arrow of time [Archive] - Physics Forums

moving finger

Jun25-06, 02:42 AM

Entropy is a measure of disorder, or "lots-of-ways-to-wiggle-ness". If no other cause is acting, the number of ways to wiggle just keeps getting bigger. That gives an arrow of time too, wich always points the same direction as the cause and effect one.
Agreed.

The "arrow of time" is a metaphor used by Arther Eddington for the first time in 1928 to represent the asymmetric properties of time that have no analogue in space.

It's important to distinguish between the arrow of time (why events seem to be asymmetric in time), and the apparent illusion of the "flow of time". These are two very different things.

There are in fact many "arrows" of time, including the psychological arrow (we can remember the past, but not the future), the thermodynamic or entropy arrow (the one described by selfAdjoint above), the cosmological arrow (the fact that the universe is expanding), and many more.

We may ask : Why does our psychological "arrow" always seem aligned with the thermodynamic "arrow"? The answer is (imho) as follows :

The Origin of the Psychological Arrow of Time
At the microscopic level of individual particles it turns out that time seems perfectly symmetric – we say that the dynamical laws of physics are invariant (do not change) under time-reversal. Thus there seems to be no fundamental difference between past and future directions of time at the level of individual particle interactions. But at the macroscopic level (the level at which our brains, and almost every other object we interact with, work), it seems to be a fundamental characteristic of our world that there is an inherent “entropy gradient” within spacetime. What this means is that if we take different “timeslices” through 4-dimensional spacetime we find that we can identify an overall asymmetry wherein the total entropy of the universe increases in one time direction (and conversely of course decreases in the reverse time direction). Unlike space, therefore, the time dimension contains an inbuilt arrow, often referred to as the thermodynamic arrow of time.

Next we need to consider how memories are formed in the brain. A memory is in general terms simply a record or a form of “representation” of one part of a timeslice (let’s say t0) within another timeslice (let’s say t1). This applies to things like computer memories, photographs, drawings, descriptions, and human memories. To form a “memory” requires an extraordinary and inherently improbable correlation between the “worldlines” of many particles. A footprint on a beach, for example, might have appeared spontaneously (there is a vanishingly small chance that this might happen), but the patterns (which represent information) within a footprint are so highly correlated that there is an incredibly overwhelming probability that the footprint is associated with some identifiable “cause” at some other timeslice which we say “formed” the footprint. The “directionality” of this correlation, in the way that the correlations between worldlines change on going from one time-slice to another, is almost always aligned with the directionality of the overall entropy gradient between those timeslices.

We see cups break, but we never see them spontaneously re-assemble, because our internal psychological arrow of time is aligned with the thermodynamic arrow of time (the entropy gradient). And the reason our psychological arrow is aligned with the thermodynamic arrow is precisely because the processes which produce “records” in our brain, representations of one timeslice within another timeslice, are themselves thermodynamic processes. Our psychological arrow is “locked” into the same directionality as the thermodynamic arrow because both arrows share a common source – the entropy asymmetry of the time dimension.

The upshot of all this is that for any macroscopic record of time t0 contained within time t1, the entropy at t0 is always lower than at t1. All of our “memories” therefore are of times of lower entropy. We simply do not have memories of times where the entropy is higher. It is simply by convention that we refer to the timeslices where entropy is lower as “the past”, and timeslices where entropy is higher as “the future”. Hence we have records and memories of the past, but not of the future.

Best Regards

moving finger

Jun25-06, 03:08 AM

Whilst that may not be the ideal metaphor, it does not
help to ignore the flow of time entirely and insist on a static universe. Dismissing the flow of time a subjective doesn't help either, since it suggests cosnciousness is exempt from physics.
Not at all. The conscious illusion that we have of time "flowing" from past to future may be explained very simply on the basis that we have memories only of the past, and never of the future (and the reason why this is the case is explained in the previous post).

Assuming that the universe is deterministic (and this is another topic entirely) then the future is just as "fixed" as the past. But what the conscious agent perceives is that the past is fixed, but the future seems to be open, or not fixed. Given these perceptions, it would not make rational sense (it would in fact be irrational) for the agent to believe that time flowed from future to past (because the agent perceives that the past is fixed).

It also would not make rational sense (from the agent's perspective) for the agent to believe that time was not flowing at all, and the agent is simply "frozen in time".

The only rational interpretation that the conscious agent can place upon its perception that the past is fixed whereas the future seems "open" is that it (the agent) is actually "flowing through time", from past to future.

Best Regards

Tyris

Jun25-06, 05:20 AM

That doesnt really answer my original question. What I want to know is how physicists can objectively establish that time flows at all. Time could equally be a concept invoked by our consciousness.Only in the same way that anything else can, e.g., distance, tables, sound...

Tournesol

Jun27-06, 11:23 AM

Not at all. The conscious illusion that we have of time "flowing" from past to future may be explained very simply on the basis that we have memories only of the past, and never of the future (and the reason why this is the case is explained in the previous post).

Assuming that the universe is deterministic (and this is another topic entirely) then the future is just as "fixed" as the past. But what the conscious agent perceives is that the past is fixed, but the future seems to be open, or not fixed.

if the universe is not merely deterministic, but a static, eternal
4D structure, then the future "already" exists, then I "already" exist in it.
But that doesn't explain the feeling of getting from one state to
another (which must be an illusion, but the source of the
illusion is not explained.)

OTOH, if future states are continually coming into freshly-mineted
being, the feeling of flow reflects the phsycial situation and is
therefore not an illusion.

I know of no theory that explains the feeling of flow as an
illusion. It is either illlusory and inexplicable or explicable
and non-illusory.

Given these perceptions, it would not make rational sense (it would in fact be irrational) for the agent to believe that time flowed from future to past (because the agent perceives that the past is fixed).

The question of why there is a "flow" at all is separate from the
question of the direction of flow.

It also would not make rational sense (from the agent's perspective) for the agent to believe that time was not flowing at all, and the agent is simply "frozen in time".

Not in face of the feeling of flow, but the feeling is not
explained under the block-universe theory.

The only rational interpretation that the conscious agent can place upon its perception that the past is fixed whereas the future seems "open" is that it (the agent) is actually "flowing through time", from past to future.

It is perfectly possible to conceive an agent which has
a fixed set of memories of the past no knowledge of the future..
and no "flow". The flow is something extra.

madness

Jun27-06, 05:24 PM

It's not botch. You didn't explain what makes the present moment a unique moment in time, or how time flows in a universe in which can just as equally be considered as 4-dimensional and static. Neurobiologists may have discovered what is happening in the brain when we feel certain emotions, but how something material actually gives rise to mental formations is not known.

Drachir

Jun28-06, 08:01 PM

madness asked excellent probing questions at the top of this thread. Let’s see how they can be answered.

Before considering the arrow of time let’s be a little more basic and clarify our understanding of time. When we see the sun at sunrise, noon, and sunset, we remember not only those observations but also the order in which they were made. Each long term or short-term memory is ‘tagged’ with its sequential position in a string of memories. Our notions of the past, present, and future are based on our recognition of memory sequences. That is the source of our concept of time.

We are not the only animals that recall memory sequences. Animals that hunt often base their present actions on the action they anticipate of their prey. To distinguish between present and future requires some understanding of time.

In a few sentences I will use the term ‘abstraction.’ so let’s be clear about what I mean by that term. An abstraction expresses a quality or characteristic apart from any specific object or instance. For example, there are red apples, red sunsets, and red light. Red is an abstraction. Red does not have existence independent of the things it characterizes. There is no such thing as red itself.

Time is an abstraction we make from the motion of things. We cannot conceive of time without conceiving of things that move, such as the rhythmic beating of our hearts, the motion of the sun across the sky, the swinging of a pendulum, the oscillations of a quartz crystal, and the alternating electromagnetic field of a photon. We do not sense time; we sense things and observe and remember their changes. Therefore, time without things can have no meaning for us. Just as there is no such thing as red itself, there is no such thing as time itself.

Since there is no such thing as time itself, it is meaningless to consider time to have physical existence. Time, therefore, cannot have physical properties; it cannot spin, dilate, shrink, or flow. When we say that time flows, we are speaking metaphorically as if time were similar to the water flowing in a river. But water is a real thing, time is not.

The idea of going forward or backward in time presumes that the time traveler would be spared the effects of the travel, that he could even go to times before and after his own existence. I guess he would don a cloak that shields him from time.

The notion of time running backwards implies that all motions would be reversed and that all history would retrace its steps backward. It’s not possible. There are too many things that prohibit the reversal of time. Water can’t change its direction through a check valve. Electrons cannot change their direction through a diode or transistor.

The earth would have to change its direction of rotation in order to make sundials tell time backwards. If it changed its direction instantaneously there wouldn’t be a human-built structure left standing and there would be horrific flooding. Instead of people getting younger they would be killed; that wouldn’t be a backward replay of history. And if it changed direction slowly, there would be terrible destruction as equatorial oceans moved towards the poles during the reversal. That, too, would not be a backward replay of history. The notion of time reversal, of history running backward, is self-contradictory.

As I said, it’s not possible. It’s as funny as a man jumping up upside down from a swimming pool and landing feet first on a diving board. Just because we’ve seen films run backward or wished we could take back some words we’ve said doesn’t make time running backwards possible, let alone a good idea The idea of the reversal of time, of going back in time, is fantasy.

If the arrow of time is stationary like a traffic sign, it can point only toward the future. If the arrow of time flies, it flew from the past to the present and now flies toward the future. The past no longer exists. The future does not yet exist. We are forever stuck in the present, observing the past, and anticipating the future.

Now let’s answer the questions posed in the opening of this thread.

1) How do we know that time flows at all? Time can flow metaphorically but not physically. In the same way that time is an abstraction from the motions of things, the flow of time is an abstraction from the continuity of the motions of things. The continuity of things and their motions is based on our concept of object persistence, a concept formed during infancy.

Is there any scientific way to distinguish between time flowing or not? If science deals with reality and not metaphors, there is no way for science to probe that question.

2} Does it make any sense at all to ask why time flows in the direction it does? That question is equivalent to asking why all things move. I don’t think it makes sense to ask that kind of question.
What would be strange is if time suddenly changed direction. But even then, would we even notice? The question is pointless since irreversible processes preclude time reversal. Think of light and heat going back to a lamp to create ac electricity. Think of the check valve and diode.

Basically, i have no idea what physicists mean when they ask why time has an arrow Physicists who ask that question are incorrectly taking metaphoric descriptions of time literally. The direction of time is implicit in Newton’s first law: “Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon”. The notion of continuity of motion is implicit in his (now archaic) use of the word ‘perseveres’ and his use of the term ‘uniform motion.’

Canute

Jun29-06, 06:29 AM

madness

Jun29-06, 08:15 AM

Thanks to Canute and Drachir, you offered interesting answers to my questions. However, I am still a bit confused about our concept of the present. In, a deterministic universe, all moments in time are preset, and would seem to have some kind of existence. For example some theologians have argued that when God created the universe he created all moments in time at once, rather than creation being related to the beginning of the universe. So what does it mean to say that a certain moment is happening now? Or does it make more sense to view the present as the only moment in existence, and the past and future as illusory? In this view, problems such as the above would be solved.

moving finger

Jun30-06, 04:00 AM

I know of no theory that explains the feeling of flow as an illusion. It is either illlusory and inexplicable or explicable and non-illusory.

Is the Flow of Time an Illusion?

The argument seems to be : Conscious agents perceive time as if the agent is “flowing in time” from the past into the future, and from this perception it is allegedly safe to infer that such agents are not simply under the illusion of “flowing in time”, but indeed (and objectively) they are “flowing in time” from the past to the future.

I shall show that this inference is invalid.

Experiments by Libet and Grey Walter on the differences in the objective and subjective (experienced) correlations between temporally separated events show that the mind can reconstruct or rearrange the actual temporal sequence of perceptual information coming from phenomenal events, such that the consciously perceived (the experienced) sequence is not the same as the objective sequence of events (see the paper by Dennett and Kinsbourne referenced below). Libet explains this in terms of “backwards referral” or “backwards projection” of certain consciously experienced events with respect to other consciously experienced events. Dennett describes this kind of mental manipulatioon of the objective sequence of events in terms of Orwellian and Stalinesque models of mental representation.

(See attached figure)

7234

As Libet remarks, there is
no method by which one could determine the absolute timing of a subjective xperience.

We perceive--and remember--perceptual events, not a successively analyzed trickle of perceptual elements or attributes locked into succession as if pinned into place on a continuous film. Different attributes of events are indeed extracted by different neural facilities at different rates, (e.g. location versus shape versus color) and people, if asked to respond to the presence of each one in isolation, would do so with different latencies, depending on which it was, and on other well-explored factors. The relative timing of inputs plays a necessary role in determining the information or content in experience, but it is not obligatorily tied to any stage or point of time during central processing. How soon we can respond to one in isolation, and how soon to the other, does not exactly indicate what will be the temporal relationship of the two in percepts that incorporate them both.

There is nothing theoretically amiss with the goal of acquiring precise timing information on the mental operations or informational transactions in the brain. It is indeed crucial to developing a good theory of the brain's control functions to learn exactly when and where various informational streams converge, when "inferences" and "matches" and "bindings" occur. But these temporal and spatial details do not tell us directly about the contents of consciousness. The temporal sequence in consciousness is, within the limits of whatever temporal control window bounds our investigation, purely a matter of the content represented, not the timing of the representing.
Thus there is an “objective timeline”, and for each conscious observer we have an individual, subjective “experienced timeline”. The individual experienced timelines do not necessarily precisely match up either with each other, or with the objective timeline, in terms of their experienced sequence of events.

Thus if time really does “flow” (and we are to believe that this flow is not an illusion), then all but one of the above timelines (since they reflect different sequences of events) must be an illusion. Which of the above timelines would one think represents the real “flow of time” – the objective timeline or one of the the experienced timelines? It obviously cannot be one of the experienced timelines (because we each experience different timelines, and none of us is in a privileged position of being able to claim to have direct access to the “absolute flow of time”), therefore (if any one timeline flows) it must be the objective timeline. But if this is the case, then it follows that we each sometimes perceive time as flowing in the opposite direction to the way it is objectively flowing! Thus, our subjective experience of the flow of time is indeed an illusion (whether the objective timeline really “flows” or not), and we thus cannot infer from our perceived or experienced flow of time that objective time is actually flowing at all.

References:

For Libet, see for example : Libet, B., 1981, "The experimental evidence for subjective referral of a sensory experience backwards in time: reply to P. S. Churchland," Philosophy of Science, 48, pp.182-97

Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992) “Time and the Observer”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2) 183-247

selfAdjoint

Jun30-06, 08:35 AM

Drachir

Jun30-06, 08:54 AM

madness wrote: So what does it mean to say that a certain moment is happening now? Or does it make more sense to view the present as the only moment in existence, and the past and future as illusory? Those questions arise for two reasons. First, it is so easy to confuse long-used metaphors with reality. Second, it is easy to confuse subjective existence with objective existence. Time is an abstraction from the motions of things. Abstractions have only mental existence. Time cannot have objective existence; it cannot have existence independent of thinking subjects. It follows that no time span, not even a moment, can have physical existence.

Physical events happen: the sun at the zenith, for example. However, abstractions do not happen. A moment of time is an abstraction and cannot happen. It is meaningless to say that a certain moment is happening now, or that the present is the only moment in existence.

An illusion is something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality. Barring neurological disorders, our minds do not deceive us. We know the difference between things of reality and things of the mind. Our memories of our past experiences with reality are not deceptive. The past is not illusory.

Many kinds of future events can be predicted with high levels of confidence from observations of the past and present, hence, the future is not illusory. Besides, how could the future retroactively deceive us in the present? :smile:

Canute

Jun30-06, 11:50 AM

Moving Finger - that's very interesting, thanks. The quote from Libet bothers me though.

"[There is] no method by which one could determine the absolute timing of a subjective experience."

It's probably just that's this is quoted out of context but it seems to me that it is not true. Every experience I've ever had has happened right now. In this case Libet's statement is only true if my subjective 'now' is not the same as the objective 'now'. But there is no such thing as an objective 'now' therefore my subjective 'now' cannot be the same as it. In this case the statement is either meaningless or false, depending on how we read it. Perhaps in context this isn't a problem.

The second para. of the Dennett and Kinsbourne quote suggests, it seems to me, that the timing of neural events may not coincide with the timing of mental events. This would seem to have rather strange consequences for theories in which the two are precisely correlated. To avoid this problem we would have to say that the timing of mental events does coincide with the timing of neural events (quantum effects in microtubules, whatever) but events in phenomenal consciousness may not coincide with either. However, I'm very sure Dennett did not mean to imply this. Nevertheless, there seems something a little incoherent about that para. to me. Maybe I'm misunderstanding it. I nearly always have a problem with Dennett's pronouncements.

madness wrote: Time is an abstraction from the motions of things. Abstractions have only mental existence. Time cannot have objective existence; it cannot have existence independent of thinking subjects. It follows that no time span, not even a moment, can have physical existence.

Physical events happen: the sun at the zenith, for example. However, abstractions do not happen. A moment of time is an abstraction and cannot happen. It is meaningless to say that a certain moment is happening now, or that the present is the only moment in existence.
The point about time seems very well put IMHO. The notion of time has always been paradoxical. Perhaps we should consider it as just a hang-over from the days of naive realism. However the statement 'physical events happen' is false in many people's view, so perhaps should not be made so boldly.

Barring neurological disorders, our minds do not deceive us. We know the difference between things of reality and things of the mind. Our memories of our past experiences with reality are not deceptive. The past is not illusory.
I strongly disagree here. You assume things of the mind are less real than something else called 'reality'. I doubt if you can justify this assumption, or even that you can show these are two different things. It is a widely-held view that we are wholly deceived by psychophysical phenomena if we consider them as inherently existent thus 'real'. Clearly they cannot be inherently existent if time is not, since they time-based phenomena. I think you have to bite the bullet. If time is not real then neither are psychophysical phenomena. This view is not scientifically contentious, as far as I know, and Erwin Schrodinger argued for it for the last forty years of life.

Many kinds of future events can be predicted with high levels of confidence from observations of the past and present, hence, the future is not illusory. Besides, how could the future retroactively deceive us in the present? :smile:
I can't figure out if this is actually relevant to retroactive deception but I think it may be. According to Briane Greene (or was it John Gribben) a number of physicists theorise that in the present we (being conscious observers) can influence the past. He discusses the possibility that we created the fossil evidence for the dinosaurs in retrospect. The maths is too complex for me, but I gained the impression that the answer to your question may be that it is possible. The problem is trying to disentagle 'deception' and 'reality'. Schrodinger, for example, considered psychophysical phenomena (thus time, change etc.) to be deceptions, and 'reality' to be a different kind of phenomenon entirely.

Regards
Canute

moving finger

Jul3-06, 11:21 PM

Thanks for that instructive post Finger! I am sure we are going to be referring back to it. In fact Libet comes up so often that it might be useful to use your post to anchor a sticky FAQ on the subject.

Given certain facts in the current state of physics research, I wonder if the concept of "current moment" has any sure physical support.
Agreed. But showing the “current moment” is either ill-defined or has no real meaning is not the same as showing that time does not flow.

1) GR has no global time evolution, as John Baez says, "You push your spacelike hypersurface ahead your way and I push mine ahead my way." And this is inherited by quantum gravity theories.
Right, but I don’t think we can actually get a relativistic reversal of event sequences can we? (like the reversal of event sequences implied by Libet’s backwards referral). So relativity alone would still be compatible with an objective flow of time?

2) In QM, time evolution is an observable. Not observed = not well defined? But always observed = no evolution (quantum Zeno effect).
Yep – but again this simply leads to a slowing down or stopping of events, not a reversal of event sequences. So QM alone would still be compatible with an objective flow of time?

An illusion is something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality. Barring neurological disorders, our minds do not deceive us.
Are you normally aware of your blind spot? No, one normally has to work hard to reveal the presence of the blind spot. Why? Because the mind has evolved to ignore the fact that information is missing from the blind spot, hence the fact that information is missing is not mentally flagged as a problem. It’s a classic illusion. There are many, many such illusions if one looks carefully enough.

Our minds have evolved to provide competitive advantage, they have not necessarily evolved to provide an accurate picture of reality (except insofar as that picture provides a competitive advantage).

We know the difference between things of reality and things of the mind. Our memories of our past experiences with reality are not deceptive. The past is not illusory.
There are countless documented cases of people having false or deceptive memories of past events, and Libet’s experiments confirm just one small aspect of this – the fact that we deliberately reconstruct conscious timelines.

Moving Finger - that's very interesting, thanks. The quote from Libet bothers me though. It's probably just that's this is quoted out of context but it seems to me that it is not true. Every experience I've ever had has happened right now.
What is “now” as far as your consciousness is concerned? “now” is just as uncertain as “here” from the perspective of your consciousness. Your conscious self is delocalized in space (it does not have a well defined location, it is just “somewhere within your brain”), and it is also delocalized in time – Libet’s experiments have confirmed this. The brain is able to reconstruct the temporal sequences of events such that an event A which in real time occurs before event B is actually consciously perceived (by the subject) as if A occurs after, and not before, B. How can this be the case, unless your conscious “now” is somehow delocalized and disconnected from the objective (external) now?

In this case Libet's statement is only true if my subjective 'now' is not the same as the objective 'now'. But there is no such thing as an objective 'now' therefore my subjective 'now' cannot be the same as it.
On what basis do you claim there is no objective “now”? Are you suggesting that time only exists in the presence of observers? (in other words, if a clock ticks in the forest and there is no-one to hear it, does it stop?)

The second para. of the Dennett and Kinsbourne quote suggests, it seems to me, that the timing of neural events may not coincide with the timing of mental events.
If by “neural events” you mean the objective event as witnessed by an external observer, and by “mental events” you mean the consciously registered event, then yes I agree. This is simply another way of saying that the objective timeline and the experienced timeline are not necessarily mapped linearly one to the other.

This would seem to have rather strange consequences for theories in which the two are precisely correlated. To avoid this problem we would have to say that the timing of mental events does coincide with the timing of neural events (quantum effects in microtubules, whatever) but events in phenomenal consciousness may not coincide with either. However, I'm very sure Dennett did not mean to imply this.
Agreed. I believe Dennett would equate mental events with events in phenomenal consciousness (ie they are one and the same).

Nevertheless, there seems something a little incoherent about that para. to me. Maybe I'm misunderstanding it. I nearly always have a problem with Dennett's pronouncements.
It seems quite coherent to me. In fact, there is no mention of the word “event” in the entire paragraph, so perhaps you are misinterpreting his intention?

Best Regards

Canute

Jul4-06, 05:56 AM

What is “now” as far as your consciousness is concerned? “now” is just as uncertain as “here” from the perspective of your consciousness. Your conscious self is delocalized in space (it does not have a well defined location, it is just “somewhere within your brain”), and it is also delocalized in time – Libet’s experiments have confirmed this. The brain is able to reconstruct the temporal sequences of events such that an event A which in real time occurs before event B is actually consciously perceived (by the subject) as if A occurs after, and not before, B. How can this be the case, unless your conscious “now” is somehow delocalized and disconnected from the objective (external) now?
As far as my consciousness is concerned my 'now' is whenever I have an experience. I'm not suggesting that this is at some point in time relative to an objective 'now'. Far from it. You are assuming there is an objective 'now', I am denying it. My conscious 'now' is the only sort of 'now' I shall ever know, the 'eternal present' as it is sometimes characterised. What the phrase 'objective now' means I really don't know.

In my view it makes no sense to say that consciousness is delocalised in time and space. It assumes what is being questionned, namely the inherent existence of time and space. Certainly I would not accept that my consciousness is somewhere within my brain. The idea depends on an objective time and space more fundamental than my consciousness. But what if time and space are conceptual creations of consciousness? Perhaps the problem here, as usual, is clarifying what we mean by 'consciousness'.

On what basis do you claim there is no objective “now”? Are you suggesting that time only exists in the presence of observers? (in other words, if a clock ticks in the forest and there is no-one to hear it, does it stop?)
I thought nobody believed in an objective 'now' anymore. Is this not what relativity is all about? On the second question I'd say yes, time would only exist in the presence of observers (i.e. in the minds of observers).

If by “neural events” you mean the objective event as witnessed by an external observer, and by “mental events” you mean the consciously registered event, then yes I agree. This is simply another way of saying that the objective timeline and the experienced timeline are not necessarily mapped linearly one to the other.
What objective timeline? Do you mean an intersubjective timeline? Or do you mean time as measured by some central cosmic clock?

Agreed. I believe Dennett would equate mental events with events in phenomenal consciousness (ie they are one and the same).
In this case phenomenal events must happen at the same time as their neural correlates. If so, then they occur in a physically determined order, and the order of experienced events must be the same as the order of the physical events they are the experiences of. But, as you say, we know this is not always the case. The physicalist account of experiences, coupled with recent experimental findings that imply 'retro-causation' (e.g. the Damasio group) leads to the idea that neurons are clairvoyant. I don't think this idea makes much sense.

The temporal sequence in consciousness is, within the limits of whatever temporal control window bounds our investigation, purely a matter of the content represented, not the timing of the representing.
This is what I meant by incoherent, although I may be misreading the words. It seems to me that if the timing of the content represented and the timing of the representing are different then clearly experiences need not happen at the same time as the brain-events that cause them. In this case there is more to experiencing than brain-states, contrary to Dennett's usual thesis.

Btw, if my responses seem confused I apologise. I find the topic very confusing.

Cheers
Canute

moving finger

Jul4-06, 06:51 AM

As far as my consciousness is concerned my 'now' is whenever I have an experience. I'm not suggesting that this is at some point in time relative to an objective 'now'. Far from it. You are assuming there is an objective 'now', I am denying it.
OK, that’s a different viewpoint certainly. I agree if one denies any objectivity to the temporal dimension, one is free to define “now” in any way that one wishes.

My conscious 'now' is the only sort of 'now' I shall ever know, the 'eternal present' as it is sometimes characterised. What the phrase 'objective now' means I really don't know.
One could say the same about space. Most people however seem to think that spatial and temporal dimensions have an objective “ontic” reality which is external to our conscious “epistemic” experience, but I agree one is entitled to assume this is not the case.

In my view it makes no sense to say that consciousness is delocalised in time and space. It assumes what is being questionned, namely the inherent existence of time and space. Certainly I would not accept that my consciousness is somewhere within my brain.
No? Where would you say it is?

The idea depends on an objective time and space more fundamental than my consciousness. But what if time and space are conceptual creations of consciousness?
Indeed. What if the whole of what the rest of us to take to be “objective reality”, including our own consciousnesses, is just a creation of your consciousness?

Perhaps the problem here, as usual, is clarifying what we mean by 'consciousness'.
Perhaps. But I think the problem is more to do with whether one accepts an objective spacetime reality which exists independently of your consciousness. It seems you do not. Re-defining or clarifying just what we mean by “consciousness” wouldn’t change your belief, presumably?

I thought nobody believed in an objective 'now' anymore. Is this not what relativity is all about?
Very good point. I agree. I shall re-phrase : Does the concept of time exist in the absence of conscious observers?

On the second question I'd say yes, time would only exist in the presence of observers (i.e. in the minds of observers).
OK, you answered. Interesting position you take here.

If by “neural events” you mean the objective event as witnessed by an external observer, and by “mental events” you mean the consciously registered event, then yes I agree. This is simply another way of saying that the objective timeline and the experienced timeline are not necessarily mapped linearly one to the other.
What objective timeline? Do you mean an intersubjective timeline? Or do you mean time as measured by some central cosmic clock?
I mean timeline as measured by any clock in absence of a conscious observer – but then you don’t believe in such a “non-experienced” timeline.

Agreed. I believe Dennett would equate mental events with events in phenomenal consciousness (ie they are one and the same).
In this case phenomenal events must happen at the same time as their neural correlates.
You have changed “neural events” to “neural corrlates”. Obviously a “correlate” must be correlated with something, otherwise we would not call it a correlate. But not all neural events are correlated with phenomenal consciousness.

If so, then they occur in a physically determined order, and the order of experienced events must be the same as the order of the physical events they are the experiences of.
Not necessarily.

But, as you say, we know this is not always the case. The physicalist account of experiences, coupled with recent experimental findings that imply 'retro-causation' (e.g. the Damasio group) leads to the idea that neurons are clairvoyant. I don't think this idea makes much sense.
Clairvoyant neurons? I have read a fair amount of Damasio’s work, I’m not aware of any such suggestion like this - knowing Damasio's approach I would be amazed if this came from his interpretation.

The temporal sequence in consciousness is, within the limits of whatever temporal control window bounds our investigation, purely a matter of the content represented, not the timing of the representing.
This is what I meant by incoherent, although I may be misreading the words. It seems to me that if the timing of the content represented and the timing of the representing are different then clearly experiences need not happen at the same time as the brain-events that cause them.
I interpret Dennetts’ phrase “timing of the representing” as the objective timeline of the representations (which you deny exists) and the “content represented” I interpret as the subjective phenomenal experience. Thus Dennett (on my interpretation) is saying that the subjectively experienced temporal sequence is purely a matter of the subjective phenomenal experience, and is not a matter of the objective timeline of the representations.

In this case there is more to experiencing than brain-states, contrary to Dennett's usual thesis.
On my interpretation, Dennett’s explanation is coherent, and consistent with conscious experience simply being a sequence of brain-states.

Btw, if my responses seem confused I apologise. I find the topic very confusing.
Probably not as confusing as I find it!

Best Regards

Canute

Jul4-06, 08:06 AM

OK, that’s a different viewpoint certainly. I agree if one denies any objectivity to the temporal dimension, one is free to define “now” in any way that one wishes.
That's not quite what I meant. I wasn't being sloppy. I would define it as any moment that I (or you) experience as 'now'. I don't know what other meaning it could have.

One could say the same about space. Most people however seem to think that spatial and temporal dimensions have an objective “ontic” reality which is external to our conscious “epistemic” experience, but I agree one is entitled to assume this is not the case.
I would say the same about space. In physics the question of whether spacetime is fundamental is, I think, known as the 'background-dependence problem'. One solution recently proposed is the 'hypothesis of duality', by which spacetime is or is not fundamental depending on which way we look at it. In other words, it has so far proved impossible to show that there is not something more fundamental than space and time.

No? Where would you say it is?
If space is not fundamental then this question is meaningless. This may sound like insanity but it makes some sense in the context of a wider theory, honest.

Indeed. What if the whole of what the rest of us to take to be “objective reality”, including our own consciousnesses, is just a creation of your consciousness?
This is not quite what I'm suggesting, but is something like it. However, to answer fully would take us way off topic.

Perhaps. But I think the problem is more to do with whether one accepts an objective spacetime reality which exists independently of your consciousness. It seems you do not. Re-defining or clarifying just what we mean by “consciousness” wouldn’t change your belief, presumably?
It wouldn't change what I believe, but it would change how I'd express it. If by consciousness we mean what Dennett means then spacetime is more fundamental than consciousness. If we mean what Chalmers means then it would be the other way around. Sorry to be cryptic but I'm not trying to push any particular view on you, just point out that not all the assumptions you make are necessary.

Very good point. I agree. I shall re-phrase : Does the concept of time exist in the absence of conscious observers?
I think the answer is in the question. The only place a concept can exist is in a mind.

You have changed “neural events” to “neural corrlates”. Obviously a “correlate” must be correlated with something, otherwise we would not call it a correlate. But not all neural events are correlated with phenomenal consciousness.
I see what you mean. But I used the term quite carefully, to distinguish any old event from those that, according to the physicalist view, are responsible for (or identical with) experiences.

