Wrong Turns.

Mentat

I want to take a look at the history of philosophy. I would say it's a look at the history of "philosophy of mind", but it covers more than that.

I want to look at the points throughout history where a shift was made, to the using of terms and concepts that had never been used before. I want to do this because I want to see if any of them were wrong turns, that have changed philosophy for the worse. If it's true that some of these "turns" were bad ones, I don't want it to appear as though the philosopher(s) did something wrong, or as if it shouldn't have happened. After all, how can we learn from a mistake we never make? How, in turn, can we call something a mistake, if it is what arose necessarily from the questions being asked at the time?

Mentat

The first "turn" I'm going to consider, is going to be the most recent in my consideration. All subsequent turns will be further and further in the past, relative to the previous.

The first "turn" I want to consider is that made by Immanuel Kant.

Would we have questions of p-consciousness and a-consciousness, if it weren't for the distinction he made between what is perceived by the senses and what is reflected in our (biased) minds? Would philosophers be trying to come up with a theory of knowledge that is absolute, if it hadn't been for this new distinction, that Kant made, which allowed for the idea that a clearer mirror would produce a more accurate representation of the physical Universe?

His turn, however, was the logical one, since he was preceded by Hume, and wished to refine Hume's concept. So, the next turn I want to consider is that of Hume...

Mentat

There were a lot of new concepts introduced by David Hume, but the two most important (to this discussion) will be "ideas" and "impressions".

According to Hume, "impressions" appeared to come from without and were impressed on the mind, whereas "ideas" are reflections thereof within the mind. Since we can never experience anything outside of our own experience, Hume's philosophy ended in Solipsism. After all, if the only things we ever experienced were our impressions and the ideas that were based on them, how could we be sure of the existence of anything outside the mind? IOW, impressions and ideas are both mental phenomena, and are thus not proof, or even indications, of anything that isn't a mental phenomenon.

But, Hume would never have been able to speak intelligently of such terms, had it not been for Locke. We wouldn't have known what the heck he was talking about. So, my next "turn" to consider is that of Locke....

Mentat

Locke introduced to philosophy the concept of an inner representation of external phenomenon. Perhaps "introduced" isn't the right word (maybe "refined the already existent concept" is better).

In any case, without Locke's belief that "meaning" was something extra, not intrinsic to any objective phenomenon, Hume's concept of "impressions" and "ideas" would have made no sense.

Locke basically showed the philosophical world that, since meaning was not something intrinsic to bits of ink on parchment, or sounds travelling through the air, they must instead have something to do with the mind's perception of them. A sound entered the ear, and was, at some point inscribed on the "tablet" of the mind, which was then read by the mind's eye. NOTE: This is not how he actually worded things, and (as with every other philosophy that I have and will discuss(ed)) it is but a fraction of the contribution made by the philosopher. However, this is my way of referring to the "wrong turn" the evolved from his insight.

I will continue this tomorrow, as I have to leave now....

Mentat

Well, inspite of the fact that I've been paraphrasing gortequely, I will have to make the rest of my posts even more paraphrased, as I may have to get off-line at any moment. Let's see if I can make my point by then.

The very concept of mind and body (as separate entities, or as ontologically distinct), on which Locke's own philosophy was based, goes back to the great Descartes himself. Descartes, in his "First Philosophy" gives us the reason for this distinction (a distinction which was (IMSO) the first in a series of "wrong turns"), by describing how he arrived at that which is indubitable. At the end of his dubito, the only things left are those describable as aspects of the cogito.

This need for incorrigibility, in turn, can be followed back to Plato and Aristotle. Before them, the Pyrroneans (probably spelled wrong) and Sophists (and pretty much everybody else, for that matter) were content to deal with "relative truth" and the winning of the argument at hand, instead of dissolving every possible future argument. After Aristotle, however, the concept of an absolute truth, and the role of philosophy as finding those absolute truths, became deeply ingrained, and is the first (from a historical PoV, now) of the "wrong turns", that I want to put into question.

Mentat

Discussion or correction of any of the above paraphrasings is welcome, but the main point of the thread is incorrigibility, the way it lead philosophy into where it currently finds itself, and whether that very first step (made by Plato and Aristotle) should ever have been made. If so, should the steps that followed have been made? If so, why all the philosophical problems?

