder, how long is it going to take for science to get its head out from being stuck up its hind end?

CJames

Sep7-03, 09:24 AM

Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The arguement that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

metacristi

Sep7-03, 10:34 AM

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

We talk here of a macroscopical object that is an emergent property of the quantum level,compatible with determinism,we do not need to know the position of every atom or electron inside the die.

The only question is to establish whether it is a chaotic phenomenon (still deterministic but practically unpredictable on an enough long run,depending on its interval of determinacy) or fully deterministic.

The answer is that the roll of a dice is a perfectly regular deterministic system if the air does not introduce nonlinear perturbations.Still we cannot make accurate predictions in all cases.The explanation is simple:in practice we cannot control the initial conditions with sufficient precision (we would need to control them exactly in fact) but only in a certain range.Or the dynamics of a rolling die has many cases where small differences produce very different outcomes.

We have therefore a zone of uncertainty introduced by our incapacity to control exactly the initial conditions that introduce a certain degree of 'randomness' however there are particular cases (providing an enough small range of uncertainty for the initial conditions and a simple movement of the dice) when the outcome could be accurately predicted.

Royce

Sep7-03, 02:41 PM

From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. any one time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for any one time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact sceince as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

An oracle supposedly sees all time as one. The past, the present and future are all the same and simutanious. An oracle sees the future as already having happened. The Oracle had seen that Neo had already chosen in his future. Not that is was predetermined but that is had already happened. This had nothing to do will free will or determinism but seeing the future as it had already happened. Could Neo still choose differently? Yes, but then the Oracle would have seen that different choice. Like time travel it can only happen if it has already happened. One could easily go nuts trying to figure this out.

CJames

Sep7-03, 03:03 PM

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.Actually that's incorrect. Even as things get larger than h-bar, quantum indeterminancey still holds. It's true that things behave more classically, but not fully deterministic. A die made of indeterminit atoms can't be fully deterministic, no matter what. There is always a degree of uncertainty no matter how small. Chaos theory investigates the macroscopic result of that indeterminacey. If you try to balance a pen on its head, it's impossible to predict what direction it will fall. What you can do, is look for patterns in this behavior.

Incidentally, this thread is really about conciousness and if you assume that it comes from the brain, then you have to consider the fact that every synaptic gap is a quantum realm of "full" indeterminacey.

hypnagogue

Sep7-03, 03:26 PM

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. any one time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for any one time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Royce, I mean this with all due respect but it appears as if you are the one without a good understanding of probability.

If we can only say that F has a 50/50 chance of choosing one or the other, this is equivalent to saying F has no preference for one or the other-- it's also equivalent to saying that F chooses absolutely randomly. If F indeed has a preference, and acts on this preference, then this preference must have some expression in the choice that F ultimately makes. Since F can only choose one or the other-- chocolate or vanilla-- at one time, this preference will not immediately make itself known after one choice. This DOES NOT imply that the preference has not been factored into that choice-- hence, it does not imply that the choice was a 50/50 proposition.

Let's say we observe F n times, for n arbitrarily large. As you acknowledge, the more observations we perform on F, the more the proportion of times F chooses chocolate in our sample of n observations converges to the proportion of times F chooses chocolate overall, in all his infinite parallel universe incarnations. So let's get extravagant and say we perform 10 billion billion observations on 10 billion billion identical parallel universe incarnations of F at their respective t0's. From this massive sample, we get that F chooses chocolate 90% of the time. Now we perform one more observation on one more identical F-- what would you put your money on, F choosing chocolate or vanilla? From your perspective, you probably wouldn't bet at all since you think that there is a 50/50 chance F will choose chocolate. But this is absurd-- since we have seen that over 10 billion billion identical trials F chooses chocolate 90% of the time, it only stands to reason to say that for our next observation there will be a 90% chance that he will choose chocolate.

Think of the same concept, but for flipping a coin. If it is a fair coin, then over many flips we will converge on the result that there is a 50/50 split between heads and tails. If it is biased, we will converge on a different result over many flips-- say, 70/30. If we flip the coin 10 million times and see it lands on heads 70% of the time do you really think there is only a 50/50 chance it will land on heads on the next flip?