Clairvoyant neurons? I have read a fair amount of Damasio’s work, I’m not aware of any such suggestion like this - knowing+ Damasio's approach I would be amazed if this came from his interpretation.
I didn't mean to suggest that Damasio talks about clairvoyance. The interpretation came from an article by C. Whitehead in the Journal of Conscious Studies, in which he talks about experiments by Bierman showing that non-conscious physiological anticipation of decisions not only precedes conscious decision-making, but begins even before any implict learning can have occured. He writes 'In layman's terms this means that neurones appear to be clairvoyant'.

I interpret Dennetts’ phrase “timing of the representing” as the objective timeline of the representations (which you deny exists) and the “content represented” I interpret as the subjective phenomenal experience. Thus Dennett (on my interpretation) is saying that the subjectively experienced temporal sequence is purely a matter of the subjective phenomenal experience, and is not a matter of the objective timeline of the representations.
Yes, that is how I interpreted it also. It seems to me that if experiences can be experienced in a different sequence from the brain-events that (let us assume) cause them, then this shows a lack of correlation between phenomenal states and (observed) brain-states. This lack of correlation would seem to cause problems for Dennett's general theory. But I haven't thought this through very carefully so may be doing him an injustice.

On my interpretation, Dennett’s explanation is coherent, and consistent with conscious experience simply being a sequence of brain-states.
Could this be the case if the temporal order of each may sometimes not coincide? To me it seems not.

Btw, I'm not suggesting there is no such thing as the flow of time. Clearly there is. But the question remains as to whether this flow is more than something experienced by conscious beings. As soon as we assume it is more than this then the notion of time becomes paradoxical. This suggests to me that it is no more than a psychological phenomenon. If it exists inherently then how would it come into existence at the Big Bang and cease to exist at the Big Crunch?

Regards
Canute

moving finger

Jul5-06, 04:19 AM

Hi Canute

I’m finding it hard to understand what it is you are trying to say in parts of your post, so I have tried to focus in my reply below on the main issues where I am having trouble. If you think I have missed important issues please do bring them up.

I would say the same about space. In physics the question of whether spacetime is fundamental is, I think, known as the 'background-dependence problem'. One solution recently proposed is the 'hypothesis of duality', by which spacetime is or is not fundamental depending on which way we look at it. In other words, it has so far proved impossible to show that there is not something more fundamental than space and time.
Are you suggesting that space does not exist (except as a creation of the conscious mind), or are you saying that space does exist independently of our conscious minds but that space may not be “fundamental” (whatever that might mean)?

No? Where would you say it is?
If space is not fundamental then this question is meaningless. This may sound like insanity but it makes some sense in the context of a wider theory, honest.
I disagree. If space exists independently of consciousness then the question "where in space does consciousness exist?" has meaning (regardless of whether that space is “fundamental” or not). Are you perhaps suggesting that space does not exist except as a creation of consciousness?

Sorry to be cryptic but I'm not trying to push any particular view on you, just point out that not all the assumptions you make are necessary.
No assumptions are “necessary”. If they were, they wouldn’t be assumptions, would they? An assumption (or premise) may be (logically) true or false, but it is never (logically) necessary.

To arrive at any attempted understanding or explanation of the world, we must make assumptions. Exactly which assumptions we make are up to us – each particular assumption is logically contingent and not logically necessary – but we cannot make any inferences (deductive or inductive) without at least some assumptions.

Does the concept of time exist in the absence of conscious observers?
I think the answer is in the question. The only place a concept can exist is in a mind.
I disagree, but again this would take us off-topic. A concept (to me) is simply a particular relationship between particular sets of information (in much the same way that an explanation is). We are used to experiencing concepts and explanations as properties of conscious minds, but to generalise and say that all concepts and explanations exist only within conscious minds would be to commit an anthropocentric error.

You have changed “neural events” to “neural corrlates”. Obviously a “correlate” must be correlated with something, otherwise we would not call it a correlate. But not all neural events are correlated with phenomenal consciousness.

I see what you mean. But I used the term quite carefully, to distinguish any old event from those that, according to the physicalist view, are responsible for (or identical with) experiences.
You used which term carefully? “neural event” or “neural correlate”? Your intention may have been to use the word “neural event” carefully, but how am I supposed to have known your intent without clarification? In your original post you said :
the timing of neural events may not coincide with the timing of mental events
And I agreed, partly because obviously not every neural event is correlated with phenomenal consciousness

The interpretation came from an article by C. Whitehead in the Journal of Conscious Studies, in which he talks about experiments by Bierman showing that non-conscious physiological anticipation of decisions not only precedes conscious decision-making, but begins even before any implict learning can have occured. He writes 'In layman's terms this means that neurones appear to be clairvoyant'.
Another (to me more rational) interpretation of the events you describe is that not all “mental decisions” originate within consciousness (or : So-called “conscious decisions” are often preceded by non-conscious decisions) – no need to invoke anything spooky!

This interpretation actually fits perfectly with the idea that (consciously) subjective timelines may reflect a different temporal sequence compared to objective timelines - because our minds are deliberately reconstructing the temporal sequence of events to aid subjective interpretation.

It seems to me that if experiences can be experienced in a different sequence from the brain-events that (let us assume) cause them, then this shows a lack of correlation between phenomenal states and (observed) brain-states. This lack of correlation would seem to cause problems for Dennett's general theory. But I haven't thought this through very carefully so may be doing him an injustice.
I agree it shows a lack of correlation between some phenomenal states and some (observed) brain states, but given that not all brain-states are correlated with phenomenal states anyway, I see no problem.

Here is one way it could happen (I am not suggesting this is a rigorous explanation, just a sketch of a possible explanation) : The subjectvely perceived temporal sequence (the phenomenal sequence of events) would effectively be a mental reconstruction based on (a set A of objectively observable) causal brain-states; that reconstruction would entail the creation of (a set B of objectively observable) additional brain states. The set B of brain-states would be temporally (sequentially) connected with the phenomenal temporal sequence, but the set A of brain-states need not be so temporally connected.

On my interpretation, Dennett’s explanation is coherent, and consistent with conscious experience simply being a sequence of brain-states.
Could this be the case if the temporal order of each may sometimes not coincide? To me it seems not.
Yes, it could be the case if we accept that not all brain-states have phenomenal correlates.

Btw, I'm not suggesting there is no such thing as the flow of time. Clearly there is.
It is not so clear to me. I do not believe that time flows, I believe that what we think of as the flow of time is an illusion.

But the question remains as to whether this flow is more than something experienced by conscious beings. As soon as we assume it is more than this then the notion of time becomes paradoxical. This suggests to me that it is no more than a psychological phenomenon.
Agreed. Isn’t that the definition of an illusion?

If it exists inherently then how would it come into existence at the Big Bang and cease to exist at the Big Crunch?
Even if time does not flow, this question still needs to be answered (but there are rational answers available)

Best Regards

Canute

Jul5-06, 05:16 AM

I’m finding it hard to understand what it is you are trying to say in parts of your post
Sorry about that. Clarity is not my strongest suit.

Are you suggesting that space does not exist (except as a creation of the conscious mind), or are you saying that space does exist independently of our conscious minds but that space may not be “fundamental” (whatever that might mean)?
I'm suggesting that the phenomenal is ontologically prior to the psychophysical, including spacetime. In other words, that time is an epiphenomenon. By saying spacetime is not fundamental I mean that there is something prior to spacetime. Colin McGinn conjectures that consciousness originates in a 'pre-spatial reality prior the Big Bang'. This is more or less what I'm suggesting, although I wouldn't put it like this.

Are you perhaps suggesting that space does not exist except as a creation of consciousness?
Yep.

To arrive at any attempted understanding or explanation of the world, we must make assumptions.
That's an assumption.:smile: Still, although I could disagree let's assume it is true. The aim then would be to make as few assuptions as possible, and only those that are absolutely necessary in order to proceed.

... , but to generalise and say that all concepts and explanations exist only within conscious minds would be to commit an anthropocentric error.
How can a concept exist outside of a mind? You could argue that the referent of the concept refers exists outside the mind, but not the concept itself.

You used which term carefully? “neural event” or “neural correlate”? Your intention may have been to use the word “neural event” carefully, but how am I supposed to have known your intent without clarification?
You aren't, I should have been more clear. But I did clarify later.

Another (to me more rational) interpretation of the events you describe is that not all “mental decisions” originate within consciousness (or : So-called “conscious decisions” are often preceded by non-conscious decisions) – no need to invoke anything spooky!
The spookiness is necessary because the brain-states anticipate their cause. (Hence 'retro-causation'). It's not a question of the brain-states preceeding the phenomenal states. It's that the brain-states seem to anticipate the brain-states that cause them, a much tougher problem.

I agree it shows a lack of correlation between some phenomenal states and some (observed) brain states, but given that not all brain-states are correlated with phenomenal states anyway, I see no problem.
But according to Dennett the phenomenal states are a consequence of correlated brain-states. This idea would be called into question if phenomenal states can occur in a different order from the brain-states with which they are supposed to be correlated, or so it seems to me.

Here is one way it could happen (I am not suggesting this is a rigorous explanation, just a sketch of a possible explanation) : The subjectvely perceived temporal sequence (the phenomenal sequence of events) would effectively be a mental reconstruction based on (a set A of objectively observable) causal brain-states; that reconstruction would entail the creation of (a set B of objectively observable) additional brain states. The set B of brain-states would be temporally (sequentially) connected with the phenomenal temporal sequence, but the set A of brain-states need not be so temporally connected.
If the set B are observable brain-states then the set A is irrelevant. It is the relationship between B and the experienced sequence that is the issue. To explain any lack of correlation between these you'd have to posit a set C of brain-states. Next you'd have to posit a set D, and so on.

Alternatively, suppose A is the set of all observable brain-states. In this case the temporal sequence of A and the experienced sequence should be strictly correlated. If not, then would it not follow that something is happening in experience that is not correlated to brain-states?

It is not so clear to me. I do not believe that time flows, I believe that what we think of as the flow of time is an illusion.
In this case we agree.

Even if time does not flow, this question still needs to be answered (but there are rational answers available)
We agree here also.

If time does not flow then how do explain its apparent flow? (You may have answered this earlier but I came in late).

Cheers
Canute

moving finger

Jul5-06, 05:27 AM

If time does not flow then how do explain its apparent flow? (You may have answered this earlier but I came in late).
Will respond to rest of your latest post later, but see post #20 (which is where you came in). The argument in brief is :

Our intuition that time flows comes from our conscious subjective perception of the flow of time.
Subjective timeline sequences of events do not map linearly to objective timeline sequences of events.
Subjective event sequences can even sometimes run counter to objective event sequences (ie as if subjective time were somehow flowing “backwards” compared to objective time).
We each have different subjective timelines.
We have no reason to think that the “flow” of any individual subjective timeline is representative of the absolute flow of time (since different subjective flows can run counter not only to the objective timeline but also counter to each other).
Thus, if any timeline is “fundamentally flowing” in any particular direction, it must be the objective timeline (rather than the subjective) timelines.
But since we only ever experience subjective flow, it may also be the case that the objective timeline is static (not flowing).
Thus, we cannot conclude from our subjective perception of time’s “flow” that time does indeed flow.

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:26 AM

Time is an abstraction we make from the motion of things.

This is a physics newsgroup, and in physics, motion is based on time, ntot he other way round.

Since there is no such thing as time itself, it is meaningless to consider time to have physical existence.

Your grounds for saying that there is no such thing
as "time itself" are that it doesn't exist separately
from specific instances. But you could say the same
about charge or mass, or anything else in physics
But we do grant them physical existence because
they have specific instances.

The notion of time running backwards implies that all motions would be reversed and that all history would retrace its steps backward. It’s not possible. There are too many things that prohibit the reversal of time. Water can’t change its direction through a check valve. Electrons cannot change their direction through a diode or transistor.

If you reverse all the laws of physics ,
you reverse all the laws of physics. The problems
you mention will "cancel through".

The earth would have to change its direction of rotation in order to make sundials tell time backwards. If it changed its direction instantaneously there wouldn’t be a human-built structure left standing and there would be horrific flooding. Instead of people getting younger they would be killed; that wouldn’t be a backward replay of history. And if it changed direction slowly, there would be terrible destruction as equatorial oceans moved towards the poles during the reversal. That, too, would not be a backward replay of history. The notion of time reversal, of history running backward, is self-contradictory.

If you reverse the direction of the earth and nothing else,
you will have that problem. because structures on its surface
will comntinue to have their old momentum.

If your reverse everything, you reverse everything, inlcuding the
momenta of structures on the Earth's surface.

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:38 AM

Tournesol writes: "I know of no theory that explains the feeling of flow as an illusion. It is either illlusory and inexplicable or explicable
and non-illusory."

Try having a look at the theory of emptiness as expounded by Nagarjuna, or dhamma theory as expounded in the 'Abhidhamma' (one of the 'three baskets of teachings' in Buddhism). In this view spacetime is a psychological construct, as I think it was for Kant.

That would be illusory and inexplicable, then.

Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way is a proof that the notion of time as existent is inherently paradoxical. He makes a reductio argument similar to Zeno's. In this view, at the deepest level of analysis nothing really exists and nothing ever really happens (really!). Roughly speaking, he argues that the past does not exist, the future does not exist, and thus the notion of the present moment is incoherent (an argument related to the 'Dedekind Cut' in mathematics).

That kind of purely logical argument is just as applicable
to the mental as it is to the physical. If it shows that time
cannot exist outside the head, it equally shows that it
cannot exist inside, making it an inexplicable illusion,
it the conclusion that it is psyhcological is to be accepted.

The feeling of the flow of time is a quale. It is a characeteristic
of qualia that an "illusory" quale -- a hallucination of the colour
red, for instance, -- is every bit as real as a real one.

So saying that the flow-of-time is psychological
doesn't explain how it can exist psychologically,
if it can't exist physically. It is an inexplicable illusion,
if it is an illusion.

The Wheeler-Feynman 'absorber theory' of time is, I think, still well thought of by physicists. In this entities can move both backwards and forwards in time quite happily, quite as if the flow of time is an illusion.

AAAGh! That's the direction of time!

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:42 AM

n, a deterministic universe, all moments in time are preset, and would seem to have some kind of existence.

In a block universe. Determinism is quite compatible with the
idea that the future doesn't exist yet.

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:49 AM

Is the Flow of Time an Illusion?

The argument seems to be : Conscious agents perceive time as if the agent is “flowing in time” from the past into the future, and from this perception it is allegedly safe to infer that such agents are not simply under the illusion of “flowing in time”, but indeed (and objectively) they are “flowing in time” from the past to the future.

I shall show that this inference is invalid.

[QUOTE]
Experiments by Libet and Grey Walter on the differences in the objective and subjective (experienced) correlations between temporally separated events show that the mind can reconstruct or rearrange the actual temporal sequence of perceptual information coming from phenomenal events, such that the consciously perceived (the experienced) sequence is not the same as the objective sequence of events (see the paper by Dennett and Kinsbourne referenced below). Libet explains this in terms of “backwards referral” or “backwards projection” of certain consciously experienced events with respect to other consciously experienced events. Dennett describes this kind of mental manipulatioon of the objective sequence of events in terms of Orwellian and Stalinesque models of mental representation.

1) showing that we misinterpret temporal sequence doesn't show
there is no such thing (we misinterpret everything to some extent)...

2) ..Libet's setup assumes that there is an objective sequence of
events in the first place.

Thus if time really does “flow” (and we are to believe that this flow is not an illusion), then all but one of the above timelines (since they reflect different sequences of events) must be an illusion. Which of the above timelines would one think represents the real “flow of time” – the objective timeline or one of the the experienced timelines? It obviously cannot be one of the experienced timelines (because we each experience different timelines, and none of us is in a privileged position of being able to claim to have direct access to the “absolute flow of time”), therefore (if any one timeline flows) it must be the objective timeline. But if this is the case, then it follows that we each sometimes perceive time as flowing in the opposite direction to the way it is objectively flowing! Thus, our subjective experience of the flow of time is indeed an illusion (whether the objective timeline really “flows” or not), and we thus cannot infer from our perceived or experienced flow of time that objective time is actually flowing at all.

You are confusing flow with sequence.

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:53 AM

Given certain facts in the current state of physics research, I wonder if the concept of "current moment" has any sure physical support.

Global current moment or local current moment ?

1) GR has no global time evolution, as John Baez says,

Global, then.

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 09:57 AM

2) In QM, time evolution is an observable. Not observed = not well defined? But always observed = no evolution (quantum Zeno effect).

http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/uncertainty.html

Tournesol

Jul5-06, 10:12 AM

But since we only ever experience subjective flow, it may also be the case that the objective timeline is static (not flowing).
Thus, we cannot conclude from our subjective perception of time’s “flow” that time does indeed flow.

But we can't explain where the subjective flow comes from if it isn't
driven by objective flow. So it is Inexplicable Illusion.

OTOH , if flow is objective, that easily explains why there is subjective
flow too. There is subjective flow because consciousness is rooted in the
phsycal brain.

So while there is a "choice", your prefered option is much less explanatory
than mine.

(BTW, the Objective Flow model has no problem dealing with mistakes
in sequencing -- they are just caused by varying latencies , like out-of-order
packets in TCP/IP)

Canute

Jul5-06, 05:05 PM

Tournesol - Thanks for your excellent comments.

That would be illusory and inexplicable, then.
Illusory yes, but not inexplicable per se. Time is explained as an epiphenomena of the beings that experience the passing of it.

That kind of purely logical argument is just as applicable
to the mental as it is to the physical. If it shows that time
cannot exist outside the head, it equally shows that it
cannot exist inside, making it an inexplicable illusion,
if the conclusion that it is psychological is to be accepted.
An illusion yes, but not entirely inexplicable. If all psychophysical phenomena are illusory in the same sense as time then there is no paradox, as long as there is something else more fundamental.

The feeling of the flow of time is a quale. It is a charachteristic of qualia that an "illusory" quale -- a hallucination of the colour red, for instance, -- is every bit as real as a real one.
Good point. I agree.

So saying that the flow-of-time is psychological
doesn't explain how it can exist psychologically,
if it can't exist physically.
I agree here also. It seems to me to be a crucial point. It is impossible to explain time or much else if we assume that the psychological and the physical features of the world are all that there is. We already know this from stagnation of metaphysics.

It is an inexplicable illusion, if it is an illusion.
As I say, I don't agree.

AAAGh! That's the direction of time!
Oh damn. Thanks for pointing that out. It wasn't quite as silly as it looks. My thought process was that if time can flow both ways, as per the theory mentioned, then the idea of a 'flow of time' is clearly logically incoherent. But I wrote the conclusion without the argument.

Cheers
Canute.

Tournesol

Jul6-06, 07:58 AM

That would be illusory and inexplicable, then.

Illusory yes, but not inexplicable per se. Time is explained as an epiphenomena of the beings that experience the passing of it.

That doesn't seem very explanatory to me. It is difficult
to see how even the appearance of a flow of time can
arise from timelessness. Talking about ephiphenomena
doesn't help as far as I can see. Oh, and then there's the problem
of the epochs of time before any conscious being existed.

An illusion yes, but not entirely inexplicable. If all psychophysical phenomena are illusory in the same sense as time then there is no paradox, as long as there is something else more fundamental.

We need something more fundamental, we need to understand
how it generates illusions, and we need to know how
all-embracing illusoriness doesn't prevent us from understanding these
things.

Or we could go for the much simpler approach of Explicable Non-Illusion.

The feeling of the flow of time is a quale. It is a charachteristic of qualia that an "illusory" quale -- a hallucination of the colour red, for instance, -- is every bit as real as a real one.

Good point. I agree.

Well, that is why saying time is psychological doesn't resolve anything.
Explianing how a timeless brain produces the appearance of a flow
of time is just as difficult as explaining how a physical brain produces
cosncius experience.

Quote:
So saying that the flow-of-time is psychological
doesn't explain how it can exist psychologically,
if it can't exist physically.

I agree here also. It seems to me to be a crucial point. It is impossible to explain time or much else if we assume that the psychological and the physical features of the world are all that there is. We already know this from stagnation of metaphysics.

If we accept tha thte fllow-of-tiime, or becoming is
a fundamental aspect of the wrld, that explains
all the physical facts, and all the psychological
ones as well (without begging any questions about the
mental being separate fromt he physical).

(The Flow OF Time may not be found in physics, but that
does not make it incompatible with physyics. Determinsitic universes and
block universes are not the same thing.)

It wasn't quite as silly as it looks. My thought process was that if time can flow both ways, as per the theory mentioned, then the idea of a 'flow of time' is clearly logically incoherent.

Two-way flow is still flow.

Canute

Jul6-06, 01:42 PM

That doesn't seem very explanatory to me. It is difficult to see how even the appearance of a flow of time can
arise from timelessness. Talking about ephiphenomena
doesn't help as far as I can see. Oh, and then there's the problem
of the epochs of time before any conscious being existed.
I wasn't suggesting that my one sentence was supposed to be the whole explanation, but it indicates the general idea. (Obviously I disagree with your assumption that there were epochs before consciousness existed).

We need something more fundamental, we need to understand
how it generates illusions, and we need to know how
all-embracing illusoriness doesn't prevent us from understanding these
things.
I agree. My sentence was not supposed to be an explanation, just an indication that there is an explanation in which time is not a fundamental phenomenon.

Or we could go for the much simpler approach of Explicable Non-Illusion.
Fine. If you can explain time in this way then there will be no reason to think there might be a better explanation. As it is, I doubt that you can. The flow of time is paradoxical once we assume time has an inherent existence. It raises questions of what happened 'prior' to the BB, the background-dependence problem etc. More philosophically, if change in the future hasn't happened yet and change in the past has ceased, then how can something change in the present? I'm sure you'll know this problem from mathematics, Dedekind, Zeno etc.

Well, that is why saying time is psychological doesn't resolve anything.
Well, it might at least explain why the notion of time is paradoxical when we assume it is not a psychological phenomenon.

Explianing how a timeless brain produces the appearance of a flow
of time is just as difficult as explaining how a physical brain produces
cosncius experience.
Yes. A timeless brain is to me an oxymoronic phrase. Brains process information, and processing implies the existence of time. Similarly, the idea that brains cause consciousness (in an ontological sense) is equally problematic.

If we accept tha thte fllow-of-tiime, or becoming is a fundamental aspect of the wrld, that explains all the physical facts, and all the psychological ones as well (without begging any questions about the
mental being separate fromt he physical).
Would that that universe gave up its secrets that easily. Physicists cannot make sense of time in this way, and there would be little point in doing so. Such a theory would be nonreductive. It does not explain time but takes it as theoretically fundamental. However, I agree that time is a fundamental aspect of out universe, that much is clear. Our universe would not exist without the passing of it. What is not clear is whether it is fundamental in the full sense of the word, and in what sense the universe exists.

(The Flow OF Time may not be found in physics, but that
does not make it incompatible with physics.
I half agree. It is incompatible with reason, not so much with physics. We can do physics, a lot of it anyway, without worrying about what time is. But when it comes to fundamental physical theories problems arise. This has been observed by countless people, some of them here, and by quantum cosmologists etc.

Two-way flow is still flow.
True. My suggestion was that the idea of a two-way flow of time reduces the idea that time is fundamental to absurdity. This may not be true, I haven't thought it through properly as a reductio proof, but it seems that way to me at the moment.

Regards
Canute

Tournesol

Jul6-06, 05:43 PM

Canute is Offline:
Posts: 1,367

Talking about ephiphenomena
doesn't help as far as I can see. Oh, and then there's the problem
of the epochs of time before any conscious being existed.

I wasn't suggesting that my one sentence was supposed to be the whole explanation, but it indicates the general idea. (Obviously I disagree with your assumption that there were epochs before consciousness existed).

The facts, in conjunction with Occam's Razor, are on my side.

Or we could go for the much simpler approach of Explicable Non-Illusion.
Fine.

If you can explain time in this way then there will be no reason to think there might be a better explanation.

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse.

They are worse for the same reason that all bad explanantions
are bad; they require more hypotheses to do less explaining.

As it is, I doubt that you can. The flow of time is paradoxical once we assume time has an inherent existence. It raises questions of what happened 'prior' to the BB, the background-dependence problem etc.

Nope. Those problems don't arise from the flow assumption alone.
You have to make additional assumptions like "every event has a prior
cause".

More philosophically, if change in the future hasn't happened yet and change in the past has ceased, then how can something change in the present? I'm sure you'll know this problem from mathematics, Dedekind, Zeno etc.

The coming-into-being of new sates of the universe is
change.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html

Well, that is why saying time is psychological doesn't resolve anything.
Well, it might at least explain why the notion of time is paradoxical when we assume it is not a psychological phenomenon.

If it is paradoxical, it is paradoxical. Logic applies to everything.
Moving i from the physical universe to the mind doesn't suspend
logic.

Explianing how a timeless brain produces the appearance of a flow
of time is just as difficult as explaining how a physical brain produces
cosncius experience.
Yes. A timeless brain is to me an oxymoronic phrase.

Then the physical universe is not timeless, since the brain
is part of it.

Brains process information, and processing implies the existence of time. Similarly, the idea that brains cause consciousness (in an ontological sense) is equally problematic.

That they do is not in the least. How they do is, somewhat.

Quote:
If we accept tha thte fllow-of-tiime, or becoming is a fundamental aspect of the wrld, that explains all the physical facts, and all the psychological ones as well (without begging any questions about the
mental being separate fromt he physical).

Would that that universe gave up its secrets that easily. Physicists cannot make sense of time in this way, and there would be little point in doing so.

It means that phsyics is not the whole story. But it is
hubristic to assume it is. And the fact that it is not the
whole story does not mean anything it says is false.
My htoery is designed to accord with accepted
scientific facts (such as the late arrival of consciouness
in the universe).

Such a theory would be nonreductive.

Yes. Theories should be as simple as possible,
but no simpler. A theory that is too reductive to explain Time
is too austere to be useful.

It does not explain time but takes it as theoretically fundamental. However, I agree that time is a fundamental aspect of out universe, that much is clear.

Weren't you just saying it is psychological ?

I half agree. It is incompatible with reason, not so much with physics.

if it is incomaptible with reason -- of course I don't think it is --
it cannot be psychological either.

Canute

Jul7-06, 04:23 AM

The facts, in conjunction with Occam's Razor, are on my side.
You'd need to show this rather than simply state it.

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse.
Do you mean that your solution is no better than others? This seems a bit underconfident. I think mine is better than yours. :smile:

They are worse for the same reason that all bad explanantions
are bad; they require more hypotheses to do less explaining.
I agree that we should minimise hypotheses. That's exactly why I think my solution is better than yours.

Nope. Those problems don't arise from the flow assumption alone.
You have to make additional assumptions like "every event has a prior
cause".
True. You'd also have to assume that time is fundamental.

The coming-into-being of new sates of the universe is
change.
I agree.

If it is paradoxical, it is paradoxical. Logic applies to everything.
Moving i from the physical universe to the mind doesn't suspend
logic.
One writer calls paradoxes 'the apostles of sedition in the kingdom of the orthodox'. This is my view also. I do not believe there is anything paradoxical about the universe. Paradoxes occur because we make false assumptions about it.

Then the physical universe is not timeless, since the brain
is part of it.
Clearly the physical universe is not timeless.

If we accept tha thte fllow-of-tiime, or becoming is a fundamental aspect of the wrld, that explains all the physical facts, and all the psychological ones as well (without begging any questions about the
mental being separate fromt he physical).
In what way does the hypothesis that time is fundamental help explain anything?

It means that phsyics is not the whole story. But it is
hubristic to assume it is. And the fact that it is not the
whole story does not mean anything it says is false.
Quite so.

My theory is designed to accord with accepted
scientific facts (such as the late arrival of consciouness
in the universe).
That isn't science, it's guesswork, and your guess contradicts the views of many physicists. You might as well cast runes to form your view.

Yes. Theories should be as simple as possible,
but no simpler. A theory that is too reductive to explain Time
is too austere to be useful.
I think you need to check the meaning of 'nonreductive'.

if it is incomaptible with reason -- of course I don't think it is --
it cannot be psychological either.
All ideas are psychological. In my view, if our idea of time is paradoxical then it's the wrong idea. The alternative is to say that the universe is paradoxical. Some people do say this, but I see no justification for it.

Cheers
Canute

Tournesol

Jul7-06, 04:06 PM

The facts, in conjunction with Occam's Razor, are on my side.

You'd need to show this rather than simply state it.

Easily done.

1 There is no evidence of consciousness except as a psychological
property of complex living organisms
2 Complex living organisms arrived late int he history
of the universe
3 Therefore, consiousness arrived late in the
history of the universe.

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse.

Do you mean that your solution is no better than others? This seems a bit underconfident. I think mine is better than yours.

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse.

I can show that other solutions are worse.

They are worse for the same reason that all bad explanantions
are bad; they require more hypotheses to do less explaining.

I agree that we should minimise hypotheses. That's exactly why I think my solution is better than yours.

I think you confuse ontology with explanation here.
Trying to explain things in terms of One Fundamental Principle does
not make for a simple explanation becasue you have
to make a long series of arbitrary functions about how
the One Fundamental Principle operats in order to accord
wit the complexity and messiness of the universe.
For instance, your counter to the argumetn
I have given above will no doubt involve hypothesising
without any evidence, that consciousness can
exist outside bodies abd always has done.

Nope. Those problems don't arise from the flow assumption alone.
You have to make additional assumptions like "every event has a prior
cause".

True. You'd also have to assume that time is fundamental.

If you make that assumption without making other assumtions
you can avoid the paradox.

If it is paradoxical, it is paradoxical. Logic applies to everything.
Moving it from the physical universe to the mind doesn't suspend
logic.

One writer calls paradoxes 'the apostles of sedition in the kingdom of the orthodox'. This is my view also. I do not believe there is anything paradoxical about the universe. Paradoxes occur because we make false assumptions about it.

You want to say that the false assumption is "time is physical"
and the true one "time is psychological". But you cannot show
that.

If we accept tha thte fllow-of-tiime, or becoming is a fundamental aspect of the wrld, that explains all the physical facts, and all the psychological ones as well (without begging any questions about the
mental being separate fromt he physical).

In what way does the hypothesis that time is fundamental help explain anything?

It explains the physical phenomena and the mental
phenomena with a single hypothesis.

My theory is designed to accord with accepted
scientific facts (such as the late arrival of consciouness
in the universe).

That isn't science, it's guesswork, and your guess contradicts the views of many physicists. You might as well cast runes to form your view.

Nonsense. You have got that completely back-to-front. All of a considerable
body of scientific evidence points to consciousness being generated
by the brain. it is not the case that "many" physicists hold
mystical views about consciousness. I am a phsyics graduate,
and I can state form experience tha tht e subject was never even
mentioned during my course. A thousand New-Age books will try
to tell you otherwise, but they are just repeating one another.

The Myth of Quantum Consciousness:

http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Quantum/QuantumConsciousness.pdf

if it is incomaptible with reason -- of course I don't think it is --
it cannot be psychological either.

All ideas are psychological.

That doesn't mean their referents are.

In my view, if our idea of time is paradoxical then it's the wrong idea. The alternative is to say that the universe is paradoxical. Some people do say this, but I see no justification for it.

The paradoxes can be resolved with appropriate assumptions

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html

Canute

Jul8-06, 06:31 AM

Easily done.

1 There is no evidence of consciousness except as a psychological
property of complex living organisms
2 Complex living organisms arrived late int he history
of the universe
3 Therefore, consiousness arrived late in the
history of the universe.

Assumption 1 is not true. This is why Wheeler and others speculate that consciousness must have been present in the early universe. McGinn even argues it may have originated 'prior' to the BB, and he is a paradigmatically non-mystical philosopher. Even if you don't accept their argument (from quantum mechanics and from the 'hard' problem) you have to accept that as far as the evidence goes your first assumption is an assumption. A necessary property of an assumption is that it may not be true.

