Law of Conservation of Energy and What it Implies for the Efficacy of p-Consciousness [Archive]

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 04:14 PM

My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. . . .

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world.

I don't think this premise (in blue) will hold water, unless you were willing to make a small adjustment to it. The law of conservation of energy refers to thermodynamics and closed systems (and right now it looks like the universe is not a closed system). It cannot be interpreted to mean energy, whatever that is (and indeed no one has ever observed it), is not ever created and cannot ever be destroyed. We in fact don't know what happens to energy once it's disappears from systems. It is gone, poof! It just might be destroyed, if not now, possibly a zillion years in the future.

Also, saying energy is of material origin doesn't solve the problem of the origin for energy. What's the origin of matter? Where did all that energy come from to create this universe that apparently didn't exist before the Big Bang?

However, if you were willing to stipulate that when energy is made available for work in this universe, its origin is the matter of this universe, then I could see that. But without knowing the origin and fate of everything, I don't see how you can state with certainty about what goes on beyond what we can observe.

. . . since matter and energy are interchangeable, I'm still considering energy to be of material origin. It has no origin outside of the physical universe, as a dualist model would place the origin of consciousness.

I wanted to answer this instead of your syllogisms because I think I can put a dent in your argument using your assumption about dualism. I want to dispute that it is necessarily dualistic to consider consciousness originating outside the universe. Is it dualist to recognize H20 can exist as a solid, liquid and gas? All three are the exact same substance, but their characteristics are determined by conditions.

Similarly, matter and energy could be the manifestation of something even more basic, of which consciousness is a manifestation of as well. In such a case, they all would have been given their unique characteristics by distinct sets of conditions, not because they actually have essentially different natures.

I realize some people do argue in favor of dualism. My objection here is your assumption that a proposition must be dualistic if it suggests consciousness has its origin outside the universe. Once we recognize that matter, energy and consciousness might be made of the same "stuff," your argument seems to teeter.

The issue then becomes what is most basic. Is matter and energy most basic? Or is there something yet more basic where consciousness first developed, and out of which matter and energy appeared as well? If consciousness is in the more basic condition of existence, then it might well be able to interact and control the energy condition of existence, which in turn moves the matter condition of existence. :smile:

hypnagogue

Dec6-04, 05:28 PM

I've been going through some of the threads that flourished while I was away, and noticed a lot of the comments about Rosenberg's theory that hypnagogue was talking about.

Phew, you just saved me some work. :smile: Your original post was a good analysis of why traditional interactionist dualism cannot work (or at least, why it is inconsistent with modern physical theory). But there are subtler notions of causation than the straightforward notion of effective causation, as in "Event A occurred as a result of Event B." The role of P-consciousness in Rosenberg's framework is more akin to Aristotle's notion of 'material causation' than effective causation, which is why it can assign a causal role to P-consciousness without violating conservation of energy or other well-established physical principles.

I'd just like to chime in here that the impression I get (I've ordered the book and will get a more complete impression once I've read it) is that this new theory introduces nothing non-physical. hypnagogue himself has said that it is not a form of dualism. It seems like Rosenberg is attempting to complete physicalist theory by getting at the fundamental nature of what exactly it is that nature is made of. He notes, correctly, that physics and other natural sciences describe quite well the interactions of objects without saying what these objects are. In fact, all of science can in theory be broken down into an accounting of interactions between fundamental particles (if we ever discover the graviton) without any mention of what the particles themselves are made of. While it seems to me that it might be difficult, likely impossible, to ever know this because of the unimaginably small size of these particles, nothing about his theory prima facie precludes physical description, but rather only functional description. In fact, it seems to complement it, almost as the logical end of reductionism.

This is another somewhat subtle issue, and Rosenberg addresses it early on in his book. This comes down to whether you consider physicalism to be object based (o-physicalism) or theory based (t-physicalism). I'm not sure I have a complete handle on these terms, but I believe o-physicalism includes the intrinsic natures of physical objects whereas t-physicalism is restricted to the extrinsic relationships between objects, such as are described in any physical theory.

It appears as if you are taking physicalism to be o-physicalism, which would account for why you see Rosenberg's framework as physicalistic, or at least not incompatible with physicalism. But it is arguable if o-physicalism really should count as a type of physicalism at all, since anytime we venture into the realm of intrinsic properties we are necessarily stepping outside of the realm of purely scientific inquiry. (That which is intrinsic by definition does not interact with other things in the manner of effective causation, or else it would be extrinsic; and if a phenomenon does not interact in such a way, it is impossible to detect in the traditional way via measuring devices, even in principle. This problem of interaction is what is ostensibly makes knowing intrinsic natures so hard (if not impossible) to know, rather than issues of size of fundamental particles or the like.)

Rosenberg takes physicalism to mean t-physicalism; that is, only that which is detectable in principle via measuring devices, or knowable in principle via theoretical deduction from observed phenomena, is taken to be physical. This automatically precludes intrinsic phenomena such as P-consciousness or the question of what an electron is aside from what it does, and so on. T-physicalism amounts to a kind of functionalism, but with apparently nothing to be carrying out the functions. Thus Rosenberg's framework is not physicalistic by t-physicalism standards.

hypnagogue

Dec6-04, 05:33 PM

I have the book and will read it in a short, I think a few others have decided to buy and read it. Maybe after the new year it can be discussed.

Would anyone be interested in a mutual reading/discussion thread? We could devote a week or two to each of the chapters and go through them one by one. I believe this has been done on philosophyforums.com with Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" with good effect. Any interest here?

edit: Please see http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=55766 if you are interested.

loseyourname

Dec6-04, 06:54 PM

I don't think this premise (in blue) will hold water, unless you were willing to make a small adjustment to it. The law of conservation of energy refers to thermodynamics and closed systems (and right now it looks like the universe is not a closed system). It cannot be interpreted to mean energy, whatever that is (and indeed no one has ever observed it), is not ever created and cannot ever be destroyed.

That may be the case, but I'm really just assuming for the purposes of this argument that each human nervous system in concert with whatever constitutes the individual phenomenal consciousness associated with each nervous system, is a closed system with respect to any causative role it may play in human action (in this case, the action can be either organismic or mental). I simply question whether the energy used to initiate these actions can come from any source outside of the cellular processes carried out by the CNS and PNS. According to the law of conservation of energy, they cannot. To sum it up, the assumption I'm making is that each conscious moment in which an action takes place constitutes a closed system.

It is entirely possible that the thermodynamics involved in incorrect, but I highly doubt it, because it has been confirmed in every chemical reaction in which confirmation was sought. The great thing about this point of contention is that it is testable in principle. Nothing precludes scientific endeavor from measuring the energy input and output of the CNS and PNS to see that they match. On a neuronal basis, they certainly do.

Thanks for bringing out the assumption, though. It didn't previously occur to me that I was making it.

Also, saying energy is of material origin doesn't solve the problem of the origin for energy. What's the origin of matter? Where did all that energy come from to create this universe that apparently didn't exist before the Big Bang?

However, if you were willing to stipulate that when energy is made available for work in this universe, its origin is the matter of this universe, then I could see that. But without knowing the origin and fate of everything, I don't see how you can state with certainty about what goes on beyond what we can observe.

Well, I cannot state what goes on outside of this universe, but I can say unequivocally that, within this universe, energy can be neither created nor destroyed. It can only be converted to different forms, each of which can be reduced in essence to the potential or kinetic energy of fundamental particles.

I don't know the ultimate origin of all matter/energy in the universe, but I'm not sure that a cosmological question like that needs to be answered here. I'd need further convincing of its relevance.

I want to dispute that it is necessarily dualistic to consider consciousness originating outside the universe. Is it dualist to recognize H20 can exist as a solid, liquid and gas? All three are the exact same substance, but their characteristics are determined by conditions.

I cannot see what point you are making with the water. Whether it be liquid, gas, or solid, it always exists within the same spatio-temporal continuum.

Edit: Actually, I do see your point now. I've elaborated below.

Similarly, matter and energy could be the manifestation of something even more basic, of which consciousness is a manifestation of as well. In such a case, they all would have been given their unique characteristics by distinct sets of conditions, not because they actually have essentially different natures.

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical. In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form? Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

This isn't to say the model is to be discounted, but a function separate from that of performing work would need to be attributed to your third form.

I realize some people do argue in favor of dualism. My objection here is your assumption that a proposition must be dualistic if it suggests consciousness has its origin outside the universe. Once we recognize that matter, energy and consciousness might be made of the same "stuff," your argument seems to teeter.

Oh, I don't argue that the model of three forms is dualist - given that all three forms conform to the definition given of physical; that is, that they are contrained by material laws of cause and effect. The only qualm I would have with the above statement with respect to this model is that there is no reason given to suspect that the third form exists in a universe separate from that of the other two. Given the definition of a universe as a single spatio-temporal continuum, any agent that can be the cause of an effect on a second agent exists in the same universe as that second agent.

The issue then becomes what is most basic. Is matter and energy most basic? Or is there something yet more basic where consciousness first developed, and out of which matter and energy appeared as well? If consciousness is in the more basic condition of existence, then it might well be able to interact and control the energy condition of existence, which in turn moves the matter condition of existence. :smile:

Okay, the model breaks down a bit here. To control energy, it would be necessary to perform work upon it. But energy is defined as the capacity to perform work. If the third form is postulated as "that which controls energy," we can reformulate the postulation definitionally first as "that which performs work upon energy" and second as "that which performs work upon the capacity to perform work." The lack of syntactical coherence in this description of the third form makes the model difficult to evaluate.

loseyourname

Dec6-04, 07:26 PM

Phew, you just saved me some work. :smile: Your original post was a good analysis of why traditional interactionist dualism cannot work (or at least, why it is inconsistent with modern physical theory). But there are subtler notions of causation than the straightforward notion of effective causation, as in "Event A occurred as a result of Event B." The role of P-consciousness in Rosenberg's framework is more akin to Aristotle's notion of 'material causation' than effective causation, which is why it can assign a causal role to P-consciousness without violating conservation of energy or other well-established physical principles.

I had actually thought about this. Aristotle's notion of material cause (bronze is the cause of the chalice) does not seem to me to constitute a cause in any sense that is still recognized. His notion of formal cause is dubious at best. The type of causation I'm referring to here is akin to efficient causation, although I had considered that efficacious phenomenal consciousness could be considered under the heading of final cause in an Aristotelian framework. Even so, it seems to me that work must be performed. The best definition of "cause" I can give to work with in this thread would be "any agent performing work upon a second agent resulting in any change to that second agent." This would encompass efficient and final causation, as well as formal causation. The thing to be considered here is that if p-consciousness is to be thought of as material cause rather than final cause, it would not perform work. In fact, a material cause can do nothing to alter the mechanical course of events brought about through the more traditional notion of causation. It would dictate the course itself, but in an equally mechanical fashion. Modeling subjective consciousness in this way seems to me to make it epiphenomenal and not efficacious.

This is another somewhat subtle issue, and Rosenberg addresses it early on in his book. This comes down to whether you consider physicalism to be object based (o-physicalism) or theory based (t-physicalism). I'm not sure I have a complete handle on these terms, but I believe o-physicalism includes the intrinsic natures of physical objects whereas t-physicalism is restricted to the extrinsic relationships between objects, such as are described in any physical theory.

It appears as if you are taking physicalism to be o-physicalism, which would account for why you see Rosenberg's framework as physicalistic, or at least not incompatible with physicalism.

Yes, I was considering intrinsic properties as a part of physicalism. This is pretty much what I meant by saying it seemed to me that Rosenberg was "completing" physicalism.

But it is arguable if o-physicalism really should count as a type of physicalism at all, since anytime we venture into the realm of intrinsic properties we are necessarily stepping outside of the realm of purely scientific inquiry. (That which is intrinsic by definition does not interact with other things in the manner of effective causation, or else it would be extrinsic; and if a phenomenon does not interact in such a way, it is impossible to detect in the traditional way via measuring devices, even in principle. This problem of interaction is what is ostensibly makes knowing intrinsic natures so hard (if not impossible) to know, rather than issues of size of fundamental particles or the like.)

The only problem I would have with this assessment is that if Rosenberg models consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical objects, he has then rendered detectable an intrinsic property, even if it is not detectable in a third-person sense.

Rosenberg takes physicalism to mean t-physicalism; that is, only that which is detectable in principle via measuring devices, or knowable in principle via theoretical deduction from observed phenomena, is taken to be physical. This automatically precludes intrinsic phenomena such as P-consciousness or the question of what an electron is aside from what it does, and so on. T-physicalism amounts to a kind of functionalism, but with apparently nothing to be carrying out the functions. Thus Rosenberg's framework is not physicalistic by t-physicalism standards.

Either way. So long as we can develop a common understanding of terms. For my purposes in this thread, I'm defining o-physicalism, at least with respect to modeling consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical things, as a form of physicalism.

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 08:11 PM

I simply question whether the energy used to initiate these actions can come from any source outside of the cellular processes carried out by the CNS and PNS. According to the law of conservation of energy, they cannot. To sum it up, the assumption I'm making is that each conscious moment in which an action takes place constitutes a closed system.

Yes, but it seems you are assuming consciousness is energy. Why should we assume that consciousness is energy?

You are also wrong to suggest that anything whatsoever about biology constitutes a closed system. As a biology guy, I think you must know this already (it even contradicts your own model). Biology is very much an open system. It takes in, it metabolizes, it moves, it loses heat. There is no possible way to prevent that. That’s about as “open” as a system gets. And as I pointed out, biology is also within a universe which itself appears open.

It is entirely possible that the thermodynamics involved in incorrect, but I highly doubt it, because it has been confirmed in every chemical reaction in which confirmation was sought. The great thing about this point of contention is that it is testable in principle. Nothing precludes scientific endeavor from measuring the energy input and output of the CNS and PNS to see that they match. On a neuronal basis, they certainly do.

You are mixing apples and oranges. No one is doubting that energy is preserved through physical processes. Don’t you see, you are assuming a priori what you are arguing? Of course if you look at physical processes and measure energy, you are going to find it all adding up. We already know that! It doesn’t prove whether a state of existence which is not energy, and cannot be measured, is capable of triggering physical actions (or, whether or not that triggering function, even if it does expend energy, uses a measurable amount of energy to do so).

Well, I cannot state what goes on outside of this universe, but I can say unequivocally that, within this universe, energy can be neither created nor destroyed. It can only be converted to different forms, each of which can be reduced in essence to the potential or kinetic energy of fundamental particles.

Hmmmmmm. How can you say that if you can’t observe what happens to energy once it leaves a system? No one on Earth seems to know anything about what the nature of energy is, or what happens to energy once we cannot observe what it does (i.e., we recognize the presence of energy by movement or heat, but no one has actually observed energy itself).

If there is one thing that’s been driven into my thick head since I’ve been here it’s that energy has not been assigned any existential qualities (Tom recently reminded me of that). Energy is nothing more than a way of measuring movement power and heat. Yet you are talking about energy like it’s actually “something.”

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical.

Why is that? The only reason I can see is that you have assumed a priori that physicalness is the basis of all. I thought that was what we were trying to decide.

In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form?

LOL!!! There is a wonderful example of an a priori conclusion. You look at the physical, you only acknowledge physical contributions, and then you conclude anything not physical doesn’t exist.

The “third form” is what physical processes have not been shown capable of achieving. Demonstrate progressive organization with physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with physicalness.

Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?

This isn't to say the model is to be discounted, but a function separate from that of performing work would need to be attributed to your third form.

Right, that’s what I’ve been suggesting.

Iacchus32

Dec6-04, 08:33 PM

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?How is it that consciousness can be emulated through the energy which is modulated on a televison screen? How do we know for a fact that consciousness isn't some form of modulated energy signal?

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 09:39 PM

How is it that consciousness can be emulated through the energy which is modulated on a televison screen? How do we know for a fact that consciousness isn't some form of modulated energy signal?

? I don't understand what you are seeing . . . can you explain how consciousness is emulated by a TV screen?

hypnagogue

Dec6-04, 11:58 PM

The thing to be considered here is that if p-consciousness is to be thought of as material cause rather than final cause, it would not perform work. In fact, a material cause can do nothing to alter the mechanical course of events brought about through the more traditional notion of causation. It would dictate the course itself, but in an equally mechanical fashion. Modeling subjective consciousness in this way seems to me to make it epiphenomenal and not efficacious.

You are correct to note that if P-consciousness is more of a material cause, then it doesn't perform work, as in efficient causation. But assuming we take epiphenomenal to mean 'having no causal relevance,' P-consciousness would still not be epiphenomenal, because it would still play a definite role in the causal dynamics of the world. P-consciousness winds up having causal relevance in Rosenberg's framework, just not in the way we may have expected.

Aristotle's notion of material causation seem antiquated, but if you accept the conceptual need for some sort of intrinsic qualities to underpin or instantiate relational phenomena, then you are accepting the conceptual need for material causation, as I'm using the term here. Saying that P-consciousness supports material causation is just the same thing as saying that it provides the fundamental, intrinsic 'stuff' that enters into the system of relationships that we call physics. Without this intrinsic base, physical relationships could not exist anymore than a game of chess could exist without a chessboard and tokens (or a computer's hard drive, or whatever) to instantiate the abstract structure of the game.

The only problem I would have with this assessment is that if Rosenberg models consciousness as an intrinsic property of physical objects, he has then rendered detectable an intrinsic property, even if it is not detectable in a third-person sense.

When I said detectable, I meant in the 3rd person sense. For something to be detectable in this sense, some sort of efficient causation is required. The sense in which P-consciousness, or 1st person data, is detectable in Rosenberg's framework is entirely different.

Iacchus32

Dec7-04, 01:33 AM

? I don't understand what you are seeing . . . can you explain how consciousness is emulated by a TV screen?Well, I was sitting at the dinner table this evening, and I could hear the newscaster on TV in the other room, and I couldn't help but believe there was a live person talking in the other room. I mean if I didn't know better, I couldn't help but believe that there was someone actually there. While the same thing goes for talking to someone over the phone. Why even bother to talk if you didn't believe there was a live person on the other side of it? So at least in that sense you've emulated the trappings of consciousness, or else there would be no comprehension of it whatsoever. Does this make the TV or the telephone conscious? No. And yet both become the means (through modulated energy) by which to extend and/or articulate it. So perhaps the key word here is information? I think this much (which belies intelligence) can be modulated over the air waves.

loseyourname

Dec7-04, 04:15 PM

Yes, but it seems you are assuming consciousness is energy. Why should we assume that consciousness is energy?

Well, let me make an attempt at clarification here. I'm assuming that if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the sense of efficient or final causation - a point I'll get into further below), then it must perform work. Because energy is defined as the capacity to perform work, then in order for consciousness (or any other causal factor, for that matter) to perform work, it must use energy. That isn't to say that it must be energy.

You are also wrong to suggest that anything whatsoever about biology constitutes a closed system. As a biology guy, I think you must know this already (it even contradicts your own model). Biology is very much an open system. It takes in, it metabolizes, it moves, it loses heat. There is no possible way to prevent that. That’s about as “open” as a system gets. And as I pointed out, biology is also within a universe which itself appears open.

This is another point where I'm probably being unclear, so I'll try a little harder. The thing I was trying to say is that all energy used in a biological system can be accounted for. Some is dissipated as heat, some stored as free energy (usually in the form of ATP), and some is taken in through catabolic processes. But this is all done in accordance with the law of conservation of energy. The amount taken in exactly equals the amount used minus the amount stored and the amount dissipated as heat.

You are mixing apples and oranges. No one is doubting that energy is preserved through physical processes. Don’t you see, you are assuming a priori what you are arguing? Of course if you look at physical processes and measure energy, you are going to find it all adding up. We already know that! It doesn’t prove whether a state of existence which is not energy, and cannot be measured, is capable of triggering physical actions (or, whether or not that triggering function, even if it does expend energy, uses a measurable amount of energy to do so).

