Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics? [Archive]

Les Sleeth

Jul21-04, 09:16 PM

I would think that it means that, as we learn more, the definition of what it means to be "physical" will change. At one time, it meant that material bodies were infinitely indivisible. Later, it meant that they were made of indivisible building blocks called atoms, that should in principle follow Newton's laws. Later still, it was found that those atoms have a structure, and that the constituents behave according to an entirely different set of laws than we had originally supposed. Then, we got to look inside the nucleus, and saw that those constituents behave according to a different set of rules, and so on.

Sorry, I just saw your post.

I have to agree with Fliption's point of needing to distinguish between physical and non-physical. One difference I often see between physicalist and non-physicalist perspectives is which came first. I would guess your view would tend toward saying that first came the big bang, and then everything else followed from the potentials created by that event.

I don't know if you followed my thread on panpsychism (BTW, thanks for the intervention), but at one point I posted a short contemplation on "substance monism" http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=30762&page=6&pp=15. It is a very common idea among non-physicalists that there exists some base substance (which I labeled illumination -- if you don't mind, I'll continue to use that term for the base substance), which was never created and cannot be destroyed, which is light-like in essence as well as possessing an energtic temperment, and which exists in an infinite continuum (illumination is not baseless speculation, there is some evidence). The idea of substance monism, then, is that everything is a form of this basic, most fundamental "stuff" of existence. In it is all the potentials needed to create a universe (out of itself) and everything we find in the universe.

Now, the physicalist will say the universe began with the physical event of the big bang, but he cannot explain what caused the big bang, nor where all the stuff composing it originated. He can explain how energy moves things, but he can't explain what energy is. We can quantify oscillatory rates, but cannot explain why particles are such determined oscillators. In the end, the answers to those questions (and lots more) for the physicalist seem to boil down to "that's just how it is."

Okay, return to the primordial illumination concept. There we only need to say "that's just how it is" about one thing: illumination (or whatever the base substance is). Ockham's razor! :smile: In terms of a theory, the final step is to infer that illumination is the potential for what is most prevalent in and necessary to the existence of the universe, and then try to figure out what illumination would have to be like in order to take the "form" of a universe.

So it seems to me your answer that the definition of physical keeps expanding will only work if we don't look before the big bang. Yet we do have two origination theories which adherents attempt to make reasonable (I'm discounting supernatural possibillities; also, if I could have my way I'd also eliminate any purely rationalistic argument or model unsupported by evidence). One origination theory puts a physical event first, the other puts something we might conservatively label "absolute potentiality" first. We cannot explain the origin of the big bang or the stuff of matter. But we don't need to explain the origin of illumination.

And it is also the case that consciousness exibits characteristics that are physical-like. Even if you are of the persuasion that consciousness or free will (or whatever you want to call it) is "in charge" in that it dermines our brain states, instead of the other way around, it is still the case whatever this nebulous thing is, it has a physical effect on material bodies. That makes it physical, too. Now the problem is to develop a physical model that accounts for it, which I think is what SelfAdjoint was getting at.

It is very true that consciousness affects matter, and is affected by matter. But if you can temporarily accept the substance monism concept, then one can say that there is no essential difference between the two. What is different, in that theory, is the conditions which define them. In the panpsychism model I used the analogy of how a mist sits on a warm lake at night. Right at the boundary between water and mist is some common point, yet there is also a point where water is liquid and mist is gas. So although identical in essence, conditions determine how H20's potentials will be manifested.

I don't think their (physical-consciousness) mutual influence must mean consciousness is physical; it could mean the physical, at the foundation, shares the same nature with consciousness and so allows a certain temporary compatibility (entropy ensures that it is impermanent). But if so then we still have the question of which is most fundamental, physicalness or consciousness.

Now the problem is to develop a physical model that accounts for it, which I think is what SelfAdjoint was getting at.

I agree that's what he is getting at, and I still maintain that is based on an a priori assumption about first cause. I've been trying to argue that it is actually easier to explain the universe if we have an uncaused first cause. Explanation "ease" also seems relevant to the question of which comes first, matter or consciousness? In the infinite ocean of illumination we are imagining, and considering the "hard problem" of consciousness, which would be easiest to first develop? Also, if consciousness developed first (and I don't mean some progeny of dogma, i.e., forever existing, all powerful, all knowing, supernatural, etc.), and we assume it has evolved far longer than the age of our universe, then doesn't that also add to the ease of explaining the development of our universe, especially when it comes to the evolution of life and consciousness?

The way I look at it, if neither the physical or non-physical side can offer convincing evidence of our origins, then all that's left is what most naturally accounts for the most unexplained things.

Philocrat

Jul21-04, 10:01 PM

First off, I for one have no idea of what "compatible with logic" means. I know what it means for two statements to be compatible (aka consistent), but logic is not a statement. Second, Mentat's objection should not be brushed aside. Second, what do you mean when you say that the concept of god is "analytically indestructible". Does that mean that you can formulate a statement regarding god that is analytically true? If so, then what is the statement? And what's the point of formulating a noncontingent theory of god? I can easily formulate an "analytically indestructible" statement about cockroaches (eg: "That cockroach is either alive or it is dead."), but I don't find any philosophical value in it.

You may be right…I could be using these terminologies in a very naïve or misleading way. But for me, I used the term ‘analytically indestructible’ to merely indicate that I personally find one or two of the premises used in both the religious and scientific arguments inconclusive. That is, in religious terms, it does not allow the nature and existence of God to be ascertained and in scientific terms as well it does not allow the whole idea of God to be completely disposed of either.

Infact, some people have argued that one of the ways to analyse anything out of existence (including the cockroaches that you mentioned) is to render all the premises in the given argument completely false. Well, from my own detailed examination of both arguments (scientific and religious), some of their premises behaved so badly that they left God hanging in a logical space, neither fully proved nor disproved. Well, people, including Mentat, say that this leaves the logic behind it in a limbo. True, perhaps. I know you do not like me to use the term ‘Logic’, but I still wish to claim that God is ‘logically’ preserved when the direction of the argument about him/her is reversed.

On the issue of what the term ‘God is compatible with logic’ implies, well, this is my own opposite view to the general claim in philosophy that ‘God is incompatible with logic’, or in a very restrictive and non-technical sense, that God has no logical explanation. The phrase ‘God is incompatible with logic’ is just one amongst many similar phrases that usually fly by in public and classroom philosophy lectures, and all I did was pick this one out and reversed its declaratory and quantificational consequences by reversing the general approach to the interpretation of God.
Equally, you could say that I used this term merely as a heading of my invitation to scholars to start the inevitable process of converting some of the declaratory, existential and quantificational claims about God from past tense to present tense. Also, I am fully aware that many participants in this forum are versed in several branches of logic, and what I am saying here may not necessarily be about logical proofs, but mainly about consistency of reasoning and approach to directing the train of our thoughts and deeds, especially on issues of this monumental magnitude.

The key problem that I have about the entire enterprise of God is that when people make declaratory, existential or quantificational claims, they tend to dive straight into the so-called logical proof with little or no attention paid to the equally necessary element of consistency of reasoning and approach. Now consider these two sentences:

1) God created the world
2) God is creating the world.

The first sentence, loaded with so many presuppositions, created the impressions from outset that not only does God exist but also that God created the world and left it in its current problematic state (at least within the human frame of reference), and that the actual process of creation itself is complete. Done and dusted! It also gives the impression of a God that finished his/her duty and went on a very long vacation or permanent early retirement. And if you look all around you, nearly all the religious books ever written, all the sermons and public lectures ever given tend to always create and labour under these nightmarish impressions. If this is correct, I argue that this is the single fundamental source of all the contradictions and inconsistencies found in declaratory and existential claims about God. This first sentence gave philosophers of all ages the ammunition to launch intellectual onslaught and destructive arguments of all kinds not only against religious arguments but also against scientific arguments about the entire nature and existence of God.

For the purpose of simplicity and explanatory convenience, I have labelled this ‘The Principle of finished Creation’ (or 'The Principle of finished Business’, as one of my friends jokingly renamed it).

The second sentence on the other hand is based on what I call ‘The Principle of Unfinished Creation’ (equally jokingly renamed by my friends as ‘The Principle of Unfinished Business). But for the purpose of widening the scope of its meaning and increasing its declaratory and quantificational significance, I have renamed it ‘The Principle of Continuing Causation’. According to this principle, the slightest error or defect found in the structure and function of an outcome of any given action renders its inconclusive, therefore continuous both in substance and in scope.

If you accept this principle as it is so defined, then the naïve notion that God could create the world and leave it in its present chaotic and problematic state and walk away, soon becomes a pointless route to ply. Now the BIG question that will return to haunt the human conscience for a very long time to come is this:

How could God take an early retirement or go on a holiday when there is still so much work to be done to take the human race out of its misery?

This is the problematic question that the principle of continuing causation is attempting resolve. Therefore, the second sentence ‘God is creating the world’, quite rightly endorsed by this principle, does the following things;

1) It renders the Principle of finished creation incompatible with
the way things really are in the world.
2) It returns God from an early retirement back to work. Hence, when
Einstein once said; “God does not play dice with the universe”, I ague
that this should be taken to imply ‘God is in active service to the world
and to the wider universe.
3) It declares God blameless of all errors in the causal and relational
structure of the world.
4) And until further notice, God is happily and wholeheartedly working
towards bringing his/her creation to a safe and perfect conclusion.

vanesch

Jul22-04, 06:06 AM

The two biggest obstacles to a 100% physicalist model are life and consciousness.

Life isn't an obstacle, if you understand by life its biological definition. We more or less know what life is, on the molecular level.

However, I think that you are right that consciousness IS the open question. For the moment, physics isn't there yet, and I think it is an open question whether consciousness will, one day, have a materialistic (hence physical) explanation or not.
The funny thing is that conciousness seems to play a role in the major difficulties in modern physics, namely the interpretations of quantum mechanics (it is at the end of the day the concious observer who needs probabilities) and problems with the arrow of time. Of course this fact may mean several things: it might be simply indicating that the theories leading to these questions have to be modified ; or it might indicate that there is a physical role for consciousness. This is, I think, an open question as of today.

cheers,
Patrick.

Les Sleeth

Jul22-04, 09:58 AM

Life isn't an obstacle, if you understand by life its biological definition. We more or less know what life is, on the molecular level.

Hi Patrick. I realize we can explain much in the way of life's chemistry. But what I meant when I referred to life as an "obstacle" to physicalism is that we cannot explain the quality of its organization. By "explain" I mean demonstrate the truth of assertions about biological causes of life; it is not enough just to offer a theory in place of an essential "something" needed to complete a physicalistic life model.

I have argued the "organization quality" point many times here a PF, so I will make this as brief as possible. Let me try an analogy. Say you and a friend are aliens who accidentally stepped in a bubbling quantum fluctuation and were instantly transported to Earth. The two of you find no humans around, but you do find a car in perfect working condition and decide to see if you can explain what caused it. You take it apart, study all the relationships between the parts, come to understand combustion, the concept of a transmission, suspension, the electrical system, etc. Finally you declare to your friend that since you can explain how all the parts work to create a working car, you fully, 100% understand what causes a car. Your friend is skeptical. He wants to know how all those parts got organized that way. After pondering that question your answer is that since all the relationships between the parts are physical/mechanical, then it must be that physical/mechanical forces brought all that stuff together. Your friend says okay then let's put all the parts in a pile and see if they come together, and of course they never do.

Similarly, as deductionists we start with an intact system of life, and as reductionists we study it intrasystemically (I'm leaving out evolution for the moment since I am just pointing to systems). With chemistry you can get a little further than the auto theorists if you put life's constituent chemicals in a vat, but not much further before chemistry turns repetitive. What is missing is what I call "progressive" organization where we can observe chemistry kicking into the sort of organizational gear that will lead to essentially perpetual system building. The very furthest we've gotten is the Miller-Urey experiment, which only demonstrates my point: self organization only can be shown to occur for a few steps before turning repetitive (even PCR, impressive as it is, is merely repetitive, plus it starts out with materials already established by biology's organizational quality).

Some say, "evolution has taken billions of years to create life." Actually it took billions of years for evolution to shape life. Life itself apparently came into existence fairly quickly. But I am not even insisting we need to observe life created from chemistry; I would consider an abiogenesis theory reasonable if progressive self-organization could be shown to be possible in any circumstances (i.e., whether it leads to life or not). So long as it can't, I will continue to see life as a problem to any purely physicalistic model.

vanesch

Jul22-04, 04:46 PM

Life itself apparently came into existence fairly quickly. But I am not even insisting we need to observe life created from chemistry; I would consider an abiogenesis theory reasonable if progressive self-organization could be shown to be possible in any circumstances (i.e., whether it leads to life or not).

I will just give my personal view on these matters, which are what they are, and are open to criticism. In fact, I also felt that there was kind of a problem: if the essential "spark" that got life started (whether it are replicating dna molecules, or replicating proteins before they "discovered" DNA, whether this happened on earth, or whether earth was, in its early history, "inseminated" by exobiologic fragments, for example from another planet whose star underwent a supernova doesn't really matter here) was "easy" to reproduce, then the universe would be full of life and we don't seem to observe that. So it is kind of a hard problem if you consider life to have happened *by chance* because that probability is SO low that it shouldn't have happened in the visible universe.
However, inflationary cosmology gave me the idea that the antropological principle could have a meaning. Indeed, inflationary cosmology (and there seems to be more and more indications that inflation is true) makes the universe "much more infinite" than it already seemed to be: our observable universe is only a tiny bubble in an infinitude of bubbles. This enhances enormously the probability that a very improbable event, such as the development of life, can happen somewhere, in some universe. The reason why it is ours is then simply dictated by the anthropological principle.
The implication of this is that we should be alone in our visible universe, as living beings ; at least if life developed first on earth. If exobiology is true, it should then be confined to our "neighbourhood" of space, because the probability of having this extremely rare process to happen twice by chance is too small.

cheers,
patrick.

Royce

Jul22-04, 05:29 PM

[QUOTE=vanesch]Life isn't an obstacle, if you understand by life its biological definition. We more or less know what life is, on the molecular level.QUOTE]

We know, to a degree, how life works, how it replicates and metabolizes. This however is not knowing what life is or knowing how it came about.

We can look at a living cell or being and know that it is alive and some of the chemical processes within it that keeps it alive; we can also look at a dead cell or being and know that it is dead and that nearly none of the life processes are at work; yet there is nothing that we can identify that is present in the living cell and absent in the dead that is life nor can we transfer this life from one living cell into another and make that cell live as we can do with DNA. We do not know what life is. We cannot tell what changes take place that causes the living suddenly to become nonliving. It just stops living. We can determine why it died but not what left it when it died other than an undetectable undefinable quality that is life.

selfAdjoint

Jul22-04, 05:38 PM

[QUOTE=vanesch]Life isn't an obstacle, if you understand by life its biological definition. We more or less know what life is, on the molecular level.QUOTE]

We know, to a degree, how life works, how it replicates and metabolizes. This however is not knowing what life is or knowing how it came about.
....
We cannot tell what changes take place that causes the living suddenly to become nonliving. It just stops living. We can determine why it died but not what left it when it died other than an undetectable undefinable quality that is life.

This undervalues what we DO know about cells. Quite often we can tell what specifically is different in the killed cell, that apoptosis has operated or some protein has accumulated blocking metabolism or some other specific condition. This is all well known science; it is wrong to deny it.

balkan

Jul22-04, 06:55 PM

We can look at a living cell or being and know that it is alive and some of the chemical processes within it that keeps it alive; we can also look at a dead cell or being and know that it is dead and that nearly none of the life processes are at work; yet there is nothing that we can identify that is present in the living cell and absent in the dead that is life nor can we transfer this life from one living cell into another and make that cell live as we can do with DNA. We do not know what life is. We cannot tell what changes take place that causes the living suddenly to become nonliving. It just stops living. We can determine why it died but not what left it when it died other than an undetectable undefinable quality that is life.
maybe you can't, because you wish to see "life" as something more that just neurological impulses and cells dividing...
it is quite possible to tell what has changed when something dies, the "life" you're talking about though, is a quality that you put there, and you recon that it has somehow left the body since the body is no longer moving...

the quality of life imo, is the experiences we gain through our lives, which is what makes us who we are (yes, yes, and of course our genetic code)... it is what governs the way we move, the way we act, and the look we have in our eyes... all those things shuts down along with the body, and that is why it feels like something has left it...
it is also because that living being had a place in your mind just before dying, and that is contrasted with the dead, stiff body...

of course, no matter how much the operation of conciousness, mind and life is proven to work by biological mechanisms, alot of people will still believe that there "is something more"... perhaps because it is more comfortable to believe, and who are we to take that comfort away, really?

Les Sleeth

Jul22-04, 08:18 PM

Quite often we can tell what specifically is different in the killed cell, that apoptosis has operated or some protein has accumulated blocking metabolism or some other specific condition. This is all well known science; it is wrong to deny it.

You are quite right that failed mechanisms kill the organism. Actually, I might have to revise my thinking and admit that a cell at least (i.e., non-nervous system life) could be functioning purely as a machine. My real objection is attributing the initial development of that living machine to mechanics alone. That is where physical processes cannot yet be shown to possess sufficient self-organizing ability to lead to life. Because of that, I honestly don't understand physicalists' absolute faith in abiogenesis. It doesn't seem objective to me, but more akin to blind faith.

But even if life is purely mechanistic, there's still the problem of consciousness.

Les Sleeth

Jul22-04, 08:45 PM

maybe you it is quite possible to tell what has changed when something dies, the "life" you're talking about though, is a quality that you put there, and you recon that it has somehow left the body since the body is no longer moving...

Maybe so. But like in my car example above, even if the body is NOW a machine, no one can at this time demonstrate chemistry behaving with adequate self-organizing ability that would lead to a living system. Until that ability of chemistry can be demonstrated, physicalist theory is lacking an essential factor required to explain the origin of life. And that also leaves the door open to some other force besides physical processes.

of course, no matter how much the operation of conciousness, mind and life is proven to work by biological mechanisms, alot of people will still believe that there "is something more"... perhaps because it is more comfortable to believe, and who are we to take that comfort away, really?

Well, there is something more to consciousness: subjectivity. Please, if you've found proof that physical processes can account for that I'd like to know about it. No one disputes biology is involved in making consciousness present here on Earth. The question is if there is something else there too. What is illogical with being open to that if physics seems unable to explain certain aspects of existence? Why can't existence be multifaceted?

Again, I really do not understand the apparent obsession to attribute everything to physics. Can anyone explain to me why that is important? Is it like being a Republican and so feeling one has to defend everything the party does? :biggrin:

balkan

Jul23-04, 02:09 AM

Maybe so. But like in my car example above, even if the body is NOW a machine, no one can at this time demonstrate chemistry behaving with adequate self-organizing ability that would lead to a living system. Until that ability of chemistry can be demonstrated, physicalist theory is lacking an essential factor required to explain the origin of life. And that also leaves the door open to some other force besides physical processes.

Well, there is something more to consciousness: subjectivity. Please, if you've found proof that physical processes can account for that I'd like to know about it. No one disputes biology is involved in making consciousness present here on Earth. The question is if there is something else there too. What is illogical with being open to that if physics seems unable to explain certain aspects of existence? Why can't existence be multifaceted?

Again, I really do not understand the apparent obsession to attribute everything to physics. Can anyone explain to me why that is important? Is it like being a Republican and so feeling one has to defend everything the party does? :biggrin:

well, can you explain the (much more widespread) obsession about there being something more to conciousness? can you explain the obsession about Gods and religion? those are much worse obsessions in my oppinion due to the fact that they are irrational and impossible to disprove... why is it so bad to believe that we are here by accident, that there migth be other lifeforms than us in the universe and that there is no life after death?

it hasn't been proven yet, but i do not believe there is anything more than neurological impulses to our mind... and you migth as well admit that it wouldn't matter if there were proof... people would still say there has to be more, which would be impossible to disprove, cause they state at the same time that it cannot be measured and is out of this world ect.
why couldn't subjectivity be another function like memory and pattern recognition? it's a very subjectivestatement that it isn't, anyway :wink:... cause you can't prove or back your theory up by anything but your own oppinion... me, on the other hand, i got lots of indications that my theory is the rigth one...

the general concensus amongst us pagan scientists is that life started as very simple molecules which through an incredibly long amount of time turned into single cell organisms and virus... which then evolved and so on and so on... the chemistry of life can be directly monitored and if we could efficiently build molecules atom by atom, we could copy this process as it is based on catalytical processes... where do you get the idea that these processes aren't understood?
anyway, we can't make living things yet, but we haven't had millions of years to do it, have we? we can on the other hand make self assembling molecules and molecular systems, so i'm afraid we're already halfway there :wink:...

Royce

Jul23-04, 06:45 AM

This undervalues what we DO know about cells. Quite often we can tell what specifically is different in the killed cell, that apoptosis has operated or some protein has accumulated blocking metabolism or some other specific condition. This is all well known science; it is wrong to deny it.

Yes, your right of course. I may not have made it clear enough. We can tell why the cell died, what was wrong or what was not happening to kill the cell; but, we cannot detect what it was that left or quit when the living cell died.
when life was no longer present in the cell. What property, characteristic, quality that is life changed the instant the cell or anything changed from living to dead other than everything stopped.

Les Sleeth

Jul23-04, 10:47 AM

well, can you explain the (much more widespread) obsession about there being something more to conciousness?

Yes. You might want to do a Google search on the "hard problem of consciousness."

can you explain the obsession about Gods and religion? those are much worse obsessions in my oppinion due to the fact that they are irrational and impossible to disprove...

I agree. However, do you think everyone has to fall into one of two categories (physicalist or religious)? I am not religious in the slightest, can't stand the stuff.

There might be something which people in the past labeled "God," but it doesn't mean they or religion have anything to do with experiencing and therefore knowing it. It's like a witch doctor casting spells on a sick person to rid him of a disease. There really is such a thing as helping to heal, but the witch doctor isn't doing anything which brings it about. Do you say there is no such thing as healing simply because of the ignorance of the witch doctor?

why is it so bad to believe that we are here by accident, that there migth be other lifeforms than us in the universe and that there is no life after death?

Because it is contradicted by the facts. The "blindness" of faith unsupported by facts is probably one of the things you find distasteful about religion. But that is exactly what physicalists do when it comes to this question of accidents. They cannot, and aren't even close, to demonstrating the potential of matter to "accidentally" organize itself into life. Since that physical potential is not merely a peripheral requirement, but an absolutely necessary one for physicalist theory to work, it should, in an objective mind, raise a red flag about the theory. Does it? Nope. Why? Because they are already committed, in spite of facts, or lack of to physicalism. Now really, is that what you'd call "objective"?

it hasn't been proven yet, but i do not believe there is anything more than neurological impulses to our mind... and you migth as well admit that it wouldn't matter if there were proof... people would still say there has to be more, which would be impossible to disprove, cause they state at the same time that it cannot be measured and is out of this world ect.

You of course are entitled to your theory, but there are others just as interested in truth as you who have different theories. When you say "people would still say there has to be more," it seems you are generalizing and suggesting someone who suspects there is "something more" is just another member of the ignorant masses. You shouldn't assume that anyone who doubts physicalism is anti-science. I for one am not, and read posts by Hypnagogue or Fliption to see others who suspect something more but also yield to what science actually has proven.

why couldn't subjectivity be another function like memory and pattern recognition?...

Because you can't create subjectivity with artificial memory, recognition programming, or anything else mechanical. If you do, then you've got it haven't you. If not, the question remains a mystery.

. . . you can't prove or back your theory up by anything but your own oppinion... me, on the other hand, i got lots of indications that my theory is the rigth one...

I might have my own pet theory, but I don't "believe" it. Can you accept that an intelligent, thinking person might look at the physical evidence and conclude something is missing, and what's "missing" seems to possess characteristics which are not physical? I agree there are lots of physical indiations of the physicalness of reality, including life and consciousness. My objection isn't to the indications physicalists notice, but the contraindications they ignore.

Tom suggests that maybe one day we will discover new physical potentials which will explain what now appears non-physical; the concept of emergence in consciousness studies is like that. But -- and here's where I claim to be more objective than you or Tom or selfAdjoint, or any dedicated physicalist -- as of now there are no demonstrated physical potentials to account for 1) the quality of organization which leads to a living system, or 2) consciousness. So isn't the objective stance one which acknowledges a non-physical explanation might be required to explain those two aspects?

the general concensus amongst us pagan scientists is that life started as very simple molecules which through an incredibly long amount of time turned into single cell organisms and virus... which then evolved and so on and so on... the chemistry of life can be directly monitored and if we could efficiently build molecules atom by atom, we could copy this process as it is based on catalytical processes... where do you get the idea that these processes aren't understood?

Of course it's the concensus among scientitsts; that's because for the most part they are physicalists. I am very familiar with physicalist abiogenesis theory; and we already can "copy this process as it is based on catalytical processes" with PCR. I never said such processes weren't understood . . . you miss the (or my) point. If a bunch of scientists use their consciousness to organize chemistry and create a living cell, that does not demonstrate that chemistry can self-organize itself! Consciousness has done the organizing, which is exactly what those who believe in God say is missing from physicalist creation theory. :smile:

anyway, we can't make living things yet, but we haven't had millions of years to do it, have we? we can on the other hand make self assembling molecules and molecular systems, so i'm afraid we're already halfway there :wink:...

That is the common argument. Quite convenient don't you think? Let me ask you, is a cell, organizationally speaking, more complex than the Declaration of Independence? Yes it is. So, could we attach a pencil to a flexible mechanical arm, put it in a windy area, and expect that in millions or billions or trillions of years the Declaration of Independence would accidentally be written?

I realize that's not a proper counterexample except in one respect, which is that we don't have to wait for the Declaration of Independence to happen by accident because someone can sit down and reproduce it right now. Similarly, if you could demonstrate the sort of self-organizing quality that would lead to a living system, then as far as I'm concern you have the basis for a sound abiogenesis theory. So you don't need millions of years not only because we don't need to demostrate life (only the mysterious self-organizing quality), but also because we have something which serves to accelerate things expotentially . . . conscious intervention in the laboratory.

balkan

Jul23-04, 02:28 PM

Yes. You might want to do a Google search on the "hard problem of consciousness."

1) I agree. However, do you think everyone has to fall into one of two categories (physicalist or religious)? I am not religious in the slightest, can't stand the stuff.

2) There might be something which people in the past labeled "God," but it doesn't mean they or religion have anything to do with experiencing and therefore knowing it. It's like a witch doctor casting spells on a sick person to rid him of a disease. There really is such a thing as helping to heal, but the witch doctor isn't doing anything which brings it about. Do you say there is no such thing as healing simply because of the ignorance of the witch doctor?

3) Because it is contradicted by the facts. The "blindness" of faith unsupported by facts is probably one of the things you find distasteful about religion. But that is exactly what physicalists do when it comes to this question of accidents. They cannot, and aren't even close, to demonstrating the potential of matter to "accidentally" organize itself into life. Since that physical potential is not merely a peripheral requirement, but an absolutely necessary one for physicalist theory to work, it should, in an objective mind, raise a red flag about the theory. Does it? Nope. Why? Because they are already committed, in spite of facts, or lack of to physicalism. Now really, is that what you'd call "objective"?

4) You of course are entitled to your theory, but there are others just as interested in truth as you who have different theories. When you say "people would still say there has to be more," it seems you are generalizing and suggesting someone who suspects there is "something more" is just another member of the ignorant masses. You shouldn't assume that anyone who doubts physicalism is anti-science. I for one am not, and read posts by Hypnagogue or Fliption to see others who suspect something more but also yield to what science actually has proven.

5) Because you can't create subjectivity with artificial memory, recognition programming, or anything else mechanical. If you do, then you've got it haven't you. If not, the question remains a mystery.

6) I might have my own pet theory, but I don't "believe" it. Can you accept that an intelligent, thinking person might look at the physical evidence and conclude something is missing, and what's "missing" seems to possess characteristics which are not physical? I agree there are lots of physical indiations of the physicalness of reality, including life and consciousness. My objection isn't to the indications physicalists notice, but the contraindications they ignore.

7) Tom suggests that maybe one day we will discover new physical potentials which will explain what now appears non-physical; the concept of emergence in consciousness studies is like that. But -- and here's where I claim to be more objective than you or Tom or selfAdjoint, or any dedicated physicalist -- as of now there are no demonstrated physical potentials to account for 1) the quality of organization which leads to a living system, or 2) consciousness. So isn't the objective stance one which acknowledges a non-physical explanation might be required to explain those two aspects?

8) Of course it's the concensus among scientitsts; that's because for the most part they are physicalists. I am very familiar with physicalist abiogenesis theory; and we already can "copy this process as it is based on catalytical processes" with PCR. I never said such processes weren't understood . . . you miss the (or my) point. If a bunch of scientists use their consciousness to organize chemistry and create a living cell, that does not demonstrate that chemistry can self-organize itself! Consciousness has done the organizing, which is exactly what those who believe in God say is missing from physicalist creation theory. :smile:

9) That is the common argument. Quite convenient don't you think? Let me ask you, is a cell, organizationally speaking, more complex than the Declaration of Independence? Yes it is. So, could we attach a pencil to a flexible mechanical arm, put it in a windy area, and expect that in millions or billions or trillions of years the Declaration of Independence would accidentally be written?

1) well... technically, people would fall into the two categories: physicalists and "there is something else"... i'm not just talking about religion... you can't be both...

2) the mind is a powerfull thing...

3) It really isn't contradicted or anything... i mentioned it as a posibility, and you say i'm contradicted by facts? i didn't say there were any facts or that i believed there to be... chemical systems can "accidentially" organize themselves into alot of incredible structures... you are aware of this, aren't you?
by your standards, nothing is based on physics... we don't have proof of how gravity, energy quantization or wave propagation works either... we only have indications... so let's just attribute that to "something else"... we have to, otherwise we're not being objective by your standards...

4) i'm not implying anything... at all... lots of brilliant people believe in god... if you have low self esteem, don't take it out on me...

5) you can't yet... a random number generator is mechanical aswell... and most of what you probably attribute to "something else", phychologists would attribute to alot of other things, mechanical processes, that "seems" like an act of individuality and a free mind... our mind is not anyway near free from mechanical processes, it is loaded with them... unless of course you want to argue with the field of psychology aswell...

6) yes of course... you are on the other hand ignoring the fact, that a lack of facts isn't a proof of anything either...

7) of course i'm open for the option, but rigth now the evidence points in the direction of physicality, so i'm betting my money on that horse...

8) so what you're saying is: you're not thrilled about the physicalist idealism, cause scientists cannot demonstrate self assembly yet... but if they could demonstrate self assembly, it would be due to "something else"... okay, why are you having this discussion if you have already made up your mind about not being convincable?

9) a flexible arm wouldn't move... the universe is constantly moving towards a higher entropy, and self assembly of systems happens all around us...
it is a very good argument... you're demanding us to demonstrate something that has been million years in the making, and you want it now! and like you said yourself, if we could demonstrate it to you, it would "prove" the existance of "something else" to you anyway... now that is what i call "not being objective," and that is also why i said "no matter how much we prove it, how many indications we find, people will still find more comfort in the existance of "something else""...

Les Sleeth

Jul23-04, 04:47 PM

i'm not implying anything... at all... lots of brilliant people believe in god... if you have low self esteem, don't take it out on me...

I don't have much time now . . . I'll answer your points later. But I wanted to apologize if I came off weird. In trying to make my points I get intense just to help me get my thoughts out, and then when someone reacts I am always surprised. I'm enjoying the debate. :smile:

balkan

Jul23-04, 06:41 PM

I don't have much time now . . . I'll answer your points later. But I wanted to apologize if I came off weird. In trying to make my points I get intense just to help me get my thoughts out, and then when someone reacts I am always surprised. I'm enjoying the debate. :smile:
that's allright... i'll make a mental note about it and not take those things too serious then... it's a fun debate, although it's all just basically a matter of opinion...

Nereid

Jul23-04, 07:55 PM

Coming late to this thread, much catching up to do (begging indulgence and patience from readers).[can] everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone?In the sense of, for example, accounting for the ecology of the Delaware delta in terms of eigenstates of up and down quarks (plus the behaviour of the odd lepton or two), it'd be a pretty tiresome task.

But the thread early on put this quibble - and others such as laws, chaos, determinist predictions, the definition and scope of physics, etc - firmly to bed, and moved on as these thread are wont to do to explaining the basis of life and consciousness/andNo one disputes biology is involved in making consciousness present here on Earth. The question is if there is something else there too.So, if romantic love can be explained as drug addiction, why should we expect that one day consciousness could not be explained in terms of (something like) brain chemistry too? Goodness, maybe 'spirituality' and 'belief in gods' has a solid (meta) brain chemisty explanation too?then the universe would be full of life and we don't seem to observe that.Depends what you mean by 'life' - the overwhelming quantity of life on Earth is bacteria, and always has been. What observational evidence is there that bacteria are not common in the warm, wet bedrock of most 'terrestrial' planets?So it is kind of a hard problem if you consider life to have happened *by chance* because that probability is SO low that it shouldn't have happened in the visible universe.With a sample size of just 1 (and close to zero knowledge about life on any other planet or moon) it's kinda hard to use observational data to argue the case one way or the other.Can you accept that an intelligent, thinking person might look at the physical evidence and conclude something is missing, and what's "missing" seems to possess characteristics which are not physical?... and what if, 200 years or more from now, the fine details of just how this intelligent, thinking person came to reach what to her are these 'conclusions' are well understood in terms of brain chemistry (and, similarly, why a different intelligent, thinking person concludes otherwise)?

Imparcticle

Jul24-04, 01:02 AM

Yes, your right of course. I may not have made it clear enough. We can tell why the cell died, what was wrong or what was not happening to kill the cell; but, we cannot detect what it was that left or quit when the living cell died.
when life was no longer present in the cell. What property, characteristic, quality that is life changed the instant the cell or anything changed from living to dead other than everything stopped.

Just what do you mean by "life"?? In the biological sense, life is characterized by (AFAIK) hereditary material. Of course, that characterization is derived from what is observed in our explored environment. In the sense you seem to be depicting, "life" is a spiritual characteristic. For example, you say :

we cannot detect what it was that left or quit when the living cell died.

I should probably note as well that we cannot tell what anything is really; we can only infer what something may be by its characteristics. Take force for example. We don't know precisely what it is, but we have an exceptional understanding of what it does. So in this context, no one can tell you what life is, but they can tell you what its characterized by...right?

Les Sleeth

Jul24-04, 11:53 AM

It really isn't contradicted or anything... i mentioned it as a posibility, and you say i'm contradicted by facts? i didn't say there were any facts or that i believed there to be... chemical systems can "accidentially" organize themselves into alot of incredible structures... you are aware of this, aren't you?

I am very aware of that. I am also very aware that the self-organizationalness of chemistry so far turns repetitive far to soon to lead to a living system (i.e., in my language, it is "non-progressive"). I have never said there isn't some self-organizing ability to found in physical processes.

The "facts" to which I refer (the inability to demostrate "progressive" organization and subjective experience) may not contradict, but I think in an unbiased mind they should naturally prevent one from being confident about physicalism at this time. The fact that right now the world is filled with people who already believe physicalism is a viable explanation indicates to me (obviously one of the few unbiased people on the planet :smile: ) that objectivity is as absent in physicalist circles as it is among the religious.

by your standards, nothing is based on physics... we don't have proof of how gravity, energy quantization or wave propagation works either... we only have indications... so let's just attribute that to "something else"... we have to, otherwise we're not being objective by your standards...

Untrue! I have never said or implied such a thing (there's a thread on the straw man argument going on somewhere at PF :wink: ). I have limited my challenge to a 100% physicalist theory to two areas, that's it. And even then, I have NOT said because there is currently no physical explanation for those two areas we should jump to the conclusion "something more" is behind it. I've simply said it should, in an unbiased mind, raise a red flag. Also about an unbiased mind I ask, what is the big deal if there is "something more"? Why should anyone genuinely interested in the truth care? I certainly don't care what the truth is as long as I can have it.

a random number generator is mechanical aswell... and most of what you probably attribute to "something else", phychologists would attribute to alot of other things, mechanical processes, that "seems" like an act of individuality and a free mind... our mind is not anyway near free from mechanical processes, it is loaded with them... unless of course you want to argue with the field of psychology aswell...

Again, we know that if consciousness is "something more" it interacts with brain physics. But why must it be fully physical or fully something more?

yes of course... you are on the other hand ignoring the fact, that a lack of facts isn't a proof of anything either...

Yes it is proof of something, and that is that something is a mystery. And if the "something" is alien to known principles, that is a stonger reason to give pause before just automatically assuming it will one day fit into one's preferred metaphysics.

of course i'm open for the option, but rigth now the evidence points in the direction of physicality, so i'm betting my money on that horse...

The evidence (in the case of progressive organization and consciousness) does NOT point in the direction of physicality yet. The evidence shows there are physical processes present, but their behaviors are not explained by physical law. According to your logic, if we find a Monet painting and wonder about its origin, we should limit ourselves to the physical processes required to create it. When I want to know how those physcial processes got in the shape of a beautiful painting, the physicalist must repy (in the absence of knowing about Monet) "right now the evidence points in the direction of physicality."

so what you're saying is: you're not thrilled about the physicalist idealism, cause scientists cannot demonstrate self assembly yet... but if they could demonstrate self assembly, it would be due to "something else"... okay, why are you having this discussion if you have already made up your mind about not being convincable?

I didn't say that, I don't know how you got that interpretation. I don't insist there is something more, I don't know for sure if there is or not. I only say that progressive organization and consciousness are reasons for suspecting something more. It is the physicalist or religionist or whatever "-ist" one can imagine who usually embraces their favorite metaphysical stance in the absence of adequate facts to justify the strength of their embrace. I myself simply say there is reason to not yet accept physicalism as the total answer, and there is reason to suspect something more.

it is a very good argument... you're demanding us to demonstrate something that has been million years in the making, and you want it now! and like you said yourself, if we could demonstrate it to you, it would "prove" the existance of "something else" to you anyway... now that is what i call "not being objective," and that is also why i said "no matter how much we prove it, how many indications we find, people will still find more comfort in the existance of "something else""...

:bugeye: I am starting to feel like the scarecrow on his way to Oz (you know, a straw man). Show me where I said if you could demonstrate chemogenesis to me it would prove the existence of something more. I said the opposite, that if chemistry could be shown to possess progressive self-organizaing ability, that would strongly tip the scales in favor of a physicalistic model of biogenesis; similarly, if a computer can create consciousness, I would also say physicalism is the current best explanation.

I am NOT anti-physicalist. What I am, is highly skeptical of those who are proclaiming confidence in a physicalist TOE as though the evidence is there to support that confidence. I say, their bias and a priori assumptions are showing.

Nereid

Jul24-04, 12:41 PM

The evidence (in the case of progressive organization and consciousness) does NOT point in the direction of physicality yet.With apologies in advance that I'm taking this out of a much larger context.

I want to argue the case that the evidence *does* point in the direction of physicality, for consciousness.

If good insights into such subjective experiences as colour perception and romantic love can be obtained from scientific study - chemistry, physics, anatomy, etc - and the more we study the better our understanding of what's going on gets, isn't this 'evidence [which points] in the direction of physicality' of consciousness?

Further, the rate of change in our understandings of subjective experience in terms of chemistry etc has been quite rapid. While all extrapolations are fraught, extrapolating this rate of change just 50 years into the future suggests even consciousness will become at least somewhat understood in terms of 'physics'.

I feel the corresponding case for 'progressive organisation' isn't as strong yet; with each advance, the gulf still to be bridged remains huge.

Les Sleeth

Jul24-04, 01:28 PM

So, if romantic love can be explained as drug addiction, why should we expect that one day consciousness could not be explained in terms of (something like) brain chemistry too?

I am guessing what you mean by saying romantic love is "drug addiction" is that it is encouraged by hormones, and so does have significant physiological force behind it. But there is also non-romantic, objectless love, or "agape" as it is called. Hormones nor any other drugs explain that.

However, you haven't addressed the main point when it comes to consciousness. Remember, when we refer to the hard problem of consciousness, we are not referring merely to the ability to think, sense and remember -- mechancal devices can do that. But there is also that aspect which is experiencing what one is thinking, sensing, and remembering, and that is what cannot be explained by any known physical processes.

This idea of one day "expecting" is a way of saying the trend in evidence points so strongly to a conclusion that it (the conclusion) now justifies faith regardless of the fact that absolute proof isn't possible (evolution is something like this, which IMO does deserve faith in the absence of absolute proof). My entire objection is exactly to that faith by physicalists in a physical TOE theory. I say it is not justified as long as there are such major missing parts to a physicalist TOE theory as progressive organization (needed for an abiogenesis explanation) and for the subjective aspect of consciousness.

Goodness, maybe 'spirituality' and 'belief in gods' has a solid (meta) brain chemisty explanation too? . . . and what if, 200 years or more from now, the fine details of just how this intelligent, thinking person came to reach what to her are these 'conclusions' are well understood in terms of brain chemistry (and, similarly, why a different intelligent, thinking person concludes otherwise)?

That's a lot of maybe's and what if's :smile:. However, I am not talking about spirituality, belief in gods, or any such thing. I am arguing from the position of reason, looking at what appears to me to be people replacing religious dogma with a new variety of dogma.

I simply look at what we know is present in the universe, and how the vast majority of the universe appears to work, and notice that in two instances there are major exceptions: the origin of life and the subjective aspect of consciousness. I say, only if you approach those exceptions already believing in a physicalist TOE will you automatically assume they must have a physicalist explanation. If one is uncommitted to any metaphysical stance one is free to be objective; and to say there is reason to suspect "something more" seems to me to be a pretty conservative stance to take.