If, instead, we were to avoid taking any of those turns for granted, we may arrive at something very much like Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

Wittgenstein's earlier work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was an excellent work, but it was along the same path that leads off from Kant's "turn". But, in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein takes none of those "turns" for granted, and goes back to the essential concept of winning in debate.

He gets rid of the concept of ultimate truth, and instead talks about relativity. He gets rid of mind-body distinction/dualities, because they are reflections (indeed, exist only for the purpose of) the need to find incorrigible truth.

Mentat

Thank you for your posts, mapper. Perhaps you should start a separate thread on the wrong turns that you wish to discuss. This thread is more about the history of philosophical thought, and the mistakes (IMO) that philosophers have been making, due to their desire for ultimate truth.

mapper

Yeah my posts were deleted. Wasnt really on your topic so sorry about that.

Mentat

Let me explain more clearly what the point of the thread is. Basically, I want to understand why (if there even is a good reason) we made the turns described above. Why did we start searching for a vantage point for absolute truths? Why did we think that we could do so by introspection? Why did we begin separating primary and secondary ideas, and ideas and impressions, and concepts and intuitions, thus making the concept of "mind" that much more complex and intractable?

This path has only lead us to philosophical problem on top of philosophical problem, and shouldn't that at least hint at the possibility that we've been going about it the wrong way?

Why doesn't mainstream philosophy take seriously the potential for Wittgensteinian thought to remove such problems?

Canute

I agree that philosophy (the western kind) has taken some wrong turns, imo often due to its close links with Christian theology and the wrong turns taken by the Church. But I don't see this quite the way you do. To me all those philosophers you mention were arriving at the same conclusion because it's the only conclusion to arrive at, not because they were building on each others work (although of course they were doing that as well).

It is simply a fact that certain knowledge is identical with its object (Aristotle), that the knowledge gained via our senses is not certain (Kant), and that the knowledge gained by our reason is not certain (Kant? Hume? Goedel anyway).

On the Wittgenstein thing I don't agree with the interpretation of the Tractatus that led to logical positivism, and get the impression that not too many people do these days. It's very difficult to show that metaphysical questions are not real questions (if that's what you meant).

On the whole though I agree with what you say. There is something amiss with western philosophy. It should have moved on by now instead of being stuck where Plato and Aristotle left it.

Mentat

Thanks for the response, Canute.

I hadn't considered Christianity's role in influencing modern philosophy...but it's something to ponder.

As to Wittgenstein, basically, whenever I refer to his philosophy I'm usually referring to his post-Tractatus stuff (the reasoning you'd find in the Philosophical Investigations). Combined with the historical approach of Heidegger and Dewey (among others), Rorty has formulated a philosophy completely independent of the post-Descartes notions of Duality. I'm just wondering if he may not be on the right track. Have you ever read any of Rorty's philosophy?

Mentat

This is from my thread, "Questions on Ontology". I think it's worth pasting here, as it is slightly more on-topic here, and may fuel some debate (if I'm lucky)...

Originally Posted by Fliption
Perhaps it would be better if you laid out how that works. As you may recall, we've had a few of those "Wittgenstein" folks participate in some discussions claiming grand things about how language causes all philosophy problems but then they never have the patience or competence to explain their position.

My Reply...
That's because Kantian, Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Lockean biases are so deeply ingrained in the reasoning of most people. I'll give it a try:

Through a Wittgensteinian approach we can first see language as not a singular process or ability, but as many. He calls each individual process/ability a "language-game", and the "family resemblances" between such "games" are many, but there is no singular quality that exists in all of them.

Now, games all have their own pieces and their own rules. Taking the "language-game" concept into history, Rorty thinks we will start to see (for an example) "ontological dichotomies" of mind and body or of universals and particulars as merely social conventions of language. IOW, whereas the mind-body distinction was originally designed (and later refined) specifically to establish a framework of things that could not be doubted -- from which we could extrapolate other "truths" and against which we could rigorously test conjectures, theories, even whole paradigms -- Wittgenstein does away with "absolute grounding" for truth (Rorty refers to "absolute grounding" as "polishing our Mirror of Nature, so that our inner representations are as accurate as possible"), and adopts a more relativistic viewpoint. Then, all that is left is to solve the puzzles that our language-games can create.

As an example, let's look at the concept of "a-consciousness" and "p-consciousness". These stand for "action-consciousness" and "phenomenal-consciousness" in the philosophical language-game. No other language game uses a distinction even remotely like this, because no other game needs it. Thus, it is only a puzzle brought on by an aspect of this particular game. Now, let's dissect the "pieces" and their roles.