Yes, but dualism itself mixes apples and oranges by the principle of interactionism. Even if consciousness is non-physical, in order to be causally efficacious to the CNS, it must be physically efficacious due to the physical nature of the CNS. My point about the possibility of accounting for energy used in brain processes is that, if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the traditional sense of efficient or final causation, which again, I will get into further below), then it must use energy, because it must perform work, and energy is defined as the capacity to perform work. Any function capable of triggering a physical action uses measurable energy, again, according to the laws and definitions being used here. This isn't to say it is entirely impossible that contra-causal triggering functions exist that attain their capacity to perform physical work from some outside source, but if these functions do exist, they are inconsistent with the laws and definitions used by modern physics. Either one or the other must go. Remember again that I am not attempting to prove or disprove any one system, I'm only proving the inconsistency of a system with the known laws of physics. I stated this at the outset. Yes, I do make assumptions. Every argument does. I am fully aware that the argument can only produce a true conclusion if my assumptions are correct.

Hmmmmmm. How can you say that if you can’t observe what happens to energy once it leaves a system? No one on Earth seems to know anything about what the nature of energy is, or what happens to energy once we cannot observe what it does (i.e., we recognize the presence of energy by movement or heat, but no one has actually observed energy itself).

Energy has no existence outside of what it does. [Edit: Actually, I shouldn't be so strong with my wording. My true position (or lack of position, if you prefer) is clarified better in the next paragraph below.] Energy is defined simply as the capacity to do things, to perform work. If by "nature" you refer to intrinsin properties, then yes, no one knows what intrinsic properties, if any, energy has. But for the purposes of thermodynamics, energy is simply the ability to perform work, which can be restated as the ability to be a cause of a physical effect. Perhaps given that formulation, you can now see my concern.

If there is one thing that’s been driven into my thick head since I’ve been here it’s that energy has not been assigned any existential qualities (Tom recently reminded me of that). Energy is nothing more than a way of measuring movement power and heat. Yet you are talking about energy like it’s actually “something.”

I'm actually trying very hard not to. I would like to stress that energy, thus defined, is itself a property of physical things - again, the capacity of those things to perform work. Whether it is itself a separate thing, or only a property, is not entirely clear (though Einstein's equivalence formula seems to suggest prima facie that it might have some form of autonomous existence). For our purposes here, I would need to be convinced that it makes a difference.

Why is that? The only reason I can see is that you have assumed a priori that physicalness is the basis of all. I thought that was what we were trying to decide.

Well, I stated only that I have no reason to believe that a third form would be non-physical. Remember the definition of physical here as "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the two known forms of the fundamental existent (which is the name I will heretofore use to refer to the "more fundamental" aspect of matter, energy, and consciousness you are postulating) are physical, then meer chance seem to suggest that a third form, and indeed the fundamental existent itself are also physical. I'm not assuming this is necessarily the case, but as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise. There is no exclusion principle in place here. Both possibilities remain possibilities. This is only a preliminary working hypothesis based on the available evidence.

LOL!!! There is a wonderful example of an a priori conclusion. You look at the physical, you only acknowledge physical contributions, and then you conclude anything not physical doesn’t exist.

I'm not entirely certain why you think a question I asked (What would be the function of the third form?) constitutes a conclusion, but go ahead and laugh.

The “third form” is what physical processes have not been shown capable of achieving. Demonstrate progressive organization with physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with physicalness.

Well, this is where we run into a problem. I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness. The thing about this is, if life and the subjective experiences of living organisms are the only examples available of progressive organization and subjectivity, then life and the subjective experiences of organisms are the only demonstrations that can be given. Obviously, this will not satisfy you, but it gives no reason in and of itself to believe that any alternative explanation can fill the gap.

I promise I will be getting to the matter of material causation and the "third form" below.

Why? Energy does the work, consciousness determines what and how work is done. That’s two totally different realms of qualities. Energy has never been proven that it can do anything but fuel things. It is dumb, mindless power. Why do you think it can decide, be creative, make decisions, learn?

Okay, here we go.

First, another brief clarification. Energy is being defined as the capacity to perform work. It is actually matter that performs the work itself, on another piece of matter. Perhaps it will do us well to imagine that matter is the carpenter and the nail, whereas energy is the hammer. Working from this metaphor, we can see that it is the carpenter that thus controls the actions of the hammer, and thus it is matter that determines what kind of work energy will be used to perform. If an organizational principle beyond the known laws of physics must be inserted to explain certain capacities of the work being performed, it will be an organizational principle of matter, not of energy. This can probably clear up the syntactical concerns I had in my earlier post.

Now getting to the issue of material causation. Let's work from hypnagogue's metaphor of the checker board. Without the checker board, there can be no doubt that the game cannot be carried out. However, the game of checkers as described by a third-party observer incapable of seeing the board or the pieces would be fully explained in terms of the rules of the game. That is the dilemma we face with respect to intrinsic properties. Even if they play an important role in the nature of causation itself, the process of cause and effect can be explained without ever invoking these intrinsic properties, sort of QED reduced to functionalism. Rosenberg seemingly is invoking these intrinsic properties as necessary to explain the nature of subjective experience, whereas you seem to prefer the invoking of a third form of the fundamental existent, while continuing to leave out any mention of the intrinsic properties of this existent or of its three forms. Where your respective approaches overlap is that both are being invoked as an organizing principle, so to speak, capable of explaining why matter and energy behave the way they do. I will contend here that his approach is parsimonious with respect to yours, and functionally equal, but that isn't to say that either is any more or less correct at this point. It might very well be necessary to invoke both a fundamental existent and its intrinsic properties to flesh out a complete explanation.

Your primary qualm with my assessment seems to be with my use of the term "physical." You see it as some kind of dirty word to be avoided when discussing matters of subjective experience. But I again must be clear in the way I am using the term. Physical means simply "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the third form you are invoking somehow enacts an organizing principle by which the behavior of matter/energy is to be explained, it would still be physical according to my definition provided it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect. In fact, I've seen nothing from you to suggest that it doesn't. If it doesn't, then there are serious issues of contracausality that will need to be addressed with respect to interactionism. The violation of the law of conservation of energy is only one of these issues.

Now lastly, I just want to stress that I am not attempting to either prove or disprove the truth of any one model. I am only discussing the relevant implications of these models, bringing up impediments to their acceptance. Any discussion of how these impediments can be overcome is more than welcome. Simply bashing traditional physicalism, however, is a bit like the ID technique of pushing their agenda, not by arguing for it, but by harping on about the flaws in evolutionary theory, all of which are based on simple mischaracterizations. That isn't what I want to see here from either side.

Rader

Dec8-04, 01:36 PM

Perhaps it is the case that matter and energy are only two forms of a more fundamental agent that can take on a third form we have previously been unable to detect. However, I cannot see any reason to believe this third form would be anything other than physical. In the case of matter and energy, the functional necessity of these two forms is clear. One form (energy) is needed to perform work, and the other form (matter) is needed to be worked upon. What would be the function of the third form? Assuming the third form to be the source of p-consciousness and assuming that it is physically efficacious, then it would also exist to perform work upon the form of matter. Given that energy already performs this function, any model containing this third form is not parsimonious.

I have read your last post but I will answer here. All physical systems require a third fundamental agent in order for work to be accomplished. Matter and energy do no just exchange partners as if they were on a dance floor. Information has to be injected into the system or you can not even test the thermodynamics of the system. Even simple systems like molecule interaction must have the information. Yes on a small scale you could brush that off for electromagnetic covalent bonding that occurs at random but how would you explain this when you get to complex systems like humans? And of course its not parsimonious, the complexity of humans is anything but that.

So assuming information to be the third form, to be the source of p-consciousness or at least a property of it, causing physical systems to be physically efficacious.

We now have three fundamental agents if you be, energy matter and information and none easy to define, all seem necessary to evolve a system.

Iacchus32

Dec8-04, 02:13 PM

We now have three fundamental agents if you be, energy matter and information and none easy to define, all seem necessary to evolve a system.Nonetheless, if consciousness can be modulated/emulated through an energy source, it must be more closely related to energy. We also have to ask if information alone comprises intelligence? It no doubt comprises structure, but like you say, as in the case with matter and energy alone, is there something else which utilizes that structure?

Rader

Dec8-04, 02:36 PM

We also have to ask if information alone comprises intelligence?

Information is a mechanical word, that if you switch the name to something else, it has a meaning in another context. I think us humans can answer affirmative to the fact, we are the end result so far.

It no doubt comprises structure, but like you say, as in the case with matter and energy alone, is there something else which utilizes that structure?

Thats a theory of a ghost in the machine.

Iacchus32

Dec8-04, 02:52 PM

Thats a theory of a ghost in the machine.And yet if there were such a thing, what it would be besides an energy pattern? ... Albeit one would have to assume there was something even more essential than that in order for energy to assume a specific form. Perhaps this is what consciousness entails? Or, maybe consciousness is just a highly modified aspect of energy?

Les Sleeth

Dec8-04, 04:58 PM

My answer takes two posts to fit. Geez we philosopher types can be windy eh?

Even if consciousness is non-physical, in order to be causally efficacious to the CNS, it must be physically efficacious due to the physical nature of the CNS.

It must be as you say.

My point about the possibility of accounting for energy used in brain processes is that, if consciousness is to be causally efficacious (in the traditional sense of efficient or final causation, which again, I will get into further below), then it must use energy, because it must perform work, and energy is defined as the capacity to perform work.

Right again, except what does it mean to “use” energy? (More below).

Yes, I do make assumptions. Every argument does. I am fully aware that the argument can only produce a true conclusion if my assumptions are correct.

My complaint is that you are using for assumptions what your argument is trying to prove is true. When I laughed, it wasn’t to ridicule, it was because of running into you taking that circular route several times.

Any function capable of triggering a physical action uses measurable energy, again, according to the laws and definitions being used here.

If I understand your meaning, this is an example of using for a premise what you are trying to prove. You cannot assume that if consciousness “uses energy” it must itself expend energy (as if it’s in possession of energy and needs to burn it to act). That is a physical requirement, not necessarily a consciousness requirement.

Consciousness might be able to “use” energy external to it because its nature might be that it is in permanent possession of power which is never depleted. This power, however, needn’t be all that much. The body and energy provided by metabolism seem all set up, sort of “at the ready,” to be kicked into motion by triggering. It’s like comparing the effort a man must make to flip a switch in a huge crane, and the work done by the crane. In between the switch and the movement of the crane is a very large force potential.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume some bit of energy is burned by consciousness itself when it uses the brain (I don’t think it is, however). Using the crane analogy again, if you had only been familiar with the level of power involved of a crane doing work, and maybe that found in its circuits, you might not have any devices capable of detecting the energy required to achieve something so subtle as flipping a switch.

This isn't to say it is entirely impossible that contra-causal triggering functions exist that attain their capacity to perform physical work from some outside source, but if these functions do exist, they are inconsistent with the laws and definitions used by modern physics.

Yet you say, “I stated only that I have no reason to believe that a third form would be non-physical.” It seems to me you do have a reason, if not to believe, to suspect it.

I'm only proving the inconsistency of a system with the known laws of physics. I stated this at the outset.

But that’s exactly what non-physicalists have been saying. Are you trying to make our case for us? :smile: Besides, the progressive development needed for chemical abiogenesis and the subjectivity of consciousness are two qualities that are presently “inconsistent” with the known laws of physics, but physicalists nonetheless insist progressive development and subjectivity must be physical in nature.

Either one or the other must go.

I just don’t see how yours is a necessary conclusion if we rely on the concept of what you labeled the “fundamental existent.” I’ll explain as I go along.

Remember the definition of physical here as "constrained by material laws of cause and effect."

That’s right, but “material” cause and effect might not be the only kinds of cause and effect. You assumption seems to be that it is.

If the two known forms of the fundamental existent (which is the name I will heretofore use to refer to the "more fundamental" aspect of matter, energy, and consciousness you are postulating) are physical, then mere chance seem to suggest that a third form, and indeed the fundamental existent itself are also physical.

How does such an inference of “chance” avoid a non sequitur classification? You lost me on that one. :confused:

I'm not assuming this is necessarily the case, but as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise. There is no exclusion principle in place here. Both possibilities remain possibilities. This is only a preliminary working hypothesis based on the available evidence.

How do you know all things known are physical? All things known through the physicalist methods of empiricism are physical, all things capable of objectification seem physical. This is more circular argument because you continue to imply if physicalness can’t define it or detect it, then it isn’t real or known. Here you do the same thing again, “the default value for any unknown . . . should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise.” For someone who has already assumed the position of physicalism, yes. Physicalists are the ones saying all they experience and know is the physical, there are others who say differently.

Well, this is where we run into a problem. I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness.

I don’t think that is a good assessment of what’s going on, not with me anyway. I don’t know what the truth is going to be, I simply recognize that right now physicalist theory ain’t got all the answers, yet plenty of physicalists claim their theory can, or will, explain it all.

If you read my models, I do at least completely and totally accept the physical side of things. Yet I also have certain personal experiences which seem non-physical; I have studied as well the history of such experiences in others. When I talk to physicalists, they seem completely ignorant of either the nature or the history of the inner experience. What am I supposed to conclude but they are only looking at physicalness, and they then conclude that’s all there is. Well, duuuuuuuhhhh I say. Why do you think one can’t detect the presence of the color blue with a microphone? :rolleyes:

The thing about this is, if life and the subjective experiences of living organisms are the only examples available of progressive organization and subjectivity, then life and the subjective experiences of organisms are the only demonstrations that can be given. Obviously, this will not satisfy you, but it gives no reason in and of itself to believe that any alternative explanation can fill the gap.

I propose models, but I don’t think they are proof. If you can find something not accounted for by any model I propose, or which contradicts known facts, then you should definitely point that out. You don’t have to offer up an alternative perfect model to find logic/factual fallacies in mine, and all it takes is one to put a model at risk. Progressive organization and subjectivity are two phenomena unaccounted for by physicalism.

Keep in mind, my call is for objectivity. I say if a theory doesn’t work, one has to stay open to other possibilities. Too often I hear talk from physicalists like “oh no, it can’t be any other way than physical.” To me that indicates a priori assumptions are in place, and that the mind is anything but objective.

(continued . . . )

Rader

Dec8-04, 05:01 PM

And yet if there were such a thing, what it would be besides an energy pattern? ... Albeit one would have to assume there was something even more essential than that in order for energy to assume a specific form. Perhaps this is what consciousness entails? Or, maybe consciousness is just a highly modified aspect of energy?

There is no physical reason to believe consciousness is energy since the laws of physics demonstrate E=mc2 and brains can not account for subjective experience. When I am conscious information energy and matter are all working together in its presence.

Les Sleeth

Dec8-04, 05:01 PM

(. . . continued from previous post)

Your primary qualm with my assessment seems to be with my use of the term "physical." You see it as some kind of dirty word to be avoided when discussing matters of subjective experience. But I again must be clear in the way I am using the term. Physical means simply "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." If the third form you are invoking somehow enacts an organizing principle by which the behavior of matter/energy is to be explained, it would still be physical according to my definition provided it is constrained by material laws of cause and effect. In fact, I've seen nothing from you to suggest that it doesn't. If it doesn't, then there are serious issues of contracausality that will need to be addressed with respect to interactionism. The violation of the law of conservation of energy is only one of these issues.

Physical is most definitely not a dirty word. But I don’t think you completely grasp the implications of the “fundamental existent” model. Let me try once more to explain, not to convince you it is true, but so you don’t think I am anti-physical or dualist.

I’ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let’s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we’ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let’s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually “learns” to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

The “knowledge” of this is most realized in the vapor condition, because that is what defines fundamental existence. Interestingly, because “knowing” is present in the vapor, when it uses itself to form water, that water has a bit of “knowing” built into it too, though dulled by density; the same is true of the solid condition, except the knowing is even more dulled (because it’s more dense). Now, if a being were made up of vapor (consciousness) water (energy) and ice (matter), they all share a existential relationship (i.e., they are all made up of the same substance), and all share the “knowledge” that is built into them, but at different levels of knowing.

Because in this case “physical” is defined as when the fundamental stuff acquires structure, we call ice (matter) physical, and we also call water (energy) physical because (viewing from our physical perspective) it appears to be derived from ice (matter) as it “melts”; and because the vapor (spirit?) has no structure, we call it non-physical. Now, as for how vapor (as conscious fundamental existent stuff) could trigger energy to move matter, since the vapor naturally and always exists at a higher temp, when it “touches” ice, that causes a release of water. The vapor itself doesn’t give up water (energy) because that’s not the condition vapor is in. But the natural “warm” way it is will cause energy to flow. Since (returning to the reality of biology) there are huge neural networks set up to channel the flow of energy, all the “warm” consciousness has to do is touch the stored energy spots in the right place to trigger release and action.

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the “frozen” universe. If that’s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that’s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

Now lastly, I just want to stress that I am not attempting to either prove or disprove the truth of any one model. I am only discussing the relevant implications of these models, bringing up impediments to their acceptance. Any discussion of how these impediments can be overcome is more than welcome. Simply bashing traditional physicalism, however, is a bit like the ID technique of pushing their agenda, not by arguing for it, but by harping on about the flaws in evolutionary theory, all of which are based on simple mischaracterizations. That isn't what I want to see here from either side.

No one is bashing physicalism, but since you brought up pushing an agenda, I can tell you I first started posting arguments against physicalism after hearing one too many scientists on TV science specials or in text/pop science books claim life “most likely” came about accidentally in the ocean’s chemistry, or that consciousness can be fully explained by brain functions. There are plenty of physicalists acting like their theory is all but established fact, and pushing it from the bully pulpit that universities (in courses taught by physicalist professors) and TV provide.

I don’t agree with ID only because they usually are trying to somehow make the Bible be true. To me that’s silly since the creation story there is a myth taken from ancient tribal story-telling and/or conjecture. But I don’t see anything wrong with looking for fatal flaws in a theory. That is a great way to either prove it wrong, or to indicate where a change needs to be made.

Iacchus32

Dec8-04, 05:26 PM

There is no physical reason to believe consciousness is energy since the laws of physics demonstrate E=mc2 and brains can not account for subjective experience. When I am conscious information energy and matter are all working together in its presence.What about electro-magnetic induction? Is it possible that consciousness is induced through the brain? And, perhaps everything else that maintains an electro-magnetic field?

loseyourname

Dec8-04, 08:17 PM

Okay, there are getting to be a lot of issues I need to address in this thread, but I'll start with this one, because I think I can clear up the misunderstanding that I see here.

(. . . continued from previous post)I?ll rely on the analogy of gas, liquid, and solid forms of water to elucidate. Let?s say water vapor is the fundamental existent; that is, water vapor is extended infinitely in every direction, so we?ll call it the vapor continuum. It was never created, it can never be destroyed, it can only change form. How might it change form? Part of the dynamics of the vapor continuum are temperature fluctuations. Every great once in while a spot in the continuum cools enough for the vapor to turn to liquid water. Let?s say in even a greater once in a while, cooling and warming happens over and over again at one exact spot, so that that spot becomes conditioned, acquires traits, and actually ?learns? to change itself back and forth between vapor and liquid; and then later it learns to cool itself even more and create solid ice.

. . . snip . . .

The bigger point is, there is really no essential difference in all the absolute essence and its forms, there are just different conditions determining how they are experienced from our perspective living here in the ?frozen? universe. If that?s the case, then you cannot classify the fundamental existent as physical. All that?s physical are forms of the fundamental existent, the fundamental existent is not a form of the physical.

Okay, I see now that you are saying consciousness is the fundamental existent, or at least an emergent property of its organizational structure (given that pre-learning to manifest physically, it doesn't seem like it would be anything recognizable as what we now refer to as "consciousness"). I thought you were saying consciousness is one of three forms of the fundamental existent, matter and energy being the other two.

Anyway, let me get to why I still wouldn't see this as non-physical - again, using our working definition of physical. According to your model, the behavior of the fundamental existent pre-physical (and correspondingly, pre-consciousness) was a mechanical behavior. You refer to its "learning" to manifest in a given way, but this "learning" doesn't seem prima facie to be any different than the learning capacity of a CPU, or perhaps even the ocean that "learns" to deposit pebbles on the beach in an increasingly organized fashion, to use a particularly banal example.

