hard problem

[sage]

what exactly is the hard problem of consciousness? why is it hard?

[Les Sleeth]

what exactly is the hard problem of consciousness? why is it hard?

A little research here (http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/index.html) will give you the answer.

[Math Is Hard]

ooh! he's cute! I knew there was a reason I went into Cog Sci! :rofl:

[loseyourname]

ooh! he's cute! I knew there was a reason I went into Cog Sci! :rofl:

Are you kidding me? He looks like Kate Winslet crossed with Jack Black.

[Problem+Solve=Reason]

I doubt, no matter how sophisticated science becomes, we will never understand the true meaning of consciousness.

----- nwO ruoY evaH ,deeN oN <----?eeS I tahW eeS uoY oD

[the_truth]

Or rather we can't with our level of technology.

One step would be to map out the brain mathematically. This would be equivalent to the complexity a 19th century scientist would find attempting to decipher a cpu it were freshly plonked under his microscope multiplied by 100 or however much more computing power our brains have to a pentium 4. If we could, inside the neo-cortex we might find a complex set of brains which chooses what we think, weighs decisions etc. Or something else.

I think therefore I am?

[Math Is Hard]

Are you kidding me? He looks like Kate Winslet crossed with Jack Black.
LOL! :rofl: :rofl:

[FZ+]

Or rather we can't with our level of technology.

Nah. The hard problem, as to where the feeling of experience comes from, is constructed so that it is absolutely insoluble by any objective method. Because we don't even know what we mean by experience, nor can we assume we know everything there is to know about the nature of physical law. Technology, and our perceptions extend only to the effects of laws and rules, and going beyond leaves only speculation and belief.

[Problem+Solve=Reason]

Nah. The hard problem, as to where the feeling of experience comes from, is constructed so that it is absolutely insoluble by any objective method. Because we don't even know what we mean by experience, nor can we assume we know everything there is to know about the nature of physical law. Technology, and our perceptions extend only to the effects of laws and rules, and going beyond leaves only speculation and belief.

Good point. Computers cant do any math without instructions, which comes from humans

----- nwO ruoY evaH ,deeN oN <----?eeS I tahW eeS uoY oD.

[jammieg]

Some interesting reading, but my headache got a lot worse.
I think we can get the basic idea if we want to, so I agree with TheTruth in that it's like a computer and we are machines of a biological sort but with so many cogs spinning around that to try and pin down how it all fits together to create what we call "consciousness" and can agree on would probably take awhile, I mean if you really want the detailed and scientifically tested and predictable version of this knowledge which is kind of a hard problem I suppose is what is meant by that.
For instance a child of a certain age will often recognize an ink dot put on it's forehead in a mirror and point to the dot showing that they are aware of their self and something has changed, a monkey sometimes does the same, but does this prove self-awareness or do they just not respond to the dot in the same way?

[sage]

sleeth, i've read his book. it was rather diffucult to follow what he was saying.i'm not convinced that the hard problem exists. seems like a red herring. what exactly do we mean by qualia or subjective experiance? the question where the vividness of colours come from seem absurd. red is different from green because of its different frequency and wavelength and that difference is detected by our eyes. hence the brain perceives them to be different, what is so 'hard' to explain about that?i just do not get it.

[FZ+]

Good point. Computers cant do any math without instructions, which comes from humans

Neither can humans without education, instincts encoded in our genetics, and the appearance of problems and stimuli from the natural world. Which are instructions, of a sort.

[hypnagogue]

sleeth, i've read his book. it was rather diffucult to follow what he was saying.i'm not convinced that the hard problem exists. seems like a red herring. what exactly do we mean by qualia or subjective experiance? the question where the vividness of colours come from seem absurd. red is different from green because of its different frequency and wavelength and that difference is detected by our eyes. hence the brain perceives them to be different, what is so 'hard' to explain about that?i just do not get it.

It's not hard to look at the optic nerve and deduce that we perceive light along three distinct channels. The hard part comes in when we try to figure out why information processed along those channels looks like anything at all. Why does the color we call red look like this instead of this? If the visual quality of redness and blueness were reversed, we would still meet the criterion of sets of information that are treated distinctly, so that alone is not sufficient to answer the question. The hard problem claims that no combination of relational properties of this sort, no matter how complex, will get us closer to an answer than our initial, humble observation of the three distinct processing channels in the optic nerve.

For that matter, why does information processing in the brain result in qualitative experience at all? Why isn't it that I do not merely detect two distinct light inputs and act upon them without experiencing anything (e.g., as if I were in a deep, dreamless sleep)? If we assume for a moment that computers are not conscious, why is it that I don't just process information like a computer? What accounts for the difference between what my brain does and what the computer does? Assuming we can isolate this causal mechanism, how is it that it somehow 'creates' subjective experience? Those are the types of questions posed by the hard problem. Chalmers argues that the types of causal mechanisms given to us by physics are not sufficient to do the job. I won't go into an extended discussion of the argument here, but you can find some discussion about it in the Metaphysics & Epistemology forum, for instance this thread (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=57498).

[saltydog]

I doubt, no matter how sophisticated science becomes, we will never understand the true meaning of consciousness.

----- nwO ruoY evaH ,deeN oN <----?eeS I tahW eeS uoY oD

Consciousness is in the dynamics. It's nothing more than neural dynamics. Get a bunch of marbles behaving in the same non-linear fashion as neural assemblies and marble mind will emerge.

SD

[Les Sleeth]

Consciousness is in the dynamics. It's nothing more than neural dynamics. Get a bunch of marbles behaving in the same non-linear fashion as neural assemblies and marble mind will emerge.

Really? Would you care to demonstrate mind emerging from any sort of assembly or dynamics you choose to set up? :cool:

[Math Is Hard]

I am reading a piece called "Quining Qualia" by Daniel Dennett at the moment. He seems intent on proving that there "simply are no qualia at all" at least none that fit the definition he has set up (ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience). If a materialist should somehow be able to prove that qualia do not exist, does that solve the "hard problem"? Or is there more to be challenged?

[Les Sleeth]

I am reading a piece called "Quining Qualia" by Daniel Dennett at the moment. He seems intent on proving that there "simply are no qualia at all" at least none that fit the definition he has set up (ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience). If a materialist should somehow be able to prove that qualia do not exist, does that solve the "hard problem"? Or is there more to be challenged?

Absolutely! And guess what, that is exactly why Dennett wants to find a way to "dismiss" qualia . . . because he can't account for it with physical principles. It's in the way of his functionalist theory, so he'll just pretend it doesn't exist. Amazingly clever little bit of intellectual dishonesty there if you ask me.

That's same thing physicalists have done with life. They've "dismissed" any sort of vital force because they can explain most of the chemistry of life. Of course, they can't explain how all that chemistry got so effectively organized . . . but who cares. Find an excuse to "dismiss" and then you can get around those damn pesky facts which are making your theory come up short.

[Math Is Hard]

Thanks, Les. I might have to PM you some questions later. I am almost done with the Dennett reading, but I am moving on to Owen Flanagan now.

[Les Sleeth]

Thanks, Les. I might have to PM you some questions later. I am almost done with the Dennett reading, but I am moving on to Owen Flanagan now.

To give a nod to humility, I should add that the "dismissing conspiracy theory" is just my opinion. I have been willing, however, to debate anyone who claims to be able to make the case that dismissing vitalism is justified with the evidence we now have. As far as I can tell, physicalist arguments are as "holey" as the creationism story of Genesis. Same with functionalists.

[Problem+Solve=Reason]

Absolutely! And guess what, that is exactly why Dennett wants to find a way to "dismiss" qualia . . . because he can't account for it with physical principles. It's in the way of his functionalist theory, so he'll just pretend it doesn't exist. Amazingly clever little bit of intellectual dishonesty there if you ask me.

That's same thing physicalists have done with life. They've "dismissed" any sort of vital force because they can explain most of the chemistry of life. Of course, they can't explain how all that chemistry got so effectively organized . . . but who cares. Find an excuse to "dismiss" and then you can get around those damn pesky facts which are making your theory come up short.

Good point Sleeth.... You go, put those theorist in their place...