"Phenomenal" is a term that has reference to events occuring in the mind, or otherwise being of a mental nature. Specifically, phenomenal-consciousness is that consciousness that is more than just neural processing of information or the uttering of responses. It is, to put it yet another way, the perception of "redness" beyond the simple electro-chemical processing of photonic information.

Now, why do we even have this concept (this "piece" in our "game")? Well, our philosophical language-game has allowed for such a distinction for some time (ever since Descartes). But why did Descartes come up with it? Well, if one looks at the time in which he was living, one can easily see how it would become necessary for him to try to establish which things could and could not be doubted. And, since you have first-hand priveleged access to what you are perceiving, that must be undoubtable. IOW, it's the one thing about which you could be allowed (by society? by other philosophers?) to be incorrigible, and nobody would mind; nobody could contest it, since it was your experience.

But, now, if "redness" was just a reflection of how something seemed to you, and had nothing to do with anything real...and if neuroscience could establish a well-grounded understanding of how we process every different kind of phenomenon, then you might not be allowed to be so incorrigible. After all, you could tell us how it seemed to you, but the neurologist could tell us how it actually was. And this is not so strange as it may seem, since people have always talked about how things seemed to them (for example, there are those who percieve an order and intelligence in the Universe...perfect clock-work) until science came in and showed them that their views needed correction (quantum mechanics, for example, does away with the clock-work Universe concept fairly well).

All I'm basically saying (for those of you who skipped ahead to the end ) is that our ability to be incorrigible about how something seems to us was blown way out of proportion (eventually becoming considered an ontological dichotomy (of all things!)), and has become the basis for a large slew of words (p- and a- consciousness among them) that would have had no meaning whatsoever without that misconception.

The usual objection is that our conscious experience ("experience" here being used in a way quite different than in any other language-game) cannot be doubted. How something seems to us cannot be overruled by someone else, and pain, "redness", love, etc, have no more existence other than how they seem to us. But, pace Rorty, I ask if that is really so. Is it really even comprehensible to speak of a "pain" without speaking of a being that is in pain? Much like beauty or valor, which cannot be spoken of intelligently (at all, really) without referencing the context (how can you speak of beauty without speaking something that "is beautiful"). What has happened, which has infected our philosophical language-game, is that words we use to describe these states have indeed been used to refer to particulars, our of context.

That is why it is nothing more than a language puzzle: it has no substance outside of one specific language game, and only has substance therein because of a misconstruition of a state for a particular.

There's obviously more to this (much more), but I'll stop here for now.

selfAdjoint

And when someone comes to another group's game, as a Briton viewing baseball or an American viewing cricket, it seems ridiculous. Why do they have those funny pieces, and those stupid rules that don't allow an honest alien to express himself clearly?

Mentat

Quote by selfAdjoint

And when someone comes to another group's game, as a Briton viewing baseball or an American viewing cricket, it seems ridiculous. Why do they have those funny pieces, and those stupid rules that don't allow an honest alien to express himself clearly?

Thus, Rorty's illustration of the Antipodeans. Do you know it?

The basic concept is that humans finally encounter another (seemingly) intelligent race. They go to visit their world, and they see grand examples of culture and intelligence. However, when they ask the people questions that involve the concepts of "raw feels" or "qualia", they are not only left without response, the Antipodeans can't even begin to make sense of what these things are, or why they should be so important. The evolution of the Antipodean race/culture has been different from our own only in that they had early exposure to the concepts of neurophysiology and such. With this knowledge, they have always expressed (for example) what happens when one is smacked across the face in terms of "stimulated C-fibers".

Now, the closest thing the philosophers of Earth can make to "progress" with these poor creatures is to get them to admit (quite freely, actually) that it is possible to believe that your C-fibers have been stimulated (because of the concomitant T-fiber stimulation, which can be stimulated without the corresponding C-fiber's also being stimulated) and be wrong.

But when it comes to "raw feels" and "incorrigibility about mental states" or "qualia", the Antipodeans are at a complete loss, because they don't even have words for such things...they don't mean anything to them.