The issue of causation here is central. If the fundamental existent is causing a certain behavior of matter/energy, and that behavior is in accordance with certain rules, then, as a causative factor, the fundamental existent itself is also physical according to our definition. Your model does not seem to introduce contracausality, but instead only an additional causative factor on top of the ones we already know of.

*Let me add here a couple unrelated issues I have with your model. The first is that no explanation is given of how phenomena that you perceive to be gaps in physicalism came into being. You postulate the fundamental existent as essentially an "organizational principle," but the laws of physics themselves are organizational principles. These are a manifestation of instrinsic properties, such as those we will be discussing in concert with the Rosenberg book. The biggest problem is that all of the known "organizational principles" of matter/energy are well-formulated in a mathematical fashion so as to enumerate all known causal relations between any objects in question. Putting aside the fact that there is no reason in principle to think that these laws alone are incapable of explaining any and all phenomena, including the ones you have concerns about, there is a more basic objection to your model in that it does not seem to provide any additional explanatory power.

There are a number of reasons for this. The obvious one comes from either reading of the potential for contracausality in the fundamental existent. If the existent is causal in nature (and thus physical according to our definition), then you have a major gap in both showing its necessity and in describing the rules by which it can be a cause. If the existent is contracausal in nature, then it just seems that you have "given up" to some degree. You are simply hypothesizing that no quantifiable mechanism exists that can explain certain phenomena, and so you simply postulate a non-quantifiable mechanism that really isn't even a mechanism in that it obeys no rules. It should be quickly apparent why this method of explanation is to be avoided if it is in any way possible to do so when we consider what the history of knowledge would be like had all past thinkers taken this path (Edit - When they were confronted with an explanatory gap in their theoretical paradigm). Perhaps you can start another thread in which you fully flesh out your model to the best of your ability and we can discuss its implications there.

** Now let us get back to the issue of accounting for energy used in a biological system. I'll be brief here in discussing the shortcomings I see with your model wrt the law of conservation of energy. It's as simple as this: volitional action (that is, action under conscious control) requires mechanical energy to be performed. This energy is measurable. In principle, we can measure all of the energy necessary to perform a given volitional action and then compare it with the energy intake of the organism in question. According to the law of conservation of energy, all motion should be accounted for after considering heat given off. The equation is incredibly simple. Just click here (http://library.thinkquest.org/C004970/thermo/gibbs.htm?tqskip1=1) for a brief explanation. Your model comes into conflict in that it proposes mechanical effects (the end results of which is volitional action) without a correspondingly physical (and thus measurable) source of energy. You are infusing energy into a system from the "ether," or in this case, from the fundamental existent. This actually implies that the amount of energy in the universe is constantly increasing because there are volitional actions being put into effect at all times without a corresponding energy source in the physical universe. The empirical testability of this hypothesis should be obvious. It wouldn't be easy, but there is no reason to think we cannot one day perform such a test. Okay, maybe I wasn't that brief.

loseyourname

Dec9-04, 01:08 AM

I was searching around some of the links provided by hypnagogue, and it turns out that Galen Strawson gives a very clear and eloquent rendition of essentially the same argument I am making (minus the points I've made about causative relations). Read this (http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Strawson.html) and see if it helps at all.

In §1 I pointed out that the word physical, as used by genuine materialists, is coextensive with "real and concrete"-so that to say something is a physical phenomenon is simply to say that it is a real (spatiotemporal) phenomenon. But then why use "physical"? Why not simply use "real"? And why bother with "real," when talking about concrete things that are assumed to exist? It is clearly redundant. All one needs, to mark the distinctions that are centrally at issue in discussion of the unfortunately named "mind-body problem," are "mental" and "nonmental," "experiential" and "non-experiential." One can simply declare oneself to be a experiential-and-non-experiential monist: one who registers the indubitable reality of experiential phenomena and takes it that there are also non-experiential phenomena. I nominate this position for the title realistic monism.

"But if one can do without 'physical,' then the word 'materialist,' used so diligently in this chapter, is just as superfluous; and it is deeply compromised by its history."

I think, nevertheless, that the word materialist, as an adjective formed from the natural-kind term matter, can be harmlessly and even illuminatingly retained. What is matter? It is whatever we are actually talking about when we talk about concrete reality, and realistic materialist monists who take it that experiential phenomena are wholly material in nature can assert with certainty that there is such a thing as matter, for they can know with certainty that there is such a thing as concrete reality (i.e. experiential phenomena). What they will want to add to this is an acknowledgement that nothing can count as matter unless it has some sort of non-experiential being-together with the working presumption (modulated by awareness of the extent of our ignorance) that current physics's best account of the structure of reality is genuinely reality-mirroring in certain ways. If in fact current physics gets nothing right, then one might say that their claim to be materialists effectively lapses; but so does everyone else's.

As a realistic materialist monist, then, I presume that physics's best account of the structure of reality is genuinely reality-mirroring in substantive ways, and that the term materialist is in good order. It has travelled far from some of its past uses, but there is no good reason to think that its meaning is especially tied to its past use, still less to one particular part of its past use, 7 and there is a sense in which its past use makes it particularly well worth retaining: it makes the claim that the present position is materialist vivid by prompting resistance that turns out to be groundless when the position is properly understood.

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 01:32 AM

Your model comes into conflict in that it proposes mechanical effects (the end results of which is volitional action) without a correspondingly physical (and thus measurable) source of energy. You are infusing energy into a system from the "ether," or in this case, from the fundamental existent. So, where did all the energy come from prior to the Big Bang? It must have come from "somewhere."

loseyourname

Dec9-04, 01:56 AM

So, where did all the energy come from prior to the Big Bang? It must have come from "somewhere."

You're missing the point. Whether or not it's possible to infuse energy into an otherwise closed system, the change in energy present in the system post-infusion should be measurable, especially when the energy is used to cause a mechanical action. I do not object to the possibility of energy being infused from outside of the universe (it would not technically violate the law provided the energy still came from "something"), only to this energy being treated as non-physical simply because it was.

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 04:21 AM

You're missing the point. Whether or not it's possible to infuse energy into an otherwise closed system, the change in energy present in the system post-infusion should be measurable, especially when the energy is used to cause a mechanical action. I do not object to the possibility of energy being infused from outside of the universe (it would not technically violate the law provided the energy still came from "something"), only to this energy being treated as non-physical simply because it was.But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

selfAdjoint

Dec9-04, 11:19 AM

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

The answer to this is from Johnny Carson. Yes, and suppose there was a chicken named George who existed before the Big Bang and was composed of chicken nuggets? Gee, Iacchus, we can suppose anything but why on earth should we?

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 12:40 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec9-04, 01:30 PM

The answer to this is from Johnny Carson. Yes, and suppose there was a chicken named George who existed before the Big Bang and was composed of chicken nuggets? Gee, Iacchus, we can suppose anything but why on earth should we?

Well, I can think of two logical reasons to imagine (for modeling purposes) some existential plane that precedes and survives the formation of the universe. The first is, there is no explanation for where everything came from. If we can imagine quantum fluctionations bubbling up universes, why can't we suppose an absolute potentiality out of which everything arises and eventually returns?

A second logical reason to imagine an unobservable plane of existence is because no one can figure out what everything is made of. Everyone says its energy, but then when you try to say energy is "something" you are told its just a calculating/measuring concept. If energy is really nothing how is it doing work, composing matter, fueling life . . . ?

Something of a constitutional nature appears to be missing from the current physical model of the universe, why couldn't that be some as-yet unobserved potentiality? It wasn't that long ago virtual particles were unobserved, so just because we haven't observed it doesn't mean it is a useful modeling possibility. That's what is happening with "dark energy" now. Nobody can observe it, but we do see the universe behaving in a way that indicates something is there.

Rader

Dec9-04, 02:37 PM

What about electro-magnetic induction? Is it possible that consciousness is induced through the brain? And, perhaps everything else that maintains an electro-magnetic field?

The components or atoms of everything that is physical do have electro-magnetic fields. If your definition of induced, is to produce (an electric current or a magnetic charge) by induction, then I would say when I am conscious my brain has electrical activity is a alive and working. If you disassemble me you will observe that I do not work. Can you come to a conclusion then, if the lack of the body is the reason why there is no more consciousness? Notwithstanding we observe things act like they should because that’s what they are and all have electro-magnetic fields that pertain to what ever there complexity is. If you took a radio or TV back in time a hundred years, would anybody think different, that nobody was in the box?

loseyourname

Dec9-04, 02:59 PM

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 03:29 PM

The components or atoms of everything that is physical do have electro-magnetic fields. If your definition of induced, is to produce (an electric current or a magnetic charge) by induction, then I would say when I am conscious my brain has electrical activity is a alive and working. If you disassemble me you will observe that I do not work. Can you come to a conclusion then, if the lack of the body is the reason why there is no more consciousness? Notwithstanding we observe things act like they should because that’s what they are and all have electro-magnetic fields that pertain to what ever there complexity is. If you took a radio or TV back in time a hundred years, would anybody think different, that nobody was in the box?If consciousness were an energy field that passes between your ears, then one would presume that consciousness exists within that energy field. Yes, and if you destroy the body, then it is no longer capable of "conducting" this energy field.

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 03:36 PM

Something of a constitutional nature appears to be missing from the current physical model of the universe, why couldn't that be some as-yet unobserved potentiality? It wasn't that long ago virtual particles were unobserved, so just because we haven't observed it doesn't mean it is a useful modeling possibility. That's what is happening with "dark energy" now. Nobody can observe it, but we do see the universe behaving in a way that indicates something is there.Forgive me for not being totally up on phyisics, but what is "dark energy?" Has it got anything to do with black holes?

Iacchus32

Dec9-04, 03:50 PM

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

loseyourname

Dec9-04, 04:13 PM

So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

Energy is conserved in induction. Mechanical energy (motion of a magnet through a field) is converted to electrical potential.

Electromagnetic Induction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_induction)

Notice the "N" in Faraday's equation.

I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

Fine by me. You may be right, you may not be. Ultimately, you're just speculating. What I'm saying is that whether or not your speculation is correct is irrelevant to whether or not energy is conserved in a neurological system under conscious control.

Les Sleeth

Dec9-04, 04:50 PM

Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

That's convenient. I think I'll define everything that's physical as spiritual, so then I get to claim every physical effect has a spiritual cause.

As I've already suggested, every key argument you make in this thread seems circular, so much so that I can't tell if you have a point or not. :yuck: Since you've not addressed my complaint yet, I wonder if you really see how this is true (I'm sure you understand what a circular argument is).

Let's take your argument apart:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.

Efficacious means having the ability to produce a desired result, so I assume this is how you are defining an efficacious relationship between p-consciousness and the brain. In other words, consciousness causes brain effects.

If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.

This is where I think your problem starts. It would be okay if you only mean the brain itself burns energy to function. If you also mean consciousness must itself burn energy, it is an utterly unsupported assumption. I'll hold off completing that idea until the end.

Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.

You can only correctly say that if p-consciousness initiates brain functions, then brain functions, having proven to be physical, must have used energy.

If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.

That's right, because energy is a physical concept. :rolleyes: Right now you are getting fatally circular. The source of energy is from matter, or the presence of matter. That is how it is defined. That's why Iaachus is wrong to talk about non-physical energy; it doesn't make any sense given the official definition of energy. There is no such thing, by definition! That's not to say, however, there isn't something else which can initiate and cause, but which is NOT derived from material processes.

Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.

P-consciousness is efficacious.

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

This is nothing but a physicalist tautology! You argue consciousness is physical by first limiting the definition of effacacious only to that which is physical. The tactic is clear, you set up your "proof" so there was no other conclusion possible.

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless. :cool:

loseyourname

Dec9-04, 05:10 PM

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless. :cool:

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source. The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal. The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

Les Sleeth

Dec9-04, 06:19 PM

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Physicalness is anything associated with matter, which ordinarily exists in one of three physical states: solid, liquid, or gas. The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology provides an interesting way to think about matter: “[matter is] The substance composing bodies perceptible to the senses. The distinguishing properties of matter are gravitation and inertia. Any entity exhibiting these properties when at rest is matter. . . . All material bodies have mass, which is a measure of inertia; every material body near the Earth’s surface has weight, which is a measure of the Earth’s gravitational attraction for the body.”

Mass and the effects of mass are much more defining of physicalness than anything else. Mechanicalness is exhibited in physicalness, but that isn't what defines it. It's like saying the presence of water in biology defines biology. Mechanics are just one thing that shows up in physics. So I can't go along with your concept of physical. You cannot just arbitrarily claim every characteristic exhibited in physicalness has a physical origin. You don't even know what the origin of physicalness is (of course, neither does anyone else).

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects. Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things. And then they project that failure of perception into theories which reflect what they themselves have simply missed. That's why, IMO, none of your answers address my claim that your argument is circular. If you only micro-focus on mechanics it will be difficult see you are only looking at one aspect of a multifaceted situation.

Rader

Dec9-04, 10:59 PM

Fliption

Dec10-04, 03:16 PM

Things are hectic and there's a lot going on so my brain may not be functioning properly (for a change :biggrin: ), but I just don't get this thread. I don't mean to interrupt an intense debate but the moment I read the original post I couldn't help but ask myself "Who cares?". This logical proof at the beginning and the whole thread since seems to dwell on what "label" we get to assign to consciousness. Is it physical or is it non-physical? Again, I asks "Who cares?". A proof one way or the other is obviously an exercise in semantics. What do we know about consciousness after reading this proof that we didn't know before? Nothing from what I can see. As a matter of fact it seems this proof glosses over the real issue of consciousness by assuming
"Consciousness is efficacious" seemingly only for the purpose of assigning it to a category. Who cares?

Everyone is defining physical and non-physical differently and always has. I have pointed this out for at least two years now. Here now we have a logical proof that consciousness is physical. What does this mean? Well, it depends on what "physical" means. So all we really have is a conclusion that is built into the definition to begin with. It tells us nothing about whether consciousness is efficacious, which is part of the real issue anyway. We just assumed that was true.

The whole discussion seems to be about who's word we get to use (all preconceived notions included) and I'm not real clear on why it matters. Please straighten me out if I'm missing something which I surely could be.

loseyourname

Dec10-04, 11:36 PM

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions. It's the same reason any man that is not married is a bachelor. It's not an argument. It's a definition. Again, I can use a different word if that will make you happy.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

That's correct. I should have mentioned that change in a system can also be brought about by removing energy. Either way, energy is required.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious. The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes. The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

Clearly, I'm attempting to establish a framework for efficacious p-consciousness, so in order to do so I must, for the purposes of my investigation, assume that it is. The second and third ways in which my argument can fail would both constitute violations of the law of conservation of energy. (Edit: Actually the second way might not violate the law after all. I just received the Rosenberg book in the mail, and I suspect he might have found a way around that little problem.) Now, don't get me wrong. It's entirely possible that the laws of physics as we know them are wrong, at least when they are applied to phenomenal causation as manifested in human consciousness. I'm not discounting this possibility. I'm simply doing what most investigators do: assuming to being with that the laws we already have in place are correct and do apply. After making this initial assumption, we then move on to make an attempt at fitting the phenomenon in question into a framework that is consistent with these laws. If it subsequently becomes clear that this won't work, we then make the contrary assumption that the laws we know do not apply to the case we are investigating. That has yet to be shown, so for the purposes of investigation, I continued to make my assumption.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Actually, if I had to take a guess, I'd say they weren't. It is certainly counterintuitive to suggest otherwise. Thankfully, I'm not constrained by the limits of my intuition when it comes time to make an attempt at establishing a consistent framework that is not ad hoc. My research into neurology strongly suggests that a lot of what we intuit about consciousness is at best misleading, and at worst dead wrong.

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects.

That's exactly what I think as well, but I'm not going to post it simply because I think it. I'm going to post only what I think I have a decent shot of demonstrating.

Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things.

Well, I think you're obsessing with the definition of "physical" that I'm using to the point that you gloss over the fact that what I've put into this thread is only a very small part of an overall framework that I've come nowhere near working out, a framework that may very well stress "interconnectedness" more than you think.

Les Sleeth

Dec11-04, 03:56 PM

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality? You didn't just define a term you were going to use, you stated how reality works, and for that you don't get be arbitrary. Either it is known to be true or its not. If it's not, then you don't get to use it as an assumption of as though it is a fact.

The other "defining tactic" you are employing is equally improper. What if the theme of this thread were "Can Everything be Reduced to Mind?" So then when you point out the realities of physicalness I just say, "well, I'm defining that as mind." It is a ridiculous debating ploy because your assertions can't possibly be falsified (ask anyone who's tried to debate an idealist), and because such circular arguments prevent you from saying anything meaningful to begin with.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

Look at this assertion and explain to me how it doesn't render your entire assertion pointless: "I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

The real and established debate, the one I assumed you were speaking to, is if consciousness can be explained by known physical principles. Everyone already knows that however consciousness is explained, it still must be able to cause physical effects (like causing body movements).

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here . . . One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

But then you have to change the definition of energy. Energy is defined quite strictly as physical, so how can it be non-physical too? Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail); but if it is energy, then it is physical.

loseyourname

Dec11-04, 05:49 PM

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality?

We do get to fuss with words somewhat when it really isn't entirely clear what they mean (if it were, we would not be having this discussion). For instance, it was once thought that breath was non-physical, that the properties of life were non-physical, that the propagation of light waves was non-physical. We gradually had to include these under the umbrella of physicalism when two things were realized. One thing was that they behaved mechanically. Another was that they were composed of matter (or in the case of light, energy quanta). So the question becomes: Which of these considerations is the reason they came to be considered physical? And correspondingly, what exactly does it mean for something to be physical?

We clearly have two options, and which you choose likely depends on what view of physicalism you take. You can take the view that only matter/energy can be considered physical, which is the view you seem to be taking. I'll explain why I don't share that view. It begins with the ontology of energy as physical stuff. Consider how it is defined: the capacity to perform work. This is a vague definition that fails to take into account the fact that certain massless particles, that do seem to be material of some sort and not simply a property of other material, are nothing more than energy quanta (string theory would hold that they are exactly the same material as matter, only with different vibrational signatures). The question we are faced with now is the same one I just asked: Given that energy and matter seem to be interchangeable manifestations of the same "stuff," is it this "stuff" that is to be considered physical? Are the physical facts nothing more than facts about relational properties between matter/energy "stuff?" You seem to think that they are.

There is another way of looking at it, though. Even before energy was known to be the same "stuff" as matter, it was still held to be a physical phenomenon. I ask why that was? My answer was that it was a mechanical property of matter and so figured into the mechanics of physical theory. Theory-physicalism, or t-physicalism, holds simply that the physical facts are those that describe relational properties, period. I take this to mean that any thing that can have a causal relation to another thing is physical. I see your view of physicalism (all that is matter/energy is everything) as matieralism. I will grant that many people, and even dictionaries, see the two as synonomous, but I'm trying my best to explain why I do not agree. I will elaborate below.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

You're right. That doesn't make sense. It's also not what I did. I challenge you to find any instance of my defining everything as physicalness. I think I've been about as specific as a person could possibly be with definitions at this point, and it should be clear that I've defined "physical" to mean anything that is bound by mechanical laws of cause and effect and "physicalism" to mean the theory that states facts about causal relationships between objects are the only facts. It should be clear by now why this is. If a causal relationship behaves mechanically, then it can be described by mathematics (even if only probabilistically). If it can be described by mathematics, then it can be included into the study of physics. I think this is the most consistent definition of "physical" out there. Given this definition, I'm not even personally a physicalist, but I am at least investigating the possibility that consciousness is a phenomenon that can be explained by a physical theory (although I intuitively suspect it likely will not).

"I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

It says that for consciousness to behave in a way not describable by physical theory (and hence not be physical), it must be one of two things: It must either be contracausal, or it must be an intrinsic property of matter/energy "stuff" that is not a part of relational causality.

