Long paper so I haven't gotten through it yet, but from the intro:
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Our analysis
suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force
usually has the opposite effect from what is intended: It is often overused,
alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and
provides a window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment. This
strategy should also include rebalancing U.S. resources and attention
on police and intelligence work. It also means increasing budgets at the
CIA, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of State and
scaling back the U.S. Department of Defense’s focus and resources on
counterterrorism. U.S. special operations forces will remain critical, as
will U.S. military operations to counter terrorist groups involved in
insurgencies.
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I see several problems with this analysis:
1. Afghanistan is not stable enough for the miltiary portion of the war to end. Even if the US military ends its counterterrorism mission, it would still need to be active as an occupying force. 6 of one, half dozen of the other.
2. The US military is more sophisticated than Rand gives them credit for and
is acting in the way that Rand suggests. It is acting as the intelligence agencies would, as the intelligence agencies simply aren't big enough for this. It is also acting as a police force, which I am against:
3. The military is not a police force and foreign terrorists do not have the rights of criminals. Using the military to kill them is the appropriate action. What is the alternative? Should we send the NYPD into Pakistan to serve arrest warrents?
4. The American people would not accept a vast increase in the size of the CIA to take over the war on terror. Simply put, it trusts the military more. And since many of the tools (such as drones) are military in nature, I think they should be controlled by the military.