In the hypothetical situation I have posed, F has a natural preference for chocolate, so it is only natural to expect this to be reflected in his choice. Well, you might ask, why should F have any preference at all? If he is truly free, would that not imply that he is free from all external influences? If you want to define free will as such, fine-- but such a radical free will clearly cannot apply to us humans in any way, since we humans ARE affected by external influences, whether we have some degree of freedom in our ensuing choices or not. To deny this is to be blind to human nature.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact sceince as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

Free to choose, compelled to choose-- either way, there is an impact from our environment. I was taking this environmental impact into account when I posited that F chooses chocolate 70% of the time. If you say that for every free choice there is a uniform distribution of probabilities across all possible choices, this is no different than saying that the possessor of free will must always choose uniformly at random with no influence from his environment, and therefore ultimately must choose with no justification for his choice that can have external expression.

edit: Another way to think about it... based on the logic you have posed, you may as well ignore weather reports that say there is a 70% chance of rain today-- after all, there is only a 50/50 chance of this happening; either it rains or it does not rain. The (pseudo) deterministic (and more accurate) take on weather forecasting, on the other hand, is that there is a greater or lesser chance that it rains today based on prevailing weather patterns. I don't see how determinism, for you, makes indications of causally influenced human behavior absolutely arbitrary. If anything it is the opposite.

hypnagogue

Sep7-03, 03:45 PM

CJames

Sep7-03, 08:52 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
We're talking here about human choice being either deterministic or free. To say we could predict a deterministic being's behavior with 100% accuracy is perhaps not strictly correct. But we can still distinguish between the determined and the free, which is all that matters. The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Under this revised way of looking at it, D may choose chocolate 99.99999999999999999999999999997 percent of the time, or some such. So it is not strictly true that D's action was absolutely fixed. But if F is still seen to choose chocolate 70% of the time, there is clearly a meaningful distinction to be made between F and D. I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

hypnagogue

Sep7-03, 10:42 PM

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

Please indicate to me how what you have just said is not in agreement with what I said in the last post, or how exactly I'm missing your point. What you say here doesn't seem to be inconsistent with what I said.

Royce

Sep8-03, 09:04 AM

hypnagogue, granted that this is beside the point of this thread and is really nothing more than nit picking; but, My point was that as observers with one observation or sample of one event, can only know that the odds of any one possibility occuring is the reciprocal of the number of possibilities. If there are only two choices or possibilities, and F has free will to choose either, there is nothing that we can determine as observers that indicates that F will choose one over the other at the next event.

F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

Anyway, I still believe that we have at least limited free will and that the universe is indeterminate. The uncertainty principle supports this. We are not robots of physics, chemistry nor psychology. All of these things and more may influence our choices but they don't compell our choices everytime.

Mentat

Sep8-03, 12:23 PM

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

Of course not, to speak of probability as even existing is a purely "free will" assumption. Throughout the rest of your post you explain probability very well, but such a thing is but an illusion in a prestined paradigm.

For example, if fate and predestination really existed (which they don't in the "Matrix" paradigm) then Neo never had a choice. He though he did, but he was predestined to think that.

Fortunately, the "predictions" of the "oracle" were explained in "Reloaded" as (basically) resultant wisdom from having seen the (almost) exact same occurances everytime the Matrix started over again.

Mentat

Sep8-03, 12:26 PM

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

I don't think it really has as much to do with the mind as you indicate here, since we have to introduce an omnipotent being anyway (in order to sustain a "predestination" paradigm, that is).

You are right that Quantum Mechanics, as it is currently understood, doesn't allow for any kind of predestination (at least, not with 100% accuracy), but Quantum Mechanics (like free will itself) may be an illusion, put forth by the Omnipotent Being to trick us (not that such "tricking" would really be necessary, since He could make us believe whatever He wanted).

hypnagogue

Sep8-03, 12:29 PM

Originally posted by Royce
F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

No, it's saying no such thing, since each event of F choosing one or the other occurs in a parallel universe, thus the events are independent of each other. If we are correct in saying that the odds of F choosing chocolate are 70%, then in any given sample of 10 observations we may see any kind of results, ranging from all 10 being chocolate to all 10 being vanilla. But if we take a whole bunch of samples of size 10, then we will inevitably see our average result converging on a ratio of 7:3.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

We don't have to know the influences to know the odds. Saying that there is a 70% chance that F chooses chocolate is equivalent to saying that if you compare all the infinite parallel universe incarnations of F to eachother, 70% of those will choose chocolate and 30% will choose vanilla. The more samples we take, the more our sample data converges on this 'true' ratio; that is just a mathematically proven fact of statistics. With no information about F, we can't predict anything beyond 50/50 odds. But with a sufficiently large sample, we can say beyond all reasonable doubt that the chance that F chooses chocolate is actually (say) 70%, not 50%.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

That's right, assuming the coin is fair-- i.e., that there really is an even odds of getting heads or tails. But in fact, the probability of getting 99 straight heads on 99 flips of a fair coin is .5^99 = 1.58 x 10^-30, in other words 1 in one hundred billion billion billion. With odds that astronomically low, doesn't it begin to make you suspicious of your initial assumption that the coin is really not biased?

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

But it does-- if our sample is large enough, it very strongly indicates that there is really a 70% chance F will choose chocolate on the next observation, not a 50% chance. The strength of the indication is proportionate to the size of the sample, so we can make our conviction as to the true chances arbitrarily strong with arbitrarily many samples.