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse. I can show that other solutions are worse.
If so then please demonstrate this. Firstly, you would have to demonstrate that your first assumption is true.

I think you confuse ontology with explanation here.
Trying to explain things in terms of One Fundamental Principle does
not make for a simple explanation becasue you have
to make a long series of arbitrary functions about how
the One Fundamental Principle operats in order to accord
wit the complexity and messiness of the universe.
I'm not sure I see the relevance of this point. I don't agree in any case. Nor, I suspect, would many physicists.

For instance, your counter to the argumetn
I have given above will no doubt involve hypothesising
without any evidence, that consciousness can
exist outside bodies abd always has done.
What makes you assume this?

If you make that assumption without making other assumtions
you can avoid the paradox.
Not in the experience of most philosophers and physicists. If the assumption that time is inherently existent were not paradoxical then nobody would question it and everybody would hold your view. As it is yours is a minority view even in physics.

You want to say that the false assumption is "time is physical"
and the true one "time is psychological". But you cannot show
that.
I'd rather say that time is psychophysical, and thus not fundamental.

It explains the physical phenomena and the mental
phenomena with a single hypothesis.
The assumption that time is fundamental is ad hoc and explains exactly nothing. If time is fundamental then it existed prior to the Big Bang and will continue to exist after the Big Crunch. I find this idea incoherent and unscientific. Qunatum cosmologists are still arguing about whether it is fundamental, so how do you know that it is?

Nonsense. You have got that completely back-to-front. All of a considerable body of scientific evidence points to consciousness being generated by the brain.
There is not one single piece of evidence that suggest this. The evidence suggests that as a general rule states of the brain correlate with states of consciousness. The origins of consciousness are a complete mystery to neurophysiologists, academic philosophers etc. If you read some of the literature this would soon become apparent to you. It is not secret, but widely acknowledged. This is the reason the problem of cosnciousness is aften refered to as the 'hard' problem.

it is not the case that "many" physicists hold
mystical views about consciousness.
I quite agree. Mind you. Erwin Schrodinger, Eddington, Jeans and others held such a view. Their ideas have yet to be falsified.

I am a phsyics graduate,
and I can state form experience tha tht e subject was never even
mentioned during my course.
That doesn't surprise me at all. This has been the way physicists have traditionally dealt with the problem. But there is plenty of literature available for extra-curricular study.

A thousand New-Age books will try
to tell you otherwise, but they are just repeating one another.
I'm not interested in New Age books.

That doesn't mean their referents are.
I agree.

The paradoxes can be resolved with appropriate assumptions
Of course they can. With the appropriate assumptions I can prove that the Earth is a perfect cube.

It's pointless approaching the problem of time or consciousness, or any other problem come to that, armed with a set of unshakable assumptions. An open mind and some disinterested reasoning is required. You might like to check out David Chalmers site, where there are a wide range of published papers on the topic available. I recomment Chalmers' 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness' as a starting point.

Cheers
Canute

Tournesol

Jul8-06, 10:20 AM

1 There is no evidence of consciousness except as a psychological
property of complex living organisms
2 Complex living organisms arrived late int he history
of the universe
3 Therefore, consiousness arrived late in the
history of the universe.

Assumption 1 is not true.

Yes it is , bearing in mind the meaning of the word evidence

This is why Wheeler and others speculate that consciousness must have been present in the early universe.

Speculation is speculation, evidence is evidence.

If you can capture a ghost or an angle, you have evidence of
nonbillogical consicousness. Otherwise there isn't any
speculation doesn't count.

McGinn even argues it may have originated 'prior' to the BB, and he is a paradigmatically non-mystical philosopher.

That's still not evidence.

Even if you don't accept their argument (from quantum mechanics and from the 'hard' problem) you have to accept that as far as the evidence goes your first assumption is an assumption. A necessary property of an assumption is that it may not be true.

It is no more of an assumption than the claim that
unicorns don't exist. It's just about possible
that they do exist, despite never having been observed,
but to argue that htey actuall do is to
commit the fallacy of argmentum ad ignorantiam.

(and let's not forget Occam's razor)

I am not arbitrarily assuming that other solutions are worse. I can show that other solutions are worse.

If so then please demonstrate this. Firstly, you would have to demonstrate that your first assumption is true.

It's a fact, for heavens sake! There is no more
evidence of dismbodied cosnciousness than of dismbodied digestion
or respiration.

I'm not sure I see the relevance of this point. I don't agree in any case. Nor, I suspect, would many physicists.

This pysicsist is not persuaded by your comments about "many
physicists".

If you make that assumption without making other assumtions
you can avoid the paradox.

Not in the experience of most philosophers and physicists. If the assumption that time is inherently existent were not paradoxical then nobody would question it and everybody would hold your view. As it is yours is a minority view even in physics.

It is simply false that "most" philosopher and
phsyicists think time is paradoxical. McTaggart's argument, for instance,
is now regarded as having been decisevly refuted.

It explains the physical phenomena and the mental
phenomena with a single hypothesis.

The assumption that time is fundamental is ad hoc

True

and explains exactly nothing.

False

If time is fundamental then it existed prior to the Big Bang

No, that is a non-sequitur.

and will continue to exist after the Big Crunch. I find this idea incoherent and unscientific. Qunatum cosmologists are still arguing about whether it is fundamental, so how do you know that it is?

I have shown that the hypothesis that (the flow of) time is
objective is non-contradictory and parsimonious.

You could say that doens't add up to truth, but
that would only be drawing attention away fromt he problems
of your own poisitiion.

Nonsense. You have got that completely back-to-front. All of a considerable body of scientific evidence points to consciousness being generated by the brain.

There is not one single piece of evidence that suggest this.

Don't forget Occam's razor.

The evidence suggests that as a general rule states of the brain correlate with states of consciousness.

And the simplest explanation for correlation is identity. The
next simples is causation. Don't forget Occam's razor.

The origins of consciousness are a complete mystery to neurophysiologists, academic philosophers etc.

Nonsense. You are getting consciousness confused
with the Hard Problem. There is an easy problem too!

You are also "passing easily" from suppositions of irreducability
made by others to your favoured hypothesis that consciousness
is not in the head at all.

If you read some of the literature this would soon become apparent to you.

If you read the literature -- read it, don't just trawl through
it for out-of-context quotes to support your favoured dogma --
the converse will become apparent to you.

It is not secret, but widely acknowledged. This is the reason the problem of cosnciousness is aften refered to as the 'hard' problem.

Not there is a hard problem as opposed to an easy pronlem.

"The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
# the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
# the integration of information by a cognitive system;
# the reportability of mental states;
# the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
# the focus of attention;
# the deliberate control of behavior;
# the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

All of these phenomena are associated with the notion of consciousness. For example, one sometimes says that a mental state is conscious when it is verbally reportable, or when it is internally accessible. Sometimes a system is said to be conscious of some information when it has the ability to react on the basis of that information, or, more strongly, when it attends to that information, or when it can integrate that information and exploit it in the sophisticated control of behavior. We sometimes say that an action is conscious precisely when it is deliberate. Often, we say that an organism is conscious as another way of saying that it is awake.

There is no real issue about whether these phenomena can be explained scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms."

http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

It is not difficult to see how carefully you have been
studying the literature.

it is not the case that "many" physicists hold
mystical views about consciousness.

I quite agree. Mind you. Erwin Schrodinger, Eddington, Jeans and others held such a view. Their ideas have yet to be falsified.

Argument from ignorance.

Quote:
I am a phsyics graduate,
and I can state form experience tha tht e subject was never even
mentioned during my course.

That doesn't surprise me at all. This has been the way physicists have traditionally dealt with the problem.

Yep. Physics also deal with economic, botanical
and aesthetic problems the same way.

For the same reason.

They are not part of physics and never have been!!!!!!

But there is plenty of literature available for extra-curricular study.

Yes, I am familiar with Fritjof Capra, etc. I'm not impressed.

The paradoxes can be resolved with appropriate assumptions
Of course they can.

With the appropriate assumptions I can prove that the Earth is a perfect cube.

Appropriate assumptions means fewer assumptions.

It's pointless approaching the problem of time or consciousness, or any other problem come to that, armed with a set of unshakable assumptions.

Like the unshakable asumption that consiousness exists
outside the head ?

Or are you mischaracterising my use adherence to facts
as "assumptions" ?

An open mind and some disinterested reasoning is required. You might like to check out David Chalmers site, where there are a wide range of published papers on the topic available. I recomment Chalmers' 'Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness' as a starting point.

I have read it, along with most of
what he has written.

moving finger

Jul8-06, 11:24 PM

To arrive at any attempted understanding or explanation of the world, we must make assumptions.
That's an assumption.
Yes, it is. The need for assumptions is assumed within the assumption itself – how else could such an explanation be self-consistent?
The alternative would be to assume that we could understand the world without making any assumptions – but such a position would be incoherent and inconsistent – and I’m not aware of anyone having achieved an understanding without making any assumptions – are you?

Still, although I could disagree let's assume it is true.
Do feel free to disagree. I would be happy to discuss any explanatory ideas you might have which you believe do not involve any assumptions.

The aim then would be to make as few assuptions as possible, and only those that are absolutely necessary in order to proceed.
Agreed; but we might not agree on what we consider to be “absolutely necessary” – how does one decide which assumptions are “necessary” and which not?

How can a concept exist outside of a mind? You could argue that the referent of the concept refers exists outside the mind, but not the concept itself.
Why not? Why should concepts exist only within conscious minds?
I agree that “conscious understanding” of a concept requires consciousness. But a concept, like an explanation, is simply a relationship between particular sets of information.

But according to Dennett the phenomenal states are a consequence of correlated brain-states. This idea would be called into question if phenomenal states can occur in a different order from the brain-states with which they are supposed to be correlated, or so it seems to me.
Once again, not all brain-states are correlated with phenomenal states. Dennett’s ideas would only be “called into question” if all brain states were correlated with phenomenal states - see once again the outline explanation below. You seem to be assuming that the “brain-states with which the phenomenal states are supposed to be correlated” are in fact the A-series brain states rather than the B-series brain states – there need be no directly linear sequential correlation between the A-series and phenomenal states.

Here is one way it could happen (I am not suggesting this is a rigorous explanation, just a sketch of a possible explanation) : The subjectvely perceived temporal sequence (the phenomenal sequence of events) would effectively be a mental reconstruction based on (a set A of objectively observable) causal brain-states; that reconstruction would entail the creation of (a set B of objectively observable) additional brain states. The set B of brain-states would be temporally (sequentially) connected with the phenomenal temporal sequence, but the set A of brain-states need not be so temporally connected.
If the set B are observable brain-states then the set A is irrelevant. It is the relationship between B and the experienced sequence that is the issue. To explain any lack of correlation between these you'd have to posit a set C of brain-states. Next you'd have to posit a set D, and so on.
Not irrelevant at all. The set A is the causal (objective) set of states – this set of states is the initial (objective) set of states which in turn results in the B-set of states, and it is the B-set of states which is directly linearly correlated with the phenomenal sequence. There is not necessarily a directly linear temporal sequential correlation between the A-set and B-set.

Alternatively, suppose A is the set of all observable brain-states. In this case the temporal sequence of A and the experienced sequence should be strictly correlated. If not, then would it not follow that something is happening in experience that is not correlated to brain-states?
Once again, not all brain states are correlates of phenomenal consciousness. A subset of brain states A1 can be correlated with the objective timeline TO but not correlated with the subjective timeline TS. This subset A1 is causally related to, but not (temporally) linearly correlated with, another subset of brain-states A2, which in turn is directly related to and correlated with the subjective timeline TS.

In summary :
A1 and A2 are subsets of the complete set A of brain-states
TO is the objective timeline
TS is the subjective timeline (the subjective timeline of phenomenal states)
A1 is temporally (sequentially) correlated with TO
States in A1 are causally antecedent to states in A2 (A2 supervenes on A1)
A1 is not necessarily temporally (sequentially) correlated with A2
A2 is temporally (sequentially) correlated with TO
Thus, A1 is not necessarily temporally (sequentially) correlated either with TO or with phenomenal states

The feeling of the flow of time is a quale. It is a characeteristic of qualia that an "illusory" quale -- a hallucination of the colour red, for instance, -- is every bit as real as a real one.
Which does not necessarily entail objective reality – imho qualia are virtual entities which have no objective meaning except as component parts of the information processing within conscious experience.

1) showing that we misinterpret temporal sequence doesn't show there is no such thing (we misinterpret everything to some extent)...
I am not claiming that there is necessarily no such thing as an objective flow of time – I am claiming (a) that the inference of an objective flow from our subjective experience of a flow is an invalid inference and (b) that it is not necessary to postulate the existence of an objective flow of time in order to explain the subjective impression of time flow. In absence of any other way of inferring an objective flow of time (apart from the subjective experience) we thus have no valid inference to go on.

2) ..Libet's setup assumes that there is an objective sequence of events in the first place.
If there is no objective sequence, how can there be an objective flow?

Thus if time really does “flow” (and we are to believe that this flow is not an illusion), then all but one of the above timelines (since they reflect different sequences of events) must be an illusion. Which of the above timelines would one think represents the real “flow of time” – the objective timeline or one of the the experienced timelines? It obviously cannot be one of the experienced timelines (because we each experience different timelines, and none of us is in a privileged position of being able to claim to have direct access to the “absolute flow of time”), therefore (if any one timeline flows) it must be the objective timeline. But if this is the case, then it follows that we each sometimes perceive time as flowing in the opposite direction to the way it is objectively flowing! Thus, our subjective experience of the flow of time is indeed an illusion (whether the objective timeline really “flows” or not), and we thus cannot infer from our perceived or experienced flow of time that objective time is actually flowing at all.
You are confusing flow with sequence.
No confusion at all – I have not once referred to “sequence” in the above paragraph.
However, flow does indeed entail sequence. A flow is a sequential temporal progression. If you are perhaps claiming there is no objective sequence, it follows there also can be no objective flow.

But we can't explain where the subjective flow comes from if it isn't driven by objective flow. So it is Inexplicable Illusion.
But we can indeed explain where the subjective illusion of flow comes from – it comes from the psychological perception of the “arrow of time”. (and no, I am not confusing the “arrow” with the “flow” – see below).

Each subjective “instant” of experienced time contains information correlated with both antecedent and consequent “instants”. The background entropy gradient means that our inferences about antecedent “instants” are usually much more accurate than our inferences about consequent “instants” – this gives us the subjective “arrow of time”.

We need an analogy to see how this psychological “arrow of time” also encapsulates the subjective illusion of a “flow of time”. Allow me to use one.

Each conscious instant may be thought of as a “pigeon-hole” embedded within a long sequence of pigeon-holes. Each pigeon-hole thus contains all the information pertaining to one particular instant of conscious experience (including the memories of previous instants). We may (if we wish) arrange these pigeon-holes in the “correct” temporal sequence, since the “arrow” of time is identified with the entropic gradient. But this does not, at first sight, seem to generate any “flow” in time, and no particular instant is singled out as being “unique”. How then does the subjective experience of “flow” originate?

Imagine that we could “activate” any particular conscious instant by briefly shining a flashlight onto the relevant pigeon-hole. We may say that the flash of light on the pigeon-hole “causes” the conscious instant within that pigeon-hole to “be experienced”. Clearly, we could then activate a complete temporal sequence of conscious experience by shining our flashlight onto a sequence of pigeon-holes. If the pigeon-holes are in the correct temporal sequence, we (as external observers, within our own temporal frame) would then “see” the complete conscious experience being “replayed” as it were, in the correct temporal sequence, within our own temporal frame. What about the subjective temporal frame of the conscious experience itself? Clearly, by illuminating the pigeon-holes in the “correct” sequence, we have effectively aligned the subjective temporal sequence of the conscious experience with our own “observer” temporal sequence. But what would happen if we were to illuminate pigeon-holes, not in the “correct” temporal sequence, but in some random sequence?

The conscious experience within each pigeon-hole, within each instant of time, would be exactly the same as it was when we illuminated the pigeon-holes in the “correct” sequence. In other words, the subjective conscious experience within each instant is independent of the objective sequence of illumination of the pigeon-holes. The subjective consciously experienced instant in pigeon-hole 2341 is just the same, no matter whether the previously (in our objective timeframe) illuminated pigeon-hole was 2340 or 1654. We could objectively replay the pigeon-holes in any sequence, forward, random, reverse, and it would make no difference as far as the subjective conscious experience encapsulated within the instants in each pigeon-hole is concerned. Indeed, we could illuminate all of the pigeon-holes simultaneously (using a large floodlight instead of our small flashlight), and the subjective consciously experienced instants of time within each pigeon-hole would be just the same as if they had been illuminated individually in sequence. In other words – there need be no objective “flow of time” at all, since the subjective illusion of the “flow of time” is already encoded within the subjective “arrow of time” within each temporal instant.

One might ask “but why do I experience only one instant of time at a time, and why is it THIS particular instant of time?” Think about it. In fact, your conscious experience experiences EVERY instant of time at which your conscious experience exists. No particular instant is more special than any other, but at each and every one of those instants in time you could ask yourself the same question – “why am I experiencing this instant rather than any other?”. The question is meaningless – because by definition you do consciously experience every instant of time in which your consciousness exists, at that particular time.

OTOH , if flow is objective, that easily explains why there is subjective flow too. There is subjective flow because consciousness is rooted in the phsycal brain.
Because consciousness is located “in time” rather than outside of time is why we have the intuitive subjective feeling of the flow of time – interpreting this as a "real flow of time" is the “easy explanation”. But as we have seen, the inference of objective flow from subjective flow is invalid, and as we have seen above there is in fact no need to posit any flow at all in order to explain the subjective experience. What is the rational reason to posit something (an objective flow) which is not needed to explain any empirical data, especially when that something (the objective flow) is itself in need of further explanation (which is yet another problem)?

while there is a "choice", your prefered option is much less explanatory than mine.
On the contrary, my interpretation is complete whereas yours is not. Mine explains the subjective experience (illusion) of flow as a direct consequence of the psychological arrow of time, without requiring any objective “flow” at all, and without the need to postulate anything special about the subjective “now”. Your interpretation explains the subjective experience of flow at the cost of postulating something mysterious called the objective flow of time, for which you have no further explanation, and your interpretation presumably also entails something special and unique about “now” which also begs further explanation.

The problem of explaining the “feeling of the flow of time” is essentially similar to the problem of explaining the “feeling of free will” – the “easy and intuitive” explanation is that our feeling of free will is due to the objective existence of something called “free will” (but this “free will” seems itself to be beyond coherent explanation), whereas the rational explanation is that our feeling of free will is an illusion, caused simply by our lack of detailed knowledge about our own internal decision-making processes.

Best Regards

Canute

Jul9-06, 05:12 AM

Tournesol

We'd better agree to differ. You seem to have access to information that the rest of us do not.

Regards
Canute

Canute

Jul9-06, 06:07 AM

Yes, it is. The need for assumptions is assumed within the assumption itself
That seems true.

The alternative would be to assume that we could understand the world without making any assumptions – but such a position would be incoherent and inconsistent – and I’m not aware of anyone having achieved an understanding without making any assumptions – are you?
I'm suggesting making no assumptions, not even the assumption that the world can be understood without making assumptions. In other words, I'm arguing for empiricism. Of course, we need to make assumptions when we are theorising, but most of these can be eliminated later.

If I was theorising from scratch I'd start with the unfalsifiability of solipsism. It is not clear to me this is an assumption. I see it as a known fact, but I suppose it could be viewed as an assumption. Similarly I wouldn't call 'cogito' an assumption, although this would propbably depend on how it is interpreted.

I suppose what I mean is not so much that we should not make any assumption when we set out to explain the world, but rather that as we progress we should quickly eliminate them. If our final theory contains an assumption then clearly we do not understand the world.

For an explanation not based on assumptions see Lao Tsu, Nagarjuna, Brown and others who share their view. In this view an 'explanation of everything' can be known to contain no assumptions. In other words, my view is that knowledge is possible, not just theories.

More clearly, I'd say it is possible to understand the world and know this is a correct understanding, as contrasted with an understanding of what follows logically from some set of assumptions. Thus, understanding and explanations (theories etc) are not the same thing.

Agreed; but we might not agree on what we consider to be “absolutely necessary” – how does one decide which assumptions are “necessary” and which not?
I don't know. I have a feeling we might agree if we discussed it.

Why not? Why should concepts exist only within conscious minds?
I agree that “conscious understanding” of a concept requires consciousness. But a concept, like an explanation, is simply a relationship between particular sets of information.
For 'concept' my dictionary gives - an idea, a theoretical construct, a directly intuited object of thought, a act of imagination. A mind is required in each case. Think of the the word 'conceptual'. How can something be conceptual except in someone's mind?

Once again, not all brain-states are correlated with phenomenal states. Dennett’s ideas would only be “called into question” if all brain states were correlated with phenomenal states - see once again the outline explanation below.
As I said, I agree that not all brain correlate with phenomenal states. For example, the brain-state of a dead person does not.

You seem to be assuming that the “brain-states with which the phenomenal states are supposed to be correlated” are in fact the A-series brain states rather than the B-series brain states – there need be no directly linear sequential correlation between the A-series and phenomenal states.
That was my point. We can always posit a B-series between the A-series and phenomenal states. If there is still a lack of correlation we can posit a C-series. If this doesn't work we can posit a D-series and so on ad infintum.

The set A is the causal (objective) set of states – this set of states is the initial (objective) set of states which in turn results in the B-set of states, and it is the B-set of states which is directly linearly correlated with the phenomenal sequence. There is not necessarily a directly linear temporal sequential correlation between the A-set and B-set.
I still don't see how this solves the problem. If we can observe the B-states then we can forget about the A-states and examine the relationship between the B-states and p-consciousness. If these do not correllate we can just posit C-states and so on. Thus any lack of correllation between a brain-state and p-conciousness can be explained by positing an intervening brain-state. If one accepts this argument then it becomes impossible to show a lack of correlation between brain an p-consciousness even if there is one. The problem you're up against here is that nobody can show which brain-states (A,B,C,D,E...) immediately preceed the conscious experience. If a researcher finds a lack of correlation then he/she can just posit an intervening state to solve the problem.

On your point about 'instants' of time or conscious experience note that to many people the idea of an 'instant' is incoherent. Physicist Peter Lynds argues this in couple of recent papers. I don't think this affects your argument, but it adds a complication. (They're available on the Cern site)

The problem of explaining the “feeling of the flow of time” is essentially similar to the problem of explaining the “feeling of free will” – the “easy and intuitive” explanation is that our feeling of free will is due to the objective existence of something called “free will” (but this “free will” seems itself to be beyond coherent explanation), whereas the rational explanation is that our feeling of free will is an illusion, caused simply by our lack of detailed knowledge about our own internal decision-making processes.
Good point. It does not follow that freewill is an illusion, but it does follow that it is a tricky topic. Some commentators have taken Libet's results as showing that freewill consists in our freedom to choose not to act. This is quite similar to the esoteric view of freewill.

Cheers
Canute

moving finger

Jul9-06, 11:52 PM

If I was theorising from scratch I'd start with the unfalsifiability of solipsism. It is not clear to me this is an assumption. I see it as a known fact, but I suppose it could be viewed as an assumption. Similarly I wouldn't call 'cogito' an assumption, although this would propbably depend on how it is interpreted.
I don’t understand what you are saying here. Are you saying that the “truth of solipsism” is a known fact? I disagree. I do not believe in the solipsist account of reality – I believe it is false. To me, solipsism involves a false assumption (viz that solipsism is true).

Solipsism maintains that the individual self of the solipsistic philosopher is the whole of reality and that the external world and other persons are representations of that self having no independent existence.

Can you show that the above is true, without making any assumptions (as opposed to assume it is true)?

I suppose what I mean is not so much that we should not make any assumption when we set out to explain the world, but rather that as we progress we should quickly eliminate them. If our final theory contains an assumption then clearly we do not understand the world.
Good luck. Let me know when you have eliminated all assumptions.

For an explanation not based on assumptions see Lao Tsu, Nagarjuna, Brown and others who share their view. In this view an 'explanation of everything' can be known to contain no assumptions. In other words, my view is that knowledge is possible, not just theories.
The Tao Te Ching makes lots of assumptions about the world – most of the text is one series of assumptions. I am not saying these assumptions are necessarily false – I am saying that they are assumptions.

Example :

The [Tao] that can be told of is not an Unvarying [Tao];
The names that can be named are not unvarying names.
It was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang;
The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand creatures,
Each after its kind.

This is nothing more than a series of premises (assumptions). You may claim that they are true propositions, you may claim that they represent knowledge rather than assumptions, but I would then ask on what basis do you claim they represent knowledge? Can you show that they represent knowledge, or are you just assuming that they represent knowledge?

More clearly, I'd say it is possible to understand the world and know this is a correct understanding, as contrasted with an understanding of what follows logically from some set of assumptions.
You may believe such a thing is possible – but can you show that it is possible?

Agreed; but we might not agree on what we consider to be “absolutely necessary” – how does one decide which assumptions are “necessary” and which not?
I don't know. I have a feeling we might agree if we discussed it.
According to you, it seems that no assumptions are “absolutely necessary”. Can you show this to be the case?

For 'concept' my dictionary gives - an idea, a theoretical construct, a directly intuited object of thought, a act of imagination. A mind is required in each case. Think of the the word 'conceptual'. How can something be conceptual except in someone's mind?
Dictionary definitions often come up in philosophical discussion. The everyday dictionary definition of a word reflects the usage of that word in everyday language, and in common usage most people use the word “concept” in the context of mental concept – but it does not follow from this that this is the only meaning of concept. Look deeper, and you will find that there are other definitions of concept which do not entail mentality : I can find dictionary definitions of concept such as “a scheme, a plan”, “an abstract or general idea inferred or derived from specific instances” (and before you start claiming that an “idea” entails mentality – idea is also defined as “a plan, scheme or method”).

I still don't see how this solves the problem. If we can observe the B-states then we can forget about the A-states and examine the relationship between the B-states and p-consciousness.
You misunderstand. I am saying that the B-series DOES correlate with the phenomenal (subjective) timeline. But the A-series does not. And it is the A-series which is correlated with the objective timeline. Hence the fact that we might observe a series of brain-states which is not correlated with the subjective timeline is of no consequnece (and is not at odds with Dennett’s view of consciousness).

On your point about 'instants' of time or conscious experience note that to many people the idea of an 'instant' is incoherent. Physicist Peter Lynds argues this in couple of recent papers. I don't think this affects your argument, but it adds a complication. (They're available on the Cern site)
Indeed, our conscious experience may require a series of “instants” in order to be a conscious experience – but the same argument would apply (we would just be illuminating a finite number of pigeon-holes with each flashlight burst, instead of a single pigeon-hole). Each of the instants in this series of instants contains an inbuilt arrow of time, and it is this arrow which gives rise to the subjective illusion of the flow of time.

Best Regards

Canute

Jul10-06, 07:21 AM

moving finger

I've confused the issues here and taken us off topic. Sorry about that. I'll work this back to time and if we don't agree about the other stuff it probably doesn't matter in this context.

What I was saying about solipsism is that it is unfalsifiable. It seems to me this may not be an assumption. What do you think? Is it an assumption? If you agree that it is unfalsifiable then are you assuming this or do you know it? To be honest I'm not sure. It may depend on how we look at it. Either way I certainly cannot show that it is unfalsifiable. I can't even show that there is anyone I could show it to.

Good luck. Let me know when you have eliminated all assumptions.
Are you suggesting that it's impossible to know anything without making an assumption? I don't think this is true.

The Tao Te Ching makes lots of assumptions about the world
Unless you know this is true you're making an assumption. Adherents of Lao Tsu say that he knew what he was talking about.

This is nothing more than a series of premises (assumptions). You may claim that they are true propositions, you may claim that they represent knowledge rather than assumptions, but I would then ask on what basis do you claim they represent knowledge? Can you show that they represent knowledge, or are you just assuming that they represent knowledge?
I cannot show that they represent knowledge, although I'd like to think I could make a reasonably good case. You're right to say that to some extent I'm asssuming they represent knowledge, but I'd rather say that I conclude that they do. I certainly can't claim to know that the words you quoted are true, but I would claim that it is possible to know that they are true, and this would follow from Lao Tsu's words.

You may believe such a thing is possible – but can you show that it is possible?
It is never possible to demonstrate that one knows something. This is the source of some of our problems here. (Btw I'm half agreeing with you on most of your points, but I just think there's a bit more to this issue than you're acknowledging).

According to you, it seems that no assumptions are “absolutely necessary”. Can you show this to be the case?
This is not quite what I'm suggesting. I've been unclear as usual. I'm suggesting that a theory based on an assumption is not knowledge. I'm suggesting that although we may make assumptions in order to explore their implications, whether they hold up against the evidence, whether they result in a reductio, or as scaffolding for a theory etc., sooner or later we have to get rid of these assumptions, otherwise our theory will be a guess. More mathematically, I'm suggecting that for a theory to become knowledge it has to be axiomatised.

Look deeper, and you will find that there are other definitions of concept which do not entail mentality : I can find dictionary definitions of concept such as “a scheme, a plan”, “an abstract or general idea inferred or derived from specific instances” (and before you start claiming that an “idea” entails mentality – idea is also defined as “a plan, scheme or method”).
But surely the whole point of a concept, used in this sense, is that the concept in question is the product of a mind. For example, manufacturers sometimes build concept cars, and these are physical objects. But the word concept means that someone has conceived of this car. Ditto for plan, scheme etc. These are concepts made real, and a real map, a real scheme ect. is not a concept. It originates as a concept. A concept has to be conceived to be a concept, and if it hasn't been conceived it is not a concept. That's how I see it anyway.

You misunderstand. I am saying that the B-series DOES correlate with the phenomenal (subjective) timeline. But the A-series does not. And it is the A-series which is correlated with the objective timeline. Hence the fact that we might observe a series of brain-states which is not correlated with the subjective timeline is of no consequnece (and is not at odds with Dennett’s view of consciousness).
You may be missing my point on this one. Suppose the B-series does not correlate. Then we could posit a C-series that does correlate. I'm suggesting that this allows us to deny any lack of correlation under all circumstances, which is dodgy tactics to me.

However, on reflection I see that to show a lack of correlation would be just as difficult to show as a correlation, since it would be impossible to show that there is not an intervening brain-state between a phenomenal state and a physical state. It seems that until we can pinpoint the final brain-state that gives rise to the p-state, if there is such a thing, then all bets are off. (Btw, I'm not arguing that there is a lack of correlation between brain and mind).

Indeed, our conscious experience may require a series of “instants” in order to be a conscious experience –
This is the idea I was questionning. To many people an 'instant' seems an incoherent idea in the same way that the idea of an infinitessimal point seems incoherent. Both are useful and apparently reasonable ideas in everyday life, and in mathematics etc, but when we start applying a bit of philosophical analysis problems arise. All the objections to the idea of infinitessimal points as real things apply to instants of time.

Take our idea of change. No change can take place in the future, no change can take place in the past. In this case, change takes place in the present instant. But, as Brian Greene puts it, applying the concept of change to an instant makes as much sense as subjecting a rock to psychoanalysis. There is a real paradox here, one that calls into question the reality of time, change etc.

regards
Canute

Drachir

Jul10-06, 10:12 AM

Canute in #23 wrote:I strongly disagree here. You assume things of the mind are less real than something else called 'reality'. I doubt if you can justify this assumption, or even that you can show these are two different things.I will try to dispel your doubt. Let us first tackle reality. The notion of reality and its attendant questions arise because we have the physiological capacity to be aware of, and to differentiate between things of the mind and things external to the mind. That capacity is called consciousness. When we are conscious we are aware of two distinct kinds of information: that presented by our sense organs and that presented by our sub-conscious. Sense information is essential for the survival of even the simplest animals. Simple animals have their ‘value codes’ ‘pre-wired.’ They cannot change their values.