----- nwO ruoY evaH ,deeN oN <----?eeS I tahW eeS uoY oD

[saltydog]

Really? Would you care to demonstrate mind emerging from any sort of assembly or dynamics you choose to set up? :cool:

Ok, the marbles was a stretch but in principle but I still hold to the concept.

Walter Freeman at Berkeley modeled the central olfactory system of cats with a beautiful set of coupled delayed ODEs. The output did share some characteristics with the . . . well how do I say this without bringing up unpleasant images . . . output of the cat. It's not mind I agree.

I must admit, his results were not extremely impressive but we are in a sort of second dark ages for this. Recall purkinje nerves. On average, they have 20,000 connections! Freeman (the reference I have) worked with 15 equations.

Neural networks, which employ non-linear functions, have the ability to "learn". For example, the Post Office uses neural network software to interpret hand-written zip codes. The software "learns" the concept of "2-ness" from the dynamics of the network and can even pick out messy numbers.

Some brain scientists suspect memory recall is dependent on "attractors" in the non-linear sense. These and other works I've studied, pretty much convince me that non-linear dynamics is the best approach to successful AI. It's my extrapolation to suspect the mind is "all" dynamics.

SD

[selfAdjoint]

salty, have you any books journals or online papers to give us to let us research this? I certainly think your nonlinear dynamics idea is a good one (if not the final answer in itself). There's a lot of stuff in this general direction on the arxiv, but my experience with those papers has been, the bigger the claim, the smellier the derivation.

[Les Sleeth]

Ok, the marbles was a stretch but in principle but I still hold to the concept.

Thanks for the info, it is interesting work. Of course, I was simply challenging the way you made your original statement "Consciousness is . . . nothing more than neural dynamics . . . mind will emerge." You stated it as a fact, not as an unproven theory. I do not think mind will emerge from that complexity, but you do. So to see who is right, first it has to be done.

What I think you will get from complexity is nothing but complex programming, and never the independent "self." It will be a zombie, but by that time Dennett will be able to claim it is consciousness anyway because qualia will have been dismissed an illusion! :wink:

[saltydog]

salty, have you any books journals or online papers to give us to let us research this? I certainly think your nonlinear dynamics idea is a good one (if not the final answer in itself). There's a lot of stuff in this general direction on the arxiv, but my experience with those papers has been, the bigger the claim, the smellier the derivation.

Yea, I look to Semmelweiss for strengh. Know the story?

It's all embodied in Complexity Theory, Emergence, and Non-Linear Dynamics. My concept of mind in such regards is itself an "emergence" through synthesis of many threads. Here's some:

1. Rene Thom's Catastrophe Theory (it's a well-defined math concept and nothing to do with Noah and the Ark). The theory deals with non-linearity and "phase-transitions" (catastrophies). Abrubt changes are common in our world. Ever heard, "what made him crack"?

2. Non-linear dynamics: The concept of "attractors" just seems to fit with the brain. T. Sejnowski ("The Computational Brain") suggests attractors may well be involved in memory recall (not in the book, he just told me so).

3. Self-organization: Camazine and others wrote "Self-Orgainzation in Biological Systems" which begin to show how properties "emerge" from interactions between simple parts (like neurons?) such that the emergent property cannot be deduced from analysis of the simple parts. "Signs of Life" is another book which explores this thesis (not emergence of mind though).

4. I find it amazing how a neural network (just computer programs consisting of simple networks which resemble neural assemblies) can learn in a way that if you show it (a graphics image) many forms of "4", it can learn to pick out a messy-written "4" it has never seen before. Neural networks often, if not always, involve non-linear functions.

5. When I look out of my window I see very much a non-linear world. The brain evolved as a successful survival strategy in this non-linear world (when in New York, act like a New Yorker). The brain is non-linear and thus is accessible through non-linear dynamics.

SD

[selfAdjoint]

Okay, thanks. I think I'll look up Sejnowski's book, and I am about where you are on the other stuff. I do encourage you to look at the arxiv (http://arxiv.org), especially the computer science and nonlinear sciences sections. Lots of papers there are less into "higher math" than the pure physics ones. New ideas come along every week.

[saltydog]

Thanks for the info, it is interesting work. Of course, I was simply challenging the way you made your original statement "Consciousness is . . . nothing more than neural dynamics . . . mind will emerge." You stated it as a fact, not as an unproven theory. I do not think mind will emerge from that complexity, but you do. So to see who is right, first it has to be done.

What I think you will get from complexity is nothing but complex programming, and never the independent "self." It will be a zombie, but by that time Dennett will be able to claim it is consciousness anyway because qualia will have been dismissed an illusion! :wink:

Yes, I stand corrected. It's an unproven "idea". However, "Emergence" is a growing field with encouraging results. Many investigators have demonstrated the central concept: complex behavior emerges from interaction of simple parts. This complexity cannot be deduced from analysis of the parts. Surely a car is a simple example but the brain has 10-100 billion parts and many of them are richly-connected in non-linear ways. For example, the "firing" of a neuron is not a simple "some-input=some-output" response. I believe something "qualitatively different" emerges from some complexity other than just "complex programming" of the same "quality". May I suggest "Self-Organization in Biological Systems" by Camazine as defense of my view? It contains many examples of "emergence" from the Biological world, simple ones I admit.

SD

[arildno]

"Emergence" is a growing field with encouraging results. Many investigators have demonstrated the central concept: complex behavior emerges from interaction of simple parts.

No one has ever said that the "Laws of large numbers" are easy to deduce from the basic principles.
What I'm slightly iffy about, is the "emergence" word, since that has some unfortunate connotations of new behaviour inexplicable or inconsistent with the basic mechanisms.

[saltydog]

No one has ever said that the "Laws of large numbers" are easy to deduce from the basic principles.
What I'm slightly iffy about, is the "emergence" word, since that has some unfortunate connotations of new behaviour inexplicable or inconsistent with the basic mechanisms.

Emergence is qualitatively different from the "Laws of Large Numbers" if I'm interpreting that to mean Probability Theory. And you are correct in implying new behavior arises from the basic mechanism. The canonical example is the simple interactions between termite, mud, and pheromone. The clay cathedral in all its complexity "emerges" from simple interactions between the three. The mound cannot be deduced from an analysis of termite, mud or pheromone unless the dynamics between them are assessed. In this regards, "moundness" exists independently of the substrate mound. It is from this perspective that I extrapolate to the independent existence of "mind" and thus to the marble analogy.

SD

[Les Sleeth]

"Emergence" is a growing field with encouraging results. Many investigators have demonstrated the central concept: complex behavior emerges from interaction of simple parts. This complexity cannot be deduced from analysis of the parts.

That's true, but the subjectivity of consciousness is not complex, it is singular and seems indivisible into something more basic. So what you have to show is something exceedingly simple (in terms of structure) emerging from complexity, and yet which also has characteristics unlike any physical phenomena known in this universe.


I believe something "qualitatively different" emerges from some complexity other than just "complex programming" of the same "quality".

Right, I understand the hope there. It should be interesting to see if it can be done. I remain a skeptic since I don't think the brain is where consciousness originates.


May I suggest "Self-Organization in Biological Systems" by Camazine as defense of my view? It contains many examples of "emergence" from the Biological world, simple ones I admit.

Taken from a book review of Camazine's book "The synchronized flashing of fireflies at night. The spiraling patterns of an aggregating slime mold. The anastomosing network of army-ant trails. The coordinated movements of a school of fish. Researchers are finding in such patterns--phenomena that have fascinated naturalists for centuries--a fertile new approach to understanding biological systems: the study of self-organization. This book, a primer on self-organization in biological systems for students and other enthusiasts, introduces readers to the basic concepts and tools for studying self-organization and then examines numerous examples of self-organization in the natural world. Self-organization refers to diverse pattern formation processes in the physical and biological world, from sand grains assembling into rippled dunes to cells combining to create highly structured tissues to individual insects working to create sophisticated societies. What these diverse systems hold in common is the proximate means by which they acquire order and structure. In self-organizing systems, pattern at the global level emerges solely from interactions among lower-level components."

As you see, the quality of self organization between living and nonliving examples is not differentiated. Yet there is a huge difference between how far matter self organizes toward a system, and the organizational quality we see in life that leads to virtually perpetual system building. Physicalist researchers assume a priori that the piddling bit of self organization you can get matter to do is the basis of the organization in life. Yet they cannot demonstrate matter can rise above a few steps of self organization when left to its own devices.