Zantra

Sep8-03, 01:47 PM

Originally posted by Iacchus32
But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ... [;)]

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

And I think compatiblism is that middle road.

Zantra

Sep8-03, 01:55 PM

Originally posted by CJames
Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The arguement that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

Ok then let me ask you this. Let's for arugments sake- challenge indeterminency. Most things are ordered at a higher level, and can be predicted. We can predict with chromosome makeup that if billy's mom and dad both have blue eyes, and all thier ancestors had blue eyes, then billy will have blue eyes. Indeterminecy to me seems like more of a "we don't know so we're making it random" theory. It's true you would need massive amounts of computing power to calculate the interaction of billions of atoms. It could be likened to plotting the rotational pathways of a thousand solar system's planets simultaneously. I don't call that random. I call that beyond our current ability to do. There are patterns in everything. If we could determine the pathway of one single electron, just one, then we can follow them all. It's all a mattere of having the capability to do it.

Zantra

Sep8-03, 02:08 PM

Zantra

Sep8-03, 02:18 PM

People we're basically sitting here- one trying to prove that nothing is 100 percent, the other trying to prove that everything is 100 percent. It's likened to proving infinity. I can't prove that t he universe never ends, because if it never ends, than I'll never reach the end to tell you. Based on our current knowledge, this is the same thing. You can't PROVE that probablility can't be ascertained to 100 percent anymore than I can prove it can't. At best all we can say is "AS FAR AS WE KNOW". Everything else is just assumption.

KitNyx

Sep8-03, 02:38 PM

One thing about this thread that I do not agree with: We are taking for granted that predestination is not the person in questions choice. For the sake of arguement, let's say "God" is the "being" creating these destinies. Who is to say that "He" (God), does not know what decision you will make? This makes things more difficult because now we have predestined freewill. As long as "God" knows the outcome of every interaction in a persons life then it could be said that our persons life is predetermined, yet because our person does not see the future, he/she has the illusion of freewill. This has actually already been discussed, but in this case I do not see where or why there would be ANY variation between two parallel universe, one with predestination, one with freewill.

Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories.

I mention these theories, but in my opinion all of them refute the existance of "God". The idea of strict freewill denies the existance of an omnisceint being. The idea of predestination refutes the division between Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell. The multiverse idea leads to the most interesting problems. It leads us to the belief in each person having an infinite number of souls, each needing to be individually judged. In my opinion, this again refutes the existance of Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell.

Honestly, I do not see how any of these theories can sustain the belief of a "being" that creates our destinies. Hence, the only theory that stands is absolute freewill without "God".

- KitNyx

Iacchus32

Sep8-03, 03:12 PM

Originally posted by KitNyx
Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories. With God being omniscient, then that means He knows everything, whether He set the universe up as a matter of free will or not. And, the only reason He can forsee the future is because He "knows" us that well. Thus it seems conspicuous that he set us up to experience free will. Or else why bother to create us, if only to see His own reflection? It would have been much easier to create a mirror. [;)]

CJames

Sep8-03, 03:54 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Please indicate to me how what you have just said is not in agreement with what I said in the last post, or how exactly I'm missing your point. What you say here doesn't seem to be inconsistent with what I said. LOL. You're right, it's not inconsistent with what you said. It's just that I think you missed the point, and that is that a deterministic universe is incompatable with quantum mechanics.

Peace.

Zantra

Sep8-03, 04:06 PM

Originally posted by KitNyx
One thing about this thread that I do not agree with: We are taking for granted that predestination is not the person in questions choice. For the sake of arguement, let's say "God" is the "being" creating these destinies. Who is to say that "He" (God), does not know what decision you will make? This makes things more difficult because now we have predestined freewill. As long as "God" knows the outcome of every interaction in a persons life then it could be said that our persons life is predetermined, yet because our person does not see the future, he/she has the illusion of freewill. This has actually already been discussed, but in this case I do not see where or why there would be ANY variation between two parallel universe, one with predestination, one with freewill.

Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories.

I mention these theories, but in my opinion all of them refute the existance of "God". The idea of strict freewill denies the existance of an omnisceint being. The idea of predestination refutes the division between Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell. The multiverse idea leads to the most interesting problems. It leads us to the belief in each person having an infinite number of souls, each needing to be individually judged. In my opinion, this again refutes the existance of Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell.

Honestly, I do not see how any of these theories can sustain the belief of a "being" that creates our destinies. Hence, the only theory that stands is absolute freewill without "God".

- KitNyx

If you're talking about free will with prior knowledge, then it's by defenition a paradox. It may be the illusion of free will, from the perspective of the person living it, but in actuality it's predtermism, because the outcome is known. Percieved free will, is not absolute free will. Which is where the theory of compatible determinism comes into play.

hypnagogue

Sep8-03, 05:08 PM

Originally posted by CJames
LOL. You're right, it's not inconsistent with what you said. It's just that I think you missed the point, and that is that a deterministic universe is incompatable with quantum mechanics.