Les Sleeth

Jul24-04, 01:52 PM

I want to argue the case that the evidence *does* point in the direction of physicality, for consciousness.

If good insights into such subjective experiences as colour perception and romantic love can be obtained from scientific study - chemistry, physics, anatomy, etc - and the more we study the better our understanding of what's going on gets, isn't this 'evidence [which points] in the direction of physicality' of consciousness?

I don't think so. If you were to similarly analyze someone using a fork lift, you would point to all the mechanical principles involved in using the fork lift without acknowledging the driver.

Is there any reason why a non-physical consciousness couldn't interact with a physical system? Well, we don't know that. I myself can imagine it could be so, and even modeled it in my "panpsychism" thread. I don't know what the truth is, but let's say I am extremely resistant to granting physicalism TOE status until progressive organization and the hard problem of consciousness can be shown to be physical.

Further, the rate of change in our understandings of subjective experience in terms of chemistry etc has been quite rapid. While all extrapolations are fraught, extrapolating this rate of change just 50 years into the future suggests even consciousness will become at least somewhat understood in terms of 'physics'.

I am not sure what understandings you are referring to. I've not seen any new understanding of that unless you are talking about understanding neurological influences and our psychology, which are not the subjectiveness that characterizes the "hard problem" of consciousness.

I feel the corresponding case for 'progressive organisation' isn't as strong yet; with each advance, the gulf still to be bridged remains huge.

I am impressed to hear you say that. I think it is the first time I have ever heard a physicalist (assuming you are) admit the difficulties in abiogenesis theory.

I hope you can see that I am only resisting jumping to the conclusion that physicalist theory can explain everything. I am not the slightest bit resistant to allowing what is physical be explained physicalistically, or to granting science top honors for discovering what is physical. It is just that as of now, I think some physicalists are going too far with the evidence we have, and are not as open as an objective mind should be.

balkan

Jul24-04, 11:51 PM

I am very aware of that. I am also very aware that the self-organizationalness of chemistry so far turns repetitive far to soon to lead to a living system (i.e., in my language, it is "non-progressive"). I have never said there isn't some self-organizing ability to found in physical processes.

The "facts" to which I refer (the inability to demostrate "progressive" organization and subjective experience) may not contradict, but I think in an unbiased mind they should naturally prevent one from being confident about physicalism at this time. The fact that right now the world is filled with people who already believe physicalism is a viable explanation indicates to me (obviously one of the few unbiased people on the planet :smile: ) that objectivity is as absent in physicalist circles as it is among the religious.

Untrue! I have never said or implied such a thing (there's a thread on the straw man argument going on somewhere at PF :wink: ). I have limited my challenge to a 100% physicalist theory to two areas, that's it. And even then, I have NOT said because there is currently no physical explanation for those two areas we should jump to the conclusion "something more" is behind it. I've simply said it should, in an unbiased mind, raise a red flag. Also about an unbiased mind I ask, what is the big deal if there is "something more"? Why should anyone genuinely interested in the truth care? I certainly don't care what the truth is as long as I can have it.

Again, we know that if consciousness is "something more" it interacts with brain physics. But why must it be fully physical or fully something more?

Yes it is proof of something, and that is that something is a mystery. And if the "something" is alien to known principles, that is a stonger reason to give pause before just automatically assuming it will one day fit into one's preferred metaphysics.

The evidence (in the case of progressive organization and consciousness) does NOT point in the direction of physicality yet. The evidence shows there are physical processes present, but their behaviors are not explained by physical law. According to your logic, if we find a Monet painting and wonder about its origin, we should limit ourselves to the physical processes required to create it. When I want to know how those physcial processes got in the shape of a beautiful painting, the physicalist must repy (in the absence of knowing about Monet) "right now the evidence points in the direction of physicality."

I didn't say that, I don't know how you got that interpretation. I don't insist there is something more, I don't know for sure if there is or not. I only say that progressive organization and consciousness are reasons for suspecting something more. It is the physicalist or religionist or whatever "-ist" one can imagine who usually embraces their favorite metaphysical stance in the absence of adequate facts to justify the strength of their embrace. I myself simply say there is reason to not yet accept physicalism as the total answer, and there is reason to suspect something more.

:bugeye: I am starting to feel like the scarecrow on his way to Oz (you know, a straw man). Show me where I said if you could demonstrate chemogenesis to me it would prove the existence of something more. I said the opposite, that if chemistry could be shown to possess progressive self-organizaing ability, that would strongly tip the scales in favor of a physicalistic model of biogenesis; similarly, if a computer can create consciousness, I would also say physicalism is the current best explanation.

i'm certainly not trying to make a strawman argument, m8... i'm merely responding to what you said, which is:

"If a bunch of scientists use their consciousness to organize chemistry and create a living cell, that does not demonstrate that chemistry can self-organize itself! Consciousness has done the organizing, which is exactly what those who believe in God say is missing from physicalist creation theory."

how in the living hell will we ever be able to prove the physicalist theory to you? we would have to create another earth, with the chemical system it had several million years ago, and then we would have to wait a million years or so untill something chemically organized itself into life...

the evidence do point in the direction of physicalism... we have lots and lots of proof of how the brain works, while we have no evidence what so ever (except for the lack of evidence as you say, which is shrinking every day) of "something else"... lots of evidence vs. nothing... that's pretty compelling, really...

now imagine that your truck is driven by a really smart computer, and that we know all the mechanisms of the computer aswell as the mechanics of the truck itself... anyway... like i said, i'm open for the option of "something else" aswell, but i'd really like some evidence to back it up if i'm going to endorse it in any way, and i'm simply not going to settle for lack of evidence...
i'm glad to hear that evidence could convince you, but it didn't come off like that in your post... quite the contrary... so if you don't want to feel like the scarecrow (what was controlling the scarecrow btw? new thread? :biggrin: ), you should proof read your posts for spots that could be misinterpreted :wink:

Les Sleeth

Jul25-04, 10:37 AM

i'm certainly not trying to make a strawman argument, m8... i'm merely responding to what you said, which is:

"If a bunch of scientists use their consciousness to organize chemistry and create a living cell, that does not demonstrate that chemistry can self-organize itself! Consciousness has done the organizing, which is exactly what those who believe in God say is missing from physicalist creation theory."

how in the living hell will we ever be able to prove the physicalist theory to you? we would have to create another earth, with the chemical system it had several million years ago, and then we would have to wait a million years or so untill something chemically organized itself into life...
. . . if you don't want to feel like the scarecrow . . . you should proof read your posts for spots that could be misinterpreted

What I was saying was that if a cell were created in the laboratory, one has to take into consideration the role of consciousness of those involved in creating that cell. If the scientists do anything which injects organizationalness into the creation of the cell which wouldn't be found in nature, then they've not proven life could have evolved from chemistry without the organizational help consciousness provides (i.e., the scientists' consciousnesses). And since most believe the help "something more" provided in the creation of life is precisely that sort of organizational quality, that is why I say if scientists' consciousnesses add the missing organizational aspect and through that create a living cell, they've actually given evidence in favor of "something more" present when life first evolved billions of years ago.

In this very thread :redface: I changed my mind about the possibility of a living cell being created in the lab after I realized it very well could be a pure machine, and that whether it is or isn't a machine isn't the main thrust of my argument anyway. My objection is that I don't believe natural conditions can generate the level of organization necessary for chemicals to achieve the functionality of a cell. So to prove it can, scientists must get the conditions together imitating Earth's early environment, and the see if life will spontaneously develop. That's what Urey and Miller did, and what happened? A few steps, and that was it. Physicalists constantly point to that as evidence chemistry self-organized into life. But I say instead it is evidence of exactly the opposite! It proves that chemicals cannot be shown, not yet anyway, to organize themselves beyond a few steps.

Now regarding the subject of creating subjective consciousness with a computer, I think if scientists could do that it would prove consciousness is physical, regardless of the help researchers provided (although that still wouldn't answer the progressive organization problem). That's because consciousness does appear to "emerge" from the machinery of biology. Yet the question is, is consciousness generated by the brain, or is the brain a device which draws consciousness into the CSN from some pre-existing general consciousness source? Because we can't tell which is happening, that's why all your examples of the physicality of the brain, and the interdepence of consciousness and brain functions, doesn't mean consciousness at the foundation is physical.

It isn't easy to see how to avoid duality and also say there is a physical system and non-physical consciousness entwined together in biology, but I believe that could be the case. I suspect there is a common foundation to them both which is neither physical nor conscious, and that is what allows their interaction (if you are interested in how this could be so, check out my thread on "panpsychism").

Anyway, my point is that the physicalist model is missing major factors needed to deserve the level of confidence many physicalists have in it. I attribute that to a lack of objectivity caused by looking only at that which supports physicalism. To me it's kind of like those cases they profile on A & E's American Justice (a cable channel) where police think a suspect did some crime, and so stop looking for any evidence but that which indicates the suspect's guilt, while also ignoring evidence which seems to suggest they're investigating the wrong man.

selfAdjoint

Jul25-04, 03:13 PM

My objection is that I don't believe natural conditions can generate the level of organization necessary for chemicals to achieve the functionality of a cell.

Do you grant that genetic variation and natural selection between them can increase adaptive complexity? It would seem they can, as demonstrated in the (misnamed) artificial life software, and for that matter in the hot field of genetic programming, where these actions are used to produce adaptive, commercially viable computer program code.

So given that the general properties of evolution are demonstrated to work to increase complexity in different arenas, I would not think that the complexity of a cell is obviously unattainable to blind physicalist processes.

Thoughts?

Les Sleeth

Jul25-04, 05:00 PM

Do you grant that genetic variation and natural selection between them can increase adaptive complexity?

Yes.

So given that the general properties of evolution are demonstrated to work to increase complexity in different arenas, I would not think that the complexity of a cell is obviously unattainable to blind physicalist processes.

Thoughts?

Well, I haven't said it is unattainable, I've said that nothing demonstrated yet shows progressive organization is possible from any chemistry left sitting on its own.

The problem with using genetics or even programming is that those things are taking place within established systems. Evolution might work to increase complexity in different arenas, but it is doing so from within an already established living system. I am not disputing evolution, or the chemical basis of adaptation; it is the initial establishment of the system through chemogenesis I am questioning.

Personally I can't see any other way to establish certainty about chemogenesis than to demostrate chemistry's ability to spontaneously get progressive. As I pointed out to balkan, about the best we've seen is what Miller's apparatus produced half a century ago! That wasn't progressive organization anyway, so by any objective scientific standard, we are far from proving an abiotic origin of life. In fact, I suspect science's inability to demostrate progressive organization is why some have started hypothesizing that life might have first arrived on Earth hitchhiking on a meteorite (which obviously doesn't solve the origin of life problem).

Rader

Jul25-04, 06:24 PM

That's what Urey and Miller did.

There one thing that should be clear and most physcalist know this.

Pasteur pointed out the most profound enigma, of the chemical construction of living things. they are asymmetrically optic. I hope I spelled that right for you, I am a little rusty in English these days. To state that a little clearer, living substances, like ``proteins``, deviate polarized light that vibrate in only one plane, in a different dirrection, from right to left, when other molecules of the same solution of the same optical type, do not deviate, if they mix equal quantities of molecules, of the opposite optical type.

Molecules that deviate polarized light to the left are levogiras L, those that deviate to the right are dextrogiras D and those that do not deviate are racemicas LD.

This property has the funtion of the molecule to have two distinct spacial confirguations, "isomeros", which are mirrored images of its opposite, like left and right hands are symetrical but not superimposed, although exactly alike, from the point of view chemically, they are without doubt completely distinct, as far as optic activity and biological properties.

Quess what Millers experiment made? racemicas LD :surprise:

I would say that, it is unattainable, until we know the origin of the intellegent design.

There exists only two ways in which molecules can appear asymmetrically optic. One is by action of enzymes inside the cell or by a chemical reactions directs a substance already asymmetrically optic. En both cases a specific information is introduced, into the chemcial reaction, to orchestrate optical resolution. Informtion that does not depend on physio-chemical laws. For the simple reason that molecules that descriminate opticallly, are chemically identical. Chemical reations of inatimate material are not discriminitative. :tongue2:

Therefore, there is no way to obtain active optical components, only by physio-chemical laws. It is absolutely necessary, another information that is of a completely different nature, to exist previous to the aparition of asymmetrically optic molecules. Without this information you end up with racimicos. :frown:

selfAdjoint

Jul25-04, 08:37 PM

Well, Marshall Nirenberg (http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/JJ/Views/Exhibit/narrative/syntheticrna.html) created a synthetic RNA molecule consisting of only uracil. Placed in a bath of amino acids it assembled the molecule phenylalanine. Does phenylanaline have enantiomorphs? Was Nirenberg's phenylalanine racemic? I don't know. It would be interesting to use a bath of Miller's racemic amino acids with Nirenberg's poly-U to see what the optical properties of the result would be. I am sure those with defensive stances about physicality and evolution would find ways to disdain such discoveries, but I for one would be fascinated to know. It doesn't seem to me implausible that a poly-U molecule could be put together by chance processes, and look what it produces, a molecule that has in it alanine, another base.

UltraPi1

Jul25-04, 09:49 PM

Philocrat

Jul25-04, 10:30 PM

Les Sleeth

Jul25-04, 10:48 PM

I am sure those with defensive stances about physicality and evolution would find ways to disdain such discoveries, but I for one would be fascinated to know.

I don't know if you'd include me with those "would find ways to disdain" but I don't believe I am trying to scorn any legitimate achievement by science or any other discipline. This phase of our debate has become about proper inference and interpretation, not achievement.

Can we infer from any experiments conducted so far that progressive organization is likely to happen? (In case there's any doubt about what I mean by "progressive organization" -- the quality of self-organization which, under conditions found naturally on Earth, heads toward adaptive system building, and keeps going.) I don't believe there's anything disparaging in challenging physicalist assertions that when researchers push organization toward amino acid formation it is similar to chemistry taking over and continuing to organize toward an adaptive system. So, while it may not be "implausible that a poly-U molecule could be put together by chance processes," that isn't the issue. I don't want to be a mega-skeptic, but I am not suspending my logic skills either to prematurely buy what appears to be over-eager physicalist inferences.

Les Sleeth

Jul25-04, 11:00 PM

Thought I'd stir things up a bit.

I would make the arguement that reality is not physical at all. From large to small - All things are conceptual in nature. I.E. A rock on the side of the road is a conceptual entity expressed by it's geometric embodiment. I'm sure this is hard to accept, but what makes everyone so sure about physical reality?

That would be a pretty good argument except for one thing: non-mental experience. We discover a wall is more than a concept when we smash into it. That's exactly why science-oriented philosophy has surpassed (IMHO) purely rationalistic musings . . . because empirical thinkers attempt to seek confirming experience. If one eschews the experiential aspect and does nothing but think about reality, then I suppose reality for that person could be wholly conceptual.

UltraPi1

Jul26-04, 01:01 AM

That would be a pretty good argument except for one thing: non-mental experience. We discover a wall is more than a concept when we smash into it.

I was going to bring that up .... such as stubbing your toe on a chair leg. How could anyone argue that it's not physical? But ........ Who says a concept can't be stationary, and who says that a concept can't move.? Who says a concept can't give you a bloody nose ... such as running into a wall?

Concepts could have laws that are followed implicitly - Same as you have physical laws. If conceptual geometric forms (made of nothing at all) obey what we term physical laws - Reality still looks and feels and acts the same as the physical one you adhere to.

In a physical reality you have a couple of choices. Either the entire panoply , including the vacuum of space is composed of physical entities by which movement seems unlikely to be even remotely possible, or we have physical entities opposed by nothing at all, by which we differentiate those physical entities?

Rader

Jul26-04, 04:17 AM

balkan

Jul26-04, 05:15 AM

In this very thread I changed my mind about the possibility of a living cell being created in the lab after I realized it very well could be a pure machine, and that whether it is or isn't a machine isn't the main thrust of my argument anyway. My objection is that I don't believe natural conditions can generate the level of organization necessary for chemicals to achieve the functionality of a cell. So to prove it can, scientists must get the conditions together imitating Earth's early environment, and the see if life will spontaneously develop. That's what Urey and Miller did, and what happened? A few steps, and that was it. Physicalists constantly point to that as evidence chemistry self-organized into life. But I say instead it is evidence of exactly the opposite! It proves that chemicals cannot be shown, not yet anyway, to organize themselves beyond a few steps.

so you're basically saying we should have to create a chemical environment as large as earth (or the probability of such an "accident" would be much lower)... then we would have to wait a million years or so, cause it didn't just "happen overnight"...
the fact that they made a very small environment and actually discovered a molecule going through a few steps seems like a major achievement to me, considering how long time and how huge an environment the earth had at its disposal...

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 10:37 AM

The claim that life forms only where physical conditions are right does put a question mark on the 'Designer Theory of Life'. If Life like any other design had a designer, would it matter which pysical condition life inherits or is placed in? Even more so, this could point to the possibility of 'propreitory self-organisation' on the basis of suitable pysical conditions. What about a 'multi-condition' form of life? How may such a life be formed, if any?

Well, I've not made any claims about what the "something more" might be like in this thread, such as if it is a "designer." But if pressed, I'd keep my speculations conservative and suggest it might be an evolutive force. In other words, just as we can see that with matter the direction of change is overall entropic (dis-organizing), possibly the effect something more has on things is to progressively organize them.

Regarding your point about if it matters "which physical condition life inherits or is placed in," I don't see your point at all. I have never suggested the something more is supernatural (even if non-physical), so the physical conditions we find are not just based on what the something more can do, but also on the potentials and limitations of matter.

And even more troubling is the fact that the term 'self-organising' is a vague term and somewhat very misleading. Do we mean:

a) A group of things organising themselves into a thing?

b) A thing organising itself into the same or similar thing by recycling its imperfect parts?

c) Or a thing organising itself into another thing by rearanging its changeagble parts?

How could I be more clear about what I mean by "progressive organization"? Here's how I defined it for selfAdjoing: the quality of self-organization which, under conditions found naturally on Earth, heads toward adaptive system building, and keeps going.

You ask, was the self-organizing principle headed for a thing? Who knows. All we know is what that principle has done, and if the amount of adaptive system-building it's achieved is any clue, then that appears to be part of its nature. Regarding b) and c), I don't see the relevance.

And lastly, those who claim that there is something more than physical explanation also need to clarify the following relations:

1) The relation between something and nothing;

(a) Can Nothing give rise to something?
(b) Can something decline or change into nothing?

Ha! Nice try Philocrat :smile:. Why are those who suggest something more any more responsible for explaining the relation between something and nothing than physicalists? However, I did attempt to model a source for "first cause" in my thread on panpsychism; I also addressed your next question there.

2) The relation between things that can be seen or felt and those that can neither be seen nor felt in any way conceivable;

(a) Does the invisibility or non-observability of things make them
non-physical?
(b) Does the invisibility or non-observability of things make them non-
existent?

It is you who say something more cannot be experienced, but I've found quite a stack of reports taken from history of people who developed the inner skill of union, or as it's called in India samadhi. There is something very different from religion found in these reports. I am convinced all legitimate reports about something more have come from adepts in this practice.

Now, I've studied those reports for decades, so compared to most people I am more or less an expert. I realize most people have never even heard of union experience, and so there is little basis for my points to carry much weight with them. My experience with people, including science types, is that they read and listen to primarily that which supports their belief system.

3) The Relation between the design and the designer (given that we took this route);

(a) can anything single-handedly give rise to another thing?
(b) what ought to be the appropriate relation between the design and
the designer?
(c) Can a perfect designer give rise to an imperfect design, or the
superior to the inferior?

These are hard-headed issues needing clarification if this debate is to have any chance of heading in the right direction, I hope.

You are the only one taking that route, I've not suggested there is a "designer." I wouldn't propose it because I don't believe I can make the case, even if I think there might be some designing aspect to the something more. Also, your question about "a perfect designer [giving] rise to an imperfect design" is clearly one of those religious concepts logical people love to blast. As I said earlier in this thread, I wish we could throw out all the religious crap and unsupported spiritual claims, wipe the slate clean, and then start over. Of course, I'd want to erase physicalist bias too. :wink:

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 11:18 AM

I was going to bring that up .... such as stubbing your toe on a chair leg. How could anyone argue that it's not physical? But ........ Who says a concept can't be stationary, and who says that a concept can't move.? Who says a concept can't give you a bloody nose ... such as running into a wall?

I am sure you know your arguments are classic idealism, and so you probably also suspect that at an empirically-oriented forum, there won't be much sympathy for that view. :wink:

Most would agree that all human experience is subjective, even if it might be experience of something whose information about it originates outside of oneself. But to make sense of internalness, I would also have to add that there is a major difference between the functions behind mentality and whatever it is that allows experience. So I don't think you accurately characterized the difference between the concept of a bloody nose and an actual bloody nose. Do you think your physical hunger could be satisfied by the concept of food? A person could imagine the perfect meal and then easily starve to death imagining eating it.

Concepts could have laws that are followed implicitly - Same as you have physical laws. If conceptual geometric forms (made of nothing at all) obey what we term physical laws - Reality still looks and feels and acts the same as the physical one you adhere to.

I agree conceptualization does have laws, very definite laws which are described by logic and reason, plus whatever principles are behind mental imaging. But I don't understand the desire to relate to reality only conceptually when there is clearly at least one other realm of consciousness. We can think/conceptualize, and we can feel/experience. Each has its own ways of operating and effects on/in consciousness.

In a physical reality you have a couple of choices. Either the entire panoply, including the vacuum of space is composed of physical entities by which movement seems unlikely to be even remotely possible, or we have physical entities opposed by nothing at all, by which we differentiate those physical entities?

I'm afraid I don't understand that statement.

selfAdjoint

Jul26-04, 11:43 AM

I don't know if you'd include me with those "would find ways to disdain" but I don't believe I am trying to scorn any legitimate achievement by science or any other discipline. This phase of our debate has become about proper inference and interpretation, not achievement.

Can we infer from any experiments conducted so far that progressive organization is likely to happen? (In case there's any doubt about what I mean by "progressive organization" -- the quality of self-organization which, under conditions found naturally on Earth, heads toward adaptive system building, and keeps going.) I don't believe there's anything disparaging in challenging physicalist assertions that when researchers push organization toward amino acid formation it is similar to chemistry taking over and continuing to organize toward an adaptive system. So, while it may not be "implausible that a poly-U molecule could be put together by chance processes," that isn't the issue. I don't want to be a mega-skeptic, but I am not suspending my logic skills either to prematurely buy what appears to be over-eager physicalist inferences.

I suppose it's inevitable that I would see you as setting the bar unreasonably high to protect your beliefs, while you would see me as an over-eager enthusiast out to sell you shaky evidence.

To me the ability to create viruses, the success of evolution in AI and genetic programming, the observation of evolution in many species, the huge body of evidence collected at the talk origins archive and panda's thumb
sites and the triumphal march of molecular biology just makes it in the last degree implausible that some vital principle outside of the visible physical principles is necessary for life. With all respect, I don't think you have internalized that evidence sufficiently to judge it.

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 12:03 PM

so you're basically saying we should have to create a chemical environment as large as earth (or the probability of such an "accident" would be much lower)...

I am not saying that. Why would we need a chemical environment as large as Earth's? All we should need is the proper conditions recreated in one spot, similar to what Stanley Miller did.

. . . then we would have to wait a million years or so, cause it didn't just "happen overnight"...

I personally wouldn't require chemistry to morph into "living" before I accept the potential of chemistry to achieve life. I've merely asked for progressive organization to be demonstrated. Is that asking so much? To me it seems the minimum one should require from physicalist theorists who are trying to say chemistry can self-organize suffiently to become life.

the fact that they made a very small environment and actually discovered a molecule going through a few steps seems like a major achievement to me, considering how long time and how huge an environment the earth had at its disposal...

It's only interpreted as a "major achievement" by those trying for a physicalistic explanation of life's origins. I say it is no achievement at all, and here's why.

I, at least, have never disputed that life evolved through chemistry here on Earth, or that chemistry is the basis of biology. Given the huge proliferation of life after its inception, shouldn't we expect that Earth's chemistry was quite encouraging to life's development? So in a bio-friendly world, why shouldn't we expect organic compounds to form? It would be more strange if they didn't.

We already know chemicals interact, and we know we can set a series of reactions in motion with the right chemicals and the right conditions. So that's not the issue is it? The issue is finding the potenital of chemistry to keep organizing toward a "system," a system which can adapt to the environment (I'm insisting on organization "toward" an adaption system because adaptivity is central to what life is). No one, ever, has demonstrated chemistry can do that on its own, yet physicalists act like it's a foregone conclusion that life developed from self-organizing chemisty! However, while such reasoning might be dubious, but it is a fine example of propaganda. :rolleyes:

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 12:41 PM

I suppose it's inevitable that I would see you as setting the bar unreasonably high to protect your beliefs, while you would see me as an over-eager enthusiast out to sell you shaky evidence.

I want to be fair to my fellow human beings who are of the physicalist persuasion, but that "bar" I cite seems minimal to me. It is the very first principle needed, and abiogenesis cannot be explained without it. You know, I am not trying to be non-physicalistic; I'd be perfectly happy for creation to be only physical if my experiences, evidence and reason supported that. I simply need for things to make sense. What is missing from physicalist theory prevents that, and so I see those glossing over the huge missing piece as people committed to physicalism regardless of what evidence is missing. That's why I said I might be one of the few truly objective people around here. Everybody else seems committed a priori to some belief system.

To me the ability to create viruses, the success of evolution in AI and genetic programming, the observation of evolution in many species, the huge body of evidence collected at the talk origins archive and panda's thumb sites and the triumphal march of molecular biology just makes it in the last degree implausible that some vital principle outside of the visible physical principles is necessary for life. With all respect, I don't think you have internalized that evidence sufficiently to judge it.

I'm surprised SA, I wouldn't have imagined you to try the ol' condescending tactic. I might not be familiar with every single thing going on in biology (although it was my first major in college decades ago), but neither am I unfamiliar with what's been achieved in the way of progressive self-organization (and I'd venture to say I've looked into science stuff a lot more than you've checked out the inner experiences I've cited as evidence worth considering).

Would you like to hear how much I think has been achieved in the way of proving progressive organization: NOTHING. NADA. Not one instance has EVER been demonstrated (self-organization, yes; progressive self-organizaiton, no). Life is the only example. If you've got an instance of self-organization that doesn't turn repetitive or non-adaptive or downright chaotic, or which doesn't need a living system to morph (i.e., a virus), please cite it.

Your example of AI really makes me wonder if we are talking about the same thing. If you set up 5 billion dominoes to tumble each other in a complex pattern, have you created progressive self-organization? AI, like those dominoes, never gets impressively far past its programming.

Also, I haven't argued for a "vital principle." I have spoken of an organzing principle, as yet unrecognized, which might be part of life and consciousness. Tell me, just how far out is such a proposal? 1) I see self organization, 2) I see no physical principle that explains it, 3) I surmise maybe there's a self-organizing principle distinct from physicality. That's really weird isn't it? I'm a crackpot kook!

Here's a question I've asked before which you and others devoted to physicalism don't seem to want to answer: Why is it so important for everything to be physical, that non-physical suggestions are resisted at every turn? What is the obsession with that need? What possible difference could it make to find out there is "something more" than what's physical? Just from my side of it, sometimes it seems like I am talking to people who are actually afraid that something might be non-physical. :surprise:

balkan

Jul26-04, 02:56 PM

I am not saying that. Why would we need a chemical environment as large as Earth's? All we should need is the proper conditions recreated in one spot, similar to what Stanley Miller did.

I personally wouldn't require chemistry to morph into "living" before I accept the potential of chemistry to achieve life. I've merely asked for progressive organization to be demonstrated. Is that asking so much? To me it seems the minimum one should require from physicalist theorists who are trying to say chemistry can self-organize suffiently to become life.

We already know chemicals interact, and we know we can set a series of reactions in motion with the right chemicals and the right conditions. So that's not the issue is it? The issue is finding the potenital of chemistry to keep organizing toward a "system," a system which can adapt to the environment (I'm insisting on organization "toward" an adaption system because adaptivity is central to what life is). No one, ever, has demonstrated chemistry can do that on its own, yet physicalists act like it's a foregone conclusion that life developed from self-organizing chemisty! However, while such reasoning might be dubious, but it is a fine example of propaganda. :rolleyes:

of course it matters whether or not the test area is huge or not since it is always a matter of probability whether or not a specific chemical reaction will occur... if it is a highly unprobable reaction, of course you need a sufficiently large environment for it to happen in a resonable timespan... that's really very simple... the same can be said about the timespan itself... if it is a very unprobable event, of course it demands alot of time to occur...
how can you disregard that and still call yourself objective?

this brings us back to the problem of conciousness being the founder of that reaction, doesn't it?

of course self organization is one of the biggest issues, but it is also a very new scientific field, and huge progress have already been made... of course it's not being objective, having 100% faith in physicalism, but having 80-90% faith is quite objective i think, once again due to the fact that absolutely no evidence have yet been discovered for the "something else" theory, while evidence of the physicalist theory is stacking up every day...

while the few physicalists who believe 100% in the theory may be irrational to some degree, i find it much more concerning, that you seem to disregard a huge amount of factors which are a basis for the very unlikely event of the "life accident"... yet, you still call yourself more objective...
i'm personally at about a 90-95% faith on the issue... while i'm quite sure that the physicalist theory is correct, however impossible it may be to proove (especially without using conciousness :wink: ), i'm keeping an open mind, should some evidence of "something else suddently show up...

FZ+

Jul26-04, 04:02 PM

This seems familiar. Here we go again.... Let's find the not-so-well-hidden pitfalls.

I've merely asked for progressive organization to be demonstrated.
The definition of progressive - here it is used in a funny pragmatic way, which eventually translates to organisation into what 'feels' like life, which conveniently is infintessimally improbable, given that our concept of what feels like life is defined after the event.

The examples have been listed time and again. Fire. Crystals. So on, and so forth. In fact, last I remembered, applied objectively your criteria for progressive organisation rules out life itself. Without the random effects of mutations, an outside factor, life would indeed be repetitive. In certain conditions, life is also chaotic. With static environment, you have stagnation. Most life also needs other life to survive. Objectively speaking, your bar is raised so high that life is not life!

selfAdjoint

Jul26-04, 04:55 PM

Your example of AI really makes me wonder if we are talking about the same thing. If you set up 5 billion dominoes to tumble each other in a complex pattern, have you created progressive self-organization? AI, like those dominoes, never gets impressively far past its programming.

(Edit out previous text). I mistyped AI for AL.

balkan

Jul26-04, 04:58 PM

The examples have been listed time and again. Fire. Crystals. So on, and so forth. In fact, last I remembered, applied objectively your criteria for progressive organisation rules out life itself. Without the random effects of mutations, an outside factor, life would indeed be repetitive. In certain conditions, life is also chaotic. With static environment, you have stagnation. Most life also needs other life to survive. Objectively speaking, your bar is raised so high that life is not life!
good point... the entire evolution of life depends on (highly unlikely!) accidents and errors... every step of the way...

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 06:03 PM

This seems familiar. Here we go again.... Let's find the not-so-well-hidden pitfalls. The definition of progressive - here it is used in a funny pragmatic way, which eventually translates to organisation into what 'feels' like life, which conveniently is infintessimally improbable, given that our concept of what feels like life is defined after the event.

As usual, your "pitfalls" are entirely straw man bullsh*t. None of what you argue against in this post is anything I've said or implied. To start off, I NEVER talked about some "feel" of life.

The examples have been listed time and again. Fire. Crystals. So on, and so forth.

The term "progressive," as applied to organizational change, I made up. I have defined it a specific way to use in a specific way to describe a specific circumstance. The examples that you've "listed time and again" are NOT the definition of "progressive" as I, the inventor of the term, meant it. If you think fire and crystals are examples of progressive organization, you've not been listening. A crystal is an example of self-organization alright, but not progressive self-organization. I've never denied a limited amount of self-organization takes place in the universe.

Without the random effects of mutations, an outside factor, life would indeed be repetitive. In certain conditions, life is also chaotic.

What are you talking about? When have I ever tried to exclude random effects, repetitiveness, or chaotic circumstances in life? They are part of existence like a lot of other things. But ONLY in life is progressive organization, as I've defined it, been observed.

With static environment, you have stagnation. Most life also needs other life to survive.

And your point is . . . What does this have to do with my argument? I don't dispute that.

In fact, last I remembered, applied objectively your criteria for progressive organisation rules out life itself. . . . Objectively speaking, your bar is raised so high that life is not life!

Make your case FZ, tell me exactly how progressive organization, AS I'VE DEFINED IT, rules out life itself. Your just being a smartass again, nothing I've ever said denotes or connotes such a thing. Geez, why don't you try responding to what I actually say once in awhile. :confused:

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 06:25 PM

good point... the entire evolution of life depends on (highly unlikely!) accidents and errors... every step of the way...

What does the fact of accidents have to do with self-organization? Besides, that life can adapt systematically to those accidents and errors indicates even more strongly the presence of some unusual organizational quality in life. Have you ever noticed the effect of the vast majority of accidents on non-living stuff?

You know, I don't understand you guys at all. Are you denying that in life self-organization has surpassed anything ever observed in our universe? Are you denying that as of now, no one can prove what is causing it? And are you denying that life could be life without it?

Here's my point. I look at it and it prevents me from believing in physicalism because it is so unlike the normal quality of physical organization or any demonstrated potential of physical processes. That's it . . . almost.

Then I look at others who don't seem to want to even acknowledge this problem to a physicalist model. What am I to think? Should I believe they are really interested in the truth? Or should I suspect they are just trying anyway they can to maintain faith in physicalism regardless of the truth.

Unlike you guys, I don't really care what the truth is. I'm not going to let myself be bullied by physicalist zealots into accepting as "probable" what they can't yet demonstrate is probable.

balkan

Jul26-04, 06:42 PM

1) What does the fact of accidents have to do with self-organization? Besides, that life can adapt systematically to those accidents and errors indicates even more strongly the presence of some unusual organizational quality in life. Have you ever noticed the effect of the vast majority of accidents on non-living stuff?

2) Unlike you guys, I don't really care what the truth is. I'm not going to let myself be bullied by physicalist zealots into accepting as "probable" what they can't yet demonstrate is probable.

see, that's my problem with what you are saying... life isn't "adapting"... when 5 million bacteria dies due to some outside influence and maybe one survives, it's due to accidents/errors in the DNA coding sequence... it's not "adaption"... life isn't adabting to these errors either...

2) but you consider "something else" probable, without any evidence what so ever.. see, that is what we (or i at least) are trying to make you realize... cause that's not objectivity or rationalism as you claim it to be... that's subjective oppinions that you try and rationalize by pointing to lack of evidence in support of the perception that isn't shared by you... and you don't care how overwhelming the evidence is compared to what you have got...
it's alrigth to be subjective, but at least admit to it...

and nobody is trying to bully you, we're merely debating flaws in both sides arguments... you are lashing out at least as much and creating strawman arguments as well by constantly stating "lack of evidence = evidence"... and that's allrigth aswell, as long as you don't put yourself on a piedestal like you're doing right now...

calling me a physicalist zealot is also a strawman argument, and quite untrue as i've stated several times... give me some evidence of "something else" (other than lack of evidence, which is yet to be collected), and i will gladly consider that an option...

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 06:45 PM

(Edit out previous text). I mistyped AI for AL.

Correction noted.

Fliption

Jul26-04, 06:45 PM

To me the ability to create viruses, the success of evolution in AI and genetic programming, the observation of evolution in many species, the huge body of evidence collected at the talk origins archive and panda's thumb

I remember posting a thread titled "Simulation of Natural Selection" where I was asking for information on a demonstration of AI like you're alluding to here. No one ever really pointed me to anything that resembled what I would expect to see. Everything that was provided didn't meet the criteria that I argued should exists if creating AI were possible. I won't get into the actual point here in this thread but I did want to ask for any information you have about this. Sources? Links? Thanks

Fliption

Jul26-04, 07:04 PM

if it is a very unprobable event, of course it demands alot of time to occur...
how can you disregard that and still call yourself objective?

I think the issue is that if matter can progressively self organize to form what we would call complex life forms then one would expect to see on some level the ability for matter to progressively self organize. So no one is asking for proof by asking for a repeat of a billion year process. What's being asked for is a simple mechanism of progressive self organization from which an accidental masterpiece could have developed. You don't need to win the lottery to show that someone can win. You only need to show that a lottery system is in place to proof that a winner is bound to happen.

i think, once again due to the fact that absolutely no evidence have yet been discovered for the "something else" theory, while evidence of the physicalist theory is stacking up every day...

(especially without using conciousness :wink: ), i'm keeping an open mind, should some evidence of "something else suddently show up...

Then consider this with an open mind. What type of evidence do you think you will find to proof something other than physical may exists? Where are you looking? I suspect, once again, that we are eaten up with semantic problems. I've posted a suggested distinction several pages back which would argue that the only difference between physical and non-physical is the type of evidence it leaves. So are you looking for all your evidence in test tubes? You might want to be even more open minded. Unless of course you define these terms differently. Then we have an even more embarrassing issue to deal with...arguing about concepts when we all mean something different by them :redface:.

balkan

Jul26-04, 07:16 PM

1) I think the issue is that if matter can progressively self organize to form what we would call complex life forms then one would expect to see on some level the ability for matter to progressively self organize. So no one is asking for proof by asking for a repeat of a billion year process. What's being asked for is a simple mechanism of progressive self organization from which an accidental masterpiece could have developed. You don't need to win the lottery to show that someone can win. You only need to show that a lottery system is in place to proof that a winner is bound to happen.

2) Then consider this with an open mind. What type of evidence do you think you will find to proof something other than physical may exists? Where are you looking? I suspect, once again, that we are eaten up with semantic problems. I've posted a suggested distinction several pages back which would argue that the only difference between physical and non-physical is the type of evidence it leaves. So are you looking for all your evidence in test tubes? You might want to be even more open minded. Unless of course you define these terms differently. Then we have an even more embarrassing issue to deal with...arguing about concepts when we all mean something different by them :redface:.

1) that's great, and i'm quite sure someone will eventually do this, but self organizing systems are still on very early experimental stages... i was arguing specifically with les on this, since his statement was, that since the proof would be made by concious minds, it would actually be an indication of "something else" (just a note, not a bash or anything)...

2) i'm going to have to look up those pages... i'm looking for any kind of evidence that isn't just an argument of lack of evidence to support the physicalist theory... no matter how that is twisted and turned, it is not evidence, it's a perception...
i can say, however, that most of those arguments about how the human mind is proof of "something else" falls rigth off me, since i've read psychology, and i know the human brain follows very specific patterns and is highly subject to chemistry and genetics aswell... the idea of subjectivity and a free mind is for the greater part an illusion...

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 07:35 PM

see, that's my problem with what you are saying... life isn't "adapting"... when 5 million bacteria dies due to some outside influence and maybe one survives, it's due to accidents/errors in the DNA coding sequence... it's not "adaption"... life isn't adabting to these errors either...

That's non sequitur if I've ever heard it. That point has NOTHING to do with progressive organization!

but you consider "something else" probable, without any evidence what so ever..

Again, you are putting words in my mouth. I NEVER said something else is probable. For the shared situation of this debate I said "possible." Now what I think personally, that is another matter.

see, that is what we (or i at least) are trying to make you realize... cause that's not objectivity or rationalism as you claim it to be... that's subjective oppinions that you try and rationalize by pointing to lack of evidence in support of the perception that isn't shared by you...

What possible difference does it make if my perceptions are shared? Do you think a physicalist's perceptions will be shared if he is in a room full of Jehovah's Witnesses? We are debating an area of reality that is unknown and not understood. Physicalist thinkers put forth physicalist explanations for that, just as one might expect. But don't act like they have some right over other theorists just because they happen to be in the majority here at PF. Nothing I've said contradicts known facts. Remember, I am the skeptic here, not the advocate of "something more."

and you don't care how overwhelming the evidence is compared to what you have got...

Please, not that impotent argument again! Let's take the car I mentioned in an earlier post, and have you argue it self-organized itself while I say I have never seen any organization principles which would make that happen. In that case, the "overwhelming evidence" would be you describing in minute detail all the physical aspects of the car, and utterly ignoring the fact that I am pointing to something completely different. Yes, life involves deep levels of physicalness and mechanics. I've never denied it.

As far as my "lack" of evidence goes, you really don't know what you are talking about. To debate that point would sidetrack this thread, and people who know me have heard me debate it many times. For a quick explanation, let's just say that there is no scientific evidence for something more; the "empirical" part of science relies on sense experience; sense experience has only been shown to reveal physical aspects of reality; so if there is anything non-physical, sense-dependent investigation ain't gonna find it.

Is there any other type of reliable consciousness experience besides through the senses? Well, I say there is but, again, this isn't the time or place to talk about it.

it's alrigth to be subjective, but at least admit to it...

Everything conscious is subjective. The issue is how much our subjectivity is biased.

you are lashing out at least as much and creating strawman arguments as well but constantly stating "lack of evidence = evidence...

Name one strawman argument I've advanced. Shame on me if I have!

Yes, I point to lack of evidence. Isn't a discipline dependent on observation required to back claims with adequate evidence? The lack of evidence is evidence; it is evidence that you don't know something.

give me some evidence of "something else" (other than lack of evidence, which is yet to be collected), and i will gladly consider that an option...

Why should I have to give evidence of something else to question claims of physicalist probability? Either the evidence supports a probability or it doesn't.