Since it cannot be shown matter has the potential to self-organize itself into life, then the issue remains open as to whether there is yet some unrecognized organizational principle associated with life which is not associated with ordinary matter. And if it is, the lack of that same organizational principle may be what defeats AI researchers from ever getting consciousness to "emerge" from a computer.

[saltydog]

Since it cannot be shown matter has the potential to self-organize itself into life, then the issue remains open as to whether there is yet some unrecognized organizational principle associated with life which is not associated with ordinary matter. And if it is, the lack of that same organizational principle may be what defeats AI researchers from ever getting consciousness to "emerge" from a computer.


Well, you could have mentioned the termites as that's the finest example in the book and a little more impressive than fire-flies.

I belive we have "examples" of the "capability" of matter organizing into precursors of life: Miller was the first to show that amino acids could be created from pre-biotic chemicals (water, ammonia, methane, few more). At high temperature, amino acids spontaneously assemble into polymers called thermal-proteins which upon cooling, produce cell-like structures called microspheres. Pre-cursors of nucleic acids (purines and pyrimidines) have been synthesized from hydrogen cyanide and other chemicals under suspected pre-biotic conditions.

No, it's not life and a human is helping but it does look encouraging.

Computers today are "linear" in my view, mostly "look-up" tables made up of transistors operating in their linear ranges (pretty sure about the transistors anyway). Someone someday is going to come up with "non-linear" devices which exhibit all the properties of non-linear dynamics: ergodic behavior, catastrophe, sensitive dependence, attractors, bifurcation, chaos, and fractal geometry. You'd think that would be a mess at first and I suspect the first workings would exhibit peculiar forms of "cognition" that we're not acustomed to. It's there I think we'll start to formulate better ideas of what mind is.

Also, I'm finding out you guys have been discussing this subject at length in the Epistemology section which I've just begun to look at. Anyway, it's just my view and like the banner in the dojo said, "a journey begins with a first step".

SD

[Bartholomew]

"non-linear" devices which exhibit all the properties of non-linear dynamics: ergodic behavior, catastrophe, sensitive dependence, attractors, bifurcation, chaos, and fractal geometry
All of those things you describe can be done, have been done, and are being done on computers.

[Les Sleeth]

Well, you could have mentioned the termites as that's the finest example in the book and a little more impressive than fire-flies.

No slight intended, I am very impressed with the organizational abilities of certain life forms and agree with you fully there. I simply quoted what the book reviewer chose to talk about.


I belive we have "examples" of the "capability" of matter organizing into precursors of life: Miller was the first to show that amino acids could be created from pre-biotic chemicals (water, ammonia, methane, few more). At high temperature, amino acids spontaneously assemble into polymers called thermal-proteins which upon cooling, produce cell-like structures called microspheres. Pre-cursors of nucleic acids (purines and pyrimidines) have been synthesized from hydrogen cyanide and other chemicals under suspected pre-biotic conditions. . . . Also, I'm finding out you guys have been discussing this subject at length in the Epistemology section which I've just begun to look at.

In the 2 1/2 years I've been debating this issue here at PF, the Miller-Urey experiment was cited every time by opponents, and the other organic potentials much of the time (sometimes they list synthesized phages as examples, though they tend to leave out that DNA was tossed into the kettle). That's how little progress has been made toward demonstrating matter can self organize itself into life since the 1950s.

The thing is, if there is an unrecognized organizational principle that worked with Earth's chemistry to produce life, the raw materials need to be somewhat predisposed to being organized. So it would not be unusual for some degree of spontaneous "mechanomorphic" organization to happen. But those few steps chemistry is capable of doesn't represent what happened, and happens, with life. There organization kept going, and going, and going . . . it is still going. Further, it wasn't just order that the organization produced, it was functioning systems which could operate in support of new systems that would be built on top. Matter alone has never been shown it can act that way spontaneously or even be kicked into "self-organizing gear" with lots of help from scientists.

So I feel my skepticism is justified, and not due to a priori convictions such as those by physicalists who insist matter is alone is the creator of life without enough evidence to make their case.


Computers today are "linear" in my view, mostly "look-up" tables made up of transistors operating in their linear ranges (pretty sure about the transistors anyway). Someone someday is going to come up with "non-linear" devices which exhibit all the properties of non-linear dynamics: ergodic behavior, catastrophe, sensitive dependence, attractors, bifurcation, chaos, and fractal geometry. You'd think that would be a mess at first and I suspect the first workings would exhibit peculiar forms of "cognition" that we're not acustomed to. It's there I think we'll start to formulate better ideas of what mind is.

I agree the research is exciting. Even though I don't believe independent and conscious subjectivity will emerge from it, what AI could produce should be impressive.

[saltydog]

All of those things you describe can be done, have been done, and are being done on computers.

But I think they're only being simulated on a computer screen. It's like watching a TV program. The images look like people but really aren't.

SD

[saltydog]

The thing is, if there is an unrecognized organizational principle that worked with Earth's chemistry to produce life, the raw materials need to be somewhat predisposed to being organized. So it would not be unusual for some degree of spontaneous "mechanomorphic" organization to happen. But those few steps chemistry is capable of doesn't represent what happened, and happens, with life. There organization kept going, and going, and going . . . it is still going. Further, it wasn't just order that the organization produced, it was functioning systems which could operate in support of new systems that would be built on top. Matter alone has never been shown it can act that way spontaneously or even be kicked into "self-organizing gear" with lots of help from scientists.



In defense of Chemistry, even one reaction can be difficult to study.

Has Stuart Kaufmann been mentioned in these discussions? He proposes a revolutionary idea: catalytic closure. In essence, primitive RNA arose which had catalytic ability to assist with protein formation. Through selection, some protein chains arose which had catalytic ability to assist in RNA synthesis. At this point the RNA-protein system becomes synergistic and in some ways self-organizing. I realize it's a theory but it's based on reasonable chemical principles.

An Idea:

With regards to increasing complexity: As the diversity of form (molecules, life-forms, habitats, etc.) increases, the number of degrees of freedom increases. This necessarily increases the dimension of the system's state space (space of all possibilities). Enlarging the state-space this way allows access to a greater variety of high-dimension "attractors" (islands of stability). I propose that what we see as increasing complexity is actually a trajectory from low dimension attractors to high dimension attractors (attractors within attractors) made possible by an influx of energy (sun, chemical bonds) and increasing diversity. Thus, similar to the marble-analogy, if a system is designed in which it's degrees of freedom increases (greatly), a suitable dynamics (with influx of energy) can be defined within the system which will have similar characteristics to the evolution of complexity on earth. At present, we're just too limited in our sophistication to model this. I mean, math is really at it's infancy now-days (no offense, I have a passion for math).

SD

[Les Sleeth]

Has Stuart Kaufmann been mentioned in these discussions? He proposes a revolutionary idea: catalytic closure. In essence, primitive RNA arose which had catalytic ability to assist with protein formation. Through selection, some protein chains arose which had catalytic ability to assist in RNA synthesis. At this point the RNA-protein system becomes synergistic and in some ways self-organizing. I realize it's a theory but it's based on reasonable chemical principles.

Yep, just theory. And you really don't know if that combination of principles is "reasonable." If someone can make it work, then it was reasonable; if not, then it wasn't. Demonstrate it, and then we have something to talk about.


With regards to increasing complexity: As the diversity of form (molecules, life-forms, habitats, etc.) increases, the number of degrees of freedom increases. This necessarily increases the dimension of the system's state space (space of all possibilities). Enlarging the state-space this way allows access to a greater variety of high-dimension "attractors" (islands of stability). I propose that what we see as increasing complexity is actually a trajectory from low dimension attractors to high dimension attractors (attractors within attractors) made possible by an influx of energy (sun, chemical bonds) and increasing diversity. Thus, similar to the marble-analogy, if a system is designed in which it's degrees of freedom increases (greatly), a suitable dynamics (with influx of energy) can be defined within the system which will have similar characteristics to the evolution of complexity on earth.

Interesting theory. You'll have to demonstrate it if you want to talk about it as fact.


At present, we're just too limited in our sophistication to model this. I mean, math is really at it's infancy now-days (no offense, I have a passion for math).