Because one of the primary values for any organism is self-survival, animals that have the ability to change their value codes require the ability to monitor the processes used to make those changes. Self-consciousness is the mental function that provides that monitor. Self-consciousness is a self-referential reentrant mental function. One can be aware of ones thoughts, and can at the same time be aware of that awareness. One can even be aware of the awareness of the awareness.

Because of self-consciousness one can direct ones thought to ones own purposes. When one chooses to think of a man with thirty arms and hands, one does know the difference between having an idea of such a creature and seeing one. One definition of reality is ‘that which exists independently of ideas concerning it.’ A more terse definition is ‘reality is objective existence’. Our primary connection with reality is through the senses.

Although we can smell a distant fire or see the light of faint, very distant stars, we cannot sense the thoughts of other people, not even of those closest to us. Consequently, it was long thought that mind was not a part of the reality presented to us by the senses. That was the source of the mind-body dichotomy idea. Contemporary neurology has demolished the mind-body dichotomy by enabling us to sense specific parts of the brain that are active during specific mental activities. We should no longer think it impossible that a single thought might be externally sensed and identified.

But, there are two aspects to a thought: the neurological processes enabling the thought and the content of the thought. The processes are a part of reality. The content may or may not correspond with reality. As an extreme example, if the content is a self-contradiction it cannot represent anything real. Reality harbors no self-contradictions. Therefore, since the contents of thoughts are not intrinsically real, and since those contents are things of the mind, we should at least conclude that some “things of the mind are less real that something else called ‘reality’”, and even conclude that some things of the mind are unreal. Because thought contents can be unreal, and since reality cannot include the unreal, thought contents and reality are two different things.

Canute continuing in #23 wrote: It is a widely-held view that we are wholly deceived by psychophysical phenomena if we consider them as inherently existent thus 'real'. Clearly they cannot be inherently existent if time is not, since they time-based phenomena. I think you have to bite the bullet. If time is not real then neither are psychophysical phenomena. This view is not scientifically contentious, as far as I know, and Erwin Schrodinger argued for it for the last forty years of life. Widely held views have often been abandoned when their errors have been discovered. Time is not fundamental to psychophysical phenomena, but motion is. Without the motion of synaptic chemical mediators and without the motion of electric charge there could be no psychophysical phenomena. Those phenomena are not time-based, they are motion-based. Although time is a very useful abstraction, it is, nonetheless, an abstraction from the motions of things and does not have objective existence. Psychophysical phenomena are inherently existent because things and their motions are inherently existent. I’ll skip the bullet for now. Time is not real but psychophysical phenomena are.

Canute in #23 also wrote:The problem is trying to disentagle 'deception' and 'reality'. Schrodinger, for example, considered psychophysical phenomena (thus time, change etc.) to be deceptions, and 'reality' to be a different kind of phenomenon entirely.Our experiences with reality are psychophysical. Reality does not deceive us. Our senses do not deceive us. If our eyes receive the light of the moon we are not led to perceive that we taste salt, and vice versa. However, when we form concepts from our percepts, or form general concepts from specific concepts, we can err and so deceive ourselves. The greater the number of conceptual levels between a concept and its underlying percept(s), the more difficult it is to discover inadvertent, obscured errors.

We know only too well that our thought processes are not infallible. If we are deceived about reality, the deception is of our own making, a self-deception. I hope I have helped to disentagle ‘deception’ and ‘reality.’

moving finger in #24 wrote:Quote:
Originally Posted by Drachir
An illusion is something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality. Barring neurological disorders, our minds do not deceive us.Are you normally aware of your blind spot? No, one normally has to work hard to reveal the presence of the blind spot. Why? Because the mind has evolved to ignore the fact that information is missing from the blind spot, hence the fact that information is missing is not mentally flagged as a problem. It’s a classic illusion. There are many, many such illusions if one looks carefully enough.

Our minds have evolved to provide competitive advantage, they have not necessarily evolved to provide an accurate picture of reality (except insofar as that picture provides a competitive advantage).If the mind did not process that information to remove the blind spot and we always saw the missing information, say as a tiny dark spot in the middle of our view, what reality would that dark spot represent? It would represent the reality of the sensor, not of the thing(s) being sensed. Partial or complete color blindness is a form of incomplete information but does produce an illusion. The fact that our eyes respond to only a narrow region of the electromagnetic spectrum that excludes IR and UV, for example, does not make our perceptions of the visible spectrum false or deceptive. Incomplete information about reality is not the same thing as illusion or deception. The bullfrog has a blind spot in front of its nostrils, but its brain is not powerful enough to eliminate the blind spot from its perception. Therefore, in order to see prey it must turn its head slightly to one side. Now, if our eyes and mind would make us perceive a cobra as a kitten, that would be a deadly deception.

Moving Finger in #24 also wrote:Quote:
Originally Posted by Drachir

We know the difference between things of reality and things of the mind. Our memories of our past experiences with reality are not deceptive. The past is not illusory.There are countless documented cases of people having false or deceptive memories of past events, and Libet’s experiments confirm just one small aspect of this – the fact that we deliberately reconstruct conscious timelines. I can’t believe that we consciously falsify our memories. Why would we? Other that that I know exactly what you mean. I experience it often. Yesterday I couldn’t find my eyeglasses. I was absolutely certain that the last time I used them was at the breakfast table. When I found them they were on my night table, meaning that they never even made it to the breakfast table. I do not think that new memories based on sensory information are false or deceptive. However, if a memory was never made or is not retrieved when needed, the inventive subconscious will sometimes substitute a. similar suitable memory. I view false, deceptive, and lost memories as equipment failures. The occurrence of occasional equipment failures is no reason to discard information obtained in the absence of such failures. If Libet could think that a countdown to ignition occurs after liftoff, I would advise Libet not to apply for a job with NASA.

Tournesol wrote in #31:Originally Posted by Drachir

Time is an abstraction we make from the motion of things.This is a physics newsgroup, and in physics, motion is based on time, ntot he other way round.When I studied undergraduate physics we did some experiments using a linear kymograph. That instrument consisted of two things: a long strip of paper to be pulled by a moving object and a pen or pencil at the end of a swinging pendulum to leave a trace on the strip of paper. If the trace was a straight line along the center of the strip, the pendulum was not moving. If the trace was a straight line, transverse to the length of the strip, the object was not moving. If the trace was a uniform sine curve, the object’s motion was uniform. If the lengths between the graph cycles increased the object’s motion accelerated. If the lengths decreased, the object’s motion decelerated. That experiment was a comparison of two motions: the motion of the moving object and the motion of the pendulum. If the motion of the pendulum was compared to that of the escapement of a stopwatch, the pendulum period could be expressed in the same units as that of the stopwatch.

When Galileo discovered the pendulum law he compared the motion of a swinging chandelier to the beating (motion) of his heart. Today the U.S. standard second of time is given by NIST-F1, the cesium fountain atomic clock. The uncertainty of NIST-F1 is so low that it would not gain or lose a second in more than sixty million years. NIST-F1 measures the natural resonance frequency of cesium atoms. In order for any kind of resonance to occur something must move. Motion is fundamental, but time is not.

Tournesol also wrote in #31 first quoting me:Since there is no such thing as time itself, it is meaningless to consider time to have physical existence.Your grounds for saying that there is no such thing
as "time itself" are that it doesn't exist separately
from specific instances. But you could say the same
about charge or mass, or anything else in physics
But we do grant them physical existence because
they have specific instances.My ground for saying that there is no such thing as time itself is not that it doesn’t exist separately from specific instances. My grounds are 1) that we cannot even conceive of time without invoking a conception of something moving, and 2) that our notion of time is an abstraction from the motions of things. When we measure time we are comparing one motion with another. Motion can be sensed with several of our senses. Time cannot be sensed at all. At most all we can do is produce clocks that count 86,400 seconds in a day. There is nothing universal about a 24 hour day, a 60 minute hour, or a 60 second minute. If I remember correctly, those choices were made in ancient Mesopotamia.

Charge and mass are not abstractions from reality. They are known to exist because they can be sensed. Charge can be sensed and even measured by the force it produces, as in a gold foil electrometer. Charge was conceived of in ancient times when amber was rubbed and found to attract bits of lint. The Greek word for amber is ‘electron.’ Franklin discovered that an electrostatic charge and lightning were the same thing. The charge of the electron was measured by Townsend, J. J. Thompson, and Millikan before the mass of the electron was known. J. J. Thompson subsequently devised a way to determine the ratio of charge to mass of the electron, and hence could calculate the mass of an electron. (As an undergraduate I had the pleasure of performing Millikan’s oil-drop experiment to determine e and J. J. Thompson’s CRT experiment to determine e/m.)

We now know that a charge can have either of two polarities. Polarity is an abstraction we make from the charges or magnetism of things. Although we can say that the negative polarity of the electron and positive polarity of the proton exist, we cannot say that polarity itself exists.

Tournesol also wrote in #31, quoting me first:Quote:
The notion of time running backwards implies that all motions would be reversed and that all history would retrace its steps backward. It’s not possible. There are too many things that prohibit the reversal of time. Water can’t change its direction through a check valve. Electrons cannot change their direction through a diode or transistor.
If you reverse all the laws of physics ,
you reverse all the laws of physics. The problems
you mention will "cancel through". Did you mean to say that if you reverse time you reverse all the laws of physics?

What change to which laws(s) of physics would allow water to flow backwards through a check valve?

You err if you equate a reversal of time with a reversal of all the laws of physics. Some essential things in physics, such as the resolution of forces, are time invariant. The general gas law pV=MRT is time invariant. Even if the motions of molecules of gas in a container were to be reversed, that law would be unaltered. Notice, also, that Newton’s first law of motion law implies that the status of a body at rest with no unbalanced force acting on it is time invariant.

Here is Newton’s first law in modern language:A body at rest remains at rest, and a body in motion continues to move at a constant speed along a straight line, unless the body is acted upon in either case by an unbalanced force.

Here is Newton’s second law:An unbalanced force acting on a body causes the body to accelerate in the direction of the force, and the acceleration is directly proportional to the unbalanced force and inversely proportional to the mass of the body.

What reversals of Newton’s first two laws would “cancel through” the effects of a reversal of time? More importantly, what would Newton’s first and second laws look like if the physics were reversed?

Tournesol, thanks for pointing out the error in my description of the effect of time running backward on the spinning earth. Let me try anew. Newton’s apple fell from the tree and hit the ground. If time had then reversed, the apple would have risen up to the tree. The only way to explain that would be that gravity had become a repulsive force (reversing a law of nature). However, if gravity became repulsive, all parts of the earth would be repelled from each other, and the earth would begin to expand. But that would not correspond to a reversal of time and a playback of history since the earth had not been contracting when the apple fell. In this last example a reversal of time requires the reversal of a physical law that contradicts the reversal of time. Can you give us an example of a reversal of time and a reversal of laws of physics that could result in a playback of history without contradiction?

Canute

Jul10-06, 12:35 PM

Canute... The notion of reality and its attendant questions arise because we have the physiological capacity to be aware of, and to differentiate between things of the mind and things external to the mind.
I agree that we have the ability to make this distinction. I do not agree that this entails the distinction is ontologically meaningful.

When we are conscious we are aware of two distinct kinds of information: that presented by our sense organs and that presented by our sub-conscious.
I feel it's easier to lump these together as physical and mental (or psychophysical) phenomena. In other words, all the things that the unfalsifiability of solipsim prevents us from establishing as existent.

Simple animals have their ‘value codes’ ‘pre-wired.’ They cannot change their values.
I didn't know that. I assumed that the brains of other animals were as plastic as ours are. Are you sure you're not just assuming this?

Because one of the primary values for any organism is self-survival, animals that have the ability to change their value codes require the ability to monitor the processes used to make those changes.
Not in the game of 'LIFE' (well known computer simulation of the evolution of species), where the survival and evolution of entities takes place with no self-monitoring. Although now I come to think of it there is a kind of self-monitoring. I'll have to think this one through. It's an interesting question.

Self-consciousness is the mental function that provides that monitor. Self-consciousness is a self-referential reentrant mental function. One can be aware of ones thoughts, and can at the same time be aware of that awareness. One can even be aware of the awareness of the awareness.
There is a view that self-consciousness is not the same as consciousness. This is because these words can be defined in different ways. For example, Dennett argues that the self is a delusion (although he fails to make clear who is being deluded) and this would be my view also. Therefore 'self-consciousness' is an ambiguous phrase. For a start, it implies two separate entities. Calling it 're-entrant' doesn't really solve this paradox of self-reference.

One definition of reality is ‘that which exists independently of ideas concerning it.’ A more terse definition is ‘reality is objective existence’.
I'm fine with that, it's just a definition. However, it is a confusing one. It is how many people, for example the philosopher Francis Bradley, would define 'Appearances' as directly contrasted with 'Reality'.

Our primary connection with reality is through the senses.
It is easy to conclude this but it is not true. We have no idea whether anything exists apart from our consciousness, so to say that we know of reality primarily through our senses makes a mockery of the word' reality'. I don't think many philosophers argue that our senses put us in touch with reality and many physicists argue that they do not. I'd say the unfalsifiability of solipsism proves that they do not, but I'm not sure that argument is watertight.

Although we can smell a distant fire or see the light of faint, very distant stars, we cannot sense the thoughts of other people, not even of those closest to us. Consequently, it was long thought that mind was not a part of the reality presented to us by the senses. That was the source of the mind-body dichotomy idea. Contemporary neurology has demolished the mind-body dichotomy by enabling us to sense specific parts of the brain that are active during specific mental activities. We should no longer think it impossible that a single thought might be externally sensed and identified.
Unfortunately contemporary neuroscience has so far failed miserably to solve the mind-body problem. Some think it will succeed in the future, but it has not succeeded yet. The source of the mind-body dichotomy is the mind-body dichotomy, and when it is demolished scientifically someone will win great fame and fortune. It will be front page news across the globe.

As you say, it's not possible to know that a physical or mental phenomena exists unless one is conscious. As a result, it is not possible to know that physical and mental phenomena are real. This is not just my opinion. You can easily and quickly establish the unfalsifiability of solipsism for yourself. This doesn't mean we all have to agree that psychophysical phenomena are in some sense not real, and clearly we don't all agree, but it does mean there is no means of falsifying a theory in which they are not really real (unless it can be shown false for other reasons). Thus, there are theories in which what you call 'reality' does not really exist. The second-century philosopher Nagarjuna wrote a very famous proof of the unreality of mental and corporeal phenomena, Not everyone thinks it is successful, but many people do. At least there's no evidence yet that forces us to the opposite conclusion.

Time is not fundamental to psychophysical phenomena, but motion is.
This is similar to what the Buddha said about all this, which might surprise you. However, there is something a little paradoxical about the idea that motion can exist before time exists. Wouldn't they have to come into existence at the same, er, time? In this case they would have to be a) equally fundamental, or b) equally non-fundamental and arise from a common source.

Our senses do not deceive us.
Descartes ran into all sorts of trouble over this one. If I remember right he concluded that we can trust that God is benign and therefore assume that He wouldn't give us senses that deceive us. I don't find this argument very convincing. Have you considered that the plot of the film 'Matrix' would be utterly ridiculous if anybody had ever shown that your statement is true? All this stuff is very confusing and it's incredibly easy to mistake an assumption for a fact.

regards
Canute

Drachir

Jul10-06, 12:47 PM

Thanks for your comments, Canute.
I will need some time to study them.

best wishes
Drachir

moving finger

Jul12-06, 04:04 AM

What I was saying about solipsism is that it is unfalsifiable. It seems to me this may not be an assumption. What do you think? Is it an assumption? If you agree that it is unfalsifiable then are you assuming this or do you know it? To be honest I'm not sure. It may depend on how we look at it. Either way I certainly cannot show that it is unfalsifiable. I can't even show that there is anyone I could show it to.
Solipsism as a belief may indeed be an unfalsifiable belief – but this is not the issue here. The issue is whether we can explain anything about the world, or understand anything about the world, or know anything about the world, without making assumptions. Are you suggesting that solipsism is an explanation of the world, or that solipsism allows us an understanding of the world, or that we can know anything about the world via solipsism? If yes, then you are simply assuming solipsism is true.

Are you suggesting that it's impossible to know anything without making an assumption? I don't think this is true.
I do. Can you provide any example of an explanation, or understanding, or knowledge, of the world which makes no assumptions?

The Tao Te Ching makes lots of assumptions about the world
Unless you know this is true you're making an assumption.
That’s OK – I’m the one who is saying knowledge of the world entails assumptions, thus I am being entirely consistent, aren’t I?

Adherents of Lao Tsu say that he knew what he was talking about.
He may have known what he was talking about (I do not say he did not) – but how did he know that he knew, and how do we know that he knew?

I cannot show that they represent knowledge, although I'd like to think I could make a reasonably good case. You're right to say that to some extent I'm asssuming they represent knowledge, but I'd rather say that I conclude that they do.
How do you arrive at this conclusion? Can you provide a rational or logical argument which shows how you arrive at this conclusion?

I certainly can't claim to know that the words you quoted are true, but I would claim that it is possible to know that they are true, and this would follow from Lao Tsu's words.
Whether “the words are true” or not is one thing, whether the propositions formed by the words represent true propositions about the world is another. How is it possible to know that these propositions are true?

It is never possible to demonstrate that one knows something. This is the source of some of our problems here. (Btw I'm half agreeing with you on most of your points, but I just think there's a bit more to this issue than you're acknowledging).
If it is never possible to demonstrate that one knows something, then we must simply assume that you know it, yes?

Knowledge is justified true belief. If one cannot justify one’s beliefs, with a coherent and rational argument which shows why one believes what one believes, then the belief is hardly justified is it? Even if the belief is justified, for “I believe that X is true” to be transformed into “I know that X is true” also entails that “X is true”. How would you propose to demonstrate the truth of the things you believe you know?

I'm suggesting that a theory based on an assumption is not knowledge.
This is not strictly true. How do you define “knowledge”? The conventional definition is justified true belief. If I justifiably believe that X, and X is true, then it follows I know that X.

I'm suggesting that although we may make assumptions in order to explore their implications, whether they hold up against the evidence, whether they result in a reductio, or as scaffolding for a theory etc., sooner or later we have to get rid of these assumptions, otherwise our theory will be a guess. More mathematically, I'm suggecting that for a theory to become knowledge it has to be axiomatised.
An axiom is a mathematical name for an assumption (otherwise known as a premise in logic). But you are saying above that a theory based on assumptions (axioms) cannot be knowledge…..?

But surely the whole point of a concept, used in this sense, is that the concept in question is the product of a mind. For example, manufacturers sometimes build concept cars, and these are physical objects. But the word concept means that someone has conceived of this car. Ditto for plan, scheme etc. These are concepts made real, and a real map, a real scheme ect. is not a concept. It originates as a concept. A concept has to be conceived to be a concept, and if it hasn't been conceived it is not a concept. That's how I see it anyway.
I understand that is how you see it – as I said before, most people associate concepts with consciously formed concepts – but this is simply anthropocentrism in action. A “concept car” could be designed by a machine which has no conscious mind.

You may be missing my point on this one. Suppose the B-series does not correlate. Then we could posit a C-series that does correlate. I'm suggesting that this allows us to deny any lack of correlation under all circumstances, which is dodgy tactics to me.
You are also missing the point. I am not the one saying that we need deny lack of correlation. YOU are the one who originally said that the objective brain-states would not be correlated with the subjective phenomenal states (and questioned the coherency of Dennett’s explanations if this were the case) – and I am simply saying that not all brain-states need be correlated with phenomenal states even if Dennett is right – hence your objection to Dennett’s explanations are not relevant.

Indeed, our conscious experience may require a series of “instants” in order to be a conscious experience –
This is the idea I was questionning. To many people an 'instant' seems an incoherent idea in the same way that the idea of an infinitessimal point seems incoherent.
Perhaps so – but all the evidence of quantum mechanics suggests that the physical world is granular and not continuous. A granular world does not necessarily imply infinitesimal points in space or infinitesimal points in time – it may be that both space and time are quantised.

Take our idea of change. No change can take place in the future, no change can take place in the past. In this case, change takes place in the present instant.
No change “takes place within any one instant”. In a quantised world, change is measured between instants.

But, as Brian Greene puts it, applying the concept of change to an instant makes as much sense as subjecting a rock to psychoanalysis. There is a real paradox here, one that calls into question the reality of time, change etc.
No paradox, as long as we view each instant of space and time in a quantum framework, rather than in a continuous framework. There is no change “within” a quantum of space or time, but there are differences between (changes between) these quanta.

If the mind did not process that information to remove the blind spot and we always saw the missing information, say as a tiny dark spot in the middle of our view, what reality would that dark spot represent? It would represent the reality of the sensor, not of the thing(s) being sensed.
The only “reality” you have direct access to is the reality (data) from your sensors – your mind makes non-conscious adjustments to these data in order to present a “picture” to the conscious mind which is more useful (from a competitive point of view) than the raw data from the sensors. Your non-conscious mind therefore chooses to ignore the blind spot, the fact that it is there is concealed from your conscious mind. You may choose to not call this an illusion, but what your mind is doing is just the same as if it was creating an illusion for you – it is creating the illusion that your field of view is complete, with no blind spot.

I can’t believe that we consciously falsify our memories.
I did not say that we consciously falsify memories – I said we deliberately reconstruct conscious timelines – that deliberate reconstruction need not be a consciously controlled reconstruction. In the same way that our brain deliberately reconstructs the visual field of view to eliminate the blind spot – this is not a conscious reconstruction (which is why we are not normally aware of the reconstruction), but it is deliberately carried out by the mind.

Best Regards

Canute

Jul12-06, 07:01 AM

Solipsism as a belief may indeed be an unfalsifiable belief – but this is not the issue here. The issue is whether we can explain anything about the world, or understand anything about the world, or know anything about the world, without making assumptions. Are you suggesting that solipsism is an explanation of the world, or that solipsism allows us an understanding of the world, or that we can know anything about the world via solipsism? If yes, then you are simply assuming solipsism is true.
I am assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable (if this is an assumption). I'm also assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable for a reason. In my view an explanation of the world that does not explain its unfalsifiability is either not fundamental or not correct. Moreover, an explanation of the world predicated on its truth or falsity would be a metaphysical theory not a scientific one. This is because according to Popper a scientific theory should be falsifiable. If a theory assumes solipsism is false then in this respect the theory is unfalsifiable.

I do. Can you provide any example of an explanation, or understanding, or knowledge, of the world which makes no assumptions?
I can't give a straight yes or no answer to this one. I'm still trying to figure out whether 'solipsism is unfalsifiable' is an assumption or knowledge. However, clearly knowledge of the world cannot be based on an assumption for then it would not be knowledge.

It seems to me that either we can know things without making assumptions or we cannot know anything. When you feel pain do you assume you are feeling it or do you know you are? If you know you are then you can know things without making assumptions.

If an explanation or theory is to make no assumptions then it cannot begin by assuming that solipsism is true or false. The only explanation of everything I know of in which solipsism is not assumed to be true or false is the 'nondual' doctrine of Buddhism, Taoism etc. I'd say this explanation is not based on assumptions, but there would be some provisos.

That’s OK – I’m the one who is saying knowledge of the world entails assumptions, thus I am being entirely consistent, aren’t I?
Yep.

He may have known what he was talking about (I do not say he did not) – ut how did he know that he knew, and how do we know that he knew?
This is the heart of the issue for me. Taoism is an empirical discipline. Lao Tsu writes that 'Knowing the ancient beginnings is the essence of Tao'. This may be interpreted to mean that that knowing the origin of the universe is what Taoism is all about. This knowledge is not knowledge if it is based on assumptions rather than being known empirically. Of course, I cannot demonstrate that it is possible to gain this knowledge in direct experience, and nor can anyone else. However, this is the perennial claim of the mystics. Curiously, all the people who agree that this knowledge is possible give the same explanation of the world.

How do you arrive at this conclusion? Can you provide a rational or logical argument which shows how you arrive at this conclusion?
Well, it's a long story but I'll try to keep it short. I reached the conclusion some time ago that if the universe begins with something or nothing this would contradict reason, just as philosophers and physicists have always concluded. This led me to wonder if the distinction we make in metaphysics between something and nothing is a category error.

I mentioned this idea to someone who, unknown to me, was a Buddhist. He pointed me at the nondual explanation of everything, specifically Buddhist doctrine, in which the something/nothing distinction is a category error. At that time I assumed that mysticism was a form of lunacy. But I persevered, and after a bit of research realised that the only explanation of everything which does not say the universe began with something or nothing is that given by the Upanishads, the Tao Teh Ching, the Buddhist sutras etc. Having now spent a few years researching this explanation my conclusion is that it is the only one that does not contradict reason. I reached this conclusion by reason, not by practice and experience, or as a result of some revelation on the road to Damascus or whatever, although as time went by I found that experience lent support to my reasoning. What is more, I discovered that the nondual doctrine explains the undecidability of all metaphysical questions, including the solipsism question. These days I can't see how it can not be the correct explanation of everything. It is even capable of explaining nonlocality.

Whether “the words are true” or not is one thing, whether the propositions formed by the words represent true propositions about the world is another. How is it possible to know that these propositions are true?
By going and checking their truth empirically. Yes, I know that will sound ridiculous to you. However, it is not unreasonable to say that a theory in which experience is fundamental is experimentally testable in experience.

If it is never possible to demonstrate that one knows something, then we must simply assume that you know it, yes?
I'd say you shouldn't assume that I know anything at all, or anyone else.

Knowledge is justified true belief. ... The conventional definition is justified true belief. If I justifiably believe that X, and X is true, then it follows I know that X.
This is one definition of knowledge but I'm not sure it's right to call it conventional. I suppose it's conventional in some circles but it's not in mine. To me knowledge is what is known. I'd say that if I justifiably believe X, then X. But the only way to justify a belief is to know that it's the case, and then it's knowledge and not belief. (However, these words can be defined variously, so this topic tends to become very muddled very quickly. I use 'belief' to mean something we do not know is the case).

An axiom is a mathematical name for an assumption (otherwise known as a premise in logic). But you are saying above that a theory based on assumptions (axioms) cannot be knowledge…..?
Yes, with a few provisos. It is contingent knowledge of the form - If X then Y. A proposition with an 'if' in it can hardly be said to be knowledge.

I understand that is how you see it – as I said before, most people associate concepts with consciously formed concepts – but this is simply anthropocentrism in action. A “concept car” could be designed by a machine which has no conscious mind.
I'd say that is an incorrect use of 'concept'. But let's just agree to differ on this one.

On the Dennet issue I don't know what I can add to what I've said already. We'll have to differ on that as well.

Perhaps so – but all the evidence of quantum mechanics suggests that the physical world is granular and not continuous. A granular world does not necessarily imply infinitesimal points in space or infinitesimal points in time – it may be that both space and time are quantised.
Oh dear. Is there anything we agree on? C. S. Peirce saw the number line, and by implication spacetime, as a continuum, and the numbers, points and instants as potentia. This is my view also. It has certainly not been shown that spacetime is quantised. Indeed, the mathematician Thomas Dantzig, much admired by Einstein, argues that the idea of a quantised spacetime is technically irrational.

No change “takes place within any one instant”. In a quantised world, change is measured between instants... There is no change “within” a quantum of space or time, but there are differences between (changes between) these quanta.

Are you proposing that change takes place in the time between successive instants of time? I can't make sense of that idea. Bear in mind that the measurement is not the issue here, it's the change itself.

The only “reality” you have direct access to is the reality (data) from your sensors –
If solipsism is unfalsifiable this cannot be true, since I am (and you are) aware of something that exists with greater certainty than the concepts we construct based on electro-chemical signals from our senses.

your mind makes non-conscious adjustments to these data in order to present a “picture” to the conscious mind which is more useful (from a competitive point of view) than the raw data from the sensors.
Note that the 'Cartesian theatre' model of consciousness has little support in consciousness studies, if any.

Regards
Canute

loseyourname

Jul12-06, 03:05 PM

I am assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable (if this is an assumption). I'm also assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable for a reason. In my view an explanation of the world that does not explain its unfalsifiability is either not fundamental or not correct. Moreover, an explanation of the world predicated on its truth or falsity would be a metaphysical theory not a scientific one. This is because according to Popper a scientific theory should be falsifiable. If a theory assumes solipsism is false then in this respect the theory is unfalsifiable.

Something tells me you have to be making a mistake here. Evolutionary theory implicitly postulates the falsity of Omphalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_%28theology%29), which is unfalsifiable, but that doesn't make evolutionary theory unfalsifiable or unscientific (regardless of how you feel about its truth). Or are you simply arguing against scientific realism and making a case for instrumentalism?

moving finger

Jul13-06, 04:01 AM

I am assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable (if this is an assumption).
Well, either it is an assumption or it is not. What do you think?

I'm also assuming that solipsism is unfalsifiable for a reason. In my view an explanation of the world that does not explain its unfalsifiability is either not fundamental or not correct. Moreover, an explanation of the world predicated on its truth or falsity would be a metaphysical theory not a scientific one. This is because according to Popper a scientific theory should be falsifiable. If a theory assumes solipsism is false then in this respect the theory is unfalsifiable.
And? I’m not sure just what point you are trying to make here. You brought up the subject of solipsism for a reason presumably – but for the life of me I can’t see what that reason is.

On Popper – I have a great deal of respect for him and his work. However it may turn out that the fundamental theories of the world are indeed unfalsifiable. If that makes them “unscientific” according to Popper then that’s just too bad. If the ultimate theories are unfalsifiable this would not make the theories false, it would just make them “unscientific”. So what?

I can't give a straight yes or no answer to this one. I'm still trying to figure out whether 'solipsism is unfalsifiable' is an assumption or knowledge.
I don’t see that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is either (a) an explanation of or (b) an understanding of the world. If the proposition is true, then it seems like an analytic truth to me (ie it is true by definition – independent of the world). I could claim that the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” is “knowledge which makes no assumptions” – but does it explain anything about the world, or does it allow us to understand the world? No, because it is an analytic truth (it is true by definition).

Thus to claim that the statement “solipsism is unfalsifiable” qualifies as knowledge about the world is in the same category as claiming that “blue is a colour” qualifies as knowledge about the world.

However, clearly knowledge of the world cannot be based on an assumption for then it would not be knowledge.
Please define what you mean by “knowledge” – I think we may have a different understanding of the word.

It seems to me that either we can know things without making assumptions or we cannot know anything. When you feel pain do you assume you are feeling it or do you know you are? If you know you are then you can know things without making assumptions.
Where is this pain that you think you are feeling? When you think you feel that pain, are you sure that you are feeling the pain, or are you perhaps a brain in a vat being manipulated by an evil scientist who is making you think that you are feeling a pain?

If an explanation or theory is to make no assumptions then it cannot begin by assuming that solipsism is true or false. The only explanation of everything I know of in which solipsism is not assumed to be true or false is the 'nondual' doctrine of Buddhism, Taoism etc. I'd say this explanation is not based on assumptions, but there would be some provisos.
Could you explain this alleged explanation?

This is the heart of the issue for me. Taoism is an empirical discipline. Lao Tsu writes that 'Knowing the ancient beginnings is the essence of Tao'. This may be interpreted to mean that that knowing the origin of the universe is what Taoism is all about. This knowledge is not knowledge if it is based on assumptions rather than being known empirically. Of course, I cannot demonstrate that it is possible to gain this knowledge in direct experience, and nor can anyone else.
If you cannot demonstrate it, then by what means do you know it is true?