Fliption

Jul26-04, 07:36 PM

What are you talking about? When have I ever tried to exclude random effects, repetitiveness, or chaotic circumstances in life? They are part of existence like a lot of other things. But ONLY in life is progressive organization, as I've defined it, been observed.

Heh. If FZ found an automobile on Mars he would allow for accidental physical processes as the creator simply because he doesn't want his subjective understanding of what a useful thing is to cloud his judgement about something on Mars. So you can see the differences in perspective here. FZ and I have gone around and around about this sort of thing. His is the sort of extreme view which states that because we can't point to the dividing line at the micro level then it's ok to completely ignore the distinctions we see at the macro level. While I see the merit in keeping this point in mind, I also have argued that to totally ignore the macro view is just intellectually dishonest. To make the argument that scientific inquiry should be driven completely by this "blind", strict process is just wrong. The scientific method is a strict process. But the direction/theories which science chooses to apply it to have been based on much less.

Surely a reasonable person would question the origin of a contraption such as an automobile on Mars? (BTW FZ, I would say this even if I had no idea what an automobile was :approve:.)

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 07:49 PM

I think the issue is that if matter can progressively self organize to form what we would call complex life forms then one would expect to see on some level the ability for matter to progressively self organize. So no one is asking for proof by asking for a repeat of a billion year process. What's being asked for is a simple mechanism of progressive self organization from which an accidental masterpiece could have developed. You don't need to win the lottery to show that someone can win. You only need to show that a lottery system is in place to proof that a winner is bound to happen.

You've said exactly what I've been trying to say. I don't know if I ever made it clear, or if my fellow debaters are purposely being obtuse. From my standpoint, mine is the concern of a reasonable person searching for the unbiased truth, so I resist accepting professed "probabilities" by those admittedly already committed to some "-ism" whether that is scientism or spiritualism. Of course, me talking like that has Balkan thinking I've put myself on a pedestal.

Whatever, I suspect I should just drop out of this debate because I am too frustrated to make any sense.

Fliption

Jul26-04, 07:55 PM

1) that's great, and i'm quite sure someone will eventually do this, but self organizing systems are still on very early experimental stages... I was arguing specifically with les on this, since his statement was, that since the proof would be made by concious minds, it would actually be an indication of "something else" (just a note, not a bash or anything)...

Fair enough. But I would think this would be rather easy to do. I eluded to this in my "Simulation" thread that I mentioned earlier. For me, you don't even need to show such things with chemicals and life forms. If someone can demonstrate that some type of simple instruction sets on a computer can progressively organize, this would be sufficient I would think. I make the argument though, that given the speed of computers and the ability to speed up the mutation and selection process, we should have some major AI soon. Like in a matter of years; not millions. Who would have thought it? We don't have to actually think about programming an AI machine. We just set up a fast running algorythm and it programs itself!

2) i'm going to have to look up those pages... i'm looking for any kind of evidence that isn't just an argument of lack of evidence to support the physicalist theory... no matter how that is twisted and turned, it is not evidence, it's a perception...
i can say, however, that most of those arguments about how the human mind is proof of "something else" falls rigth off me, since i've read psychology, and i know the human brain follows very specific patterns and is highly subject to chemistry and genetics aswell... the idea of subjectivity and a free mind is for the greater part an illusion...

Who is suffering from the illusion and how do we explain matter creating a "who" that can be subject to illusions? Or perhaps the concept of "I" is just an illusion to? In which case, who is experiencing that illusion?

It appears you're looking for evidence in the test tube. If you read the pansychism thread by Les, you'll see he is eluding to other kinds of evidence. Also, I would recommend some serious study into some philosophical issues like the problems of consciousness if you haven't already. Science books aren't going to talk about these things.

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 07:56 PM

i can say, however, that most of those arguments about how the human mind is proof of "something else" falls rigth off me, since i've read psychology, and i know the human brain follows very specific patterns and is highly subject to chemistry and genetics aswell... the idea of subjectivity and a free mind is for the greater part an illusion...

Human psychology may very well fall primarily in the physical realm, and of course certainly brain stuff does. To understand the part of consciousness being pointed to as an "exception," you should do a Google search on the "hard problem of consciousness."

Nereid

Jul26-04, 09:13 PM

I am impressed to hear you say that. I think it is the first time I have ever heard a physicalist (assuming you are) admit the difficulties in abiogenesis theory.Hey Les, I’m really enjoying this thread, so please don’t get frustrated and leave, please? :smile:

I have no idea if I’m a ‘physicalist’ or not! Let’s see …I hope you can see that I am only resisting jumping to the conclusion that physicalist theory can explain everything. I am not the slightest bit resistant to allowing what is physical be explained physicalistically, or to granting science top honors for discovering what is physical. It is just that as of now, I think some physicalists are going too far with the evidence we have, and are not as open as an objective mind should be.Several pages of this thread have been devoted to the origin of life, and what sort of gulf there is in terms of a ‘physicalist’ position, and Les has kept insisting on his shibboleth – progressive organization. There have also been a couple of posts on consciousness (the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness), and one or two of mine that I’d like to come back to at a later time (e.g. ‘romantic love’).

This post is addressed principally to Les.

My view is that many, if not most, new domains that become available for us to study, or study in more detail, reveal a richness that is rarely anticipated. These domains can be the very tiny – the Standard Model clarifying the ‘fundamental particle zoo’, or neutrino oscillations; tiny – the fractal nature of ISM grains, nanoparticles; small - the dominance of life on Earth by bacteria, quasi-crystals; … hidden oceans on Io, planetary systems, interstellar cirrus, … right up to the universe – inflation, primordial nucleosynthesis. With the richness comes a great many gaps and some gulfs, every one of which is an opportunity for ‘something more’, or ‘a god of the gaps’, or ‘new physics/chemistry/biology/whatever’. Sometimes the gaps shrink relatively quickly, (e.g. helium?, Oklo); oftentimes they take decades to show significant progress (e.g. solar neutrinos, plate tectonics, snowball Earth); and no doubt some take centuries (evolution?). Perhaps the origin of life and the hard problem of consciousness will be among this last group?

But why focus on just these two? I mean, between Planck time and distance (~10-43 s, ~10-35 m) and the current best we can see (~10-18 s, ~10-17 m?), there are ~20 orders of magnitude! That’s approx as many as between the size of the Earth and the whole universe. How much richness is there in these ~20 OOM? How many surprises, gaps, gulfs, etc?

Or take the early universe. Between the first Planck second and what we can ‘see’ directly (the CMBR, at ~300,000 years), there are >50 OOM!! And only ~5 from the surface of last scattering to today.

So, why spend lots of time pondering consciousness and the origin of life? If you can’t do some experiments or perform some observations to close the gaps, there are thousands of other gaps (and gulfs) that you can work on. :biggrin:

Les Sleeth

Jul26-04, 10:16 PM

Hey Les, I’m really enjoying this thread, so please don’t get frustrated and leave, please? :smile:

Okay, one more post then! :smile:

My view is that many, if not most, new domains that become available for us to study, or study in more detail, reveal a richness that is rarely anticipated. These domains can be the very tiny – the Standard Model clarifying the ‘fundamental particle zoo’, or neutrino oscillations; tiny – the fractal nature of ISM grains, nanoparticles; small - the dominance of life on Earth by bacteria, quasi-crystals; … hidden oceans on Io, planetary systems, interstellar cirrus, … right up to the universe – inflation, primordial nucleosynthesis. With the richness comes a great many gaps and some gulfs, every one of which is an opportunity for ‘something more’, or ‘a god of the gaps’, or ‘new physics/chemistry/biology/whatever’. Sometimes the gaps shrink relatively quickly, (e.g. helium?, Oklo); oftentimes they take decades to show significant progress (e.g. solar neutrinos, plate tectonics, snowball Earth); and no doubt some take centuries (evolution?). Perhaps the origin of life and the hard problem of consciousness will be among this last group?

But why focus on just these two? I mean, between Planck time and distance (~10-43 s, ~10-35 m) and the current best we can see (~10-18 s, ~10-17 m?), there are ~20 orders of magnitude! That’s approx as many as between the size of the Earth and the whole universe. How much richness is there in these ~20 OOM? How many surprises, gaps, gulfs, etc?

Or take the early universe. Between the first Planck second and what we can ‘see’ directly (the CMBR, at ~300,000 years), there are >50 OOM!! And only ~5 from the surface of last scattering to today.

So, why spend lots of time pondering consciousness and the origin of life? If you can’t do some experiments or perform some observations to close the gaps, there are thousands of other gaps (and gulfs) that you can work on. :biggrin:

Well, I think we already have plenty of minds (far more predisposed to deduction than I) who will do an infinitely better job at those research projects you've suggested. My preferred mode of thinking is induction. As a result, I am a 100% dyed-in-the-wool generalist, and after 57 years of looking at things that way, I can't see me switching sides.

Being a generalist, what attracts my attention before anything else are universals, and exceptions to universals. I am always looking for the common principle, or what properties things share. The more broadly a principle applies, the more it excites me (is the inevitability of my particular shibboleth becoming clear?). At the old PF I used to have as my signature a saying of Confucious, "“Do you suppose that I am one who learns a great deal and remembers it? No, I have a thread that runs through it all.” To me, there is no greater intellectual treasure than finding such a thread.

Besides declining your offer to fail at being a scientist :wink:, I am telling you that about me because I don't believe the progressive organization point I am making is going to be explained by your very true and excellent insight, "many, if not most, new domains that become available for us to study, or study in more detail, reveal a richness that is rarely anticipated." I do understand what you mean, and because I really appreciate others doing such work is why I spend so much time reading about it or watching it in science specials.

My progressive organization observation is straight from "exception to a universal." We have an entire universe behaving within a certain level of organization, and then we have here on planet Earth something which completely busts out of that general rule. Now, I will concede your point by saying that it is possible matter may have realized a new potential here. There are those who say consciousness, for instance, is a new property of matter (as in "emergent" theory).

But if so, then I still want to see it reproduced. All the arguments about life having millions of years to evolve don't impress me much as an excuse for not demonstrating it (i.e., before proclaiming confidence in abiogenesis). I say that because look at the resiliancy of life. Whatever established it couldn't have been a flimsy or delicate principle for pre-life organization to have endured the hostilities of early Earth, made it to become a "living" system, and then to have survived (in one form or another) billions of years of untold hardships and natural catastrophies. It transformed our atmosphere, the oceans, the entire planet! As a system, life "works." It kicks butt, it gets it on . . . :tongue2: Besides, we know most of the conditions and chemicals that were present in prebiotic Earth. How many ways can those factors be arranged in a search for progressive organization anyway?

So I say, get some molecules going, force them to start self-organizing, pull out the old bag of chemical tricks that a science-educated consciousness should be able to develop far better than chance conditions could have back in primitive times. Prove once and for all chemistry can, in conditions that might be found on Earth, spontaneously kick into progressively organizing gear.

You know, you might be right that as we learn more about matter and self-organization, secrets will be found confirming physicalist theory. But it might also turn out that one day we will hear scientists say, "we can't do it." It's like those scientists today who are starting to waver about finding life on other planets, or even another planet anything like our seemingly rare Earth! :biggrin:

Philocrat

Jul26-04, 11:09 PM

The facts are that all life here on Earths stems from ACDT base combinations. When we find, if we find, life forms with other base combinations, that will raise a whole bunch of new philosophical questions to address. Will we find something different on Mars? Would I like to know. :smile:

Well, I only go by what science says and my main interest is to deduce from what science ascertains. And my argument is this:

If the 'Right conditions theory of Life' is true, then it holds true that wherever we find similar conditions as eath's, a life identical or equivalent to ours must also exist. However, this does not resolve the issue of there being something more than the physical aspect of life itself. We still have to show how life could be brought about, or related to, by something other than the physical.

Fliption

Jul26-04, 11:28 PM

So, why spend lots of time pondering consciousness and the origin of life? If you can’t do some experiments or perform some observations to close the gaps, there are thousands of other gaps (and gulfs) that you can work on. :biggrin:

I will just add to this that in the case of consciousness, there is good argument that the current scientific paradigm "cannot", in principal, close the gap. This is more than just plugging god into a temporary gap of ignorance.

UltraPi1

Jul27-04, 01:30 AM

Do you think your physical hunger could be satisfied by the concept of food? A person could imagine the perfect meal and then easily starve to death imagining eating it. My arguement is that reality is not physical in any way......so the question does not make sense from that standpoint. You could ask - Do you think your conceptual hunger could be satisfied by the concept of food. My answer would be yes (most definately). Just grab that munchy and eat it. I would also argue that the act of getting the food is not a physical act. Motion would be an act of conceptual interaction governed by the adherence to conceptual laws.

If there are fundamental entities (no parts). We must conclude that these fundamental entities are made of nothing at all. I.E The fundamental entities are no more than conceptual geometric forms.

balkan

Jul27-04, 04:17 AM

yes of course i'll just mix up some chemicals and demonstrate progressive organization... and while i'm at it i'll solve every quantum mechanical problem in the universe and i'll do that right now, cause of course it doesn't demand time and research... that's no excuse... just do it :rolleyes:
really, that kind of argumentation is not what i'm looking for... there are loads of exceptions to universal rules, if you've studied it for so long, you should know that...

lack of evidence isn't evidence of anything but the fact that there's something you don't know... quite my point... evidence of that, and nothing else!

about "the hard problem of conciousness" ... now i've done some searches on it, and **** like this:
"The being underlying Chalmers' account of the hard problem is a zombie twin of a real person. Let the real person be John and his double be Zohn (zombie John). Zohn is made of flesh and blood and is neurophysiologically identical with John. John and Zohn are atom for atom the same, but John has qualitative states while Zohn does not. If Zohn is logically possible this implies first of all that the qualitative is not supervenient upon the physical. If phenomenon P is supervenient upon a substructure S then it is not logically possible for two beings to have the same substructure S and yet differ with respect to P. John and Zohn by definition share their substructure yet differ with respect to their mental states. Furthermore, since John and Zohn are physically just the same, but different in qualia, it follows that qualia must be nonphysical. So if zombies are logically possible, physicalism is false."
is just another load of subjective arguments...
there are some interesting twists and turns, but really, it is all deep down subjective and perception-based...
the imagined existance of "zombies" doesn't prove anything whatsoever...

and about the remarks on your perception and bias, you have several times made it quite clear what you think, which:
1) i cannot just overlook because you ask me to. not unless you completely forget that i have mentioned physicalism as my favoured theory.
2) is an obvious origin of a bias.
^
and that is also why i said you placed yourself on a piedestal...

balkan

Jul27-04, 04:51 AM

Royce

Jul27-04, 07:42 AM

Well, I for one, believe that there is something more to life than conventional physics. I believe that there is a life force or energy that exists and is the motivating and organizing force or arrow pointing toward more complex life forms. Is it spiritual or super natural? No, that would be an oxymoron. What could be more natural to living organisms than life,life force or energy.

I believe this for a number of reasons and admittedly if looked at in a different way they could be used to support physicalism.

Life is ubiquitous here on earth. It is everywhere, even in places and conditions that were previously thought to be impossible for life to flourish.

Evidence is found that life progresses from simple to complex and while there are exceptions the arrow points one way just as does the arrow of time and entropy.

We cannot create life nor can we create or manufacture many of the chemicals of life without using life itself to do it for us.

Once dead we can not make even a "simple" cell come back to life even if we provide all of the necessities for it to do so. It does not spontaneously come back to life and all of its chemical processes and reactions start up again even thought there is not reason for it not to and every reason to believe that it would if abiogenisis is correct. The chemicals, energy and environment are there. Why then doesn't it live again once dead?

This in itself, in my mind, is enough to prove that abiogenisis is wrong. There is something more. We just don't know yet what it is and haven't yet identified it mainly because it hasn't reached up and slapped us in the face, we haven't been looking for it and even though it lays there right in front of us, as obvious as life itself, we refuse to see it because it doesn't fit in nicely with our pet theories of physics and chemistry. No it isn't supernatural nor spiritual. It is as natural as life itself. It is life. It is a quality that makes the difference between living and non-living, organic and non-organic. Just exactly what it is and how can we measure or detect it, I don't know; but, there is a whole world of things I, and/or we, don't know that does exist in the physical world.

We don't even know what matter, space time or energy is.
What is an electron made of and why does it behave as it does most of the time yet can still behave differently counter to every physical law know to man at other times? How can any of you be so cock sure that physicalism is right and everything else wrong when physical science can't even tell us what the physical world is made of.

Philocrat

Jul27-04, 07:44 AM

Regarding your point about if it matters "which physical condition life inherits or is placed in," I don't see your point at all. I have never suggested the something more is supernatural (even if non-physical), so the physical conditions we find are not just based on what the something more can do, but also on the potentials and limitations of matter.

I am not accusing anyone in particular of that. I am merely giving a general guideline as to how different people may think of it. Admittedly, people do think of it in the ways I suggested, or don't they?

How could I be more clear about what I mean by "progressive organization"? Here's how I defined it for selfAdjoing: the quality of self-organization which, under conditions found naturally on Earth, heads toward adaptive system building, and keeps going.

You mean 'Collective organisation into a progressive whole' which I think should be naturally distinguished from the singular term 'self-organisation'? Or is it collective self-organisation? Which one?

You ask, was the self-organizing principle headed for a thing? Who knows. All we know is what that principle has done, and if the amount of adaptive system-building it's achieved is any clue, then that appears to be part of its nature. Regarding b) and c), I don't see the relevance.

The points of b) and c) might seem like a tautology, but they still stand. I will clarify and expand upon it later.

Ha! Nice try Philocrat :smile:. Why are those who suggest something more any more responsible for explaining the relation between something and nothing than physicalists? However, I did attempt to model a source for "first cause" in my thread on panpsychism; I also addressed your next question there.

It is you who say something more cannot be experienced, but I've found quite a stack of reports taken from history of people who developed the inner skill of union, or as it's called in India samadhi. There is something very different from religion found in these reports. I am convinced all legitimate reports about something more have come from adepts in this practice.

Now, I've studied those reports for decades, so compared to most people I am more or less an expert. I realize most people have never even heard of union experience, and so there is little basis for my points to carry much weight with them. My experience with people, including science types, is that they read and listen to primarily that which supports their belief system.

I have not read the thread with your model yet......and I am not denying that there could be something more. However, my argument is that if there were something more, such a thing could never take the form of 'Nothing' or 'Nothingness'. It must lay within the bounds of accountability eitther now or in future.

You are the only one taking that route, I've not suggested there is a "designer." I wouldn't propose it because I don't believe I can make the case, even if I think there might be some designing aspect to the something more. Also, your question about "a perfect designer [giving] rise to an imperfect design" is clearly one of those religious concepts logical people love to blast. As I said earlier in this thread, I wish we could throw out all the religious crap and unsupported spiritual claims, wipe the slate clean, and then start over. Of course, I'd want to erase physicalist bias too. :wink:

Well, my own detailed investigations within the bounds of logic and critical thinking constantly point to the fact that Religious thinking, however naive it may outwardly appear, is here to stay, at least until further notice. We all thought that science could dispose of relgious claims completely, but it turns out that it can't. On the claim that I am the only one taking that route, well, I am not taking any route. Rather I am merely trying to reroute the reasoning on the whole subject from the direction of inconsistency to the direction of consistency. Please refer back to my earlier posting on this.

Fliption

Jul27-04, 08:23 AM

about "the hard problem of conciousness" ... now i've done some searches on it, and **** like this:

is just another load of subjective arguments...
there are some interesting twists and turns, but really, it is all deep down subjective and perception-based...
the imagined existance of "zombies" doesn't prove anything whatsoever...

You seem like a person with some reasoning ability so let me just asks that you spend some more time studying this topic because I don't think you grasp the weight of the argument. If you look at this with an open mind I think you'll find some interesting things to ponder at least, even if you don't deny your current beliefs. This topic isn't so easily cast aside as you have done here. The zombie argument is a thought exercise merely to demonstrate a point. If you get the point then you no longer need the zombie illustration. So many people get caught up in it literally.

There's lots of stuff on the internet as I'm sure you've found. Also, I'll suggest looking into threads in this forum started by Hypnagogue that deal with "reductionists" not being able to explain "Consciousness". (I can't think of the exact titles.) Hypnagogue has a gift for explanation on this matter and the patience to explain it :smile:

balkan

Jul27-04, 09:18 AM

You seem like a person with some reasoning ability so let me just asks that you spend some more time studying this topic because I don't think you grasp the weight of the argument. If you look at this with an open mind I think you'll find some interesting things to ponder at least, even if you don't deny your current beliefs. This topic isn't so easily cast aside as you have done here. The zombie argument is a thought exercise merely to demonstrate a point. If you get the point then you no longer need the zombie illustration. So many people get caught up in it literally.

i didn't take it literally... i know it's a thought experiment, and that's my point... he's stating an example of a being with exactly the same structure, but without certain qualities, and is by this trying to prove that physicalism cannot explain the existance or loss of these qualities... this is a totally hypothetical and subjective idea, that has got no hold in anything concrete of any kind... trying to prove his own perception by using a situation that only exists in his own mind...
as far as i see it, it's a slightly improved version of the "a stone cannot fly - mom cannot fly - mom is a stone" argument...

Fliption

Jul27-04, 11:01 AM

i didn't take it literally... i know it's a thought experiment, and that's my point... he's stating an example of a being with exactly the same structure, but without certain qualities, and is by this trying to prove that physicalism cannot explain the existance or loss of these qualities... this is a totally hypothetical and subjective idea, that has got no hold in anything concrete of any kind... trying to prove his own perception by using a situation that only exists in his own mind...
as far as i see it, it's a slightly improved version of the "a stone cannot fly - mom cannot fly - mom is a stone" argument...

The problem of consciousness is so much more than this illustration. But you do what you must to justify your curiosity and beliefs.

balkan

Jul27-04, 11:51 AM

The problem of consciousness is so much more than this illustration. But you do what you must to justify your curiosity and beliefs.
same to you...
if the rest of the arguments are like the initial ones i've read, then i really can't see how an objective person can think of it as being anything but a mind game... i'll look more into it, but please warn me up front if the rest is similar...

Les Sleeth

Jul27-04, 12:28 PM

now les, as for your strawman arguments, lets take on the last one, which is quite ridiculous: the car analogy.
first of all, the car isn't evolving. the car is stationary and only subject to erosion... that's not a progressive organization so it's a rediculous strawman argument. shame on you.
now, will you admit to it? or do you want me to look out the rest? i'm pretty tired of you claiming to be the objective and resonable one, when obviously you're just as bad as the rest of us. and especially when you once in a while get emotional fits...
both strawman arguments and emotional fits are ok, as long as you don't act like you'd never do such a thing, cause you're on the moral highground...

I suspect we are from two different planets. Nothing you say makes sense to me, none of your logic adds up to a justification for your views.

One such case is your above example of my supposed strawman argument, which is itself a bit strawmanish. What I said might be a misapplied analogy (though I don't believe it is), but it is not a strawman argument. A strawman argument is one where you pretend your opponent has meant something he really didn't mean so you can create an argument against it. Here's a past strawman argument of yours, "by your standards, nothing is based on physics... we don't have proof of how gravity, energy quantization or wave propagation works either... we only have indications... so let's just attribute that to "something else"... we have to, otherwise we're not being objective by your standards."

I have never questioned any scientific claim where there is enough evidence supporting a theory. Evolution and the Big Bang are such theories I generally accept. Your logic seems to have been: doubt one science claim, and it means you doubt science altogether. However, I never said or implied anything remotely like that, so we are left to conclude you made it up so you could act like my point is as moronic you try to make it appear.

Here's your most recent strawman argument, ". . . and what would a 'something else' person say? that the car was magically created by 'something else' and the mechanic merely found it... which is a significantly less rational than the physicalist theory..." That's downright blatent :grumpy:. I have never said or implied the something more is magical. Your tactic there seems obvious, which is to associate my position with the irrational claims of supernaturalists.

But let's return to your refutation of my "ridiculous" car analogy . . .

now, to further counter the car analogy and explain why i pointed to the chaotic nature of life: the scientific subject at hand is evolutionary cells, not a piece of metal... this is what we study to find the origin of life... you said "life adabts" and it doesn't! some life dies due to not having the rigth mutations and some life survives... this is caused by errors and accidents in the chemical reactions and sometimes these errors have a positive effect, which is what creates the "the strongest survives" principle of evolution... the opposite is just as likely and happens all the time...

. . . you missed the point once again! Not one thing you said to refute the car analogy applies to what I'm saying, which is why I gave the analogy in the first place. In fact, all your answers in this post I'm responding to confirms that you are doing what I am portraying you as doing in my analogy, as this quote, demostrates:

"physicalism can explain an incredible amount of phenomenons regarding life, and have traced back chemical errors and changes through hundreds of thousands of years (an example of that is the recent breakthroughs in skizophrenia research)... we have evidence of how this work in a forward sense and thus also in a backward sense, so it is quite resonable to say that physicists have quite a good and resonable explanation of how life came to be..."

You seem to think that all the physical stuff that is present in life somehow transfers over to the progressive organization question. Likewise, your following logic again misses the target:

"now, with that in mind, lets revisit your car analogy: constantly, a mechanic (let's call him Random Errors) is changing things on the machine to make it better and have better mileage, although he mostly make mistakes or no change at all... he even has a logbook of many of the changes that has been made throughout the years... would a physicalist be resonable when saying that the building of the car was probably initiated by the mechanic? yes!"

You are pointing to how mutation can work to improve i an already living system. I've never questioned the role of mutation. We've been talking about non-living chemicals forming themselves into life. Period! NOTHING MORE! So what are you doing giving me examples within a living system?

Back to the car analogy. I was saying that your argument is to list all the physicalness of an intact system, and to talk about the on-going organization quality exhibited in a system; while I am trying to point to the question of how the physical stuff got organized into a system in the first place. I claimed you do not address the organization question at all, just exactly as you did in this post. So tell, me how is my analogy either strawman or "ridiculous"?

balkan

Jul27-04, 12:57 PM

a strawman argument is any argument that divert the attention... your car example was such a one...

"You are pointing to how mutation can work to improve i an already living system. I've never questioned the role of mutation. We've been talking about non-living chemicals forming themselves into life. Period! NOTHING MORE! So what are you doing giving me examples within a living system?
Back to the car analogy. I was saying that your argument is to list all the physicalness of an intact system, and to talk about the on-going organization quality exhibited in a system; while I am trying to point to the question of how the physical stuff got organized into a system in the first place. I claimed you do not address the organization question at all, just exactly as you did in this post. So tell, me how is my analogy either strawman or "ridiculous"?"
i ****ing did adress the organization question, but you are too pigheaded to read it and let anything inside that skull of yours... i'm quite fed up with your high horse attitude.

the mechanic argument directly deals with the organization as it is quite rational to suggest that the same functions that evolves the current system was the one starting it. that's not friggin hard to understand. it is at least a thousand times more rational than attributing it to something else for your own sense of psychological security...

"Your logic seems to have been: doubt one science claim, and it means you doubt science altogether. "
and this is no strawman argument either, is it mr. high horse? not even in your own definition. give me a break, i'm fed up with your endless superior attitude...

Fliption

Jul27-04, 01:08 PM

same to you...
if the rest of the arguments are like the initial ones i've read, then i really can't see how an objective person can think of it as being anything but a mind game... i'll look more into it, but please warn me up front if the rest is similar...

Yes, same to me...which is why I have studied both sides of the topic diligently.

I strongly encourage you to study further but I have to say I don't sense an openness to it from you. You'll probably find whatever you want to find if that's the case. The hard problem of consciousness is one that I can see and understand very clearly and I also do not like the zombie illustration. I find it very unnecessary and it does nothing but cause problems and misunderstandings. So don't let a 5 minute read from one webpage justify you casting aside a topic that's been debated for centuries by many very credible people.

This is a link to investigate
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html

This chapter of the same book deals specifically with the argument against physicalism.
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr2.htm

Les Sleeth

Jul27-04, 02:12 PM

i ****ing did adress the organization question, but you are too pigheaded to read it and let anything inside that skull of yours... i'm quite fed up with your high horse attitude . . . that's not friggin hard to understand. it is at least a thousand times more rational than attributing it to something else for your own sense of psychological security . . . and this is no strawman argument either, is it mr. high horse? not even in your own definition. give me a break, i'm fed up with your endless superior attitude...

Ooooooooh . . . now I get it. Very logical. :cool:

FZ+

Jul27-04, 02:34 PM

The examples that you've "listed time and again" are NOT the definition of "progressive" as I, the inventor of the term, meant it.
Of course they are not, because you have used the term progressive in a very much subjective, and biased manner.

What are you talking about? When have I ever tried to exclude random effects, repetitiveness, or chaotic circumstances in life? They are part of existence like a lot of other things. But ONLY in life is progressive organization, as I've defined it, been observed.
Define it. Define it properly. As I see it, your progressiveness rules out life, because all of life's non-repetitiveness is due to a non-repetitive environment, or an environment which it has failed to reach equilibirium in. All evolution is due to flaws, which propagate in the system.

Show how life is progressive self-organisation, please, and I'll point out the gaps. There seems to be just repeated assertions that it is, without anything like an attempt at justification. I am not responding to you are saying, because this sort of thing tends to get very long, and I get tired easily, and wish to focus on what I perceive to be the core problem - your very slippery notion of life itself.

Heh. If FZ found an automobile on Mars he would allow for accidental physical processes as the creator simply because he doesn't want his subjective understanding of what a useful thing is to cloud his judgement about something on Mars.
A human designer is an example of an accidental, physical process. The logic is self-consistent. Of course it conflicts with you granting a special role to design, and consciousness, and so on. But so what?

balkan

Jul27-04, 02:47 PM

Yes, same to me...which is why I have studied both sides of the topic diligently.

I strongly encourage you to study further but I have to say I don't sense an openness to it from you. You'll probably find whatever you want to find if that's the case. The hard problem of consciousness is one that I can see and understand very clearly and I also do not like the zombie illustration. I find it very unnecessary and it does nothing but cause problems and misunderstandings. So don't let a 5 minute read from one webpage justify you casting aside a topic that's been debated for centuries by many very credible people.

This is a link to investigate
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html

This chapter of the same book deals specifically with the argument against physicalism.
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr2.htm

thanx, i'll look into it...

Fliption

Jul27-04, 03:11 PM

A human designer is an example of an accidental, physical process. The logic is self-consistent. Of course it conflicts with you granting a special role to design, and consciousness, and so on. But so what?

For my message to Les, this isn't the way I make the distinction. It doesn't matter because it's purely a semantic issue that you raise. I'm just pointing out that fact in case anyone thinks it affects my point.

Assuming that the debate is between something being directly built by chance processes or directly built by a conscious designer with a plan, my point was that you will choose the chance processes even in the most absurd instances. To then argue that a designer is also a chance process is just denying that there is any disagreement at all on the topic. Just another example of defining ones view such that the opposing view cannot even exists by definition. Word games, pure and simple.

FZ+

Jul27-04, 03:58 PM

Just another example of defining ones view such that the opposing view cannot even exists by definition. Word games, pure and simple.
Of course that is all it amounts to. If conscious designers exist at all as a special case, materialism, physicalism cannot be true. Your argument, invoking the existence of a conscious designer as a special, distinct option, already assumes physicalism to be true. It's an example of assuming what you prove. All it shows it that physicalism is consistent with physicalism, and is not consistent with the other view. Which is pretty obvious. If I am honestly arguing for physicalism, the question itself just doesn't make any sense.

In any case, if we look back into history, in that thread we were arguing as to whether it is possible to perceive the presence of design. My viewpoint was:

(a) Design is only meaningful relative to a consumer, which provides purpose.
(b) Rarity, or abundance is itself no indicator of design.
(c) Improbability is no evidence of design, if we concede a lack of total knowledge.

With the car on Mars, the best we can say is that it may be produced by a process which we have arbitarily labelled 'a human designer', or a relative of this process. We can compare the probability of this to a variety of other alternatives, and pick a possibility as the highest at a particular time. But we cannot declare absolutely that the car is designed, especially if we don't know a lot of context, and because design isn't absolutely defined, and because same product does not entail same process.

Just my opinion, so end of story?

loseyourname

Jul27-04, 05:30 PM

As far as I can tell, what Sleeth means by "progressive organization" is the ability of non-living matter to organize into a living system through progressive steps. It is nothing more than abiogenesis.

My question is simple: If there is indeed a special quality that the first living matter possessed, why did only that batch of matter possess this quality? As far as we can tell, life only arose once (at least on this planet), and it took close to a billion years for it to do so. If there is indeed "something more" that is responsible for this happening, what took it so long? Why has it only manifested its presence once and in such a limited capacity? There seems to be the concession that organic evolution can be accounted for through purely physical processes. If so, then "something more" only had to present in a very limited amount of matter billions of years ago and never again (also never before). If this were not the case, and "something more" was present in all matter, then we would see living systems develop in Urey-Miller type experiments! Given that this just happened to occur on a planet capable of supporting life at a good time would seem to not be chance. So is "something more," or the "general pool of consciousness," itself conscious? It certainly seems to have made a choice. If so, then you have introduced a clever variation on an intelligent designer, but an intelligent designer nonetheless.

Nereid

Jul27-04, 06:49 PM

As far as I can tell, what Sleeth means by "progressive organization" is the ability of non-living matter to organize into a living system through progressive steps. It is nothing more than abiogenesis.

My question is simple: If there is indeed a special quality that the first living matter possessed, why did only that batch of matter possess this quality? As far as we can tell, life only arose once (at least on this planet), and it took close to a billion years for it to do so.Hmm, do you have a reference for that? IIRC, there is evidence that life was already established on Earth in the very oldest of terrestrial rocks. Certainly that's several hundred million years after the Earth was formed, but as there are no older rocks, when it originated will have to wait until we find Earth meteorites on Mars, the Moon etc to check (or some other, indirect method).If there is indeed "something more" that is responsible for this happening, what took it so long? Why has it only manifested its presence once and in such a limited capacity?But we have, as yet, no way to test either statement. In the next five decades Mars and Io probes should either find life (or fossils) there, or at least provide much stronger limits on what sort of life isn't (and wasn't) on either.There seems to be the concession that organic evolution can be accounted for through purely physical processes. If so, then "something more" only had to present in a very limited amount of matter billions of years ago and never again (also never before). If this were not the case, and "something more" was present in all matter, then we would see living systems develop in Urey-Miller type experiments!But only if they got it 'right', reproducing the ancient environment correctly for example (IIRC, it's now thought their experiment modelled an environment that didn't actually exist on the early Earth).

Nereid

Jul27-04, 07:36 PM

Okay, one more post then! :smile:Thanks Les. :smile:Now, I will concede your point by saying that it is possible matter may have realized a new potential here. There are those who say consciousness, for instance, is a new property of matter (as in "emergent" theory).

But if so, then I still want to see it reproduced. All the arguments about life having millions of years to evolve don't impress me much as an excuse for not demonstrating it (i.e., before proclaiming confidence in abiogenesis). I say that because look at the resiliancy of life. Whatever established it couldn't have been a flimsy or delicate principle for pre-life organization to have endured the hostilities of early Earth, made it to become a "living" system, and then to have survived (in one form or another) billions of years of untold hardships and natural catastrophies. It transformed our atmosphere, the oceans, the entire planet! As a system, life "works." It kicks butt, it gets it on . . . :tongue2: Besides, we know most of the conditions and chemicals that were present in prebiotic Earth. How many ways can those factors be arranged in a search for progressive organization anyway?

So I say, get some molecules going, force them to start self-organizing, pull out the old bag of chemical tricks that a science-educated consciousness should be able to develop far better than chance conditions could have back in primitive times. Prove once and for all chemistry can, in conditions that might be found on Earth, spontaneously kick into progressively organizing gear.

You know, you might be right that as we learn more about matter and self-organization, secrets will be found confirming physicalist theory. But it might also turn out that one day we will hear scientists say, "we can't do it." It's like those scientists today who are starting to waver about finding life on other planets, or even another planet anything like our seemingly rare Earth! :biggrin:Whew, quite a lot there, probably more than I can handle in just one post, but let's try ...

Per my reply to loseyourname, the best we can say today is that life seems to have been well established in the earliest terrestrial rocks that are capable of providing such evidence (i.e. there's no trace of life in early igneous rocks, but then we wouldn't expect there to be anyway!). Another thing that's become increasingly clear is that we live the Age of Bacteria; indeed, it has always been the Age of Bacteria, and will likely be so until the Earth is fried by the Sun going red giant. Further, there's no evidence of anything but random walks from bacteria, life hasn't 'progressed' at all since it began! AFAIK, Gould first drew attention to this, and there's a marvellous chapter or two in one of his popular books explaining it (and, no doubt, a paper or six in the peer-reviewed literature).

So, there doesn't seem to be much chance of making progress on discovering how life began, from local rocks. A more productive approach may be molecular reconstruction ... learn in great detail how the most primitive bacteria work, and how less primitive ones work, and maybe just maybe some reconstruction can be done ... a bit like constructing the vocabulary and grammar of proto-IndoEuropean.

Then there's Miller-Urey XXXIV, etc. Maybe that will work, maybe not; even if it does, the sheer complexity - as we now know - of the enterprise will mean it will likely take at least 50 years just to nail down the main stages with any degree of confidence.

Then there's panspermia. Perhaps before 2100, samples returned from Mars will show clearly that life began there before 3.9 bya, and seeded the Earth. Perhaps sample returns from comets will show a far richer brew of organics - that could be used as starter chemicals - than anyone has so far dreamed of.

But that's all perhaps and maybes, and I don't have a spare $trillion or three to fund an accelerated research program. :tongue2:

Next post, something about the time dimension, and how its passage may change the nature of our discussion.

Fliption

Jul27-04, 09:15 PM

Of course that is all it amounts to. If conscious designers exist at all as a special case, materialism, physicalism cannot be true.

My only point to Les has been made into a mountain. If I change the words to say "human" designer versus random chance, then I say you would choose random chance for the car on mars for all the reasons I stated. Is that better?

(a) Design is only meaningful relative to a consumer, which provides purpose.

Huh? We can agree as beings that can communicate using language that the word "design" means something willfully created by a conscious being. It doesn't have to mean something useless. I'm not sure if you're going to go down the infinite path of asking for definitions like "what is willful?" but if you do, I will remember it and show you in a future thread that you're participating in that you cannot escape what you're trying to dish out. Or maybe you won't go there. I hope not.

(b) Rarity, or abundance is itself no indicator of design.

Surely you aren't denying a correlation? One does not lead to the other I agree but one only has to look at the fact that things designed by conscious beings have a tendency to be very rare where there are no conscious beings.

(c) Improbability is no evidence of design, if we concede a lack of total knowledge.

Same as above. Let's not pretend there is no correlation.

But we cannot declare absolutely that the car is designed, especially if we don't know a lot of context, and because design isn't absolutely defined, and because same product does not entail same process.

You will never hear me declaring anything absolutely. So yes I agree we cannot do that. I have never argued for that.

loseyourname

Jul27-04, 10:05 PM

Hmm, do you have a reference for that? IIRC, there is evidence that life was already established on Earth in the very oldest of terrestrial rocks. Certainly that's several hundred million years after the Earth was formed, but as there are no older rocks, when it originated will have to wait until we find Earth meteorites on Mars, the Moon etc to check (or some other, indirect method).

The exact age isn't important. The only evidence that life may have existed in the very oldest rocks is that fossils found in slightly younger rocks are of the type that likely would have taken a while to evolve. Either way, it took a while for it to happen. Whether it was a million years or a billion years, it took a while. Given the fairly large amount of carbon to work with, it was a rare event. The ability to organize into life does not seem to be an intrinsic property of either carbon-based or silicon-based matter. It seems to depend very highly on the environment and on chance. To postulate the existence of "something more" that gives such matter the ability to self-organize, we must conclude that this something more was very choosy. Only a conscious being can make a choice. A conscious "something more" is a variation on an intelligent designer. Anyway, that's the conclusion I've come to reading through all of this for the past couple of months. We'll see if Sleeth agrees.

But we have, as yet, no way to test either statement. In the next five decades Mars and Io probes should either find life (or fossils) there, or at least provide much stronger limits on what sort of life isn't (and wasn't) on either.

I limited my discussion to this planet for that very reason.

But only if they got it 'right', reproducing the ancient environment correctly for example (IIRC, it's now thought their experiment modelled an environment that didn't actually exist on the early Earth).

This again corroborates my point. If there is "something more" that embues matter with the ability to organize into living systems, then it should be able to operate in any environment where such organization is possible. Such organization was possible in Urey-Miller, but did not occur, which is negative evidence for the existence of "something more" in that particular batch of matter. If the organizational capacity is entirely natural, then we would expect it to be much more heavily dependent on environment, which is in fact what we find.

balkan

Jul28-04, 05:36 AM

really:
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr2.htm#_ftnref1
http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/book.html

some of you objective people and also physicalists out there should read it... at least if you know your physics and science, cause this guy clearly doesn't...

i like how he jumps rigth over important physical facts and establish his own physics theory... e.g. he claims the world of physics to consist of bare differences (in the life world that equals on and off, on is different from off and vice versa) but in real life physics, a particle can be in two different states... even a rather large molecule like C60 has been observed to be in two places at once! He should read some quantum mechanics and write a new book...
and the simplicity with which he governs his experiments is just amazing... circular arguments and quite blatant subjective statements that you then are supposed to take as the truth... how can any objective person read this, and still claim that this is not just another mind game? i'm really curious... his argument is ridiculously simplified and filled with subjective statements that backs up his claims, and not to mention quite obvious flaws in his knowledge about physical science...

i'm quite offended that he calls himself a "scientist"... this has nothing to do with science...