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

You might question the soundness, but unless you disagree that the hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens are valid argument forms (you would be at odds with every single logician in the world if you did), you cannot question the logic. Anyway, all I was attempting to prove was what I stated in the paragraph above. Let me paraphrase myself:

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

Actually, let's examine this a bit. It isn't strictly a hole in the argument, because the argument is really only meant to establish a hypothetical conditional, not any fact about reality. Nonetheless, I get the feeling that this might actually be a fairly fruitful way in which to approach a theory of consciousness that at least isn't covered isn't by any currently known physics. I've been thinking about your idea of the fundamental existent as a causative agent of energetic action rather than of material action (obviously, energy itself is the cause of material action). Even if we consider energy to be the same "stuff" as matter, because of the definition of work, a causative agent that only acts on energy actually wouldn't perform any work. Work is defined as force applied over a certain distance, and force is defined as mass multiplied by acceleration. It should be clear that, because energy has no mass, that no force, and hence no work, is needed to cause a change in its behavior. The question of whether or not the fundamental existent is a cause of energetic behavior in a mathematically describable manner is still relevant to the question of whether or not it is physical under my framework, but it is certainly not covered by any known theory of physics.

Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail)l.

Actually, I don't see that as being a possibility. Because work is performed when a material action is initiated, energy must be required by the definition of energy. I think looking into the initiation of energetic action is indubitably the potentially fruitful avenue we've uncovered here. Thanks for the help.

StatusX

Dec11-04, 10:03 PM

If I understand you right, loseyourname, you're saying that consciousness causing physical events and the conservation of energy are incompatible views. I agree with this, as I'll illustrate below, but I think it might be that some of the confusion is coming from a difference in the definition of phenomenal consciousness.

Everything we have explained so far with physics has been functional relationships. No physical theory has made any claims about the intrinsic qualities of substances (neutrons or energy, for example). The hard problem of consciousness arises because experience is entirely intrinsic. This may be controversial, but I believe that every function of the human brain can be explained, from learning to believing to laughing.

First let me explain what I don't mean. I don't mean the subjective experience of finding something funny or feeling a spiritual connection to the world, or anything like that. I mean the physical processes that take place in our brain when we think about something. We will one day be able to correlate electrical activity in the brain to specific thoughts. We will be able to explain exactly what our neurons are doing when we feel sad and start to cry. This is NOT an explanation of consciousness, it is an explanation of the functional relationships between different parts of our bodies and the outside world, and there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that these are within the explanatory reach of the current scientific method.

So when you say consciousness can't have an effect on the world, I couldn't agree more, because that is the definition of consciousness. It is what we subjectively experience, not the functions carried out by our brains. Now some people may say that experiences do affect the physical world. When I feel angry, I act differently than when I'm happy. Maybe I'll decide to punch a stranger in the back of the head. That's a physical event that was caused by a subjective feeling, right? Well, wrong. That is caused by physical processes that took place in the brain. Something physical happened, say your girlfriend called and told you she never wanted to see you again, and these sound waves caused neuron firing patterns in your brain that continued to be altered by sensroy information throughout the day until you saw that guys head and it triggered a signal to be sent to the muscles in your arm. I hate these dry, obvious explanations as much as anyone else, but you have to understand the crucial point. Experience was not mentioned once. This chain of physical actions took place, and the only place for consciousness was to experience the sounds, emotions, sights, and sore fist.

Many people don't believe this, and think that if we didn't have subjective experiences, we wouldn't have felt those strong emotions, and wouldn't have punched that poor guy. This is where conservation of energy helps to illustrate the flaw in this way of thinking. Assume that it was the subjective experience of anger that caused you to punch him, and there would be no physical way to predict this action just from examining the state of your brain a few minutes prior. Now I doubt you'd argue that it took some kind of impulse from a neuron in the central nervous system to get that arm to start moving. So what caused the impulse. One second, everything was quiet, and the next, spontaneously, an impulse fired. That violates conservation of energy.

One counterargument is to say that the laws of physics as we know them do not apply in the brain. This is unappealing physically, and while I would agree we don't yet have a complete description of the universe because of the remaining gaping hole of consciousness, I think that any final explanation will be universal, and not specific to the configuration of atoms in our brain. Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.

Pavel

Dec12-04, 12:36 AM

Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.
Hey man, I thought you left the consciousness topic, so I never bothered replying back to you, but here you go again :smile: . Thanks for the reference to the Chalmers paper, I did read it. I loved the way he set up the problem. I thought he was superb and I was with him all the way... until he started talking about his proposals. I'm not going through all the problems that I had with him, until the need arises in posts that fall back on his ideas. Since you mentioned information, I want to comment on it, as it was one of the problems or misunderstandings that I had.

First of all, the use of the term "information" is probably a misnomer in his paper, unless he really means information. He needs to find another, very objective and naturalistic term. Another example of what I consider misnomers is when people talk about "purpose" in the context of the biological evolution. I hear all the time "the evolution meant", or "the purpose of the protein..." Remember, the evolution is blind and everything is working the way it is, is because the organic matter, accidentally or by external natural events, got arranged into a configuration that allowed it to "survive and procreate". By the same token, the genetic code, or the "information" in the DNA is a misnomer because it attributes a conscious process to something completely blind.

Information implies a conscious process behind coding and behind its interpretation. Otherwise, it's randomn noise. In my understanding, in Chalmers' view, consciousness stands to chemical brain in the same relationship as information stands to the computer running the software. If that's the case, there's a big problem, as far as I'm concerned.

I, the programmer and the end user, am the one who assigns and interpretes the information. It's something abstract that exists only in mind, or by convention and consensus, in similar minds. My mind can assign interpretation to anything. Did you see the toast with the image of virgin Mary on the news that was being sold on E-bay for over 10 grand? The toast apparently carries information but it's up to the "viewer" to interpret that information. So, my question is what is the ontological status of this information that Chalmers categorically equates with consciousness? Who is the viewer and who is the coder in his picture, what process, specifically. To me, if I believe in pure physicality of consciousness, I see neurons made up of chemicals, that's it, there's no information per se, just like there’s no inherent information in the gene. The computer analogy is wrong because I can clearly explain the information with respect to the human mind assigning interpretation to bits. So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?

Pavel.

Fliption

Dec12-04, 11:38 AM

loseyourname: One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

Les: I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

I wanted to ask here if it was possible for consciousness to just be along for the ride? It just experiences the qualia it associates with the information it receives from brain processes. The fact that we cannot know otherwise is what the hard problem is all about. But Status X has an eloquent post explaining all of this.

It says that for consciousness to behave in a way not describable by physical theory (and hence not be physical), it must be one of two things: It must either be contracausal, or it must be an intrinsic property of matter/energy "stuff" that is not a part of relational causality.

But we already know this right? Because consciousness appears to be "contracausal" in a world where science insist everything is causal is the reason we have a hard problem. Your logical argument just seems to have set up a proof for what we already know. It just goes the long way around by inserting categories(which are meaningless anyway).

Ultimately your conclusion is making a statement about one of the assumptions you made, "Consciousness is efficacious". This is why I was asking the questions in my previous post. Why bother with this debate on definitions and categories and let's just discuss the real issue. Is consciousness casual? The truth about it's causality may or may not decide whether it is physical depending on how one defines the word 'physical', but who cares about that anyway?

selfAdjoint

Dec12-04, 03:00 PM

RingoKid

Dec12-04, 03:54 PM

So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?

I suspect he's talking about the vibrational signatures of strings in a dimension of consciousness which takes into account the uncertainty principle. Information changes over time so that no 2 systems percieve the same result given the same input due to spatio temporal diffences giving rise to different subjective interpretations.

Physical to me means a percievable effect or object operating in 4d spacetime. String theory to me isn't a physical theory as it's background is not detectable by sensory perception inside of our 4d universe...yet!!!

What it is, is an elegant abstract mathematical theory that models reality and has the ability to include consciousness in a very simple and elegant fashion.

If strings are bands of energy and everything is made of strings but not everything is conscious then somewhere along the way an entity/accumulation of strings acquires consciousness by a vibrational signature in a compactified dimension of a Calabi-Yau manifold that is omni present and ever changing in 4d spacetime to allow the changing of matter due to movement of objects and the effects of electro magnetic fields.

So consciousness has it's origins in a non physical "location"

dimension2: a construct whereby objects or individuals can be distinguished;

Now what I'd like to know is who else is exploring this or is everyone too chickensh!t cos strings is still only a speculative theory with no physical evidence ???

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 04:19 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 05:35 PM

I find loseyourname's insistence on as much rigor as is available to be refreshing on this thread where hot air and squabbles over semantics are more common.

I don't know about anyone else, but I am not playing semantic games. I am trying to have a fair debate. Tell me how it makes sense to define physicalness as "anything that is bound by mechanical laws of cause and effect and 'physicalism' to mean the theory that states facts about causal relationships between objects are the only facts"??

In particular it is ridiculous to claim mechanistic cause and effect defines physical. We don't know that something non-physical can't have mechanistic characteristics as well. Mechanistic behavior is not what defines physicalness, it is merely part of it. It's the same way crystaline structure doesn't define ice; lots of other things have crystaline structure too.

His is not the definition physical science gives us, nor any dictionary/encyclopedia I can find, so why should I adopt his defintion just because he needs the definition to be a certain way to help him to make his argument?

Princeton's Word Reference site give the definition of physical science here (http://www.wordreference.com/definition/physical+science):

- the science of matter and energy and their interactions

On the same page you can find a definition for physicalness:

- the quality of being physical; consisting of matter

The Word Reference site gives several relevant definitions of physical here (http://www.wordreference.com/definition/physical):

1* physical
* involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit . . .

2* physical
* relating to the sciences dealing with matter and energy; especially physics; "physical sciences"; "physical laws"
3* physical, tangible, touchable
* having substance or material existence; perceptible to the senses; "a physical manifestation"; "surrounded by tangible objects"
4* physical
* according with material things or natural laws (other than those peculiar to living matter); "a reflex response to physical stimuli"

6* physical
* concerned with material things; "physical properties"; "the physical characteristics of the earth"; "the physical size of a computer"

Of Physicalism the Wikipedia says:

Physicalism is the metaphysical position that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- that is, matter and energy.

So tell me, what is semantic about insisting we use proper definitions. Physical is defined first and foremost by mass and energy, and then those properties and laws which stem from that. The tactic of redefining physical so you can claim broaden the meaning to include what isn't necessarily physical is a dubious approach.

StatusX

Dec12-04, 06:51 PM

That's if you define consciousness using only qualia, which has never made sense to me. How does it make sense that conscious experience is defined only by "what it's like" to taste a gourmet pizza, and then to say it is not conscious that I personally willed my intellect to learn and my body to create the dish I was going experience "what it's like"?

There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically. This isn't proof, but think of it like this. An alien race comes and studies us the way we study animals. They document our behavior and examine some of our bodies, and using advanced technology and scientific knowledge, they are able to explain why we do everything we do.

Now you seem to disagree that this is even theoretically possible. So I have to ask you: would they be able to completely explain the behavior of an earthworm? How about a mouse, a dog, or a monkey? If so, then why not a human? What is so fundamentally different? Now you might say it's consciousness; that we have it while animals don't. What evdience do you have for this? If this is so, then this alien race, assuming it doesn't have anything resembling our consciousness, will be baffled as to why it can explain the behavior of every creature on earth except humans. If instead you think that not all animal behavior can be explained, where is the line? Surely we'll understand bacteria, fungii, etc. Almost definitely, we'll explain the behavior of the most simple animals with brains. There would have to be some point in the hierarchy of animals where a mystical power creeped in. I'm sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that our behavior can't be explained.

StatusX

Dec12-04, 07:15 PM

First of all, the use of the term "information" is probably a misnomer in his paper, unless he really means information. He needs to find another, very objective and naturalistic term. Another example of what I consider misnomers is when people talk about "purpose" in the context of the biological evolution. I hear all the time "the evolution meant", or "the purpose of the protein..." Remember, the evolution is blind and everything is working the way it is, is because the organic matter, accidentally or by external natural events, got arranged into a configuration that allowed it to "survive and procreate". By the same token, the genetic code, or the "information" in the DNA is a misnomer because it attributes a conscious process to something completely blind.

Information implies a conscious process behind coding and behind its interpretation. Otherwise, it's randomn noise. In my understanding, in Chalmers' view, consciousness stands to chemical brain in the same relationship as information stands to the computer running the software. If that's the case, there's a big problem, as far as I'm concerned.

I, the programmer and the end user, am the one who assigns and interpretes the information. It's something abstract that exists only in mind, or by convention and consensus, in similar minds. My mind can assign interpretation to anything. Did you see the toast with the image of virgin Mary on the news that was being sold on E-bay for over 10 grand? The toast apparently carries information but it's up to the "viewer" to interpret that information. So, my question is what is the ontological status of this information that Chalmers categorically equates with consciousness? Who is the viewer and who is the coder in his picture, what process, specifically. To me, if I believe in pure physicality of consciousness, I see neurons made up of chemicals, that's it, there's no information per se, just like there’s no inherent information in the gene. The computer analogy is wrong because I can clearly explain the information with respect to the human mind assigning interpretation to bits. So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?

I haven't read enough of Chalmers to get a real sense of what he means by information. Like you mentioned, there is a massive amount of information in our DNA, so does that mean each DNA strand has awareness? I doubt it. Does the information in DNA need a conscious observer to be meanigfully called information? I doubt that too. Surely any adequately general definition of information we can come up with will cover the function of DNA, which is precisely to pass on the "information" of the species, regardless of the presence of any intelligent observers.

Whether we have a good definition of information yet is debatable, but there is an interesting link between information and entropy that seems to make the second law of thermodynamics more of a true law and not just a statistical trend. Here is a quote from the wikipedia article on information entropy:

"Shannon's definition of entropy is closely related to thermodynamic entropy as defined by physicists and many chemists. Boltzmann and Gibbs did considerable work on statistical thermodynamics, which became the inspiration for adopting the word entropy in information theory. There are relationships between thermodynamic and informational entropy. For example, Maxwell's demon reverses thermodynamic entropy with information but getting that information exactly balances out the thermodynamic gain the demon would otherwise achieve."

If information entropy can be incorporated into an objective physical theory, than it is a good candidate for the physical root of consciousness. Specifically, I think Chalmers probably means something more like the processing of information. This is extremely vague, but perhaps one way of interpreting this is that any system that can be simulated by a turing machine has some kind of experience. Maybe the complexity of the simulating machine is in some sense a measure of the sophistication of the conscious experience. This is all just speculation. The important point is that there is the possibilty that the world can still be completely described by its physical state, and that state is what determines how consciousness is distributed among physical systems. Whether the important structure in this correlation is information, in some sense, or something completely different, we don't know yet.

Now I don't intend to say this explains why consciousness arises from physical systems. That is philosophy, while the study of exactly how it does is (or one day will be) science, at least in my opinion.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 07:44 PM

Ultimately your conclusion is making a statement about one of the assumptions you made, "Consciousness is efficacious". This is why I was asking the questions in my previous post. Why bother with this debate on definitions and categories and let's just discuss the real issue. Is consciousness casual? The truth about it's causality may or may not decide whether it is physical depending on how one defines the word 'physical', but who cares about that anyway?

I can say why I am bothering with this point. It has to do with what is the baseline. Which is more basic, physicalness or consciousness? How you are discussing "causal" is confusing to me because we've been talking about it a couple of ways. One way is, can consciousness "cause" physical effects. The other is, is consciousness "caused" by physical processes. Which are you referring to?

If your meaning of "causal" is that consciousness cannot be shown to be caused by any principles present in creation, and so you want to discuss causality in that context as a strategy, I understand, especially given your new reading project. :wink:

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 07:56 PM

There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically. This isn't proof, but think of it like this. An alien race comes and studies us the way we study animals. They document our behavior and examine some of our bodies, and using advanced technology and scientific knowledge, they are able to explain why we do everything we do.

The rules of proof are, if you assert functionalism can account for consciousness, YOU are the one who has to make your case. No one expected to prove it CANNOT be done.

Now you seem to disagree that this is even theoretically possible.

Not theoretically impossible, practically impossible.

So I have to ask you: would they be able to completely explain the behavior of an earthworm? How about a mouse, a dog, or a monkey? If so, then why not a human?

I think it's pretty funny you can't distinguish between human consciousness and that of an earthworm.

So what is so fundamentally different? Now you might say it's consciousness; that we have it while animals don't. What evdience do you have for this?

Well, I don't necessarily think earthworms aren't conscious, minimully of course.

If this is so, then this alien race, assuming it doesn't have anything resembling our consciousness, will be baffled as to why it can explain the behavior of every creature on earth except humans.

How exactly will an alien race without consciousness be baffled? That makes NO sense. :tongue2:

If instead you think that not all animal behavior can be explained, where is the line? Surely we'll understand bacteria, fungii, etc. Almost definitely, we'll explain the behavior of the most simple animals with brains. There would have to be some point in the hierarchy of animals where a mystical power creeped in. I'm sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that our behavior can't be explained.

Yes, I've stated my opinion on this many times. I think the "line" is a nervous system.

Fliption

Dec12-04, 08:25 PM

Fliption, you may "already know" that consciousness is acausal, but I sure don't. I find loseyourname's insistence on as much rigor as is available to be refreshing on this thread where hot air and squabbles over semantics are more common.

You haven't understood what I'm saying. I am not claiming that consciousness is not causal. Go back and read the entire exchange again. Loseyourname was making a point that IF consciousness cannot be described by a physical (which means casual to him)theory then it suggest that consciousness might be fundamental. This is what I'm saying we already know. I'm reading this statement and saying "Duh!"

And my whole point on this thread has been that Loseyournames's logical argument is nothing but an exercise in semantics. It is more of the same as it relates to the semantics issues in this forum(hot air and squabbles). If you step back and think about what information this argument is really giving you(nothing) then you'll see what I mean.

Fliption

Dec12-04, 08:30 PM

Fliption

Dec12-04, 08:50 PM

One way is, can consciousness "cause" physical effects. The other is, is consciousness "caused" by physical processes. Which are you referring to?

I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

Well If Loseyouename is trying to make an argument along these lines then the thread doesn't seem as insane as it did before. I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any implications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

This is my impression of the first post. It's possible I missed some points in subsequent posts from him though.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 09:04 PM

I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any impications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

LOL. That's exactly my argument with him. :tongue2:

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 09:18 PM

A definition of consciousness might include that aspect and I guess that's why there are terms like A-consciousness and P-consciousness to differentiate between the various components. Qualia is the part that is best understood to be non-reducable and subject to study by science. "Will" I'm not so sure about. It seems one might could argue that "will" could be explained with brain processes.

But you've left out the rest of my argument. :cry: How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?

StatusX

Dec12-04, 09:39 PM

The rules of proof are, if you assert functionalism can account for consciousness, YOU are the one who has to make your case. No one expected to prove it CANNOT be done.

Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness. Now, I happen to use the term "consciousness" to mean nothing more than that, and if you want to include the various functional processes of the mind in your definition, then we're not talking about the same thing. You think those processes can't be explained by science and I think they can. But I don't think we necessarily have to agree on this to talk about the non-functional "aspect" of consciousness, which is subjective experience.

I think it's pretty funny you can't distinguish between human consciousness and that of an earthworm.

Well, I'm glad you had a good laugh about it, but you're missing the point. There is only a quantitative difference, ie, in the number of neurons and synapses. So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience? If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

How exactly will an alien race without consciousness be baffled? That makes NO sense. :tongue2:

It might not feel the subjective experience of being baffled as we do. But it would report confusion, much in the same way a computer would give an error message if it doesn't "know" what to do next. You have to understand that processes and the experiences of them are not the same thing.

Yes, I've stated my opinion on this many times. I think the "line" is a nervous system.

Ok, good. Does it have to be a biological one? If so, why?

StatusX

Dec12-04, 09:47 PM

I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.

Fliption

Dec12-04, 10:53 PM

But you've left out the rest of my argument. :cry: How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?

Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow :redface:

Fliption

Dec12-04, 10:55 PM

Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.