Peace.

Yeah, and I addressed exactly this point in my post. So let's quit the condescending laughter and read more carefully.

CJames

Sep8-03, 07:33 PM

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok then let me ask you this. Let's for arugments sake- challenge indeterminency. Most things are ordered at a higher level, and can be predicted. We can predict with chromosome makeup that if billy's mom and dad both have blue eyes, and all thier ancestors had blue eyes, then billy will have blue eyes. Indeterminecy to me seems like more of a "we don't know so we're making it random" theory. It's true you would need massive amounts of computing power to calculate the interaction of billions of atoms. It could be likened to plotting the rotational pathways of a thousand solar system's planets simultaneously. I don't call that random. I call that beyond our current ability to do. There are patterns in everything. If we could determine the pathway of one single electron, just one, then we can follow them all. It's all a mattere of having the capability to do it. It's not totally random. As I explained in a later post, chaos theory looks for those patterns. If you were to take it beyond chaos theory's capabilities and could instead model the entire system atom by atom, you could theoretically calculate the exact probability that the child's eyes would be blue. This value will be extremely close to 100%, but it won't be 100%. To use a real-life example, mutations in genetic code are relatively common. Enough so for even viruses to evolve.

EDIT: The last part about determining the pathway of a single electron is your misconception. That is an impossibility. To know an electron's position you must observe it with, say, a photon. But by detecting its existence with this photon you are altering its velocity dramatically. In this way, only varying degrees of velocity and position can be determined with certain accuracys.

CJames

Sep8-03, 07:40 PM

Originally posted by Mentat
I don't think it really has as much to do with the mind as you indicate here, since we have to introduce an omnipotent being anyway (in order to sustain a "predestination" paradigm, that is).

You are right that Quantum Mechanics, as it is currently understood, doesn't allow for any kind of predestination (at least, not with 100% accuracy), but Quantum Mechanics (like free will itself) may be an illusion, put forth by the Omnipotent Being to trick us (not that such "tricking" would really be necessary, since He could make us believe whatever He wanted). I don't think predestination is exactly the same as determinism, however. The idea behind determinism is that each subatomic particle obeys a clockwork set of rules, meaning that every point in the future would be determined exactly by the laws of physics. But now that the laws of physics are not so clockwork, this is no longer the case.

CJames

Sep8-03, 07:53 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yeah, and I addressed exactly this point in my post. So let's quit the condescending laughter and read more carefully. The unfortunate thing about a forum is that you can't read other expressions. I put the LOL in there with the hopes of lightening the mood, but it kinda comes off condescending. In any case, you may be right that I didn't read carefully enough.

This is why I thought you missed my point:
The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.Maybe by physical theories you meant classical theories? This is crucial because quantum mechanics is a physical theory.

hypnagogue

Sep9-03, 12:35 AM

Originally posted by CJames
The unfortunate thing about a forum is that you can't read other expressions. I put the LOL in there with the hopes of lightening the mood, but it kinda comes off condescending. In any case, you may be right that I didn't read carefully enough.

This is why I thought you missed my point:

The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Maybe by physical theories you meant classical theories? This is crucial because quantum mechanics is a physical theory.

Sorry if I misinterpretted your message, CJames. We cool baby, we cool. [:D]

I also probably obscured the issue with my language. I meant 'the determined' in the above to be an analog to a rigidly deterministic character in a quantum-indeterminate world. Hence, I spoke of D as perhaps having something like 99.99997% odds of choosing chocolate instead of 100%, with the small uncertainty due to quirky quantum effects.

I recognize that theoretically speaking, it's impossible to predict anything with 100% accuracy. But the indeterminacy of quantum effects drops drastically as scale increases, and I don't see how quantum effects could have anything more than a very negligible impact on human choice. For instance, a computer processes information on a scale much smaller than the human brain, and in fact even owes its very functionality to some of the principles of quantum mechanics. But having said this, the behavior of computers is extremely regular and predictable (insert Windows joke here [6)]); if quantum effects don't make our computers act strangely indeterminate, I don't see how they could have a meaningful 'indetermining' effect on the much coarser scale of neurons in the human brain.

So we take it for granted that nothing is 100% predictable-- it follows that any choice a person has made could have been made differently, and thus the person by definition has free will. Or do they? Are we satisfied to equate free will with the infinitesimal chance that some weird quantum effect might influence one of our choices one day and nudge us in the other direction? I think this doesn't really capture the spirit of what is meant by free will.