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 09:42 AM

As far as I can tell, what Sleeth means by "progressive organization" is the ability of non-living matter to organize into a living system through progressive steps. It is nothing more than abiogenesis.

Yes, a means for abiogenesis. "Progressive steps" would mean, each step builds toward a higher functioning adaptive system. I am looking at the quality of that "stepping," and claiming it is atypical of physical processes.

My question is simple: If there is indeed a special quality that the first living matter possessed, why did only that batch of matter possess this quality? As far as we can tell, life only arose once (at least on this planet), and it took close to a billion years for it to do so. If there is indeed "something more" that is responsible for this happening, what took it so long? Why has it only manifested its presence once and in such a limited capacity? There seems to be the concession that organic evolution can be accounted for through purely physical processes. If so, then "something more" only had to present in a very limited amount of matter billions of years ago and never again (also never before). If this were not the case, and "something more" was present in all matter, then we would see living systems develop in Urey-Miller type experiments! Given that this just happened to occur on a planet capable of supporting life at a good time would seem to not be chance. So is "something more," or the "general pool of consciousness," itself conscious? It certainly seems to have made a choice. If so, then you have introduced a clever variation on an intelligent designer, but an intelligent designer nonetheless.

I think it is a good question to ask why new life doesn't appear to have formed. The problem is, just this question of if we need "something more" to explain biogenesis is tough enough. To me it seems more focused to fight out one issue at a time.*

*Just a quick note, I at least haven't evisioned the "something more" as present in matter. I've usually thought of it present more like gravity, as a general effect ubiquitously present.

Regarding your question, remember, all I've said progressive organization indicates is 1) as of now, chemistry cannot be shown to be in possession of that ability, and 2) there might be an additional principle at work in conjuction with physics.

Now, if anyone wants to speculate beyond that, I am not responsible :biggrin:. Is the progressive principle a designer, intelligent, conscious? I personally refrain from speculating in a debate such as this because I don't think I can make the case about those things. I feel I can make the progressive organization case, and chemistry's lack of ability to achieve it. The "leap" I take from that fact I've claimed is pretty conservative: I simple suggest it might mean there is "something more." Maybe it is an organizing force, or an evolutive force. Of course, maybe it is physical too, but if so, because we have such wonderful research tools for physical principles, then I believe we should demonstrate physical organization can behave progressively.

loseyourname

Jul28-04, 10:36 AM

Regarding your question, remember, all I've said progressive organization indicates is 1) as of now, chemistry cannot be shown to be in possession of that ability, and 2) there might be an additional principle at work in conjuction with physics.

I feel I can make the progressive organization case, and chemistry's lack of ability to achieve it. The "leap" I take from that fact I've claimed is pretty conservative: I simple suggest it might mean there is "something more." Maybe it is an organizing force, or an evolutive force. Of course, maybe it is physical too, but if so, because we have such wonderful research tools for physical principles, then I believe we should demonstrate physical organization can behave progressively.

See, I'm still a little confused. You compare it to gravity, saying at the very least it is some form of quality of matter or force acting on matter to progressively organize it. But gravity acts on all matter. It does not act selectively. If there was an organizing principle, a "something more" that was present everywhere in the universe, then experiments like Urey-Miller would work. Progressive organization would be found all over the place because this "something more" would working everywhere. Since this is obviously not the case, "something more," if it indeed exists, operates selectively. I think at some point, if you really want to develop this idea, you're going to have to at least conjecture about why this may be. What was going on back in the primordial seas that isn't going on in the lab?

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 10:51 AM

Per my reply to loseyourname, the best we can say today is that life seems to have been well established in the earliest terrestrial rocks that are capable of providing such evidence (i.e. there's no trace of life in early igneous rocks, but then we wouldn't expect there to be anyway!). Another thing that's become increasingly clear is that we live the Age of Bacteria; indeed, it has always been the Age of Bacteria, and will likely be so until the Earth is fried by the Sun going red giant. Further, there's no evidence of anything but random walks from bacteria, life hasn't 'progressed' at all since it began! AFAIK, Gould first drew attention to this, and there's a marvellous chapter or two in one of his popular books explaining it (and, no doubt, a paper or six in the peer-reviewed literature).

I've read and enjoyed Gould, and Margulis as well, and believe they make good points about bacteria except, that is, that the abundance, variety, adaptability, and age of bacteria means they are more advanced than humans. If we use survivability as the determining factor, then of course we can say bacteria are tops. But in terms of the progressive development of a single organism (it doesn't seem a proper comparison to contrast millions of species of bacteria to the single species of man), humanity is tops.

I am saying quantity is one thing, quality is another. Human physiology is the finest example of evolutionary and progressive quality. What primarily determines that? Consciousness, in my opinion.

So, there doesn't seem to be much chance of making progress on discovering how life began, from local rocks. A more productive approach may be molecular reconstruction ... learn in great detail how the most primitive bacteria work, and how less primitive ones work, and maybe just maybe some reconstruction can be done ... a bit like constructing the vocabulary and grammar of proto-IndoEuropean.

Then there's Miller-Urey XXXIV, etc. Maybe that will work, maybe not; even if it does, the sheer complexity - as we now know - of the enterprise will mean it will likely take at least 50 years just to nail down the main stages with any degree of confidence.

Then there's panspermia. Perhaps before 2100, samples returned from Mars will show clearly that life began there before 3.9 bya, and seeded the Earth. Perhaps sample returns from comets will show a far richer brew of organics - that could be used as starter chemicals - than anyone has so far dreamed of.

But that's all perhaps and maybes, and I don't have a spare $trillion or three to fund an accelerated research program. :tongue2:

Next post, something about the time dimension, and how its passage may change the nature of our discussion.

It must be obvious to you that your research examples would operate under the assumption that life origination can be found in physical processes alone. Yes, all those offer hope that a secret of abiogenesis will be found, although it doesn't mean it will be found. I realize because there are more possibilities to investigate, nothing I can say now will prove abiogenesis is unlikely. But those possibilities do not strengthen the case for abiogenesis either.

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 11:41 AM

See, I'm still a little confused. You compare it to gravity, saying at the very least it is some form of quality of matter or force acting on matter to progressively organize it. But gravity acts on all matter. It does not act selectively. If there was an organizing principle, a "something more" that was present everywhere in the universe, then experiments like Urey-Miller would work. Progressive organization would be found all over the place because this "something more" would working everywhere. Since this is obviously not the case, "something more," if it indeed exists, operates selectively. I think at some point, if you really want to develop this idea, you're going to have to at least conjecture about why this may be. What was going on back in the primordial seas that isn't going on in the lab?

You want speculation, I'll give you speculation :rofl: (just kidding).

I'll suggest something or two, but it's under great protest (okay, maybe not THAT great) because of the theme of this thread, which is simply to ask if physicalness can explain everything. I am saying no it can't as yet, and that the organization necessary to create a life form is an example of what cannot be explained. By speculating about what might have done it, I am leading the discussion away from the topic.

But let's say it is like gravity, or even the effect of acceleration. Mass and acceleration engender something resembling a constricting force on the object of mass or acceleration. No mass or acceleration in a given space, and no constriction can be observed. It's almost like that potentiality sits there dormant, ready to respond, but not manifesting until specific conditions occur.

I've characterized gravity/acceleration effects as causeing "constriction" because in a way they mimic focus; that is, the effect is "focused" inward on the object of mass or acceleration. Similarly, possibly "something more" focuses (when it manifests) on the first point of organization it attaches to. Assuming that progressive organization is central to the nature of "something more," then we might imagine it is driven to manifest ever higher levels of progressive organization. It might have used the first "living" organization as a platform to evolve (once the living system could replicate) ever higher levels of progressive organization. Since its very nature is to develop/evolve, in this model we would expect there to always be a "lead point" (i.e., focal point) in its ever-upward climb of manifestation.

(Repeating something I've written before . . .) We might surmise the first instance of progressive manifestation (let's call it an "evolutive force") began when the proper conditions existed here on planet Earth, and the force of evolutiveness billions of years ago could begin its organizing ways using Earth’s chemistry to pull together a life form. Evolutiveness marshaled rich resources building system on top of system, each dedicated at first to the overall purpose of sustaining and progressing organization that could thrive in the harsh conditions of Earth.

As it developed, the living organization became an organism, and new organisms branched off to evolve in unique ways. As the planet became more supportive, eventually the evolutive force gave priority to paths with the most emanative promise (i.e., to "emanate" in the sense of manifest progressive organization), and these became the lead evolutive structures; but left behind were evolutive effects still alive in all surviving species. The non-selected forms continued to physically evolve in the sense that they could adapt to environmental conditions, but since they were no longer the vanguard of the evolutive thrust, such peripheral evolution was not where one might find continuing progression manifestation. The evolutive force continued to push, leaping up through species after species, ever seeking the highest possible expression of itself (“seeking” in the opposite sense of how water “seeks” the lowest point) until after billions of years of evolutive momentum, the modern human came about.

So what is this "highest" expression of progressive organization? Consciousness. Isn't a healthy consciousness very much about organization? Look at, for example, what determines beautiful music for consciousness. If you've ever studied music, you know there is a precise mathematical relationship between notes. Rhythm too falls in that category. Or take physical beauty; studies have shown we are attracted to symetry, which is another aspect of organization.

I say, consciousness is pure progressive organizational quality.

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 12:42 PM

Of course they are not, because you have used the term progressive in a very much subjective, and biased manner.

You tend to make statements without feeling any need to follow up with evidence supporting the statements' accuracy. Here you've done so again. How exactly have I used the term progressive subjectively? I honestly can't see what you are talking about.

Define it.

I have defined it.

Define it properly.

I have defined it properly, again and again.

If you aren't satisfied with my definition, then maybe you can relate to Fliption's explanation, which I think sums it it up perfectly. He said:

"I think the issue is that if matter can progressively self organize to form what we would call complex life forms then one would expect to see on some level the ability for matter to progressively self organize. So no one is asking for proof by asking for a repeat of a billion year process. What's being asked for is a simple mechanism of progressive self organization from which an accidental masterpiece could have developed. You don't need to win the lottery to show that someone can win. You only need to show that a lottery system is in place to proof that a winner is bound to happen."

As I see it, your progressiveness rules out life, because all of life's non-repetitiveness is due to a non-repetitive environment, or an environment which it has failed to reach equilibirium in. All evolution is due to flaws, which propagate in the system.

The statement "All evolution is due to flaws" is inaccurate. Do you know why they call life an "organism"? According to you they should call it a "chaoticism."

A small percentage of evolution is due to randomness; but change is HUGELY in favor of the directions biological organization sends processes. The fact that an organism endures through chaotic situations proves the strength and adaptibility of life's organization. Also, although I realize mutation is commonly attributed to pure chance, I don't believe that is necessarily so. The "pure chance" principle is naked physicalism, and so an a priori assumption about how change must occur in an adapting system. But if there is a progressively organizing force present in life, then it could tip the "chance" scales in favor of change which leads to an organized, adaptive mutation.

Show how life is progressive self-organisation, please, and I'll point out the gaps. There seems to be just repeated assertions that it is, without anything like an attempt at justification. I am not responding to you are saying, because this sort of thing tends to get very long, and I get tired easily, and wish to focus on what I perceive to be the core problem - your very slippery notion of life itself.

First of all, you are the only one here maintaining that life isn't primarily the result of exceptional organization. I think it is you who needs to show how life is primarily the result of chaos.

Second, I don't have a "slippery notion of life." I've not proposed any new definitions for life. Why would you say that? I am relating to the same definition as most scientists -- you know, life is a metabolizing, reproducing, system capable of participating in natural selection, etc.

A human designer is an example of an accidental, physical process. The logic is self-consistent. Of course it conflicts with you granting a special role to design, and consciousness, and so on. But so what?

Now there's a well-justified statement. :uhh: Rather than "self-consistant" you should have said self referencing.

P.S.
I've said nothing about design.

Nereid

Jul28-04, 01:08 PM

My view is that many, if not most, new domains that become available for us to study, or study in more detail, reveal a richness that is rarely anticipated. These domains can be the very tiny – the Standard Model clarifying the ‘fundamental particle zoo’, or neutrino oscillations; tiny – the fractal nature of ISM grains, nanoparticles; small - the dominance of life on Earth by bacteria, quasi-crystals; … hidden oceans on Io, planetary systems, interstellar cirrus, … right up to the universe – inflation, primordial nucleosynthesis. With the richness comes a great many gaps and some gulfs, every one of which is an opportunity for ‘something more’, or ‘a god of the gaps’, or ‘new physics/chemistry/biology/whatever’. Sometimes the gaps shrink relatively quickly, (e.g. helium?, Oklo); oftentimes they take decades to show significant progress (e.g. solar neutrinos, plate tectonics, snowball Earth); and no doubt some take centuries (evolution?). Perhaps the origin of life and the hard problem of consciousness will be among this last group?Next post, something about the time dimension, and how its passage may change the nature of our discussion.If progress is made relatively quickly - months, years, decades - 'science' and beliefs about how well 'everything can be reduced to physics' will likely have not changed their spots in the interim. But what if it's centuries?

Example: for how many years has the source of the Sun's light and heat been studied scientifically, as part of physics? We now know the answer (though not until the 'solar neutrino problem' had been solved, just a few years ago, could we have a high degree of confidence in our understanding) - within the best physics we have today - but the question has been pondered for a very long time. How much of that time has been scientific pondering? We can't be anachronistic, and impose today's standards of what's science on the efforts of Greeks (for example).

What we now call abiogenesis may be another example; lots of ideas ('theories'?) on the origin of life proposed going way, way back. How many were 'science', or 'physics'? Starting sometime last century (or maybe the 19th?), various experimental and observational approaches got going into the origins part (as opposed to the 'what is life and how did it evolve' parts); after some initial hubris - like the early days of AI? - it became apparent that it's a much more complex - richer? - problem than it looked from 50,000' (sound familiar?). So maybe it'll take another 200 years to get an understanding comparable to that we have today of what goes on in the Sun's core, how and why?

Which brings me to (may be slightly out of context, apologies)I simply look at what we know is present in the universe, and how the vast majority of the universe appears to work, and notice that in two instances there are major exceptions: the origin of life and the subjective aspect of consciousness. I say, only if you approach those exceptions already believing in a physicalist TOE will you automatically assume they must have a physicalist explanation. If one is uncommitted to any metaphysical stance one is free to be objective; and to say there is reason to suspect "something more" seems to me to be a pretty conservative stance to take.Here Les and Nereid differ, enormously. In fact, we haven't a clue as to how 'the vast majority of the universe appears to work', not least because we aren't able to even 'see' it yet! (If anyone doubts this, please say so, I'd be only too happy to provide a few tiny examples). From this perspective, why worry about 'something more' (or 'god in the gaps', or whatever) for just two of the hundreds (thousands?) of such 'instances [that] are major exceptions'?

Dangerous to do for sure, but make a range of extrapolations, and estimate a range of dates by which abiogenesis and the hard problem of consciousness will have a (future) physicalist explanation. In the latter case, it may be necessary to also extrapolate to a considerable extent about 'science'. If even the minimum estimate of any extrapolation is >~100 years, why not go work on something else in philosophy?

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 02:04 PM

Les: "I simply look at what we know is present in the universe, and how the vast majority of the universe appears to work, and notice that in two instances there are major exceptions: the origin of life and the subjective aspect of consciousness."

Nereid: "Here Les and Nereid differ, enormously. In fact, we haven't a clue as to how 'the vast majority of the universe appears to work', not least because we aren't able to even 'see' it yet! (If anyone doubts this, please say so, I'd be only too happy to provide a few tiny examples). . ."

What Les means by "major exception": operating outside the boundary of any known core physical principles. What are "core" principles? Universals (remember my generalist inclinations?) such as gravity, relativity, light speed, the internal forces of matter, the relationship between energy and matter, etc. One way I'd sum up core physical principles is as "mechanistic." Yes, they can be made to behave quite strangely, but physical dynamics, once discovered, are quite predictable, methodical, and, if enduring, repetitive. Is progressive organization or the subjectivity of consciousness like that? I say no.

I realize you probably think they will prove to be mechanistic or physical in the end, while I don't think physicalists have a snowball's chance in hell of demostrating it . . . so we must disagree. But if progressive organization could be shown to sponteneously occur in chemistry, or if a computer could create subjective consciousness, then I would change my mind and acknowledge that physicalism is the explanation for life and consciousness.

. . . not least because we aren't able to even 'see' it yet! (If anyone doubts this, please say so, I'd be only too happy to provide a few tiny examples). . ."

Part of the problem is that scientists are using a method (sense-dependent empiricism) which only can "see" what is physical. Really, what else do you think they can find other than physical stuff? My point is, no matter how much they see relying only on sense experience, they will never discover anything which requires a different sort of experience to know it.

. . . From this perspective, why worry about 'something more' (or 'god in the gaps', or whatever) for just two of the hundreds (thousands?) of such 'instances [that] are major exceptions'? . . . If even the minimum estimate of any extrapolation is >~100 years, why not go work on something else in philosophy?

I am not "worried" about something more, I've limited myself to saying as little about that as possible because of the theme of this thread. If you want to know the positive reasons I believe there is something more, read my thread on panpsychism. My belief is based on an experience I've practiced daily for thirty + years. Just to make it clear, I am not religious and I don't think the "something more" is supernatural.

I am working on this aspect of philosophy because I really do believe there is something more, and I also don't think physicalists in general present the strength of their case objectively. Personally, I am not very interested in anything other than the "something more" and how it works.

loseyourname

Jul28-04, 02:44 PM

Also, although I realize mutation is commonly attributed to pure chance, I don't believe that is necessarily so. The "pure chance" principle is naked physicalism, and so an a priori assumption about how change must occur in an adapting system. But if there is a progressively organizing force present in life, then it could tip the "chance" scales in favor of change which leads to an organized, adaptive mutation.

To be fair, a mutation is only a substitution or deletion of one or several bases in a polynucleotide chain. There is absolutely no way to predict which base (out of the billions in an entire genome) will be changed or deleted, and if changed, what it will be changed to. Uncertainty really rules out the possibility of even trying to predict this process. By any definition of the word, it is a random process. Even if "something more" was responsible for directing these mutations, the very amount of information needed to make this direction purposeful would be astounding. You would need to know exactly where in a given gene the base was located, and what amino acid it coded for. You would need to know what amino acid a gene with the given substitution or deletion would code for. You would need to know exactly how the new amino acid would change the conformation of the protein it is a part of. You would need to know how this changes the enzymatic or structural properties of the protein. You would need to know how this change in property would affect the overall process of structure that the protein is a part of, then know exactly how that translates into changes on the cellular, tissue, organ, and organismic levels. We don't even understand fully how a given protein attains its conformation, so we'd be stuck on step two here.

Another thing is that the vast majority of mutations are not harmful or helpful. The vast majority of mutations have no effect on conformation whatsoever. Let's take the amino acid Arginine, for example. There are four different codons that all code for Arginine. They are CGU, CGC, CGA, and CGG. These are the mRNA sequences, of course, and the corresponding DNA sequences are GCA, GCG, GCT, and GCC. Any change in the first two bases will produce a different codon, but any change in the third will not. So 1 out of every 3 mutations in this case will not even change the codon.

Let's take the codon CGG, which corresponds to the DNA sequence GCC. Given that any change in the third base will result in the same amino acid, let's look at changes to the first two bases. Changing the first base to A, so that we have the codon AGG, still results in a codon for Arginine. UGG results in Tryptophan, and GGG results in Glycine. Now let's change the second base. CAG results in Glutamine, CCG results in Proline, and CUG results in Leucine. So we have 9 possible ways of mutating this codon (by a single substitution), 5 of which results in a different amino acid being expressed, and 4 of which result in the same amino acid being expressed. You will find similar results for base-substitutions in other codons as well. However, even changing the amino acid will not necessarily change the conformation of the protein coded for. Let's say you have Tryptophan in the original protein. You can substitute in any of the other 19 amino acids through a proper number of mutations, but only 11 of them will certainly change the conformation. Because Tryptophan is nonpolar, substituting in any other nonpolar amino acid is likely to produce exactly the same conformation (with the possible exceptions of Glycine and Alanine, because they are a good deal smaller).

Now if you start multiplying these respective probabilities together, you will see that the probability of actually getting any noticeable change in the function or structure of the organism itself is very low. Most mutations are simply neutral.

loseyourname

Jul28-04, 02:48 PM

Nereid

Jul28-04, 03:21 PM

Hey Les, I really do hope you stick around, this is really a very interesting discussion! :smile:What Les means by "major exception": operating outside the boundary of any known core physical principles. What are "core" principles? Universals (remember my generalist inclinations?) such as gravity, relativity, light speed, the internal forces of matter, the relationship between energy and matter, etc. One way I'd sum up core physical principles is as "mechanistic."But even here, I would say we really don't have a clue about the universals; we merely know something about what seems to work across a dozen or so OOM of time and space. For example, what sort of processes - mechanistic or otherwise - rule for dark energy and dark matter? What goes on in spaces smaller than a Planck 'metre' or between Planck 'seconds'?Yes, they can be made to behave quite strangely, but physical dynamics, once discovered, are quite predictable, methodical, and, if enduring, repetitive. Is progressive organization or the subjectivity of consciousness like that? I say no.But aren't you then jumping to conclusions? If it takes another 200 years to nail down even the outline of how life got going (from various chemicals, in a particular set of environments); or 300 years to be able to explain the subjectivity of consciousness, why do you say 'no'? Imagine your great-(great) grandmother and my great (etc) grandfather having a debate about the source of light and heat in the Sun - how would that differ from the debate we're having here today? Of course, science (and philosophy?) have moved on a tad since then, but otherwise? (Side note: it seems I've misunderstood your 'progressive organisation' idea; I'll need to go back and read the threads again).I realize you probably think they will prove to be mechanistic or physical in the end, while I don't think physicalists have a snowball's chance in hell of demostrating it . . . so we must disagree.Yes, I do think that, but I'm not worried about it (sorry, I see that 'worry' means something stronger for you than it does for me); what really matters is that the questions are still open, and may very well stay open until well after I'm gone.But if progressive organization could be shown to sponteneously occur in chemistry, or if a computer could create subjective consciousness, then I would change my mind and acknowledge that physicalism is the explanation for life and consciousness.That's good, and I applaud the sentiment. However, one of the things I am trying to point out - badly, as usual, it seems - is that by the time something like your test might be feasible, it's entirely possible that the very concepts will have changed so much as to make your test hopelessly ambiguous (or worse). The best analogy I can think of right now is phlogiston.Part of the problem is that scientists are using a method (sense-dependent empiricism) which only can "see" what is physical. Really, what else do you think they can find other than physical stuff? My point is, no matter how much they see relying only on sense experience, they will never discover anything which requires a different sort of experience to know it.Fair comment. That suggests, however, that a) this can't be studied scientifically (why not?), or b) science will never expand to encompass a deep understanding of all other sorts of experience (why not?), or c) ....I am working on this aspect of philosophy because I really do believe there is something more, and I also don't think physicalists in general present the strength of their case objectively. Personally, I am not very interested in anything other than the "something more" and how it works.Are there any good reasons why any 'something mores' can't be studied scientifically?

Fliption

Jul28-04, 03:36 PM

really:
some of you objective people and also physicalists out there should read it... at least if you know your physics and science, cause this guy clearly doesn't...

I consider myself objective so I can respond.

he claims the world of physics to consist of bare differences (in the life world that equals on and off, on is different from off and vice versa) but in real life physics, a particle can be in two different states... even a rather large molecule like C60 has been observed to be in two places at once! He should read some quantum mechanics and write a new book...

Several things....

1) Does stating that the world of physics is made up of bare differences "on" and "off" and then defining them as opposites necessarily imply that they cannot both be true at the same time? I've read the text many times and I don't see this implication.

2) I've had to read this part of the text many times to even comprehend all the points. The text even admits the concept of bare differences is difficult to grasp.(I'm impressed you came to such a definitive understanding and conclusion so quickly) I'm not even sure that the "bare differences" that the author is referring to even relate to states dealt with in quantum physics(like position).

3) And does it even matter? You're suggesting that states of ON and OFF cannot entail consciousness but a combination of ON and OFF can? You will need to explain how this happens. I think the author's point is that these bare differences cannot entail consciousness regardless of how you mix the bag.

and the simplicity with which he governs his experiments is just amazing... circular arguments and quite blatant subjective statements that you then are supposed to take as the truth... how can any objective person read this, and still claim that this is not just another mind game? i'm really curious... his argument is ridiculously simplified and filled with subjective statements that backs up his claims, and not to mention quite obvious flaws in his knowledge about physical science...

Speaking of subjectivity....this paragraph above is full of it. You may be correct but it helps in a response if you can point to specific statesments of subjectivity. Also make sure the subjective pieces are relevant to the conclusions of the text.

i'm quite offended that he calls himself a "scientist"... this has nothing to do with science...

This is a philosophy text. Not science. The author's scope is vastly different from a scientist's. But again, it would help if you pointed to specific facts of physics that are contradicted. The one above about bare differences and quantum physics seem a bit interpretive and possibly misunderstood.

Also, if you don't agree with some of the basic assumptions of this paper in the end, then you'll need to be prepared to explain how you will someday be able to communicate the experience of red to a blind man with your facts of physics. To me, this text simply documents in a philosophical manner the "whys" and "hows" of what we all know to be obviously true.

Oh yeah. Don't forget to be objective. :wink:

FZ+

Jul28-04, 04:30 PM

I think the issue is that if matter can progressively self organize to form what we would call complex life forms then one would expect to see on some level the ability for matter to progressively self organize.
Come on! Don't patronise me. That isn't a definition at all. That's just an unsupported assertion of a need for a so-called demonstration of progressive organisation, without actually identifying what progressive organisation is. Try defining progressive organisation without referring to progressive organizing (which is tautological), complexity (which means different things to different people), higher (which misses the whole point of evolution, and also is specific to a set of criteria) and life. (which is circular logic)

A small percentage of evolution is due to randomness;
Which tape measure are you using? How on earth can you talk about percentages?

Evolution =

Inheritance
Randomness
Selection

All 3 have a 100% role.

First of all, you are the only one here maintaining that life isn't primarily the result of exceptional organization.
Your logic is out of date. Chaos and organisation go hand in hand. The issue I am attacking is this special case you raise of "progressive organisation". Evolution isn't magic. Neither is life. They follow the laws of a chaotic universe - that, under certain circumstances, they undergo changes in their system, and that under changing circumstances, they keep changing. What my attacks centre on is the notion that you can generate this holy progressive organisation, and allow life, and life only. To do this, it seems to me that you can only inject gigantic volumes of subjectivity to keep things afloat. Physicalism is entirely self consistent.

FZ+

Jul28-04, 04:47 PM

My only point to Les has been made into a mountain. If I change the words to say "human" designer versus random chance, then I say you would choose random chance for the car on mars for all the reasons I stated. Is that better?
No, because that question is still loaded.

Imagine if I asked you this question:
A car is found by Mars. Why was it there? An unconscious physical human, or another unconscious cause.

Would you accept it? By the phrasing of the question, you assume a difference, when the whole point of my viewpoint is that there is no difference. To me, a valid option-list would be: "human" designer versus *another example* of random chance

To which, my answer would be: I don't know, since both look pretty unlikely, and I can only give a quick, and probably inaccurate guess. I won't treat human design causes any differently to how I would treat other so-called random chance effects.

I'm not sure if you're going to go down the infinite path of asking for definitions like "what is willful?"
Don't tempt me.... To me, something done willfully implies that it was done to fulfil the goal of that will, however abstract that maybe. Hence, if we want a design-based debate at all, we need a designer, and a particular viewpoint by which we can assess how well it fulfills a goal. If we have never seen a human, if we cannot even concieve of the need for personal transport, we can't say the car looks like it has been designed.

Surely you aren't denying a correlation? One does not lead to the other I agree but one only has to look at the fact that things designed by conscious beings have a tendency to be very rare where there are no conscious beings.
But that doesn't work the other way round. Because it is rare, we can't say is must be designed by conscious beings which gave up on it. Because it is not rare, we can't say that it must have been mass-produced by conscious beings. Same for probability.

I have never argued for that.
Well, there you go. The sum result of that particular argument was that the Design Argument doesn't work. That was all I was trying to say.

balkan

Jul28-04, 05:47 PM

I consider myself objective so I can respond.

Several things....

1) Does stating that the world of physics is made up of bare differences "on" and "off" and then defining them as opposites necessarily imply that they cannot both be true at the same time? I've read the text many times and I don't see this implication.

2) I've had to read this part of the text many times to even comprehend all the points. The text even admits the concept of bare differences is difficult to grasp.(I'm impressed you came to such a definitive understanding and conclusion so quickly) I'm not even sure that the "bare differences" that the author is referring to even relate to states dealt with in quantum physics(like position).

3) And does it even matter? You're suggesting that states of ON and OFF cannot entail consciousness but a combination of ON and OFF can? You will need to explain how this happens. I think the author's point is that these bare differences cannot entail consciousness regardless of how you mix the bag.

Speaking of subjectivity....this paragraph above is full of it. You may be correct but it helps in a response if you can point to specific statesments of subjectivity. Also make sure the subjective pieces are relevant to the conclusions of the text.

This is a philosophy text. Not science. The author's scope is vastly different from a scientist's. But again, it would help if you pointed to specific facts of physics that are contradicted. The one above about bare differences and quantum physics seem a bit interpretive and possibly misunderstood.

Also, if you don't agree with some of the basic assumptions of this paper in the end, then you'll need to be prepared to explain how you will someday be able to communicate the experience of red to a blind man with your facts of physics. To me, this text simply documents in a philosophical manner the "whys" and "hows" of what we all know to be obviously true.

Oh yeah. Don't forget to be objective. :wink:
does it matter?
he's leaving out an entire dimension! and have somehow managed to get in his head, that a world of stationary cells that are on or off, can be a representation of a world of particles and motion... that's pretty astounding... and let's not forget both the uncertainty principle which cannot be related in any way to the life game, but plays a huge part in real life physics...
there's no probability involved either, which is mega essential to everything related to physics, and even if there was probability involved, this would require something to randomly decide which event should be chosen... and if this should not be a pattern based random number generator like we use in our computers, then we have a problem cause that would mean that the computer either conciously had to choose (at which point you would have intelligence in the computer) or that you would have to draw from a real life measured source with exactly the same properties as the one in the computer...
and let's not forget, that even while only being a one dimensional program, and infinite grid is highly hypothetical and that there cause of that is no possible way of having infinite complexity...

moreover:
i have yet to learn about a game of life type program that could actually successfully represent something physical, except for hypothetical and theoretical things like fluctuations in the economy, which isn't in any way related to physics...
so wow... he proved by using an example that cannot represent anything physical, that since it cannot explain conciousness, physics can either...
what an accomplishment...

if there was a game of life in that regard, that followed all my requirements for being a physical representation, it would only be responsive to what the computer tells it to, and thus, the game of life wouldn't be conscious, the computer would...

Fliption

Jul28-04, 05:59 PM

To me, a valid option-list would be: "human" designer versus *another example* of random chance

This is all you had to say, FZ.

So Les, If I factor in this text that FZ has presented above...... his view is the sort that will choose a non-human random process for what is clearly an automobile created by a human to the rest of us, simply because he doesn't want his subjective earth notions of what an automobile is to be projected onto Mars.

Don't tempt me.... To me, something done willfully implies that it was done to fulfil the goal of that will, however abstract that maybe. Hence, if we want a design-based debate at all, we need a designer, and a particular viewpoint by which we can assess how well it fulfills a goal. If we have never seen a human, if we cannot even concieve of the need for personal transport, we can't say the car looks like it has been designed.

I mentioned the concepts 'conscious' and 'will'. I don't believe they need to equate to a goal other than fulfilling a conscious desire. I really don't understand the extreme you have to go to here to keep your views intact. This might amuse anyone else reading....

If FZ came home one day and found all his things thrown outside and torn up he would have this dialogue with the police.

Police: So FZ, do you think a storm reached down into your chimney and pulled all these things out or do you think that someone intentionally did this?

FZ: I don't understand the question officer. How can anything be more intentional then a storm? Everything is random chance.

Policeman(after glancing at his partner with a "what a nutjob" glance): So you don't want to investigate and press charges?

FZ: Against a storm? Of course not. It would never show up into court anyway.

But that doesn't work the other way round. Because it is rare, we can't say is must be designed by conscious beings which gave up on it. Because it is not rare, we can't say that it must have been mass-produced by conscious beings. Same for probability.

Of course it doesn't work the other way around. Who said it did? Who's talking about a "Design" argument? You're equating me to some preconceived notion of what a design argument is. Your comments above are quite obvious and I can't really understand why you think it needs to be pointed out. Unless you aren't understanding my point. My only point on this issue has always been that while odds cannot be conclusive, for all the reasons you state, they should not be totally ignored either. When a decision needs to be made about which direction scientific inquiry should go, the correlation that the odds of something existing have with "how" those things come into existence, should be a weighing factor. It is only another tool, a possible indicator. We have a whole branch of mathematics that tells us these correlations are useful called "statistics". I don't understand why it doesn't apply in FZ's PF world because I know it does in his real world.

Well, there you go. The sum result of that particular argument was that the Design Argument doesn't work. That was all I was trying to say.

What design argument? You're swatting invisible flies. I'll argue that odds should be used as an indicator regardless of what the topic is...design, dogs, or pea gravy; You name it.

balkan

Jul28-04, 06:27 PM

and about the mary example... please!
let's see, she spends all her life in a black and white cell, watching black and white TV, learning about wavelengths and how the brain responds to the color red... but she doesn't know how red looks like...
wow... astounding... given that the human brain has to learn how to see colours, and learn to see at all actually... just like you have to learn the alphabet, but wouldn't be able to read it just by hearing about it... this has nothing to do with "something else" and everything to do with neurology. If she had learned the wavelength of red ligth and could see the wavelength when exposed to it, then she could by herself learn that it was red ligth, without someone having to tell her...

if seeing colors (or seeing in general) isn't learned within a certain timespan from being born, the human brain is almost incapable of learning it... this is due to the fact that the centers that learn this, has to be activated through impulses for this particular neural circuit to be built properly... this curcuit also influences ones ability to see colors...

why would there be colorblind people if "something else" had anything to do with it? why couldn't "something else" teach her? that's weird... i guess that the "something else" theory proves just as false...

explaining the experience of red to a man that has never seen it... man, that is just such a typical philosophical way of arguing around anything that can't be explained rationally...
"you can't do that, so physicalism is false"...
could you explain what "round" is to man that has been blind and senseless for all his life? no... cause his brain hasn't learned the concept of "round" yet, so his ability to relate to that is not functioning... this again has nothing to do with the communication of the data, but with neurology...

marys brain haven't learned to see red, so unfortunately she would be unable to understand a description of "red" no matter if i used "something else" or physics... so is "something else" false as well?
why can't "something else" make blind people see or colorblind people see color? where does the "something else" come to play with the mary mind game? why doesn't the blind senseless man know about the concept of "round" if influenced by "something else"?

physicalism can explain everything about red light... including how it is "seen" by the eye and eventually it will be able to directly explain how the neurosystem reacts to the impulses... the fact that we have to learn colours, like we have to learn how to hear different sounds or how to read, is obviously just another thing amongs many that this type of philosophy can gladly shuffle around in order to prove a hypothetical point...
besides, physics isn't supposed to concern itself with how the color red is percieved by people, since it will be sligthly different from individual to individual due to differences in the build of their neurological circuits and how they have learned to see that particular color. Physics deals with the nature of ligth, not the perception of the color... the actual action of perception of the color can be explained as well...

i'm having less and less respect for philosophy each day i'm afraid... at least this type of philosophy which is all mind games and rhetorics... i've said before that when science and philosophy go hand in hand, they support eachother well, but when philosophy tries to prove something without the use of anything but subjective statements and thought examples that cannot be in any way tested for being practically possible, then it all goes down the ****ter...

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 07:35 PM

i'm having less and less respect for philosophy each day i'm afraid... at least this type of philosophy which is all mind games and rhetorics... i've said before that when science and philosophy go hand in hand, they support eachother well, but when philosophy tries to prove something without the use of anything but subjective statements and thought examples that cannot be in any way tested for being practically possible, then it all goes down the ****ter...

After being made so dense by your opinionated and closeminded ways you can't embrace the philosophical method, you conclude it is philosophy that's the problem. I love it! Thanks for the case study in projection.

Fliption

Jul28-04, 07:37 PM

and about the mary example... please!

This post wreaks of objectivity. :biggrin:

wow... astounding... given that the human brain has to learn how to see colours, and learn to see at all actually... just like you have to learn the alphabet, but wouldn't be able to read it just by hearing about it... this has nothing to do with "something else" and everything to do with neurology.

Are you suggesting that a baby has absolutely zero experiences? Why is it crying? :cry: I disagree strongly that qualia does not exist in babies. It's impossble for you say anything about qualia with certainty and there's every indication that babies do have experiences. What an individual learns is to categorize and make sense of it's experiences but it has them none the less.

why would there be colorblind people if "something else" had anything to do with it? why couldn't "something else" teach her? that's weird... i guess that the "something else" theory proves just as false...

The same reason that physics doesn't teach a blind man to see. Why is "something else" any different? I sense some preconceived notions about what "something else" might be. Despite the caveats posted about doing just that.

physicalism can explain everything about red light...

But it can say nothing about my experience of that red light.

besides, physics isn't supposed to concern itself with how the color red is percieved by people, since it will be sligthly different from individual to individual due to differences in the build of their neurological circuits and how they have learned to see that particular color. Physics deals with the nature of ligth, not the perception of the color...

Well something must deal with it? Biology? I don't understand why perception would be off limits to science. It seems like it would be an extremely valuable thing to understand why people perceive things differently. We could avoid wars even. Why would we not study it since perception is so easily understood to be brain activity? The truth is, science doesn't have a clue why light within a certain wavelength should have a specific qualia attached to it. Even if we concede that qualia is learned, science cannot tell us how the experience is generated. The truth is that science cannot possibly know what my experience is. There is no way for it to measure it. It can only know what I tell it. The only reason a scientist knows that qualia exists to begin with is because of his/her own experiences. How in the world does a world of circuits and data turn into subjectivity that cannot be communicated? That's what I want to know as I study. I cannot turn to science? Where do I turn?

the actual action of perception of the color can be explained as well...

This is either a gross misunderstanding of terminolgy or it is a blatant lie. There are tons of literature on this topic. I can't wait for you to singled handed pick apart every single text on this topic as if only you see the absurdity.

i'm having less and less respect for philosophy each day i'm afraid... at least this type of philosophy which is all mind games and rhetorics...

I have to say that I take this personally. I honestly do want to understand the world around me. I have no interest in tricking myself into believing something. If I wanted to do that, I'd go to a church. It would be a lot easier than having to read all the stuff I have to read to participate here. Now you may think the view is absurd, but this doesn't necessarily equate to people who are open to it having an agenda that deserves this tone. I honestly see issue with what you're saying on this topic. Believe it. It's shocking to me as well whenever someone disagrees with what seems so obvious to me but I've learned it's a fact of nature. That's why I'm careful not to write off a mass of people in one swoop just because a few pages I read sound absurd to me. I've been wrong before! :surprise: But never in PF. :biggrin:

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 07:40 PM

Another little caveat: in order to make a mutation purposeful, you would also need to know the future environmental pressures on a given population. So not only would "something more" need to know an astounding amount of molecular, cellular, physiological, and organismic biology, it would also need to be able to predict the future.

Well, that's the "something more" you envision, I see it a bit differently. Let’s compare situations where an infant being cared for by loving, attentive adults is suddenly moved to an environment where the adults who care for him constantly fight and are spaced out on drugs. Even though the child doesn’t intellectually understand what’s going on, he will feel the difference, and that difference can affect his development. Similarly, would I suggest that if the progressively organizing force is part of the inner environment of life, the odds of adaptive mutation occuring when it needs to might increase in favor of adaption.

By the way, studies being conducted (such as the QSC research by Gao Shan that Radar mentioned in another thread) are exploring the possibility of consciousness being able to affect things on a quantum level. We might imagine that any living awareness, once sensing the need to adapt, could have an effect on its own genetics.

Fliption

Jul28-04, 07:47 PM

does it matter?
he's leaving out an entire dimension! and have somehow managed to get in his head, that a world of stationary cells that are on or off, can be a representation of a world of particles and motion...

I didn't see this post until after I responded to the last one.

I think you're mind is made up. I would encourage you to read more and definitely look into and participate in Hypnagogues postings on this topic.

BTW, I'm not convince of any of this myself but I do understand the relevance a bit more than you seem to and I'll be open to it for that reason only.

Nereid

Jul28-04, 08:11 PM

By the way, studies being conducted (such as the QSC research by Gao Shan that Radar mentioned in another thread) are exploring the possibility of consciousness being able to affect things on a quantum level. We might imagine that any living awareness, once sensing the need to adapt, could have an effect on its own genetics.I'm all for experiments!

This one sounds like it will have a rather difficult time of controlling the confounding effects. :smile:

How does the idea which seems to motivate this experiment differ from Lamarckism?

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 08:28 PM

Come on! Don't patronise me. That isn't a definition at all. That's just an unsupported assertion of a need for a so-called demonstration of progressive organisation, without actually identifying what progressive organisation is. Try defining progressive organisation without referring to progressive organizing (which is tautological), complexity (which means different things to different people), higher (which misses the whole point of evolution, and also is specific to a set of criteria) and life. (which is circular logic)

Patronize? I don't know what you are talking about. I have defined it, everybody else here knows what I am saying whether they agree or not. What's your problem FZ? Are you waiting for me to define it in a way that you can finally find fault with the definition?

