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Oct2-08, 10:35 PM
Astronuc's Avatar
P: 21,910
It's certainly complicated because of the heterogenity in Afghanistan with rival factions/tribes and the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pashtun people move back and forth across the border. The Taliban grew in the Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan, so they move back and forth across the border.

Pakistan's Chitral District: A Refuge for al-Qaeda's Top Leadership?
By Hassan Abbas
In the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other top al-Qaeda leaders, security services continue to focus on Pakistan's Chitral district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Chitral became a concern after the release of a bin Laden videotape from September 2003 in which trees native to the Chitrali mountain range were evident. Extensive search operations for the al-Qaeda leader and fellow operatives by Pakistani and U.S. forces were conducted in the area in February-March 2003 (Dawn, March 7, 2003). More recently, in May there were claims that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had established an office in Chitral to monitor militant activities in the district (The Nation, May 1). Other links to the district include Abu Khabaib, an Arab explosives expert who has been spotted several times in the hills of Chitral. He is known to have helped Sheikh Ahmed Saleem, an Arab member of al-Qaeda. Saleem has been giving money to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for recruiting militants for al-Qaeda in Pakistan (Daily Times, October 2). Finally, because Chitral is adjacent to Afghanistan's Nuristan province, there is concern that Taliban and al-Qaeda militants are crossing the border between the two countries.
With respect to the last point, it is still an issue.

The US and some European Allies have Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.
Led by the US, Kamdesh Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), is an extension of the Kamdesh PRT and provides reconstruction and development assistance to the people of Nuristan. The PRT is also working with DynCorp International to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) through the US funded Afghanistan Police Program
I don't know how effective DynCorp is there, but I have my doubts.

Digressing a little further -

Four Years Later, Much Of U.S. Aid In Afghanistan Has Little Impact
Cox News Service
Monday, October 10, 2005
SHOWKHEI, Afghanistan — Most mornings, boys from this village walk to a mud-brick school constructed two years ago, compliments of U.S. taxpayers. But the building is already in disrepair, its walls crumbling and its roof pitted by termites chewing into untreated wooden beams.

Village elders in Showkhei, some 20 miles from the main U.S. military base at Bagram, were unanimous in the summer of 2003 when soldiers arrived and asked what they needed: a bigger school for their children. The soldiers sent a construction firm called Ahmad Jamil Construction to Showkhei to double the size of the existing school from five rooms to 10.

But no one from the military came back to inspect the quality of materials or the company's work, villagers said. The next time they saw the soldiers was weeks later at a ribbon-cutting ceremony. U.S. officials took pictures of the new building and then left, said school principal Said Rakhman.

Two years and $20,000 later, the locally made mud bricks crumble to the touch, and termites have infested the roof beams, leaving villagers with the morbid pastime of guessing when the ceiling will fall.

"Do they just care about photographs?" asked Rakhman. "My children have to stay in this building, their children don't."

Use of inferior construction materials is just one of myriad complaints lodged by auditors and aid workers who are critical of U.S. efforts to rebuild Afghanistan.

Four years after American forces invaded Afghanistan to purge the Taliban, the United States has spent more than $1.62 billion to reconstruct this war-ravaged Central Asian country.

Some vital and visible results of the U.S. intervention are evident. After 25 years of open warfare, millions of Afghans have returned home, voters have elected a government and many women are back at work.

But a report published in July by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited bureaucratic squabbles, poor planning and a lack of coordination and oversight in the spending of U.S. reconstruction money in Afghanistan. The effect is that building and public works projects by the State Department and the Pentagon have had little impact on improving the country's long-term reconstruction, the GAO said.

For Afghans this is cause for despair. In a country ranked among the world's worst in terms of poverty, literacy and infant mortality, the slow reconstruction endangers short- and long-term stability.