I also threw out the notion that one with free will could be defined as one whose behavior cannot be predicted by physical theories to account for this 'spirit' of the term 'free will.' Thus, while D's behavior is not really fixed since there is an infinitesimal chance he might choose vanilla, he is still basically 'determinate' insofar as there's an almost 100% chance he chooses chocolate, and this result at least should be in complete agreement with existing physical theories. I don't know if it's really physical-theoretically tenable to say that F has a 70% chance of choosing chocolate, but this view seems to better characterize the notion that F has some meaningful room for freedom in his choice.

CJames

Sep9-03, 02:21 AM

[:)]
if quantum effects don't make our computers act strangely indeterminate, I don't see how they could have a meaningful 'indetermining' effect on the much coarser scale of neurons in the human brain.Neurons are much larger than transistors, but the two are very different systems. A transistor is designed rigidly to be either "on" or "off." A neuron is designed more to send a "random" signal, reinforced by past signals and their effect. This random element is impossible in a deterministic universe. There have actually been software symulations that treat neurons as though they were subatomic particles, and the results are highly encouraging, revealing neural nets that can learn and make decisions. Synaptic gaps require chemical effects as well as electric ones. Molecules are quite QM based.

So we take it for granted that nothing is 100% predictable-- it follows that any choice a person has made could have been made differently, and thus the person by definition has free will. Or do they? Are we satisfied to equate free will with the infinitesimal chance that some weird quantum effect might influence one of our choices one day and nudge us in the other direction? I think this doesn't really capture the spirit of what is meant by free will. Again, I did only say that QM leaves room for free will, it doesn't imply it. However, it would be more correct to say that quantum mechanics on a large scale (more correctly chaos theory) is influencing every choice we make. Why does a mind made of interactions between various wavefunctions not capture the spirit of free will?

hypnagogue

Sep9-03, 02:56 AM

Originally posted by CJames
Neurons are much larger than transistors, but the two are very different systems. A transistor is designed rigidly to be either "on" or "off." A neuron is designed more to send a "random" signal, reinforced by past signals and their effect. This random element is impossible in a deterministic universe. There have actually been software symulations that treat neurons as though they were subatomic particles, and the results are highly encouraging, revealing neural nets that can learn and make decisions. Synaptic gaps require chemical effects as well as electric ones. Molecules are quite QM based.

Neurons are more complex in their functionality than transistors, this is true. But the basic premise is the same-- neurons are either 'on' or 'off' depending on their electrostatic potential with respect to the surrounding environment. This having been said, neurons are not 'off' all the time-- they do exhibit a sort of 'random' or rest activation level even when they are not strongly stimulated, but I don't see any theoretical reason why this could not be explained in terms of continuous fluctuations in the neurons' potentials in addition to weak ambient signals bouncing around in the brain. Additionally, this effect is not as important as it might seem since the strength of a neural signal is determined by how rapidly a neuron fires. So though neurons have a 'resting' rate of activation, it is essentially the equivalent of a non-signal, or at least a very weak one, compared to the higher rates of firing which are actively reinforced by direct stimulation.

It is also true that a neuron's behavior is dependent on the transmission of molecular neurotransmitters, which themselves reside within the domain of quantum effects. However, it takes not one but a whole bunch of neurotransmitters to activate a neuron sufficiently to get it firing. I would think that this dependence on large quantities of neurotransmitters would in effect average out the influence of quirky quantum behavior of individual molecules on the firing of the neuron, thus making the quantum effects again relatively unimportant.

Again, I did only say that QM leaves room for free will, it doesn't imply it. However, it would be more correct to say that quantum mechanics on a large scale (more correctly chaos theory) is influencing every choice we make. Why does a mind made of interactions between various wavefunctions not capture the spirit of free will?

In one sense it does, if the indeterminacy/randomness that these wavefunction interactions introduce is really significant. If this uncertainty makes a certain choice 99.9999999% certain (in the parallel universe sense of probability), then for all practical purposes we can speak of this system as if it is deterministic. If it allows for significant 'breathing room' in the decision making process-- even, say, a 90/10 or 95/5 split in a binary decision-- then we can't equate such a system with determinism and must allow that it is meaningful to say, yes, the decision could have been made differently.

In another sense, wavefunction interactions don't capture the spirit of free will, which was one of the main points I've been trying to make. In addition to my definition of free will at the outset of this thread, there is the notion that the posited freedom of choice is under the discretion and control of the individual. But if we explain the room for freedom in terms of wavefunction interactions, it implies that choices can be made freely only by virtue of randomness, which by definition cannot be controlled.

Mentat

Sep9-03, 11:31 AM

Originally posted by CJames
I don't think predestination is exactly the same as determinism, however. The idea behind determinism is that each subatomic particle obeys a clockwork set of rules, meaning that every point in the future would be determined exactly by the laws of physics. But now that the laws of physics are not so clockwork, this is no longer the case.

You are right, of course, but that doesn't preclude the possibility (in principle) that all of the observations of indeterminacy have been predestined to occur as they did.