All your logic criticisms are bogus too. You are just parroting concepts. You don't even know what you are saying, because if you did you'd explain yourself instead of just dropping mindless fecal matter all over the place.

Which tape measure are you using? How on earth can you talk about percentages?

Evolution =

Inheritance
Randomness
Selection

All 3 have a 100% role.

Wow, talk about a disconnect! Do you think any of that happens OUTSIDE the established system of biology?

Your logic is out of date. Chaos and organisation go hand in hand. The issue I am attacking is this special case you raise of "progressive organisation". Evolution isn't magic. Neither is life. They follow the laws of a chaotic universe - that, under certain circumstances, they undergo changes in their system, and that under changing circumstances, they keep changing. What my attacks centre on is the notion that you can generate this holy progressive organisation, and allow life, and life only. To do this, it seems to me that you can only inject gigantic volumes of subjectivity to keep things afloat. Physicalism is entirely self consistent.

Life is a sytem, first and foremost. Virtually every single bit of chemistry that happens in it is programmed to do so. It is an incredible machine, a machine that is organized to function in accordance with the environment we call nature. Whatever "randomness" that occurs is mostly overwhelmed by the strength of the bio-system. And when the systemic aspect can't prevail, that's when the system is damaged or destroyed.

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 08:52 PM

I'm all for experiments!

Hi Nereid, I've not forgotten about you. I wanted to think about your previous post a bit before responding.

This one sounds like it will have a rather difficult time of controlling the confounding effects. :smile:

I agree. Dr. Shan, I believe, is looking into the possibility that consciousness is a new property of matter, so as far as I can tell his approach is strictly physicalist. I also gleaned from his comments (he generously offered a brief explanation of his work in my thread on panpsychism) that his concept of consciousness is modeled somewhat on how a computer functions.

How does the idea which seems to motivate this experiment differ from Lamarckism?

I don't think it is motivated by Lamarckian concepts at all. I think his experiments take off from the observed wave function collapse in non-locality experiments. I personally don't know how it can be established that the wave collapse isn't the result of the physical aspects of observation (i.e., photon interference), but then I've not kept up with the latest developments in this area. Fliption seems to think there is reason to suspect consciousness itself might have a quantum effect.

Fliption

Jul28-04, 09:10 PM

Fliption seems to think there is reason to suspect consciousness itself might have a quantum effect.

Well there are studies that I have posted that show a correlation between wave collapse and the potential for knowledge. Exactly how this relates to consciousness I'm not sure.

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 09:13 PM

Well there are studies that I have posted that show a correlation between wave collapse and the potential for knowledge. Exactly how this relates to consciousness I'm not sure.

Could you post them again? I might give it another look.

Nereid

Jul28-04, 09:19 PM

Hi Nereid, I've not forgotten about you. I wanted to think about your previous post a bit before responding.No worries! (oops :redface: )

I can't always spend time every day on PF, and the concepts we're discussing won't disappear tomorrow. And in any case, I've got at least three things that have appeared earlier in this thread that I want to work on myself. L8ter.

Philocrat

Jul28-04, 09:43 PM

The debate about whether physics alone can explain reality or everything so far goes like this:

1) THE PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT: Many of you believe that the physical world is describable only by Physics. A higher percentage of you argued that there is nothing over and above physical explanation. And quite rightly (and very appreciatively) most of you provided a substantial amount of 'real' examples from your different disciplines.

2) THE SKEPTICAL NON-PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT: Those on this side of the argument argued that (equally with some source materials and examples) there is something over and above physical explanation. That certain aspect of the human reality displays some non-physical properties that counter the claim that only physical explanation is possible, as the current voting result suggests.

So far so good. But there are a few issues that we need some clarification with regards to (1) CAUSATION, (2) PURPOSE OF ANY CAUSE, and (3) CAUSAL RELATIONS:

(1) CAUSATION

(a) Is there a first cause? That is what started it all? Or simply, can anything self-cause itself?
(b) If anything can self-cause itself, what is or should be the nature of its being in terms of its structure and function?
(c) Or is everything jointly cuased? That is, a thing caused by a collection of other things.
(d) If everything is joinlty caused, what would be the nature of its being in terms of its overall structure and function? For example, would it be structurally and functionally progressive towards attaining a state of indestructibility, or would it remain structurally and functionally moderate, stagnant and circular ad infinituum?

(2) CAUSAL RELATIONS AND THE PURPOSE OF ANY CAUSE

(a) What is the purpose of any cause? Why would anything want to cause another?

(b) Can a self-caused thing single-handedly cause or give rise to another thing? And what would be the reason and purpose of this possibility? For example, if I could self-cause myself and I am completly self-sufficienct, both in structure and in fucntion, would I have the need to cause or give rise to another thing?

(c) The cause of something by another thing or by a group of other things kickstarts a chain of causation, what is the natural clarifying relation between (1) ORIGINAL CAUSES, (2) INTERMEDIATE TRANSPORTATIONAL CAUSES and (3) FINAL CAUSES?

------------------------------------------

Or is the universe locked up in an infinite repetitious recycling of its moderate or imperfect parts?

------------------------------------------

Fliption

Jul28-04, 10:11 PM

Could you post them again? I might give it another look.

Absolutely.:smile: There were other links I provided but I think this site may reference most of those as well.

http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/qphil.html

loseyourname

Jul28-04, 10:14 PM

Well, that's the "something more" you envision, I see it a bit differently. Let’s compare situations where an infant being cared for by loving, attentive adults is suddenly moved to an environment where the adults who care for him constantly fight and are spaced out on drugs. Even though the child doesn’t intellectually understand what’s going on, he will feel the difference, and that difference can affect his development. Similarly, would I suggest that if the progressively organizing force is part of the inner environment of life, the odds of adaptive mutation occuring when it needs to might increase in favor of adaption.

By the way, studies being conducted (such as the QSC research by Gao Shan that Radar mentioned in another thread) are exploring the possibility of consciousness being able to affect things on a quantum level. We might imagine that any living awareness, once sensing the need to adapt, could have an effect on its own genetics.

Did you even read the post before this one? There is almost no way of knowing what a given mutation will result in. Even if consciousness was capable of having an effect on its own genetics, it still wouldn't be able to cause a purposeful mutation; certainly an individual consciousness would not. If you contend that the informational resources of this general pool of consciousness is so great that it would be capable of making a purposeful mutation (an incredible claim), then how do you explain the fact that almost every mutation is either neutral or detrimental? Wouldn't we expect a majority of favorable mutations if mutations were, in fact, purposeful and directed?

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 11:20 PM

Did you even read the post before this one? There is almost no way of knowing what a given mutation will result in. Even if consciousness was capable of having an effect on its own genetics, it still wouldn't be able to cause a purposeful mutation; certainly an individual consciousness would not. If you contend that the informational resources of this general pool of consciousness is so great that it would be capable of making a purposeful mutation (an incredible claim), then how do you explain the fact that almost every mutation is either neutral or detrimental? Wouldn't we expect a majority of favorable mutations if mutations were, in fact, purposeful and directed?

I did read the post, why are you asking? But I didn't say purposeful or directed, YOU said that (why is everyone so intent on putting words in my mouth?). I spoke of conditions turning more supportive of constructive mutation, and the possibility that the awareness of the organism sensing some need might affect that.

That doesn't necessarily mean when conditions are more friendly, even then things go 100% in a positive direction. Maybe the percentage turns from 99% negative/neutral to 60% negative/neutral.

I would then explain the vast majority of neutral or destructive mutations as having resulted from the "normal" odds being against it; and the development of very sophisticated systems (such as eyes) as having been assisted when the more positive condition is "switched on."

With a theory like that (or any theory really), one would have to wonder why human consciousness should have evolved. It is something strange don't you think?

Les Sleeth

Jul28-04, 11:27 PM

Philocrat

Jul28-04, 11:36 PM

Gee, would you mind posing a bit more challenging questions?
:bugeye:

How challenging do you want them? Is it by posting examples and counter-examples that return us back to square one? I could do that and I have tons of materials to do that. But then again, of what value is that when it returns us back to square one? If you see nothing challenging in the above questions, then just pass over in silence. Just pretend they are meaningless. That's fine by me.

loseyourname

Jul29-04, 12:23 AM

I did read the post, why are you asking? But I didn't say purposeful or directed, YOU said that (why is everyone so intent on putting words in my mouth?). I spoke of conditions turning more supportive of constructive mutation, and the possibility that the awareness of the organism sensing some need might affect that.

Well jeez, how is that different from directed? If they occur in a manner such that it is more likely than not that mutations will cause an organism to evolve in a predetermined way, well heck, what else would you call this? And again with the awareness of the organism effecting the mutations that occur. I think you are seriously underestimating the fact that it is impossible, given the amount of information we currently have, and it may be impossible altogether, to even tell how deleting or substituting a given base will effect the organism on a macroscopic, tangible level. I'm really having difficulty fathoming how you could imagine it would be possible for a given entity to contain all of this information, have all of this computing capability, and be able to influence the direction of evolution such that mutations favoring the emergence of certain traits would be more likely to occur, without being either conscious or intelligent.

That doesn't necessarily mean when conditions are more friendly, even then things go 100% in a positive direction. Maybe the percentage turns from 99% negative/neutral to 60% negative/neutral.

I still don't see how that could happen without a purposive, intelligent entity behind it.

I would then explain the vast majority of neutral or destructive mutations as having resulted from the "normal" odds being against it; and the development of very sophisticated systems (such as eyes) as having been assisted when the more positive condition is "switched on."

Okay, but what's wrong with the current theory that mutations occur at a rate, and organisms are of such a great number, such that, given enough time, enough mutations will occur that are favorable in a given environment and be selected for? This is one of the best tested theories ever, and it always holds up, without any need for additional directive input. Why postulate another mechanism when the mechanisms already known to exist are capable of doing the job on their own?

With a theory like that (or any theory really), one would have to wonder why human consciousness should have evolved. It is something strange don't you think?

Well, with your hypothesis, the evolution of consciousness would be predetermined. Under the theory of evolution by natural selection, the rudiments of elementary consciousness would arise by chance and be selected for because they provide the organism with this trait with a greater chance of reproductive success. There are many ways in which this could be an advantage, so I imagine your only problem is with consciousness being an emergent property at all.

Rader

Jul29-04, 01:58 AM

Absolutely.:smile: There were other links I provided but I think this site may reference most of those as well.

http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/qphil.html

Fliption, Thanks for the link, if you have anymore good ones, post them.
I did not see the previous ones. Were you able to read all the links of Gao Shan?

balkan

Jul29-04, 05:06 AM

I didn't see this post until after I responded to the last one.

I think you're mind is made up. I would encourage you to read more and definitely look into and participate in Hypnagogues postings on this topic.

BTW, I'm not convince of any of this myself but I do understand the relevance a bit more than you seem to and I'll be open to it for that reason only.
my mind isn't made up at all... i'm an agnostic...
but the "evidence" you provided has got nothing at all to give... nothing... (face it, you can't proove the existance of "something else" or even point to indications of it... not without making a heap of mistakes compared to reality and science)... i think it's quite okay to believe... in fact i think it's great if it's working for you, but those mind games are ridiculous, they really are... especially the zombie one... the game of life example is just plain sad, since he's using an example that can't explain anything physical and then he's trying to argue that since this example, (that can't explain anything physical) can't create consciousness, physics can't either... that's just sad... especially when he calls himself a scientist...

i also see that you merrily skipped around everything i said, including my comments on the mary problem... i got loads of more on that btw, if your mind is open, that is...
the more i think about it, the more does the mary problem prove to me that "something more" migth not exist, which is the first argument to actually do that...

vanesch

Jul29-04, 06:42 AM

Therefore, there is no way to obtain active optical components, only by physio-chemical laws. It is absolutely necessary, another information that is of a completely different nature, to exist previous to the aparition of asymmetrically optic molecules.

This is not true. The process of generating a solution that doesn't have the symmetry of the original problem (here, parity) is called spontaneous symmetry breaking and is a known phenomenon in many fields.

cheers,
Patrick.

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 09:13 AM

How challenging do you want them? Is it by posting examples and counter-examples that return us back to square one? I could do that and I have tons of materials to do that. But then again, of what value is that when it returns us back to square one? If you see nothing challenging in the above questions, then just pass over in silence. Just pretend they are meaningless. That's fine by me.

:smile: Sorry Philocrat, I didn't make it more clear that what I said was tongue-in-cheek. I was teasing you good-naturedly, not ridiculing. I was really saying your questions are incredibly difficult! To ask about first cause or purpose is to pose two of the most elusive issues I know of. Already the subject of this thread has a lot of people thinking of how to answer it, do you really want to add more issues we can't answer? :tongue2:

Fliption

Jul29-04, 09:18 AM

i think it's quite okay to believe... in fact i think it's great if it's working for you, but those mind games are ridiculous, they really are... especially the zombie one... the game of life example is just plain sad, since he's using an example that can't explain anything physical and then he's trying to argue that since this example, (that can't explain anything physical) can't create consciousness, physics can't either... that's just sad... especially when he calls himself a scientist...

I'll say this one more time. I do not and have not participated in mind games. What I was trying to say earlier is that what seems absurd to you actually makes sense to others. It depends on background and perspective. I contend that you have come to the conclusions that you have because you do not understand the topic and it is quite obvious that you do not want to. Also, I don't "believe" in any view. I think about things a lot. If you could hear the internal debate in my mind you'd understand why I say I don't have a steadfast belief.

i also see that you merrily skipped around everything i said, including my comments on the mary problem... i got loads of more on that btw, if your mind is open, that is...
the more i think about it, the more does the mary problem prove to me that "something more" migth not exist, which is the first argument to actually do that...

I skipped merrily around nothing. I hit it straight on. I asked you a very specific question (which you didn't answer) to directly respond to all your "Mary" comments. I asked you if you are claiming that babies do not have experiences. The reason you do not see this as a direct response is because perhaps you do not understand the point of these illustrations to begin with. Seeing the color red is but one example of qualia. It's too easy for you to pick apart an example like this and dazzle us with irrelevant physics knowledge. So I'm raising the real issue. You're claiming that babies do not have experiences. Right?

Fliption

Jul29-04, 10:08 AM

Fliption, Thanks for the link, if you have anymore good ones, post them.
I did not see the previous ones. Were you able to read all the links of Gao Shan?

I think this topic was discussed and the links were provided in a thread called "Clarification of Quantum Physics". If you can't find it let me know.

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 10:46 AM

Well jeez, how is that different from directed? If they occur in a manner such that it is more likely than not that mutations will cause an organism to evolve in a predetermined way, well heck, what else would you call this? And again with the awareness of the organism effecting the mutations that occur.

You seem determined to stick me in the "purpose" box, but I don't want to be there. I might just try to argue some aspect of purpose if I could set up the debate myself, to argue as I'd need to for anything to make sense. But here I am looking at the internal biological environment in which mutation takes place. So what I suggest to "call this" is the biological environment becoming friendlier-than-normal to constructive mutation. One of the factors which might affect that internal bio-milieu is the organism's awareness of survival pressures in its external environment.

I think you are seriously underestimating the fact that it is impossible, given the amount of information we currently have, and it may be impossible altogether, to even tell how deleting or substituting a given base will effect the organism on a macroscopic, tangible level. I'm really having difficulty fathoming how you could imagine it would be possible for a given entity to contain all of this information, have all of this computing capability, and be able to influence the direction of evolution such that mutations favoring the emergence of certain traits would be more likely to occur, without being either conscious or intelligent.

There you go again, characterizing what I "imagine" is possible in your own terms. I can tell you flat out I do not think some entity is "computing" a bunch of info. I think all the conditions for mutative change are in place. If anything "directive" occurs, then I'd liken it to will. In other words, it is like when you want to move your body from point A to point B, and then it responds to your will. A million internal events have to occur inside your body for that movement to happen, but all you need to know is how to will it to happen. A system is in place that allows that.

Of course, if the typical physicalist were to desribe that event the same way they describe evolution, they'd only talk about what metabolized, calories burned, nerve impulses fired, muscles moved . . . i.e., the body's physiology. And will? No such thing, it can't be observed!

I still don't see how that could happen without a purposive, intelligent entity behind it.

Oh, so you do believe in God :biggrin:.

Okay, but what's wrong with the current theory that mutations occur at a rate, and organisms are of such a great number, such that, given enough time, enough mutations will occur that are favorable in a given environment and be selected for? This is one of the best tested theories ever, and it always holds up, without any need for additional directive input. Why postulate another mechanism when the mechanisms already known to exist are capable of doing the job on their own?

Well, I don't really want to jump to a new debate, but I don't buy that theory for the same reason I don't believe abiogenesis can happen without the help of some progressive organizating force.

According to physicalists, constructive mutation happens through nothing but physical processes. You say the vast majority of mutation is neutral or destructive, but mutation has nonetheless brought the incredible developments found in life -- from metabolism and reproduction to senses and consciousness. Wow.

Now look at physical processes outside of life and notice how often physical changes, unaffected by living or conscious processes, are constructive. Get it? To me, without progressive organization the entire physicalist theory is a house of cards, built on quicksand.

Well, with your hypothesis, the evolution of consciousness would be predetermined.

I can find a way to say Darwinist evolution is predetermined too (think about it). My hypothesis is only predetermined in the sense that the progressive force pushes toward ever-higher levels of the manifestation of its organizational nature. But if consciousness is regarded as a highly evolved expression of organization, then yes I suppose I might agree the eventual manifestation of consciousness was "predetermined."

Under the theory of evolution by natural selection, the rudiments of elementary consciousness would arise by chance and be selected for because they provide the organism with this trait with a greater chance of reproductive success.

There are plenty of Darwinists who don't see how consciousness assists survival, and who think we'd be more likely to survive without it. It is a mystery why (and how) consciousness developed.

There are many ways in which this could be an advantage, so I imagine your only problem is with consciousness being an emergent property at all.

My problem with physicalist theory is the same from start to finish. There are no variations in my objection. It is that physicalness lacks the organizational quality to achieve life, as well as any known properties which can account for consciousness. This new concept of "emergence" (i.e., that consciousness is a new "property" of matter) is, in my opinion, nothing more that a physicalist strategy to incorporate what can't be explained by physicalist theory.

As I've said several times in this thread, I don't understand the dread, loathing, the trepidation, the revulsion, the horror, the abhorance, the utter and complete panic!!!!!!!!!!!!! :surprise: at the idea of something non-physical being part of the description of reality. OMFG! What if it's true?? Chaos and mayhem :bugeye: insanity :eek: a freaking nightmare :yuck: a tragedy :cry:. blaspheme (oh yeah :biggrin:) . . . :cool:

Nereid

Jul29-04, 11:21 AM

Hey Les, you missed this smiley: :devil:
:tongue2: :wink:

selfAdjoint

Jul29-04, 01:37 PM

There are plenty of Darwinists who don't see how consciousness assists survival, and who think we'd be more likely to survive without it. It is a mystery why (and how) consciousness developed.

Cite one. And make sure it's really a Darwinist.

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 01:43 PM

But even here, I would say we really don't have a clue about the universals; we merely know something about what seems to work across a dozen or so OOM of time and space. For example, what sort of processes - mechanistic or otherwise - rule for dark energy and dark matter? What goes on in spaces smaller than a Planck 'metre' or between Planck 'seconds'?

True, but you do know that all that’s been discovered so far about physicalness has been mechanistic, generally repetitive, and inevitable (even uncertainty only describes our own lack of ability to predict, not that anything actually chaotic is happening there).

But aren't you then jumping to conclusions? If it takes another 200 years to nail down even the outline of how life got going (from various chemicals, in a particular set of environments); or 300 years to be able to explain the subjectivity of consciousness, why do you say 'no'? Imagine your great-(great) grandmother and my great (etc) grandfather having a debate about the source of light and heat in the Sun - how would that differ from the debate we're having here today? Of course, science (and philosophy?) have moved on a tad since then, but otherwise? (Side note: it seems I've misunderstood your 'progressive organisation' idea; I'll need to go back and read the threads again).

I do understand what you are saying, but I there are two reasons why I don’t believe time is going to help physicalists make their case. To understand the first reason, I think you have to consider how seriously I take my generalism. I see every example you are giving as falling easily into the “mechanistic” category, plus your approach to life and consciousness is to look for mechanisms. So if there is an aspect of life that isn’t mechanistic, then there is no possible way for you to find it through that investigative appoach.

That brings us to my second reason, which is why I don’t think life and consciousness are mechanistic. What would help you understand where I’m coming from is if you went to this link to a thread on “empirical induction” I initiated -- http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=30762 -- and read my opening posts about a certain experience I have studied and practiced (that way too I don’t have to repeat stuff other participants here who know me have already read). When you understand that besides the intellectual objection I pose, my studies and experience also contradict a purely mechanistic explanation, I think you will better see why I don’t think physicalists will ever account for life and consciousness.

. . . one of the things I am trying to point out - badly, as usual, it seems - is that by the time something like your test might be feasible, it's entirely possible that the very concepts will have changed so much as to make your test hopelessly ambiguous (or worse). The best analogy I can think of right now is phlogiston.

I think you are doing a good job of making your point, it’s just that I am not convinced by it for the generalist and experiential reasons I cited above. However, I don’t think phlogiston is a good analogy because you are talking about a clearly physical phenomenon. Combustion was produced by physical actions, even if they didn’t understand what was happening behind those actions. But the physical actions that would explain the origin of life or consciousness are missing. Just because we can’t explain something, doesn’t mean one can assume it will be explained by physical processes. To say “wait with faith in science, while we who have believe in physicalism attempt to make our case” doesn’t seem to allow there are other possible explanations.

Are there any good reasons why any 'something more' can't be studied scientifically?

Yes, I am afraid there are. Whatever human consciousness is, it is now in a physical body. To perceive we rely on the senses, which are also physical, and they reveal only physical information. The empirical aspect of science depends solely on the senses. That means if there is something more than physicalness, then science has no experiential avenue with which to empirically confirm hypotheses about “something more.”

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 02:46 PM

Cite one. And make sure it's really a Darwinist.

Sorry, I can’t find it. I thought it was Strickberger (writing in “Evolution”) or Dorion Sagan . . . Actually I thought it was commonly agreed upon that it is a mystery why consciousness evolved, especially since it might be threatening to survival. I did find this by Sir Alister Hardy (1896-1985, former Oxford professor of zoology):

“I am a Darwinian in the modern sense, but I venture to suggest that there is something more about the process of evolution than is generally conceded by most biologists today . . . . I am not a vitalist in the old-fashioned sense of the word. I fully expect that the whole of an animal’s bodily mechanism will be resolved in terms of biophysics and biochemistry; but I am not materialist in that I am blind to the reality of consciousness in the organic world. As yet we just do not know where, or how, it relates to the physiochemical system; and our science, at present, cannot deal with it. . . . Are natural selection and the gene complex the only factors [in evolution]? Important they must be – but are they all-important? Frankly we do not know, and I for one doubt it.”

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 02:47 PM

Hey Les, you missed this smiley: :devil:
:tongue2: :wink:

That's 'cause I'm an angel.

Rader

Jul29-04, 03:39 PM

This is not true. The process of generating a solution that doesn't have the symmetry of the original problem (here, parity) is called spontaneous symmetry breaking and is a known phenomenon in many fields.

Therefore, there is no way to obtain active optical components, only by physio-chemical laws. It is absolutely necessary, another information that is of a completely different nature, to exist previous to the aparition of asymmetrically optic molecules.

If its not true, then explain to me why, I gave a sufficient explanation, of the difference between biologically active substance, that can discriminate and those that can not. Yes inate matter can produce its symmetical equal, but only live matter will produce its, symmetical equal. Thats what, the something more seems to be.

All proteins that form part of living things are optically active and almost all are levogiras.

By there nature, chemcial reations can never produce, spontaneously, a substance formed exclusively by a optic isomero, be it L or D. This is statistically imposible.

Logically, a chemical reaction confronts, by chance enormous quantities of atoms and molecules, that have no power to individually decide, that only obey the thermodynamic rule of reaction, a probablistic law of big numbers.

We can predict with full, rigor the result of the individual reaction because we know that millions of molecules of a substance, unite with millions of molecules of others. But that molecule that unites with that other is solely by chance. Because of the freedom of chance, they are indefectibly conducted to reach a percental equality in there distribution.

In chemical reactions of inate material, this funtions perfectly, because all molecules of each type of substance intervene en a reaction are exactly the same between themselves. So that, it makes no difference, indistinction, which one with which other.

Remembering that each molecule of ++ has two optical forms L or D, and both identical from the point of a chemical view. It is to say that ++ L, for example has no way to know if ++ with whom it will combine is L or D.

For the following to produce the condensatation of muchos ++ and not making a special selection stange to the chemical reaction in itself, the substance will include molecules of both optical types. That is to say racemico and not apt for life. This is theoretical and experimental, there is no discussion here.

In the experiments of Miller, results were all racemicos, without exception. Useless from the point of a biological standpoint, for use as building blocks of life.

Unless the data I have on Miller experiments is totally false, what has been stated is true.

To give you an idea, of the diffulculty with asymmetrically optic molecules, the probabilities, of a relatively simple protein, of say 400 ++ by chance or by the physio-chemical laws, to produce all the ++ en form of L, would be 1X10X123.

Nereid

Jul29-04, 03:57 PM

Re-reading this thread I'm reminded of a passage I read once, in Kuhn?

Earnest explication by two groups of people, frustration, talking past each other, puzzlement that the others 'just don't get it'; clear, cogent laying out of the cases, followed by examples and deeper explanations; more frustration and bewilderment; apparently simple words and phrases that you realise the others understand in subtly (and not so) different ways, ... welcome to the Hotel Paradigm Gulf?

loseyourname

Jul29-04, 04:14 PM

You seem determined to stick me in the "purpose" box, but I don't want to be there.

I'm just curious why you're so dead intent on avoiding it when, from what I can tell, your hypothesis requires it to really make any sense.

There you go again, characterizing what I "imagine" is possible in your own terms. I can tell you flat out I do not think some entity is "computing" a bunch of info. I think all the conditions for mutative change are in place. If anything "directive" occurs, then I'd liken it to will. In other words, it is like when you want to move your body from point A to point B, and then it responds to your will. A million internal events have to occur inside your body for that movement to happen, but all you need to know is how to will it to happen. A system is in place that allows that.

I'm not trying characterize what you imagine. I'm telling you what I think your hypothesis requires to be feasible. A couple of things:

-The vast majority of organisms have no such system in place (one by which they can will a movement from point A to point B).

-The "something more" that you are proposing is not an entity internal to any particular organism. It is an outside force. Even organisms that do have the capability to will their own movement can't will the movement of another organism.

-Movement occurs according to a huge interface of nervous and muscle systems. The replication of DNA, in contrast, occurs in an environment that is completely cut-off from any interaction with any other organismic process. This analogy does not hold up to scrutiny.

Oh, so you do believe in God :biggrin:.

First off, the purposive intelligence is something I am proposing to make your hypothesis more feasible. It is not something that I believe in. Second, why does this have to be called God? I never it was all-powerful or all-knowing or that it had anything to do with the existence of the universe itself. There is also no reason why such an entity would be worthy of or require worship.

Well, I don't really want to jump to a new debate, but I don't buy that theory for the same reason I don't believe abiogenesis can happen without the help of some progressive organizating force.

I thought you didn't believe abiogenesis because it hadn't been demonstrated. Evolution by natural selection has been. What comparison is there?

According to physicalists, constructive mutation happens through nothing but physical processes. You say the vast majority of mutation is neutral or destructive, but mutation has nonetheless brought the incredible developments found in life -- from metabolism and reproduction to senses and consciousness. Wow.

Destructive because an organism is fine-tuned to exist in a given environmental niche. When the environment changes and pressures are applied, some of those mutations will come in handy, and they will be selected for. You seem to be neglecting the huge amount of time this takes and the enormous sample size when you are considering every single member of a species that ever exists. Your argument is what is called the "argument from personal incredulity" and isn't much of an argument.

Now look at physical processes outside of life and notice how often physical changes, unaffected by living or conscious processes, are constructive. Get it? To me, without progressive organization the entire physicalist theory is a house of cards, built on quicksand.

Okay, but what does this have to do with evolution? The changes brought about through organic evolution often are brought about by living forces. The single most important pressure applied is competition from other living organisms and the second most important is predation by other living organisms and the third most important is sexual selection by other living organisms. You can't make an analogy with non-living systems because they don't compete for resources, eat each other, or have sex with each other.

There are plenty of Darwinists who don't see how consciousness assists survival, and who think we'd be more likely to survive without it. It is a mystery why (and how) consciousness developed.

Traits are selected for that provide the organism with an increased chance to reproduce. Length of survival is irrelevant as long as it reaches breeding age. Do you honestly not see how being conscious of a potential mate's preferences and tastes and being conscious of your own looks and behavior would be helpful here?

My problem with physicalist theory is the same from start to finish. There are no variations in my objection. It is that physicalness lacks the organizational quality to achieve life, as well as any known properties which can account for consciousness. This new concept of "emergence" (i.e., that consciousness is a new "property" of matter) is, in my opinion, nothing more that a physicalist strategy to incorporate what can't be explained by physicalist theory.

Emergence is not a new concept. The expansion of freezing water is an emergent property. Whether or not consciousness is an emergent property might be up for debate, but the existence of emergent properties is not.

As I've said several times in this thread, I don't understand the dread, loathing, the trepidation, the revulsion, the horror, the abhorance, the utter and complete panic!!!!!!!!!!!!! :surprise: at the idea of something non-physical being part of the description of reality. OMFG! What if it's true?? Chaos and mayhem :bugeye: insanity :eek: a freaking nightmare :yuck: a tragedy :cry:. blaspheme (oh yeah :biggrin:) . . . :cool:

Okay. I don't understand why anyone would feel horror either way.

Nereid

Jul29-04, 04:18 PM

Rader

Jul29-04, 04:29 PM

Anyone familiar with the decades of research on the amino acid enantiomers found in the Murchison meteorite (a carbonaceous chondrite)?

IIRC, despite initial skepticism (to put it mildly) the excess of left enantiomers over right is both real and extraterrestrial.

How can this be? Surely only living things can produce a non-racemic mix?? Well, it seems that billions and billions of tonnes of amino acids are produced on grains in ISM gas clouds; the mechanism for producing the enantiomer imbalance is polarised UV light from (certain) stars. How to get from a small imbalance to pure L or D? Catalysis; several organics possible, some of which are also found in carbonaceous chondrites (and presumably on ISM dust grains).

Do you have some good links?

So are you saying we may have been seeded. I felt you were hinting towards this. That does not solve the problem it just makes another. Look at my post in the Astronomy section today.
http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=37261

Thats a interesting combination of elements, on those carbonaceous chondrites. So were asteroids once a planet with life?
http://www.ibiblio.org/lunar/school/solar_system/minecarb.html
Murchison meteorite.
http://www.panspermia.org/chiral.htm

Nereid

Jul29-04, 04:44 PM

I’m having some difficulty here Les, so please be gentle.By the way, studies being conducted (such as the QSC research by Gao Shan that Radar mentioned in another thread) are exploring the possibility of consciousness being able to affect things on a quantum level. We might imagine that any living awareness, once sensing the need to adapt, could have an effect on its own genetics.I'm all for experiments!

This one sounds like it will have a rather difficult time of controlling the confounding effects. :smile: I agree. Dr. Shan, I believe, is looking into the possibility that consciousness is a new property of matter, so as far as I can tell his approach is strictly physicalist. I also gleaned from his comments (he generously offered a brief explanation of his work in my thread on panpsychism) that his concept of consciousness is modeled somewhat on how a computer functions.How does the idea which seems to motivate this experiment differ from Lamarckism? I don't think it is motivated by Lamarckian concepts at all. I think his experiments take off from the observed wave function collapse in non-locality experiments. I personally don't know how it can be established that the wave collapse isn't the result of the physical aspects of observation (i.e., photon interference), but then I've not kept up with the latest developments in this area. Fliption seems to think there is reason to suspect consciousness itself might have a quantum effect.Then laterAre there any good reasons why any 'something more' can't be studied scientifically?Yes, I am afraid there are. Whatever human consciousness is, it is now in a physical body. To perceive we rely on the senses, which are also physical, and they reveal only physical information. The empirical aspect of science depends solely on the senses. That means if there is something more than physicalness, then science has no experiential avenue with which to empirically confirm hypotheses about “something more.”If any ‘something mores’ cannot, by their very nature, be studied scientifically, is there any way that the experiments of Dr. Shan (etc) can contribute to an understanding of any ‘something more’? Including, potentially, a demonstration that there is no ‘something more’?

Other than the two tests you briefly described (a computer with consciousness and creation of life in a test tube, to oversimplify), is there any way to substantially shrink the potential scope for ‘something more’ wrt consciousness and the origin of life?

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 05:08 PM

I’m having some difficulty here Les, so please be gentle.Then laterIf any ‘something mores’ cannot, by their very nature, be studied scientifically, is there any way that the experiments of Dr. Shan (etc) can contribute to an understanding of any ‘something more’? Including, potentially, a demonstration that there is no ‘something more’?

Other than the two tests you briefly described (a computer with consciousness and creation of life in a test tube, to oversimplify), is there any way to substantially shrink the potential scope for ‘something more’ wrt consciousness and the origin of life?

Yes, I almost addressed that, but I thought you might already know about it. Radar and I exchanged similar ideas, and then I explained it this way. If there is something more to consciousness which is non-physical, there must be a way it interacts with the physical, since here we are alive in physical biology. I don't think the physical can detect the non-physical, but I can see where physical experiments might be able to detect that point, on the physical side, where they interact.

Nereid

Jul29-04, 07:07 PM

Do you have some good links?Here is the landmark 1997 paper (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9305838&dopt=Abstract). If you google on "Murchison", with words such as "non-racemic", "amino acids", etc you will find plenty of links.So are you saying we may have been seeded. I felt you were hinting towards this.What I am saying is that as we look closer into new domains, we often find a richness that is unexpected and surprising. In this case, it's another small 'physicalist step' about the origin of life - quite complex organics are apparently being formed, in interstellar space, by the billions of tonnes, with a clear non-racemic flavour. There's still, IMHO, at least a good 50 years' of work to do before all the major steps in the abiogenesis story are even sketched.

Panspermia - 'seeding' - is another story, equally fascinating, but barring a surprising discovery, also a story that will likely run for at least 50 years yet before tantalising hints become moderately confident understanding.

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 07:44 PM

First off, the purposive intelligence is something I am proposing to make your hypothesis more feasible. It is not something that I believe in. Second, why does this have to be called God? I never it was all-powerful or all-knowing or that it had anything to do with the existence of the universe itself. There is also no reason why such an entity would be worthy of or require worship.

I’ll start with this. Lighten up! I was teasing you, I hope you haven’t lost your sense of humor.

Emergence is not a new concept. The expansion of freezing water is an emergent property. Whether or not consciousness is an emergent property might be up for debate, but the existence of emergent properties is not.

What I meant was that the popularity of applying emergent theory to consciousness is relatively recent.

I thought you didn't believe abiogenesis because it hadn't been demonstrated. Evolution by natural selection has been. What comparison is there?

Physicalists study all the physical stuff happening and then proclaim that’s it, we figured it out! But they utterly ignore the advantages being part of a living system gives the physical processes. That is why when they want to prove their case, they have to do it with a living system, or using something that was once part of life (as with viruses or PCR). All that’s been proven is that physical process are thoroughly involved in a living system, and from that they ASSUME physicalness is causing all systemic aspects. I don’t buy for a second, with the evidence we have, that all there is to evolution is physcial processes and the physical environment. If I were an a priori physicalist, I might buy it. :wink:

I'm just curious why you're so dead intent on avoiding it when, from what I can tell, your hypothesis requires it to really make any sense.

I don’t think you do understand my hypothesis because . . .

I'm not trying characterize what you imagine. I'm telling you what I think your hypothesis requires to be feasible. A couple of things:

-The vast majority of organisms have no such system in place (one by which they can will a movement from point A to point B).

-The "something more" that you are proposing is not an entity internal to any particular organism. It is an outside force. Even organisms that do have the capability to will their own movement can't will the movement of another organism.

-Movement occurs according to a huge interface of nervous and muscle systems. The replication of DNA, in contrast, occurs in an environment that is completely cut-off from any interaction with any other organismic process. This analogy does not hold up to scrutiny.

. . . none of that is relevant to it. I will try to explain what I mean once more. Keep in mind that it was you who asked me to hypothesize about all this when I said up front I didn’t think this was the place for me to speculate. There isn’t enough room here for me to account for everything I need to make my case.

Anyway, I’ll start with an anology. If I were trying to teach you the concept of follow-through on a tennis swing, my lesson (not that you need one) would be to get you to feel the naturalness of follow-through. There was this guy, I think his name was Tim Galway, who wrote a best seller years ago called “The Inner Game of Tennis.” He said he could teach people who never had a racquet in their hand how to hit the ball effectively in an hour. The show “60 Minutes” took him up on the offer, and he did it! His approach was to have students learn to feel one’s way to the proper swing, and to do that ahead of breaking down a swing into minute detail.

My concept of the holistic influence a force of progressive organization might have on a biological system is like that. I have been trying to suggest that the force acts holistically, but results in detailed effects within the complexities of biology (similar to the analogy of will I used earlier). You keep wanting to make the force detailed, but that is not what I, at least, have been saying. If you want to describe it as a detailed, computing, thinking, rational force, then that is your model, not mine. The progressive organizing force I envision is “whole,” it acts holistically, and it’s nature is to move things in the direction of organization (if you want to call that nature “purpose,” I am fine with that). I am making no other claims about it!

Now, as far as an organism’s awareness affecting evolution, again you are bogged down in the minutia of bio-complexity. What I mean is, since biology (in my model) is a system originally borne of the force of progressive organization, evolved by it, and its chemistry is now kept reacting organizationally “upward” by that force (I realize that’s a new aspect of the concept), it means biology is most intimately tied to the organizing force. Awareness, in this model, is the ultimate expression of that organizing force, so it and biology are both offspring of progressive organization and therefore kin. So the idea is that because it is all entwined, each (system awareness and biology) has an avenue for affecting the other.

Philocrat

Jul29-04, 09:14 PM

:smile: Sorry Philocrat, I didn't make it more clear that what I said was tongue-in-cheek. I was teasing you good-naturedly, not ridiculing. I was really saying your questions are incredibly difficult! To ask about first cause or purpose is to pose two of the most elusive issues I know of. Already the subject of this thread has a lot of people thinking of how to answer it, do you really want to add more issues we can't answer? :tongue2:

Perhaps......and I think it was Descartes who thought along this line. He vowed to steer clear of any question for which he may never provide an answer. Everytime I think of these hard-headed questions, they just make my chemistry boil. I share in everyone's frustration in not being able to answer these questions. Yet I feel that we still have to ask them. I think we are better off asking them than not do so at all. Who knows, some clever dude might turn up in future to answer them.

Sorry if irritate you any more than I have to....but one question that I would like us to at least think about is this:

if there is so much deficit in our knowledge of the universe or the human reality, must we physically (or otherwise) change ourselves first before we can know the remainder, given that we knew anything at all?

Les Sleeth

Jul29-04, 09:53 PM

Perhaps......and I think it was Descartes who thought along this line. He vowed to steer clear of any question for which he may never provide an answer. . . .

Sorry if irritate you any more than I have to....but one question that I would like us to at least think about is this . . .

I wouldn't want you to steer clear of any meaningful question -- that's what philosophy is all about -- so good questions are never irritating. I was only suggesting you pose one such brain-breaker per thread. :wink:

if there is so much deficit in our knowledge of the universe or the human reality, must we physically (or otherwise) change ourselves first before we can know the remainder, given that we knew anything at all?

This question would make an excellent thread subject, for example.

loseyourname

Jul29-04, 10:28 PM

I’ll start with this. Lighten up! I was teasing you, I hope you haven’t lost your sense of humor.

What made you think I had a sense of humor?

What I meant was that the popularity of applying emergent theory to consciousness is relatively recent.

To be fair, neuroscience has only existed for several decades. It isn't like there are past scientific models you can compare emergence to.

Physicalists study all the physical stuff happening and then proclaim that’s it, we figured it out! But they utterly ignore the advantages being part of a living system gives the physical processes. That is why when they want to prove their case, they have to do it with a living system, or using something that was once part of life (as with viruses or PCR). All that’s been proven is that physical process are thoroughly involved in a living system, and from that they ASSUME physicalness is causing all systemic aspects. I don’t buy for a second, with the evidence we have, that all there is to evolution is physcial processes and the physical environment. If I were an a priori physicalist, I might buy it.

Oh come now. Yes, for the most part, they have figured it out. It isn't like organic evolution can be spoken of outside the context of a living system. If you want to be skeptical about abiogenesis, I can accept that. The best most chemists can say is that we probably have an infinite universe combined with millions of years and even if the probability is extremely low, it was bound to happen at some point. I admit that isn't very satisfying. But once you have a living system, all you really need is random mutations, honed by natural selection. Now, as I outlined previously, many of the major environmental pressures that cause populations to evolve (it's important to remember this: organisms themselves do not evolve) are organic themselves. This is certainly a huge advantage to the process, but it is nothing mysterious and it is nothing non-physical.

I have no problem with postulating the existence of non-physical entities to explain phenomena that do not easily lend themselves to a physical explanation, but organic evolution is not such a phenomenon. The rate of change in base sequences, due to replication errors, crossing over, viral insertion, hybridization, and other such processes is more than enough to produce the variability that is required for evolution to occur. Once this variability is in place, selective pressures will move a given population in whatever direction it needs to move to remain in existence. The vast majority of mutations, as I have pointed out, are either neutral or even detrimental, until some selective pressure (that could not possibly have been forseen by an unintelligent, non-prognosticatory force) comes along and makes it advantageous. Take the famous example of the peppered moth. Until the industrial revolution, the few moths with more dark speckles has less chance of surviving. There was no way to tell that this would eventually become an advantage and be selected for as buildings and trees were darkened by soot.