Everybody says they need more time to prove their theory is true. Creationists need more time to find the Garden of Eden and Noah's Ark.

It is possible that the reason you cannot make your case now is because you will never be able to make your case. Physicalists can't insist we accept they will eventually discover the truth based on their faith in empiricism to reveal all revealable truths! I don't share that faith, and lots of other thinking people also do not. I am open to a physicalist proof, but I ain't budging from my skepticism until I see progress in the areas of abiogenesis and physically-derived consciousness.

[saltydog]

It is possible that the reason you cannot make your case now is because you will never be able to make your case. Physicalists can't insist we accept they will eventually discover the truth based on their faith in empiricism to reveal all revealable truths! I don't share that faith, and lots of other thinking people also do not. I am open to a physicalist proof, but I ain't budging from my skepticism until I see progress in the areas of abiogenesis and physically-derived consciousness.

Ok. I've exhausted my comments about the matter and besides, I think I've gotten off the subject of the initial posting. Suppose I'll go back to differential equations. I think I can be of practical help to the group there.

Well . . . a question: I made the following statement elsewhere here attempting to define existence in relation to Decartes' comment:


Existence \notin \varnothing


Yes, no, off-the subject? Anyone?

SD

[cen2y]

Existence \notin \varnothing
Whether your notion is wrong or not depends on what logical system you use to declare that. According to my ontology
Existing\ objects \notin \varnothing
i.e.
Things\ which\ possess\ the\ property\ of\ existance \notin \varnothing
\forall(x)(Existing(x) <=> x \notin \varnothing)
Which is quite obivious since writting out 'existance' is inessential.

[Photongod]

Sage asked:
what exactly is the hard problem of consciousness? why is it hard?

Perhaps the difficulty lies with a problem of self reference. In order to study ones consciousness, one must use his/her consciousness to do so . This leads to a set of obvious problems of interference and gridlock.

Photongod

[Problem+Solve=Reason]

This leads to a set of obvious problems of interference and gridlock.
Not exactly. We (our consciousness lets say) study our (itself) consciousness by things that have been affected by our consciousness, not the actual entity itself.

____________________________________
In seeking wisdom thou art wise; in imagining that thou hast attained it - thou art a fool.
Lord Chesterfield

[selfAdjoint]

Yep, just theory. And you really don't know if that combination of principles is "reasonable." If someone can make it work, then it was reasonable; if not, then it wasn't. Demonstrate it, and then we have something to talk about.

Type catalytic+closure+experiment but not cognitive into google scholar and get over 2100 responses, most of them reports of experiments that found, studied or confirmed it. Les you get away with murder here with your handwaving dismissals of things you evidently know only slightly.

[philocrazy]

loseyourname


Do you believe that absolutely everything can be expressed scientifically?
-Hedwig Born to Albert Einstein

Yes, it would be possible, but it would make no sense. It would be description without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.
-Einstein's reply
====================================
would + would = 2 woulds + would =3 woulds (sounds like science to me)
what does it say?=nothing (description without meaning)
sound is a variation of wave presure and beethoven symphony when
heard is also a variation of wave presure
everything can be expressed philosophically and with meaning

The myth

[Les Sleeth]

Type catalytic+closure+experiment but not cognitive into google scholar and get over 2100 responses, most of them reports of experiments that found, studied or confirmed it. Les you get away with murder here with your handwaving dismissals of things you evidently know only slightly.

I regretted being so negative after seeing Saltydog say "Suppose I'll go back to differential equations." I was in the warpath over theories stated like facts. In his case it stemmed from his opening statement "Consciousness is in the dynamics. It's nothing more than neural dynamics. Get a bunch of marbles behaving in the same non-linear fashion as neural assemblies and marble mind will emerge." However, he'd backed off from that, and was discussing things fairly yet I kept pushing the point. I am sorry for that. :redface:

However, while I don't think my attitude was called for, my response to his statement was factually correct. I know of Kauffman's work and have his book "The Origins of Order." I can't say I understood every bit of his book (it's been a few years since I read it), but I do know his perpetual autocatalytic hypothesis is another abiogenesis theory no one can prove will lead to "livingness."

So when Saltydog posted, "In essence, primitive RNA arose which had catalytic ability to assist with protein formation. Through selection, some protein chains arose which had catalytic ability to assist in RNA synthesis. At this point the RNA-protein system becomes synergistic and in some ways self-organizing," I was stating that is abiogenesis theory, not fact. I stand on that.

[saltydog]

I regretted being so negative after seeing Saltydog say "Suppose I'll go back to differential equations." I was in the warpath over theories stated like facts. In his case it stemmed from his opening statement "Consciousness is in the dynamics. It's nothing more than neural dynamics. Get a bunch of marbles behaving in the same non-linear fashion as neural assemblies and marble mind will emerge." However, he'd backed off from that, and was discussing things fairly yet I kept pushing the point. I am sorry for that. :redface:


Well, that was hard Les. I admire your wisdom sir. I'd like to think I didn't back-off the marbles, just can't prove something I believe in (I'm thinking 300 years for the boot). And I really love differential equations but find myself here more often than not. Thanks.

Salty

[selfAdjoint]

So when Saltydog posted, "In essence, primitive RNA arose which had catalytic ability to assist with protein formation. Through selection, some protein chains arose which had catalytic ability to assist in RNA synthesis. At this point the RNA-protein system becomes synergistic At this point the RNA-protein system becomes synergistic and in some ways self-organizing," I was stating that is abiogenesis theory, not fact. I stand on that.


Agreed that's just a hypothesis ("just a theory" is technically wrong and sounds too much like the creationists). You are absolutely right there and as far as you limit yourself to that issue I have no argument.

But lots of things the consciousness dualists assert are just hypotheses too. Sauce for the goose? Example, the claim in that book they're studying, that science is "just differences" that you can add up and totalize is contradicted by catalytic closure in chemistry, populations, and cellular dynamics.

[Canute]

But lots of things the consciousness dualists assert are just hypotheses too. Sauce for the goose? Example, the claim in that book they're studying, that science is "just differences" that you can add up and totalize is contradicted by catalytic closure in chemistry, populations, and cellular dynamics.
The claim that science is the study of bare differences has nothing to do with dualism as far as I can tell. It's just a fact, or put forward as one. What makes you say that chemistry, cellular dynamics and so on contradict that claim? I can't see the connection.

[selfAdjoint]

In the 2 1/2 years I've been debating this issue here at PF, the Miller-Urey experiment was cited every time by opponents, and the other organic potentials much of the time (sometimes they list synthesized phages as examples, though they tend to leave out that DNA was tossed into the kettle). That's how little progress has been made toward demonstrating matter can self organize itself into life since the 1950s.

Following quote is from a semitechnical account of Venters artificial virus creation, in November 2003.

To create the virus, the researchers first assembled single nucleotide bases into DNA based on the virus' known genetic sequence. An enzyme then transcribed the DNA into the single-stranded RNA genome. The virus could then replicate itself naturally.

The DNA that was "thrown into the kettle" was created by hand from single bases.

The claim that science is the study of bare differences has nothing to do with dualism as far as I can tell. It's just a fact, or put forward as one. What makes you say that chemistry, cellular dynamics and so on contradict that claim? I can't see the connection.

Catalytic Closure is an emergent property that cannot be reached by adding up the elementary processes that comprise it. There is a random component. Catalytic closure has been SHOWN to occur in chemical and other contexts, as the google search I suggested above will show you. This contradicts the assertion that physical nature is just bare differences and falsifies the "fact" that you assert.

[Photongod]

[QUOTE=Problem+Solve=Reason] said:

Not exactly. We (our consciousness lets say) study our (itself) consciousness by things that have been affected by our consciousness, not the actual entity itself. [QUOTE]

Could you give me an example?

It still sounds like a nose trying to smell itself to me. Photongod

[Les Sleeth]

The DNA that was "thrown into the kettle" was created by hand from single bases.

Keep in mind I was responding to claims of chemistry's self-organizing ability. In this case, I was referring to the argument that all you have to do to produce a phage is throw a bunch of chemicals in a vat and you get one (I think it was Psychodelerium who first put it that way to me), and therefore it is an example of extended self organization by chemistry. But as you know, there is significant assembling done ahead of time (plus, included in the materials needed for PCR is typically genomic DNA), and so it doesn't demonstrate the ability of chemistry to self organize itself from scratch into bacteriophages.