However, this is the perennial claim of the mystics. Curiously, all the people who agree that this knowledge is possible give the same explanation of the world.
Do they? I doubt that. What explanation do they all give?

Well, it's a long story but I'll try to keep it short. I reached the conclusion some time ago that if the universe begins with something or nothing this would contradict reason, just as philosophers and physicists have always concluded. This led me to wonder if the distinction we make in metaphysics between something and nothing is a category error.

I mentioned this idea to someone who, unknown to me, was a Buddhist. He pointed me at the nondual explanation of everything, specifically Buddhist doctrine, in which the something/nothing distinction is a category error. At that time I assumed that mysticism was a form of lunacy. But I persevered, and after a bit of research realised that the only explanation of everything which does not say the universe began with something or nothing is that given by the Upanishads, the Tao Teh Ching, the Buddhist sutras etc. Having now spent a few years researching this explanation my conclusion is that it is the only one that does not contradict reason. I reached this conclusion by reason, not by practice and experience, or as a result of some revelation on the road to Damascus or whatever, although as time went by I found that experience lent support to my reasoning. What is more, I discovered that the nondual doctrine explains the undecidability of all metaphysical questions, including the solipsism question. These days I can't see how it can not be the correct explanation of everything. It is even capable of explaining nonlocality.
You have said what this explanation of yours is “not” – can you tell us what this explanation “is”?

By going and checking their truth empirically. Yes, I know that will sound ridiculous to you. However, it is not unreasonable to say that a theory in which experience is fundamental is experimentally testable in experience.
And exactly what knowledge does this “experience” provide to you about the world?

I'd say you shouldn't assume that I know anything at all, or anyone else.
Ahh I see – word games. Then I guess we better start at the beginning - Do you believe that you know anything at all? If so, what?

This is one definition of knowledge but I'm not sure it's right to call it conventional. I suppose it's conventional in some circles but it's not in mine. To me knowledge is what is known.
Forgive me for rejecting this definition as a tautology.

I'd say that if I justifiably believe X, then X.
You do not believe that your justified beliefs could ever be mistaken? You are infallible?

But the only way to justify a belief is to know that it's the case, and then it's knowledge and not belief.
Then it would seem that your definition of knowledge is indeed tautological. Do you think that defining “knowledge as something that is known” is a very useful definition? Does it help us to understand what knowledge is, and how we can come to acquire knowledge?

Yes, with a few provisos. It is contingent knowledge of the form - If X then Y. A proposition with an 'if' in it can hardly be said to be knowledge.
Earlier you claimed “mathematically, for a theory to become knowledge it has to be axiomatised”……. And now you are saying that once axiomatised it is not in fact knowledge?

Oh dear. Is there anything we agree on? C. S. Peirce saw the number line, and by implication spacetime, as a continuum, and the numbers, points and instants as potentia. This is my view also. It has certainly not been shown that spacetime is quantised. Indeed, the mathematician Thomas Dantzig, much admired by Einstein, argues that the idea of a quantised spacetime is technically irrational.
I did not claim that “it has been shown that spacetime is quantised”. But perhaps you could explain why you think the idea is irrational?

Are you proposing that change takes place in the time between successive instants of time? I can't make sense of that idea. Bear in mind that the measurement is not the issue here, it's the change itself.
No. Imho change is measured as the difference between successive instants.

If solipsism is unfalsifiable this cannot be true, since I am (and you are) aware of something that exists with greater certainty than the concepts we construct based on electro-chemical signals from our senses.
I have no idea what you mean here, you’ll need to explain.

Note that the 'Cartesian theatre' model of consciousness has little support in consciousness studies, if any.
Note that this is why I put the word “picture” in scare-quotes. I’m well aware of the invalidity of the simplistic Cartesian theatre model – I did not intend the idea of “picture” to be taken literally (hence the reason for the scare-quotes). (If anybody did take it literally then I apologise for misleading you).

Best Regards

Canute

Jul13-06, 05:09 AM

Something tells me you have to be making a mistake here. Evolutionary theory implicitly postulates the falsity of Omphalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_%28theology%29), which is unfalsifiable, but that doesn't make evolutionary theory unfalsifiable or unscientific (regardless of how you feel about its truth). Or are you simply arguing against scientific realism and making a case for instrumentalism?
I see your point, but I'm not sure omphalism/evolutionary theory is an equivalent problem. I'll think about it some more. Interestingly, some physicists now conclude that it would not be unscientific to conjecture that we create the past in hindsight, as it were, that our stories of the past become real as we come to believe them. I haven't got a reference but I think I picked this up from Michio Kaku's book.

This doesn't answer your question though. It seems to me that omphalism would render most scientific theories unfalsifiable. But omphalism is predicted on the notion of a creator God able to create the entire modern universe and everything in it from scratch from nothing in an instant. I feel this idea can be shown to be logically incoherent for reasons atheists have given over the ages. By contrast, solipsism makes no wild claims about Gods and ex nihilo creation. This isn't a very satisfactory answer but it's a first attempt.

Instrumentalism seems a sensible view to me but not scientific realism, although the latter may mean slightly different things to different people so it would depend. For everyday purposes scientific realism seems a practical and probably necessary approach, but problems arise with it when it is extended into the realms of ontology imo.

Regards
Canute

PS I found the passage in question. I thought it interesting enough to quote.

"While the ‘classical’ world we observe, in which particles have definite positions, may be one of the consistent worlds described by a solution to the theory, Dowker and Kent’s results showed that there had to be an infinite number of other worlds too. Moreover, there were an infinite number of consistent worlds that have been classical up to this point but will not be anything like our world in five minutes’ time. Even more disturbing, there were worlds that were classical now that were arbitrarily mixed up superpositions of classical at any point in the past. Dowker concluded that, if the consistent-histories interpretation is correct, we have no right to deduce from the existence of fossils now that dinosaurs roamed the planet a hundred million years ago."

Lee Smolin
Three Roads to Quantum Gravity
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000 (44)

Canute

Jul13-06, 06:36 AM

MF

I'd like to simplify all this but can't see how at the moment. For now I'll go through the questions you raise. If you can see a way to narrow the discussion down to a couple of key issues then I'd be all for doing so. How come you and me end up arguing in so many threads?

Well, either it is an assumption or it is not. What do you think?
I don't know. I'm thinking of posting it as a question. It may be that there are two ways of looking at it. I can see two points of view.

And? I’m not sure just what point you are trying to make here. You brought up the subject of solipsism for a reason presumably – but for the life of me I can’t see what that reason is.
I've forgotten as well. Would it have been something to do with the logical incoherence of the idea that time exists inherently?

On Popper – I have a great deal of respect for him and his work. However it may turn out that the fundamental theories of the world are indeed unfalsifiable. If that makes them “unscientific” according to Popper then that’s just too bad. If the ultimate theories are unfalsifiable this would not make the theories false, it would just make them “unscientific”. So what?
I agree. A theory is a theory whether or not it is scientific. But someone mentioned Popper's ideas so I objected to the idea that scientific theories were truly falsifiable.

I don’t see that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is either (a) an explanation of or (b) an understanding of the world. If the proposition is true, then it seems like an analytic truth to me (ie it is true by definition – independent of the world). I could claim that the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” is “knowledge which makes no assumptions” – but does it explain anything about the world, or does it allow us to understand the world? No, because it is an analytic truth (it is true by definition).
To me the unfalsifiability of solipsism cannot be an analytic truth since its truth cannot be derived from the definitions of the terms. But I agree that the proposition 'solipsism is unfasifiable' is not an explantion of anything. Rather, as I was proposing, it is a fact that needs an explanation. In my view a genuine 'theory of everything' should explain it.

Thus to claim that the statement “solipsism is unfalsifiable” qualifies as knowledge about the world is in the same category as claiming that “blue is a colour” qualifies as knowledge about the world.
Someone who has never seen 'blue' could nevertheless look up in a dictionary the fact that it is a colour. However, the unfalsifiability of solipsism is not a matter of definitions.

Please define what you mean by “knowledge” – I think we may have a different understanding of the word.
Yes, the trouble is that 'knowledge' it has at least two significantly different meanings. In an everyday sense of the word 'knowledge' generally means contingent, provisional or relative knowledge of the form 'if this then that'. (E.g. if my speedgun is working properly then that car doing 90 mph; if this supernova is this bright then that supernova must be x light years way etc.). But true knowledge, in Aristotle's sense, would be what is known for certain with no ifs or buts.

Where is this pain that you think you are feeling? When you think you feel that pain, are you sure that you are feeling the pain, or are you perhaps a brain in a vat being manipulated by an evil scientist who is making you think that you are feeling a pain?
It doesn't make any difference. If I'm feeling pain I'm feeling pain.

Could you explain this alleged explanation?
I'd be more than happy to try. But it ought to be done in a dedicated thread I think. If you post a question I'll have a go.

If you cannot demonstrate it, then by what means do you know it is true?
This is the million dollar question. You seem to agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable, yet you cannot demonstrate it. How then do you know? You know by virtue of being conscious. This is connected with Aristotle's remark that true knowledge is the identity of knower and known, one of the most important observations that a philosopher can make imho.

Do they? I doubt that. What explanation do they all give?
Let's start another thread to discuss this. The answer is a longish one.

And exactly what knowledge does this “experience” provide to you about the world?
Well, for a start, that solipsism is unfalsifiable.

Ahh I see – word games. Then I guess we better start at the beginning - Do you believe that you know anything at all? If so, what?
Ditto.

Forgive me for rejecting this definition as a tautology.
Yes it's a tautology. I don't have a non-tautological definition of certain knowledge. I suppose I would be happy with Aristotle's definition, that true knowledge is identical with its object.

You do not believe that your justified beliefs could ever be mistaken? You are infallible?
The answer to the first question would depend on what you mean by 'justified'. Generally I would define 'belief' as the opposite of 'knowledge', but I know many people define them differently.

Then it would seem that your definition of knowledge is indeed tautological. Do you think that defining “knowledge as something that is known” is a very useful definition? Does it help us to understand what knowledge is, and how we can come to acquire knowledge?
Strangely I do think this is a useful definition. Once it is understood then it helps in distinguishing between relative and absolute knowledge. The point is that only you can know whether you know something and how you do it.

Earlier you claimed “mathematically, for a theory to become knowledge it has to be axiomatised”……. And now you are saying that once axiomatised it is not in fact knowledge?
What I was getting at is that a theory founded on a axiomatic proposition whose truth or falsity is not known takes the form 'if A then B then C...'. Any theorems derived from the proposition would be contingent on a guess. The derived theorem would count as knowledge in the sense that it is knowledge of what follows from the truth of the proposition by a certain logical procedure, but it would not be knowledge in an absolute sense. In the mystical literature the two kinds of knowledge are usually distinguished by using a upper-case 'K' for the absolute kind ('Knowledge' as opposed to 'knowledge'). Perhaps we could adopt this convention to save some confusion.

I did not claim that “it has been shown that spacetime is quantised”. But perhaps you could explain why you think the idea is irrational?
Well, Zeno of Alea gives a few reductio arguments for its irrationality, as has physicist Peter Lynds more recently. Here is mathematician Tobias Dantzig from Number - The Language of Science (1930). This steers us back onto the topic.

"The axiom of Dedekind - "if all points of a straight line fall into two classes, such that every point of the first class lies to the left of any point of the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions" - this axiom is just a skillful paraphrase of the fundamental property we attribute to time. Our intuition permits us, by an act of the mind, to sever all time into the two clasess, the past and the future, which are mutually exclusive and yet together comprise all of time, eternity: The now is the partition which separates all the past from all the future; any instant of the past was once a now, any instant of the future will be a now anon, and so any instant may itself act as such a partition. To be sure, of the past we know only disparate instants, yet, by an act of the mind we fill out the gaps; we conceive that between any two instants - no matter how closely these may be associated in our memory - there were other instants, and we postulate the same compactness for the future. This is what we mean by the flow of time.

Furthermore, paradoxical though this may seem, the present is truly irrational in the Dedekind sense of the word, for while it acts as partition it is neither a part of the past nor a part of the future. Indeed, in an arithmetic based on pure time, if such an arithmetic was at all possible, it is the irrational which would be taken as a matter of course, while all the painstaking efforts of our logic would be directed toward establishing the existence of rational numbers.

No. Imho change is measured as the difference between successive instants.
Are you suggesting that change happens between instants, and thus outside time altogether?

I have no idea what you mean here, you’ll need to explain.
I was suggesting that for a person who concludes that solipsism is unfalsifiable there is something of whose existence they are more certain than the conceptual constructs they create from the evidence of their senses.

Note that this is why I put the word “picture” in scare-quotes. I’m well aware of the invalidity of the simplistic Cartesian theatre model – I did not intend the idea of “picture” to be taken literally (hence the reason for the scare-quotes). (If anybody did take it literally then I apologise for misleading you).
Ah. Pardon me, I misssed the quote marks.

regards
Canute

Drachir

Jul13-06, 06:50 AM

Canute in #52] wrote:Originally Posted by Drachir
The notion of reality and its attendant questions arise because we have the physiological capacity to be aware of, and to differentiate between things of the mind and things external to the mind.I agree that we have the ability to make this distinction. I do not agree that this entails the distinction is ontologically meaningful. To know that a thing exists, that thing must somehow stand out from all other things, else it could not be differentiated from anything and we could not even be aware of it. To know that one exists one must first differentiate between oneself and something else. Since a consciousness conscious only of itself is a contradiction in terms, the distinction between things of the mind and things external to the mind is most meaningfully at the heart of ontology.

Canute in #52] wrote, first quoting me:Quote:
When we are conscious we are aware of two distinct kinds of information: that presented by our sense organs and that presented by our sub-conscious.I feel it's easier to lump these together as physical and mental (or psychophysical) phenomena. In other words, all the things that the unfalsifiability of solipsim prevents us from establishing as existent. You have agreed that we have the capacity to differentiate between things of the mind and things external to it. Haven’t you just contradicted the solipsist position? As for solipsism, because of it’s incoherence it is neither falsifiable nor unfalsifiable and prevents us from nothing.

There are other simpler problems for the solipsist. The solipsist cannot know of his own existence because for him there is nothing else from which he can stand out. As the sole existent, the solipsist would be the generator and possessor of all knowledge. Since he would know about every thing except his own existence the only thing he could doubt would be his own existence. But then he could not be sure who is doing the doubting.:rofl:

Canute in #52]next wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Simple animals have their ‘value codes’ ‘pre-wired.’ They cannot change their values.I didn't know that. I assumed that the brains of other animals were as plastic as ours are. Are you sure you're not just assuming this? It’s not a matter of plasticity; it’s a matter of resources.

The sea snail Aplysia californica’s brain contains only about 20,000 neurons. It can learn from experience (via its sensory systems). However, it cannot choose not to learn and it cannot choose what to learn; it is “pre-wired” to learn a few things to enhance its chances of survival. Like all animals, it has consciousness; it is aware of its surroundings. It can distinguish between food and a predator. It even has one kind of self-consciousness, the awareness of its own body. However, it does not have the wherewithal to be conscious of any of its mental processes. That kind of self-consciousness requires the capacity for language and grammar. When we are conscious of our own thinking, we present those self-conscious ideas to ourselves in language. We can do that because a human brain contains about 100 billion neurons.

Whether for bees, birds, dogs or humans, language arises only in a social context. Solipsists use language, a product of society, to claim that there is no society. In so doing they have figuratively cut off their legs and cannot stand. Descartes’ ontology (which spawned modern solipsism) was as flawed as his physiology (e.g., ‘the function of the lungs is to warm the blood’}. He was, however, a brilliant mathematician and we are forever in his debt for wedding algebra to geometry with his Cartesian coordinates.
.
Canute in #52] wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Self-consciousness is the mental function that provides that monitor. Self-consciousness is a self-referential reentrant mental function. One can be aware of ones thoughts, and can at the same time be aware of that awareness. One can even be aware of the awareness of the awareness.This is where these issues become very complicated. There is a view that self-consciousness is not the same as consciousness. This is because these words can be defined in different ways. Dennett argues that the self is a delusion (although he fails to make clear who is being deluded) and this would be my view also. Therefore 'self-consciousness' is an ambiguous phrase. For a start, it implies two separate entities. Calling it 're-entrant' doesn't really solve this paradox of self-reference. I find no complication in these issues. We should first recognize that that the word ‘self’ has two distinct usages. If, after having carelessly hit my thumb with a hammer, I say “I hurt myself,” ‘self’ means body or a part of it. However, if I convince myself that I can tell in advance how a tossed coin will land, and then find that I cannot and say “I have deluded myself,” self means thought content, not body or body part.

Consciousness is nothing else than being aware of sense information. That sense information includes information about ones own body as I mentioned above.
Thus the self-consciousness where ‘self’ means ‘body’ is one of the functions of consciousness.

Being aware of ones own thinking is not the same as being aware of ones body. In that second kind of self-consciousness, one is aware not of the body, brain, or the physical process of thought; one is then aware of the content or meaning of the thought and how that content was formed. The mapping of each body part, or kind of sensor, is highly localized in the brain. The mapping of ‘thought self-consciousness’ is widely diffused in the brain. The two kinds of self-consciousness are indeed different things. If Dennett believes that the body self is a delusion I will lend him my hammer and he can discover whose thumb it is that hurts when he strikes his thumb. If Dennett thinks the thought content awareness self is a delusion and is not sure whose ideas he is espousing, he better be careful about what he copyrights.

Here is an analogy that may aid comprehension of the difference between the process of thought and the content or meaning of a thought. Computer memory stores information in binary format (0 or 1). A byte of information consists of 8 binary bits. The content or meaning of the byte 01000001 can represent different things depending on the context. Converted to a decimal number it means 65. Converted to an alphanumeric character it means capital A. It can represent a location in computer memory, and other things as well. The state of the bits (flip-flop state, magnetic polarity, etc) is physical; but their meaning is not inherent in the physical states representing the byte. The meaning depends on how the information is to be used.

Canute in #52] also wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
One definition of reality is ‘that which exists independently of ideas concerning it.’ A more terse definition is ‘reality is objective existence’.I'm fine with that, it's just a definition. However, it is a confusing one. It is how many people, for example the philosopher Francis Bradley, would define 'Appearances' as directly contrasted with 'Reality'.It’s just a definition? A definition specifies the meaning of a word or term. If we are not clear about the meanings of the words with which we think, we cannot know what we are thinking about.

I thought that Bradley believed that every appearance, even if misleading, is a constituent of reality. Appearance is a matter of how one interprets the information from the senses. The unconscious climber of Mt. Everest appeared to be dead when in fact he wasn’t. That appearance was not a part of reality; it was the content of a thought. I described above how the content of a thought cannot be a part of reality.

Canute in #52] also wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Our primary connection with reality is through the senses.It is easy to conclude this but it is not true. We have no idea whether anything exists apart from our consciousness, so to say that we know of reality through our senses makes a mockery of the word' reality'. I don't think many philosophers argue that our senses put us in touch with reality, and many physicists argue that they do not. I'd say the unfalsifiability of solipsism proves that they do not, but I'm not sure that argument is watertight.
I have presented above a view on this topic based on Wittgenstien’s Philosophical Investigations. It effectively disposes of the notions of private experience and private language that are basic presumptions in Cartesian dualism and solipsism.

Canute in #52] also wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Although we can smell a distant fire or see the light of faint, very distant stars, we cannot sense the thoughts of other people, not even of those closest to us. Consequently, it was long thought that mind was not a part of the reality presented to us by the senses. That was the source of the mind-body dichotomy idea. Contemporary neurology has demolished the mind-body dichotomy by enabling us to sense specific parts of the brain that are active during specific mental activities. We should no longer think it impossible that a single thought might be externally sensed and identified.Unfortunately contemporary neuroscience has so far failed miserably to solve the mind-body problem. Some think it will succeed in the future, but it has not succeeded yet. The source of the mind-body dichotomy is the mind-body dichotomy, and when it is demolished scientifically someone will win great fame and fortune. It will be front page news across the globe.How can something be its own source?

I remember some work done in the 60’s on planaria worms. Some of them were taught to curl up on receipt of an electric shock. Their offspring had that knowledge. But what was more striking was that untrained worms fed a puree of trained worms acquired the knowledge without training. Those studies also indicated that learning and memory are chemical processes.

One of the people who did win great fame while demolishing the mind-body dichotomy is Eric Kandel. Kandel searched for and found the chemical bases of learning, of short-term memory, and of long-term memory. The neuron and its ‘wiring’ are not modified, but synaptic sensitivity is chemically modified. Thus mind (e.g., learning, memory) is body (chemical). He won the Nobel Prize for that work in 2000. I would imagine it was front-page news across the globe.

[]Canute[/b] in #52] continued:It's not possible to know that a physical or mental phenomena exists unless one is conscious, as you say. As a result, it is not possible to know that physical and mental phenomena are real. This is not my opinion. You can easily and quickly establish the unfalsifiability of solipsism for yourself. This doesn't mean we all have to agree that psychophysical pehnomena are in some sense not real, and clearly we don't all agree, but it does mean there is no means of falsifying a theory in which they are not really real (unless it can be shown false for other reasons). Thus, there are theories in which what you call 'reality' does not really exist. The second-century philosopher Nagarjuna wrote a very famous proof of the unreality of mental and corporeal phenomena, Not everyone thinks it is successful, but many people do. At least there's no evidence yet that forces us to the opposite conclusion.Solipsism denies itself by its use of language as I have noted above. All self-denials are without meaning and, hence, are neither true nor false, neither falsifiable or unfalsifiable. The statement “This statement is false” is a self-denial, hence meaningless and neither true nor false.

Your statement “Thus, there are theories in which what you call 'reality' does not really exist” seems an inadvertent bad choice of words. What meaning can the term ‘really’ have if there is no reality?

Canute in #52] also wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Time is not fundamental to psychophysical phenomena, but motion is.This is similar to what the Buddha said about all this, which might surprise you. However, there is something a little paradoxical about the idea that motion can exist before time exists. Wouldn't they have to come into existence at the same, er, time? In this case they would have to be a) equally fundamental, or b) equally non-fundamental and arise from a common source. Motions exist in the real world. Time never comes into existence in the real world. Time is a mental abstraction, a content of thought that allows one to correlate different motions. That abstraction can only be made after one observes the motions of things.

Canute in #52] also wrote, first quoting me:
Quote:
Our senses do not deceive us.Descartes ran into all sorts of trouble over this one. If I remember right he concluded that we can trust that God is benign and therefore assume that He wouldn't give us senses that deceive us. I don't find this argument very convincing. Have you considered that the plot of the film 'Matrix' would be utterly ridiculous if anybody had ever shown that your statement is true? All this stuff is very confusing and it's incredibly easy to mistake an assumption for a fact. Descartes introduced the benign God idea to avoid falling into the solipsism ready to jump out from his dualism. Solipsism would lead to questions about the existence of God. Descartes was a devout Catholic and did all he could to avoid becoming a subject of the Inquisition or to be censured by the Church in any way.

I still maintain that our senses do not deceive us, but inadvertent misinterpretation of sense information is a form of unwitting self-deception. Magicians count on it to make a living.

I never saw Matrix.

Best wishes
Drachir

octelcogopod

Jul13-06, 02:37 PM

To drachir about solpsisim:

If someone is conscious, and it assumes, or at least senses some external world, how can it ever prove that this external world exists, when it has nothing to reference it with?
Meaning, the information the brain receives, will always be interpreted by that same brain, so the brain can never verify if the information is coming from itself, or from an external source, no matter how much evidence tips it to the latter.

This isn't like what you said about "this statement is false", it is also a "real" phenomena that would arise with any conscious being.

Drachir

Jul14-06, 06:39 AM

Hello octelcogopod.

You ask If someone is conscious, and it assumes, or at least senses some external world, how can it ever prove that this external world exists, when it has nothing to reference it with?First of all, one senses things of the external world. The external world is the class of things that can interact with our senses or extensions of our senses. The idea of a class is an abstract idea; hence the external world is not a physical thing and cannot be sensed.

I think the intent of your question can be put more fundamentally as ‘How can we prove that a sensed thing exists?’ I have stated above that if we are not clear about the meanings of the words with which we think, we cannot know what we are thinking about. The meaning of the word exist is worth examining.

The word exist is defined as be in almost any dictionary. But, most curiously, the word be is defined as exist. Such a circular definition is useless for our purposes. Those words did not always have that circular definition. The circularity arose from metaphoric uses of the two words. The word be has multiple uses now as in ancient times. The uses can be divided into several categories. One of the categories is the existential use of the verb be. In that category there are several different uses of the verb be.

The word exist, however, had essentially a single use in ancient times that is reflected not only by its etymology, but also by its ancient uses. The word exist derives form the Latin words existere and exsistere, meaning ‘to stand out’ and ‘to stand forth.’ When something stands out or forth it can be differentiated from whatever it stands out of or before. Having been differentiated it can next be identified and known.

Now in the question “How can we prove that a sensed thing exists?” we can replace exists with ‘stands out or stands forth.’ The question then becomes “How can we prove that a sensed thing stands out or stands forth? If it is sensed that a particular thing stands forth from another or other things, its standing forth is proved and its existence is proved. To prove to others that something exists, have them do the same sensing. Viruses were not proved to exist until they (tobacco mosaic viruses) were sensed to stand forth from the background when viewed with an electron microscope.

Canute

Jul14-06, 09:06 AM

Canute - To know that a thing exists, that thing must somehow stand out from all other things, else it could not be differentiated from anything and we could not even be aware of it.
To know that one exists one must first differentiate between oneself and something else.Since a consciousness conscious only of itself is a contradiction in terms, the distinction between things of the mind and things external to the mind is most meaningfully at the heart of ontology.
That is one view. Another view is that things are not simple. The word 'exist' needs to picked apart, and what is fundamental, the only phenomenon that is really real (putting all this crudely) is consciousness conscious of itself.

You have agreed that we have the capacity to differentiate between things of the mind and things external to it. Haven’t you just contradicted the solipsist position? As for solipsism, because of it’s incoherence it is neither falsifiable nor unfalsifiable and prevents us from nothing.
No, this is not a contradiction. The making of distinctions is precisely what the mind does, and reality itself may be an undifferentiated whole. You don't have to agree that it is, but many people say it is and so your view is not secure. The underlying issue here is that by one view mind is no more real in an ultimate sense than matter. In this view solipsism is unfalsifiable because (ultimately) it is not false.

The solipsist cannot know of his own existence because for him there is nothing else from which he can stand out.
Solipsism is precisely the claim that ones own consciousness can be known to exist with greater certainty than anything else. It stands out from nothingness.

As the sole existent, the solipsist would be the generator and possessor of all knowledge. Since he would know about every thing except his own existence the only thing he could doubt would be his own existence. But then he could not be sure who is doing the doubting.:rofl:
Yeah, it's very confusing. I'm not suggesting that solipsism is true. I'm suggesting that it's not false.

The sea snail Aplysia californica’s brain contains only about 20,000 neurons. It can learn from experience (via its sensory systems). However, it cannot choose not to learn and it cannot choose what to learn; it is “pre-wired” to learn a few things to enhance its chances of survival.
I'm sorry, but I see this pure speculation. It is impossible to prove that human beings are conscious and make choices so of course the same goes for sea snails.

Like all animals, it has consciousness;
Try demonstrating this. It is impossible.

Solipsists use language, a product of society, to claim that there is no society. In so doing they have figuratively cut off their legs and cannot stand.
Yes, that's a good point. However, I don't think anyone is a solipsist so it doesn't really matter. The real point here is that the existence of language does not show that solipsism is false. There is no method by which we can show that it's false.

Descartes’ ontology (which spawned modern solipsism) was as flawed as his physiology (e.g., ‘the function of the lungs is to warm the blood’}. He was, however, a brilliant mathematician and we are forever in his debt for wedding algebra to geometry with his Cartesian coordinates.
I think this was achieved by someone else (Nicole d'Oresme?) a lot earlier, but no matter. Solipsism was not spawned by anyone in particular, although the name obviously was. Plato discusses it at length.

I find no complication in these issues. We should first recognize that that the word ‘self’ has two distinct usages. If, after having carelessly hit my thumb with a hammer, I say “I hurt myself,” ‘self’ means body or a part of it. However, if I convince myself that I can tell in advance how a tossed coin will land, and then find that I cannot and say “I have deluded myself,” self means thought content, not body or body part.
I agree that 'self' has two distinct uses, but to me you are speaking here of the same one, namely your ordinary conscious self.

Consciousness is nothing else than being aware of sense information.
It would be good practice to add 'in my opinion'. Either that or prove it. The unfalsifiability of solipsism means that nobody can prove this statement true, and in my view proves that it cannot be true.

I agree with you that Dennett is wrong by the way, but not for the reasons you give.

Here is an analogy that may aid comprehension of the difference between the process of thought and the content or meaning of a thought. Computer memory stores information in binary format (0 or 1). A byte of information consists of 8 binary bits. The content or meaning of the byte 01000001 can represent different things depending on the context. Converted to a decimal number it means 65. Converted to an alphanumeric character it means capital A. It can represent a location in computer memory, and other things as well. The state of the bits (flip-flop state, magnetic polarity, etc) is physical; but their meaning is not inherent in the physical states representing the byte. The meaning depends on how the information is to be used.
In my view the meaning depends on how it is interpreted, and this will determine how it may be used.

A definition specifies the meaning of a word or term. If we are not clear about the meanings of the words with which we think, we cannot know what we are thinking about.
Agreed.

I thought that Bradley believed that every appearance, even if misleading, is a constituent of reality.
I don't know what he believed but I know what he wrote. He wrote that appearances are not really real, in the sense that there is something from which appearances arise which is fundamental. In order to have information one must have an information space.

I have presented above a view on this topic based on Wittgenstien’s Philosophical Investigations. It effectively disposes of the notions of private experience and private language that are basic presumptions in Cartesian dualism and solipsism.
I don't think Wittgenstein would agree with your interpretation.

I remember some work done in the 60’s on planaria worms. Some of them were taught to curl up on receipt of an electric shock. Their offspring had that knowledge. But what was more striking was that untrained worms fed a puree of trained worms acquired the knowledge without training. Those studies also indicated that learning and memory are chemical processes.
Yes I remember reading about those experiments. They seem to lend some credence to Lamarck's view. But what does this have to do with consciousness, solipsism etc.?

One of the people who did win great fame while demolishing the mind-body dichotomy is Eric Kandel. Kandel searched for and found the chemical bases of learning, of short-term memory, and of long-term memory. The neuron and its ‘wiring’ are not modified, but synaptic sensitivity is chemically modified. Thus mind (e.g., learning, memory) is body (chemical). He won the Nobel Prize for that work in 2000. I would imagine it was front-page news across the globe.
What has this got to do with phenomenal consciousness? How and why do you conclude he demolished the mind-brain dichotomy? He seems to have been studying learning and short-term memory.

Solipsism denies itself by its use of language as I have noted above. All self-denials are without meaning and, hence, are neither true nor false, neither falsifiable or unfalsifiable. The statement “This statement is false” is a self-denial, hence meaningless and neither true nor false.
Solipsism is unfalsifiable. This is a fact. Nothing you note about self-denials, language or anything else will change this.

Your statement “Thus, there are theories in which what you call 'reality' does not really exist” seems an inadvertent bad choice of words. What meaning can the term ‘really’ have if there is no reality?
The 'really' is there as a proviso, to ensure the theory is not confused with nihilism.