I am simply trying to be parsimonious here. If you are going to posit the existence of a non-physical, directive force to evolution, you'll need to provide some good reason to believe that such a thing is necessary. An old philosophy professor of mine used an example of invisible goblins that help move the hands around a clock. He continued to point out that we couldn't prove they weren't there, but if we can explain the motion of the clock simply by detailing the way the different gears and circuits work, why postulate the existence of an additional force at work? Personal incredulity alone is not a sufficient reason. When evolution is so well explained using purely physical terminology, why insist that something more is at work there?

I don’t think you do understand my hypothesis because none of that is relevant to it. I will try to explain what I mean once more. Keep in mind that it was you who asked me to hypothesize about all this when I said up front I didn’t think this was the place for me to speculate. There isn’t enough room here for me to account for everything I need to make my case.

Anyway, I’ll start with an anology. If I were trying to teach you the concept of follow-through on a tennis swing, my lesson (not that you need one) would be to get you to feel the naturalness of follow-through. There was this guy, I think his name was Tim Galway, who wrote a best seller years ago called “The Inner Game of Tennis.” He said he could teach people who never had a racquet in their hand how to hit the ball effectively in an hour. The show “60 Minutes” took him up on the offer, and he did it! His approach was to have students learn to feel one’s way to the proper swing, and to do that ahead of breaking down a swing into minute detail.

All I can do here is repeat that this is not a good analogy. Hitting a tennis ball is an action that requires the coordinated effort of many bodily systems, all interacting with the nervous system, which is clearly in control. DNA replication, on the other hand, is a closed system. The only extent to which a holistic force could be holistic would be to encompass all of the machinery used, which is limited to a couple of enzymes and protein scaffolds, and of course, the strands themselves, all closed off within the nucleus of a cell. Heck, the DNA is curled up within chromatin right before and right after replication. It isn't even exposed to the internal environment of the nucleus itself for more than a split second.

The point is, there is no interaction between DNA replication and any other part of an organism, at any level. There is certainly no interaction with the CNS, which your hypothesis considers to be the seat of consciousness within the body. Another thing this analogy does not consider is that the expression of a mutation does not occur until a new organism develops. The base-substitutions or deletions themselves occur within germ cells, either sperm or ovum. In the case of an ovum, a given mutation might not be expressed until 30-40 years after the initial replication error. This is not akin to swinging a tennis racket.

You keep wanting to make the force detailed, but that is not what I, at least, have been saying. If you want to describe it as a detailed, computing, thinking, rational force, then that is your model, not mine. The progressive organizing force I envision is “whole,” it acts holistically, and it’s nature is to move things in the direction of organization (if you want to call that nature “purpose,” I am fine with that). I am making no other claims about it!

Forget the idea of "purpose." At this point, I just want some hint at how the expression of a given mutation can be pushed in any particular direction when the system within which the error occurs is a closed system and the error may not be expressed for several decades. Don't forget also that mutations due to replication errors are only a small part of how we get the variability necessary for evolution. Are crossing over, hybridization, aneuploidy, viral symbiosis, and mutation due to radiation also controlled by your evolutive force? It would need to control breeding habits, wind and water current patterns, viral infection vectors, and many other environmental and intraorganismic factors. It's really quite mind-boggling. I'm not asking for a complete detailed explanation of how this would be achieved; that would be virtually impossible. But when all you give is "holistically," heck, what does that even mean in this context? I understand what it means within the context of nervous/muscular actions (i.e. the analogies you have given), but that understanding does not extend to this particular context. As of right now, "holistic" is probably factually meaningless in this context.

Now, as far as an organism’s awareness affecting evolution, again you are bogged down in the minutia of bio-complexity.

Well, I understand your quandry here. You've proposed an entirely new force and there is no known mechanism by which it operates nor even any language associated with it. Your task is not easy. If you want an analogy from the world of biology, consider Gregor Mendel. When he proposed his model of heredity, he knew nothing whatsoever of meiosis or molecular genetics. In fact, he was very lucky to choose examples of discrete heredity that fit his model in his experiments. But to make this hypothesis meaningful in any way, you'll have to propose some testable means by which it operates. First, outline what needs to be explained. Then outline how your hypothesis explains it. Then outline what we would expect to find if your hypothesis is correct. This is not just minutia. This is what takes us beyond philosophy into science, and ultimately any theory of evolution must be scientific, whether or not it includes non-physical elements. I don't want caveats about the limitations of sense perception. We can't use our senses to detect an electron either, but we are still able to use it meaningfully in scientific models. As it is, we cannot detect the physical mechanism by which a mutation occurs. We just know that a certain base is selected; we don't know how, and yet we still build a model around this occurence.

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 12:30 AM

Oh come now. Yes, for the most part, they have figured it out. . . . once you have a living system, all you really need is random mutations, honed by natural selection. . . it is nothing mysterious and it is nothing non-physical.

You know, I do not need these on-going biology lectures. You aren't telling me anything I don't already understand. I can do without "Oh come now" too. Further, those statements you made above are pure physicalistic dogma; that you state them as "fact" let's me know it is a waste of time talking about them with you.

If you are going to posit the existence of a non-physical, directive force to evolution, you'll need to provide some good reason to believe that such a thing is necessary.

Grrrrrrrrrr . . . I told you I didn't want to debate it here. What I "posited" was meant to be a quickie "possibly it happens like this" in response to your request. If I'd known you were baiting me I wouldn't have said anything.

I am simply trying to be parsimonious here.An old philosophy professor of mine used an example of invisible goblins that help move the hands around a clock. He continued to point out that we couldn't prove they weren't there, but if we can explain the motion of the clock simply by detailing the way the different gears and circuits work, why postulate the existence of an additional force at work? Personal incredulity alone is not a sufficient reason. When evolution is so well explained using purely physical terminology, why insist that something more is at work there?

Jesus, do I really need to hear this? Tell it to some high schoolers please.

All I can do here is repeat that this is not a good analogy. Hitting a tennis ball is an action that requires the coordinated effort of many bodily systems, all interacting with the nervous system, which is clearly in control. DNA replication, on the other hand, is a closed system. The only extent to which a holistic force could be holistic would be to encompass all of the machinery used, which is limited to a couple of enzymes and protein scaffolds, and of course, the strands themselves, all closed off within the nucleus of a cell. Heck, the DNA is curled up within chromatin right before and right after replication. It isn't even exposed to the internal environment of the nucleus itself for more than a split second. . . . In the case of an ovum, a given mutation might not be expressed until 30-40 years after the initial replication error. This is not akin to swinging a tennis racket.

I don't know how it is any more possible to miss my point. :confused: Plus, it was YOU who asked me to explain what I meant by a progressive force, yet in every case you switch the conversation to mechanisms of biology. If you want to have that conversation, then have it with someone who is looking to talk about that.

I'm not asking for a complete detailed explanation of how this would be achieved; that would be virtually impossible. But when all you give is "holistically," heck, what does that even mean in this context? I understand what it means within the context of nervous/muscular actions (i.e. the analogies you have given), but that understanding does not extend to this particular context. As of right now, "holistic" is probably factually meaningless in this context.

This is not a biology forum, this is philosophy. We were talking what if's and you've used that opportunistically to nitpick, drown us in details, and otherwise interfer with having a philosophical discussion. I'm not interested in playing this game.

loseyourname

Jul30-04, 04:04 AM

balkan

Jul30-04, 06:12 AM

I'll say this one more time. I do not and have not participated in mind games. What I was trying to say earlier is that what seems absurd to you actually makes sense to others. It depends on background and perspective. I contend that you have come to the conclusions that you have because you do not understand the topic and it is quite obvious that you do not want to. Also, I don't "believe" in any view. I think about things a lot. If you could hear the internal debate in my mind you'd understand why I say I don't have a steadfast belief.

I skipped merrily around nothing. I hit it straight on. I asked you a very specific question (which you didn't answer) to directly respond to all your "Mary" comments. I asked you if you are claiming that babies do not have experiences. The reason you do not see this as a direct response is because perhaps you do not understand the point of these illustrations to begin with. Seeing the color red is but one example of qualia. It's too easy for you to pick apart an example like this and dazzle us with irrelevant physics knowledge. So I'm raising the real issue. You're claiming that babies do not have experiences. Right?
i understand perfectly, and don't patronize me. you didn't adress one single point, you just fired another mind game question back at me.
yes, babys have experiences. thay also have a brain. what does this has to do with anything?
and you don't get to decide what i believe or not... i do believe there might be something else, i even hope for it, but those mind games are ridiculous non the less... i'm not attacking "something else" at all, since that would be attacking my own beliefs, but i am adressing the profound lack of both objectivity, rationality and fact in the arguments... furthermore, i'd like to add, that if there was "something else" i doubt it would reside within the human brain... it would probably be somewhere else... that idea is so arrogant... why the hell should the human mind be anymore special than a dolphins (other than the size)...

the mary example is false and totally disregards everything we know about the brain.. it tries to twist words into something relevant...
the reason why we can't explain the experience of the color red to mary is, that the vision center in the brain is totally different from the hearing center, learning centers and verbal center... it is a distinct neural center, that needs to learn colors through vision, just like the ear has to learn sound through the ears and not the eyes... so it is a mind game, or a trick of words if you like.
i perfectly understand the point of it (that physics couldn't explain the color to her)... but unlike you, i am not amazed by this fact, since to learn the color red, she would need the right kind of impulses... the physics do, on the other hand, account for both why and how she can or cannot see the color red, and furthermore accounts for properties of the ligth itself... i must admit though, that it is a clever mind game, and if people didn't take it serious and thought it to be true, but instead used it as a way to test their own objectivity, i might even like it...

as for the john/zohn ridiculous (i know you're pissed at me for using that word, but that is my hones oppinion) thought experiment:
First of all: The statement that the case of two identical (atom by atom) beings existing while one has got qualia and the other hasn't, is claimed to be both logical and plausible by the author... yes of course it is, cause the author believes in the "something else" theory, so it's quite logic to him, but to someone who thinks consciousness is a neurological phenomenon, this makes absolutely no sense! This is a highly subjective argument that only has validity because the author is biased towards the "something else" theory.
Secondly: for the two characters to have identical atomic configurations, doesn't mean that their chemical and electromagnetic signals are the same, due to quantum mechanical probabilities... the changes of the energy states of their constructs are random and would of course differ... if we talk about them having grown up, they would be quite alot different even.
Thirdly: For them to have obtained exactly the same experiences, would require them to occupy the exact same space all their lives, in which case they would be one.
So it is a rediculous argument that only makes sense if you're biased towards "something else"... if you had been objective, you would have noticed the highly subjective initial argument.

selfAdjoint

Jul30-04, 09:47 AM

This is not a biology forum, this is philosophy. We were talking what if's and you've used that opportunistically to nitpick, drown us in details, and otherwise interfer with having a philosophical discussion. I'm not interested in playing this game.

What is obvious is that you have a non falsifiable, entirely defensive position with the property that whatever experiments you are shown, you can declare "Nah, that doesn't convince me!" To which the proper reply is, who the hell cares if you are convinced.

balkan

Jul30-04, 09:52 AM

"This is not a biology forum, this is philosophy. We were talking what if's and you've used that opportunistically to nitpick, drown us in details, and otherwise interfer with having a philosophical discussion. I'm not interested in playing this game."

philosophy has to take ground in science to be of any use... otherwise it's just a group of people discussing their very subjective oppinion and trying to convince eachother, that even though they have absolutely no evidence, their oppinion is the rigth one...

this is the metaphysics and epistemology forum, biology is only irrellevant if you consider the mind to be other than a neurologic phenomenon... well newsflash: alot of people consider the mind to be a neurologic phenomenon, so your oppinion about whether biology should be included or not, is quite irellevant.

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 12:28 PM

You seem to have your what-ifs down pretty well. I'm sorry if I wanted to dig a little deeper. For what it's worth, the author of the thread hasn't been in in a while and I doubt he cares. Also for what it's worth, I wasn't trying to discredit your hypothesis. It does genuinely intrigue me. Just remember that a philosophical model that attempts to explain biological entities is going to have to get a little biological at some point.

I am extremely happy that we are all having this type of discussion. Some of the exchanges in this thread have been among the best I've had at PF. I didn't think you were trying to discredit my hypothesis; my frustration was due to trying reason inductively, which I thought you asked me to do, and then feeling like you were insisting I make the inductive exercise follow deductive rules.

Nereid's quote "Earnest explication by two groups of people, frustration, talking past each other, puzzlement that the others 'just don't get it'" I think well characterizes the typical situation when people are looking at a subject both deductively and inductively. So a decision has to be made about what sort of reasoning has priority for any given discussion.

I realize at a science-oriented site that induction isn't going to be appropriate for most of the forums. Nothing can be "proven" through induction, it is purely a theoretical exercise every time. That’s why it is better suited to philosophy than science. However, something I have lobbied for in the PF philosophy area is to have evidence-based induction as the standard for philosophy. If you visit other sites devoted to pure philosophy, I think you would notice how little evidence is relied on in debates. The standard is rationalistic. I’ve been somewhat confronting to people who come here wanting to do rationalism. Even though it’s not my place to decide, I really hope those of us interested in philosophy fight to keep it out of here.

The rationalist variety of philosophizing never decides anything because they don’t take time to solidify their starting assumptions with evidence. A typical example might be someone starting off a discussion about God saying, “if God is all-powerful . . .” Now, God is a possibility which is supported by reports through the centuries, so it isn’t totally out in left field to tentatively assume, for the sake of discussing an issue related to that assumption, there is something real that’s been referred to as “God.” Also, if God exists and is responsible for creation, then God must be powerful, so again we have a reason for the assumption. But why is “all-powerful” assumed?

The question of all-powerful or not itself is rather insignificant, but it does illustrate my point, which is that the discussion would be stronger if we don’t assume something we can’t justify with some kind of evidence. If we build an inductive model from unsupported assumptions, then we cannot have the slightest bit of realistic confidence in conclusions we reach. What is the point of wasting time reasoning about something only to end up in as much doubt as we started with?

The strongest induction I’ve seen is that which uses evidence as “steps” leading toward some model that is consistent with observed facts. Reasoning analogously, if rocks were placed across a lake so someone can cross it, then the rocks can’t be so far apart that the person is unable to leap to the next rock (of course, someone might position a “rock” far off in the distance and use that as an azimuth while attempting to place the necessary steps in between).

The reason I am talking about this is to suggest to those predisposed to reduction that if we can develop this idea of evidence-based induction, then maybe more people at PF would feel comfortable participating in philosophical discussions (even proposals insinuating something nonphysical!!!!!! :biggrin:)

Locrian

Jul30-04, 12:45 PM

I read the entire first page carefully. The only attempt anyone made to define the meaning of "explain" as it used here was Sleeth when he said "if when you use the term "explain" you mean prove." In light of the history of physics, I feel this is an awful definition.

In my humble opinion this post couldn't have possibly produced any interesting dialogue without dealing with that word carefully first, and even if it happened later, it seems to me it was too late to recover.

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 12:46 PM

What is obvious is that you have a non falsifiable, entirely defensive position with the property that whatever experiments you are shown, you can declare "Nah, that doesn't convince me!" To which the proper reply is, who the hell cares if you are convinced.

Why don't we eliminate philosophizing altogether then? "Falsifiable" isn't even an appropriate standard for speculation, which I have clearly labeled my points you are now criticizing for lack of falsifiability! More strawman low blows.

True, it isn't important whether or not I personally am "convinced." I probably shouldn't use that phase. I use it to mean that given the logical stance I've assumed, some counterargument just presented doesn't really counter it. In this debate, a counterargument that has been made repeatedly is that the huge list of physical facts involved in biology is overwhelming evidence that life is nothing but physical. No matter how I try to address the flaw in that argument, some simply repeat the same exact argument again, and again and again . . . It would be more honest to come out and openly express one's embedded contempt for any "what ifs" that can't reduced to physical facts.

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 12:55 PM

philosophy has to take ground in science to be of any use... otherwise it's just a group of people discussing their very subjective oppinion and trying to convince eachother, that even though they have absolutely no evidence, their oppinion is the rigth one...

A lot of people far more educated in philosophy than either of us would strongly disagree with you about that. However, I would agree that philosophy should be grounded in evidence. Where I differ is that I think there are other sorts of evidence besides what science can provide.

this is the metaphysics and epistemology forum, biology is only irrellevant if you consider the mind to be other than a neurologic phenomenon... well newsflash: alot of people consider the mind to be a neurologic phenomenon, so your oppinion about whether biology should be included or not, is quite irellevant.

I never said biology was irrelevant. I never said biology shouldn't be included. I was saying that insisting philosophy be reductionist eliminates the entire purpose of philosophy. If you want to be purely reductionist, then why are you in the philosophy area?

nolachrymose

Jul30-04, 01:35 PM

I think this poll is missing a choice: "it cannot be."

The physical world is only real to you, as given by your senses. Reality is defined by a group of people whose senses give them similar experiences (thus the idea of "sane" and "insane"). Therefore, describing the physical world can only be applicable to a single reality.

Anyways, why would you want to be able to describe *everything*? Knowledge is not always beneficial -- mystery can be far greater.

Royce

Jul30-04, 01:51 PM

The reason I am talking about this is to suggest to those predisposed to reduction that if we can develop this idea of evidence-based induction, then maybe more people at PF would feel comfortable participating in philosophical discussions (even proposals insinuating something nonphysical!!!!!! :biggrin:)

Hey, Les, I've tried! But you guys keep ignoring me and my posts :frown:

One of the problems that I have seen with this whole doscussion is that LYN insists on arguing from a reductionist position and as you say use deduction where as you are argueing conceptionally and using induction. Never the twain shall meet, to steal and paraphrase the old adage. Again it is apples and oranges. Yeah, they are both fruit but not of the same vine.

One problem that I have with LYN's argument is that he seems to think that the theory of evolution is a done deal in that it is both complete and comprehensive; and, that it is completely explained by biochemists and genetist. Its not there is still much that cannot be completely explained by any one theory. The first example that comes to mind is that it mutation is random DNA events then how can we explain the increasing complexity of genomes. The human genome is billions of bits long and still contains date from the simplest organisms that are unused and as far as we can tell unnecessary. Yet they are still there. Also the fact that there are living organisms such as turtles and crocadiles that have remained unchanged for hundreds of millions of years. Of course this also counters our arrow toward increasing complexity.

Okay, Ive put in my 2 cents worth. You can go back to ignoring me again. :grumpy: :rofl:

loseyourname

Jul30-04, 02:12 PM

One of the problems that I have seen with this whole doscussion is that LYN insists on arguing from a reductionist position and as you say use deduction where as you are argueing conceptionally and using induction.

I don't know where you guys get the idea that I'm using deductive reasoning to establish anything. Science is an inductive discipline. We see that whatever we put in the lab or observe in nature behaves according to certain laws many times when observed under the same conditions, and we induce that these laws will always hold under these conditions.

One problem that I have with LYN's argument is that he seems to think that the theory of evolution is a done deal in that it is both complete and comprehensive; and, that it is completely explained by biochemists and genetist.

When did I ever say this? I've said many times there are still a great of deal of questions pertaining to tempo and taxonomic relationships. In fact, even the mechanisms are not completely impervious to questioning. We certainly know that the factors I've listed previously play into it, but there could very well be more. We needed to introduce endosymbiosis to explain the evolution of the eukaryotic cell. We may very well need to introduce some other mechanism to explain abiogenesis and the evolution of consciousness. I can't say for certain and neither can anyone else. What I can say is that the evolution of increased complexity, once a living cell is in place, is perfectly explained. Anyone that contends otherwise likely has not properly studied or understood the subject.

Its not there is still much that cannot be completely explained by any one theory. The first example that comes to mind is that it mutation is random DNA events then how can we explain the increasing complexity of genomes. The human genome is billions of bits long and still contains date from the simplest organisms that are unused and as far as we can tell unnecessary. Yet they are still there. Also the fact that there are living organisms such as turtles and crocadiles that have remained unchanged for hundreds of millions of years. Of course this also counters our arrow toward increasing complexity.

All right, now this is where it gets frustrating. I'm not going to sit here and insult you, but all of this is explained perfectly well. The fact that you are unaware of the explanations and it seems improbably to you is of little consequence. Both you and Sleeth have perfectly valid reasons for believing that "something more" exists and is needed to explain certain phenomena within the universe. These are not among them.

Read through some of the threads in the biology forum. Most of the questions you've raised have been addressed there in the past. As far as the turtles and crocodiles go, the reason they haven't changed much (it is fallacious to say that they haven't evolved at all - the species around today are not the same as the ones around millions of years ago) is that they fit their niche pretty well. It's the same reason we still have bacteria on this planet. That doesn't mean that there aren't other niches that aren't fit by bacteria and turtles and crocodiles that are there waiting to be filled. When a subpopulation of crocs moves into an environment where they aren't properly adapted, they evolve, and there are plenty of extant species that are not crocodiles that evolved from crocodiles. It's just that the parent population that remained in the environment it is adapted to has not had any need to evolve much and so has remained a crocodile. Evolution is not a simple, linear process. It is complex and relationships are not easy to track. It is a rich subject and if you have any honest desire to learn about it, head on down to your local library.

balkan

Jul30-04, 02:16 PM

I am extremely happy that we are all having this type of discussion. Some of the exchanges in this thread have been among the best I've had at PF. I didn't think you were trying to discredit my hypothesis; my frustration was due to trying reason inductively, which I thought you asked me to do, and then feeling like you were insisting I make the inductive exercise follow deductive rules.

Nereid's quote "Earnest explication by two groups of people, frustration, talking past each other, puzzlement that the others 'just don't get it'" I think well characterizes the typical situation when people are looking at a subject both deductively and inductively. So a decision has to be made about what sort of reasoning has priority for any given discussion.

I realize at a science-oriented site that induction isn't going to be appropriate for most of the forums. Nothing can be "proven" through induction, it is purely a theoretical exercise every time. That’s why it is better suited to philosophy than science. However, something I have lobbied for in the PF philosophy area is to have evidence-based induction as the standard for philosophy. If you visit other sites devoted to pure philosophy, I think you would notice how little evidence is relied on in debates. The standard is rationalistic. I’ve been somewhat confronting to people who come here wanting to do rationalism. Even though it’s not my place to decide, I really hope those of us interested in philosophy fight to keep it out of here.

The rationalist variety of philosophizing never decides anything because they don’t take time to solidify their starting assumptions with evidence. A typical example might be someone starting off a discussion about God saying, “if God is all-powerful . . .” Now, God is a possibility which is supported by reports through the centuries, so it isn’t totally out in left field to tentatively assume, for the sake of discussing an issue related to that assumption, there is something real that’s been referred to as “God.” Also, if God exists and is responsible for creation, then God must be powerful, so again we have a reason for the assumption. But why is “all-powerful” assumed?

The question of all-powerful or not itself is rather insignificant, but it does illustrate my point, which is that the discussion would be stronger if we don’t assume something we can’t justify with some kind of evidence. If we build an inductive model from unsupported assumptions, then we cannot have the slightest bit of realistic confidence in conclusions we reach. What is the point of wasting time reasoning about something only to end up in as much doubt as we started with?

The strongest induction I’ve seen is that which uses evidence as “steps” leading toward some model that is consistent with observed facts. Reasoning analogously, if rocks were placed across a lake so someone can cross it, then the rocks can’t be so far apart that the person is unable to leap to the next rock (of course, someone might position a “rock” far off in the distance and use that as an azimuth while attempting to place the necessary steps in between).

The reason I am talking about this is to suggest to those predisposed to reduction that if we can develop this idea of evidence-based induction, then maybe more people at PF would feel comfortable participating in philosophical discussions (even proposals insinuating something nonphysical!!!!!! :biggrin:)
i don't think i've ever agreed with you so much... ever :eek:
The sky is falling? :D
what i do believe though, for a philosophy to have any meaning what so ever, reduction has to be done... it is inevitable, otherwise it is just a mind game (which isn't bad at all in itself, but some philosophers tend to consider these mind and word games as "truth", something i highly oppose of)...

also, i am open to any suggestions about the other evidense, i really am, but what i have been presented yet is something that, when i look at it objectively, can be easily placed in the "subjective," "plain out wrong" or "narrowscoped logic" categorys...
with narrowscoped, i'm e.g. talking about the mary example, which, if the brain did function as a whole, would have been quite more substantial... except maybe from the fact, that you cannot explain impulses to other people, you can only describe their nature... no matter how well you describe an atom you can't see that either without an STM or AFM device...

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 02:32 PM

What is obvious is that you have a non falsifiable, entirely defensive position . . .

By the way, is abiogenesis falsifiable? :cool:

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 03:08 PM

I don't know where you guys get the idea that I'm using deductive reasoning to establish anything. Science is an inductive discipline. We see that whatever we put in the lab or observe in nature behaves according to certain laws many times when observed under the same conditions, and we induce that these laws will always hold under these conditions.

I don't think there are many who would agree with you that the practice of science is primarily inductive. The only aspect which is inductive is theorization and, as you say, when it's inferred that laws will hold under all similar conditions; but once it's time to get down to research, that is deductive. The "scientific method" is a deductive map, probably the finest bit of deduction ever formulated.

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 03:17 PM

Hey, Les, I've tried! But you guys keep ignoring me and my posts :frown:

Sorry, in the heat of the battle I missed your earlier post.

One of the problems that I have seen with this whole doscussion is that LYN insists on arguing from a reductionist position and as you say use deduction where as you are argueing conceptionally and using induction. Never the twain shall meet, to steal and paraphrase the old adage. Again it is apples and oranges. Yeah, they are both fruit but not of the same vine.

I hope you are wrong about the two never meeting. One thing I think philosophy desparately needs is "grounding."

loseyourname

Jul30-04, 03:23 PM

loseyourname

Jul30-04, 03:26 PM

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 03:57 PM

i don't think i've ever agreed with you so much... ever :eek:
The sky is falling? :D
what i do believe though, for a philosophy to have any meaning what so ever, reduction has to be done... it is inevitable, otherwise it is just a mind game (which isn't bad at all in itself, but some philosophers tend to consider these mind and word games as "truth", something i highly oppose of)...

Right, that is what I was referring to as "rationalistic," and I too see it, except for tautologies, as word (or concept) games. The great thing about science is the addition of experience to the truth-seeking formula. But reduction isn't the only source of knowledge. For example, someone might open the drapes in room where you are sleeping, and it wakes you up. That experience is quickly recognized for what it is . . . say, the brightening of the room. You don't need to do any research to know that. So I think one can "know" directly from experience.

. . . also, i am open to any suggestions about the other evidense, i really am . . .

Most people of the physicalist persuasion think there's been no experience of the "something more" we've been discussing. But that may not be true. There is a history of people who've reported that "something more" can be known experientially (and I am not talking religion); it has often been described as being immune to accurate conceptualization, but quite friendly to direct experience.

Now, if we assume people have experienced it, the next issue for a philosophical discussion becomes -- what does the experience tell us about the nature of reality? That's where all the trouble comes. Using the analogy above, one person might say the light filling the room when the drapes are opened is God flowing through the window, while another interprets it as EM. So the experience is one thing, and the interpretations of the experience are another.

In my opinion, one of the smartest guys ever to talk about something more was the Buddha because he refused to speculate about "what it meant." His advice was (more or less), "experience it and decide for yourself what it 'means'."

Les Sleeth

Jul30-04, 04:04 PM

Royce

Jul30-04, 05:51 PM

In both cases, it was induced from a holistic analysis that something (whether it be discrete heredity or evolution) was going on. It took a reductionist approach to prove that this was indeed the case and to explain how this was the case. This is really all I'm trying to do here. Sleeth has holistically evaluated the situation he sees and induced certain conclusions. I want him to now take a more reductionist approach and move beyond this to get to the all important "how" that can lead to genuine confirmation of his hypothesis.

It was not and is not my intention to criticize you, deductive reasoning nor reductionism or reductionist thinking. I was making an observation. I also apologize for both my spelling (I was in a hurry and didn't have spell check of that computer) and for going off half cocked about evolution. While I have been following this discussion with interest, I misunderstood the direction and purpose of your argument. Again my only defense is that I was in a hurry and didn't consider my post well enough.

Part of the problem as I see it is that what both Les, I and others have experienced and that leads us to what and how we think and believe, by its very nature, absolutely defies reductive analysis. It is not just holistic but conceptually holistic. What I, at least, experience is an entire complete concept that often takes months to realize, understand and integrate into our thinking. As soon as we (I) try to analyze it by taking it apart and examining it piece by piece we lose the concept. Only by holistic or Big Picture
thinking can we attempt to get a hold of it or better get our minds wrapped around it. This is one of the main reasons I am of the Platonic school rather than the Aristotelean school.

It is never a matter of how something happens but that it is, it happens and why. While I agree that we must find a common ground on which to discuss, argue and learn, I cannot see such a ground between holistic and reductionistic thinking, they're opposites and mutually exclusive in my mind. As far as inductive and deductive thinking is concerned I don't see any problem at all. Both are extremely valuable and useful tools so long as they are properly applied, a hammer for a nail and a screwdriver for a screw.
Both are needed and can both be used at the same time and are often most productive when used together. Maybe that can be the common ground for this discussion so long as we make it clear which mode we are using at the moment.

In any event, I also am enjoying this discussion and wish it to continue so long as I can reserve the right to interject my thoughts occasionally. :rolleyes: :tongue2:

Philocrat

Jul30-04, 10:34 PM

I wouldn't want you to steer clear of any meaningful question -- that's what philosophy is all about -- so good questions are never irritating. I was only suggesting you pose one such brain-breaker per thread. :wink:

This question would make an excellent thread subject, for example.

You have a point....but I am also thinking of how these questions can be adapted and answered (or attempted to be answered) under this thread. Admittedly, they decisively appear unrelated to the battles under this thread. Let me scratch my head and maybe something will turn up sooner or later.

Philocrat

Jul30-04, 10:56 PM

Reductionism can certainly be met by more holistic evaluations. I would argue the best example out there is evolution, in particular heredity. Take the example of Gregor Mendel that I used earlier. Using a holistic approach, he formulated a general theory of discrete heredity. When the reductionist approach of molecular genetics finally came around, we came upon a reason why Mendel's theory was correct. Similarly, the idea of evolution was nothing new when Darwin published. It was thought by many people, based on the obvious implications of the fossil record, that species had evolved. But it took Darwin and his reductionist theory of natural selection to explain how this could have happened.

Reductionism is already writtten into holistic or general principles. Subsequently, when consciousness has elevated itself to a superior height, the former would become an indistinguishable component of the latter. The only question is how consciousness could be rendered fully purposive and so elevated.

Philocrat

Jul30-04, 11:34 PM

Well, this seems decisively so, but then why was consciousness devised in the first place? Well, if we accept that some forms of life are more advanced than others, then consciousness ought to be a very usefull device for an advanced form of life. The three-dimensional character of consciousness makes it even more so. When people ask me about the purpose of conscousness I always answer:

We INQUIRE and ACQUIRE to AVOID!

That is, conscousness has three distinctivly useful aspects or modes: (1) the Inquaisitive mode, (2) The Acquisitive Mode and (3) the Precautionary Mode, and together they define the fundamental purpose of consciousness.

On the issue of random possibilities or designs umdermining or defeating the purpose of consciousness, I say that this view is irrelevant because the puropose of anything, including consciousness, could be either way, premeditated or unexpected. If we took the route of there being an intelligent designer, he or she may have thought of the purpose of the design before hand. Equally, if we took the route of random design, its purpose may have been realised afterwards. In this case, we perceive the usefulness of randomly derived entity from its function or outward behaviour.

However, this does not solve problem of the possibility of progress from any purposive inteligent or random design. That is, how do things progress from the purpose we know of them?

loseyourname

Jul31-04, 12:50 AM

Traits are selected for that provide the organism with an increased chance to reproduce. Length of survival is irrelevant as long as it reaches breeding age. Do you honestly not see how being conscious of a potential mate's preferences and tastes and being conscious of your own looks and behavior would be helpful here?

Did anybody actually read this the first time around?

Fliption

Jul31-04, 01:51 AM

i understand perfectly, and don't patronize me. you didn't adress one single point, you just fired another mind game question back at me.

This is just not true. And I'm going to do my damnest to try to show you.

yes, babys have experiences. thay also have a brain. what does this has
to do with anything?

It seems to have everything to do with it. You said the experience of redness was learned. So either you believe that all experiences are learned (which would mean that babies have no experiences) or you believe that some experiences are learned and some are not. In the second option, you would claim the experience of redness is learned but you have some other experience in mind that isn't learned. Now that you have said that babies have experiences above, it must be this second option that you believe. So which experience is it that babies can have without having to learn it?

and you don't get to decide what i believe or not... i

No, but I do get to decide what I believe about what you believe :biggrin:

furthermore, i'd like to add, that if there was "something else" i doubt it would reside within the human brain... it would probably be somewhere else... that idea is so arrogant... why the hell should the human mind be anymore special than a dolphins (other than the size)...

You're preaching to the choir. If I've said anything to insinuate I'm defending this position then I take it back now! I don't believe that "something more", if it exists, resides in humans any more than it does in dolphins or even rocks.

the mary example is false and totally disregards everything we know about the brain.. it tries to twist words into something relevant...
the reason why we can't explain the experience of the color red to mary is, that the vision center in the brain is totally different from the hearing center, learning centers and verbal center... it is a distinct neural center, that needs to learn colors through vision, just like the ear has to learn sound through the ears and not the eyes... so it is a mind game, or a trick of words if you like.

There's just something about your point that is not clicking with me. Let me try something. I suspect that you and I have a different perspective on the concept of qualia and that's what is driving this difference in interpretation.

It seems like you have an issue with the fact that Mary can't possibly have "redness" communicated to her because the brain has to learn to do vision. So what if we tweak this example a bit and say that Mary has not always been blind. She had sight for most of her life and understands the experience of color. She has only recently become blind. Now lets say that a brand new color is sweeping the fashion industry and everyone is talking about this new color. Some people are even painting their houses this color. Mary is very curious. So she reads(the way blind people read) all the scientific facts about this new color. Dispite learning every physical fact about this light frequency, she is still missing a piece of information about this color. The only way she can receive this information is to experience it. So this piece of information is clearly out of the hands of physics to provide.

Is this example any better against your objections? I'm not sure because I haven't quite grasped why you're struggling with this so much.

Again, I'm suspecting that the key is our understanding of qualia so I'll just emphasize that while the brain may have to learn to do the processes required for what we call vision, there is no process that has been identified as responsible for producing the "qualia" associated with the visual data. We don't know how this happens. So while the brain may Learn to see, we can't say it learns qualia. We have no idea where qualia fits into this picture. If you disagree with this then this is our problem.

First of all: The statement that the case of two identical (atom by atom) beings existing while one has got qualia and the other hasn't, is claimed to be both logical and plausible by the author... yes of course it is, cause the author believes in the "something else" theory, so it's quite logic to him, but to someone who thinks consciousness is a neurological phenomenon, this makes absolutely no sense! This is a highly subjective argument that only has validity because the author is biased towards the "something else" theory.
Secondly: for the two characters to have identical atomic configurations, doesn't mean that their chemical and electromagnetic signals are the same, due to quantum mechanical probabilities...

Grrrrr..... Sounds like you're speaking about the zombie illustration. And just like so many before you, you have gotten distracted with it's irrelevant points and taken it too literally. I just hate this illustration. It is probably the single biggest mistake Chalmers made in designing his argument. This is just my opinion from what I've observed in this forum and read in opposing works. Hypnagogue may come in and hit me with a stick :yuck: lol but this just seems like such a sloppy illustration. There are too many unnecessary pieces of information that people get hung up on. I'll see if I can help you understand the point as I understand it.

Do you believe that, in principle, a robot can be built so that it can sense the world as a human does? We know that robots do exist today. So it makes sense that, in principle, technology can improve to the point that we can replicate every known physical process in the eyes, ears, toungue, nose, and skin to allow the robot to sense it's suroundings just as we do. The robot can then be given a computer brain to process that incoming data and execute instructions. We can program this brain to process this information using every physical process that the human brain performs. It will even seem human as it goes about its day. If you do not think that this can be done in principal, then this illustration stops here and you will need to explain why this cannot be done, in principle. But if you think that this can be done, in principle, then there is one question to ask. Is this robot conscious?

It's eyes are basically cameras feeding pixel data to a computer which computes movement instructions. Is this robot experiencing vision? Is it processing color as XX wavelength or is it experiencing the qualia of color? If you say I don't know(which is what everyone I know would say) then why don't you know? IF it does every physical process that a human does and humans are conscious why can't you be sure? This means that none of the physical processes that you programmed into this robot necessarily entail consciousness. There is no consciousness subroutine that you can point to and say "yeah there's where I programmed it in". It is perfectly conceivable that a robot could do everything that you and I do and we would have no idea that it was even a robot. It could move, eat, behave just like a human. This can all be programmed in.(I often wonder why life is conscious at all. It doesn't seem that we need it.) This robot can be programmed to survive and thrive. Why should it be "aware" of anything? And how can you prove that anything or anyone is aware and experiencing qualia, anyway? What physical process will you point to to prove it? Your scientific machinery can monitor my eyes and see all the physical processes and prove that I am taking in visual data. But your machinery tells you nothing(and never willl) about what I'm actually experiencing. Why is this if it's just another physical process?

To say the answer lies in the future research of science is to say that one day we will be able to communicate to blind Mary the qualia of this new color simply by allowing her to read the scientific facts. This will never happen. Mary can learn everything there is to know about math from math books but she can learn nothing about qualia from qualia books. It is a feature of our universe that must be experienced to be understood.

Anyway, to me, this is the main point of the zombie illustration. It doesn't matter whether the two beings are identical. That's just a necessary assumption that has to be made so that someone can't claim that the slight difference between the two is what is causing the consciousness. The whole point is that I very well may not be conscious. I don't need to be conscious to do anything that you witness me doing. Therefore, all the physical processes that you can observe in me do not necessarily entail consciousness.

I'll also add that this view doesn't necessarily mean there is "something more". Many argue that consciousness, qualia etc is just a fundamental property of reality. It is not the emerging product of a physical process. It's just a fundamental element of nature much like matter and energy etc. Given the inability to reductively understand and communciate qualia, it's easy to see why many people favor this view.

So it is a rediculous argument that only makes sense if you're biased towards "something else"... if you had been objective, you would have noticed the highly subjective initial argument.

This just isn't true. At the very least you have to allow for the fact that maybe someone just doesn't understand it as well as they should. It doesn't always have to mean they are biased.

Fliption

Jul31-04, 02:05 AM

Did anybody actually read this the first time around?

This seems like a misuse of the word conscious. I don't see how "consciousness" as we speak of it here in the philosophy forum has any benefit to survival. If you can actually prove such a thing then you can prove that a being is conscious and eliminate the philosphical debate that's been going around on this for centuries.

To say that an animal has to be conscious to notice a particular aspect of its surroundings is somewhat like saying that a security camera is conscious of its surroundings because it turns a light on by detecting movement. So either this camera is actually conscious or animals don't need to have "awareness" to sense their surroundings and compute the appropriate response.

balkan

Jul31-04, 06:02 AM

1) It seems to have everything to do with it. You said the experience of redness was learned. So either you believe that all experiences are learned (which would mean that babies have no experiences) or you believe that some experiences are learned and some are not. So which experience is it that babies can have without having to learn it?

2) No, but I do get to decide what I believe about what you believe

3) It seems like you have an issue with the fact that Mary can't possibly have "redness" communicated to her because the brain has to learn to do vision.
Mary has not always been blind. She had sight for most of her life and understands the experience of color. Now lets say that everyone is talking about this new color. Mary reads all the scientific facts about this new color. Dispite learning every physical fact about this light frequency, she is still missing a piece of information about this color. The only way she can receive this information is to experience it. So this piece of information is clearly out of the hands of physics to provide.

4) Is this example any better against your objections? I'm not sure because I haven't quite grasped why you're struggling with this so much.

5) there is no process that has been identified as responsible for producing the "qualia" associated with the visual data. We don't know how this happens. So while the brain may Learn to see, we can't say it learns qualia. We have no idea where qualia fits into this picture. If you disagree with this then this is our problem.

6) Do you believe that, in principle, a robot can be built so that it can sense the world as a human does? So it makes sense that, in principle, technology can improve to the point that we can replicate every known physical process in the eyes, ears, toungue, nose, and skin to allow the robot to sense it's suroundings just as we do. The robot can then be given a computer brain to process that incoming data and execute instructions. We can program this brain to process this information using every physical process that the human brain performs. It will even seem human as it goes about its day. But if you think that this can be done, in principle, then there is one question to ask. Is this robot conscious?
It's eyes are basically cameras feeding pixel data to a computer which computes movement instructions. Is this robot experiencing vision? Is it processing color as XX wavelength or is it experiencing the qualia of color? If you say I don't know(which is what everyone I know would say) then why don't you know? IF it does every physical process that a human does and humans are conscious why can't you be sure?
This can all be programmed in.(I often wonder why life is conscious at all. It doesn't seem that we need it.) This robot can be programmed to survive and thrive. Why should it be "aware" of anything? And how can you prove that anything or anyone is aware and experiencing qualia, anyway? What physical process will you point to to prove it? Your scientific machinery can monitor my eyes and see all the physical processes and prove that I am taking in visual data.