The consciously unassisted self-organizing ability of chemistry was my point, not that scientists aren't doing clever things with biochemistry. I am claiming that chemistry's demonstrated self-organizating potential falls significantly short of what it would take for abiogenesis (or for viruses to self organize from raw materials).

[selfAdjoint]

I am claiming that chemistry's demonstrated self-organizating potential falls significantly short of what it would take for abiogenesis (or for viruses to self organize from raw materials).


Some spontaneous chemical self-organizations in 1994:
http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/1994/pdf/6610x1961.pdf

[Les Sleeth]

Some spontaneous chemical self-organizations in 1994:
http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/1994/pdf/6610x1961.pdf

I haven't denied what self-organizing potential has been demonstrated, and certainly polymers and amino acids are examples. But as I pointed out earlier to Saltydog:

". . . those few steps chemistry is capable of doesn't represent what happened, and happens, with life. There organization kept going, and going, and going . . . it is still going. Further, it wasn't just order that the organization produced, it was functioning systems which could operate in support of new systems that would be built on top. Matter alone has never been shown it can act that way spontaneously or even be kicked into [that sort of] "self-organizing gear" without lots of help from scientists."

So it is a specific quality of self organization that cannot be demonstrated, not that self organization cannot happen at all.

BTW, what's wrong with the idea there might be an undiscovered organizing principle? Nobody minds considering the possibility of the theoretical Higgs particle, or dark matter, or any other thing that helps explain things.

[loseyourname]

Catalytic Closure is an emergent property that cannot be reached by adding up the elementary processes that comprise it. There is a random component. Catalytic closure has been SHOWN to occur in chemical and other contexts, as the google search I suggested above will show you. This contradicts the assertion that physical nature is just bare differences and falsifies the "fact" that you assert.

I think Gregg is right to say that physics is the study of relational properties that don't need to be instantiated for physics to be coherent. His analogy between a pure Life world and a pure physical world is dubious if taken literally, but I don't think he meant it that way and I can see why he uses a Life world as an illustration. Perhaps the facts of all other sciences are entailed by these facts of physics - they certainly seem to be. I do know, however, that many of the phenomena studied by other sciences are strongly emergent and cannot be deduced statically from facts of physics. This is especially true of the social and behavioral sciences. I'm having a hard time getting hypnagogue to agree to this, though.

The phrase "bare differences" may not be the best way to describe physical quantities. I've never liked it myself, because physics can certainly study the relations of phenomena that are exactly the same, potentially even in exactly the same state. The thing is, entailment to me doesn't mean the potential to be logically deduced from lower-level physical facts. It just means that a given output is the result of a given input, even if you can potentially get many different outputs and the result is in many ways random.

[selfAdjoint]

I suspect that the bare differences was chosen for rhetorical effect, but it does artificially narrow his focus, and just isn't convincing to someone who has a rich background in science. I for one would wonder how he would impose bare differences on topology. How is the difference between a sphere and a torus "bare"

[selfAdjoint]

I haven't denied what self-organizing potential has been demonstrated, and certainly polymers and amino acids are examples. But as I pointed out earlier to Saltydog:

". . . those few steps chemistry is capable of doesn't represent what happened, and happens, with life. There organization kept going, and going, and going . . . it is still going. Further, it wasn't just order that the organization produced, it was functioning systems which could operate in support of new systems that would be built on top. Matter alone has never been shown it can act that way spontaneously or even be kicked into [that sort of] "self-organizing gear" without lots of help from scientists."

So it is a specific quality of self organization that cannot be demonstrated, not that self organization cannot happen at all.

I would distinguish "has not been demonstrated" from "cannot be demonstrated"

BTW, what's wrong with the idea there might be an undiscovered organizing principle? Nobody minds considering the possibility of the theoretical Higgs particle, or dark matter, or any other thing that helps explain things.

Well, self-organized criticality IS a new organizing principle; it has taken off because it has testable consequences. People can see it happening. It is also a clear idea that people can grasp, something rare and precious in science :biggrin: .

The article on spontaneous chemical assemblies I linked to is part of a research program in chemistry called the supermolecular program. Since it is demonstrated that SOME chemicals will spontaneously react to form more complex molecules, they have worked to find rational ways to specify what those some chemicals might be. Just as autocatalysis requires patters of internal interactions to work, so these researchers find "algorithms" encoded in the moleculare reactivities which they can follow up. Some of this, while admirably ingenious, seems a little pedestrian to me. Quantum theorists studying self-organization have stronger tools in their kits - renormalization group theorems for example.

Of course you have adopted the "Naw that ain't it" stance, and "that" won't ever be "it" until Galatea rises from the inert chemical bath in that kettle.

[Les Sleeth]

Of course you have adopted the "Naw that ain't it" stance, and "that" won't ever be "it" until Galatea rises from the inert chemical bath in that kettle.

Well, I thought you offered a collegial olive branch a few dozen posts ago. Since then, I've not descended into ridicule of your skepticism about what I have come to trust, nor directly confronted you about your beliefs.

To me, collegial means respecting what has convinced another of something; and then, if we are to disagree, it is in the spirit of mutual respect. Those comments above feel like ridicule. Do you really think the basis of my skepticism is a moronic "naw that ain't it"?

Why not put the shoe on the other foot? Are you ready to buy centuries of introspectionists' reports of "something more," along with my testimony, and abandon your own skepticism? My skepticism is not due to a priori beliefs as yours seem to be. I don't "believe" in God and I don't "believe" in the potential of physicalness to self organize itself into a cell (and even less into consciousness). Why?

In the case of God, all I have is an inner "feel" for something that I've experienced many years from mediation. To be fully accurate, there isn't enough information in that experience (not yet anyway) to make me certain that the "something more" is God. If you aren't going to try that experience for yourself, then you aren't going to understand what confidence I have there is "something more" going on behind reality than just physics.

In the case of physicalness being the "creator," I don't see the right evidence in a couple of crucial places. I can imagine a dumb cell might be purely physical, but the self-organizing ability to make it into a cell is not showing itself in physicalness. Physicalist "believers" in my opinion are suffering from the same blind faith they are down on the religious for indulging in. All the examples given for why someone should have faith in matter's self organizing potentials are smoke. No one is even close to demonstrating it, but the a priori commitment to physicalism seems to make people gloss over this huge missing piece.

As for me, since I don't care one iota what the truth turns out to be, I remain free to believe what the evidence indicates (including my inner experience), and to remain skeptical of the exaggerations of "believers."

[Canute]

I suspect that the bare differences was chosen for rhetorical effect, but it does artificially narrow his focus, and just isn't convincing to someone who has a rich background in science. I for one would wonder how he would impose bare differences on topology. How is the difference between a sphere and a torus "bare"
It wasn't for rhetorical effect, it is the basis of his argument against physcalism. What he is saying, as Loseyourname said, is that physics studies the relations between things, not the things themselves. In other words, physics has no grounding ontology.

This is equivalent to saying that the universe of subjects and objects has only a dependent existence or, more scientifically, as Bohm and others argue, that it is in effect a hologram. I don't know Bohm well but perhaps one could say that physics studies what is explicate, not what is implicate. Note also that in M-theory there is a sense in which spacetime, and thus all it contains, does not exist. Physics has yet to identify any absolute substance or entity. In more philosophical terms we could say that we still cannot see beyond appearances, or out of Plato's cave, or solve the problem of attributes (of what exists other than appearances).

This is what the issue of bare differences is about. What GR is saying is that physics cannot provide a complete ontological account of the universe, an account of what things actually are, because it studies only the difference between things, not the things themselves. These differences are 'bare' in the sense that they are not ontological differences but simply differences in the appearance of things. In a way this is just a restatement of the 'hard problem' in a different form. GR relates this to the problematic ontology of conscious experience, but it is just relevant to the problematic ontology of matter and energy.

On the biology/life question you might be interested in Varella's work on autopoetic systems. He examines their structure and emergence in the light of the mathematics of George Spencer-Brown, which is founded on the proposition that such structures arise from and consist of, in effect, just bare differences.