I agree with you.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 11:22 PM

Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow :redface:

I'm the one blushing now. :redface: I left a few words out of my post. Jeez, I must have been hungry. Okay, let's try it again.

The first step: my desire to have a qualia experience of what the experience of a pizza "is like."

I will my intellect to learn pizza making, I will my body to prepare it.

Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 11:40 PM

Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness.

Okay, but that isn't what you said initially. You said, "There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically."

So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience?

Personally I don't think it can, but the earthworm's subjectivity is so primitive I can't make a convincing case. But in brief, I see the worm's will as a primitive form of subjectivity.

If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

Well, there's more complexity too.

Fliption

Dec13-04, 08:44 AM

Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.

I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept :blushing: .

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 09:42 AM

I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept :blushing: .

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

As far as some functionalist only pointing to the behaviors, he still has to commit the error of denying subjectivity by refusing to acknowledge why the person is doing an act specifically aimed at achieving a subjective experience.

selfAdjoint

Dec13-04, 09:56 AM

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before.

I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that its self measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 10:40 AM

I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that its self measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.

True, I agree want or intent is theoretically programmable, I argued that myself earlier in this thread (or the thread on consciousness).

But you've left out the essential part of my statement, which is that an intent be linked to the desire for an experience of "what it's like." If that isn't part of the conditions, then I have nothing to say about intent alone (though I've recently seen papers by philosophers trying to prove intent alone indicates consciousness).

I am talking about what we're defining as conscious experience intiating actions, say using the brain and body to make a pizza, specifically out of the desire to have an experience of what the pizza "is like." In this case, intent is being used by what we've already defined as consciousness . . . it is not following programming. Even if someone were so experienced at making a pizza they could do it unconsciously, I still maintain that if consciousness sets the programming in motion in order to experience "what it's like" to taste pizza, then consciousness "causes" physical effects (everyone has probably forgot, but that's the original point I was making :smile: i.e., that consciousness can physcially "cause").

StatusX

Dec13-04, 10:49 AM

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

This is the premise I used in another thread to reach the opposite conclusion. I argued that zombies would try to discover the cause of their own "consciousness", just like us. I'm not saying that my way is necessarily right; neither way is. You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 11:20 AM

You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.

I am not saying anything about zombies, or anything about exploring questions. This is just a point of logic.

IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

If you don't accept that definition of consciousness, then the logic doesn't apply.

Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.

It just might be, but again, that's not the dynamic I am referring to. I am only referring to the IF-THEN I stated above.

hypnagogue

Dec13-04, 12:44 PM

IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

First, let me clear the air a bit. I do not put in any weight in deflationist arguments that suppose that subjective experience does not exist or is an "illusion"; it is obvious enough to me that it does exist. That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable. However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about, or derived from, qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. To an observer who goes no further, it could very likely appear as if bulb A's lighting up causes bulb B to light up. However, the truth of the situation is that inside the box, there is an electronic circuit designed such that whenever circuit 1 is on, circuit 2 turns on as well. It just so happens that circuit 1 is connected to bulb A, and circuit 2 to bulb B. So in actuality, the underlying circuitry is what causes bulb B to light up, not the lighting of bulb A. The correlated activity of A and B mimics that of 1 and 2, but the causative links between A and B and 1 and 2 are nonetheless distinct. In this case, obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.

Fliption

Dec13-04, 01:33 PM

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating [i]so it can have the experience of qualia.

OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way :yuck:

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 01:34 PM

That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

Well, this is an interesting thing to debate. Since I don’t believe your analysis is correct I am tempted to start another thread so we don’t hijack Loseyourname’s theme. If you don’t accept the point I am about to make, or I yours in the next post or two, then I’ll start that thread.

That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable.

Good, because my point is contingent on accepting qualia as true.

However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

I would agree we can be misguided by judgements and beliefs. But judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument.

How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Having stated judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument I probably don’t need to agree with you here, but I do agree.

Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. . . . obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.

Likewise, I don’t disagree.

Let me see if I can make my point more clear so you don’t argue against something I don’t mean.

Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

I am not arguing that epiphenomenalists or functionalists or behaviorists can’t point to any observable act whatsoever and find a way to explain it with their theory. I know they certainly can. Neither would I argue that I cannot believe or misjudge circumstances. But if I, as consciousness, merely attempt or even wish to produce a specific qualia experience, and that desire has physical consequences, then the existence of consciousness has been physically causal.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 01:38 PM

OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way :yuck:

It isn't about free will, I was trying to explain how consciousness can be seen as causal. I hope my last post to Hypnagogue made it more clear.

StatusX

Dec13-04, 02:08 PM

Here's a thought experiment that might illustrate the point:

Picture a man in a virtual reality system. This system simulates an external world and supplies the man with all the appropriate sensory stimulation. But another thing the program does is predict exactly how this man will react in given situations. It knows the sensory data this man is getting, and it knows the way his brain is wired to respond to this data. So, for example, if the program predicts the man will want to scratch his back, it will simulate the sights, sounds, and other sensations of the man scratching his own back. If it predicts the man will want pizza, it will get some virtual pizza for him. (Specifically, it will predict the man wants to stand up, then once hes up it will predict that he'll want to start walking towards the fridge, etc.)

This man will think he is in complete control. When he feels the subjective desire for pizza (say he sees a pizza hut commerical on tv), he will get some. But this is only because the computer has predicted he will feel this desire and done what it predicted the man would do.

Now there is no doubt the man would have subjective experiences identical to those he would have if he was really doing these things. The only crucial assumption is that human behavior can be predicted given a sufficient understanding of the person's brain and sensory experiences. This may not be practically possible, but the point remains even if it is only explainable in principe, ie, governed by physical laws. I think this basically does boil down to a free will argument, which is disappointing, but unavoidable.

One more thing. I don't know if you saw any of my posts in the other consciousness thread about zombies, but what we're talking about now is closely related. I was talking about the paradox that arises if consciousness is not causal. Zombies with the same physical makeup as us but lacking conscious experience would also try to explain consciousness, because that's really just physical behavior. I had a hard time convincing people they really would, but I hope you can all see why it's a real problem if you deny consciousness causal power. My resolution was that zombies can't exist, and if one physical system is conscious, an identical one must necessarilly also be.

hypnagogue

Dec13-04, 02:46 PM

Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects. Depending on how one interprets your exact phrasing, one could make a case that either your argument is circular or that the conditional is false; I'll argue briefly for both cases.

The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

If you don't mean to imply anything about the nature of a causal connection here and are simply listing correlated events, then you've underdetermined the problem, because we don't have enough information in the antecedent to determine the nature of the causitive link. Suppose we are given the events

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection between these events is that D leads directly to B, which leads directly to E, as you are suggesting; in other words, B happens in virtue of D, or D does the ontological 'work' required to bring about B. This causal model looks like this: D -> B -> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the ontological 'work,' and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. This causal model would look like this:

D
^
|
B -> E

In this scenario, your antecedent is true and your consequent is false, meaning that your original conditional statement was false as well.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 09:31 PM

By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

I didn’t realize that’s what you meant by “judgment.” I suppose I thought you meant it figuratively. So to get more precise now, if we use the experience of blue, then I was referring to the specific moment of experience when blue information reaches consciousness and is experienced. We don’t need a word or concept to experience that, we need only be conscious. If a person were able (and some humans are), they could refrain from assigning interpretation or inference or a name to the experience and still recognize blue the next time it was experienced. So my argument doesn’t concern mental interpretations or logical inference unless you want to say recognition is a judgment. I am just pointing to what happens when consciousness desires experience and that consequently involves the brain and body.

You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects.

Correct.

If you . . . are simply listing correlated events . . .

Let’s get this out of the way first. I am not simply listing correlated events.

The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

:confused: It is hardly a presumption or a vacuous conclusion to suggest cause and effect after repeated observations of subjective longing (“I want”) setting the brain and body in motion. Just how prohibitive are you going to be about considering something a cause which obviously behaves as one?

I am going to quote others a bit, so I’ll make them the color blue so they are easily recognized. :wink:

Rudolf Carnap points out, “From my point of view, it is more fruitful to replace the entire discussion of the meaning of causality by an investigation of the various kinds of laws that occur in science. When these laws are studied, it is a study of the kinds of causal connections that have been observed. The logical analysis of laws is certainly a clearer, more precise problem than the problem of what causality means.”

In other words, rather than speculate, lets look at how reality “works.” What does our experience with cause tell us? Consider the concept of causality as offered by physics Nobel laureate Max Born:

"1. Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.

2. Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.

3. Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact.”

Of course, he is talking about physical cause and effect, but without the endless “what ifs” rationalists tend to attach to every question, the meaning of cause should seem clear to anyone interested in being practical. When one class of occurrence A is followed under the same conditions every time by occurrence B, and when there is an unambiguous connection between A and B, then we can assume A causes B.

In their book “Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible” Aronson, Harré, and Way suggest, “The relative verisimilitude of laws can be thought of . . . as the degree to which the relationships between properties depicted in relevant theories resemble the actual relationships between properties in nature.”

They continue, “It is the method of manipulation. It is so commonplace that we are hardly aware of its ubiquitous role in our lives and practice. Every time we turn on the shower and stand beneath it we are, in effect, using the unobservable gravitational field to manipulate the water. The way that Stern and Gerlach manipulated magnetic fields to manipulate atomic nuclei in their famous apparatus is metaphysically much the same as our everyday strategy of standing under the shower.”

John Sowa, whose pragmatic thinking influenced me in the past http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/, and whose view of causality guided my response here says, “As Peirce would say (:!!) . . . love Peirce!), experience provides a pragmatic confirmation of the law of gravitation and its applicability to the event of taking a shower. But Peirce's view of law includes much more than the laws of logic and physics. In addition to the laws that make the shower work, he would include the habits and social conventions that cause people to take a shower. Various formulas ‘to which real events truly conform’ can be observed, tested, and verified at every level from mechanical interactions to the conventions, habits, and instincts of living creatures.’”

In the case of consciousness causing brain and body effects, there is an unswerving relationship between consciousness seeking specific experiences, and brain and bodily activity. What possible reason is there to question the consistent response of brain and body in accordance with conscious intent? If I say lift your hand, and you will it, then hand lifts. You want water, you will your body to get water to drink, and it does.

You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn’t always in control of one’s physical and mental faculties, I’d agree. But that doesn’t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

When we observe the same consistency between two events in purely physical situations, science accepts that as an adequate indication of cause and effect. So is there a different standard of certainty required for the apparent cause and effect relationship between consciousness and brain/body?

To make sure it doesn’t seem I’ve wandered from my original argument, let me reaffirm that. I claim that because experience is what defines consciousness, when its intention/desire to stimulate a specific experience in itself results in brain and body involvement, those are instances of consciousness causing physical effects.

EDIT: I suppose to be correct I should say those are instances of consciousness triggering physical effects. I am not implying that consciousness is handling the entire range of activity-movement of the brain and body. It appears conscious lives in the brain, and is able to affect it in what ever place it needs to for the brain and body to respond. The pathways for physical response are already set up and powered, ready to respond.

loseyourname

Dec13-04, 10:02 PM

His is not the definition physical science gives us, nor any dictionary/encyclopedia I can find, so why should I adopt his defintion just because he needs the definition to be a certain way to help him to make his argument?

Princeton's Word Reference site give the definition of physical science here (http://www.wordreference.com/definition/physical+science):

- the science of matter and energy and their interactions

On the same page you can find a definition for physicalness:

- the quality of being physical; consisting of matter

The Word Reference site gives several relevant definitions of physical here (http://www.wordreference.com/definition/physical):

1* physical
* involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit . . .

2* physical
* relating to the sciences dealing with matter and energy; especially physics; "physical sciences"; "physical laws"
3* physical, tangible, touchable
* having substance or material existence; perceptible to the senses; "a physical manifestation"; "surrounded by tangible objects"
4* physical
* according with material things or natural laws (other than those peculiar to living matter); "a reflex response to physical stimuli"

6* physical
* concerned with material things; "physical properties"; "the physical characteristics of the earth"; "the physical size of a computer"

Well, I thought I gave a pretty good account of why I think these definitions are inadequate and fail to communicate the essence of what a physical interaction is. If you're satisfied with these definitions, continue to use them.

Of Physicalism the Wikipedia says:

Physicalism is the metaphysical position that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- that is, matter and energy.

So tell me, what is semantic about insisting we use proper definitions. Physical is defined first and foremost by mass and energy, and then those properties and laws which stem from that. The tactic of redefining physical so you can claim broaden the meaning to include what isn't necessarily physical is a dubious approach.

I don't exactly see how it helps to describe "physicalism" as the theory that "everything is physical." That explains nothing. If all "physical" meant was "pertaining to matter or energy," then it would include the intrinsic properties of matter and energy, but it does not. It is this central inconsistency in the idea of physicalism that led me to attempt a better definition.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

Anyway, I did want to show that anything that is the cause of a mechanical effect must use energy, because the definition of energy entails that. I really just wanted to use this as a jumping off point from which we can then move on to the possibilities for the principles by which this interaction takes place, all the while assuming that phenomenal consciousness is indeed efficacious (an assumption that I guess you don't mind since you agree with it). Energy has to be used. There is no way around that. That's the reason that I actually like your idea of the fundamental existent as an organizational principle that plays a causative role in the workings of energy, since it does not take (or at least there is the theoretical possibility that it does not take) work to perform a causal role on a massless material agent.

I'm honestly not too concerned with the historical origins of consciousness and materialism, or attempting to delineate the order in which each came to be (or perhaps in which one came to be from another that simply always existed). This investigation may come to such conclusions incidentally, but that really isn't the point. The point is simply to determine relations as they exist currently. Let's just run with your own theory here, but develop it a little further. If there is such a fundamental existent that preceded all other existence, what is it and how does it give rise to experiential phenomena? For that matter, if it is indeed fundamental, how does it give rise to non-experiential phenomena? Is it truly the fundamental existent, or is it in fact only a property of things that exist? If it is an organizational principle by which matter/energy comes to create complex structures that accounts for structures that you don't think known organizational principles do, how is it different from these other principles? Of course, to ask that, we need to know what these other principles are to begin with. Are they relational properties that exist because of interactions between material agents, or are they intrinsic properties that give rise to the interactions of material agents?

I really didn't mean to get into such a fundamental aspect of metaphysics, but I'm coming to realize that any construction of a model of consciousness is going to have to account for these others things if it is not to be ad hoc.

loseyourname

Dec13-04, 10:11 PM

You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn?t always in control of one?s physical and mental faculties, I?d agree. But that doesn?t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 10:33 PM

I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.

You didn't include the timing on that experiment, but I assume you mean his brain was stimulated before he pushed the button. If so, to me it indicates exactly the opposite of the interpretation you gave.

If consciousness is not created by the brain, but is instead associated with it, then you could stimulate the brain to act, but consciousness, having not initiated it, would be unaware of that until after the action.

Les Sleeth

Dec13-04, 10:46 PM

See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

This is a pretty big point. Traditionally, non-physical has been described as lacking materiality, and materiality is associated with mass/matter. Why is that significant?

You say math could describe mechanics, and you are correct. But that isn't all there is to science. In science, a mathematical prediction must be experienced, and with the senses, to be considered true! You cannot leave this out of any debate about what is real to physicalists.

Once you no longer require mass and the effects of mass to be the definition of physicality, you have also eliminated the possibility that something unavailable to the senses is present, lacks mass, but has a mechanical or orderly aspect to it. The definition of physical I'm arguing for allows both physical and non-physical to have ordered aspects, but the demarcation between them is mass and the effects of mass (which is also the definition virtually every authority states).

selfAdjoint

Dec13-04, 11:58 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 12:19 AM

Mass is pretty small cheese in modern physics. The mass of protons and neutrons, which is nearly all your tangible mass, is partly due to interactions between quarks and Higgs particles, and partly the binding energy of the sea of gluons that holds them together. Neither string theory or LQG add anything that would make mass more central.

Let me ask you a sincere question. If it weren't for the realities of mass, what would there be to observe? Gravity, for instance, might exist, but who would know it unless something with mass were present? What was the measure of mass at the moment of the Big Bang? Even if you say there is significant masslessness around, how much of hasn't emerged from mass or isn't manifested by the presence of mass?

RingoKid

Dec14-04, 12:45 AM

Isn't mass another vibrational signature of a string operating in a compactified dimension that masquerades as a higgs field ???

The transition through said field is how a particle/object acquires mass.

so mass while having a physical presence in our 4d universe doesn't limit universes to having objects with mass only universe that have 3d + time d...

...like ours ???

consciousness on the other hand not requiring mass or a physical presence to exist transcends the multiverse scenario...

What then is there to observe in a universe without mass ???... seemingly chaotic string activity like neo vision in the matrix

of course this is all IMHO...

selfAdjoint

Dec14-04, 11:41 AM

Let me ask you a sincere question. If it weren't for the realities of mass, what would there be to observe? Gravity, for instance, might exist, but who would know it unless something with mass were present? What was the measure of mass at the moment of the Big Bang? Even if you say there is significant masslessness around, how much of hasn't emerged from mass or isn't manifested by the presence of mass?

Interesting question. In addition to science-fictional zombies, we now have to consider science-fictional pure energy beings. Since in GR (only an effective theory, I know, but this aspect of it is lovingly preserved in current tries at quantum gravity) not only mass but momentum and energy gravitate; in fact the "mass term" in the momentum-energy tensor carries the energy equivalent: m/c^2 of local mass, and is perfectly capable of adding other forms of energy. So pure energy beings in a pure energy universe could observe gravity. If we talk about very high energy domains, like the earliest moments of the universe, the three other forces are unified, the masses of all the elementary particles are zero, but you still have the binding energy of the gluon sea, so there is something to curve space that is localized, too.

hypnagogue

Dec14-04, 12:00 PM

So my argument doesn’t concern mental interpretations or logical inference unless you want to say recognition is a judgment. I am just pointing to what happens when consciousness desires experience and that consequently involves the brain and body.

Well, there are two layers here. You can recognize that it feels as if your conscious intention is causing you to act. That would be a first order judgment; it is simply an observation of what it is like to be in a particular experiential state, and nothing more. There is no arguing that it feels as if conscious intention causes bodily action.

However, if we rely on the experiential feeling of conscious agency to come to the conclusion that consciousness is in fact a causal agent, then we have moved beyond mere recognition / observation / first order judgment. Now we are using information from consciousness to make judgments about phenomena beyond just subjective experience in and of itself-- in this case, that consciousness actually does have causal agency, as opposed to just seeming as if it does. This is a higher order judgment, and as such it is a belief / logical construct that can be wrong. For instance, in addition to mere observation of qualitative experience, we are also relying here at least on the assumption that our qualitative experience of self-agency is veridical, that it accurately depicts the reality of the causal situation.

Let’s get this out of the way first. I am not simply listing correlated events.

:confused: It is hardly a presumption or a vacuous conclusion to suggest cause and effect after repeated observations of subjective longing (“I want”) setting the brain and body in motion. Just how prohibitive are you going to be about considering something a cause which obviously behaves as one?

Sorry if I didn't explain myself properly, but that isn't what I meant. Let's look at your conditional statement again: "If a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." The reason I asked about the wording of the antecedent is as follows. You're trying to establish a causal relation between consciousness and physical action in the body, but on one reading of your antecedent, you've already built in this causal relationship. If you mean "...initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about" to mean that consciousness, upon having desired a certain experience, actually goes down into the brain and somehow starts up a causal chain of events, then your argument is circular. In this case, your conditional statement would essentially be "If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events," which is a vacuous statement.

The only way to avoid this is to be neutral about the nature of the causal relationship between consciously experienced desire and bodily action from the start. That is, we should initially consider them only to be correlated (since this correlation is without dispute), and then try to establish a causal relationship from that correlation and whatever other information may be relevant. That's what I was getting at when I asked if you were considering these two events only to be correlated when you mention them in the antecedent of your conditional statement.