7) To say the answer lies in the future research of science is to say that one day we will be able to communicate to blind Mary the qualia of this new color simply by allowing her to read the scientific facts. This will never happen.
It is a feature of our universe that must be experienced to be understood.

8) It doesn't matter whether the two beings are identical. The whole point is that I very well may not be conscious. I don't need to be conscious to do anything that you witness me doing. Therefore, all the physical processes that you can observe in me do not necessarily entail consciousness.
I'll also add that this view doesn't necessarily mean there is "something more". Many argue that consciousness, qualia etc is just a fundamental property of reality. It is not the emerging product of a physical process. It's just a fundamental element of nature much like matter and energy etc.
1) that's utter bull****... like i said, the baby has experiences... you can't grasp the meaning of the word "learn" in terms of the brain or what? (<- this is what happens when you patronize people) the baby is exposed to a great deal of input when being in the mothers womb... feeling pressure and pain doesn't have to be learned, genetically inflicted achetypes that we are afraid of (certain color patterns and shapes) doesn't have to be learned... your claim is almost offensive in it's attempt to twist something quite simple and straightforward into something that has to be either "this" or "that"...
babys are exposed to light aswell in the womb, not much but a little... it is exposed to touch and chemicals from the mother that induced different moods... so what the bleeding hell are you on about?

2) fair enough... now i believe you believe in "something else" and that something else has to do with consciousness... take it or leave it...

3) you cannot communicate it verbally or in writing! this isn't hard to understand... it's quite simple. no matter how hard you try, you cannot verbally induce an electromagnetic wave to strike the retina. noone is claiming they can. you and whoever thought of that example, claim we can...
i have learned alot of colours by being told their color compunds... like lavender, and i could probably pick something that was quite close to lavender out if i saw it, because i have learned the basic colors...
The piece of information isn't out of physical hands to explain, but it is out of the physical hands to communicate to someone else... just like you once again can't verbally communicate something to substitute an electromagnet wave striking the retina.
this doesn't mean that physics cannot describe the event itself in full details, but the event cannot be induced verbally into the brain due to the fact that it resides in a different neural center, and that to "feel" this event, it has to happen directly... is this hard to understand?
if you can't see, that this is a word game, then you are either daft, or simply unable to look at it objectively.

4) look above what happens when you patronize people...

5) what you call qualia, is what every phychologist would call "association". these "qualia" are attributed to colors, shapes and things through experience... the baby doesn't have a qualia associated with the color "lavender" untill it sees it... or do you object to this?
sometimes associations are attributed to things due to flaws in the neurological curcuit... chocks and traumas can often wrongfully induce association with fear or disgust or even pleasure to something that is has nothing to do with the traumatizing event... this is called phobias...
now, these "qualia" as you call them, can be found through hypnosis... a skilled hypnotist can draw out what association you have with a e.g. color and why you have it, and sometimes even when it happened.
association and recognition of characteristics is exactly what makes the human brain so effective...

6) if it had all the abilities of the brain (every single one! including chemical reactions that make us feel comfortable, frigthened or sexually aroused... which would be equal to it having a human brain) and was exactly as sensitive in physical regards, and it had gone through series of impressions similar to that of a human, then yes, it would be conscious... why wouldn't it? just because it's eye is a camera? note however, that the camera must be sensitive to touch and be in contact with the brain curcuit presicely like a human brain...
the fact that you make a program that "acts" like a human, doesn't make it human... that makes it a program... the robot would have to have access to the same chemical influences like us and similar... which would be impossible with a conventional computer... that analogy is proof of nothing else than the fact that computers cannot replicate a human brain... impressive :rolleyes:
"your machinery tells you nothing(and never willl) about what I'm actually experiencing. Why is this if it's just another physical process?"
if the above is not a totally subjective claim, then i don't know what is!
by monitoring your brain, scientists can tell you whether or not you experience fear, desire, sorrow or joy when seing something... that's how far brain research has come. they can even tell if you associate something with a direction... why do you claim they'll never be able to monitor what you are feeling? i thought you were objective.

7) total bull****! it cannot verbally or otherwise[/i] be communicated! [b]that doesn't mean it cannot be explained physically! i'd really like to see you back up your statement with other than word games.

8) what are you talking about? subconsciousness? that can be monitored aswell, and the list of things that are triggered in the subconsciouss grows bigger every week, as scientists discover new things.
the human brain was a tool for survival... just like wings on a bird... it wasn't neccessary... everything could just be bacteria and you would be happy or what?
it happened and it worked... for a large number of tribes of humanoids that lived at the same time as our tribe, it didn't work, but for our specific one it did... it was a succesfull survival tool... it made us more clever than the animals that we hunted and the predators that hunted us... that doesn't go on your positive list or what?
evolution doesn't care about necessity, it just randomly evolves the species, and maybe some of them survives...

and why wouldn't you be consciouss? what are you on about?

now, patronize me again, and my next reply will be just as inpleasant in tone... you choose how we speak to eachother...

Les Sleeth

Jul31-04, 09:54 AM

1) that's utter bull****... now, patronize me again, and my next reply will be just as inpleasant in tone... you choose how we speak to eachother...

Fliption isn't being patronizing. His is probably the most patient mind around here, and regularly sticks with rude and obtuse people long after the rest of us have given up on them.

He has humbly been trying to explain to you something which you clearly don't understand. Before going any further, let me add that I am not equating "agreeing" with "understanding" (i.e., I mean you don't have to agree with the concept of qualia before I acknowledge you understand).

How do I know you don't understand the concept? It would be like you trying to explain to someone that the rate of time is altered in a frame of reference when that frame accelerates. After explaining it to them they say, "oh, all that happens is the g-forces from acceleration inhibits the clocks' movement." In other words, the way he answers proves he doesn't understand relativity. Likewise, the way you answer about qualia proves you don't understand the significance of it.

Your complaint that the qualia argument is a nothing but a "word game" isn't quite fair. Actually it is a thought problem, and as you know scientists use them all the time. Einstein's twin paradox is one, as is Schrodinger's cat. If you'd tone down the outrage a bit and give this thought problem a fair look, you might see there is a genuine point in there.

However, I'll admit that personally I don't like the way the zombie argument is set up, and I don't like using qualia as the defining characteristic of consciousness. But let me defend it a little anyway by simplifying the argument.

Is it possible for someone without taste buds to act like they can taste? Or, can someone act loving without actually feeling love? If so, then taste and love involve something more than behavior -- there is an internal subjective aspect. The idea of using either a zombie or a robot in the thought experiment was to point out that consciousness isn't just functions or behaviors, but the heart of it is that experience of what a particular taste "is like" or what the experience of love "is like." You can get a robot to put food in its mouth, to chew, to go "ahhhhhhhh, so delicious," but the robot isn't really having subjective experience of taste, it is just imitating the external behaviors of taste.

My personal preference for describing what a robot/zombie is missing is to say they can detect taste or light or sound, but they don't "know" they are detecting anything. So like with Fliption's example of the security camera, it detects movement, but it is clueless that it does.

THAT subjective self-knowledge is what thinkers, physicalists and non-physicalists alike, are in a quandry to explain in the way of consciousness. Functionalist thinkers like Daniel Dennett wave off the problem saying he's confident "one day" we'll find a physicalistic answer, but no one in either camp believes we have it yet.

One quick comment on babies and experience. I think Fliption's point was that a baby is born with the potential to experience red is "like this." He doesn't need to learn how to have a subjective aspect of consciousness. Also, if you maintain that we don't need to experience a color to know the color, then you are disputing empiricism itself, which demands that researchers experience what they hypothesize to be true. If, as an empiricist, you were blind and hypothesized the new color Fliption talked about was a certain way, that is a theory, and will remain a theory to you until you can actually see the color. Even if your imagination can approximate the color, it still isn't the same information as sense experience.

Unless you want to agree with the rationalists that truth can be known by reason alone, then you have to admit that experience is a unique dimension of living awareness without which we cannot really know if what we imagine to be true is actually true.

Anyway, as of now physical processes can't account for the subjective aspect of consciousness, and that is why it, along with progressive organization, was on the list of what cannot currently be explained by physicalness.

balkan

Jul31-04, 10:22 AM

like i've said, les: it is you and also fliption, that subjectively attribute something special to these qualia when there's nothing special about it...
i am quite aware of the camera/robot analogy and i understand perfectly what you mean... but the fact that these extremely simple machines register inputs, but aren't aware of it only proves something in your mind... not in mine... to me, it proves that we are unable to create a sufficiently sophisticated "brain" yet.
alot of those "qualities" when you look at things and feelings you get comes from chemicals in your brain... this includes fear, lust and love...
about "self awareness" - even in a simple machine... what if that was just part of the "program"? it didn't need much other than a few questions: "why am i here?" "where am i?" "what am i?" and the brain to try and calculate the possibilities. i mean, isn't that all we really have to go on?
you aren't "aware" that you exist... you "think" you exist.

the fact that you attribute something more to association, is proof to me, that you don't know dick about how the human brain works, you just really like to think you do.

edit: oh, and the fact that you once again attribute so much to our selfawareness also shows that you don't know how extremely dependant human behaviour is on our past experiences and learned "programs" (although it is not exactly a comforting thought for metaphysicists)... the self awareness is also something that evolves in the human mind through learning and thinking... it's not "just there", like you seem to think. imo (and many others, as there are great indications that it is in this agerange that selfawareness becomes prominent) it's caused by our increasing searching for questions in our first 4-10 years.

Fliption

Jul31-04, 11:00 AM

1)
now, patronize me again, and my next reply will be just as inpleasant in tone... you choose how we speak to eachother...

Holy crap! What did I do? Seriously, I wasn't intending on patronizing you. I think you've got me in the wrong bucket. It was late and I was very tired when I finished that post last night and I left out a few things but I've re-read it and I don't remember attempting to be patronizing anywhere. The last post was only step one of my goal to tweak the examples a bit and measure your objections so that, hopefully, I can begin to understand what your overall point of view is. I suspect that we have a different understanding of what some key terms mean and I was probing to verify that. After your last post I think I am correct. My apologies if you thought I was being patronizing. I appreciate the detail of your response despite the fact that you felt patronized. So many people would just huff and puff and leave. But this detail is the only way I can begin to understand your view.

that's utter bull****... like i said, the baby has experiences... feeling pressure and pain doesn't have to be learned, so what the bleeding hell are you on about?

This is where I probably left out some explanation. Let me see if I can explain my logic on all this. Your main objection to the Mary illustration was that the experience of color had to be learned as opposed to just being an innate ability. I was merely trying to probe a bit to see if there were other types of experiences that you felt were innate and didn't need to be learned. If so, then this particular experience can be inserted into the Mary illustration and it still works and your objection no longer does. You said above that "pain" doesn't have to be learned. So how could you ever explain what pain is to someone who has never experienced it?

Anyway, that was what I was attempting to do but lets not dwell on this because I see now that this won't convince you of anything. I now understand your response will be because a non-verbal part of the brain has to process it. So I'll just move on and try to deal with those things there.

2) fair enough... now i believe you believe in "something else" and that something else has to do with consciousness... take it or leave it...

Actually I don't. This would make you wrong on two topics now :biggrin: (This was a joke, ok?)

3) you cannot communicate it verbally or in writing! this isn't hard to understand... it's quite simple. this doesn't mean that physics cannot describe the event itself in full details, but the event cannot be induced verbally into the brain due to the fact that it resides in a different neural center, and that to "feel" this event, it has to happen directly... is this hard to understand?

Actually, it does appear to be a word game. I don't think you realize just how close we are to being in complete agreement. One question: What is it about some things that allow us to communicate them verbally and other things we cannot? Why does a brain use two methods to gain knowledge? A blind person can read all about the color red and understand every scientific fact. Another person with sight can understand what it "feels like" to see red but may have never read any of the scientific facts. Both of these people have a piece of information that the other doesn't have. Only a person that does both has all the knowledge. So in your opinion, why does it require two different processing methods to obtain all knowledge?

5) what you call qualia, is what every phychologist would call "association". these "qualia" are attributed to colors, shapes and things through experience... the baby doesn't have a qualia associated with the color "lavender" untill it sees it... or do you object to this?

I agree with the last sentence but not the first one.

sometimes associations are attributed to things due to flaws in the neurological curcuit...

While I understand this piece, it doesn't seem relevant to me. I think it's because this is where our understanding of what qualia is is just different. Above I could agree that qualia is "associated" with the visual process of seeing a specific color. But the way association is being used here is more of what I think happens "after" qualia. I can associate all sorts of unrelated things to my qualia resulting in phobias. What else would I be associating these things to? Qualia is the only thing I can directly relate to and associate anything with. So in this sense, qualia is not the association. It is was I associate the unrelated events to. I think there's more clarification and work to do here on this word.

6) if it had all the abilities of the brain (every single one! including chemical reactions that make us feel comfortable, frigthened or sexually aroused... which would be equal to it having a human brain) and was exactly as sensitive in physical regards, and it had gone through series of impressions similar to that of a human, then yes, it would be conscious... why wouldn't it?

This very well may be but how will you be certain? How do you know that I am conscious? What brain process are you directing your proof to? Chemicals may arouse certain nerve endings but which chemical gives me the subjective qualia associated with that? Why does it "feel like" something just because a certain chemical has been produced?

the fact that you make a program that "acts" like a human, doesn't make it human... that makes it a program... the robot would have to have access to the same chemical influences like us and similar... which would be impossible with a conventional computer... that analogy is proof of nothing else than the fact that computers cannot replicate a human brain... impressive :rolleyes:

LOL. Hypnagogue is probably laughing at me now. And casually tapping his stick against his hand preparing for its use on me. Balkan do you not see that this objection above is the very same one that I claimed is the reason Chalmers was forced to use the zombie illustration with beings who are identical in every single way? If you go back and look, I said the main reason he did this was because someone would claim that it is the difference between the two beings that is causing the consciouness. That is exactly what you just did above. So I've learned my lesson.

Don't you see that the reason you can make this claim is because you are assuming the brain is what produces consciousness? There is no brain process that has been identified as the one that produces the "feeling of being". This just isn't known. So the point of the exercise above was to show that if you gave a robot every single physical process and then you still aren't sure, then consciousness is not necessarily entailed by those processes.

"your machinery tells you nothing(and never willl) about what I'm actually experiencing. Why is this if it's just another physical process?"
if the above is not a totally subjective claim, then i don't know what is!
by monitoring your brain, scientists can tell you whether or not you experience fear, desire, sorrow or joy when seing something... that's how far brain research has come. they can even tell if you associate something with a direction... why do you claim they'll never be able to monitor what you are feeling? i thought you were objective.

You haven't said anything above that contradicts what I said. I agree that science can monitor the physical processes of my eyes and brain. So yes, it will be able to see that some activity is taking place. But it will NEVER know what the contents of my subjective world are. My qualia. It will never be able to know just what it feels like when I'm stuck with a needle or what I'm tasting when I taste brussel sprouts. It cannot even be sure that I have a subjective world to begin with. Brussel sprouts may taste to me like Pizza taste to you. Slapping me in the face may feel to me like a back rub does to you. Science can never ever know what the contents of my qualia are. If this is nothing but a physical process then why is this so? Why is this information off limits?

7) total bull****! it cannot verbally or otherwise[/i] be communicated! [b]that doesn't mean it cannot be explained physically! i'd really like to see you back up your statement with other than word games.

For clarification, when I say something is "explained" that means that knowledge has been communicated. So what doesn't equate for me is how something can be "physically explained", yet it cannot be communicated the same way. This isn't really relelvant to this discussion but I think we just use these words a bit differently. In the end I suspect there would be agreement on much of this.

8) what are you talking about? subconsciousness? that can be monitored aswell, and the list of things that are triggered in the subconsciouss grows bigger every week, as scientists discover new things.
the human brain was a tool for survival...
and why wouldn't you be consciouss? what are you on about?

I'm really wondering if we even mean the same thing when we say consciousness. Throughout this whole post you speak of consciousness as if it's a well known documented concept in science; And even the professed physicalists here don't do this. Everyone concedes that consciousness is a knowledge gap. I'll just throw that semantic issue out as a possible reason for our difficulties.

So I'm not talking about the brain, bird wings or anything else like that. I understand evolution pretty well. What I'm talking about is consciousness. I can't think of one reason why anything needs to be conscious. If you can, then go ahead and take a stab at presenting one.

Les Sleeth

Jul31-04, 11:15 AM

the fact that these extremely simple machines register inputs, but aren't aware of it only proves something in your mind... not in mine... to me, it proves that we are unable to create a sufficiently sophisticated "brain" yet.

LOL. Isn't that what we've been saying . . . it can't be explained with physical processes? Hey, I didn't say it "proved" anything positive, stop putting words in my mouth please. The closest I've come to a positive statement about what is, is to say the failure to explain progressive organization or the subjective aspect of consciousness leaves the door open for "something more."

about "self awareness" - even in a simple machine... what if that was just part of the "program"? it didn't need much other than a few questions: "why am i here?" "where am i?" "what am i?" and the brain to try and calculate the possibilities. i mean, isn't that all we really have to go on

Right, "what if." That's all you or anyone has, so the question is still open isn't it. But you act like you "know" that is all it is, while I say it may be that or it may be something more. Now who is most open to having the truth be whatever why it turns out to be?

And if subjectivity is the result of complex programming, then we should be able to recreate that don't you think? So, I will wait for that event before making up my mind programming can create consciousness.

you aren't "aware" that you exist... you "think" you exist.

Do you believe because you can't stop your mind from thinking none of us can? According to your theory, if I stop thinking then I will lose awareness that I exist. But just an hour ago I sat with my mind perfectly still, absent of a single thought, and I was very aware of my existence. How do you explain that?

the fact that you attribute something more to association, is proof to me, that you don't know dick about how the human brain works, you just really like to think you do.

Why, that's brilliant!!! What a piece of logic that is. You conclude my openness to something more means I don't understand "dick" about how the brain works? I am up on my brain studies, if only you had one I could converse with we might have an intelligent exchange of ideas. Your vocabulary certainly suggests the class of education you've acquired, and your logic suggests you forgot to take your medication this morning.

edit: oh, and the fact that you once again attribute so much to our selfawareness also shows that you don't know how extremely dependant human behaviour is on our past experiences and learned "programs" (although it is not exactly a comforting thought for metaphysicists)...

The way you draw conclusions is giving me nightmares. :bugeye: By the way, being "physicalist" is a metaphysical position, so you are a metaphysicist yourself. Are you in discomfort?

Fliption

Jul31-04, 11:18 AM

After posting that last post I've since read the post from Les and Balkans response. I'm saying this to save some space and time but Les' post summed this up pretty well. He said it better than I could. His even references the physicalists like Dennett who all recognize that this area requires attention.

So if the post from Les did nothing but solicit the response above from you Balkan, then don't bother responding to mine because I can't do any better than that. It'll save us some time and frustration.

balkan

Jul31-04, 11:37 AM

Originally Posted by balkan
the fact that these extremely simple machines register inputs, but aren't aware of it only proves something in your mind... not in mine... to me, it proves that we are unable to create a sufficiently sophisticated "brain" yet.

response: "LOL. Isn't that what we've been saying . . . it can't be explained with physical processes? "

i like your logic aswell.. just how the hell did you derive that from the above sentence? you must be a magician.

i've stated it time and time again... i'm not attacking your beliefs. i'm attacking the ridiculous "evidence" that you present...
and of course it's only bad when i generalize or put words in someones mouth... not when you do it... no...

i've said it before, les: i'm quite fond that you haven't definitively decided (although you've mentioned several times that you do have some beliefs, and even a theory, but who's counting?)... that's fine, but your socalled evidence still reaks of ignorance, subjectivity and flaws...

as for fliption:
why can't we "make" a brain some day? because you say so?

why can't we measure everything that's going on in peoples minds some day? because you say so?

and furthermore: if "something else" deals with consciousness and selfawareness, then why doesn't it activate untill a certain age? and why isn't the human brain just a sensing device like your computer in the analogy is? why is it more than that, when your "something else" could be taking care of all the rest? why is it so big? and why can alot of our emotions directly be monitored to stem from different neural centers and chemicals? is "something else" selective, and needs alot of physical space to exist?

Fliption

Jul31-04, 12:12 PM

as for fliption:
why can't we "make" a brain some day? because you say so?

I think it's pretty clear that I believe a computer/robot can, in principle, be given every single process that the brain has. My only claim is that once we do this, we will not know if it is conscious. If you claim that it has to be consicous then you are assuming that the physical process of brains produce consciousness and I have pointed out to you that no one can point to that process. Even physicalists admit this is not known. Only you seem to know this with such certainty. Which brings us to the next question.

why can't we measure everything that's going on in peoples minds some day? because you say so?

So it's conceivable to you that one day science will be able to know exactly what it is that I am tasting when I eat pizza? Since what pizza taste like is one of those things that cannot be verbally communicated, as you say, and can only be "felt", I'm not sure how this can ever happen. How exactly does the scientist taste what I taste? Can you explain?

and furthermore: if "something else" deals with consciousness and selfawareness, then why doesn't it activate untill a certain age?

You aren't hearing me when I say that you cannot possibly know when consciousness begins. You cannot know whether I am even conscious at this moment. Besides, I thought you said that babies experienced pain without learning it and this is a conscious action so how is it that they aren't conscious until a later age?

and why isn't the human brain just a sensing device like your computer in the analogy is? why is it more than that, when your "something else" could be taking care of all the rest? why is it so big? and why can alot of our emotions directly be monitored to stem from different neural centers and chemicals? is "something else" selective, and needs alot of physical space to exist?

"Why is the brain so big?" I'm not sure I understand these questions. They seem to be a bit subjective and relative. When is a brain considered to be "big"?

loseyourname

Aug1-04, 03:35 AM

This seems like a misuse of the word conscious. I don't see how "consciousness" as we speak of it here in the philosophy forum has any benefit to survival. If you can actually prove such a thing then you can prove that a being is conscious and eliminate the philosphical debate that's been going around on this for centuries.

To say that an animal has to be conscious to notice a particular aspect of its surroundings is somewhat like saying that a security camera is conscious of its surroundings because it turns a light on by detecting movement. So either this camera is actually conscious or animals don't need to have "awareness" to sense their surroundings and compute the appropriate response.

Name me a camera that can comprehend a potential suitor's personal tastes and tailor its personality to this suitor. I have no doubt that I am conscious. I also have no doubt that by being conscious of the way my behavior and personality affects another human being emotionally, I increase my chances of mating with this other human being. Quite often I am preoccupied with other things and become temporarily unaware of actions of mine that are detrimental to a human relationship. When this happens, the sex life often suffers.

I would imagine consciousness is helpful in making creative leaps of abstract thought as well. As proficiently as computers can solve math problems, have you ever heard of one developing a new theorem? You can't honestly tell me that you experience no advantage in performance (of any kind) when you are more fully aware of yourself and your surroundings.

I'm guessing you'll probably come back and say that it might very well be possible to design a computer program that could do anything just as proficiently as a human without the need for consciousness. Well, that is beside the point. I'm sure there is more than one way to solve a great deal of the problems that evolution has solved. That doesn't take away from the fact that being conscious helps us.

balkan

Aug1-04, 05:58 AM

1) I think it's pretty clear that I believe a computer/robot can, in principle, be given every single process that the brain has. My only claim is that once we do this, we will not know if it is conscious. If you claim that it has to be consicous then you are assuming that the physical process of brains produce consciousness and I have pointed out to you that no one can point to that process. Even physicalists admit this is not known. Only you seem to know this with such certainty. Which brings us to the next question.

2) So it's conceivable to you that one day science will be able to know exactly what it is that I am tasting when I eat pizza? Since what pizza taste like is one of those things that cannot be verbally communicated, as you say, and can only be "felt", I'm not sure how this can ever happen. How exactly does the scientist taste what I taste? Can you explain?

3) You aren't hearing me when I say that you cannot possibly know when consciousness begins. You cannot know whether I am even conscious at this moment. Besides, I thought you said that babies experienced pain without learning it and this is a conscious action so how is it that they aren't conscious until a later age?

1) i've said many times i'm not certain... there might be something else, but there's just no indication of it whatsoever... i'm attacking the arguments against physicalism in order to get the objectivity and not subjectivity in first priority, i'm not defending it...

2) no, the experience cannot be induced into other people by communication alone. only experience.
you are trying to stack "explain" and "communicate" into one barrel. By monitoring your brain while you were eating, scientists could probably some day see what physical processes were activated. Then they could, by activating the same physical impulses in another humans brain, induce the impression of eating a pizza, even though the person isn't eating it.
that would be a way of "communicating" the experience. verbally doing it is impossible, but that doesn't mean we can't explain the process and everything that creates the impression.

3) being capable of responding to input isn't the same as being "aware". babys are only consciouss of their imidiate desires, and this is all they have in their minds. pain = unpleasent. hunger = unpleasent. and in this case, "unpleasent" is followed by an instinctive response, since they do not yet have the capability of rationally responding to it.
the selfawareness doesn't come into play untill later, when they begin to need it.
are you saying that a cockroach is self aware? no. it is a "machine" that responds to impressions primarily by instinctive reactions and very few random reactions that are caused by quantum probability.

you can go on an on about how "if you were to build a machine that was only a sensory device, would it be consciouss?"...
no. it would be a sensory device. but the above analogy only proves something in your mind, because you are biased towards the mind not consisting of physical processes. in my mind it's just an argument that the brain is something more than a sensory device, which in no way indicates that it shouldn't be physical...
now, the fact that this makes sense to me, is that i'm biased towards a physical explanation. i'm thinking:
"the brain is more than a sensory device, it might be due to "something else" but there's absolutely no indication of it in the evidence, so i'll stick to physics for now"
but at least i'm no hipocrite, cause i admit to it. you call yourself "objective" even though your arguments only makes perfect sense if you are of the same conviction as you are.

i'll gladly say it again for the 100th time: i'm not attacking "something else" in any way. i'm attacking the people that call themself "objective" while stating one subjective argument after another, and i'm attacking the "arguments".

Fliption

Aug1-04, 11:07 AM

Name me a camera that can comprehend a potential suitor's personal tastes and tailor its personality to this suitor.

I would imagine consciousness is helpful in making creative leaps of abstract thought as well.

Are you suggesting that consciousness allows you to gather information that your 5 senses cannot gather on their own? I still say that the way you are using consciousness you simply mean to be aware. A video camera is aware of the type of input it is designed to receive. The only reason it can't "comprehend a protential suitors taste" is because it has no brain to do such a thing. I see no reason, in pinciple, why all of the functions you speak of cannot happen in the dark. I suspect you are opening up a philosophical can of worms here.

Fliption

Aug1-04, 11:43 AM

2) By monitoring your brain while you were eating, scientists could probably some day see what physical processes were activated. Then they could, by activating the same physical impulses in another humans brain, induce the impression of eating a pizza, even though the person isn't eating it.
that would be a way of "communicating" the experience.

But this gets you no where. This only launchs the physical processes of the "other" persons brain and makes them taste pizza the way they would normally taste it. This tells us nothing about what it feels like for the first person's brain to run through these physical processes.

We have no direct casual connection between the physical process and the resulting qualia. My blue may be your green. I don't see how we can ever resolve that fact. And no physicalist ever argues that we can.

3) being capable of responding to input isn't the same as being "aware". babys are only consciouss of their imidiate desires, and this is all they have in their minds.

are you saying that a cockroach is self aware? no. it is a "machine" that responds to impressions primarily by instinctive reactions and very few random reactions that are caused by quantum probability.

Who said anything about self awareness? This is not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about qualia. We have agreed that babies have qualia. I can agree that self awareness may come later but that is not the phenomenon I'm talking about.

no. it would be a sensory device. but the above analogy only proves something in your mind, because you are biased towards the mind not consisting of physical processes. in my mind it's just an argument that the brain is something more than a sensory device, which in no way indicates that it shouldn't be physical...
now, the fact that this makes sense to me, is that i'm biased towards a physical explanation. i'm thinking:
"the brain is more than a sensory device, it might be due to "something else" but there's absolutely no indication of it in the evidence, so i'll stick to physics for now"
but at least i'm no hipocrite, cause i admit to it. you call yourself "objective" even though your arguments only makes perfect sense if you are of the same conviction as you are.

I think you need to learn the definition of 'objective'. Objective simply means to lack emotion and to make decisions based on objective facts. The first thing you have to realize is that I haven't stated that I believe in "something more". So what is it that I'm being subjective about? The only thing I have tried to do is to make you appreciate the topic a bit more than your very first response on this topic indicated. That response insults hundreds of prefessional, credible people who have particpated in this discussion for many years, on BOTH sides of the issue. You've been told on several occasions that you do not understand the terminology being used. I have pointed out several semantic issues(self awareness from a qualia discussion?). This alone could be the reason the things people say appear to be subjective and make no sense to you. But it seems you would rather just wing it based on 1 day's study and just assume everyone else is a hypocrite. If I ever saw you move a little and begin to see the issue, you might be surprised what I might actually argue in the end :surprise: .

So you admit that you are biased to the physical when I know there are very good arguments to the contrary. You may actually be correct in the end. Or you may not be. I am open to both possibilities.

Fliption

Aug1-04, 12:26 PM

Here is a link to an article in Scientific American. It's a good summary of the topic and it doesn't get too technical. This article is written by David Chalmers but he references and includes an article from neurobiologists. Both parties even speak about a derivation of the "Mary" illustration. I think you'll find that one interesting and you may even enjoy the responses.

This isn't meant to convince anyone of any particular view, as there are many views on this. But it should show that a gap has been acknowledged, the topic is credible and alive & well and that a respectful dialogue among the various views is taking place.

http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/puzzle.pdf

balkan

Aug1-04, 01:27 PM

But this gets you no where. This only launchs the physical processes of the "other" persons brain and makes them taste pizza the way they would normally taste it. This tells us nothing about what it feels like for the first person's brain to run through these physical processes.

We have no direct casual connection between the physical process and the resulting qualia. My blue may be your green. I don't see how we can ever resolve that fact. And no physicalist ever argues that we can.

Who said anything about self awareness? This is not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about qualia. We have agreed that babies have qualia. I can agree that self awareness may come later but that is not the phenomenon I'm talking about.

now we're getting somewhere...
if every process going on at the time of eating was copied, the other guy would feel the same when eating the pizza, rigth? that means, that the experience is either:
1) totally physical, which would make it explainable and calculable.
2) physical, but "something else" is what's "feeling" the impression...

in case of 2, this "something else" would either be:
1) capable of being directly influenced by physical processes, and directly influence the physical processes back (otherwise, why can we measure the feeling of fear, love, pleasure, anger in the brain?). If this is true, then it would have to be something you could measure and explain.
2) totally disconnected from the physical world. it only experiences and cannot influence the physical world, which would make it unmeasurable. Unfortunately, this would make it totally unneccessary for the human system, which would go through those reactions on its own anyway.

so it's either 1) something that can be physically measured and influenced or 2) something that cannot do anything at all, which would rule out the ability to will even simple things such as movement.
what's it gonna be?

and exactly what qualia does a baby have?

Fliption

Aug1-04, 02:50 PM

now we're getting somewhere...
if every process going on at the time of eating was copied, the other guy would feel the same when eating the pizza, rigth?

Not necessarily. This is correct only if you assume consicousness is physical to begin with, which sort of defeats the purpose of even discussing this. We cannot know whether the other person will experience the same qualia. As I said above, you cannot ever know what "it feels like" to have the physical processes running through the first persons brain. You only experience what it feels like when those processes run through your brain.

1) (otherwise, why can we measure the feeling of fear, love, pleasure, anger in the brain?).

We cannot do this. We cannot measure the qualia associated with these things. We can only measure the chemical processes that we associate with that qualia. These are key distinctions to understanding the issue with consciousness.

and exactly what qualia does a baby have?

You said earlier that babies do have experiences. Pain was mentioned as one. In my mind, an experience without qualia is not possible by definition. Qualia is the way we experience.

loseyourname

Aug1-04, 03:23 PM

Are you suggesting that consciousness allows you to gather information that your 5 senses cannot gather on their own? I still say that the way you are using consciousness you simply mean to be aware. A video camera is aware of the type of input it is designed to receive. The only reason it can't "comprehend a protential suitors taste" is because it has no brain to do such a thing. I see no reason, in pinciple, why all of the functions you speak of cannot happen in the dark. I suspect you are opening up a philosophical can of worms here.

All right. You're missing the point here. I see no reason, in principle, why you can't design a zombie with an extremely advanced computer for a brain that could perform every function a human performs. So what? I'm sure we could also, in principle, design an organism that is identical to a human in every respect except that it uses echolocation instead of sight. This doesn't take away from the survival value of human sight.

Think about what we use our own consciousness to do, for the most part. It gives us a mechanism by which we can scan and focus on certain thoughts, emotions, memories, sensory inputs, and utilize them as they are needed. Now in principle, all of these functions could be performed just as well, perhaps better, without us being conscious of it. That doesn't matter. This is the mechanism we were given, and it does work. You cannot second-guess evolution.

Fliption

Aug1-04, 06:53 PM

Now in principle, all of these functions could be performed just as well, perhaps better, without us being conscious of it.

Thank you.

I think I should point out that I realize some definitions of consciousness may include some useful functions. This complex definition is why Chalmers felt it useful to split things into easy and hard problems. So to be clear, the feature I'm referring to is illustrated by claiming it is the dfference between a conscious human and a non-conscious robot that is programmed to do the exact same physical processes. That difference is that the human "knows" he is doing it. The robot is performing every function just as the human does but "knows" nothing. Why is "knowing" of any value? So when you keep saying that this is the way that evolution chose to do it, you're assuming that it is doing something useful.

You may claim that this knowing process is what influences some behavior therefore it influences some of the physical processes themselves but I can see this same "reasoning" process going on in the robot. The only difference is that it doesn't know it's doing it.

Philocrat

Aug1-04, 10:53 PM

Functionalist Account of Consciousness

1) http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Functionalism%2(philosophy%20of%20mind) (The Dictionary Introduction to Functionalism and the immediately related issues…..probably the best point or place to start.)

2) http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_functionalism_introduction.htm (A brief Introduction and the Main Thesis on).

3) http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/function.htm (The Main definition and the consequence of it ……..that is, what functionalism means and what it is attempting to achieve and the developmental consequence of it. One of such consequences is that, functionalism renders consciousness independent of its means of production. It is not only the human brains alone that may be capable of producing consciousness, computers and other intelligent devices are now believed to be potential candidates. And if you took upon route of the improving the functionality of the productive mechanism, you may end up with multiple levels of consciousness that get more and more sophisticate or smarter and smarter. But is such improvement possible even at the physical underlying level?)

4) http://www.arrod.co.uk/essays/functionalism.php (A more detailed assessment of Functionalism, looking more closely at the relation between Input, function and output as a gap-bridging for the problematic behaviourist thesis)

5) http://ww2.coastal.edu/rsmith/Phil309/309-10%20Functionalism%20I.doc (A schematic account aided by illustrative diagram, and followed by several classifications and counter-arguments.)

6) http://www.def-logic.com/articles/silby014.html (The problem with Qualia - a schematic assessment of the problems faced by the functionalist / Physiclist theory of consciousness with regards to qualia. A closer look at the arguments for and against Functionalism and Phsyicalism.)

The Identity Theory Account of Consciousness

(1) http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_identity_what.htm (Introduction and the main thesis)

(2) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy gives a more formal and detailed definitions and classification of the key arguments and counter-arguments for and against Identity Theorist account of consciousness.)

(3) http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/guttnpln.htm (A formal approach and classification of the main arguments and counter-arguments).

(4) http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_identity_dualism.htm (Identity Theory and Dualism……Identity theory taken not only as simpler and less-complicated than dualism but, by all means, also as a solution to dualism)

(5) http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/pom/pom_identity_technology.htm (Modern Technology and Identity Theory…….many years of researches in neuroscience and cognitive science has lead to clear identification many areas of the brains being linked to different brain states and different types of the human behaviour.)

Representationalist Account of Consciousness

1) http://www.imprint.co.uk/online/Qualia_globus5.html (Argument for and Against the claim that both the functional brain states and qualia are representational).

2) http://www.hbcse.tifr.res.in/Data/Objects/jram_cogdev_1/node24.html (The classification of mental states and the distinction between ‘Propositional Attitudes and ‘Qualia’)

3) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality (Detailed definition and classification by Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy…..putting all the arguments and counter-arguments in proper contexts.)

4) http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v4/psyche-4-03-carruthers.html (Detailed assessment and Classification of Representationalist accounts of consciousness)

5) http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/what_phen_conc_is_like.pdf (Distinction between Intentionalism and Phnenomenism and some arguments for and against representationalism.)

The Dualist Account of Consciousness

1) http://www.str.org/free/studies/natural.htm (Argument for and against the existence of the immaterial substance or non-physical aspect of consciousness. The document also looks at the materialists’ denials of the existence of the ‘universals’, and the fight to restore the Christian belief and acceptance of ‘immaterialism’)

2) http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf (Biological Naturalism - John Seale thinks that his notion of this term is confused with Property Daulism. In this paper, he not only makes a clear distinction between the two, but also he distances himself from property dualism.)

3) http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195106466/ref=pd_sim_books_1/002-7415338-6970457?v=glance&s=books (The claim that certain aspect of the human consciousness extend beyond explainable physical realms is not limited to philosophical refutation alone. In fact, eminent mathematicians and physicists also provide a more sophisticated refutation using a combination of mathematical logic and scientific arguments. Roger Penrose is one such candidate. In his book ‘The Emperor’s New Mind’, he launched a relentless attack on the claim that AI can replicate consciousness in purely functionalist terms thereby undermining the dualist account of consciousness. This links provides readers’ reviews of the book and gives an introductory but clear insight into the content of the book. WARNING: the opening top page of this links contains invitation to buy the book. Don’t blame me if you do. The readers’ reviews are on the bottom part of the page – just scroll down the page.)

Online Papers and Interviews On Consciousness

1) http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/online2.html (A comprehensive compilation of Online Papers on Consciousness by David Palmer……a one-man crusade to keep philosophy alive!)

2) http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs.html (A list of online papers on consciousness in the Journal of Consciousness Studies)

3) http://www.stanford.edu/group/dualist/vol4/pdfs/searle.pdf (Interviews of some philosophers and their opinionated responses to major questions about consciousness….a dualist perspective)

4) http://www.stanford.edu/group/dualist/vol9/pdfs/tamir.pdf (The problem of Freewill and Consciousness is looked at in this paper)

5) http://www.arrod.co.uk/essays/biological-naturalism.php (Biological Naturalisation of Consciousness distinguished from the computationalist account such as functionalism above.)

The Multi-dsiciplinary Projects on Consciousness?

1) http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/Holland_Introduction.pdf (Will machines possess or have consciousness? This link reports a multi-disciplinary conference that lead to a unanimous answering of yes to this question)

2) http://noosphere.princeton.edu (Global Consciousness – a project investigating the ‘Extended nature of Consciousness’, that is, the claim that we may have direct communication links with each other, and that our intentions can have effects in the world despite physical barriers and separations. This project tends to suggest that there may be a tension between our individual conscious attention to our private daily concerns and another aspect of our consciousness, which outwardly extends to be connected to a ‘global consciousness’. The website also contains projects data globally collected in over 52 data collection centres and processed and derived results to date

loseyourname

Aug1-04, 10:55 PM

You still seem to be missing the point, Fliption. Even if the advantages of being conscious could be attained through some other means, there is still an advantage in being conscious. Show me an unconscious human that has as good a chance of surviving and reproducing as a conscious human.

loseyourname

Aug1-04, 10:56 PM

Philocrat - You should probably move those links to the philosophy napster thread in General Philosophy.

Philocrat

Aug1-04, 11:03 PM

Philocrat - You should probably move those links to the philosophy napster thread in General Philosophy.

Are the links too elementry? I just thought they might be useful for the faint-hearted like myself who knows very little about philosophy? Should I really move them?

Philocrat

Aug1-04, 11:08 PM

By the way, I am following the debate very religiously and I think I like what u guys are doing so far. But don't blame me if I only occasionally merely watch.

balkan

Aug2-04, 03:48 AM

Thank you.

I think I should point out that I realize some definitions of consciousness may include some useful functions. This complex definition is why Chalmers felt it useful to split things into easy and hard problems. So to be clear, the feature I'm referring to is illustrated by claiming it is the dfference between a conscious human and a non-conscious robot that is programmed to do the exact same physical processes. That difference is that the human "knows" he is doing it. The robot is performing every function just as the human does but "knows" nothing. Why is "knowing" of any value? So when you keep saying that this is the way that evolution chose to do it, you're assuming that it is doing something useful.

You may claim that this knowing process is what influences some behavior therefore it influences some of the physical processes themselves but I can see this same "reasoning" process going on in the robot. The only difference is that it doesn't know it's doing it.

it is valuable because it enable us to step out of the box and adapt to our environment... humans are the most ingenious of all creatures, since they no longer require evolution in order to do that...
how can that not be usefull? of course it isn't neccessary just like a dog could just as well be a bacteria and survive, but the "dog concept" works, and so does the "human concept".
noone is assuming that "evolution is doing something usefull" it's doing just as much damage as good. look around you and observe how many geniouses and really gifted people there are, and how many there are below the average...
if evolution had its way, those below the average would have a small chance of surviving, but once again, we don't really need evolution anymore in order to survive... that's what our consciousness is good for...
and pay notice, that we invented the ideas of taking care of the lesser privilidged, so you really can't make the robot analogy there once again without looking desperate or foolish...

Fliption

Aug2-04, 05:36 PM

Fliption

Aug2-04, 05:56 PM

it is valuable because it enable us to step out of the box and adapt to our environment... humans are the most ingenious of all creatures, since they no longer require evolution in order to do that...