[saltydog]

Some spontaneous chemical self-organizations in 1994:
http://www.iupac.org/publications/pac/1994/pdf/6610x1961.pdf

Thanks for the reference SelfAdjoint. My background is in Chemistry so I'll feel at home.

Salty

[saltydog]

BTW, what's wrong with the idea there might be an undiscovered organizing principle? Nobody minds considering the possibility of the theoretical Higgs particle, or dark matter, or any other thing that helps explain things.

I believe their are and am optimistic future generations will discover them. To avoid redundancy, I won't bring up the banner in the dojo again.

[Tournesol]

How do you get from non-linear (or any other) kind of behaviour to qualia ?

[selfAdjoint]

It wasn't for rhetorical effect, it is the basis of his argument against physcalism. What he is saying, as Loseyourname said, is that physics studies the relations between things, not the things themselves. In other words, physics has no grounding ontology.

This is equivalent to saying that the universe of subjects and objects has only a dependent existence or, more scientifically, as Bohm and others argue, that it is in effect a hologram. I don't know Bohm well but perhaps one could say that physics studies what is explicate, not what is implicate. Note also that in M-theory there is a sense in which spacetime, and thus all it contains, does not exist. Physics has yet to identify any absolute substance or entity. In more philosophical terms we could say that we still cannot see beyond appearances, or out of Plato's cave, or solve the problem of attributes (of what exists other than appearances).

This is what the issue of bare differences is about. What GR is saying is that physics cannot provide a complete ontological account of the universe, an account of what things actually are, because it studies only the difference between things, not the things themselves. These differences are 'bare' in the sense that they are not ontological differences but simply differences in the appearance of things. In a way this is just a restatement of the 'hard problem' in a different form. GR relates this to the problematic ontology of conscious experience, but it is just relevant to the problematic ontology of matter and energy.

On the biology/life question you might be interested in Varella's work on autopoetic systems. He examines their structure and emergence in the light of the mathematics of George Spencer-Brown, which is founded on the proposition that such structures arise from and consist of, in effect, just bare differences.

Thanks for the explanation Canute. I do grant this aspect of science, and my own belief is that the "ding an sich" is just as much a myth as the homonculus. I can't follow the reasoning that says "since empirical study of the world does not supply us with an ontology, let us derive one by thinking abstractly about consciousness". That is a traditional way to go of course (Hegel and successors) but I have never seen it lead anywhere productive.

[Canute]

Thanks for the explanation Canute. I do grant this aspect of science, and my own belief is that the "ding an sich" is just as much a myth as the homonculus. I can't follow the reasoning that says "since empirical study of the world does not supply us with an ontology, let us derive one by thinking abstractly about consciousness". That is a traditional way to go of course (Hegel and successors) but I have never seen it lead anywhere productive.
I'm guessing that "ding an sich" is thing-in-itself. If so then doesn't there have to be at least one thing that is a thing in itself? It seems to me that most things can have no 'in themselves' existence, as you suggest, and have only a dependent existence, but not absolutely everything, otherwise nothing could exist.

Like you I also can't follow the reasoning of the sentence you give. We cannot see the 'in itself' aspect of consciousness by thinking abstractly about it, so to do so will tell us no more about ontology than thinking abstractly about electrons, quarks or branes (or God). All we are thinking about are 'bare differences'. However consciousness is 'what it is like', and as such is the one thing that we can explore without thinking abstractly about it. So in this respect it seems that we can know it as a thing in itself and therefore can, in principle at least, derive an ontology from it.

[selfAdjoint]

Let me clarify. Science replaces "is" questions by behavior questions. What the electron "is" doesn't matter to physics, what the electron "does" matters. See Patrick Vanesch's statement in http://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=450692&postcount=24 that for him the formalism (statement of what things do, and the consequences of them) precedes and drives the interpretation (statement, suitably qualified of what the things "really" are).

So I don't believe that consciousness is a thing, that could have an independent or prior ontology. I believe it is an emergent behavior of a complex system of other behaviors, getting simpler and smaller in scale as you go down, with maybe other stages of emergence along the way.

My support for this view is the massive amount of evidence that our apparent world that we are conscious of does not correspond closely to the world as we think it does, the .4 second gap between the time our brain starts our arm moving and the time we become aware of the stimulus for that move, the optical illusions, etc. etc.; in fact all the evidence amassed by Dennet in Consciousness Expained. Consciousness is not the way you think, and as a complex, unreliable phenomenon is quite unsuitable as a basis for philosophy.

It doesn't seem to me that I have to come up with my own detailed account of being conscious in order to be mightily skeptical of anyone who says it is primary.

[loseyourname]

It wasn't for rhetorical effect, it is the basis of his argument against physcalism. What he is saying, as Loseyourname said, is that physics studies the relations between things, not the things themselves. In other words, physics has no grounding ontology.


Rosenberg confuses this point a bit, though. On the one hand, he seems to mean "bare differences" as simply differences uninstantiated, without a grounding ontology. If that is the case, then yes, that is what physics studies. But to make his analogy with a Life world more cogent, he brings in the stipulation that "bare differences" mean differences that are defined circularly - 'on' is not 'off,' 'off' is not 'on.' This is not the way physical quantities are defined and so, in this sense, his analogy fails.

[Canute]

Let me clarify. Science replaces "is" questions by behavior questions. What the electron "is" doesn't matter to physics, what the electron "does" matters.
This is what Rosenberg is saying. Science studies appearances, relations, bare differences.

So I don't believe that consciousness is a thing, that could have an independent or prior ontology.
I don't understand the word "so" here. In what way does your view of consciousness follow from the fact that physics does not study what "is"? You seem to be saying that physics cannot study consciousness, therefore consciousness cannot be explained by science, therefore consciousness must be epiphenomenal on something that can be explained by science. Perhaps that's a misunderstanding. But this sort of argument, even when well made, never works, because it is impossible to prove that something that can be explained by science is not epiphenomenal on something that cannot be explained by science.

This goes back to Rosenberg's point, that the things science can explain cannot be shown to be more than collections of bare differences. In the final analysis there is nothing supporting the scientific model of the universe but an explanatory gap. That doesn't make the model completely wrong, but it's a problem that cannot be ignored for ever.

My support for this view is the massive amount of evidence that our apparent world that we are conscious of does not correspond closely to the world as we think it does, the .4 second gap between the time our brain starts our arm moving and the time we become aware of the stimulus for that move, the optical illusions, etc. etc.;
There are a number of valid objections to this interpretation of Libet's results, many discussed at length in the literature. Certainly those results do not show that we do not know what consciousness feels like. Also, those results (and others like them) tell us nothing about the ontology of consciousness.

in fact all the evidence amassed by Dennet in Consciousness Expained.
That bloody book again. :grumpy: What evidence are you refering to? There's certainly none that shows that Dennett is right in what he asserts about consciousness, and most of his reasoning does not stand up to even a superficial dispassionate analysis. I don't want to argue about the book, but I think its inneffectiveness is shown by the lack of impact it's had in consciousness studies.

Consciousness is not the way you think, and as a complex, unreliable phenomenon is quite unsuitable as a basis for philosophy.
Surely the point of researching into consciousness, whether by science, philosophy or meditative practice, is to get our thinking about it on the right track? If we were to dismiss consciousness as a subject for study because it was not what some people think it is then we'd have to dismiss the entities we study scientifically on exactly the same grounds. There may be nothing at all that's what we think it is.

Is consciousness an unreliable phenomenon? I don't know what 'unreliable' would mean in this context. I'd argue that it follows from the fact that solipsism is unfalsifiable that consciousness is the most philosophically reliable phenomenon that there is.

It doesn't seem to me that I have to come up with my own detailed account of being conscious in order to be mightily skeptical of anyone who says it is primary.
In a way. But the two sides of the debate are not quite equivalent. Those who argue that Being is fundamental assert that no detailed account can be given of our consciousness. They say that what it really is cannot be explained. Because of this it would be unreasonable, or pointless at least, to expect them to ever give such an account. The onus is therefore on those who say that it can be explained to show that it can be.

(This looks like a cop-out, but it is not. In this other view, Buddhism etc., the reasons that consciousness cannot be explained can be explained. That is, there is nothing mysterious about why C cannot be explained, it just follows logically from the way the world is. In other words, the proposition that consciousness is inexplicable in principle can be shown to be consistent with the proposition that consciousness is fundamental. It is only the thing in itself that cannot be fully explained).