CJames

Sep9-03, 01:25 PM

I'd like to say now that you are a very intelligent person, hypnogogue.
Originally posted by hypnagogue
This having been said, neurons are not 'off' all the time-- they do exhibit a sort of 'random' or rest activation level even when they are not strongly stimulated, but I don't see any theoretical reason why this could not be explained in terms of continuous fluctuations in the neurons' potentials in addition to weak ambient signals bouncing around in the brain. Additionally, this effect is not as important as it might seem since the strength of a neural signal is determined by how rapidly a neuron fires. So though neurons have a 'resting' rate of activation, it is essentially the equivalent of a non-signal, or at least a very weak one, compared to the higher rates of firing which are actively reinforced by direct stimulation.But you must consider that the "direct stimulation" came from somewhere. A great example from chaos theory is that when a butterfly flaps its wings, a few months later this can mean the difference between rain and sunshine hundreds of miles away. (The butterly effect.) In the same way, of the random weak signals sent by various neurons in the brain, some of these signals will by chance come together and grow larger and larger until they become a main or "on" signal. In the same way that chaos theory show us it is impossible to predict the whether months in advance, it is just as impossible to predict a choice very far in advance, until the probability increases (as one signal or the other becomes stronger) to near 100%, at which point I would argue the decision has essentially been made already. Keep in mind that the decision to have icecream in the first place way likely a random response to a general lowering of dopamine levels in the brain, a choice made from many alternatives.

It is also true that a neuron's behavior is dependent on the transmission of molecular neurotransmitters, which themselves reside within the domain of quantum effects. However, it takes not one but a whole bunch of neurotransmitters to activate a neuron sufficiently to get it firing. I would think that this dependence on large quantities of neurotransmitters would in effect average out the influence of quirky quantum behavior of individual molecules on the firing of the neuron, thus making the quantum effects again relatively unimportant.Depending what you consider important. The position and velocity of a single molecule could ultimately determine whether a singnal is on or off, via the butterfly effect. Since the position and velocity of a single molecule is quantum mechanical in nature, it's very important to the overall effect.

In one sense it does, if the indeterminacy/randomness that these wavefunction interactions introduce is really significant. If this uncertainty makes a certain choice 99.9999999% certain (in the parallel universe sense of probability), then for all practical purposes we can speak of this system as if it is deterministic. If it allows for significant 'breathing room' in the decision making process-- even, say, a 90/10 or 95/5 split in a binary decision-- then we can't equate such a system with determinism and must allow that it is meaningful to say, yes, the decision could have been made differently.It depends when you take the measurement what the probability is. I can't say for sure when it becomes more certain, but by the time it gets up to 99.99999% the decision has pretty much been made.

In another sense, wavefunction interactions don't capture the spirit of free will, which was one of the main points I've been trying to make. In addition to my definition of free will at the outset of this thread, there is the notion that the posited freedom of choice is under the discretion and control of the individual. But if we explain the room for freedom in terms of wavefunction interactions, it implies that choices can be made freely only by virtue of randomness, which by definition cannot be controlled.Remember what the individual is though. The individual's mind is supposed to be the overall effect of all the behavior going on in the brain. The choice may be made by virtue of randomness, but this randomness is part of the individual, and thus the choice was made by the individual.

hypnagogue

Sep9-03, 03:40 PM

Originally posted by CJames
I'd like to say now that you are a very intelligent person, hypnogogue.

Thanks CJames, I'd have to say the same about you since you definitely make me question my ideas.

But you must consider that the "direct stimulation" came from somewhere. A great example from chaos theory is that when a butterfly flaps its wings, a few months later this can mean the difference between rain and sunshine hundreds of miles away. (The butterly effect.) In the same way, of the random weak signals sent by various neurons in the brain, some of these signals will by chance come together and grow larger and larger until they become a main or "on" signal. In the same way that chaos theory show us it is impossible to predict the whether months in advance, it is just as impossible to predict a choice very far in advance, until the probability increases (as one signal or the other becomes stronger) to near 100%, at which point I would argue the decision has essentially been made already. Keep in mind that the decision to have icecream in the first place way likely a random response to a general lowering of dopamine levels in the brain, a choice made from many alternatives.

I admit I haven't read up extensively on chaos theory, but it seems to me that the butterfly effect, although intractable to predict, still ultimately functions as a deterministic process. Likewise, weak ambient signals in the brain may snowball into something meaningful on a large scale, but it seems that this is still ultimately a deterministic process. To call something truly random (indeterminate), do we not have to make recourse to quantum indeterminacy?