Motions exist in the real world. Time never comes into existence in the real world. Time is a mental abstraction, a content of thought that allows one to correlate different motions. That abstraction can only be made after one observes the motions of things.
What real world? If time is not real then neither is motion, which depends entirely on the existence of time, whether or not it is conceptual.

Descartes introduced the benign God idea to avoid falling into the solipsism ready to jump out from his dualism. Solipsism would lead to questions about the existence of God.
Yes, I agree. Descartes assumed solipsism is false. His theory therefore became a metaphysical conjecture.

I still maintain that our senses do not deceive us,
That's fine by me, as long as you accept that it is an assumption. For as long as solipsism is unfalsified it will remain an assumption.

I never saw Matrix.
The plot is predicated on our inability to know whether or not our senses are deceiving us. If it were not for this inability the film would not have been made. The authors were extremely careful not to contradict any known facts of physics or philosophy. They dealt with most of the issues rigorously, by reference to Buddhist doctrine, Jean Baudrillard's 'desert of the real' and so on, all relevant here.

Regards
Canute

octelcogopod

Jul14-06, 03:13 PM

Hello octelcogopod.

Now in the question “How can we prove that a sensed thing exists?” we can replace exists with ‘stands out or stands forth.’ The question then becomes “How can we prove that a sensed thing stands out or stands forth? If it is sensed that a particular thing stands forth from another or other things, its standing forth is proved and its existence is proved. To prove to others that something exists, have them do the same sensing. Viruses were not proved to exist until they (tobacco mosaic viruses) were sensed to stand forth from the background when viewed with an electron microscope.

Sorry but this just doesn't make any sense to me.
It's very simple;

The brain receives signals from somewhere, the origin of those signals are unverifiable.
No matter how much you bend on certain topics, this remains a fact.
You proposed "how can we prove that senses thing exists?" and what we're really asking here is "where is the signal coming from that's giving me this vision?"

Technically, you could be lying in a matrix like little tube, getting data input from sme computer directly into your brain.
It can't be verified 100% that this isn't the case, even if lets say, we were able to manipulate and understand our consciousness and bodies in an absolute way.
Even then, we could still ask ourselves "but what if this is just part of the simulation?"

It seems to me any subjective experiencer would, or could, ask this question.
In a way, even god can ask this question.

Tournesol

Jul14-06, 03:15 PM

Sorry but this just doesn't make any sense to me.
It's very simple;

The brain receives signals from somewhere, the origin of those signals are unverifiable..

How did you verify that "The brain receives signals from somewhere",
then ?

Tournesol

Jul14-06, 03:21 PM

Hello octelcogopod.

You ask First of all, one senses things of the external world. The external world is the class of things that can interact with our senses or extensions of our senses. The idea of a class is an abstract idea; hence the external world is not a physical thing and cannot be sensed.

That doesn't follow. The idea of a class C may be abstract. That doesn't
make C itself abstract.

I think the intent of your question can be put more fundamentally as ‘How can we prove that a sensed thing exists?’

How can we sense a thing if it doesn't ?

octelcogopod

Jul14-06, 04:14 PM

How did you verify that "The brain receives signals from somewhere",
then ?

Well that's the thing, we can't verify it.

Tournesol

Jul14-06, 07:18 PM

Well that's the thing, we can't verify it.

Then there may not be a problem in the first place.

Scepticism turns out to be a self-refuting universal solvent,
yet again.

Universe_Man

Jul14-06, 08:35 PM

Maybe time flows forward as we see it because it is the most energy efficient way to do things, kinda like why when you blow a bubble, it takes the shape of a sphere rather than a cube or a pyramid. Maybe nature takes the easiest course of action.

Then again, I don't really know much about it so...

Canute

Jul15-06, 04:59 AM

Then there may not be a problem in the first place.

Scepticism turns out to be a self-refuting universal solvent,
yet again.
To say that solipsism is unfalsifiable is not scepticism. It's just the way the world is. To say solipsism is true would be scepticism, of a sort, but I don't think anyone here is saying that it's true.

Tournesol

Jul15-06, 06:24 AM

To say that solipsism is unfalsifiable is not scepticism. It's just the way the world is. To say solipsism is true would be scepticism, of a sort, but I don't think anyone here is saying that it's true.

Solipsis is self-falsifying. It cannot maintain the truth of whatever assumption it starts with (usually one about how the human brain
connects up to the rest of the world).

Tournesol

Jul15-06, 06:41 AM

moving finger

Jul16-06, 12:56 AM

I'd like to simplify all this but can't see how at the moment. For now I'll go through the questions you raise. If you can see a way to narrow the discussion down to a couple of key issues then I'd be all for doing so. How come you and me end up arguing in so many threads?
Must be because we have similar interests, but different beliefs?

I agree. A theory is a theory whether or not it is scientific. But someone mentioned Popper's ideas so I objected to the idea that scientific theories were truly falsifiable.
I’m confused. By Popper’s definition, an hypothesis doesn’t count as a scientific hypothesis unless it is falsifiable (by definition), so how can a scientific hypothesis be not falsifiable?

If it is true that solipsism is unfalsifiable then by definition solipsism would not be a scientific hypothesis (but that neither makes solipsism true nor false).

When it comes down to the quantum world, our hypotheses about ontic reality may be unfalsifiable. In other words it seems (according to our understanding of QM) that the world cannot be both local and real, but is it reality that is false, or locality, or both? It seems that the question can never be answered – thus rendering the question unscientific.

I don’t see that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is either (a) an explanation of or (b) an understanding of the world. If the proposition is true, then it seems like an analytic truth to me (ie it is true by definition – independent of the world). I could claim that the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” is “knowledge which makes no assumptions” – but does it explain anything about the world, or does it allow us to understand the world? No, because it is an analytic truth (it is true by definition).
To me the unfalsifiability of solipsism cannot be an analytic truth since its truth cannot be derived from the definitions of the terms.
Let’s see.

Here’s an attempt at defining Solipsism = the belief that only my conscious “I” has any real existence, and everything in my conscious perceptual world (if I perceive anything at all) is purely a figment of my imagination, including my perceptions of feelings – and we also assume that I am capable of imagining anything and everything.

Now, how could I go about showing that solipsism is false? Clearly, as far as I am concerned, “I” exist (otherwise the question would not arise in the first place). Thus to show that solipsism is false I would need somehow to show conclusively that there is something within my perceptual world which is NOT a figment of my imagination.

But clearly, if I can imagine anything at all, then it may be the case that everything in my perceptual world IS a figment of my imagination – because I can imagine anything and everything. Anything that I may care to identify as a possible candidate for “real existence” external to the “I” may not in fact be real. There is no logical proof (to my knowledge) which I could employ which would lead me to the sound conclusion that any particular part of my perceptual world is not imagined by me.

Thus, it follows that solipsism is indeed unfalsifiable – the unfalsifiability follows from the definition of (and assumptions inherent in) solipsism. In other words, the fact that solipsism is unfalsifiable is an analytic truth.

(But this of course does NOT mean that solipsism is true).

But I agree that the proposition 'solipsism is unfasifiable' is not an explantion of anything. Rather, as I was proposing, it is a fact that needs an explanation. In my view a genuine 'theory of everything' should explain it.
I believe I have shown above that the truth of the proposition 'solipsism is unfalsifiable' follows necessarily from the definition of solipsism. Thus, the proposition tells us nothing useful about the world (in the same way that the proposition “all bachelors are unmarried” tells us nothing useful about the world).

Thus to claim that the statement “solipsism is unfalsifiable” qualifies as knowledge about the world is in the same category as claiming that “blue is a colour” qualifies as knowledge about the world.
Someone who has never seen 'blue' could nevertheless look up in a dictionary the fact that it is a colour. However, the unfalsifiability of solipsism is not a matter of definitions.
Sorry but I believe it is a matter of definitions.

If one believes that solipsism IS unfalsifiable, then (with respect) one also needs to be able to show WHY one believes it unfalsifiable (otherwise it becomes an assumption or an article of faith).

I have explained above why I believe it is unfalsifiable (we can show that it is necessarily unfalsifiable based on the definition of solipsism).

Can you explain why YOU believe solipsism is unfalsifiable? If you cannot, then on what basis do you claim that it IS unfalsifiable? Unjustified belief?

Please define what you mean by “knowledge” – I think we may have a different understanding of the word.
Yes, the trouble is that 'knowledge' it has at least two significantly different meanings. In an everyday sense of the word 'knowledge' generally means contingent, provisional or relative knowledge of the form 'if this then that'. (E.g. if my speedgun is working properly then that car doing 90 mph; if this supernova is this bright then that supernova must be x light years way etc.).
This seems to rest on inference, but it does not define knowledge. Basically you are saying “if I know that my speedgun is working properly, then by inference I also know that the car is doing 90mph” – you have simply defined one knowledge in terms of another knowledge. But how am I to know that my speedgun is working properly in the first place? Where does my original knowledge come from? And what does this word “knowledge” actually mean?

But true knowledge, in Aristotle's sense, would be what is known for certain with no ifs or buts.
In other words, infallible knowledge. I would argue that the only infallible knowledge we can have is based on analytic truths (or tautologies) – ie truths by definition (like the knowledge that “solipsism is unfalsifiable”). I do not believe that we can have infallible knowledge of the world outside of such analytic truths. But once again – before we can rationally argue this point we need a “definition” of knowledge which is not tautological To define knowledge as “what is known for certain” is tautological – it defines knowledge (ie what is known) in terms of “what is known”.

(it’s like defining “free will” as “the ability to act freely”)

What we need is to agree the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, so that we can say “if these conditions are satisfied, then we possess knowledge; if these conditions are not satisfied, then we do not possess knowledge”. Clearly, to avoid tautology we must avoid using “knowledge” or “know” within our conditions.

Where is this pain that you think you are feeling? When you think you feel that pain, are you sure that you are feeling the pain, or are you perhaps a brain in a vat being manipulated by an evil scientist who is making you think that you are feeling a pain?
It doesn't make any difference. If I'm feeling pain I'm feeling pain.
On the contrary, it makes all the difference. One of the characteristics of physical pain is that it has a locus of feeling – we don’t just “feel in physical pain”, that pain seems to be located in a particular part of the body. For the sake of this argument, where would you like to say that this so-called pain is located? Perhaps in your foot? But what if in reality you don’t have any feet? It follows then that the pain you think you are feeling in your foot is an illusion.

Granted that you think you feel pain – but does it does not follow from this that you are really feeling pain. To suggest that “I think that I feel pain entails that this thought arises from a real feeling of pain, as opposed to being a figment of my imagination” assumes solipsism is false – but we have already shown that solipsism is unfalsifiable.

If solipsism is true, then the pain “exists” only in your imagination (ie the fact that you think you feel pain is telling you nothing about the real world external to your consciousness).

This is the million dollar question. You seem to agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable, yet you cannot demonstrate it. How then do you know?
I believe I have shown above that it is true by definition.

You know by virtue of being conscious.
Agreed that it seems reasonable that consciousness is a necessary condition for knowledge – but imho it is far from being a sufficient condition.

This is connected with Aristotle's remark that true knowledge is the identity of knower and known, one of the most important observations that a philosopher can make imho.
This seems inherently tautological to me. “Knower” would seem to be “possessor of knowledge”, and “known” would seem to be the “knowledge possessed”, thus the proposition would become “true knowledge is the identity of the possessor of knowledge and the knowledge possessed” – mystically wonderful perhaps, but not very enlightening is it?

I could use the same form of proposition to “define” any content of consciousness, for example “true happiness is the identity of the possessor of happiness with the happiness possessed”, or “true hatred is the identity of the possessor of hatred with the hatred possessed”, or “true forgiveness is the identity of the possessor of forgiveness with the forgiveness possessed” – all of which I am sure some mystic would love to meditate about (and I’m sure one could sell a book on the subject), but none of which give us a real clue into anything in particular.

Again, until you can define precisely what you mean by the word knowledge then it seems to me that the word doesn’t really mean anything in particular.

And exactly what knowledge does this “experience” provide to you about the world?
Well, for a start, that solipsism is unfalsifiable.
How does your experience tell you that solipsism is unfalsifiable? Can you explain how you arrive at this conclusion based on your experience?

I believe that this particular proposition is an analytic truth (as shown above).
If you disagree, can you tell me by what means you know that solipsism is unfalsifiable? ie where is the rational argument which leads to the conclusion that solipsism is unfalsifiable? In absence of such a rational argument, on what grounds are you claiming it is unfalsifiable?

Suggested possible for grounds for believing that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is true : Logical argument (as I have used above); or mathematical proof; or empirical evidence from experience, experiments etc; or divine inspiration; or a mystical vision; or intuition; or guesswork…..

Which grounds do you claim?

You do not believe that your justified beliefs could ever be mistaken? You are infallible?
The answer to the first question would depend on what you mean by 'justified'. Generally I would define 'belief' as the opposite of 'knowledge', but I know many people define them differently.
That doesn’t mean much until you first define what you mean by knowledge.
Surely knowledge entails belief (rather than being the opposite of belief)? Do you think it is possible to claim that one “knows that X” if one does not also “believe that X”?

Example : How could I claim to know that 2 + 2 = 4 unless I also believe that 2 + 2 = 4?

Of course it does not follow from this that belief entails knowledge. Just because I might believe that the Tooth Fairy exists, it does not follow that I know that the Tooth Fairy exists (because knowledge also entails truth – I cannot know something which is false).

Then it would seem that your definition of knowledge is indeed tautological. Do you think that defining “knowledge as something that is known” is a very useful definition? Does it help us to understand what knowledge is, and how we can come to acquire knowledge?
Strangely I do think this is a useful definition. Once it is understood then it helps in distinguishing between relative and absolute knowledge. The point is that only you can know whether you know something and how you do it.
And how do you know it? How do you know that you know what you think you know, and how do you know that what you think you know is true?
(I hope you can see that an answer “I simply know” would be pretty meaningless).

It all hinges on the definition of knowledge. Plato’s standard account of knowledge seems to me to be much more rational and coherent and useful than Aristotle’s cryptic and tautological claim that “knowledge is the identity of knower and known”. (Rather strange, because by all accounts Aristotle tended to have if anything a more scientific and rational approach to philosophy that did his teacher Plato – but I guess no man is infallible).

According to Plato, knowledge is justified true belief. In other words, for an agent S to know that X, three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions must be satisfied:

1 X is true
2 S believes that X
3 S has evidential justification for believing that X

Would you agree, or would you care to offer a different definition that we could discuss?
(imho unless we can agree on a working definition, further discussion on the meaning of knowledge, and even the use of the terms “knowledge” or “know” in our debate, seems fruitless)

Earlier you claimed “mathematically, for a theory to become knowledge it has to be axiomatised”……. And now you are saying that once axiomatised it is not in fact knowledge?
What I was getting at is that a theory founded on a axiomatic proposition whose truth or falsity is not known takes the form 'if A then B then C...'. Any theorems derived from the proposition would be contingent on a guess. The derived theorem would count as knowledge in the sense that it is knowledge of what follows from the truth of the proposition by a certain logical procedure, but it would not be knowledge in an absolute sense. In the mystical literature the two kinds of knowledge are usually distinguished by using a upper-case 'K' for the absolute kind ('Knowledge' as opposed to 'knowledge'). Perhaps we could adopt this convention to save some confusion.
OK. I tend to agree. We should distinguish between fallible knowledge and infallible Knowledge. However, we still need to define knowledge to start with.

(imho Knowledge is impossible, except in the special but uninteresting case of analytic truths).

I did not claim that “it has been shown that spacetime is quantised”. But perhaps you could explain why you think the idea is irrational?
Well, Zeno of Alea gives a few reductio arguments for its irrationality, as has physicist Peter Lynds more recently.
Would you care to present these arguments so we could discuss them?

Here is mathematician Tobias Dantzig from Number - The Language of Science (1930). This steers us back onto the topic.

"The axiom of Dedekind - "if all points of a straight line fall into two classes, such that every point of the first class lies to the left of any point of the second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the straight line into two portions" - this axiom is just a skillful paraphrase of the fundamental property we attribute to time. Our intuition permits us, by an act of the mind, to sever all time into the two clasess, the past and the future, which are mutually exclusive and yet together comprise all of time, eternity: The now is the partition which separates all the past from all the future; any instant of the past was once a now, any instant of the future will be a now anon, and so any instant may itself act as such a partition. To be sure, of the past we know only disparate instants, yet, by an act of the mind we fill out the gaps; we conceive that between any two instants - no matter how closely these may be associated in our memory - there were other instants, and we postulate the same compactness for the future. This is what we mean by the flow of time.

Furthermore, paradoxical though this may seem, the present is truly irrational in the Dedekind sense of the word, for while it acts as partition it is neither a part of the past nor a part of the future.
Why is this either paradoxical or irrational? Why should it be the case that the idea “the present is neither part of the past nor part of the future” is irrational? This is not shown at all.

Indeed, in an arithmetic based on pure time, if such an arithmetic was at all possible, it is the irrational which would be taken as a matter of course, while all the painstaking efforts of our logic would be directed toward establishing the existence of rational numbers.
A nice piece of mystical prose, but what exactly is the message hidden in here, and where is it shown that the idea “spacetime is quantised” is irrational?

Imho change is measured as the difference between successive instants.
Are you suggesting that change happens between instants, and thus outside time altogether?
What do you mean by “happens”? If we have state S1 at time T1, and state S2 at time T2, then there is clearly a change of state between times T1 and T2. Thus we might say the change of state “happens” between T1 and T2. But it does not follow from this either that T1 and T2 are continuous variables, or that S1 and S2 are continuous variables. We already know that many properties of the physical world are quantised (ie come in discrete values rather than being continuously varying), why then should it not be that case that changes in this physical world also come in discrete values?

I was suggesting that for a person who concludes that solipsism is unfalsifiable there is something of whose existence they are more certain than the conceptual constructs they create from the evidence of their senses.
I’m still confused.
I conclude that solipsism is unfalsifiable by definition (as per above) – and I can justify my belief based on a logical analysis of solipsism – the truth of the unfalsifiability of solipsism is an analytic truth – true by definition. If this is what you mean by “something of whose existence they are more certain than the conceptual constructs they create from the evidence of their senses” then in a very limited sense I agree with you – but an analytic truth (otherwise known as a tautology) tells us nothing useful about the world. It is true, in all logically possible worlds, by definition.

An analytic truth is true even under solipsism. An analytic truth is true, no matter whether the world of our perceptions represents reality or imagination.

Best Regards

Canute

Jul16-06, 07:15 AM

I’m confused. By Popper’s definition, an hypothesis doesn’t count as a scientific hypothesis unless it is falsifiable (by definition), so how can a scientific hypothesis be not falsifiable?
This was what I was saying. By Popper's definition a theory in which solipsism is false is technically unfalsifiable. Of course, other parts of the theory may be falsifiable, but this part of it is not.

If it is true that solipsism is unfalsifiable then by definition solipsism would not be a scientific hypothesis (but that neither makes solipsism true nor false).
Yes, I agree.

When it comes down to the quantum world, our hypotheses about ontic reality may be unfalsifiable. In other words it seems (according to our understanding of QM) that the world cannot be both local and real, but is it reality that is false, or locality, or both? It seems that the question can never be answered – thus rendering the question unscientific.
That seems slightly incorrect to me. We know that naive realism is false and that the world is nonlocal. This is not new knowledge but it's new in physics. Nonlocality seems to me to be a scientific hypothesis or theory, and it seems to be a fact. But why do you say the world cannot be both local and real. This would suggest that its nonlocality implies its reality. I'd say that it cannot be local or real. (Obviously it's real in a sense, but I'm speaking ontologically).

Here’s an attempt at defining Solipsism = the belief that only my conscious “I” has any real existence, and everything in my conscious perceptual world (if I perceive anything at all) is purely a figment of my imagination, including my perceptions of feelings – and we also assume that I am capable of imagining anything and everything.
OK.

Now, how could I go about showing that solipsism is false? Clearly, as far as I am concerned, “I” exist (otherwise the question would not arise in the first place). Thus to show that solipsism is false I would need somehow to show conclusively that there is something within my perceptual world which is NOT a figment of my imagination.
Exactly. The unfalsifiability of solipsism can be known because there is something that cannot be a figment of your imagination, since the fact you can imagine anything demonstrates its existence.

But clearly, if I can imagine anything at all, then it may be the case that everything in my perceptual world IS a figment of my imagination – because I can imagine anything and everything.
Yes, but don't forget there has to be something that is aware of what you are imagining.

Anything that I may care to identify as a possible candidate for “real existence” external to the “I” may not in fact be real. There is no logical proof (to my knowledge) which I could employ which would lead me to the sound conclusion that any particular part of my perceptual world is not imagined by me.
Yep. Actually it's worse than than that, since your 'I' may also be unreal.

Thus, it follows that solipsism is indeed unfalsifiable – the unfalsifiability follows from the definition of (and assumptions inherent in) solipsism. In other words, the fact that solipsism is unfalsifiable is an analytic truth.
It's cannot be an analytic truth since it is only unfalsifiable for a conscious being. The statement says that my consciousness, at the deepest level of analysis, may be all that really exists. The statement therefore makes a claim about consciousness, not simply about words. If it is true or false this would have implications for the world, not just for definitions.

I believe I have shown above that the truth of the proposition 'solipsism is unfalsifiable' follows necessarily from the definition of solipsism.
I see what you're getting at but think you are mising something. Forget solipsism for a moment. Let's just say - everything of which I am conscious may ultimately be illusory. This is not a tautology.

Nobody can show that it is unfalsifiable. Nor can anyone show it is true or false. This follows from the fact that nobody can show that consciousness exists. However, every human being can know it is unfalsifiable, given some ability to think about the issue. Philosophers have always accepted its unfalsifiability, regardless of what else they believe about the world.

[quote]I have explained above why I believe it is unfalsifiable (we can show that it is necessarily unfalsifiable based on the definition of solipsism).
If solipsism is unfalsifiable then it is impossible to show that philosophical materialism is true. Thus, according to your argument, the unverifiability of materialism follows analytically from the definition of solipsism. I feel this doesn't make much sense.

Can you explain why YOU believe solipsism is unfalsifiable? If you cannot, then on what basis do you claim that it IS unfalsifiable? Unjustified belief?
If you do not agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable then we are not going to agree on anything at all. You are the only person I've ever come across who doubts that it is unfalsifiable and I have no arguments that could convince you. I can only suggest you try to show that it is not unfalsifiable. Perhaps the impossibility of doing so might persuade you.

This seems to rest on inference, but it does not define knowledge. Basically you are saying “if I know that my speedgun is working properly, then by inference I also know that the car is doing 90mph” – you have simply defined one knowledge in terms of another knowledge. But how am I to know that my speedgun is working properly in the first place?
Exactly. This is why such knowldge ican never be certain, and thus in this senses is not knowledge. It is relative or provisional knowledge, true as long as other assumptions are true (e.g. that the speedgun is working properly, I read it correctly, I'm not dreaming etc).

Where does my original knowledge come from?
Philosophers generally conclude that all knowledge starts in experience.

And what does this word “knowledge” actually mean?
It has quite a few meanings according the dictionary. I think I gave my dual (absolute/relative) definition earlier.

[quote]In other words, infallible knowledge. I would argue that the only infallible knowledge we can have is based on analytic truths (or tautologies) – ie truths by definition (like the knowledge that “solipsism is unfalsifiable”).
When we know we are feeling pain this is not a matter of the definition of pain and knowing (unfortunately).

I do not believe that we can have infallible knowledge of the world outside of such analytic truths.
If we had no infallible knowledge outside the world of analytic truths we could not know that solipsism is unfalsifiable. To know this one must be conscious. Knowing we are conscious is infallible knowledge but not an analytic truth.

But once again – before we can rationally argue this point we need a “definition” of knowledge which is not tautological To define knowledge as “what is known for certain” is tautological – it defines knowledge (ie what is known) in terms of “what is known”.
Sorry, but I don't know how else to define it. I gave you Aristotle's equivalent definition but presumably you don't like it. I cannot improve on it.

(it’s like defining “free will” as “the ability to act freely”)
Yes. It's exactly like that.

What we need is to agree the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, so that we can say “if these conditions are satisfied, then we possess knowledge; if these conditions are not satisfied, then we do not possess knowledge”. Clearly, to avoid tautology we must avoid using “knowledge” or “know” within our conditions.
True knowledge is identical with its object, says Aristotle, and I'm sticking to that definition. Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for (true) knowledge would be the identity of knower and known. This follows inevitably from the unfalsifiability of solipsism since anything with which we are not identical may not exist, and in principle any process of reasoning may be flawed.

On the contrary, it makes all the difference. One of the characteristics of physical pain is that it has a locus of feeling – we don’t just “feel in physical pain”, that pain seems to be located in a particular part of the body. For the sake of this argument, where would you like to say that this so-called pain is located? Perhaps in your foot? But what if in reality you don’t have any feet? It follows then that the pain you think you are feeling in your foot is an illusion.
Exactly. This is precisely Berkeley's argument. The pain one feels when kicking a rock does not falsify solipsism.

Agreed that it seems reasonable that consciousness is a necessary condition for knowledge – but imho it is far from being a sufficient condition.
I disagree again. To be conscious is to know what it is like to be conscious. Ergo, consciousness is a sufficient condition for knowledge.

This seems inherently tautological to me. “Knower” would seem to be “possessor of knowledge”, and “known” would seem to be the “knowledge possessed”, thus the proposition would become “true knowledge is the identity of the possessor of knowledge and the knowledge possessed” – mystically wonderful perhaps, but not very enlightening is it?
I feel it is very enlightening if one considers what Aristotle was getting at. However, I agree it is a tricky idea to get hold of.

I could use the same form of proposition to “define” any content of consciousness, for example “true happiness is the identity of the possessor of happiness with the happiness possessed”, or “true hatred is the identity of the possessor of hatred with the hatred possessed”, or “true forgiveness is the identity of the possessor of forgiveness with the forgiveness possessed” – all of which I am sure some mystic would love to meditate about (and I’m sure one could sell a book on the subject), but none of which give us a real clue into anything in particular.
Hmm. That's a very cheap shot. Still, you do raise an interesting issue. However, we are talking about knowledge, not happiness, forgiveness etc.

Again, until you can define precisely what you mean by the word knowledge then it seems to me that the word doesn’t really mean anything in particular.
Yes, the problem of knowledge is very difficult. Russell was not sure that it was possible for a human being to know anything at all with certainty. It's certainly impossible to demonstrate that they do, and neurophysiologists have no idea how we do it. Really the problem of knowledge is just the problem of consciousness in disguise. If we cannot show we are conscious then we cannot show we know anything. If we cannot show we know something then we cannot show we are conscious. All we can show is that sometimes we behave just as if we are conscious and know something.

How does your experience tell you that solipsism is unfalsifiable? Can you explain how you arrive at this conclusion based on your experience?
Surely you don't need me to tell you this? You must know as well as I do that solipsism is unfalsifiable. How do you know this? Because you are conscious, just as I am. Solipsism would not be unfalsifiable for a thermostat.

If you disagree, can you tell me by what means you know that solipsism is unfalsifiable? ie where is the rational argument which leads to the conclusion that solipsism is unfalsifiable? In absence of such a rational argument, on what grounds are you claiming it is unfalsifiable?
Well, it depends what you mean by 'rational'. If you mean, do I know that it is unfalsifiable entirely as the result of a process of reasoning then the answer is clearly no. First I have to be conscious, then from this the reasoning process begins. If this were not true then a insentient machine could work out that solipsism is unfalsifiable.

Suggested possible for grounds for believing that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is true : Logical argument (as I have used above); or mathematical proof; or empirical evidence from experience, experiments etc; or divine inspiration; or a mystical vision; or intuition; or guesswork…..
I know it is true from the empirical evidence, namely my own experience of consciousness. So do you. I find it very hard to believe that someone can argue they don't know that solipsism is unfalsifiable, especially someone who argue the statement is an analytic truth.

Surely knowledge entails belief (rather than being the opposite of belief)? Do you think it is possible to claim that one “knows that X” if one does not also “believe that X”?
Personally I reserve the term 'belief' for something one is very sure is true but not quite certain. If one is certain then it is knowledge. However, people use these terms variously and I don't mind defining them differently as long as their meaning is clear in the context.

Example : How could I claim to know that 2 + 2 = 4 unless I also believe that 2 + 2 = 4?
You couldn't.

Of course it does not follow from this that belief entails knowledge. Just because I might believe that the Tooth Fairy exists, it does not follow that I know that the Tooth Fairy exists (because knowledge also entails truth – I cannot know something which is false).
Yes, this is why I like to distinguish between belief and knowledge. This is a good point I think, that we can believe something that is false, but not know it.

And how do you know it? How do you know that you know what you think you know, and how do you know that what you think you know is true? (I hope you can see that an answer “I simply know” would be pretty meaningless).
It's no good blaming me for a problem that has plagued philosophers and mathematicians for centuries. Think of Godel's infinite regress of metasystems, it's the same old problem.

It all hinges on the definition of knowledge. Plato’s standard account of knowledge seems to me to be much more rational and coherent and useful than Aristotle’s cryptic and tautological claim that “knowledge is the identity of knower and known”. (Rather strange, because by all accounts Aristotle tended to have if anything a more scientific and rational approach to philosophy that did his teacher Plato – but I guess no man is infallible).
Is Aristotle fallible because you don't agree with him? That seems a slightly arbitrary way to dismiss a great philosopher, especially since many people completely agree with the reasoning by which he reaches his concusion about knowledge. I'd rather place the fallibility somewhere else.

There is a reason his claim is tautological, and this is what you are missing here. The whole idea of knowledge is tautological. This is why Russell, Frege, Church, Godel et al have had to face so many problems of self-reference. We know what we know we know we know, and so on. But how do we know we know we know? Computationally we cannot, as Godel showed. Neverthless, we do.

According to Plato, knowledge is justified true belief.
Yes. What is easily missed is that the evidential justification for certain knowledge is the identity of knower and known. In the absence of this the knowledge is relative, provisional on the truth of some assumption or other.

OK. I tend to agree. We should distinguish between fallible knowledge and infallible Knowledge. However, we still need to define knowledge to start with.
Well, we've both defined it. The problem is we don't agree on the defintion. Could you give me an example of what you would call certain knowledge? Perhaps we could work from particular instances of knowledge back to a more general definition.

(imho Knowledge is impossible, except in the special but uninteresting case of analytic truths).
This view is consistent with your overall view of knowledge. But surely you know you are conscious?

Why is this either paradoxical or irrational? Why should it be the case that the idea “the present is neither part of the past nor part of the future” is irrational? This is not shown at all.
It would be better to ask a mathematician this question, you'd get a much clearer answer. The Dedekind cut is all about how to treat a continuum as a series of points (whether this is the number line, time or space). This requires the notion of infinitessimals, instants and points, the 'ghosts of departed quantities' I think someone called them. There is a paradox inherent in these concepts. IMHO (!) this is what lay behind Zeno's idea of reality being unchanging, and his famous reductio arguments against a mathematical analysis of motion into successive positions and instants.

A nice piece of mystical prose, but what exactly is the message hidden in here, and where is it shown that the idea “spacetime is quantised” is irrational?
If you're happy to drop the rest of the topics here (temporarily at least) and go with this one then I am also. It's difficult to deal with so many issues at once.

What do you mean by “happens”? If we have state S1 at time T1, and state S2 at time T2, then there is clearly a change of state between times T1 and T2. Thus we might say the change of state “happens” between T1 and T2. But it does not follow from this either that T1 and T2 are continuous variables, or that S1 and S2 are continuous variables. We already know that many properties of the physical world are quantised (ie come in discrete values rather than being continuously varying), why then should it not be that case that changes in this physical world also come in discrete values?
If spacetime is quantised then we have two choices. Either motion/change occurs in an instant or between instants. Both ideas seem paradoxical to me, and I am not alone in this.