Not everybody thinks that this assertion, that consciousness is inexplicable, is true. However nobody can show that it's false, so as a reason or excuse given by someone for not being explain consciousness despite their claiming to know that it is is fundamental it's perfect, and the assertion may be true as far as anybody can ever show.

On the other hand those who argue that consciousness is not-fundamental say that the fact of our being conscious can be explained, even if we cannot do so yet. So it is they who must come up with an explanation of it, or show that it is, in principle at least, possible to explain it. However so far all attempts to do this have become quickly enmired in metaphysical paradoxes, barriers to knowledge, explanatory gaps, undecidable questions and so on, just as those who take the other view predict they will.

Because of this I feel that someone who wants to argue that consciousness is not-fundamental must, before they get into the scientific detail of the explanation, start by showing that at least it is possible in principle to reduce consciousness to either mind or matter. As it is nobody has succeeded in doing this yet, which we can know from the fact that still many experts feel that the 'hard' problem is unsolvable.

It seems to me that the fact that solipsism is unfalsifiable is incontrovertible proof that we can never show that consciousness reduces to brain, or even more generally to matter, but I've never seen anyone using this argument so maybe I'm missing something.

Sorry - written too much again.

[selfAdjoint]

Just a couple of points.

About that "so". Obviously my belief is that whatever is non-vacuous about consciousness is something that can be studied by science, and it will therefore turn out to be about behavior. And BTW, I don't accept the GR characterization of studying relationships and behavior as "bare differences", since I don't grant that the "content" they are supoposed to be missing is real.

Next that Dennet's book has had no affect on consciousness studies. There is a whole school of people working in that tradition. Of course it appeals more to neurologists and such more than to the pure philosophers.

[Canute]

Rosenberg confuses this point a bit, though. On the one hand, he seems to mean "bare differences" as simply differences uninstantiated, without a grounding ontology. If that is the case, then yes, that is what physics studies. But to make his analogy with a Life world more cogent, he brings in the stipulation that "bare differences" mean differences that are defined circularly - 'on' is not 'off,' 'off' is not 'on.' This is not the way physical quantities are defined and so, in this sense, his analogy fails.
Yes, I don't like his use of the idea of 'bare differences' either. However it does seem to me that science defines differences circularly. It has to do this because it has nothing that is fundamental on which to ground its definitions so has to define things by their relationship to other things. This is not just a problem for science, to be fair. I suppose one could call it the human condition.

[Canute]

Just a couple of points.

About that "so". Obviously my belief is that whatever is non-vacuous about consciousness is something that can be studied by science, and it will therefore turn out to be about behavior. And BTW, I don't accept the GR characterization of studying relationships and behavior as "bare differences", since I don't grant that the "content" they are supposed to be missing is real.
I'm still baffled by the idea that conscious experience can be explained by reference only to behaviour. Behaviourism has been abandoned by most people (Dennett notwithstanding) and consciousness experiences are now generally assumed to exist. They are thus in need of an explanation. (If "non-vacuous" mean 'scientific' then your first sentence seems to be a tautology).

If the 'content' of scientific entities is not real then in what sense do these things exist except as dependent appearances or relative phenomena?

[Tournesol]

I'm still baffled by the idea that conscious experience can be explained by reference only to behaviour. Behaviourism has been abandoned by most people (Dennett notwithstanding) and consciousness experiences are now generally assumed to exist. They are thus in need of an explanation. (If "non-vacuous" mean 'scientific' then your first sentence seems to be a tautology).

The argument is that we always DO ascribe consc. to others on the basis
of their behaviour. On the other hand, we do ascribe CONSCIOUSNESS, an
inner mental life that doesn't have to be manifested in behaviour.

If the 'content' of scientific entities is not real then in what sense do these things exist except as dependent appearances or relative phenomena?

They exist as concrete mechanisms that give rise to apparent phenomena,
but are only described by physical theory as abstract structures and behaviours, with no information about their intrinsic nature being given. The
features of the map are not those of the territory, they only
have the same mutual relationship.

[Tournesol]

And BTW, I don't accept the GR characterization of studying relationships and behavior as "bare differences", since I don't grant that the "content" they are supoposed to be missing is real.

Surely there must be some content...bare differences cannot stand
on their own two feet, ontologically.

[Tournesol]

Thanks for the explanation Canute. I do grant this aspect of science, and my own belief is that the "ding an sich" is just as much a myth as the homonculus. I can't follow the reasoning that says "since empirical study of the world does not supply us with an ontology, let us derive one by thinking abstractly about consciousness". That is a traditional way to go of course (Hegel and successors) but I have never seen it lead anywhere productive.

There is a big difference between having no ontology, having one based
entirely on what we are directly aware of (consciousness) and having
one that includes consciousness among other things. If you take the third option, your ontology has to include substances and properties which are neither given by empircal
study of the external world nor directly as part of consciousness, and are
therefore "completely unknown to us". The "Ding an Sich" is a traditonal
label for this negative concept.

I'm guessing that "ding an sich" is thing-in-itself. If so then doesn't there have to be at least one thing that is a thing in itself? It seems to me that most things can have no 'in themselves' existence, as you suggest, and have only a dependent existence, but not absolutely everything, otherwise nothing could exist.

The TII is not a separate entity or class of entities. It stands
in contrast to the things-as-it-appears to us - they are both
ways of conceiving the same "thing". If you do not admit a TII
then everything has not only a dependent existence but an
existence which is dependent on us -- our consciousness
would be all-embracing (The 2nd of my 3 options). The TII is therefore a "limiting" concept.

All we are thinking about are 'bare differences'. However consciousness is 'what it is like', and as such is the one thing that we can explore without thinking abstractly about it. So in this respect it seems that we can know it as a thing in itself and therefore can, in principle at least, derive an ontology from it.

Or at least include it in an ontology.

[selfAdjoint]

Suppose I said to you, building an ontology is just as foolish as casting a horoscope, and you have as much value in the one as in the other when you get done? Not that I fully believe that, but it's the feeling I get when I hear people going on and on about it, as if it could constrain what we perceive and do.

[loseyourname]

Yes, I don't like his use of the idea of 'bare differences' either. However it does seem to me that science defines differences circularly. It has to do this because it has nothing that is fundamental on which to ground its definitions so has to define things by their relationship to other things. This is not just a problem for science, to be fair. I suppose one could call it the human condition.

Physical quantities aren't defined in a circular manner at least according to my understanding of the word "circular." They are generally defined as mathematical expressions that dictate the manner in which they interact. I suppose you mean that any quantity x is defined by its relationship to quantities y, z, and so on, while quantity y is defined by its relationship to quantities x, z and so on. In that sense I suppose they are defined circularly, although I didn't infer from the book that Rosenberg intended that sense (in fact, I would just use the physicist's language and say they are defined relative to a certain frame of reference and that there exists no absolute frame of reference). I also can't see how reference to a grounding ontology would necessarily alleviate the condition of this particular type of circular definition.

To be fair, string theorists do seem to be attempting to develop a theory of the intrinsic nature of fundamental units of reality, although it doesn't seem that they can say much about these units other than that they have the intrinsic properties of being strings that vibrate. They also have the problem of their ideas not necessarily being amenable to empirical investigation, although they may come up with a way around the difficulties they've had.

[Zantra]

Are you kidding me? He looks like Kate Winslet crossed with Jack Black.

ROFL you are SO dead on with that description

[Math Is Hard]

ROFL you are SO dead on with that description
whatever! :rolleyes: I still think he's cute! :biggrin:

I am reading about "functionalism" now. From what I understand, functionalism says that we can learn what we need to know about the mind by observing behavior. It seems like a 'black box' point of view. We don't need to know how the machinery functions, just how the outputs (behavior) correspond to the inputs (stimuli). It seems like this is skirting the whole "mind-body interaction" issue.
Is this the scientific point of view then? - should we give up on understanding how a physical event causes a mental event and solely focus on which physical event causes which physical action(s) from the body?
I apologize if I sound naive or unclear. I am a beginner. :redface:

[honestrosewater]

The thoughts of another beginner:

If "x is not y" and "x is not x" have different meanings, "x" and "y" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "x is not y". How can a system tell the difference between "x is not y" and "x is not x" if it can't tell the difference between "x" and "y"? :confused:

How is replacing "x" and "y" with "on" and "off" different from replacing "x" and "y" with "this" and "this"?