I would say that the principle cause of 'direct stimulation' of neurons comes from input from the sensory organs, which sets everything else off in a cascade of mental events. While weak signals can in principle snowball to something much greater, this process itself must take place against the greater backdrop of ongoing activity in the brain. This greater activity can be seen both as a necessary condition to allow the snowballing effect to take hold, and as an inertial condition resisting chaotic fluctuations. What I'm getting at is that it's not clear to what extent and how often such chaotic fluctuations make a big difference in brain activity.

Depending what you consider important. The position and velocity of a single molecule could ultimately determine whether a singnal is on or off, via the butterfly effect. Since the position and velocity of a single molecule is quantum mechanical in nature, it's very important to the overall effect.

This is true, but if these molecules are really acting randomly, then the random tendency to promote the chaotic snowballing effect could equally be counterbalanced by the random tendency to not promote such fluctuations. So again, I agree that in principle such an effect could take place, but it's not clear in a practical context how much it influences our day to day activity.

Remember what the individual is though. The individual's mind is supposed to be the overall effect of all the behavior going on in the brain. The choice may be made by virtue of randomness, but this randomness is part of the individual, and thus the choice was made by the individual.

I absolutely agree with this sentiment-- it's why I believe that even in a deterministic framework the individual's choice is his own. If free will is to be explained by random fluctuations in the position and velocity of neurotransmitters, then we can say that the freedom of choice is part of the individual's unique makeup. However, we can't say that the individual is controlling his freedom. Rather, we'd have to say that the individual has freedom of choice only by virtue of randomness-- he may be 'jolted' into a new perspective thanks to quantum uncertainty, but he can't consciously bring this 'jolting' into effect through willpower or directed thought. His freedom comes only by his tendency to be affected by his own randomness.

CJames

Sep9-03, 05:16 PM

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Thanks CJames, I'd have to say the same about you since you definitely make me question my ideas.[:)]

I admit I haven't read up extensively on chaos theory, but it seems to me that the butterfly effect, although intractable to predict, still ultimately functions as a deterministic process. Likewise, weak ambient signals in the brain may snowball into something meaningful on a large scale, but it seems that this is still ultimately a deterministic process. To call something truly random (indeterminate), do we not have to make recourse to quantum indeterminacy?That's why I keep going back and forth between chaos theory and quantum mechanics. Chaos theory isn't actually a part of quantum mechanics, but it's the macroscopic result of quantum mechanics.

Allow me to present an example. Imagine trying to balance a perfect diamond on its tip. Further imagine that this diamond is in a vacuum, and that it is being placed on a crystaline plain by a robotic arm oriented as perfectly possible as we can make it. When this diamond is released, it will fall a different direction every time. Why? The diamond is a crystal latice, its tip is just a few atoms, if that, across. Quantum uncertainty dictates that these few atoms are really statistical waves, and the diamond leans slightly due to this. Eventually the whole diamond falls over.

The primary variable in this expiriment is the atoms at the tip of the diamond, though some other factors ultimately contribute as well. This is an easily seen example of how quantum randomness ultimately effects the macroscopic world seen as chaos theory.

In the butterfly effect, one flap of the wing generates a small air movement. But even if the air around the butterfly is perfectly still, and the wing is perfectly shaped, this puff of air will alter in shape very shortly after the flap. A puff of air can't be treated like a simple point, it has to be treated as a dynamic system of millions of interacting particles, as even fluid dynamics breaks down beyond a certain point. The domination of this air puff gets less and less visible until it has blended in with all other fluctuations in the air. But the slight deveations it made throughout the system are expressed along with other things as a huge difference in the whether much later. There's nothing deterministic about it. The same butterfly can flap it's wings in an infinite number of universes, as the only change in the entire universe, and the wheather will still be different in each universe months later.

I would say that the principle cause of 'direct stimulation' of neurons comes from input from the sensory organs, which sets everything else off in a cascade of mental events. While weak signals can in principle snowball to something much greater, this process itself must take place against the greater backdrop of ongoing activity in the brain. This greater activity can be seen both as a necessary condition to allow the snowballing effect to take hold, and as an inertial condition resisting chaotic fluctuations. What I'm getting at is that it's not clear to what extent and how often such chaotic fluctuations make a big difference in brain activity.If I'm not hungry, nobody's mentioned ice cream, and I'm pretty happy, what could drive me to suddenly decide I want some icecream? Randomness.

This is true, but if these molecules are really acting randomly, then the random tendency to promote the chaotic snowballing effect could equally be counterbalanced by the random tendency to not promote such fluctuations. So again, I agree that in principle such an effect could take place, but it's not clear in a practical context how much it influences our day to day activity.Except that it isn't as shown by chaos theory. [;)] Randomness on a small scale doesn't blend away to uniformity, it is exagerated immensely. This is why so many things tend to come in waves, why a lot of things happen simultaneously, for no apparent reason at all.