If this is what you mean by “something of whose existence they are more certain than the conceptual constructs they create from the evidence of their senses” then in a very limited sense I agree with you – but an analytic truth (otherwise known as a tautology) tells us nothing useful about the world. It is true, in all logically possible worlds, by definition.
I meant that the unfalsifiability of solipsism shows that our consciousness is known with more certainty than anything else, since anything else may be an illusion. We may, for example, be brains in a vat, or may be being tricked by Descartes' evil demon.

An analytic truth is true even under solipsism. An analytic truth is true, no matter whether the world of our perceptions represents reality or imagination.
Agreed.

Phew
Canute

Tournesol

Jul17-06, 08:17 PM

You are confusing flow with sequence.
No confusion at all – I have not once referred to “sequence” in the above paragraph.
However, flow does indeed entail sequence. A flow is a sequential temporal progression. If you are perhaps claiming there is no objective sequence, it follows there also can be no objective flow.

Let me take another crack at it.

Thus if time really does “flow” (and we are to believe that this flow is not an illusion), then all but one of the above timelines (since they reflect different sequences of events) must be an illusion.

Not all the different sequences can be correct.

Which of the above timelines would one think represents the real “flow of time” – the objective timeline or one of the the experienced timelines? It obviously cannot be one of the experienced timelines

It most certainly *could*. Even serendipitously.

(because we each experience different timelines, and none of us is in a privileged position of being able to claim to have direct access to the “absolute flow of time”),

The objective timeline is measured with clocks.

therefore (if any one timeline flows) it must be the objective timeline.

Any of them can flow. They cannot all match the objective sequence (that
is sequnce, not flow). Of course there is really just one timeline, and
certain latencies and delays in the brain that produce different
subjective "timelines". But subjective timelines are nothing
fundamental. If you could make a complete informational model
of the brain and peer into it from the outside, it would
all work within objective time -- and you would be able
to say objectively that some parts of the brain receive information
out-of-order.

But if this is the case, then it follows that we each sometimes perceive time as flowing in the opposite direction to the way it is objectively flowing!

Again, that is sequence, not flow.

Thus, our subjective experience of the flow of time is indeed an illusion

No, no, no. You have got two different things mixed up
here:

(1)whether we have a quale of flow, and (2) whether
we always perceive things in the correct sequence.

We don't always perceive things in the correct sequence, but
that has no impact on (1).

A red object under green light will look black. You cannot infer from
that there are no colour-quale !

(whether the objective timeline really “flows” or not), and we thus cannot infer from our perceived or experienced flow of time that objective time is actually flowing at all.

Doesn't follow.

Each subjective “instant” of experienced time contains information correlated with both antecedent and consequent “instants”.

well, antecedent anyway.

The conscious experience within each pigeon-hole, within each instant of time, would be exactly the same as it was when we illuminated the pigeon-holes in the “correct” sequence.

But what would the experience of the *whole* system of pigeon-holes be like ?

In other words, the subjective conscious experience within each instant is independent of the objective sequence of illumination of the pigeon-holes. The subjective consciously experienced instant in pigeon-hole 2341 is just the same, no matter whether the previously (in our objective timeframe) illuminated pigeon-hole was 2340 or 1654. We could objectively replay the pigeon-holes in any sequence, forward, random, reverse, and it would make no difference as far as the subjective conscious experience encapsulated within the instants in each pigeon-hole is concerned. Indeed, we could illuminate all of the pigeon-holes simultaneously (using a large floodlight instead of our small flashlight), and the subjective consciously experienced instants of time within each pigeon-hole would be just the same as if they had been illuminated individually in sequence. In other words – there need be no objective “flow of time” at all, since the subjective illusion of the “flow of time” is already encoded within the subjective “arrow of time” within each temporal instant.

There will be no subjective flow of time in that scenario. Instead "I" will have some
sort of simulatenous 4D consciousness. I would not merely remember past events ,
but I would be conscious of them in the past while also being conscious of
present events in the present. You are not following through
your own premmisses. If the "light" means "consciousness on"
the illuminating everytng simultanously mean simultaneous-conscious-throughout-personal-history.

One might ask “but why do I experience only one instant of time at a time, and why is it THIS particular instant of time?” Think about it. In fact, your conscious experience experiences EVERY instant of time at which your conscious experience exists. No particular instant is more special than any other, but at each and every one of those instants in time you could ask yourself the same question – “why am I experiencing this instant rather than any other?”. The question is meaningless – because by definition you do consciously experience every instant of time in which your consciousness exists, at that particular time.

But one at a time. I remember the past, I am not aware of it simultaneously with the present.

OTOH , if flow is objective, that easily explains why there is subjective flow too. There is subjective flow because consciousness is rooted in the phsycal brain.
Because consciousness is located “in time” rather than outside of time is why we have the intuitive subjective feeling of the flow of time – interpreting this as a "real flow of time" is the “easy explanation”.

What does "in time" mean to a flow-denier (AKA Block theorist) ? "Time" is just another spatial
dimension to a block theorist.

But as we have seen, the inference of objective flow from subjective flow is invalid, and as we have seen above there is in fact no need to posit any flow at all in order to explain the subjective experience. What is the rational reason to posit something (an objective flow) which is not needed to explain any empirical data, especially when that something (the objective flow) is itself in need of further explanation (which is yet another problem)?

Everything is in need of further explanation.

while there is a "choice", your prefered option is much less explanatory than mine.
On the contrary, my interpretation is complete whereas yours is not. Mine explains the subjective experience (illusion) of flow as a direct consequence of the psychological arrow of time, without requiring any objective “flow” at all, and without the need to postulate anything special about the subjective “now”.

All you are doing is holding up Sequence and saying "Behold, this is Flow!".

Well, it isn't.

(Bearing in mind that nothig corresponds to the torch
in Block Universe theory -- either everythig is illuminated
equally, or nothing is at all).

Your interpretation explains the subjective experience of flow at the cost of postulating something mysterious called the objective flow of time, for which you have no further explanation, and your interpretation presumably also entails something special and unique about “now” which also begs further explanation.

Whatever. Block theorists can't explain why there is an extra quasi-spatial dimension. Why isn't
the universe a single 3D snaphsot ? Every theory leaves something unexplained.

The problem of explaining the “feeling of the flow of time” is essentially similar to the problem of explaining the “feeling of free will” – the “easy and intuitive” explanation is that our feeling of free will is due to the objective existence of something called “free will” (but this “free will” seems itself to be beyond coherent explanation), whereas the rational explanation is that our feeling of free will is an illusion, caused simply by our lack of detailed knowledge about our own internal decision-making processes.

Free will *is* capable of explanation.

Tournesol

Jul17-06, 08:55 PM

My ground for saying that there is no such thing as time itself is not that it doesn’t exist separately from specific instances. My grounds are 1) that we cannot even conceive of time without invoking a conception of something moving, and 2) that our notion of time is an abstraction from the motions of things. When we measure time we are comparing one motion with another. Motion can be sensed with several of our senses.

To move is to be in different places at different times. v=dx/dt

Time cannot be sensed at all. At most all we can do is produce clocks that count 86,400 seconds in a day. There is nothing universal about a 24 hour day, a 60 minute hour, or a 60 second minute. If I remember correctly, those choices were made in ancient Mesopotamia.

Inches and grammes and coulombs are arbitrary too.

Charge and mass are not abstractions from reality. They are known to exist because they can be sensed. Charge can be sensed and even measured by the force it produces, as in a gold foil electrometer.

Charge is inferred from force and motion. Time is inferred from the position
of clock-hands

The notion of time running backwards implies that all motions would be reversed and that all history would retrace its steps backward. It’s not possible. There are too many things that prohibit the reversal of time. Water can’t change its direction through a check valve. Electrons cannot change their direction through a diode or transistor.
If you reverse all the laws of physics ,
you reverse all the laws of physics. The problems
you mention will "cancel through".
Did you mean to say that if you reverse time you reverse all the laws of physics?

What change to which laws(s) of physics would allow water to flow backwards through a check valve?

You err if you equate a reversal of time with a reversal of all the laws of physics. Some essential things in physics, such as the resolution of forces, are time invariant.

If they are time-invariant, a fortiori they can be reversed. Time-invariance
doesn't mean reversal is impossible, it means it makes no difference !

What reversals of Newton’s first two laws would “cancel through” the effects of a reversal of time?

if they are time-invariant, all of them. Or they would nto be invariant.

More importantly, what would Newton’s first and second laws look like if the physics were reversed?

what any time-invariant law looks like under time-reversal. Left as an exercise to the reader.

Tournesol, thanks for pointing out the error in my description of the effect of time running backward on the spinning earth. Let me try anew. Newton’s apple fell from the tree and hit the ground. If time had then reversed, the apple would have risen up to the tree. The only way to explain that would be that gravity had become a repulsive force (reversing a law of nature).

Nope. Reverse the "t" in Newton' equations and the "x" also reverses wihtout any
further changes.

In this last example a reversal of time requires the reversal of a physical law that contradicts the reversal of time. Can you give us an example of a reversal of time and a reversal of laws of physics that could result in a playback of history without contradiction?

Pick any time-invariant law...

moving finger

Jul19-06, 01:38 AM

This was what I was saying. By Popper's definition a theory in which solipsism is false is technically unfalsifiable. Of course, other parts of the theory may be falsifiable, but this part of it is not.
Assumptions need not always be falsifiable (if they were always falsifiable, we would not need to assume them, would we?). An hypothesis plus assumptions simply says “given these assumptions, this hypothesis says that such and such should be true”. Popper’s definition re falsifiability applies to the hypothesis, not to the assumptions.

Do you know of any scientific hypothesis in which solipsism (or the denial thereof) figures as a part of the working hypothesis (as opposed to being a part of the underlying assumptions)?

That seems slightly incorrect to me. We know that naive realism is false and that the world is nonlocal.
Do we indeed? Check the Many Worlds Interpretation of QM – this interpretation is compatible with the assumption of locality. And depending on exactly how one defines locality, Cramer's Transactional Interpretation can also be compatible with the assumption of locality.

But why do you say the world cannot be both local and real. This would suggest that its nonlocality implies its reality. I'd say that it cannot be local or real.
Oh Canute, really! To say that “X cannot be both Y and Z” is not the same as saying “X cannot be either Y or Z”. This is elementary logic for goodness sake! Thus if I say that X “cannot be both Y and Z”, it does NOT follow (as you claim) that I am saying “not-Y implies Z”.

(Obviously it's real in a sense, but I'm speaking ontologically).
It would be interesting to know in what sense you think the world is real if you think it is ontologically not real. Obviously solipsism would fit with the notion that the world (outside of the conscious “I”) is ontologically not real – but you’re surely not suggesting that you believe solipsism is true, are you? If so then I’m out of here.

Yes, but don't forget there has to be something that is aware of what you are imagining.
So what? Solipsism does not posit that the conscious “I “ is unreal.

It's cannot be an analytic truth since it is only unfalsifiable for a conscious being. The statement says that my consciousness, at the deepest level of analysis, may be all that really exists. The statement therefore makes a claim about consciousness, not simply about words.If it is true or false this would have implications for the world, not just for definitions.
The definition of solipsism assumes an “I” within the definition. That’s what definitions do, it’s in their nature to make assumptions. A bachelor is defined as an unmarried man, but we do not claim that the proposition “all bachelors are unmarried” is therefore NOT an analytic truth simply because there are possible worlds where men do not exist.

In a world where men do not exist, we might claim that the statement “all bachelors are unmarried” is meaningless. In the same way, in a world where consciousness does not exist we might claim that the statement “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is meaningless.

But the logical possibility of other worlds where men and consciousness do not exist has no bearing on OUR world, where men and consciousness DO exist. In our world, “all bachelors are unmarried” has a meaning, and it is an analytic truth. In our world, “solipsism is unfalsifiable” also has a meaning, and it also is an analytic truth.

I see what you're getting at but think you are mising something. Forget solipsism for a moment. Let's just say - everything of which I am conscious may ultimately be illusory.
That seems like solipsism to me.

Nobody can show that it is unfalsifiable.
Please show where my argument that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is an analytic truth is incorrect.

Nor can anyone show it is true or false. This follows from the fact that nobody can show that consciousness exists.
No, it follows from the fact that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is an analytic truth.

However, every human being can know it is unfalsifiable, given some ability to think about the issue. Philosophers have always accepted its unfalsifiability, regardless of what else they believe about the world.
I have asked you many times in this thread to show that it is unfalsifiable, instead of simply stating it. You have not done so, indeed you reject my argument that the unfalsifiablity of solipsism is an analytic truth, you even claim above that “Nobody can show that it is unfalsifiable” – thus on what basis do you claim that it IS unfalsifiable?

If solipsism is unfalsifiable then it is impossible to show that philosophical materialism is true.
Please show (with a rational, coherent logical argument if possible) why this follows.

Has anyone claimed that it IS possible to show that philosophical materialism is true? How have they shown this? (Again a rational, coherent logical argument if possible would be much appreciated).

If you do not agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable then we are not going to agree on anything at all. You are the only person I've ever come across who doubts that it is unfalsifiable and I have no arguments that could convince you. I can only suggest you try to show that it is not unfalsifiable. Perhaps the impossibility of doing so might persuade you.
Canute – I thought that we were having a rational and constructive discussion up to this point, but the above comment of yours suggests to me that you are replying to my posts without reading them. Many times in this thread I have claimed, and I have shown, that the proposition “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is an analytic truth – and now you claim that I do not agree that solipsism is unfalsifiable?????

With the greatest respect to you, it seems either that you do not bother to try and understand my posts, or that you have trouble understanding plain English, in either case there isn’t much point in continuing our discussion.

One last time, for the avoidance of doubt – you are claiming (without any supporting argument) that solipsism is unfalsifiable, but you do not agree with my argument that “solipsism is unfalsifiable” is an analytic truth – please therefore explain on what basis you claim solipsism is unfalsifiable.

Canute - I’ll refrain from responding to the rest of your post until we clear this up, because it’s a waste of time to continue any further if you don’t read.

Best Regards

But what would the experience of the *whole* system of pigeon-holes be like ?
There is no experience of the *whole* system in entirety. Conscious experience is localized in time and space (yes I know some people claim to be able to delocalize their consciousness over the whole of space or even the whole of time – but to me that’s just BS).

There will be no subjective flow of time in that scenario. Instead "I" will have some
sort of simulatenous 4D consciousness. I would not merely remember past events ,
but I would be conscious of them in the past while also being conscious of
present events in the present. You are not following through
your own premmisses. If the "light" means "consciousness on"
the illuminating everytng simultanously mean simultaneous-conscious-throughout-personal-history.
You misunderstand the idea of the metaphor. “Light on” means “consciousness on”, but it does not mean there is any communication between the conscious experience in different pigeon holes. Each conscious experience of each instant of time is located within a single pigeon-hole, there is no conscious communication between them (over and above the existing physical causal connections between adjacent pigeon-holes). Illuminating 1000 pigeon-holes simultaneously just means that we get 1000 separate instants of conscious experience enacted in parallel, but these instants do not communicate anything to each other, the experience in each pigeon-hole is just the same as if they had been illuminated one by one, in sequence.

But one at a time. I remember the past, I am not aware of it simultaneously with the present.
I have never said that illuminating all pigeon-holes simultaneously produces a single communicating conscious experience where past and present are experienced together as one conscious experience – this is your misinterpretation of the idea. Illuminating 1000 pigeon-holes simultaneously simply produces 1000 parallel but non-communicating conscious experiences. The individual experiences would be exactly the same as if each pigeon-hole were illuminated in sequence.

What does "in time" mean to a flow-denier (AKA Block theorist) ? "Time" is just another spatial
dimension to a block theorist.
“In time” means from within the 4D block universe. It is because our conscious experience of the universe is from within that same universe, and we consciously perceive of an arrow of time from within that universe, that we have the subjective impression of a flow of time. If we could “stand outside” the 4D universe and view it from a 5th dimension (which we cannot) we would see the illusion for what it is.

All you are doing is holding up Sequence and saying "Behold, this is Flow!".
No, I am saying the arrow of time provides the illusion of a flow of time to any conscious entity that exists within that time dimension. Only by standing outside of time (viewing from the 5th dimension) would we be able to see that there is no flow at all.

(Bearing in mind that nothig corresponds to the torch
in Block Universe theory -- either everythig is illuminated
equally, or nothing is at all).
The torch and pigeon-hole metaphor is just an attempt to provide a way of looking at (examining) the problem from another perspective – it’s not meant to be taken literally as a model of how the world works. The metaphor of the floodlight shows that all instants of conscious experience could be enacted “in parallel” (when viewed from the 5th dimension), and yet we as 4D conscious beings would still think (from within our 4 dimensions) that we are instead experiencing each conscious moment sequentially, and we would perceive it as a flow of time.

Whatever. Block theorists can't explain why there is an extra quasi-spatial dimension. Why isn't
the universe a single 3D snaphsot ?
Because it is a single 4D snapshot.

Maybe there is another universe “out there” which is a single 3D snapshot (3 spatial dimensions and no time dimension) – but such a universe would not contain sentient beings. Life could not evolve in a single 3D snapshot.

4 dimensions (3 of space and 1 of time) would seem to be the essential minimum geometric conditions required for sentient beings to evolve. But none of this requires any objective “flow” of time – it requires only a time dimension.

Free will *is* capable of explanation.
I didn’t say it isn’t. I can explain the existence of the Tooth Fairy, but that doesn’t make my explanation coherent.

Best Regards

Tournesol

Jul19-06, 06:00 AM

(Obviously it's real in a sense, but I'm speaking ontologically).

It would be interesting to know in what sense you think the world is real if you think it is ontologically not real.

When physicists talk about "local realism" , the "realsim" they are talking about is the princuiple that objects have pre-existing values corresponding
to any possible measurement. Lack of realsim in that
sense doens't add up to objects not existing at all,
just to them existing fuzzilly.

Canute

Jul19-06, 06:26 AM

moving finger

Shall we call it a day here? We're going nowhere. If you are convinced that 'solipsism is unfalsifiable' is an analytic truth then anything else I say won't make sense to you. It'll come up again I'm sure. If we keep going one of us is going to lose their composure.

regards
Canute

Tournesol

Jul19-06, 07:05 AM

But what would the experience of the *whole* system of pigeon-holes be like ?

There is no experience of the *whole* system in entirety. Conscious experience is localized in time and space (yes I know some people
claim to be able to delocalize their consciousness over the whole of space or even the whole of time – but to me that’s just BS).

That is how consciousness seems to work. However, the question is what the implications of Block Universe/B-series
theory are. The BU/BS theory doesn't have the resources to switch on individual moments of time one after the other
--that would require an A series.
Either all moments are conscious or none are. It is clearly not the case
that none are, so all are. That is the predictions of the BU/BS theory. And
it doens't match what is observed. So the BU/BS theory is wrong.

There will be no subjective flow of time in that scenario. Instead "I" will have some
sort of simulatenous 4D consciousness. I would not merely remember past events ,
but I would be conscious of them in the past while also being conscious of
present events in the present. You are not following through
your own premmisses. If the "light" means "consciousness on"
the illuminating everytng simultanously mean simultaneous-conscious-throughout-personal-history.

You misunderstand the idea of the metaphor. “Light on” means “consciousness on”, but it does not mean there is any
communication between the conscious experience in different pigeon holes. Each conscious experience of each instant of time is
located within a single pigeon-hole,

Why ? Why isn't conscious experience located in individual neurons? Why does
individualisation apply ot time and not to space ? Flow-of-Time/A-series theorists
can claim this because it follows naturally form their premises. But BU/BS theorists
regrard time as being almost the same, or the same, as space.

there is no conscious communication between them (over and above the existing physical causal
connections between adjacent pigeon-holes).

Well, quite. The causal connection between neurons are enough to allow
consciousness to spread over the brain. Why aren't the causal connections
between moments in time enough to allow consciousness to spread over the fourth dimension ?
Again, the whole point of BU/BS is that time is just like space.

Illuminating 1000 pigeon-holes simultaneously just means that we get 1000 separate instants
of conscious experience enacted in parallel, but these instants do not communicate anything to each other,

They have "already" communicated, in that subsequent moments contain information-traces from previous ones.

the experience in each
pigeon-hole is just the same as if they had been illuminated one by one, in sequence.

The experience is all-or-nothing in BU/BS.

But one at a time. I remember the past, I am not aware of it simultaneously with the present.

I have never said that illuminating all pigeon-holes simultaneously produces a single communicating conscious experience where
past and present are experienced together as one conscious experience – this is your misinterpretation of the idea.
Illuminating 1000 pigeon-holes simultaneously simply produces 1000 parallel but non-communicating conscious experiences.
The individual experiences would be exactly the same as if each pigeon-hole were illuminated in sequence.

All you are doing is holding up Sequence and saying "Behold, this is Flow!".

No, I am saying the arrow of time provides the illusion of a flow of time to any conscious entity that exists within that
time dimension. Only by standing outside of time (viewing from the 5th dimension) would we be able to see that there is no
flow at all.

(Bearing in mind that nothig corresponds to the torch
in Block Universe theory -- either everythig is illuminated
equally, or nothing is at all).

The torch and pigeon-hole metaphor is just an attempt to provide a way of looking at (examining) the problem from
another perspective – it’s not meant to be taken literally as a model of how the world works. The metaphor of the
floodlight shows that all instants of conscious experience could be enacted “in parallel” (when viewed from the 5th dimension),
and yet we as 4D conscious beings would still think (from within our 4 dimensions) that we are instead experiencing each
conscious moment sequentially, and we would perceive it as a flow of time.

That doesn't follow. Under the BU/BS theory, we are 4D, so why wouldn't we have
a 4D condciousness ? If spatially separated neurons can form the same consciousness,
why can't temporally separated ones ?

Whatever. Block theorists can't explain why there is an extra quasi-spatial dimension. Why isn't
the universe a single 3D snaphsot ?

Because it is a single 4D snapshot.
Maybe there is another universe “out there” which is a single 3D snapshot (3 spatial dimensions and no time dimension) –
but such a universe would not contain sentient beings. Life could not evolve in a single 3D snapshot.
4 dimensions (3 of space and 1 of time) would seem to be the essential minimum geometric conditions required for sentient
beings to evolve. But none of this requires any objective “flow” of time – it requires only a time dimension.

How can there be evolution without a flow of time ?

Free will *is* capable of explanation.

I didn’t say it isn’t. I can explain the existence of the Tooth Fairy, but that doesn’t make my explanation coherent.

Free will is capable of coherent explanation. You have not been able to show otherwise.

Drachir

Jul24-06, 08:34 PM

The notion that solipsism is unfalsifiable is a widespread idea that has appeared in seven posts of this thread. Although there have been some attempts at refuting that idea, they have relied on indirect or external attacks. One such indirect attack tries to place the language used by the solipsist into a world outside the solipsist by virtue of the societal origins of language and the external world implied by the notion of a society. However, that is an implication that the solipsist can readily discount by pointing out that a notion is an idea, and all ideas are, after all, merely objects of the solipsist’s consciousness.

The claim has been made that a non-solipsist cannot convince a solipsist of the fallacy of solipsism because the solipsist considers the non-solipsist to be only an object of the solipsist’s consciousness. It has also been claimed that the solipsist cannot falsify solipsism because the solipsist cannot prove that an outside world is anything more than merely an object of the solipsist’s consciousness. Thus, solipsism is held to be unfalsifiable. Nonetheless, I may have found out how a solipsist might falsify solipsism.

Solipsism is the theory held by a solipsist that the solipsist is the sole existent. As a consequence of holding that theory, the solipsist also holds that what a non-solipsist might call the outside world – including the solipsist’s body -- is only the content or object of the solipsist’s consciousness. The solipsist, therefore, can only consider a solipsist to be a disembodied consciousness that is the sole existent. Therefore, the solipsist considers the subjects and contents of the solipsist’s consciousness to be completely dependent on the solipsist’s consciousness. The solipsist considers solipsism to be unfalsifiable since any manifestations of things that might be used to verify an external world are merely the subjects or contents of the solipsist’s consciousness.

In all other respects the solipsist is similar to a non-solipsist and can be conscious of perceptions and thoughts, can learn, can recall memories, can experience memory lapses, can find meaning in the words used to express the solipsistic theory, can think logically, and is not omniscient, omnipotent, or eternal. The solipsist remembers not having always understood the meaning of many words, including the word solipsism. The solipsist remembers having had perceptions of dictionaries and of having noted that words can only be defined in terms of other words. The solipsist also remembers having learned that the unknown can only be defined in terms of the known.

In light of that last remembrance, the solipsist deduces that the solipsist’s definition of the solipsist’s first unknown must have been done in terms of what the solipsist already knew, i.e., some already-held knowledge. The solipsist notes that the solipsist’s first conscious act had to have been the act of identifying and defining the content of the solipsist’s first perception. That was the solipsist’s first meeting with the unknown. Since no perception or act of consciousness could precede that first perception or first act of consciousness, the solipsist becomes aware that such an act implied that the requisite already-held knowledge could not have been acquired from perceptions by the solipsist’s consciousness.

The solipsist therefore concludes that any such already-held knowledge must be independent of the solipsist’s perceptions and consciousness. The solipsist then realizes that since that already-held knowledge is independent of the solipsist’s consciousness, the solipsist’s consciousness cannot be the sole existent. The solipsist has found a contradiction to the solipsist’s definition of a solipsist and has thereby falsified solipsism.

selfAdjoint

Jul24-06, 08:56 PM

The solipsist remembers having had perceptions of dictionaries and of having noted that words can only be defined in terms of other words. The solipsist also remembers having learned that the unknown can only be defined in terms of the known.

In light of that last remembrance, the solipsist deduces that the solipsist’s definition of the solipsist’s first unknown must have been done in terms of what the solipsist already knew, i.e., some already-held knowledge. The solipsist notes that the solipsist’s first conscious act had to have been the act of identifying and defining the content of the solipsist’s first perception. That was the solipsist’s first meeting with the unknown. Since no perception or act of consciousness could precede that first perception or first act of consciousness, the solipsist becomes aware that such an act implied that the requisite already-held knowledge could not have been acquired from perceptions by the solipsist’s consciousness.

I don't find this at all convincing. All this talk about what the solipsist must conclude assumes that the solipsist is a logical machine. I am not such, and were I a solipsist I should rather accept my awareness as an unanalyzable "Fall" (in the existentialist sense - a situation we find ourselves in and have no account of).

Drachir

Jul24-06, 10:04 PM

selfAdjoint, I did not refer to what a solipsist must conclude. I did refer to how a solipsist might falsify solipsism. As for "logical machine" I merely said that the solipsist can think logically. You know, as you and I can.

moving finger

Jul24-06, 11:29 PM

Free will is capable of coherent explanation. You have not been able to show otherwise.
Show me an alleged explanation of free will, and I will show you that it is either incomplete or incoherent.

Obviously, I cannot show that a particular explanation is incoherent if there is no explanation, or if the explanation is incomplete - this is the way that most libertarians avoid the charge of incoherence, by refusing to explain how their pet notion of free will works, and clouding it in mysticism, smoke, mirrors and claiming "and then a miracle occurs....." - obviously a non-explanation cannot be shown to be incoherent, but then a non-explanation isn't worth the paper that its not written on. :smile:

Best Regards

moving finger

Jul24-06, 11:39 PM

The solipsist notes that the solipsist’s first conscious act had to have been the act of identifying and defining the content of the solipsist’s first perception. That was the solipsist’s first meeting with the unknown. Since no perception or act of consciousness could precede that first perception or first act of consciousness, the solipsist becomes aware that such an act implied that the requisite already-held knowledge could not have been acquired from perceptions by the solipsist’s consciousness.
This does not follow. It is quite possible that the solipsist's consciousness is the only thing in existence, and the first act of that consciousness was to imagine a perception. You seem to be assuming that the first perception must be grounded in some reality external to consciousness, but there is no a priori reason why this must be the case.

You talk of "knowledge" - but what do you mean by the word? The conventional analysis of knowledge defines it as justified true belief. Now there is no way that the solipsist can know for certain that his beliefs are true, therefore any knowledge he thinks he has is simply a "belief about" knowledge. The solipsist has beliefs (beliefs which he may even claim are justified beliefs), but to make the leap of faith from belief to knowledge entails that those beliefs are true - and the solipsist has no access to certain truth (any more than you or I).

Your argument is therefore unsound.

Best Regards

moving finger

Jul25-06, 12:03 AM

That is how consciousness seems to work. However, the question is what the implications of Block Universe/B-series
theory are. The BU/BS theory doesn't have the resources to switch on individual moments of time one after the other
--that would require an A series.
Either all moments are conscious or none are. It is clearly not the case
that none are, so all are. That is the predictions of the BU/BS theory. And
it doens't match what is observed. So the BU/BS theory is wrong.
All moments (= temporal plane slices in 4D spacetime) are conscious - but from the conscious perspective "within" each moment (temporal plane slice in 4D spacetime) you have no direct awareness of the other moments (other temporal plane slices in 4D spacetime). Just because all moments are conscious does not mean they are all conscious "at the same time" - because the (internal) time is different for each moment, and there is no other dimension of "background time" against which the 4D spacetime is "played out"! It is static. Its the same problem as "if time is flowing - what is it flowing relative to?" - the question is meaningless, because time is not flowing (therefore it is not flowing relative to anything).

Why ? Why isn't conscious experience located in individual neurons? Why does individualisation apply ot time and not to space ? Flow-of-Time/A-series theorists can claim this because it follows naturally form their premises. But BU/BS theorists regrard time as being almost the same, or the same, as space.
I agree that consciousness must be delocalised over a finite region of 4D spacetime, but this does not mean that time flows, any more than it means that "space flows".

Well, quite. The causal connection between neurons are enough to allow
consciousness to spread over the brain. Why aren't the causal connections between moments in time enough to allow consciousness to spread over the fourth dimension ?
Again, the whole point of BU/BS is that time is just like space.
I agree that consciousness must be delocalised over a finite region of 4D spacetime, but this does not mean that time flows, and more than it means that "space flows".

They have "already" communicated, in that subsequent moments contain information-traces from previous ones.
Agreed, but that communication is limited to times and spaces which are in direct causal contact with the spacetime in question. The only information in your brain linked to previous times is contained in the causally dependent brain-states which result from those direct causal contacts. You have no conscious connection with those other spacetimes except via the information provided from those causal connections.

That doesn't follow. Under the BU/BS theory, we are 4D, so why wouldn't we have a 4D condciousness ? If spatially separated neurons can form the same consciousness, why can't temporally separated ones ?
Consciousness is delocalised over a small, but only a very small, region of spacetime, I agree.

Our consciousness is 4D, but the relations between different temporal "slices" of 4D spacetime is mediated by intervening slices. In the same way that a person when in New York is spatially (and temporally) separated from that same person when in New Delhi, your consciousness in 1996 is temporally (and spatially) separated from your consciousness in 2006 - they are separate instances of consciousness in spacetime.

How can there be evolution without a flow of time ?
Because evolution is simply the deterministic relation between different temporal plane slices in a block 4D spacetime. Why need there be any flow?

Free will is capable of coherent explanation. You have not been able to show otherwise.
See earlier response (post #84).

Best Regards

Tournesol

Jul25-06, 09:33 AM

I don't find this at all convincing. All this talk about what the solipsist must conclude assumes that the solipsist is a logical machine. I am not such, and were I a solipsist I should rather accept my awareness as an unanalyzable "Fall" (in the existentialist sense - a situation we find ourselves in and have no account of).