The consistent correlation between consciously experienced intention and bodily action is certainly suggestive of a causitive link between the two. However, starting from just the observations that these events are correlated, we are not justified in concluding that they are causally linked in the way you want to demonstrate-- that consciousness is directly causally responsible for bodily action. For example, this correlation is also consistent with the scenario I drafted in my previous post, where consciously experienced intention and bodily action are both the effects of a single underlying cause. In this case, they are links on the same causal chain, but nonetheless they are linked in an indirect manner such that conscious experience is not the causal agent responsible for initiating bodily action. Since the antecedent of your conditional statement is consistent with a conclusion that contradicts the consequent you wanted to demonstrate, the conditional statement is false.

When we observe the same consistency between two events in purely physical situations, science accepts that as an adequate indication of cause and effect. So is there a different standard of certainty required for the apparent cause and effect relationship between consciousness and brain/body?

I would say there is good reason for holding a stricter standard here. For one thing, there are well established epistemic challenges facing any attempt of understanding consciousness and reconciling it with our understanding of physical reality. For this reason alone, it behooves us to be especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

There is also the matter of what is at stake here. Coming to a conclusion about the nature of the causal relationship between consciousness and the body/brain will naturally have enormous implications for our worldview, much more so than evaluating causal relationships on a strictly physical level of analysis. Once again, we have good reason for being especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

Thus far I've only attempted to argue that your argument asserting downward causation from consciousness is either circular or unsound. To do so I presented an alternative to your conclusion that is nonetheless logically consistent with your premises. It's worth noting, however, that there is also some positive empirical evidence for a conclusion that would contradict downward causation from consciousness. For instance, Benjamin Libet demonstrated (at least in the conditions of his experiment) that the brain begins to show neural activity related to performing an action before an individual reports the subjective experience of willing that action. Daniel Wegner has written an entire book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, with other empirical findings that appear to contradict the notion of conscious will. I'm not well-read on all the evidence, and I'm not trying to argue the case for it; for now I'm just pointing out that, if you are unsatisfied with my approach, there have been more empirical efforts that also contradict your conclusion about consciousness's causal powers.

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 05:15 PM

There is no arguing that it feels as if conscious intention causes bodily action. However, if we rely on the experiential feeling of conscious agency to come to the conclusion that consciousness is in fact a causal agent, then we have moved beyond mere recognition / observation / first order judgment.

:frown: I am not primarily relying on feeling, I am relying on the observation of my system. I am witnessing it, I am not thinking about it, or wondering about it. I am just looking at what is happening.

Let's look at your conditional statement again . . . In this case, your conditional statement would essentially be "If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events," which is a vacuous statement.

From bad to worse! :cry: In my last post I attempted to clear up what I meant to say. I certainly am not so silly as to think it means anything to say, “If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events.” I do know what a proper logical statement is supposed to be (whether I originally expressed it clearly or not).

In my last post I restated it as, “. . . because experience is what defines consciousness, when its intention/desire to stimulate a specific experience in itself results in brain and body involvement, those are instances of consciousness causing physical effects.” I followed that up with a pragmatic defense, which is that I simply accept what I observe to be true. I justified that by pointing out I have no reason to doubt the team of cause and effect are working any differently between my volition and body than the way cause and effect work in all other observed situations. That is, the consistent observation that when I (and all observable humans) will the body to move, the body moves, is proper support for my conclusion of a causal relationship by the empirical standards which define cause and effect. There would, of course, be reason to doubt that causality with sufficient contrary evidence (more on that in a second).

If you ask me, the current challenge to will is a premature functionalist effort to win debate points. If they can find a way to make will irrelevant or illusory, then they can claim the brain is doing it all and merely feeding the subjective aspect a little feeling to make it believe it’s in control.

In a book review of Wegner’s The Illusion of Conscious Will, reviewer Thomas W. Clark says, “The functionally necessary self/world distinction has been overlaid with, or misinterpreted as, the metaphysically dubious and functionally otiose proposition that persons, as Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner puts it, ‘cause themselves to behave.’ Folk wisdom has it that from some internal vantage point, imagined to be something over and above the brain, we consciously will our actions – behavior is more than the deterministic outcome of neural and muscular mechanisms.

“In The Illusion of Conscious Will, Wegner sets out to deconstruct, largely from an experimental psychological perspective, this sense of conscious willing. His thesis is that our feeling of will doesn’t reflect the underlying causes of behavior, rather it’s an ‘emotion of authorship’ that usefully tags actions as ours, not someone else’s. This is very much in line with neuroscientific and cognitive-behavioral accounts of the functional necessity of having a robust self-representation. The sense of will more or less accurately tracks who (me or somebody else) did what, so that persons can successfully manage social contingencies.”

(http://www.sci-con.org/reviews/20020508.html#Libet)

It's worth noting, however, that there is also some positive empirical evidence for a conclusion that would contradict downward causation from consciousness. For instance, Benjamin Libet demonstrated (at least in the conditions of his experiment) that the brain begins to show neural activity related to performing an action before an individual reports the subjective experience of willing that action. . . . I'm just pointing out that, if you are unsatisfied with my approach, there have been more empirical efforts that also contradict your conclusion about consciousness's causal powers.

Regarding Libet’s findings (who himself rejected notions of will like Wegner’s “the emotion of authorship”), in my opinion they do not provide nearly enough evidence to seriously challenge the causality of will. The fact that the body would ready itself for an action before consciousness is aware of the action being taken is too easily explained.

(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/libetnew.html)

There is no doubt the body can be readied for pregnancy, for example, before the woman becomes aware of it, or that the body has systems which can ready if for fight or flight, or that we have an autonomic system, or we are capable of subliminal perception, etc. Because the body has certain survival or biologically programmed responses/capabilities built into it doesn’t mean consciousness doesn’t have control of selected aspects too.

It doesn’t matter whether we have complete control for consciousness causality to be true. If I fly a jet, I must adapt to how the systems work. If there is a system which automatically takes over when the plane stalls, or if the plane is worn out in some respect, or if it lacks a capability I want anyway . . . then I don’t have total control in the sense I can’t make it obey every exertion of my will. Nonetheless, I can still assert my will in specific ways, and so in those ways my conscious will causes the plane to do certain things.

I would say there is good reason for holding a stricter standard here. For one thing, there are well established epistemic challenges facing any attempt of understanding consciousness and reconciling it with our understanding of physical reality. For this reason alone, it behooves us to be especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

I don’t find it the slightest bit useful, or find any compelling reason to doubt, my volition. I believe it is merely the exaggerations and sophistries of functionalist theorists who are raising doubt, aided by those opposing intellectuals who are willing to debate functionalists’ still-vacuous :biggrin: assertions. I believe I am on solid empirical and logical ground to believe there is no evidence serious enough to warrant doubting what is observed to be true.

There is also the matter of what is at stake here. Coming to a conclusion about the nature of the causal relationship between consciousness and the body/brain will naturally have enormous implications for our worldview, much more so than evaluating causal relationships on a strictly physical level of analysis. Once again, we have good reason for being especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

If you want to doubt your own volition, we should probably agree to disagree about this. I will continue to state that as for me, I am certain my will causes physical effects. What makes me so certain? Here is where I think it becomes obvious you and I are working on the problem of consciousness from opposite ends. I respect your approach, but I don’t agree it is the best way to understand the nature of consciousness.

I’ll try an analogy to explain myself. Let’s say you are a pool of water that can ripple itself, and when you do, that produces thoughts. A bunch of pools are trying to figure out what consciousness is by rippling the most brilliant thoughts that can be. The thing is, the nature of a pool only becomes apparent when it is so still the surface becomes like a mirror which reflects the depth of the pool. What the ripplers don’t realize is the very act of trying to figure out what they are obscures their underlying nature from them, and restricts them to surface operations (where rippling takes place).

I don’t expect you (or anyone) to agree that the nature of consciousness is revealed when it achieves silence. Believe what you want. You certainly have the mainstream approach (academia) agreeing with you. I am content to have my little experientialist spot from which to suggest an alternative approach. But I am not going to doubt what is crystal clear to me when in the experience of silence. I look at all the thinking about volition as the very thing that is producing the confusion and doubt. When one is absorbed in the experience of consciousness, one knows what it is. Very simple, no doubts.

And hey, I do okay when it comes to supporting my ideas with evidence and logic. At least I'm not a total flake. :smile:

StatusX

Dec14-04, 05:36 PM

I justified that by pointing out I have no reason to doubt the team of cause and effect are working any differently between my volition and body than the way cause and effect work in all other observed situations. That is, the consistent observation that when I (and all observable humans) will the body to move, the body moves, is proper support for my conclusion of a causal relationship by the empirical standards which define cause and effect. There would, of course, be reason to doubt that causality with sufficient contrary evidence (more on that in a second).

That's exactly what the problem is: correlation does not imply causation. Say you do a study that finds a correlation between juvenile diabetes and cancer later in life. Does this mean diabetes cause cancer? Or just that some third factor, maybe a faulty gene, causes both? You don't have enough information to make that judgment. So just because your conscious willing of an action and that action tend to occur at the same time doesn't mean there couldn't be a third factor, possibly the physical brain, that causes both.

That being said, we're left with only two undesirable options:

1. The physical world is causally closed, which means nothing that happens is affected by the mental world. And yet, we have discussions about consciousness. We suppose that consciousness is there and yet not causal, but how could that opinion have arisen if our thoughts aren't affected by our consciousness? The only conclusion we can reach is that it's a complete coincidence that we think about consciousness and actually happen to have it which, as anyone will agree, is bad science.

2. The physical world is not causally closed, and the laws of physics are routinely broken.

They'll probably have to be some massive shift in our way of thinking before we'll be able to resolve this paradox.

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 05:46 PM

That's exactly what the problem is: correlation does not imply causation. Say you do a study that finds a correlation between juvenile diabetes and cancer later in life. Does this mean diabetes cause cancer? Or just that some third factor, maybe a faulty gene, causes both? You don't have enough information to make that judgment. So just because your conscious willing of an action and that action tend to occur at the same time doesn't mean there couldn't be a third factor, possibly the physical brain, that causes both.

I understand the difference. I dropped my pen awhile ago and a car immediately backfired down on the road. I realize one doesn't decide causality by casual observation and thought. It requires experience and a solid understanding how reality works. That said, I stand by my statement. I am certain from experiencing the nature of my own consciousness, that I can cause physical action with my will. If you want to indulge in doubt, be my guest. :smile:

They'll probably have to be some massive shift in our way of thinking before we'll be able to resolve this paradox.

Or, you might consider my suggestion of learning to experience consciousness directly.

Fliption

Dec14-04, 09:24 PM

What started all this was me posting this response.

Originally Posted by Fliption
loseyourname: One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

Les: I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

I wanted to ask here if it was possible for consciousness to just be along for the ride? It just experiences the qualia it associates with the information it receives from brain processes. The fact that we cannot know otherwise is what the hard problem is all about.

We got off track a bit. My original point was that whether consciousness is efficacious or not is a major philosophical issue. The logical argument that started this thread made an assumption about this important issue apparently so that it could draw a conclusion about........ the definition of the word "physical"? This is like building a vehicle that runs on water so that you can drive to the strore to buy gasoline for your regular car which is out of gas in the backyard. This just doesn't make sense to me.

Where are all those pesky linguistic analytical philosophers when you need one? :biggrin:

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical. Who cares? Once that is done then it's a new word that means nothing to anyone else other than loseyourname. Physical means causal, consciousness is causal, therefore consciousness is physical. So what? What does this tell us? We can define words how ever we like in our assumptions and can conclude anything we wish but what do we know about the real world as a result of this exercise? I'm struggling here :yuck:

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

loseyourname

Dec14-04, 10:57 PM

You didn't include the timing on that experiment, but I assume you mean his brain was stimulated before he pushed the button. If so, to me it indicates exactly the opposite of the interpretation you gave.

If consciousness is not created by the brain, but is instead associated with it, then you could stimulate the brain to act, but consciousness, having not initiated it, would be unaware of that until after the action.

Actually, my description of the experiment was a little ambiguous. Sorry about that. The electrodes are actually stimulated by the brain. The brain has fired in whatever decision-making site was being read, causing the effect to be produced before the subject becomes conscious of his decision to push the button. The subject reports that it seems as if the machine is anticipating his decision. So given that the decision is made before the subject becomes conscious of it, it would seem to indicate that conscious input in the decision-making process is illusory. I'm not saying it is, but any model will have to account for these effects.

loseyourname

Dec14-04, 11:04 PM

We got off track a bit. My original point was that whether consciousness is efficacious or not is a major philosophical issue. The logical argument that started this thread made an assumption about this important issue apparently so that it could draw a conclusion about........ the definition of the word "physical"?

That's what it's come to, but that wasn't my initial intent. I've posted my intent in several posts, in bold type-face.

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical.

I think I've been careful enough in establishing a definition that it should be clear that I haven't defined everything as physical. I even said I don't consider myself to be a physicalist, so obvious I must not believe that everything is physical. It doesn't seem you're reading my posts very carefully.

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

Actually, discussion of a framework by which consciousness might be efficacious was what I wanted to discuss. I got sidetracked because of people focusing in on my use of the word physical, which I felt I must defend. I do feel it is a better definition, but it isn't particularly important what words we use. Maybe now that we've got all of it out, we can now get back on point and actually discuss what you just said we should be discussing. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

hypnagogue

Dec15-04, 01:28 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec15-04, 04:51 PM

Les, I think we're touching on a number of interesting points, but in the process it appears as the core of what I originally wanted to convey is getting lost. So allow me to just state my case here again in its most bare form.

A statement of the form P -> Q cannot be true if it can be the case that P is true and Q is false. In the case of your conditional statement about the causality of consciousness, I showed that your premises were consistent with an outcome contrary to your conclusion. That is, I presented a case where the statement P ^ ~Q is true, which means that P -> Q is false. It does no good to continue arguing the case for believing P -> Q if you can't show that P ^ ~Q must be false.

Putting this back into context, let's look again at the propositions from your argument--

P: "People seek a specific qualia experiences, and bodily actions are initiated in an attempt to bring these experiences about."
Q: "Consciousness causes physical effects."

and some other propositions to help us reason about your argument--

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection among events, D, B, and E is that D leads directly to B, which brings about E, as you are suggesting. So your conclusion Q looks like this:

Q:

D --(causes)--> B --(causes)--> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the causal work, and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. Call this causal scenario R.

R:

D
^
|
(causes)
|
B --(causes)--> E

Clearly, Q and R contradict eachother, so both cannot be true. However, P does not sufficiently constrain the possibility space to pick out one or the other; P is consistent with both Q and R. So it is not enough from P to conclude that Q.

Here is my original statement you quoted, and then commented on:

“IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body) If you don't accept that definition of consciousness, then the logic doesn't apply.”

Remember, I’ve already admitted the very first thing I said wasn’t as clear as it needed to be, but you didn’t jump in then. You jumped in right where I stated the above, and posed your objection.

At that point I was clear (even if nobody else was) that the only condition I was talking about is if an actual state of consciousness exists, and it is that consciousness and only that consciousness which has desired and willed a specific experience. This is the case:

A. Consciousness exits
B. Consciousness can desire and will an experience
C. Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will and consumes pizza.
D. Les’ conscious will has caused physical effects

Here’s the logic (I can’t get my computer to make all the proper logic marks so I’ll use words:

If A and B, and if and only if C, then D

I have not excluded the possibility that the brain or conditioning can also cause Les to unconsciously eat pizza (your “R”). I made that about as clear as I could in my last post. I did not say only consciousness causes physical activity in the body.

At the end of my last post I also made my conviction clear that one has to be conscious of what consciousness itself is to be able to recognize if an action is conscious or not. So I did not exclude someone merely believing they consciously willed eating pizza (i.e., but really the brain did it).

Finally, I claim that I know I, as consciousness, will my body to do things because I experience what consciousness is. In fact, that is primarily what my statement was. I am not confused about what is going on, but maybe you or others are. I refuse to indulge the question much because it’s about on the same plane as contemplating if we are brains in a vat, or if we are just someone’s dream in another universe. If a person sacrifices the certainty of being consciously present for the speculation, imaginings and doubt that comes with trying to figure that sort of stuff out, then have at it. I’d rather just experience the certainty of knowing what I am doing.

Fliption

Dec15-04, 06:14 PM

I think I've been careful enough in establishing a definition that it should be clear that I haven't defined everything as physical. I even said I don't consider myself to be a physicalist, so obvious I must not believe that everything is physical. It doesn't seem you're reading my posts very carefully.

What you are attempting to define physical as isn't really relevant to my comment. I was only pointing out that categorizing consiousness is all the argument seems to be geared to do. But since you brought it up, I do know what you have defined physical to be. Your argument basically says that if things in our reality have a causal relationship, then they are physical.
I can't think of anything that doesn't have a causal relationship. I assume consciousness does to. I just don't know where in the causal chain it is, the beginning or the end. But regardless of it's ontological nature, with this definition, it is physical and that's all we've concluded with this argument.

Actually, discussion of a framework by which consciousness might be efficacious was what I wanted to discuss. I got sidetracked because of people focusing in on my use of the word physical, which I felt I must defend. I do feel it is a better definition, but it isn't particularly important what words we use. Maybe now that we've got all of it out, we can now get back on point and actually discuss what you just said we should be discussing. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

I assumed that there had to be something you were trying to show with the post other than semantics but I just haven't been able to figure out what it is. I have gone back and read the original post several times thinking each time that I might see something I didn't before. Each time, I see this conclusion:

"Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source."

which means to me that p-consciousness is physical. So the whole point of the argument seems to be to classify consciousness as physical as opposed to non-physical. Maybe I have misunderstood.

So I need more direction. As I said to Les....me slow :redface:

Les Sleeth

Dec15-04, 06:31 PM

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical. Who cares? Once that is done then it's a new word that means nothing to anyone else other than loseyourname. Physical means causal, consciousness is causal, therefore consciousness is physical. So what? What does this tell us? We can define words how ever we like in our assumptions and can conclude anything we wish but what do we know about the real world as a result of this exercise? I'm struggling here :yuck:

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

I’ll take one more shot at explaining why I think it is important to define physical properly. I just reviewed the debate between Loseyourname and myself, and I can’t agree with either your version of how we got to debating about the meaning of physical, or that the definition of physical is insignificant to his theme. It seems to me you’ve forgotten Loseyourname’s original assertion:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

His conclusion:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Well, what is physical? I see our disagreement starting with two of his statements. The first was, “’Remember the definition of physical here is "constrained by material laws of cause and effect.’" Okay, look at that statement. Does it not say material laws? What is material? Matter. What is matter? Mass (and I’d include the products/effects of mass).

Loseyourname’s second point is what made me object. He then decided that if anything behaves mechanically, that too must be physical. He indicated that by mechanics he meant order-regularity-predictability (“If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics . . .”) My objection is, order-regularity-predictability isn’t necessarily only associated with matter. I didn’t want to allow him to claim if anything possesses order-regularity-predictability, then it is material. (Remember, it is he who first defined physical as “constrained by the material laws of cause and effect”)

You claim Loseyourname was not trying to suggest that physicalness is the bottom line, and make a case that consciousness is physically derived. Well, have you read this entire thread carefully? He says, for instance, “I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness.”

Later he says, “. . . as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise.”

And don’t forget his original proposition:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

How much more plainly can he put it that consciousness is derived from material properties, proven (he claims) by the fact that it MAY use energy (he doesn’t know if consciousness uses energy or not, of if it does that it is a large enough quantity to measure)?

So I have been trying to hold him to a proper definition of physical, which no other authority seems ambiguous about. Does consciousness have a material source? Is it ONLY mechanistic and material? Or is there something more we yet need to explain consciousness?

loseyourname

Dec15-04, 06:41 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec15-04, 07:23 PM

I suggest that you guys abandon the conclusion of my original series of syllogisms and instead focus on the truth or falsity of my revised proposition as I stated it on page 4 (after all of the clarification):

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

If you still find this proposition to be unclear, then I can further elaborate after any questions have been asked. I will specify, for now, that contracausality can mean either that conscious acts are not the result of mechanical causation, or that they are, but conscious volition, as the first link in the causal chain, is not itself the result of any other cause.