If "this is not this" and "this is not this" have different meanings, "this" and "this" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "this is not this". How can a system tell the difference between "this is not this" and "this is not this" if it can't tell the difference between "this" and "this"?

If "on is not off" and "on is not on" have different meanings, "on" and "off" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "on is not off". How can a system tell the difference between "on is not off" and "on is not on" if it can't tell the difference between "on" and "off"?

If it's like something for a person to see this, how is it not like something for a Life cell to be on? What is the flippin difference? Is it just a difference of complexity?

[Canute]

The situation seems to me to be something like this. We cannot show that anything has an inherent exitence (as a thing-in itself). There are therefore two options. The first option breaks down into two views; a) things do have an absolute existence as things in themselves but we will remain forever ignorant of what these things are, and be forever unable to prove that they exist (the scientific view) or - b) most things do not have an absolute existence (are 'bare differences) but at least one thing does and from this all the rest arise as epiphenomena or appearances (Rosenberg's view?). The second option, the 'middle way' view, is to say that we have a muddled notion of what 'existence' means, and this leads to all these problems.

Strangely the view closest to latter view seems to be Self-Adjoint's, who (correct me if I'm wrong SA) argues that things do not have any substance underlying their external or conceptual appearances. This is what people mean when they say that 'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

[saltydog]

'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

Nothing is everything? I'm missing out. I realize I'm a stranger in a strange land over here but that's just not happening with me. I tend to believe in Karl Popper: "we approach the truth asymptotically".

Can you explain, briefly, what "nothing is everything" means, or has someone already done so in an earlier post that I missed?

Thanks,
Salty

[Canute]

Yes, if you read it like that it's a nonsensical phrase. However in this context the term 'emptiness' does not mean nothing.

[saltydog]

Yes, if you read it like that it's a nonsensical phrase. However in this context the term 'emptiness' does not mean nothing.

I find "emptiness is at the heart of everything" very interesting and well, I went through them again (the above posts) and it's still not happening for me but that's ok. I'm a neophyte about these things I know. But I do have an idea about it I may post as a separate link. Please tolerate my ignorance everyone. I don't wish to behave inappropriate here . . .

[loseyourname]

I find "emptiness is at the heart of everything" very interesting and well, I went through them again (the above posts) and it's still not happening for me but that's ok. I'm a neophyte about these things I know. But I do have an idea about it I may post as a separate link. Please tolerate my ignorance everyone. I don't wish to behave inappropriate here . . .

He's referring to the possibility that all of reality is built up through relational structures of differences, but without any grounding material substance that holds the differences. I still think that it sounds pretty nonsensical myself even when it is put that way, but there are those who consider it a possibility. Well, I shouldn't say that. Some kind of non-material substance can hold the differences, but it certainly seems like something has to.

[selfAdjoint]

The situation seems to me to be something like this. We cannot show that anything has an inherent exitence (as a thing-in itself). There are therefore two options. The first option breaks down into two views; a) things do have an absolute existence as things in themselves but we will remain forever ignorant of what these things are, and be forever unable to prove that they exist (the scientific view) or - b) most things do not have an absolute existence (are 'bare differences) but at least one thing does and from this all the rest arise as epiphenomena or appearances (Rosenberg's view?). The second option, the 'middle way' view, is to say that we have a muddled notion of what 'existence' means, and this leads to all these problems.

Strangely the view closest to latter view seems to be Self-Adjoint's, who (correct me if I'm wrong SA) argues that things do not have any substance underlying their external or conceptual appearances. This is what people mean when they say that 'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

I did not say they have no "substance" or "ontological reality" or however you want to call it. I said that science has not found any, and as the mainsteam of it is currently configured, isn't looking for any. But if there is any such thing, it will be found by scientists probing deeper, not by people trying to derive it from their mental exxperiences.

Some current theories (not the standard ones yet, but scientific, not crank) have proposed some underlying reality with everything else being relationships within that reality. The realitiy might be a cellular mechanism underlying spacetime, or spin foams underlying spacetime, or whatever. Or a truly relational theory might have space and time just relations between things, which have prior reality. Theorizing beyond current data is a legitimate function within science.

If the ultimate TOE ever comes about, and there is truly some reality underlying what we can measure, then that reality will have its place in it.

[Canute]

Self-Adjoint

I don't really want to keep arguing, and maybe we should just agree to disagree. But this seems an odd post to me. You say science is not looking for any 'ultimate' or 'true' reality. I agree with this, and there seems to be general agreement on it, since it's a inevitable consequence of the way science is done. But then you say that eventually a scientific TOE will tell us all about this ultimate reality. What is going to change between then and now that will allow science to do this? Plato, Kant and most other philosophers and many physicists say it will never happen, and their arguments seem unassailable to me.

Despite the inability of science to tell us anything about what is real (fundamental, absolute) you say that in the end science will tell us all about it, and that exploring ones own inner experiences is a waste of time in this respect, even though the only thing whose existence we can be sure of are our own experiences. It's not easy to see how you reach these conclusions.

Doesn't it seem likely that if there is an underlying reality, which of course there must be, and if all the things which we study scientifically exist in dependence upon this thing, exist relative to it, as you say is possible, then this 'underlying reality' cannot be just another scientific entity. Otherwise that would have to exist relative to something else, and so on ad infinitum. Turtles on turtles again.

I'd say that Alan Guth's attempts to develop a theory of ex nihilo creation, and Stephen Hawkings conclusion that physics cannot be completed, suggest that it is no good us waiting for science to tell us about reality. On the evidence we'll be waiting forever.

You seem completely opposed to any idea that we can know anything beyond science. Yet we know that what we want to know about reality is beyond science, for this is the only reason that metaphysics exists. How then can you justify your position?

He's referring to the possibility that all of reality is built up through relational structures of differences, but without any grounding material substance that holds the differences. I still think that it sounds pretty nonsensical myself even when it is put that way, but there are those who consider it a possibility.
It does sound pretty nonsensical from many perspectives. But most people (all people?) who have ever claimed to know anything about this have asserted that what is ultimate transcends the difference between material and immaterial. This is no proof of anything of course, but it's suggestive. What is also suggestive is that if this is not true then we are left with a choice between ex nihilo creation and an infinite regression of physical substances as an explanation of the origins of the universe, or of the ontology of mind and matter, and both these views seem to contradict reason to most people. The question is therefore considered undecidable. So, to be fair, although the idea seems nonsensical so do the alternatives.

[selfAdjoint]

I don't really want to keep arguing, and maybe we should just agree to disagree.

Yes, I think that's best. This post is only for clarification.

But this seems an odd post to me. You say science is not looking for any 'ultimate' or 'true' reality. I agree with this, and there seems to be general agreement on it, since it's a inevitable consequence of the way science is done.

No, only of the contigent current state of science, mostly driven by the kind of data available.

But then you say that eventually a scientific TOE will tell us all about this ultimate reality. What is going to change between then and now that will allow science to do this?

One path would be for theorists to develop a true TOE, which is falsifiable through experimental predictions, but also of its necessary nature makes statements about what reality is. That is, its logical structure is to be such that you can't have the experimental predictions without the assertions about reality. Quantum mechanics almost behaves this way (asserting "reality is quantized" and making excallent experimental predictions), but not quite, because the split between its unitary physics and the highly nonlinear projection to real probabilities undercuts it's assertion.

Plato, Kant and most other philosophers and many physicists say it will never happen, and their arguments seem unassailable to me.

As to the philosophers, who cares? They disagree with each other and form no constraint on physics development. As to the many physicists, name three since 1950. No sorry, we weren't going to dispute anymore, but obviously I am skeptical of this statement. Maybe start a new thread ?

[Canute]

Yeah that might be interesting. To answer your question I'd have to root around a bit to check my facts, but Stephen Hawkings comes to mind. Does Scroedinger count as post-1950? Karl Pribram probably qualifies as well, and Franco Varella, but I'm not quite sure of them. And Greg Rosenberg of course, if he counts as a scientist. I'll think about it and try and get some more sorted. It's quite an interesting little research project.