And, for all of you who think that we know such things because they are "obvious" to us, or because they are "primary" in our "experience": the ancient Greek philosophers (pre-Plato) didn't have words for any of that stuff either. They got along with their philosophy (some of it quite deeply concerned with what can and cannot be known, what can and cannot be doubted, and how we know anything at all...viz, Pyrronean skepticism) just fine, without ever invoking any of these terms or anything like them.

Canute

If Rorty had flown on just a few more parsecs he'd have discovered the planet of the AntiAntipodeans. These people believe that mind is fundamental and have never bothered doing neuroscience. When you speak to them of qualia, of how things appear and of states of being, they seem just like us. However when you speak of c-fibres in the brain they look back blankly.

Hmm. Not sure that works, but it could probably be made to work.

Why not just say that the reason we have words for raw experiences is that we have raw experiences, and that they are clearly something different to c-fibres firing. Even if brain does cause mind this is true. After all, we have a word for 'cake', not just words for flour, butter, eggs and fruit.

The idea that sentient beings could have intelligence and a well-developed and shared language but have no word for sentience seems unlikely to me. The clincher is that we (and the Antipodeans) know when we have been hit across the face. If we could only know this by studying our c-fibres then we'd have to go to the doctor to find out whether someone had hit us or not. When we got there he'd ask why we thought we'd been hit, and wouldn't have the words to explain why, for we'd have no word for pain.

The only reason that a neuroscientist is interested in c-fibres is that they are useful in explaining the state of being in which one feels as if one has been hit across the face, and other such states. If we did not have such feelings then we'd be like Rorty's Antipodeans, uninterested in c-fibres and unable to make first person reports. Also, when we talk about c-fibres we are talking about our inner perceptions and conceptions of them, for this is all we know about c-fibres. If we can't talk about mental states then we can't talk about how c-fibres appear to be to us.

But when it comes to "raw feels" and "incorrigibility about mental states" or "qualia", the Antipodeans are at a complete loss, because they don't even have words for such things...they don't mean anything to them.

Surely they are zombies then, not just linguistically challenged?

And, for all of you who think that we know such things because they are "obvious" to us, or because they are "primary" in our "experience": the ancient Greek philosophers (pre-Plato) didn't have words for any of that stuff either.

Erm, are you sure? What's all that stuff Animaximander and Parmeneides go on about then, 'Being', appearance and reality and so forth.

They got along with their philosophy (some of it quite deeply concerned with what can and cannot be known, what can and cannot be doubted, and how we know anything at all...viz, Pyrronean skepticism) just fine, without ever invoking any of these terms or anything like them.

But they did invoke these terms. They said that 'knowing' is inextricably tied up with 'Being'.

To go back to theology and philosophy - What Christian theology did was to objectify God, against the advice of all Christian mystics and against the (reported) advice of Jesus. This allowed the development of the institution, and of a priestly class standing as gatekeepers between Man and God. It seems to me that this led to the objectification of everything and thus to analytical theology, analytical philosophy, and the scientific method. Could it be that science has flourished best in Christian countries for this reason?

Canute

I was thinking about what you said about language. It seems to me that we give names to things for which we have concepts. Wouldn't it be better then to say that our problems are caused by misconceptions of what things really are, rather than the misnaming of things or the misuse of language?

Hmm, or is it the misnaming of things which causes us to misconceptualise them? I suppose it works both ways.

Mentat

Quote by Canute

If Rorty had flown on just a few more parsecs he'd have discovered the planet of the AntiAntipodeans. These people believe that mind is fundamental and have never bothered doing neuroscience. When you speak to them of qualia, of how things appear and of states of being, they seem just like us. However when you speak of c-fibres in the brain they look back blankly.

Hmm. Not sure that works, but it could probably be made to work.

Nope. Sorry, but it doesn't change the situation in the slightest. Indeed, the anti-antipodeans would be just like us (or, at least, where we currently find ourselves), and so wouldn't be any help in ascertaining how consciousness could exist completely independent of anything like "raw feels", if such things even exist (which is what it called into question by this case, since they were invoked to help explain consciousness).

Why not just say that the reason we have words for raw experiences is that we have raw experiences, and that they are clearly something different to c-fibres firing.

We don't necessarily have "words for raw experiences", as you put it. The very phrasing of that is indicative of your still being stuck in a post-Cartesian framework. We have terms like "raw feels" or "qualia", but that doesn't mean that they refer to anything physically identifiable. They could, quite simply, be useless words in every language-game other than post-Kantian philosophy (as I think I've already shown them to be), and the only purpose they've served there is to further complicate matters and create philosophical "problems".