Cool :smile: (hey, I do that all the time, adjust my statements when I understand either more about the subject or how to communicate it better during the discussion).

I think I'm going to drop out of this discussion however because I feel like I've interfered with what you want to say. I honestly don't get either the earlier statement or this one. Others seem to get it, so I'll let everyone who does, work on this question. :smile:

Philocrat

Dec15-04, 07:57 PM

I was just thinking about this last night. Granted, I'm not pretending to answer any questions as to whether or not p-consciousness is efficacious or whether or not it has a non-physical origin. I am attempting only to eliminate one possibility. My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. Here is how I reached this conclusion:

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world. This includes the energy necessary to carry out physical functions in the human body, as well as the energy to initiate neural processes that lead to physical action. If p-consciousness is efficacious, then it is capable of initiating these neural processes. Because neural processes require energy, they must be initiated by a physical source. Let me see if I can construct a formal proof for this. I will assume for the purposes of this proof that p-consciousness is efficacious.

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Edit: I can't get LaTeX to separate my lines, so you'll need to accept this series of syllogisms as a formal proof. Two hypothetical syllogisms and a modus ponens are used.

Additional unanswered questions include:

1) THE DEFINITION OF 'CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATES': for the debates often approach a point where critical mechanical states are mistaken for the over-and-above-the-mechanical conscious activities.

QUESTION: Do critical mechanical states naturally mimic conscious states? If they do, why should one be mistaken for the other?

2) DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS (REGARDLESS OF TYPE): the general impression given so far in all the threads that deal with the subject in this forum seems so far to hold that 'Consciousness is indefinable', at least to the full satisfaction of both the philosophical and scientific communities. The most powerful definition would be that which bodly says consciousness is this and nothing else. But then why are we going around in circles in threads after threads? Why are we all afraid to land the aguments in safe intellectual grounds and say this is what consciousness is and get on with other issues?

3) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS TRULY DISTINCT FROM OR OVER AND ABOVE THE MATERIAL, HOW DOES IT INTERACT WITH THE MATERIAL BODY WITHOUT THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS THAT YOU ARE HYPOTHESISING ABOUT? The cartesian dualism is widely disputed in various ways in a forest of literatures. Aristotle's version of how they interact comes just very close to making a lot of sense, but fails when applying purposive analysis to it.

4) WHAT THE OUTWARD AND OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF MIND AND MATTER ARE. Can the 'what' and 'how' questions about both be answered via a purposive account of both? That is, if we cannot answer the questions about what they are, how they interact, can we answer these two questions by asking why they are in this sort of dual relationship in the first place? What is the fundamental purpose of them coming together in this inexplicable union? Since 1998, I have always had the suspicion that this might very well be the case. Othwerwise we might as well default to supension of all judgements about everything.

NOTE: Your argument has some validity in it, but as you know circularism often turns our focus to self-serving hypotheses.

loseyourname

Dec15-04, 08:18 PM

1) THE DEFINITION OF 'CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATE': for the debates often approach a point where critical mechanical states are mistaken for the over-and-above-the-mechanical conscious activities.

QUESTION: Do critical mechanical states naturally mimics conscious states? If they do, why should one be mistaken for the other?

You'll have to answer that one. I'm not too sure what a "critical mechanical state" is.

2) DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS (REGARDLESS OF TYPE): the general impression given so far in all the threads that deal with the subject in this forum seems so far to hold that 'Consciousness is indefinable', at least to the full satisfaction of both the philosophical and scientific communities.

I'm only asking about the efficacy of phenomenal consciousness in this thread. Some people will tell you that is the only kind of consciousness, while others will say that we should include some level of functionality. Regardless, all I'm referring to when I use the word "consciousness" in this thread is P-consciousness; that is, the ability to subjectively experience qualitative states. The question then becomes whether or not this capacity alone has any causal significance to human action and, by extension, whether or not it can be non-physical. (It should be noted that non-physicality does not necessarily imply dualism.)

3) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS TRULY DISTINCT FROM OR OVER AND ABOVE THE MATERIAL, HOW DOES IT INTERACT WITH THE MATERIAL BODY WITHOUT THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS THAT YOU ARE HYPOTHESISING ABOUT? The cartesian dualism is widely disputed in various ways in a forest of literatures. Aristotle's version of how they interacts comes just very close to making a lot of sense, but fails when applying purposive analysis to it.

Do you mean Aristotle's notion of final causation, or the influence of the Prime Mover on the intelligences? hypnagogue has brought up an interesting parallel between one of the hypotheses being investigated on these forums and the Aristotelian notion of material causation. Have you been following any of that?

The question of how any agent can be the cause of a physical event without requiring energy is part of what is being addressed here. There are several rather novel ways of getting around the apparent impossibility, but they either require an overhaul of the modern notion of causation or a leap of rationalism that is not supported by any empirical evidence.

4) WHAT THE OUTWARD AND OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF MIND AND MATTER. Can the what and how questions about both be answered via a purposive account of both? That is, if we cannot answer the questions about what they are, how they interact, can we answer these two questions by asking why they are in this sort of dual relationship in the first place. What is the fundamental purpose of them coming together in this inexplicable union?

By what and how questions do you mean "What matter and consciousness are?" Along with "How do matter and consciousness interact (assuming, of course, that consciousness does not have a material origin)?" This seems to be the case, but I cannot see how answering these questions (if we even can) would lead to any teleological conclusions, nor do I see how a teleological assumption could lead to the answering of these questions. I suppose I am giving you a tentative no here, although it is only tentative.

NOTE: Your argument has some validity in it, but as you know circularism often turns our focus to self-serving hypotheses.

Well, I'm not exactly a professional researcher as of this moment, so I have no vested interest in the truth or falsehood of any one model over another. That is to say none of these hypotheses would serve my self.

Note that I would like the discussion, at this point, to turn not on the first post, but rather on the bold-faced proposition I've copied above. We'll see where that leads us.

Fliption

Dec15-04, 10:31 PM

How much more plainly can he put it that consciousness is derived from material properties, proven (he claims) by the fact that it MAY use energy (he doesn’t know if consciousness uses energy or not, of if it does that it is a large enough quantity to measure)?

Ok I've got all that. Honestly, to me it still looks like a battle of definitions with no implications at all :frown: . It seems he's just redefining "material" to include all things that act mechanically in a causal relationship. To me, this has no meaning at all. Pardon the pun :rofl: .

Let me try an analogy to show you how this appears to me. Let's say two scientists are trying to determine the color of a flash of light. They use their equipment to determine that the light is in the range of 610 Thz. They look at their chart and see that this is "blue". This is an example of people learning something about reality. They understand the ontology of that flash of light better now than they did before.

Now let's say that a week later scientist #1 comes back to scientist #2 and claims that the flash of light was not blue; It was green. Scientist #2 doesn't believe this for a second. He did the experiment very carefully and is sure the light frenquency was 610 Thz. Scientist #1 then begins to debate him. His trump card is an article in Scientific American claiming that the science community has changed the frequency range for green by raising it to 610 Thz. The flash of light is now green! Scientist #2 says "Oh poo is that all?! I thought I had done something wrong! The light IS at 610 Thz!

The ontology of the light does not change and the credibility of the experiment and the information it provided does not change. We have gained absolutely zero information about the ontology of this flash of light as a result of this definition change.

This is what I see happening in the original post of this thread and beyond. We know nothing about consciousness that we didn't know before. We're just calling it Fred now instead of Ralph.

hypnagogue

Dec16-04, 10:31 AM

A. Consciousness exits
B. Consciousness can desire and will an experience
C. Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will and consumes pizza.
D. Les’ conscious will has caused physical effects

Here’s the logic (I can’t get my computer to make all the proper logic marks so I’ll use words:

If A and B, and if and only if C, then D

I can't really make head or tails of what you're trying to say here with your revised conditional statement. It would really be helpful if you could use arrows and dashes to represent the conditional (eg "->" for if... then and "<->" for "if and only if... then"). As it stands, I'm not sure the verbal logic statement you wrote here can be translated into symbolic logic.

But ignoring that for now, I see your general idea is to have A, B, and C as your premises and D as your conclusion. But again, this amounts to a trivial proof. If you take as a premise "Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will," then of course it follows that your consciousness has caused physical effects, but you haven't really done any explanitory work here. You want to argue that consciousness is efficacious, but in step C you basically already assume that it is.

I have not excluded the possibility that the brain or conditioning can also cause Les to unconsciously eat pizza (your “R”). I made that about as clear as I could in my last post. I did not say only consciousness causes physical activity in the body.

For our purposes, this distinction isn't vitally important. You can assume that in my previous post, Q means that there is at least some causal effect from p-consciousness onto the body, and that R implies that there is absolutely no causal effect from p-consciousness onto the body.

Finally, I claim that I know I, as consciousness, will my body to do things because I experience what consciousness is. In fact, that is primarily what my statement was. I refuse to indulge the question much because it’s about on the same plane as contemplating if we are brains in a vat, or if we are just someone’s dream in another universe. If a person sacrifices the certainty of being consciously present for the speculation, imaginings and doubt that comes with trying to figure that sort of stuff out, then have at it. I’d rather just experience the certainty of knowing what I am doing.

I have no doubt that you experience certainty about p-consciousness's causal agency, but that's not necessarily a compelling reason for believing it is so. We can be certain of the existence and character of p-consciousness in and of itself, but when we take p-consciousness as a representation of some other phenomenon and use it to draw conclusions about that represented phenomenon, we can be wrong in our conclusions. Any number of perceptual illusions will prove the point.

Your only way out of the above consideration is to claim that you do not experience will as a representation of a causal process, but that you directly experience the causal process itself. But this does not get us very far. How are you justified in believing that you are experiencing will-as-causation as opposed to will-representing-causation? Simply noting the systematic correlation between will and action is not sufficient, for reasons I've already explained. Is it something in the experience itself, then, that somehow tips you off? If the only evidence is experiential, then once again we are prone to being victims of illusion.

Maybe framing the question in this manner will be most helpful: suppose there are two kinds of people. One kind of people (call them 'Causers') possess a p-consciousness that directly influences the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Causers directly experience will-as-causation. The other kind of people (call them 'Effectees') possess an epiphenomenal p-consciousness that does not directly influence the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Although their p-consciousness is not efficacious, Effectees still experience will; they believe that their p-consciousness causes them to act just as much as the Causers do. There is no discernible difference in the average behavior of a Causer as opposed to that of an Effectee.

Now, how do we differentiate the two? How do the Causers' subjective experiences give them justified belief in knowing that they possess conscious will, while an Effectees' subjective experience does not provide such a justified belief? How does a Causer know he is not an Effectee, and how does an Effectee know he is not a Causer? Unless you can provide a good answer to this question, you can't be sure that you yourself are a Causer and not an Effectee.

Les Sleeth

Dec16-04, 03:35 PM

Hypnagogue, I believe this debate perfectly exemplifies our very different approaches to philosophy. It is the experientialist and the rationalist trying to make sense to each other. I hope I can explain things better by the end of this post because so far we are not even close to talking about the same thing (miiiiiiles apart :yuck: ).

I can't really make head or tails of what you're trying to say here with your revised conditional statement. It would really be helpful if you could use arrows and dashes to represent the conditional (eg "->" for if... then and "<->" for "if and only if... then"). As it stands, I'm not sure the verbal logic statement you wrote here can be translated into symbolic logic.

I know the logic symbols, got’em right here, but we don’t need them. A philosopher should be able to reason with people and make sense. If we were computers talking to each other, then maybe . . . but I don’t enjoy thinking like a computer or exchanging ideas with one.

But ignoring that for now, I see your general idea is to have A, B, and C as your premises and D as your conclusion. But again, this amounts to a trivial proof.

Lol . . :smile: Either you haven’t been listening or I’ve been dreadfully unclear. I am at a loss for why I can’t get you understand it’s not an attempt at a proof at all! :tongue2:

If you take as a premise "Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will," then of course it follows that your consciousness has caused physical effects, but you haven't really done any explanatory work here. You want to argue that consciousness is efficacious, but in step C you basically already assume that it is.

That’s correct. I haven’t done any explanatory work because I am not attempting to justify my statement beyond demonstrating how it represents the testimony of my experience. I am not trying to prove anything. I am not concerned if it satisfies others’ intellectual dilemmas. It is you who are attempting to reframe my meaning into a logical proof. I never meant it as one (since I don’t believe such a proof is possible), so I don’t care now to engage in what I consider a futile effort by trying to convert it into a proof.

I have no doubt that you experience certainty about p-consciousness's causal agency, but that's not necessarily a compelling reason for believing it is so.

Not compelling for whom? Do you mean for others? If you only knew how that statement utterly dumbfounds me as an experientialist. What you state as no “compelling reason for believing” is the only reason I know for believing: experience.

We can be certain of the existence and character of p-consciousness in and of itself, but when we take p-consciousness as a representation of some other phenomenon and use it to draw conclusions about that represented phenomenon, we can be wrong in our conclusions. Any number of perceptual illusions will prove the point.

What conclusions am I drawing when I make a report as a witness? I am the witness of the event of me, consciousness, watching what happens to my body when I exert my will. There isn’t much concluding necessary. What I could do is question what has over time become patently obvious to me, and thereby needlessly confuse myself. I won’t do it.

Your only way out of the above consideration is to claim that you do not experience will as a representation of a causal process, but that you directly experience the causal process itself. But this does not get us very far.

It gets me as far as I need to go, I am not concerned about how far it gets anyone else. Take it or leave it. It is just an affidavit.

How are you justified in believing that you are experiencing will-as-causation as opposed to will-representing-causation?

You are closer now because for me personal justification is the key. I’ll explain below.

Simply noting the systematic correlation between will and action is not sufficient, for reasons I've already explained. Is it something in the experience itself, then, that somehow tips you off? If the only evidence is experiential, then once again we are prone to being victims of illusion.

Well, you will never know, in my opinion, trying to figure it out. Because you think it can be figured out is why you keep demanding proof, and because I don’t believe it can be done is why I refuse to attempt it.

Maybe framing the question in this manner will be most helpful: suppose there are two kinds of people. One kind of people (call them 'Causers') possess a p-consciousness that directly influences the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Causers directly experience will-as-causation. The other kind of people (call them 'Effectees') possess an epiphenomenal p-consciousness that does not directly influence the effective causal dynamics of the brain. Although their p-consciousness is not efficacious, Effectees still experience will; they believe that their p-consciousness causes them to act just as much as the Causers do. There is no discernible difference in the average behavior of a Causer as opposed to that of an Effectee.

Now, how do we differentiate the two? How do the Causers' subjective experiences give them justified belief in knowing that they possess conscious will, while an Effectees' subjective experience does not provide such a justified belief? How does a Causer know he is not an Effectee, and how does an Effectee know he is not a Causer? Unless you can provide a good answer to this question, you can't be sure that you yourself are a Causer and not an Effectee.

Maybe there are two kinds of people. One kind prefers and practices living in and under the influence of (as best as they are able) the experience of the present (let’s call them “Experientialists”). The other kind prefers and “practices” living under the influence of relentless, incessant, inexorable thinking (let’s call them “Rationalists”).

From the point of view of a dedicated Experientialist (especially one who formerly was a Rationalist), Rationalists do not have complete control over their thought processes or they would be able to halt them when they wished (easily found out by closing one’s eyes and attempting it). Since they cannot be consciously still, they cannot experience consciousness as it is when clean of all that thinking. Also, they usually are unaware of the after effects ceaseless thinking causes, which lingers and influences one’s perspective of reality. The result is, Rationalists can see consciousness performing various functions, but they cannot see what consciousness is.

As an Experientialist I’ve been trying to say that to see the causal connection between conscious will and physical action, the non-functionalistic state of consciousness must first be experienced. That state of just “being” consciousness, which in stillness rests as pure potentiality, reveals what it is about consciousness that “causes.” One can actually witness it doing it because the contrast of movement against the stillness makes it stand out as clear as day.

I claim that years of witnessing that experience has created a certainty about it, and that none of functionalist nonsense I’ve heard fits my experience. When the Rationalist wants me to “think” about what conscious is, I already know that once I’m involved in functionality I won’t be able to experience what consciousness is, and so like the Rationalist, I must resort to speculation. To that suggestion I must say . . . forget about it, I am not going back to that state where everything is subject to doubt. If there is one true advantage of the pure experience of consciousness it’s that it firmly instills in one the knowledge of existence and one’s nature (including the fact that will is present and consciousness can cause through it).

Now how is the Experientialist going to prove that? It can’t be done because the entire experience is internal. We can only “prove” external events and circumstances; the veracity of internal truths must be realized by each individual human being. I cannot do it for others, and others cannot do it for me. That’s not my fault, I didn’t make reality this way!

Likewise, there is no logical proof possible. You labeled my claim “trivial.” Well, I say it isn’t trivial to know one’s self, and it isn’t trivial to point out that if one really wants to know consciousness one is going to have to stop thinking about consciousness and learn to experience it directly.

It is like this. What if you and a friend were eating a mango, and then you offered a mango to a man who’d never had it before. He asks you “what is it like”? You say, “it’s sort of like a peach.” Then he asks your friend what the mango is like, and he replies, “It isn’t like a peach at all, it is like a papaya.”

The man says, “oh wow, it is so interesting to me what the taste of a mango is.” So he goes off and starts a new academic discipline called Mango Studies. He attract geniuses from all over the world who are interested in figuring out how a mango tastes. They debate all the time, and demand “proofs.” The peach-like side figures out ways to undermine the papaya side, and the papaya-like side figures out ways to counter that and then undermine the peach-like side.

Meanwhile, you are back home enjoying the taste, and wondering why each person doesn’t taste it and decide for himself what a mango is like. When you say you know exactly how it tastes, the Mango Studies geniuses demand proof. You say that is ridiculous, just taste it! NO, they answer, show us the logical steps between R and Q, how S derives from B, and how A can avoid being contradicted by your statement that a mango tastes like a peach.

Of course that is a silly analogy, but to me so is people trying to “figure out” what consciousness is, when they have one, are one, and could, if they wanted to, learn how to experience its fundamental nature.

I respect your right to try to figure it out, but I’m not interested in submitting to what I have proven to myself is a colossal waste of time. You have a lot more years to waste than I do, so knock yourself out. Who knows, maybe you will figure it all out. But of course, that still doesn’t mean you will “know” consciousness, the same way the person with a concept of a mango does “know” the experience of a mango.

So I repeat my certainty that as consciousness I will my body to move, and it does. I am not going to attempt a proof because none is possible, or necessary either since mine is the statement of a witness, not of a theorist. Experience and know, or indulge in speculation. It doesn’t matter to me as long as I am allowed to practice philosophy as I see fit, and am not forced to conform to other’s personal standards.

StatusX

Dec16-04, 04:28 PM

I haven’t done any explanatory work because I am not attempting to justify my statement beyond demonstrating how it represents the testimony of my experience. I am not trying to prove anything. I am not concerned if it satisfies others’ intellectual dilemmas. It is you who are attempting to reframe my meaning into a logical proof. I never meant it as one (since I don’t believe such a proof is possible), so I don’t care now to engage in what I consider a futile effort by trying to convert it into a proof.

You seem to think the causal ability of consciousness is an unanswerable question, but this is not the case. If we are one day in possession of a physical explanation of everything we do, right down to the mechanism in our brain that's responsible for our discussions of consciousness, then we'll know the answer: consciousness is not causal. If we reach a roadblock and have accounted for everything our brain does but still have actions that are unexplained, then there's a good chance consciousness is the missing piece. This question is in the realm of science because all science does is study cause and effect relationships. So unless you're going to deny everything science shows and claim all that's real is what you experience, (which is solipsism, and I don't think you intend to do that), then you have to admit there is at least a valid question to be answered: Can consciousness cause? We don't have the answer now, but one day we might. You can't just say that since all you know for sure is what you experience, that's all there is, and that what you experience is objectively true.