I absolutely agree with this sentiment-- it's why I believe that even in a deterministic framework the individual's choice is his own. If free will is to be explained by random fluctuations in the position and velocity of neurotransmitters, then we can say that the freedom of choice is part of the individual's unique makeup. However, we can't say that the individual is controlling his freedom. Rather, we'd have to say that the individual has freedom of choice only by virtue of randomness-- he may be 'jolted' into a new perspective thanks to quantum uncertainty, but he can't consciously bring this 'jolting' into effect through willpower or directed thought. His freedom comes only by his tendency to be affected by his own randomness.Willpower and directed thought are the emmergent properties of this jolting effect, so in that sense you're right. But you can't separate willpower from this randomness. The end result is still an individual that does what it wants when it wants, or chooses not to.

metacristi

Sep10-03, 03:55 AM

CJames

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

Actually that's incorrect. Even as things get larger than h-bar, quantum indeterminancey still holds. It's true that things behave more classically, but not fully deterministic. A die made of indeterminit atoms can't be fully deterministic, no matter what. There is always a degree of uncertainty no matter how small. Chaos theory investigates the macroscopic result of that indeterminacey. If you try to balance a pen on its head, it's impossible to predict what direction it will fall. What you can do, is look for patterns in this behavior.

Incidentally, this thread is really about conciousness and if you assume that it comes from the brain, then you have to consider the fact that every synaptic gap is a quantum realm of "full" indeterminacey.

James,we talk here of the usual definition of 'determinism' (correlated with 'randomness') in accordance with the requirements of science and the scientific method.All subsistems (for we cannot 'run' the Universe itself from the same initial conditions) which when ran from the same (indistinguishable experimentally) initial conditions present the same behaviour at least for a limited (experimentally accesible) period of time (in the case of chaotic systems the interval of accurate predictions is given by the Liapunov exponents) are deterministic.Otherwise they are random.

Basically we cannot prove that the universe itself is deterministic or random in the absolute sense (not to mention that there is no way to disprove the existence of a deity who chooses how the 'dice' are thrown at quantum level-though,maybe,there is no mathematical formula to model them exactly).The Copenhagen Interpretation is not enough,there are alternative interpretations fully compatible with the standard mathematical formalism of QM and determinism,at least at quantum level (de Broglie-Bohm's interpretation of QM).

There is no proof that chaotic systems are so because of quantum events (though I cannot deny such a possibility).All we know is that the macroscopic level is an emergent property of matter where deterministic laws (as I defined them above) reign.To make the constatation that a specific subsystem is deterministic (chaotic or deterministic clasically) we do not need to have the exact position of all its atoms.

It's enough to make the constatation that initial conditions, indistinguishable experimentally,lead to the same behaviour in time,at least for a limited period of time (the case of chaotic systems).For that there is no need to have a good model of the subsystem,all we need is to be able to 'run' it again experimentally.

In this context the flipping of a coin or the 'dice' problem are fully deterministic processes,they are not even chaotic,as I've argued previously.The 'randomness' is introduced by our inability to control the initial parameters inside a small enough range (anyway macroscopic way above quantum level).As I've argued there are some cases when we can actually predict the outcome of a dice roll,providing a small enough range of errors in the knowledge of the initial conditions (besides some initial parameters are fully macroscopical).

Are all macroscopic phenomena determnistic (fully deterministic or chaotic)?.The reality is that we do not know.There are many macroscopic processes we deem now as being stochastic but this entirely due to the fact that we are not able to predict their behaviour.Especially due to their complexity.For example the 'background noise' is a stochastic process however no one can claim that it is intrinsically so.Indeed it can be a chaotic process or even a fully deterministic one but tremendously complex so that basically we have no chance to establish that,at least now.

The problem of consciousness is directly related with the above considerations.The actual emergentist-computational theory claim that consciousness is entirely a macroscopic phenomenon being also a very complex emergent property of matter.Though I am a supporter of Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness' approach,the reality is that now we have no experimental 'confirmation' that consciousness does have a connection with the quantum level.

It' not clear now whether this (macroscopical) emergentist approach support the reductionism of consciousness at the laws of physics or chemistry.It postulates however that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon,dependent also of previous states of the brain,that can be modeled:it is dependent of some initial conditions of the brain's 'neural network' which,very possible,might not be reduced entirely at the laws of physics and chemistry (but this does not make it less deterministic).That is,though not directly,it questions the existence of the 'libertarian' free will.From what I've read some say that consciousness is a chaotic phenomenon,being also very complex,so that we will have big problems in establishing its true nature.

The libertarian free will needs the existence of an 'element' that it is neither fully random nor deterministic.Or in nature we know (apparently at least) only random and deterministic processes (chaotic determinism included).There is nothing left to choose...Still our ignorance of today does not mean it cannot exist,my suggestion is to remain open to such a possibility...the actual emergentist approach might prove unable (though possible will never be disproved experimentally) to explain all features of consciousness as we know it...