Even if brain does cause mind this is true.

What is this "mind" you keep talking about? I never said that the brain "caused" anything.

The idea that sentient beings could have intelligence and a well-developed and shared language but have no word for sentience seems unlikely to me.

I didn't say that they had no word for "sentience". Sentience is self-consciousness and awareness. They clearly are capable of such processes, otherwise they would not have been able to say that it was "I" who had "my" C-fibers stimulated.

The clincher is that we (and the Antipodeans) know when we have been hit across the face. If we could only know this by studying our c-fibres then we'd have to go to the doctor to find out whether someone had hit us or not.

You missed the point. They have privileged access to what's going on inside them (it doesn't matter how, it's part of the story). We, OTOH, claim to have some privileged access, and yet the words we are using don't describe anything that's going on inside us (as your "doctor" could quickly tell you).

The only reason that a neuroscientist is interested in c-fibres is that they are useful in explaining the state of being in which one feels as if one has been hit across the face, and other such states.

That's only true of our neuroscientist is a post-Kantian philosopher on the side. Real neuroscientists are interested in c-fibers for the same reason molecular-biologists are interested in mitochondria: it's their field.

If we did not have such feelings then we'd be like Rorty's Antipodeans, uninterested in c-fibres...

But they are interested in their c-fibers. They're just not interested in discussing terms that have no meaning to them (of which "c-fiber" is not one, but of which "qualia" and "raw feel" are indeed).

...and unable to make first person reports.

The antipodeans do indeed make first-person reports. Why should it be otherwise? How can one refer to "my" c-fiber, or the fact that it the stimulation of concomittant t-fibers is strongly indicative thereof, and still not be making a first-person report?

Also, when we talk about c-fibres we are talking about our inner perceptions and conceptions of them, for this is all we know about c-fibres. If we can't talk about mental states then we can't talk about how c-fibres appear to be to us.

C-fibers appear to us exactly as they always have. A stimulated C-fiber is one phenomenon that is different from other phenomena. We (Antipodeans) can tell the difference, and speak intelligently about it, but we cannot speak intelligently about "mental states" since this concept is completely foreign to us.

Surely they are zombies then, not just linguistically challenged?

"Zombies" is also a foreign word to us. Could you perhaps define it in terms we might understand?

Erm, are you sure? What's all that stuff Animaximander and Parmeneides go on about then, 'Being', appearance and reality and so forth.

Yes, there were distinctions between how something appeared (or something about which you could be fairly confident) and how something actually was. This requires the concepts of skepticism and criticalness, but not the concept of a "veil of mind" which conceals the true nature of things from a central mind. I have studied the ancient Greek language for a while now. I can assure you to a high degree of certainty that there is no term for such things (I'm as sure of that as I can be, but not absolutely so; this does not indicate anything wrong with my "mental apparatus", merely that I may not have all the facts).

But they did invoke these terms. They said that 'knowing' is inextricably tied up with 'Being'.

And it is. What has that to do with mind-body duality?

To go back to theology and philosophy - What Christian theology did was to objectify God, against the advice of all Christian mystics and against the (reported) advice of Jesus. This allowed the development of the institution, and of a priestly class standing as gatekeepers between Man and God. It seems to me that this led to the objectification of everything and thus to analytical theology, analytical philosophy, and the scientific method. Could it be that science has flourished best in Christian countries for this reason?

Possibly. However, all throughout the Holy Scriptures, God Himself commands that no physical representations be made of Him. This was not because He Himself was not physical (or, at least, He never said that this was why), it was because He was not like anything that we could possibly find here on Earth. Thus, to make a representation of Him that was like something that He had created (since, according to Scripture, He created all things) was an insult.

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Mentat	Thank you for your posts, mapper. Perhaps you should start a separate thread on the wrong turns that you wish to discuss. This thread is more about the history of philosophical thought, and the mistakes (IMO) that philosophers have been making, due to their desire for ultimate truth.

mapper	Yeah my posts were deleted. Wasnt really on your topic so sorry about that.

selfAdjoint Recognitions: Gold Member Staff Emeritus	And when someone comes to another group's game, as a Briton viewing baseball or an American viewing cricket, it seems ridiculous. Why do they have those funny pieces, and those stupid rules that don't allow an honest alien to express himself clearly?