Likewise, there is no logical proof possible. You labeled my claim “trivial.” Well, I say it isn’t trivial to know one’s self, and it isn’t trivial to point out that if one really wants to know consciousness one is going to have to stop thinking about consciousness and learn to experience it directly.

You're proof was trivial because, as you admitted, you've already decided that you believe consciousness is causal, and your proof was totally unnecesary, as the conclusion was in one of the premises.

hypnagogue

Dec16-04, 04:47 PM

I know the logic symbols, got’em right here, but we don’t need them. A philosopher should be able to reason with people and make sense.

Yes, that's the whole point. :smile: Expressing things formally can help remove ambiguities inherent in natural language communication, so we can get a clearer idea of exactly what is being claimed.

What conclusions am I drawing when I make a report as a witness? I am the witness of the event of me, consciousness, watching what happens to my body when I exert my will. There isn’t much concluding necessary. What I could do is question what has over time become patently obvious to me, and thereby needlessly confuse myself. I won’t do it.

Consider this analogy. Suppose there is a person, Bob, who lives his whole life confined in a room. There is only one object in the room: an unopenable black box with two light bulbs protruding from a side. Whenever one of the lightbulbs lights up, the other light bulb lights a second later. Bob is the witness of this box, watching what happens whenever one of the bulbs lights up for his entire life. To Bob, there isn't much concluding necessary; the light from one light bulb obviously causes the other to light up. Bob sees no reason to question what has become a patently obvious causitive relation.

But, in fact, Bob is mistaken in his belief that the light from one bulb causes the other to light up. What is actually causing the bulbs to light up is the underlying circuitry inside the black box. Bob holds his belief because he witnesses repeated, reliable correlation, and given his existential circumstances, it's a very good belief. But it still turns out to be wrong.

Please don't misunderstand me here. I'm not trying to say you are wrong. I'm trying to say you very well may be wrong, and thus should not consider this matter decisively concluded.

Well, you will never know, in my opinion, trying to figure it out. Because you think it can be figured out is why you keep demanding proof, and because I don’t believe it can be done is why I refuse to attempt it.

Granted, perhaps 'proof' was too strong of a word. However, if there are two competing hypotheses that fit a phenomenon equally as well, we must at least have considerable doubt when choosing one over the other.

Maybe there are two kinds of people. One kind prefers and practices living in and under the influence of (as best as they are able) the experience of the present (let’s call them “Experientialists”). The other kind prefers and “practices” living under the influence of relentless, incessant, inexorable thinking (let’s call them “Rationalists”).

Now I've done it... I never thought I would get the famous Rationalist lecture from you! :biggrin:

The result is, Rationalists can see consciousness performing various functions, but they cannot see what consciousness is.

I think the situation is the complete opposite. I won't speak in terms of your Rationalist/Experimentalist dichotomy, but in general, it is philosophically accepted that we are acquainted with what p-consciousness is, but not with what it does. Contrast this with physical phenomena: we know what (eg) an electron does, but we don't know what it is.

Because we have a firm grasp on what physical phenomena do, we have a pretty good idea of their causal relationships, as depicted by physics. But we don't know what they are-- it's like the physical world is a bundle of math equations without a computer to process those equations. Another way to say this is that our understanding of physical phenomena is entirely relational, or extrinsic, in nature. We know how physical things relate, but we don't know what is doing the relating.

On the other hand, it is precisely because we don't know what p-consciousness does that this thread was started in the first place, and in general why there has been no historical concensus on epiphenomenalism vs. interactionist dualism or some other causal depiction of p-consciousness. Contrariwise, the only reason we are talking about p-consciousness is because we know what it is-- because we are immediately acquainted with it. If I just sit and stare blankly at a red ball, it's not clear that my subjective experience of redness is doing anything to me, but it's certainly there, right in my conscious visual field. Another way to say this is that our understanding of p-consciousness is entirely intrinsic. We know the thing-in-itself (eg phenomenal redness), but we're not sure what role it plays in the causal structure of the world.

It is like this. What if you and a friend were eating a mango, and then you offered a mango to a man who’d never had it before. He asks you “what is it like”? You say, “it’s sort of like a peach.” Then he asks your friend what the mango is like, and he replies, “It isn’t like a peach at all, it is like a papaya.”

The man says, “oh wow, it is so interesting to me what the taste of a mango is.” So he goes off and starts a new academic discipline called Mango Studies. He attract geniuses from all over the world who are interested in figuring out how a mango tastes. They debate all the time, and demand “proofs.” The peach-like side figures out ways to undermine the papaya side, and the papaya-like side figures out ways to counter that and then undermine the peach-like side.

Meanwhile, you are back home enjoying the taste, and wondering why each person doesn’t taste it and decide for himself what a mango is like. When you say you know exactly how it tastes, the Mango Studies geniuses demand proof. You say that is ridiculous, just taste it! NO, they answer, show us the logical steps between R and Q, how S derives from B, and how A can avoid being contradicted by your statement that a mango tastes like a peach.

I'm entirely with you on this. The only way to know a mango taste is to actually experience tasting a mango; there is no objective analysis that will reveal this experience. If I disagreed with you here, I would probably be a deflationary materialist extolling the virtues of Dennett, but you already know that that's not me.

What is different about experiencing the taste of a mango and experiencing will moving the physical body? In the former, we are talking exclusively about an intrinsic property, a thing-in-itself, whereas in the latter we are talking about a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic phenomena (subjective experience of will + causal movement of the body). There can be no doubt that a mango tastes a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us; likewise, there can be no doubt that the experience of will subjectively feels a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us. Where we run into problems is trying to bridge that ineffible 1st person datum across the great divide to the causal dynamics of the external world.

For all I know, interactionist dualism may be true; however, there is not enough in just the experience of will to come to this conclusion. Why not? Because given what we know about the causal dynamics of the world, the experience of will is entirely compatible with epiphenomenalism as well. Assume epiphenomenalism and the world still runs smoothly, with no contradictions as to what we actually experience. Perhaps it contradicts our intuitions, but it's entirely possible-- that is to say, there is no contradiction in assuming-- that we feel as if p-consciousness causes something without it actually causing anything.

loseyourname

Dec16-04, 06:18 PM

Ok I've got all that. Honestly, to me it still looks like a battle of definitions with no implications at all :frown: . It seems he's just redefining "material" to include all things that act mechanically in a causal relationship.

I actually made it pretty clear several times that what I was talking about had nothing to do with anything "material," which again tells me you haven't been reading the posts very carefully. I'll just ask, though: Has it not occured to you that it might be a good idea to clearly define terms before we get into implications and learning?

You know, that way we don't have you thinking I mean one thing by "material" when I mean something else, and Les realizes that I don't mean the same thing by "physical" that he does, so he will not get perturbed when I call something "physical" that he wouldn't. Otherwise, what happens is this - we get into an argument over definitions rather than learning anything. I didn't think it would be this difficult just to get everyone on the same page so we can start the real discussion.

Lord almighty.

Les Sleeth

Dec16-04, 06:59 PM

Now I've done it... I never thought I would get the famous Rationalist lecture from you! :biggrin:

I won't have time to answer you properly for a couple days, my wife is leaving town and so we are doing Christmas early. I quoted that above because I've been feeling a bit under-understood by your insistance I formulate my approach in your terms, but your words there made me feel like you are trying to get it.

Let me say that when I do answer, I will continue not to agree with you much. I still don't think you appreciate the approach I am taking to philosophy. While I understand everything you say, I feel like you have yet to "get" where I am coming from. Once I believe you get it, and if you can make a strong argument against it, then I will be impressed.

I'll give you one little clue. Have you read Carlos Castenada's account of Don Juan describing "seeing"? (I liked the description in "Journey to Ixtland" best.) This practice of "seeing," if you understand it, is quite different than how you are suggesting we decide about conscious will and causility. In my opinion, we are split exactly at the difference between seeing and pure reason.

My life has not been a sheltered or cautious one. I've taken a lot of chances, gotten seriously injured, fallen hard (embarassingly hard), tried everything I could, sometimes to the point of obsession . . . I've studied too, so I am not ignorant of the varieties of things in our universe. You are talking to someone who, though battered somewhat, is still a game experimenter. But I am not going to go backwards. The approach you are taking is "backward" for me, and the only reason I'd consider it is if I've missed something there which would have changed my mind if I'd experienced it.

I'll probably respond Saturday sometime.

hypnagogue

Dec16-04, 10:20 PM

Let me say that when I do answer, I will continue not to agree with you much. I still don't think you appreciate the approach I am taking to philosophy. While I understand everything you say, I feel like you have yet to "get" where I am coming from. Once I believe you get it, and if you can make a strong argument against it, then I will be impressed.

I'm not under the illusion at this point that we're going to change eachother's minds. :wink: But I think it would still be informative to continue the discussion. I am giving you an honest effort trying to understand where you're coming from. Probably the best way for you to state your case to me would be to address my black box analogy and explain why it is not analogous to your situation, even if you think it's a step backwards for whatever reason. Humor my foolish rationalism. :tongue2: In the meantime I'll look into the Castenada thing.

my wife is leaving town and so we are doing Christmas early.

Enjoy!

Fliption

Dec16-04, 10:29 PM

I actually made it pretty clear several times that what I was talking about had nothing to do with anything "material," which again tells me you haven't been reading the posts very carefully. I'll just ask, though: Has it not occured to you that it might be a good idea to clearly define terms before we get into implications and learning?

I have read the posts carefully. I was responding to the post from Les, not any of yours. I was responding to his description of what you were doing. If you weren't actually doing that then you need to take that up with Les. My summation was from Les' point of view.

And you're singing to the choir when you talk to me about making sure we all have the same definitions. I have been on the "let's define physical and non-physical" bandwagon for quite some time now. My request has typically been ignored. It's quite amusing to me seeing people fight over something when they are talking about two different things. But it gets old fast.

This particular thread isn't that bad. It has become obvious to all participating here that the definitons were different and that's been part of the discussion. That's a good thing that rarely happens.

But from what I see in your points on this thread, if we remove the semantics then there is nothing else to talk about because all you're doing is engaging in an exercise of semantics. For example, let's take your advice and get the definitions straight. If you just accept Les' definition of physical and replace your word with a word "X", your conclusion will read: "Consciousness comes from a "X" source." What you'll find is that it is a no-brainer conclusion that you already knew because it's sitting right there in your assumptions.

Les Sleeth

Dec16-04, 11:58 PM

For example, let's take your advice and get the definitions straight. If you just accept Les' definition of physical and replace your word with a word "X", your conclusion will read: "Consciousness comes from a "X" source." What you'll find is that it is a no-brainer conclusion that you already knew because it's sitting right there in your assumptions.

I agree with you that definitions need to be clear. But to be accurate about the definitions I posted, they weren't mine. I assume we all have Google, so why not do what I did and look up every definition you can find of "physical"? I did that, and then checked my Britannica, my Oxford Dictionary, Scientific American Encyclopedia of Science, my Chambers, my McGraw Hill Science Encyclopedia, my Webster's Unabridged (the $125 version), my Columbia Encyclopedia, my . . .

What I published is not just some specialized definition I dug out of an occult science dungeon. It is mainstream. Virtually every authority defines physical in terms of mass and energy, and even Loseyourname (though he doesn't seem to want to admit it) started out defining it the same way when he said "constrained by material laws of cause and effect." I can't see how that definition can construed any other way than as materiality.

Why should it be so hard to accept the mainstream definition? And then if you want to get creative, start from the mainstream, and the explain how you want to diverge from that. But any communication endeavor is going to be made more difficult when someone uses a word with an established definition in a new way. :yuck:

Philocrat

Dec17-04, 02:22 AM

WHAT IS A CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATE?

Since all mechanical laws or scientific laws are logical laws, a crtical mechanical state is a point in a mechanical process where logical pathways appear to visually vanish when in actual facts they are not. At this point pure mechanical states or logical steps appear unintelligible when in actual fact they are still naturally intelligible at this critical point and beyond. Logical or Mechanical connectedness suddenly appears discontinuous and logically disconnected.

The question that I am still asking is this:

Is it this illusive logical discontinuity in a critcal mechanical state that is being mistaken for consciousness?

Fliption

Dec17-04, 09:39 AM

I agree with you that definitions need to be clear. But to be accurate about the definitions I posted, they weren't mine.

Yes I agree with you. I was just pointing out to Loseyourname that I too am one of the last that needs a lecture on being clear about definitions.

In the case of this thread, once you get the definitions straight and everyone can agree on the right words, I don't believe there will be anything left to talk about since the whole purpose of the thread is seemingly to do nothing but define the concepts in such a way as to categorize consciousness as "Physical". I can't see that Loseyourname's argument does anything other than make a statement about categories. "The Law of conservation" implies NOTHING about the efficacy of consciousness to answer the title of this thread. All this thread seems to be saying is IF consciousness is efficacious, then we can now call it "Physical" because physical means "X". This is a semantic argument.

Les Sleeth

Dec17-04, 04:02 PM

Hypnagogue, I’ve rearranged the order of your comments to help me answer them in a logical way (it seems I found some time after all :smile:).

Bob holds his belief because he witnesses repeated, reliable correlation, and given his existential circumstances, it's a very good belief. But it still turns out to be wrong.

I’ve always understood your point. It’s just that I haven’t wanted to bring union experience into this. But I can’t find any other way to communicate my conviction about conscious will unless you understand the perspective I am describing things from. As you will see, besides my own experience I’ve relied on other individuals experienced with union to help me explain myself. Hopefully the process of providing this perspective will answer why your black box analogy doesn’t apply.

Since I referred you to Carlos Castaneda, let me start there with two of don Juan’s concepts, in particular “seeing” and “stopping the world.” In an interview Castaneda explained, “. . . what he [don Juan] calls seeing is apprehending the world without any interpretation . . . When we stop the world, the world we stop is the one we usually maintain by our continual inner dialogue. Once you can stop the internal babble you stop maintaining your old world.”

What Castaneda reports is fully in line with union practice, which not only achieves a high level of “seeing,” but also lifts consciousness out of its normal p-consciousness-only perspective to “see” much bigger and deeper than before the “lift.” I’ll explain as answer the rest of your post.

I think the situation is the complete opposite . . . in general, it is philosophically accepted that we are acquainted with what p-consciousness is, but not with what it does. . . . We know the thing-in-itself . . . but we're not sure what role it plays in the causal structure of the world.

We aren’t using the same meaning for “is-ness.” I agree that we don’t understand all that p-consciousness does, and we do know that aspect of subjectivity everyone in consciousness studies is talking about.

But that isn’t the only “is-ness” I am referring to. In fact, that is merely the tip of the iceberg, which is a good analogy because beneath the surface of our familiar subjective experience is much more. My overall point has been: everyone is trying to figure out consciousness by looking at the part that’s showing, and trying generate a model from that limited view.

There can be no doubt that a mango tastes a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us; likewise, there can be no doubt that the experience of will subjectively feels a certain way that is above and beyond what physicalism can tell us. Where we run into problems is trying to bridge that ineffable 1st person datum across the great divide to the causal dynamics of the external world.

The thing is, from your descriptions of things I’m forced to conclude that the great divide you see is different than what I see from the perspective of union experience. That experience seems to pull one out of the brain somewhat to reveal that consciousness is joined to something big, really big. The experience brings to mind the words of the 13th century monastic Angela of Foligno (Italy), “The eyes of my soul were opened . . . so that through excess of marveling the soul cried with a loud voice, saying, ‘This whole world is full of God!’ Wherefore did I now comprehend that the world is but a small thing . . .”

With enough practice this withdrawal or pull-back from the brain can become permanent, so that one experiences being sort of “behind” the body and more within the great expanse. Here’s how I might represent what I “see” in terms of that aspect when I look at the interaction of consciousness and the body (C stands for consciousness and P stands for physical):

Former p-consciousness perspective of the “great divide”:
C--->P--------------------------------------------------------->
“Great divide” after conscious perspective is shifted:
C--------------------------------------------------------->P--->

In this major shift in perspective, the physical shrinks considerably, and one experiences consciousness as the fundamental thing, as the larger thing. Another monastic, Julian Norwich in the 14th century described it, “And then the Lord opened my ghostly eye and shewed my soul . . . I saw the Soul as it were an endless world.”

Part of the sense too is that one has been pulled out a bit from the multiplicity of brain functions and unified. Plotinus’ description seems apt, “Because what the soul seeks is the One . . . from the multiplicity that it was it must again become one. Only thus can it contemplate the supreme principle, the One.”

For all I know, interactionist dualism may be true; however, there is not enough in just the experience of will to come to this conclusion. Why not? Because given what we know about the causal dynamics of the world, the experience of will is entirely compatible with epiphenomenalism as well.

Well, that’s what you know, but that doesn’t necessarily apply to me. Besides experiencing that consciousness extends much further than one’s brain, there’s another part of the experience which reveals consciousness has an essence (commonly reported as light) and this essence seems shared by, and the “stuff” of, all of reality. I mention that here because of your use of the word “dualism.” Since you didn’t say “substance dualism,” then I assume you don’t necessarily mean that, but just in case . . .

The important thing is, where before the shift one sees virtually only the physical and only sees reality as zillions of different things, after the shift one “sees” that consciousness is the big thing (because one is now part of it), and that there is an underlying unity behind all existence. Here are some descriptions by famous union adepts that give a sense of this:

The 12th century German monastic Hildegarde, “. . . my soul has always beheld this Light; and in it my soul soars to the summit of the firmament and into a different air . . . the brightness which I see is not limited by space and is more brilliant than the radiance round the sun. . . . . sometimes when I see it . . . I seem a simple girl again, and an old woman no more!”

The Sufi Nimatullah Wali in 9th century Persia, “In the prison of form we still rejoice—watch what we do then in the world of essence . . . we are drowned in the universal ocean, we do not seek water now.”

George Fox in the 17th century, “[The Light is where] there is no division but unity in the life . . . . Therefore, in the Light wait where the unity is, where the peace is, where the Oneness . . . is, where there is not rent nor division.”

Zen master Kakuan in 12 century China, “ . . . all merge in No-Thing. This heaven is so vast no message can stain it. How may a snowflake exist in a raging fire?”

Jacopone Da Todi in the 13th century, “When the mind’s very being is gone . . . in a rapture divine and deep, itself in the Godhead lost . . . knowing not how it was crossed . . . drawn from its former state, to another [that is] measureless . . .”

Please don't misunderstand me here. I'm not trying to say you are wrong. I'm trying to say you very well may be wrong, and thus should not consider this matter decisively concluded. . . . Granted, perhaps 'proof' was too strong of a word. However, if there are two competing hypotheses that fit a phenomenon equally as well, we must at least have considerable doubt when choosing one over the other.

So we are back at your suggestion that I cannot possibly “know” if my experience of conscious will is what I believe it is. To that I would say that we cannot absolutely know anything of that sort (at least while still in the confines of the body). You cannot prove to me that I am not someone else’s dream, for example.

What we can have in the inner world is some degree of certainty that is established by the extent of our experience. The perspective I have described to you, which I have been experiencing for many years, has given me certainty. If someone hasn’t had that experience, they cannot possibly have such certainty. What can I do about that? Nothing, not a thing, except possibly recommend others to check out the possibility of acquiring such experience themselves. If you don’t want to, fine. I still am able to report to you, as a witness, that I can see conscious will is asserting itself over physicalness. I can even report that in light of the vastly disproportionate size difference, the concept that physicalness is capable of producing consciousness is ludicrous.

This idea of sticking with and totally trusting the experience of “shifted” consciousness is sometimes called the “path of knowledge.” I believe it is called that because in the experience one is more aware of one’s existence, and the nature of that existence, than in any other mode of consciousness (intellectual, for instance). So when I resist your efforts to have me participate in what I can clearly see is not going to give a definitive answer, I resist. Since I started off with don Juan I’ll finish by saying my effort is similar to his idea of a “man of knowledge.”

He says, “A man of knowledge chooses a path with heart and follows it and then he looks and rejoices and laughs, and then he sees and knows."