Then you would be the less anoying osrt of solipsist, the ones
who don't attempt to persuade others. The rest do
indeed rely on logic, since they can't rely on (3rd person) empiricisim.

I thought Drachir's comment was along the right lines, (although it is only
one of a number of objections against to "unfalsifiable" solipsism).

Solipsists have to rely on their 1st person experience. and our
experience is that we learn things and are surprised by things -- things
that "come into" our consciousness from "outside".

Tournesol

Jul25-06, 09:35 AM

Show me an alleged explanation of free will, and I will show you that it is either incomplete or incoherent

I have done, and you haven't.

moving finger

Jul25-06, 10:11 AM

I have done, and you haven't.
Are you referring to your Darwinian model here?

That's not an "explanation of free will", it's a simple model which combines determinism and random behaviour. Why do you think it has "free will"?

Best Regards

Tournesol

Jul25-06, 10:39 AM

Are you referring to your Darwinian model here?

That's not an "explanation of free will", it's a simple model which combines determinism and random behaviour. Why do you think it has "free will"?

("That's not water , it is just hydrogen combined with oxygen!")

It combines CHDO and rationality. Look at the definition
of FW at the beginning.

Tournesol

Jul25-06, 10:39 AM

All moments (= temporal plane slices in 4D spacetime) are conscious - but from the conscious perspective "within" each moment (temporal plane slice in 4D spacetime) you have no direct awareness of the other moments (other temporal plane slices in 4D spacetime).

The implication of the BU/BS theory is that you should have. I agree you don't.
That is how the BU/BS theory doesn't match observation.

Just because all moments are conscious does not mean they are all conscious "at the same time"

It does under the BU/BS theory, because being conscious one-after the
other would require an A series, which it explictly lacks.

- because the (internal) time is different for each moment,

what do you mean by "internal time" ? The mental contents
are certainly different. But, by hypothesis, they call
co-exist in the fourth dimension.

and there is no other dimension of "background time" against which the 4D spacetime is "played out"!

Exactly. The BU is no different from 4D space. The fourth dimension is only
time in an "honourary" sense. Every moment along the 4th dimension is "on
all fours" with all others, so there is no way individual moments
can be picked out to be conscious. They either all are equally, or none are.

It is static. Its the same problem as "if time is flowing - what is it flowing relative to?" - the question is meaningless, because time is not flowing (therefore it is not flowing relative to anything).

The flow of time is subectively evident. It can be explained by Becoming without the paradoxes of the "motion" metaphor.

Why ? Why isn't conscious experience located in individual neurons? Why does individualisation apply to time and not to space ?
Flow-of-Time/A-series theorists can claim this because it follows naturally form their premises. But BU/BS theorists regrard time as being almost the same, or the same, as space.

I agree that consciousness must be delocalised over a finite region of 4D spacetime, but this does not mean that time flows, any more than it means that "space flows".

BU theory predicts that consciousness must be much less localised than is observed.
BU theory is therefore false.
Either time flows, or there is a block universe.
Since BU is false, FoT must be true.

They have "already" communicated, in that subsequent moments contain information-traces from previous ones.

Agreed, but that communication is limited to times and spaces which are in direct causal contact with the spacetime in question. The only information in your brain linked to previous times is contained in the causally dependent brain-states which result from those direct causal contacts. You have no conscious connection with those other spacetimes except via the information provided from those causal connections.

Which me ? The me *now*...the me *now*...?

Each "me" at each point in time is in exactly the same boat, according to BU/BS.

Either they are all conscious, or none are.

So the me at time T is conscious, and the me at time T-1 is conscious.

Now, you can argue that there is no reason that me(T-1) should have
consicous awarness of me(T), because me(T-1) lacks information about
me(T). But the reverse is not the case. Why shouldn't me(T) share me(T-1)'s
conscious experience ? The natural model would be that my consicousness
expands as it goes on, just as my information does

Conscious(T0)
Conscious(T0+T1)
Conscious(T0+T1+T2)

rather than the perceived

Conscious(T0)
Conscious(T1)
Conscious(T2)

That doesn't follow. Under the BU/BS theory, we are 4D, so why wouldn't we have a 4D consciousness ? If spatially separated neurons can form the same consciousness, why can't temporally separated ones ?

Consciousness is delocalised over a small, but only a very small, region of spacetime, I agree.

Consciousness is delocalised over a small area of space, because the rich causal
interaction inside the cranium do not extend outside the cranium. The perceived delocalisation
is exactly line with the causal evidence--as far a s space is concerned.

However, every brains state of your existence is casually connected to every other
one. So we would expect, on the BU/BS theory, that you cosnciousness is "delocalised"
to you lifetime -- and not just a moment.

Our consciousness is 4D, but the relations between different temporal "slices" of 4D spacetime is mediated by intervening slices. In the same way that a person when in New York is spatially (and temporally) separated from that same person when in New Delhi, your consciousness in 1996 is temporally (and spatially) separated from your consciousness in 2006 - they are separate instances of consciousness in spacetime.

Spatial separation doesn't matter so long as there is casual connection. (E.g. split-brain patients).

How can there be evolution without a flow of time ?

Because evolution is simply the deterministic relation between different temporal plane slices in a block 4D spacetime.

Why should future events need to be causally determined by laws if they exist already ?

Drachir

Jul28-06, 02:44 PM

moving finger wrote in #85:Originally Posted by Drachir
The solipsist notes that the solipsist’s first conscious act had to have been the act of identifying and defining the content of the solipsist’s first perception. That was the solipsist’s first meeting with the unknown. Since no perception or act of consciousness could precede that first perception or first act of consciousness, the solipsist becomes aware that such an act implied that the requisite already-held knowledge could not have been acquired from perceptions by the solipsist’s consciousness.
This does not follow. It is quite possible that the solipsist's consciousness is the only thing in existence, and the first act of that consciousness was to imagine a perception. You seem to be assuming that the first perception must be grounded in some reality external to consciousness, but there is no a priori reason why this must be the case.
Your are correct in stating that there is no reason why the first perception must be grounded in some reality external to consciousness. The first perception might well be a hallucination. However, for the first perception to be meaningful (even if a hallucination) it must be identified or defined. However, identification and definition require some already-held knowledge, since the unknown can only be defined in terms of the known. That already-held knowledge could not have been consciously acquired prior to that first act of consciousness. That already-held knowledge, therefore, is independent of consciousness. Hence, consciousness cannot be the sole existent. That already-held knowledge, the bootstrap data so to speak, is inherent in the ‘pre-wiring’ of the brain. First experiences (first inputs) could have no meaning if they did not somehow relate to that already-held knowledge (bootstrap data).

moving finger continued: You talk of "knowledge" - but what do you mean by the word? The conventional analysis of knowledge defines it as justified true belief. Now there is no way that the solipsist can know for certain that his beliefs are true, therefore any knowledge he thinks he has is simply a "belief about" knowledge. The solipsist has beliefs (beliefs which he may even claim are justified beliefs), but to make the leap of faith from belief to knowledge entails that those beliefs are true - and the solipsist has no access to certain truth (any more than you or I).

Your argument is therefore unsound.If knowledge is defined as justified true belief, and if there is no access to certain truth , then we cannot justify the truth of a belief and, hence, cannot have knowledge. Nonetheless, in your response quoted above you have made several claims to knowledge. Perhaps we can improve on, and simplify, the definition of knowledge.

A golfer goes to the pro shop at his club on a Thursday afternoon and requests a caddy. The pro tells him that the only caddy available is old Mike, who, though 97 years old, still has excellent eyesight. At the first tee the golfer hits a beautiful long one and asks his caddy “Did you see that one?” Old Mike replies “Sure I saw it. I have eyes like an eagle.” Then the golfer asks, “Where did it go?” Old Mike replies “I don’t remember.”

By my definition, knowledge is recallable memory. Old Mike did not know where the ball went. We all occasionally experience temporary memory lapses during which we cannot recall some knowledge, say the name of a person we met earlier in the day. During that lapse we do not know the name of that person. If we subsequently recall the memory we know the name of the person.

Knowledge, a recallable memory, is not necessarily ‘true.’ Ptolemy developed an epicyclic model of the universe with the sun in orbit around the earth and the planets in orbit around the sun. For fourteen centuries people knew his system was ‘true’ because it gave good correspondence with observations. But, knowledge can be updated. Isn’t that what a bulletin board like this is all about?

Here is a dictionary definition of belief - confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately susceptible to rigorous proof. If the truth or existence of something is immediately susceptible to rigorous proof, it is not a belief.

As for access to certain truth by the solipsist and us, is their anything uncertain or untrue about Aristotle’s laws of identity, excluded middle, or non-contradiction? Aren’t those laws the very foundations of, and touchstones for, certainty and truth?

Best regards.

Drachir

Jul28-06, 02:46 PM

Tournesol wrote in #76: Originally Posted by Drachir
My ground for saying that there is no such thing as time itself is not that it doesn’t exist separately from specific instances. My grounds are 1) that we cannot even conceive of time without invoking a conception of something moving, and 2) that our notion of time is an abstraction from the motions of things. When we measure time we are comparing one motion with another. Motion can be sensed with several of our senses.To move is to be in different places at different times. v=dx/dtI cannot agree with your definition because circular, oscillating, or rebounding motion allows being in the same place at different times. My dictionary defines motion as the action or process of changing place or position. That definition does not refer to time. I still maintain that things and their motions have physical existence; time does not. Time exists only in our minds as an abstraction from the motions of things.

Tournesol also wrote in #76: Time is inferred from the position
of clock-hands I think you forgot something important. Time is inferred from the position of clock hands only if the hands are moving.

Tournesol also wrote in #76 first quoting me: You err if you equate a reversal of time with a reversal of all the laws of physics. Some essential things in physics, such as the resolution of forces, are time invariant.If they are time-invariant, a fortiori they can be reversed. Time-invariance doesn't mean reversal is impossible, it means it makes no difference ! And if it makes no difference to a physical law it means the law is not reversed by a reversal of time.

Drachir

Jul28-06, 02:55 PM

If the arrow of time were to reverse and point backward to the past, old knowledge would disappear and no new knowledge could form. Then it could not be known that time reversed or ran backwards, since that would be new knowledge. Therefore, the arrow of time can only be known to point one way, toward the future.

Psykostx

Jul28-06, 04:41 PM

Wait wait. I thought time was simply the effect of movement through space? I got a good question , is time speeding up, or slowing down? Is time singular or dynamic? Maybe our minds are time travel devices, breaking the one component of time into many pieces, allowing us to experience one short event (the big bang) as a sequence of longer events. Our small size could dialate time as objects trillions of times our size move through space at the speed of light.. much as a spider experiences many events in the same time we experience one. A boxer can get nine shots in (fully conscious of each hits location and power) before you even feel the first one....because he is trained to slow down his perception of time through extreme concentration. This is a cool thread!!

Tournesol

Jul28-06, 05:03 PM

Tournesol wrote in #76:I cannot agree with your definition because circular, oscillating, or rebounding motion allows being in the same place at different times.

That is not a problem if the definition is read as

"If the same thing is ever in different places at different times, it is moving"

(rather than "if a thing is never in the same place twice, it is moving").

My dictionary defines motion as the action or process of changing place or position. That definition does not refer to time.

In the way that "bachelor" does not refer to "man"....
time is always impicit in change.

I still maintain that things and their motions have physical existence; time does not. Time exists only in our minds as an abstraction from the motions of things.

It doesn't go away when you stop thinking about it.
So, no.

Tournesol also wrote in #76: I think you forgot something important. Time is inferred from the position of clock hands only if the hands are moving.

That doesn't mean "time is motion" any more than "temperature is mercury".

Tournesol also wrote in #76 first quoting me: And if it makes no difference to a physical law it means the law is not reversed by a reversal of time.

It doesn't mean it is "not reversed" in the sense that
it keeps stubbornly pointing the same way, it means it is "not reversed"
in the sense that it never pointed in the first place.

Drachir

Jul30-06, 07:10 PM

Tournesol wrote in #96: "If the same thing is ever in different places at different times, it is moving" I disagree with that statement. If something was at one position in the past and is at another position at present, it certainly moved in the past, but it does not necessarily follow that it is moving at present. It could have just come to rest at present or perhaps even sooner.

Tournesol continued in #96 quoting me first:My dictionary defines motion as the action or process of changing place or position. That definition does not refer to time.In the way that "bachelor" does not refer to "man"....
time is always impicit in change. In the same vein, one could also claim that time is always implicit in the absence of change. Examples: how long it took to change, or how long it hasn’t changed. How can time be implicit in both change and the absence of change? Time seems to be independent of change.

Motion, not time, is implicit in change, because there can be no change without motion of something. Motion is implicit in change; absence of motion is implicit in absence of change. If we say that a person is fifty years old, it means that the earth has completed 50 orbits of the sun since that person was born. Motion is implicit in those orbits, not time. The aging or the changes of that person are not the result of the passage of time; they are the result of motions of molecules, atoms, electrons, photons, and so on.

Time is an abstraction we make to allow us to compare different motions. When we measure the time elapsed during a change we compare the motions implicit in the change to the motions implicit in the clock used for the measurement.

Tournesol continued in #96 quoting me first:I still maintain that things and their motions have physical existence; time does not. Time exists only in our minds as an abstraction from the motions of things.It doesn't go away when you stop thinking about it.
So, no.When you stop thinking of an abstraction, it has certainly gone away from your conscious mind and is not necessarily preserved in memory. So, yes?

Tournesol continued in #96 quoting me first:[ I think you forgot something important. Time is inferred from the position of clock hands only if the hands are moving.That doesn't mean "time is motion" any more than "temperature is mercury". At last we agree on something. Of course time is not motion. Time is an abstraction we make from motions.

Tournesol finally wrote in #96 quoting me first:And if it makes no difference to a physical law it means the law is not reversed by a reversal of time.It doesn't mean it is "not reversed" in the sense that
it keeps stubbornly pointing the same way, it means it is "not reversed"
in the sense that it never pointed in the first place. If some laws of physics “never pointed in the first place,” it is meaningless to speak of reversing them. However, Tournesol did want them reversed when he wrote in #31:If you reverse all the laws of physics ,
you reverse all the laws of physics. The problems
you mention will "cancel through"

In #94 I wrote:If the arrow of time were to reverse and point backward to the past, old knowledge would disappear and no new knowledge could form. Then it could not be known that time reversed or ran backwards, since that would be new knowledge. Therefore, the arrow of time can only be known to point one way, toward the future. A reversal of time would be unknowable; we could have no knowledge of it. Science is a branch of knowledge. The word science derives from the Latin word scientia, meaning knowledge. Anything unknowable, such as the reversal of time, is not a subject of science.

Tournesol

Jul31-06, 08:39 AM

I disagree with that statement. If something was at one position in the past and is at another position at present, it certainly moved in the past, but it does not necessarily follow that it is moving at present. It could have just come to rest at present or perhaps even sooner.

Fine then:

"If the same thing is ever in different places at different times, it is HAS MOVED"

You are making mountains out of molehills. The basic point is that
motion is change of position over time. That is how it is defined
in both physics and philosophy.

In the same vein, one could also claim that time is always implicit in the absence of change. Examples: how long it took to change, or how long it hasn’t changed. How can time be implicit in both change and the absence of change? Time seems to be independent of change.

In a timeless universe, there is complete absence
of change, so time is not always implicit in absence of change.

Time is impict in "how long" something doesn't change or any
other "how long" question. It is implicit in the "how long" not
the "didn't change".

Motion, not time, is implicit in change, because there can be no change without motion of something.

How do you know ? That would depend on the laws
of the universe. We can conceive of universes where nothing
moves, but changes occur (changes of colour, for instance).

Chnge and time are more concpertually fundamental than motion.

If we say that a person is fifty years old, it means that the earth has completed 50 orbits of the sun since that person was born.

It is convenient to measure time with
moving objects. Concpetually, we don't
have to -- we could use something that
goes through a cyclic colour change.

Motion is implicit in those orbits, not time. The aging or the changes of that person are not the result of the passage of time; they are the result of motions of molecules, atoms, electrons, photons, and so on.

Time underpinds motion.

Time is an abstraction we make to allow us to compare different motions. When we measure the time elapsed during a change we compare the motions implicit in the change to the motions implicit in the clock used for the measurement.

we can't analyse time in terms of motion. Of we did, we
would have to conclude that when a pendulum returns to
a point it has visited before, it has gone back in time.

[ time ] doesn't go away when you stop thinking about it.

When you stop thinking of an abstraction, it has certainly gone away from your conscious mind and is not necessarily preserved in memory. So, yes?

So , no. The clock keeps ticking. Time is still passing
objectively.

At last we agree on something. Of course time is not motion. Time is an abstraction we make from motions.

Why not say motion is an abstraction form
time and position ? You need a consistent set of criteria.

However, Tournesol did want them reversed when he wrote in #31:

If you reverse all the laws of physics ,
you reverse all the laws of physics. The problems
you mention will "cancel through"

I didn't "wan't them reversed". I pointed out that it
was possible; that your counterexamples assume only
some things are reversed and not other. In fact,
if the laws of physics ae time-invariant, that only
reinforces the point.

If the arrow of time were to reverse and point backward to the past, old knowledge would disappear and no new knowledge could form.

Looked at from the perspective of the "old" arrow
of time. You are assuming some things reverse and not others,
again.

Then it could not be known that time reversed or ran backwards, since that would be new knowledge. Therefore, the arrow of time can only be known to point one way, toward the future.

The question is more why it should point at all.

A reversal of time would be unknowable; we could have no knowledge of it. Science is a branch of knowledge. The word science derives from the Latin word scientia, meaning knowledge. Anything unknowable, such as the reversal of time, is not a subject of science.

There are different arrows of time.

Drachir

Aug3-06, 06:05 AM

Tournesol wrote in#98: Fine then:

"If the same thing is ever in different places at different times, it is HAS MOVED" If you meant to write “it HAS MOVED”, thanks for coming over to the other side on that one. However, you started out to describe present motion when you wrote in #96: If the same thing is ever in different places at different times, it is moving. How would you change that definition to define present motion in terms of time?

Tournesol continued: You are making mountains out of molehills. The basic point is that
motion is change of position over time. That is how it is defined
in both physics and philosophy. That definition leads to a serious problem in the following way. If something is in continuous motion from position A, through position B, to position C, it has no change of position and spends no time at position B. According to that definition, then, it has no motion at position B, which contradicts our postulate that it is in continuous motion. We know, however, that because it is continuously moving, it has both velocity and momentum (qualities of motion) at position B.

My dictionaries define motion as the act or process of moving or of changing place or position. That definition has no such problem at position B where the act or process, and hence motion, can continue.

Here are Newton’s definitions of motion: “Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place into another; and relative motion is a translation from one relative place into another.”

Philosophers wouldn’t define motion in terms of time, which few have considered to be real. Antiphon the Sophist (circa 500 BC) held that “Time is not a reality, but a concept or a measure."

Newton believed in the reality of absolute space and absolute time, but gave us neither proof of their existence nor methods to determine them. Regarding relative time, Newton wrote: “Relative, apparent, and common time is any sensible and external measure (precise or imprecise) of duration by means of motion; such a measure - for example, an hour, a day, a month, a year - is commonly used instead of true time." Note that in his definition of relative time Newton measured “duration by means of motion”, not vice versa.

Leibniz believed time to be an abstract concept rather than real. Kant considered time to be an a priori notion or idea, so denying the external reality of time. Emerson and Julian Barbour deny the reality of time in their own ways.

Einstein wrote, “Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the field.”

Tournesol also wrote in #98:In a timeless universe, there is complete absence
of change, so time is not always implicit in absence of change. A universe is a world or sphere in which something exists or prevails. A timeless universe would have to be empty of matter or energy, i.e., with nothing existing or prevailing in it. Therefore, a timeless universe is a contradiction in terms, and meaningless.

Tournesol also wrote in #98, quoting me first: Motion, not time, is implicit in change, because there can be no change without motion of something.How do you know ? That would depend on the laws
of the universe. We can conceive of universes where nothing
moves, but changes occur (changes of colour, for instance).

Chnge and time are more concpertually fundamental than motion. A universe in which nothing moves is meaningless for the same reasons that a timeless universe is meaningless. Color is an abstraction we make from our sensing of visible wavelengths of light. For color to have meaning there must be light. Light moves.

We form concepts from our percepts. We can perceive motion but cannot perceive change or time. Therefore, motion is more fundamental than change or time.

Tournesol also wrote in #98: It is convenient to measure time with
moving objects. Concpetually, we don't
have to -- we could use something that
goes through a cyclic colour change. What would cause a color change if not the motions of things? We could certainly design an LCD clock that displayed time as a cyclic color change, but we would have to use something that moves (such as an oscillating quartz crystal) to produce the cycles.

Tournesol also wrote in #98: Time underpinds motion. and we can't analyse time in terms of motion. Do you mean that Newton was wrong regarding relative time? In what terms can we analyze time?

Tournesol also wrote in #98: So , no. The clock keeps ticking. Time is still passing
objectively.The only thing objective there is that the clock escapement keeps moving and ticking. Things and their motions are objective. Time is subjective because it is a mental abstraction.

Tournesol also wrote in #98: Why not say motion is an abstraction form
time and position ? You need a consistent set of criteria.
That cannot be said because motion is experienced as a percept. Time, like any concept, is an abstraction. An abstraction expresses a common quality of two or more percepts or concepts.

Tournesol also wrote in #98, quoting me first: If the arrow of time were to reverse and point backward to the past, old knowledge would disappear and no new knowledge could form.Looked at from the perspective of the "old" arrow
of time. You are assuming some things reverse and not others,
again. How would they differ looked at from the perspective of the “new” arrow of time? As for assumptions, that statement clearly assumes that a reversal of time means that all things reverse, all motions reverse, that each event plays backward, and all sequential events or states of the world occur in reverse order.

Tournesol also wrote about the arrow of time in #98: The question is more why it should point at all. The arrow of time has to point because all arrows have a point by definition.

If the arrow of time were to point to neither future nor past, if it were not to point at all, time would stand still. If time were to stand still, there could be no new knowledge, not even that time was standing still. Time standing still would be unknowable. Anything unknowable is beyond comprehension and is meaningless.

Tournesol finally wrote in #98 There are different arrows of time. We have tackled the forward arrow of our time, the backward arrow of time reversal, the arrow of time that points to neither future nor past, the arrow of time that does not point at all (despite all arrows having a point}and the absent arrow of time. Have we omitted any, and if so, how would they change this discussion?

Tournesol

Aug3-06, 03:09 PM

If you meant to write “it HAS MOVED”, thanks for coming over to the other side on that one. However, you started out to describe present motion when you wrote in #96: How would you change that definition to define present motion in terms of time?

Motion is still change of location. All this past/present stuff is a red herring.

That definition leads to a serious problem in the following way. If something is in continuous motion from position A, through position B, to position C, it has no change of position

It obviously does change position.

and spends no time at position B.

Don't get the problems of time confused with the problems of real-number analysis.

According to that definition, then, it has no motion at position B, which contradicts our postulate that it is in continuous motion. We know, however, that because it is continuously moving, it has both velocity and momentum (qualities of motion) at position B.

If you are saying it has no **instantaneous** velocity, I can only agree: motion requires time.

My dictionaries define motion as the act or process of moving or of changing place or position. That definition has no such problem at position B where the act or process, and hence motion, can continue.

I have no idea what you mean.

Here are Newton’s definitions of motion: “Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place into another; and relative motion is a translation from one relative place into another.”

Although he doesn't say so, motion requires time, or ther would be no difference between
a moving point and a stationary line.

Philosophers wouldn’t define motion in terms of time, which few have considered to be real. Antiphon the Sophist (circa 500 BC) held that “Time is not a reality, but a concept or a measure."

Philosophers nowadays are expected to come up with arguments, not just "say" things.

Newton believed in the reality of absolute space and absolute time, but gave us neither proof of their existence nor methods to determine them. Regarding relative time, Newton wrote: “Relative, apparent, and common time is any sensible and external measure (precise or imprecise) of duration by means of motion; such a measure - for example, an hour, a day, a month, a year - is commonly used instead of true time." Note that in his definition of relative time Newton measured “duration by means of motion”, not vice versa.

We've been through this before. The fact that time is measured with the help
of motion does not mean motion is more *conceptually* fundamental than time.

Leibniz believed time to be an abstract concept rather than real. Kant considered time to be an a priori notion or idea, so denying the external reality of time. Emerson and Julian Barbour deny the reality of time in their own ways.

Yes, and I have criticised their views.

Einstein wrote, “Space-time does not claim existence on its own, but only as a structural quality of the field.”

Tournesol also wrote in #98: A universe is a world or sphere in which something exists or prevails. A timeless universe would have to be empty of matter or energy,

Why ?

i.e., with nothing existing or prevailing in it. Therefore, a timeless universe is a contradiction in terms, and meaningless.

You are making a lot of arbitrary assumptions.

Tournesol also wrote in #98, quoting me first: A universe in which nothing moves is meaningless for the same reasons that a timeless universe is meaningless. Color is an abstraction we make from our sensing of visible wavelengths of light. For color to have meaning there must be light. Light moves.

We could see colours for centuries before we knew anything about wavelengths. So the meaning of colour has
nothing to do with motion.

We form concepts from our percepts. We can perceive motion but cannot perceive change or time. Therefore, motion is more fundamental than change or time.

We *can* perceive change. We can perceive things getting louder or quieter, warmer or colder.

Time is more fundamental than motion because motion is defined as dx/dt

What would cause a color change if not the motions of things?

Alternate laws of physics.

We could certainly design an LCD clock that displayed time as a cyclic color change, but we would have to use something that moves (such as an oscillating quartz crystal) to produce the cycles.

With our laws of physics, yes. But our laws of physics define motion in terms of time.

and Do you mean that Newton was wrong regarding relative time? In what terms can we analyze time?

Newton was talking about measurement.

Time is fundamental in physics.

The only thing objective there is that the clock escapement keeps moving and ticking. Things and their motions are objective. Time is subjective because it is a mental abstraction.

Time passes whether you believe in it or not. Although there are legions
of people who think Time Is An Illusion, none of them has ever gone back to last tuesday.

Time, like any concept, is an abstraction. An abstraction expresses a common quality of two or more percepts or concepts.

Motion is a percept and a concpept. As a concept, it is less fundamental than time.

How would they differ looked at from the perspective of the “new” arrow of time?

They wouldn't. If you reverse everything, no change would be evident. You have to
reverse one arrow but not another.

If the arrow of time were to point to neither future nor past, if it were not to point at all, time would stand still.

Time would be like space, which has no inherent direction.

The question is more why it should point at all.

The arrow of time has to point because all arrows have a point by definition

Then the question is why it has an arrow.

Pademelon

Aug4-06, 06:08 AM

I believe that the 'arrow of time', which is defined by increasing entropy and the second law of thermodynamics, is variable through spacetime. I believe that planck's constant, the underlying constant of thermodynamics and quantum theory, is not a constant but varies through spacetime. For example if we were to travel linearly 'backwards' through spacetime to the 'big bang', plancks constant would decrease until at the singularity at the big bang, plancks constant would = 0 and time would essentially stop. However, traveling linearly further 'backwards' through spacetime, plancks constant would have an increasingly negative value and the 'arrow of time' would be reversed from our perspective. This is the theoretical scenario if one could travel through the event horizon of a black hole. The arrow of time therefore is unique to each point in spacetime

Mick

Tournesol

Aug4-06, 11:28 AM

There is no evidence for variation in Planck's constant.

moving finger

Aug5-06, 12:13 AM

Then the question is why it has an arrow.
If there were no arrow of time, there would also be no intelligent life to ask the question why.

Life can only arise in a universe where there is an arrow of time.

Best Regards

moving finger

Aug5-06, 01:14 AM

The implication of the BU/BS theory is that you should have. I agree you don't. That is how the BU/BS theory doesn't match observation.
No, the implication of the BU (Block Universe) interpretation is NOT that you should have direct awareness of other moments of time. You seem to think of consciousness existing “outside of” the BU, so that it can “experience” all times simultaneously – that is not how it works. Consciousness exists within the BU, not external to it..

It does under the BU/BS theory, because being conscious one-after the
other would require an A series, which it explictly lacks.
No. Under the BU interpretation there is no such thing as “at the same time” except as coincident points on the T-axis, because time exists only within the universe (as one of the dimensions of the universe), there is not necessarily any time dimension external to the BU.

what do you mean by "internal time" ? The mental contents are certainly different. But, by hypothesis, they call co-exist in the fourth dimension.
Yes, but they exist at different “points” in that 4th dimension, hence the “time” is different for each of them. In the BU interpretation, “time” is simply a way of measuring position in the 4th dimension.

Exactly. The BU is no different from 4D space. The fourth dimension is only time in an "honourary" sense. Every moment along the 4th dimension is "on all fours" with all others, so there is no way individual moments can be picked out to be conscious. They either all are equally, or none are.
They all are, but not at the same “time” – by definition they each exist at different times.

The 4th dimension of time is quite different to the 3 dimensions of space. It has very different properties.

The flow of time is subectively evident. It can be explained by Becoming without the paradoxes of the "motion" metaphor.
Indeed it is explained, as simply a subjective interpretation that conscious entities place upon their experience of the arrow of time.

BU theory predicts that consciousness must be much less localised than is observed.
BU theory is therefore false.
The BU interpretation predicts nothing of the sort.

Either time flows, or there is a block universe.
Since BU is false, FoT must be true.
BU is not necessarily false.

Which me ? The me *now*...the me *now*...?
Which *me* would you like to choose? The argument applies to every one of them.

Each "me" at each point in time is in exactly the same boat, according to BU/BS.
They are at different spacetime positions in that boat.

Either they are all conscious, or none are.
They all are, but at different points on the 4th dimension, hence at subjectively different times.

So the me at time T is conscious, and the me at time T-1 is conscious.
Agreed.

Now, you can argue that there is no reason that me(T-1) should have consicous awarness of me(T), because me(T-1) lacks information about me(T). But the reverse is not the case. Why shouldn't me(T) share me(T-1)'s conscious experience ? The natural model would be that my consicousness expands as it goes on, just as my information does
Why should it? Nothing “goes on” because there is no flow. The natural explanation simply that each conscious point on the T-axis exists in deterministic relation to each other point. There is no “expansion” of consciousness”, except insofar as there is a correlation between information between each conscious point due to the deterministic relationships between them.

Conscious(T0)
Conscious(T0+T1)
Conscious(T0+T1+T2)

rather than the perceived

Conscious(T0)
Conscious(T1)
Conscious(T2)
The latter is the correct interprettation, as long as you remember that these conscious points are not uncorrelated.

Consciousness is delocalised over a small area of space, because the rich causal interaction inside the cranium do not extend outside the cranium. The perceived delocalisation is exactly line with the causal evidence--as far a s space is concerned.

However, every brains state of your existence is casually connected to every other
one. So we would expect, on the BU/BS theory, that you cosnciousness is "delocalised"
to you lifetime -- and not just a moment.
Not at all. The conscious experience is not delocalised over all time for the same reason that it is not delocalised over all space. The rich causal interaction inside the “now” does not often extend outside the now, in the same way that the rich causal interaction inside the “here” does not often extend outside the “here”. But when you look at a starry night sky, your consciousness is in (indirect) causal contact with spaces and times that exist in completely different regions of the BU – far away in space and far away in time.

Why should future events need to be causally determined by laws if they exist already ?
You are looking at our so-called “laws of nature” as being prescriptive. They are not, they are descriptive. They simply describe the regularities that exist in nature (they do not tell nature how to behave). One of those regularities is that given any state of the universe at time T1, all other states of the universe at all other times are “fixed” to be consistent with the state at T1. None of this implies an arrow of time or a flow of time.

Best Regards