Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness.

Mentat

And yet it is considered an "easy problem" (explanable in principle) to devise a machine (like a visual cortex) which distinguishes between wavelengths of light without the ability to classify them mathematically...besides, what's wrong with saying that they strike with a different amount of force, and thus stimulate differently on that basis (after all wavelength is inversely proportional to frequency, which is directly proportional to energy).

Mentat

1) Consciousness is not the brain, it is a process of the brain.
2) The brain is not completely understood, by any stretch of the imagination (kind of a failed attempt at a pun [t)]), so there is plenty to explain.

Scientists would not ask the question if subjective experience of a red ball were already defined as synonymous with such-and-such stimulation of the visual cortex. It's all about defining the term, and the Chalmereans haven't even done that yet (AFAIK), which leaves them right back at square one.

It is identical to a particular brain state...wait, scratch that, it's identical to a particular brain process. If I can say "produce hormones" I can say "subjectively experience"...besides, I've at least defined the term. Can you say that for all the philosophers who challenge Dennett?

Fliption

However you wish to program a computer to distinguish color, (and it must be some form of logic. Math comes in if there is analysis of the actual waveforms. If these waveform differences can be detected through some other force measurement then there must be some sort of number comparison somewhere.) the point is that no where in your program will there be any lines of code associated with experiencing the qualia of color. So how does your program do this without being programmed to do this?

Mentat

By being programmed to tell the difference between colors based exclusively on those things which our eyes and visual cortexes use...I don't know exactly what they are, but I know that they include rods and cones (I think "rods" are sensitive to brightness (which is clearly a simple matter of beings sensitive to the amount of energy entering the eye at any given time) and "cones" are sensitive to texture or something like that...I'm sorry, this is not really my area of expertise).

hypnagogue

The fundamental problem is not how we can compare colors, but how we can be aware of the quality of colors. This problem can be demonstrated with only one color (say a uniform red field subjectively experienced by an observer). It is readily acknowledged that we can build a machine that works on the same functional principles as the brain (a neural network) that can do things like discriminate between two sets of information encoded in it. But it is not clear whether such a machine then necessarily has subjective experience of this information, and if it does, exactly what is responsible.

Mentat

What difference does it make? You can look at another human and be unsure whether s/he is capable of "subjective experience".

I still don't see how you are going to get any further without defining what it is you wish to explain. As I've said before, you might as well be disappointed at the lack of an explanation for "xxxxxxxxxx yyyyyyyyyy", since that has the same amount of logical meaning as does "subjective experience" (to date).

Fliption

This discussion seems hopeless. I cannot believe that a naturally curious person would not notice the difference between being awake and dreamless sleep and not care to have it explained simply because it cannot be objectified for the rest of the world. This is insane. Hypnagogue's patience is amazing. I wish I could borrow some of it.

Canute

Well put, and like you I admire Hypno's patience. I fear I've just about lost mine.

Mentat

I am grateful for the patience that all of you have shown. However, I don't see what the big problem is. You, of all people, should understand the need to define the terms (without circular logic) before logical discussion can take place, and yet now you are amazed that I can't just "know what you mean" by "subjective experience" and move on from there? That's disappointing.

Fliption

If you don't know what it is Mentat then no amount of words I try to attach to it will make any difference. The real issue is that you do know what it is and yet you publicly take such a ridiculous stance.

Canute

You really should read up on epistemology and mathematics. It is impossible to define all the terms in a non-trivial theory. You have made up your mind too early, before you understand the issues.

Mentat

I like this statement. I ask you: What good is a concept that can only be explained to someone who already knows what it is, and then only in circular terms?

Pay attention to what I'm saying, please: I have asked for nothing more than a logical, working definition of the most integral term in your side of the argument. Without this, the term has no meaning, and any argument built up from that term suffers the same fate; it is a strawman.

It is almost incomprehensible to me that you cannot see this, specifically you, Fliption. We spent alot of time on this issue in "Why the bias against Materialism", and your stance the entire time was that the terms must first be defined before logical discussion can take place.

And now you blatantly take the stance that I must already know what you mean, and we must just move on from this shared knowledge. It doesn't work that way.

To tell the absolute truth, I really don't know what you mean by "subjective experience", and I can't understand an argument built on the assumption of its existence without understanding what "it" is ITFP.

Mentat

I have done quite a bit of reading on the subject, and I know that one can never define all the terms in a theory completely. I'm not asking them to (or, at least, I don't mean to); and I think I've made it pretty clear that I only want one term defined, and that term is the most integral term in the entire Chalmerean paradigm: subjective experience.

You don't have to define anything else if you don't want to, but it is absolutely vital that I understand what you mean by this term before it can be discussed logically.

What are you talking about? I'm the one who's trying to keep an open mind by not assuming off-hand that someone else is going to understand where I'm coming from right from the start. I've taken the open-minded approach, and asked that we define the basic, integral terms before building up arguments based on those terms.

I'm just asking that we stop building strawmen and start building up our arguments.

Canute

Mentat

The definition of consciousness is 'what it is like to be'. What's the problem? How many times must everyone post this before you stop asserting that consciousness has no definition?

Also it is not true that because the definition of thing is not to your liking it cannot exist.

Neither is it true that keeping an open mind means arguing that you have no idea what consciousness experiences are. It is not jumping to conclusions to accept what is self-evident.

Neither is it true that you are keeping an open mind.

Mentat

Dear Canute, why must you continue to say that I don't think consciousness is defined? I can't say it enough: Consciousness can be defined. Consciousness is no mystery. There is nothing that I currently can't understand with regard to consciousness.

It's not about consciousness. It's about "subjective experience". If you define "subjective experience" as "what it is like to be" you have created an illogical, circular definition, and I am no closer to an understanding than when we started. Give me something I can use (something that is logically coherent), I'm practically begging you.

It is not open-minded to assume that anything is self-evident. If something is self-evident, then it is beyond disproof, and isn't that also a logical fallacy?

Fliption

Who cares about the concept? It's the phenomenon that needs explaining. Reality exists without or without concepts to describe it. Language is for communication. That is all.




Mentat, the term HAS BEEN DEFINED.

In contrast, the term "materialism" is a label to categorize a specific view. It is a meaningless term as it is being used by some and I showed how it is so. Consciousness is not just a category label of views. It is assigned to a feature of how the mind works. There is nothing to study with "materialism". It's just a label. Consciousness is a word that describes something that actually does require study and explanation.

If you think you have the solution to this and it's so easy, then you should not be spending time discussing it with the likes of me. You ought to be screaming from the rooftops to people alot more qualified than I am (who also don't have the solution, btw). Personally, I'm tired of entertaining your need to debate against the obvious. I feel like I'm participating in someone's psychology experiment for school.

Canute

Consciousness is defined as 'what it is like'. There is no scientific defintion.

Ok, yet again. Consciousness IS subjective experience. What else could it possibly be? because of this, for convenience, when speaking generically about subjective experience, they are given the same definition.

[quote]It is not open-minded to assume that anything is self-evident.
I am not assuming that the existence of consciousness is self-evident. It is a fact. It's not my fault.

Interesting point. No it isn't a fallacy. It is well known that we can know more than we can prove, and it is also well known (check out Aristotle or Popper's 'Problem of Induction' paper) that the only self-evident knwledge can be certain. (Certain knowledge must be one with its object.