I can't really effectively discuss these points with you because it has become obvious that you don't have the same understanding of the concepts that I am referring to. The statement above is another indicator that we aren't talking about the same things.

Everything that you consider to be useful behaviour of humans is derived from physical processes in the brain. None of those physical processes can be attributed to "consciousness" or the part that allows a conscious being to "know" that they are performing physical processes.

if evolution had its way, those below the average would have a small chance of surviving, but once again, we don't really need evolution anymore in order to survive... that's what our consciousness is good for...
and pay notice, that we invented the ideas of taking care of the lesser privilidged, so you really can't make the robot analogy there once again without looking desperate or foolish...

This assumes that evolution values only those that can meet their "physical" needs. This is largely a semantic issue but I think that people assisting those less fortunate is evolution at work as well. Perhaps we could argue that the value has shifted to put more weight on preservation of the "variety of life" as opposed to just the ones that can hunt the best.

But consciousness has nothing to do with these changes. It is largely the development of a brain that can reason. A robot can do this too.

Les Sleeth

Aug2-04, 05:57 PM

But what I have been saying is that there are no advantages of being conscious so this point doesn't mean much to me.

Not everyone grasps that there is something which most defines consciousness (self-awareness), and which is more fundamental than mentality (or emotions).

You are correct in saying we don't need the self-aware aspect of consciousness to survive. We could be smart zombies whose programming just gets smarter (say, the way a computer does) as we adapt to the environment. So there really is no explanation for why it exists. If we didn't have the self-aware aspect of consciousnes, we wouldn't have have free will; and if we didn't have free will, we wouldn't be destroying the environment and each other. So I'd say we might be more likely to survive as zombies.

One of my pet theories is that certain people don't recognize the significance of the self-aware aspect of consciousness because they aren't that self-aware. If someone spends most of their time involved in cogitating, then they might come to see themselves as the computing aspect of consciousness and never really get to know that part of themselves that is aware of all it does. That's why Dennett, IMO, thinks consciousness is "busy-ness" of the mind -- because that's all he pays attention to.

loseyourname

Aug2-04, 08:56 PM

But what I have been saying is that there are no advantages of being conscious so this point doesn't mean much to me.

There are no advantages over this hypothetical zombie robot human, but there are huge advantages over an actual unconscious human. This is what you seem to be ignoring.

yesicanread

Aug2-04, 09:04 PM

Say these zombies were colinear in perimeter perception. This was the key to their harmony, and them being zombies.

They couldn't conspire. Could they ?

balkan

Aug3-04, 04:34 AM

1) Everything that you consider to be useful behaviour of humans is derived from physical processes in the brain. None of those physical processes can be attributed to "consciousness" or the part that allows a conscious being to "know" that they are performing physical processes.

2) This assumes that evolution values only those that can meet their "physical" needs. This is largely a semantic issue but I think that people assisting those less fortunate is evolution at work as well. Perhaps we could argue that the value has shifted to put more weight on preservation of the "variety of life" as opposed to just the ones that can hunt the best.

3) But consciousness has nothing to do with these changes. It is largely the development of a brain that can reason. A robot can do this too.

1) i highly disagree. the ability to be conscious of what you are doing is quite essential to making innovations that would enable you to adabt to present and future environment... a brain that only responded and reasoned couldn't do that... you don't "react" a bow or clothes due to impulses... an idea like that comes from being aware of what you need and how you feel, and how you would feel if you took clothes on.

2) you don't seem to understand what evolution does... evolution is random, taking care of "the variety of life" is a choise.. so it can't be evolution, it's human.

3) according to whom? you? a merely reasoning brain would surely let the weak ones die. they're an expense and quite unneccessary for the human race to survive... on the other hand, if you have empathy and understand that they have feelings and lives too, then you wouldn't... but that has got nothing to do with reason.

Rader

Aug3-04, 06:17 AM

2) you don't seem to understand what evolution does... evolution is random, taking care of "the variety of life" is a choise.. so it can't be evolution, it's human.

While Balkans defending, is now swaying to ontological terms, of the way the world out to be, self interest, ethics and religion.

But what I have been saying is that there are no advantages of being conscious so this point doesn't mean much to me..

It seems that Fliption is defending, this position of why we should even be conscious, on a epistemological terms of the what is of the world, properties relations and change.

Please go on.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 08:31 AM

There are no advantages over this hypothetical zombie robot human, but there are huge advantages over an actual unconscious human. This is what you seem to be ignoring.

Please tell me what these advantages over the hypothetical robot are and I won't ignore them. I honestly don't know of any.

balkan

Aug3-04, 08:47 AM

Please tell me what these advantages over the hypothetical robot are and I won't ignore them. I honestly don't know of any.
well... like i've personally said many times:
consciousness isn't a necessity... like wings aren't necessary for a bird either, it didn't have to take that evolutionary step (it didn't, evolution did), it could have survived in other shapes...
but it's working... the bird survived, and so did we... it doesn't matter whether or not it is necessary. our appendix isn't necessary either. that doesn't mean (or even indicate) that it wasn't at some point an advantage or that "something else" deals with our our appendix, now does it?

Fliption

Aug3-04, 08:49 AM

1) i highly disagree. the ability to be conscious of what you are doing is quite essential to making innovations that would enable you to adabt to present and future environment... a brain that only responded and reasoned couldn't do that... you don't "react" a bow or clothes due to impulses... an idea like that comes from being aware of what you need and how you feel, and how you would feel if you took clothes on.

Again, everything you speak of can be attributed to a physical process in the brain. You are aware of your emotional and reasoning processes. That doesn't mean they would function differently if you were not aware of them.

2) you don't seem to understand what evolution does... evolution is random, taking care of "the variety of life" is a choise.. so it can't be evolution, it's human.

This is just a minor semantic point but humans are part of evolution to. I don't understand it when people suddenly think that humans can somehow override the evolutive process. Because as soon as we override it, then overriding it becomes simply a part of evolution.

3) according to whom? you? a merely reasoning brain would surely let the weak ones die. they're an expense and quite unneccessary for the human race to survive... on the other hand, if you have empathy and understand that they have feelings and lives too, then you wouldn't... but that has got nothing to do with reason.

The post from Les above said that people are confusing feelings/emotions with consciousness. Every single emotion that you have is the result of a physical process in the brain. The only difference between a conscious person and a non-conscious one is that the conscious person "knows" that they are feeling it and acting on it. None of the actions would be impacted by this fact.

I'm really surprised that there are people arguing this point when a major view of philosophy called Idealism/Solipsism is dependent on the fact that we cannot ever know whether anyone is conscious other than ourselves. That's why I keep asking for examples because I think I can make a lot of money ending Solipsism once and for all.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 08:50 AM

well... like i've personally said many times:
consciousness isn't a necessity... like wings aren't necessary for a bird either, it didn't have to take that evolutionary step (it didn't, evolution did), it could have survived in other shapes...
but it's working... the bird survived, and so did we... it doesn't matter whether or not it is necessary. our appendix isn't necessary either. that doesn't mean (or even indicate) that it wasn't at some point an advantage or that "something else" deals with our our appendix, now does it?

Fine. Tell me what it "could" have been useful for. It's still the same exercise. Let's end solipsism once and for all.

balkan

Aug3-04, 08:55 AM

innovation, building a more advanced social structure than any other animal on the planet...
the ability to express ourself in more depth than any other animal, and the ability to reason oneself out of an instinctive reaction... not usefull at all :rolleyes:
yes, a robot could do that... because we would have programmed it.

you tell me why consciousness is indicative of "something else" because it isn't necessary, if it is not the same case with the appendix...

balkan

Aug3-04, 08:57 AM

The post from Les above said that people are confusing feelings/emotions with consciousness. Every single emotion that you have is the result of a physical process in the brain. The only difference between a conscious person and a non-conscious one is that the conscious person "knows" that they are feeling it and acting on it. None of the actions would be impacted by this fact.

I'm really surprised that there are people arguing this point when a major view of philosophy called Idealism/Solipsism is dependent on the fact that we cannot ever know whether anyone is conscious other than ourselves. That's why I keep asking for examples because I think I can make a lot of money ending Solipsism once and for all.
i'm not confusing anything... what comes with this knowledge is the ability to know you're having these feelings, and not act on them... the ability to analyze and take advantage of those feelings and thoughts...
that is tremendously helpfull in a society.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 09:23 AM

innovation, building a more advanced social structure than any other animal on the planet...
the ability to express ourself in more depth than any other animal, and the ability to reason oneself out of an instinctive reaction... not usefull at all :rolleyes:
yes, a robot could do that... because we would have programmed it.

All these things are the result of brain processes. None of which are attributed to consciousness.

you tell me why consciousness is indicative of "something else" because it isn't necessary, if it is not the same case with the appendix...

I'm saying it has no evolutive purpose and never has had one. Unlike the appendix.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 09:29 AM

i'm not confusing anything... what comes with this knowledge is the ability to know you're having these feelings, and not act on them... the ability to analyze and take advantage of those feelings and thoughts...
that is tremendously helpfull in a society.

I understand what you're saying but I don't think you quite see where I'm drawing the semantic lines yet. One more time...everything you have mentioned above, analyzing feelings and acting upon it are all brain processes. None of these processes are attributed to consciousness.

Les Sleeth

Aug3-04, 12:01 PM

I'm saying it has no evolutive purpose and never has had one. Unlike the appendix.

The thing is, even if the self-aware aspect can be shown to be attractive to natural selection, we are still left with the question of how a nervous system can produce it. What materials did nature have to work with according to physicalist theory? We have nerves for conduction of information and interconnectivity, we have complexity, and we have electro-chemical energy. From those materials we can see how an environmentally sensitive system could have been established in biology, and given what we know today about computers, we also can see how computing ability and memory might develop. So sensitivity, computing ability, and memory are covered.

Those most certain consciousness is purely neurological are encouraged by developments in AI. Some believe when the right algorithms are combined with sensitivity, computing ability and memory, it will eventually result in the self-aware aspect of consciousness. Actually, they think complexity is the key, and guess what? They can’t get a computer to stop acting like a computer. If the proper level of complexity is what’s needed, then shouldn’t the best AI programs already be showing some sort of self awareness? Even snails seem to have the self-aware aspect (as primitive as it is) because one can observe them asserting their will. Surely AI is currently able to produce a program as complex as snail awareness, and therefore demonstrate a computer with will. Put it on wheels, give it a system for initiating self-propulsion, and then show us a willful computer equaling, say, the willfulness of a snail. That is a very simple test of the physicalist theory of consciousness.

So far, it ain’t happening primarily because of one wrench stuck in the works: repetitiveness. It’s not the presence of repetitiveness that’s the problem (yes, living and conscious processes are full of repetitiveness); the problem is the inability of non-living physical operations to escape repetitiveness, which the physical processes associated with life, and functions associated with consciousness both do with ease (e.g., as manifested respectively in evolution and will). That computer on wheels above, for instance, might move around, but it will only “repeat” its programming, and will never escape it (and random variation programmed in isn’t “will”).

Thus physicalist theories for origin of life and consciousness share a common nemesis (mechanistic repetitiveness). So at least one physicalist skeptic asks for a small but very specific bit of evidence before expressing faith in physicalism. When asked for such evidence, all we hear is what physicalness can do, while the evidence being requested is what matter CAN’T be shown to do. The evidence isn’t to show that matter can self-organize itself for a few steps or be coaxed (by conscious chemists) to combine into highly complex molecules. The test isn’t to show that a computer can “think.” The two tests are: 1) demonstrate the potential of chemistry to progressively self-organize on its own (no, not into life, just show the ability to perpetually organize in harmony with the environment), and 2) demonstrate that any sort of physical construction can exhibit will. Very modest requests if you ask me. :redface:

Fliption

Aug3-04, 02:41 PM

After reading the strength of my last post, I should probably clarify a bit. I'm not reallly saying that consciousness has no purpose. I suspect it does play a role in the scheme of things. What I'm saying is that in a strictly physical explanation of things, consciousness would have no known purpose or usefulness. And we can never know whatever usefulness it may truly have under such assumptions because there are so many philosophical issues associated with consicousness in a physical world. This is why I've suggested that anyone who claims that consciousness has definite advantages in evolution are making statements that would solve some of the oldest philosophical issues on this topic.

loseyourname

Aug3-04, 02:44 PM

But what I have been saying is that there are no advantages of being conscious so this point doesn't mean much to me.

Fliption, you can't be serious. What are you capable of accomplishing, as a human, when you are unconscious? How long do you think you would last as a sleepwalker?

Fliption

Aug3-04, 03:10 PM

Fliption, you can't be serious. What are you capable of accomplishing, as a human, when you are unconscious? How long do you think you would last as a sleepwalker?

I don't think you are understanding the issue you are raising.

Are you saying that my brain processes are not altered when I am unconscious? Is it not a fact that the altered brain processes are the reason I wouldn't be able to function? If my brain began to function as it would when I was conscious then I could function perfectly well, I just wouldn't know I was doing it. Of course this never happens because whenever my brain functions this way I just happen to be aware of it. This tells us that the two are closely connected somehow. Yet you know nothing about this connection of awareness to any of the physical processes that you are attributing so much usefulness to. This connection without an explanation is why it's called the hard problem. If you can make this connection you can end centuries of debate.

What you have just done is equate my consciousness to all the brain process differences between a sleeping and a conscious person. This is a physicalist theory with very little to stand on. How could anyone argue for solipsism when all we have to do is argue that if they didn't have consciousness then they would just go to sleep?

balkan

Aug3-04, 03:23 PM

I understand what you're saying but I don't think you quite see where I'm drawing the semantic lines yet. One more time...everything you have mentioned above, analyzing feelings and acting upon it are all brain processes. None of these processes are attributed to consciousness.
well, indirectly they definitely are (at least according to the definition you wrote earlier)... cause you would necessarily have to be aware of your feelings in order to analyze them.

balkan

Aug3-04, 03:37 PM

1) Those most certain consciousness is purely neurological are encouraged by developments in AI. Some believe when the right algorithms are combined with sensitivity, computing ability and memory, it will eventually result in the self-aware aspect of consciousness. Actually, they think complexity is the key, and guess what? They can’t get a computer to stop acting like a computer. If the proper level of complexity is what’s needed, then shouldn’t the best AI programs already be showing some sort of self awareness? Even snails seem to have the self-aware aspect (as primitive as it is) because one can observe them asserting their will. Surely AI is currently able to produce a program as complex as snail awareness, and therefore demonstrate a computer with will. Put it on wheels, give it a system for initiating self-propulsion, and then show us a willful computer equaling, say, the willfulness of a snail. That is a very simple test of the physicalist theory of consciousness.

2) So far, it ain’t happening primarily because of one wrench stuck in the works: repetitiveness. It’s not the presence of repetitiveness that’s the problem (yes, living and conscious processes are full of repetitiveness); the problem is the inability of non-living physical operations to escape repetitiveness, which the physical processes associated with life, and functions associated with consciousness both do with ease (e.g., as manifested respectively in evolution and will). That computer on wheels above, for instance, might move around, but it will only “repeat” its programming, and will never escape it (and random variation programmed in isn’t “will”).

3) Thus physicalist theories for origin of life and consciousness share a common nemesis (mechanistic repetitiveness). So at least one physicalist skeptic asks for a small but very specific bit of evidence before expressing faith in physicalism. When asked for such evidence, all we hear is what physicalness can do, while the evidence being requested is what matter CAN’T be shown to do. The evidence isn’t to show that matter can self-organize itself for a few steps or be coaxed (by conscious chemists) to combine into highly complex molecules. The test isn’t to show that a computer can “think.” The two tests are: 1) demonstrate the potential of chemistry to progressively self-organize on its own (no, not into life, just show the ability to perpetually organize in harmony with the environment), and 2) demonstrate that any sort of physical construction can exhibit will. Very modest requests if you ask me. :redface:
1) no... they aren't even at cockroach yet. or ant for that matter, i believe. but they are slowly progressing towards insectlike intelligence... comupter brains today are still incredibly linear compared even to that of a snail.
and exactly what selfawareness does a snail have, if you don't mind me asking?

2) well... that's where things like quantum mechanics come in handy... it's a neat way of escaping repetitiveness, but unfortunately, that can't yet be simulated on a computer.

3) yes... very modest... especially the "any physical construction can exhibit will" part... i like that... it's not like it took evolution a million years to do it, no... that's just a bad excuse for us not stepping right up and showing it...
one step at a time...

more about the "consciousness" not being neccessary...
evolution isn't choosing... it's random... how many times do i have to say this? is it hard to comprehend or what?
if you go to a club with a 50$ entrance fee, but you have crooked teath and are wearing leather pants, you won't get in or what? of course you will... and you'll have crooked teeth and be wearing leather pants on when you do...

if our mind was enough for us to survive, what the hell does it matter that we got more than necessary? i really don't get it...
and how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

loseyourname

Aug3-04, 03:57 PM

I don't think you are understanding the issue you are raising.

Are you saying that my brain processes are not altered when I am unconscious? Is it not a fact that the altered brain processes are the reason I wouldn't be able to function? If my brain began to function as it would when I was conscious then I could function perfectly well, I just wouldn't know I was doing it. Of course this never happens because whenever my brain functions this way I just happen to be aware of it. This tells us that the two are closely connected somehow. Yet you know nothing about this connection of awareness to any of the physical processes that you are attributing so much usefulness to. This connection without an explanation is why it's called the hard problem. If you can make this connection you can end centuries of debate.

What you have just done is equate my consciousness to all the brain process differences between a sleeping and a conscious person. This is a physicalist theory with very little to stand on. How could anyone argue for solipsism when all we have to do is argue that if they didn't have consciousness then they would just go to sleep?

Who said anything about going to sleep? I said an unconscious human. Sleeping humans are still conscious of their dreams, at least in part.

Again, you are iterating what a hypothetical brain could do if it were capable of performing all of the normal human functions without consciousness. That is not the brain we have. The brain we have benefits from consciousness. You're still making an argument analagous to "Penguins could have fins that perform all of the functions that their wings do, and so wings are of no benefit to them." Surely you can see the fallacy here.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 03:57 PM

well, indirectly they definitely are (at least according to the definition you wrote earlier)... cause you would necessarily have to be aware of your feelings in order to analyze them.

The process of identifying and analyzing anything is done by brain processes, none of which are attributed to consciousness.

loseyourname

Aug3-04, 03:59 PM

Identifying and analyzing cannot be put to productive use until we become conscious of the analysis and identity.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 04:28 PM

Who said anything about going to sleep? I said an unconscious human. Sleeping humans are still conscious of their dreams, at least in part.

You asked me if I could function when I was unconscious. The only time I am usually considered unconsiousness is when I am asleep. So how else was I to answer your question? And you also specifically mentioned sleepwalking.

Again, you are iterating what a hypothetical brain could do if it were capable of performing all of the normal human functions without consciousness. That is not the brain we have. The brain we have benefits from consciousness.

You definitely aren't seeing the point I'm making or the cans of worms you're opening. I am not creating a hypothetical brain. What I am trying to point out is that we have a feature that is not addressed by any physical process of the brain. Yet, all the behavior that is being referenced as "useful" can be mapped to a brain process. You are only making an assumption that consciousness is useful because that is the way it seems to be working to you subjectively. How else could you possibly know this?

You're still making an argument analagous to "Penguins could have fins that perform all of the functions that their wings do, and so wings are of no benefit to them." Surely you can see the fallacy here.

Yes I can easily see the fallacy here. But this is not what I am doing. I have already responded to this comment by saying that this only works if consciousness is useful to begin with! Wings are useful regardless of whatever else one might have evolved to replace wings with. But you haven't given any examples of how consciousness is useful. To do this, you will need to point to an activity that cannot be fully explained by some other process that has nothing to do with consciousness. Everything that has been listed here can be completely explained by physical processes of the brain that are not attributable to consciousness.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 04:35 PM

Identifying and analyzing cannot be put to productive use until we become conscious of the analysis and identity.

Lol, or so it seems to you. Where is the scientific evidence?

So in a scientific description of the process of Identifying, analyzing and then putting into productive use, you're saying that there is a mystery process in there into which we can plug conscious activity? I still contend that all of this activity is the result of known brain processes, none of which are attributable to consciousness.

balkan

Aug3-04, 04:49 PM

The process of identifying and analyzing anything is done by brain processes, none of which are attributed to consciousness.
once again: how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

Fliption

Aug3-04, 05:02 PM

once again: how can you honestly say that you can analyze your emotions without being aware of them?

Because the process of anlyzing emotions can be attributed to brain processes that have nothing to do with consciousness. You only think it does because it seems that way to you subjectively. I feel like a broken record.

It is stated so boldly here yet there is no scientific evidence of such a thing.

balkan

Aug3-04, 05:42 PM

Because the process of anlyzing emotions can be attributed to brain processes that have nothing to do with consciousness. You only think it does because it seems that way to you subjectively. I feel like a broken record.

It is stated so boldly here yet there is no scientific evidence of such a thing.
yes, you do sound like a broken record... you only focus on specific things, and avoid the rest like the plague to avoid having to answer them... you have done this from the beginning...
and look who's talking about scientific evidence... do you have evidence, that you can consciously analyze your emotions and thoughts without being aware of them? i'd really like to see that.

the analysis itself is not necessarily a conscious process, but if you weren't conscious of your feelings, you would simply react... this isn't hard to understand.
you have to be aware about your thoughts aswell in order to analyze them... otherwise you would have to do trial and error untill you got something right.
you would have to be aware of a thought in order to realize that it demands analysis...

Fliption

Aug3-04, 06:57 PM

who's talking about scientific evidence... do you have evidence, that you can consciously analyze your emotions and thoughts without being aware of them? i'd really like to see that.

So now you're suggesting that a computer cannot, in principle, accomplish these acts without being aware? Even loseyourname concedes that there may be other ways to accomplsih these things but consciousnesss is just the way we happen to do it.

the analysis itself is not necessarily a conscious process, but if you weren't conscious of your feelings, you would simply react... this isn't hard to understand.

It isn't? Show me where I can find that in a science book that actually refers to consciousness as it is defined in this discussion. You are just saying what seems like common sense to you. But this isn't good enough to base science on as I'm sure you know.

you have to be aware about your thoughts aswell in order to analyze them... otherwise you would have to do trial and error untill you got something right.
you would have to be aware of a thought in order to realize that it demands analysis...

LOL Put needle on record... say it again...... Naaa I'm tried of saying it because I'm either not saying it effectively enough or no one really cares to understand it. I think I've learned through this whole process to appreciate the time it takes to understand these concepts. I've been studying this stuff in some form or another for some time now and I think it's gotten into my brain through some process of osmosis, apparently, because it doesn't seem to be obvious to people who haven't been exposed to it long.

I have repeated the same comment because it is a comment that is so key to understanding the philosophical issues that are so carelessly being swept aside here. I may have focused only on specific things but I have not avoided anything that was relevant. I actually understand exactly what you are saying because I would have said the same thing....before I understood the issues. I hate to say it that way but it's honestly true.

balkan

Aug3-04, 07:26 PM

lol... you're amazing...
you all the time base everything on thought experiments, lack of scientific evidence and the insufficiensy of science to explain something, but when confronted with an argument, you want it based on scientific evidence...

and you can't compare a computer in any way with anything living that has a brain... it's programmed in premade steps... no i don't think a computer can consciously react on an emotion... 1st of all, it doesn't have any, 2nd, it would be a programmed reaction (no quantum uncertainty involved anywhere). 3rdly, if it should analyze feelings and thoughts it would have to discover them first, which means that it would have an idea that they existed.

i would like you to define consciousness once again... cause last time, you defined it as being aware of your thoughts and feelings...
well, for the last time, tell me how you can analyse a thought or a feeling without being aware that its there... how would you set your thought processes in motion? how would you prioritize and how would you get the idea that this particular thought or emotion should be analysed?
and i would especially like to see some scientific evidence for what you have to say.

and avoid posting another question back about a computer please...

Philocrat

Aug3-04, 08:20 PM

In the 'Book of nature' Consciousness is classed under a set of things called 'Unnecessary necessities' and the causal and relational laws which govern it are classed under the same set of things.

It seems that no one takes any notice of my classification of consciounes into three fundamental mods; (1) Inquisitive, (2) Acquisitive and (3) Precautionary. For those who claim that consciousness is an unnecessary or irrelevant sustaining device in the intelligible being of the human, but they still haven't explained why consciousness became or becomes part of the current human form. How can it be useless if it's part of the human nature? Now I am suggesting that not only is consciousness important and neceassry but also that it is divided into three fundamentally useful parts.

Ok, some of you seem to also argue that things get dumped or thrown away on the evelutionary pathways even when we see and find them to be very usefully and necessary. But how can evolution dump things that are constantly but quantifiably progressive? It would mean that the entire creative processes are pointless and mindless ventures? That everything is mindlessly going around in a circle? Either we say that CIRCULARISM is perfection itself or alternatively that given any creative process in spcacetime, things, or at least some things, resulting from this process ought to be able to physically progress to a perfect state? So which one is viable now: circularism or progressive existence?

Well, my own suggestion is that:

1) We should treat consciousness as purposive, regardless of if this is originally or subsequently realised.

2) We should classify it into three purposive parts as listed above and treat some parts as ephemerally relevant or necessary and the rest as originally and permanently necessary.

The question now is which of these three modes of consciousness is ephemerally necessary and which one is permanently or eternally necessary? Or simply which mode of consciousness will outlast the rest or survive destruction, given that it may be possible for human beings or a human being to survive physical destruction in the first place?

What do you guys think? My bet is on 'Acquisitive Mode of Consciousness', given that human beings are capable of physically progressing on their mutational pathways in the first place.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 08:21 PM

lol... you're amazing...
you all the time base everything on thought experiments, lack of scientific evidence and the insufficiensy of science to explain something, but when confronted with an argument, you want it based on scientific evidence...

You say these things because you do not understand what my position is. I am not claiming the truth of anything! Based on scientific evidence or not. It is you and loseyourname who are demanding that things work a certain way(with NO scientific evidence). I have actually clarified in a previous post that I do believe that consciousness is serving a useful function. But what I've been trying to illustrate is that when you claim that consciousness is useful to a "physical" theory, you are introducing and forcing yourself to confront the hard problem of consciousness. You cannot make such statements without solving this problem first.

and you can't compare a computer in any way with anything living that has a brain... it's programmed in premade steps... no i don't think a computer can consciously react on an emotion... 1st of all, it doesn't have any, 2nd, it would be a programmed reaction (no quantum uncertainty involved anywhere). 3rdly, if it should analyze feelings and thoughts it would have to discover them first, which means that it would have an idea that they existed.

Yes I understand that these things cannot be done in practice. But I said in principle. Are you suggesting that quantum computers cannot ever be created? Are you claiming that artificial intelligence is just a dream? If you are, then you'll be lining up against a lot of physicalists/scientists. The odd thing is that you keep arguing that there is "nothing more" but yet you claim that we cannot duplicate the very same physical processes going on in the brain with a computer. It just doesn't make sense to me

i would like you to define consciousness once again... cause last time, you defined it as being aware of your thoughts and feelings...

There is absolutely no known reason, in princple, why all of the physical processes of the brain cannot be performed and the resulting entity not be conscious. So if we actually did this, the only difference between the conscious and non-conscious beings is that the conscious being "knows" he is performing the physical processes. From a 3rd party perspective, you cannot tell the difference between these two beings. It is the feature of "knowing" that I am referring to.

well, for the last time, tell me how you can analyse a thought or a feeling without being aware that its there... how would you set your thought processes in motion? how would you prioritize and how would you get the idea that this particular thought or emotion should be analysed?
and i would especially like to see some scientific evidence for what you have to say.

I just do not know how to say this any other way. All the activities you have mentioned above are directly related to physical processes in the brain. None of these physical processes can be attributable to consciouness. These are just the facts. You assume they are connected because it seems that way to you. Don't worry it seems that way to me too. I'm just telling you that this "seeming" is the only evidence we have and it is completely subjective.

You are under the impression through common sense that you consciously do these things that you mentioned above, but there is no connection scientifically between the two. This is why there is so much discussion about a "hard problem". How can two things that seem so connected have no connection when we look at it from a purely physical, reductionsist view? This is all part of the hard problem. Again, I'm not telling you that consciousness serves no purpose. I'm telling you that the hard problem prevents us from knowing any such fact. To suggest that you can map a specific physical process in the brain to the feature I called "knowing" is to suggest a MAJOR find of outlandish proportions.

Fliption

Aug3-04, 08:32 PM

For those who claim that consciousness is an unnecessary or irrelevant sustaining device in the intelligible being of the human, but they still haven't explained why consciousness became or becomes part of the current human form. How can it be useless if it's part of the human nature?

I don't disagree in the end. I've tried to clarify my position by saying that consciousness cannot be useful in a purely physical theory. To insist that it is so and then have no way to show the connection is what introduces the hard problem. The hard problem goes away with many of the suggestions from the likes of Chalmers, who suggest introducing consciousness as a fundamental property of nature, as opposed to an emerging property of physical processes. The latter view is what causes all the problems.

But it's seems obvious to everyone that it is a property that does exists so therefore probably exists for a good reason. Which is why there is all the effort to explain it.

My only point is that we cannot claim there is a connection (that consciousness is useful) without dealing with the issues that stand in the way of us knowing such things.

Philocrat

Aug3-04, 09:12 PM

Computers (within the AI Principle and consciousness argument) are already capable of 98% of what the humans are capable of. The other 2% is only a matter of further science. If any one of you understand computers to programming level, you should know that the only thing that is left to be programmed into computers is 'Introspective self-awareness'. Well, my own investigation into this suggests that computers lack introspective self-awareness because of the 'Instruction Set limitations' in programs and programming languages. According to the 'INTRUCTION SET THEORY', all instructions in every program are fixed. Introspective self-awareness is possible only if you make instruction set in programs (especially in programming languages) fully dynamic. This will also enable us to answer the questions:

1) Can a Machine Think?

2) Can a Machine have Consciousness?

On the question as to whether biological form of intelligence could be rendered redundant, I would answer yes to this but with substantial clauses attached to it, of course. And one of such clauses is that we treat biological form of intelligence not only as inconclusive but aslo as actually physically improveable!

Philocrat

Aug3-04, 10:14 PM

I don't disagree in the end. I've tried to clarify my position by saying that consciousness cannot be useful in a purely physical theory. To insist that it is so and then have no way to show the connection is what introduces the hard problem. The hard problem goes away with many of the suggestions from the likes of Chalmers, who suggest introducing consciousness as a fundamental property of nature, as opposed to an emerging property of physical processes. The latter view is what causes all the problems.

But it's seems obvious to everyone that it is a property that does exists so therefore probably exists for a good reason. Which is why there is all the effort to explain it.

My only point is that we cannot claim there is a connection (that consciousness is useful) without dealing with the issues that stand in the way of us knowing such things.

I am as puzzled as everyone else about the whole idea of there being a hard problem in the first place. Curse me under your breath if you like. My own private investigation into the whole 'hard problem' episode suggests to me (perhaps naively) that there is none. Although this process is substantially still primitive in structure and in scope, subjective experiance is almost wholly public, that is, objective. To say that it is causally and relationally exclusive to the beholder and inexplicable to the outside world, or to even a bystander is absurd.

Or even if we wanted to take alterantive route and claim that consciousness or aspect of it is over and above the physical, we still haven't answered the questions as to its fundamental relevance to the overall human existence. For example could we do without it and what is its place in the end state of things or of the causal scheme of man? Supposing zombies and mary could survive purely within the physical without any emergent properties of any special kind to interplay?

There is equally the puzzle as to why we want to explain any hard or soft problem of consciousness at all? Supposing our physical bodies are already able to communicate the perculiar nature of consciousness to each other independent of our actually knowing this. If the physical bodies are already capable of this, it seems we owe no one any oral, physical or quantitative explanation.

On the next note, if the explanation of consciousness at soft and hard levels is relevent in science and needed in order to improve the entire human nature, may be we should think of redesigning the human visual faculty first before attempting such an explanation, for all we know we may have exhausted our very intellectual limits, and who knows.

Then finally, there is the vague term 'Physical' or 'Physical Explanation'; most of the people are limiting the scope of its meaning to what physics or science in general dictates. What stops us from widening the scope of its connotation? For we could say that what appears over above is physical. Is it only when causes, events, relations and any other properties of natural forms are mathematically accounted for that they are physical? Or are materially substantiated or instantiated that they are physical? My suggestion is that the term needs further expansion in scope and in substance. I have asked these questions before:

1) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-physical?

2) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-existent?

Philocrat

Aug3-04, 10:32 PM

One priniciple that may be relevant to all this is the 'DEPRIORITISING PRINCIPLE' which attempts to fully synchronise 'CONSCIOUS-LEVEL VISUAL ATTENTION' with 'PASSIVE-VISUAL LEVEL ATTENTION. The former is mapped co-extensively into the external world and the latter mapped internally likewise up to the genetic level. I can't say very much about this as yet, but I am currently working on it to see in what way it could assist in the overall explanation of consciousnes without the over-demandedness of Physicalism, which I still believe is vaguely valued.

Fliption

Aug4-04, 04:41 PM

I am as puzzled as everyone else about the whole idea of there being a hard problem in the first place.

Well first of all "everyone else" is not puzzled about it. There are a few tormented souls who don't agree with it or understand it but there are many people contributing here that do. Since I think I understand what the issue is and why it is not "absurd", perhaps I can help and discuss it with you. It's really hard to do this without more specific points on what you find difficult to accept. You may already have a laundry list of items but if not perhaps a place to start is the Scientific American article that I referenced earlier in this thread. It's a good summary. You could take a look at that and pick it apart. If it isn't detailed enough then we can move on to something else.

For example could we do without it and what is its place in the end state of things or of the causal scheme of man? Supposing zombies and mary could survive purely within the physical without any emergent properties of any special kind to interplay?

This is what we've been discussing here in the last few pages I think.

Then finally, there is the vague term 'Physical' or 'Physical Explanation';
1) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-physical?

2) Does the invisibility or unobservability of things make them non-existent?

I couldn't agree more. If you've read any of my particpation in threads like this you'll see that this is one of my soap boxes. I think I even discussed it in this very thread pages and pages ago. I personally dislike the concepts of physical versus non-physical. I don't have a clue what they mean. That's because everyone uses them in different ways. Personally I don't know why this distinction is even important. Who cares if something is physical or non-physical? Hard to know why it's important when you don't know what it means. lol

I suggested earlier that perhaps the distinction should be that a non-physical thing is something that has a causal relationship to things that lend themselves to objective inquiry but yet does not lend itself to objective inquiry. So in this definition, "something more" simply means something existing beyond our ability to objectively understand it.

But since that post I think I have another suggestion that could also work. At times I see people referring to non-physical things as if they have physical attributes. To say things like "non-physical substance" is a contradiction in terms and just blurs the distinction. So another suggestion that I have is that non-physical things are things that have some sort of mental value only. I'm talking about data, information, intelligence. For example, to look at a fractal is to see the mechanical and physical manifestation of an algorythm. The fractal is physical. The algorythm is non-physical. When people entertain the question "What is the connection between the physical and the non-physical?", they see a contradiction because they are attempting to mentally connect a "physical substance" with a "non-physical sybstance", whatever that is. The contradiction is in their definitions. No where else. But what is the relationship between a fractal and it's algorythm? It's kind of abstract and hard to explain but it's there nonetheless. In this particular definition "something more" is meaningless. The two concepts also loose all the biased preferences as everyone agrees that both these things exist.

These are just suggestions. It all depends on which definition best represents where people disagree. Currently, I have no idea where people disagree because all disagreement seems to be based on having different definitions. So it appears we have constructed this process backwards.

But it would be so nice if people would decide to either avoid these distinctions or come to a common understanding of what they mean.

Philocrat

Aug4-04, 10:36 PM

Types of Visual Data

The visual data are products of the entire human visual faculty and they are used for conducting and administering safe human existence. They are classified into three fundamental types:

(1) Inquisitive Visual Data (IVD)

They are newly derived visual information from diverse visual organs such as the eye, nose, tongue, ears, skin etc. Inquisitive Visual Data are administered by the ‘Inquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they are usually earmarked as unsafe as they enter or find their ways into the human visual faculty for conscious or passive visual attention and assessment. They remain in unsafe mode until such times as when they are given visual clearance via a mechanism of understanding from the ‘Precautionary Mode’ of the human visual faculty or consciousness. Inquisitive Visual Data are life-critical in that they require high-level of visual attention both at the conscious decision-making level and at the passive decision-making level.

(2) Acquisitive Visual Data (AVD)

They are the sort of visual information administered by the ‘Acquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they include (1) Temporary Visual Data such as qualia and ‘extra-sensory’ ones used in real time thinking or visual awareness within the conscious-level or passive-level decision system, (2) Archived or Historical Data consisting of past and present experiences stored for subsequent or future recall or remembering and (3) Hereditary Visual Data carried genetically from one generation to the next. In my own thinking, visual faculty extend to cover visual information genetically transmitted from parents to their children in the furtherance of a safe and successful life. .

(3) Precautionary Visual Data (PVD)

These are visual data that are constantly monitored and validated in real-time visual processing for continual visual accuracy. This includes life-critical visual data brought into the visual faculty via the inquisitive mode or those recalled from memory via the acquisitive mode. All visual data that enter into the visual faculty are initially earmarked as unsafe until immediately or subsequently declared safe. That is they are treated at the initial stage of first entry as unsafe. Those that are immediately visually analysed and understood are declared safe until proven otherwise. Both those that are partially understood and those not understood at all are given the same level of precautionary visual alert. And throughout their stay and administration in the acquisitive section of the human visual faculty or consciousness they are constantly visually reviewed and reassessed towards understanding them. Things understood as good and useful to our lives are earmarked for constant use to service the human life and existence. Both those things that are understood as bad and dangerous to our lives and those that are not properly or fully understood at all are earmarked as things to be feared and avoided.

Life-critical visual data such as qualia and other physical information that are critical to the human survival are given high-level visual attention at the higher conscious decision-making level. For example, all the visual information and physical parameters needed to successfully perform a substantially dangerous act as crossing a street with moving vehicles are classed under life-critical data and unfortunately this is the sort of the physical activity that we cannot afford to pay less attention to.

How Does the Purposive Theory deal with Qualia?

The Purposive Theory always invokes from the ‘Book of Nature’ the Principle of Continuing Causation to explain qualia. I have used this principle before above to reverse the logic of interpretation of God. My argument is that it is this same principle that governs the interpretation and understanding of qualia. According to the Principle of continuing Causation, the slightest causal and relational error found in things renders them structurally and functionally inconclusive, and therefore, continuous both in substance and in scope. According to this principle, qualia, like all other sustaining parts or properties of a given entity or life form, should be interpreted purposively since there is no guarantee that, as a mere part, it may form part of the final state of that entity or life form. In the Book of Nature there are two fundamental types of properties: (1) those that serve ephemeral sustaining purposes to any thing in which they are parts and (2) those that survive destruction with any thing in which they are parts. For personal convenience and simplicity, I always call those things, be they laws, relations or properties of any kind, that fall under (1) ‘Unnecessary Necessities’, and those that fall under (2) ‘Necessary Necessities’. According to the Principle of Continuing Causation, since (2) is already naturally technically over-demanding by rigorously forcing properties and their immediate governing laws to fully synchronise causally and relationally as things in which they are parts head towards their final perfect states, there is no need to worry about their explainable causal roles since they may be mutated out of place in (2) and banished into (1). That if qualia cannot be fully synchronised with the other sustaining parts of man it will be structurally and functionally abandoned within the causal and mutational pathway of the human existence.

However, this is not a way of saying that all category (1) Properties and their governing laws are completely useless in the book of nature. Rather, what it all means is that they serve only ephemeral sustaining purposes in their overall outward values. Or simply that they are merely compensatory in their overall outward values. They temporally stand for the best sustaining properties to come!

Finally, according to the principle of continuing causation, Qualia is explainable, valued and measured by the level of its functional success in the public realm. There is no life for qualia outside the public realm. For example, in terms of the road-crossing example that we mentioned above, qualia is explainable, valued, understood and measured by the number of people that succeed in crossing the road with equivalent number of dangers without being harmed. Who cares whether two road-crossers see an on-coming car differently, one seeing it as red and the other seeing it as blue! So long as by balance of probability they both succeed in (1) visually identifying the car and know that it is a car and not something else, (2) recognise it as a danger to be avoided and (3) physically escape being harmed or killed, then none of the two road-crossers owe neither themselves nor any bystander any explanation as to what qualia is or as to its exact nature. According to this principle, the only significant visual data are those relevant to the actual physical danger and not any arbitrary ones that pose no danger at all. For example, in the road-crossing case, one of the road crossers visualising and correctly recognising an on-coming car as a danger and the other one erroneously seeing and interpreting it as a sexy woman or man coming to embrace him or her. This would be very significant and according to the principle of continuing causation, if this sort of causal and relational error were to be widespread and persistent, it would trigger the mutational system to interplay and invoke corrective measures or in some very nasty cases to abandon the whole human form of life altogether.

In fact this is one of the key reasons why I think we are better off concentrating on the science of man than on the science of needs. I will expand on this later.

NOTE: Purposive Theory treats causal and relational errors in things, especial in life forms such as ours, as correctable by structural re-engineering. It does not believe in explaining things beyond their actual structural and functional limits.

Royce

Aug7-04, 09:53 AM

The original question was; "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
Some of us answered, yes. They have been designated in this discussion as "physicalist" and their point is that everything that exist is either physical and thus reducible to Pure Physics or a product of physics and therefore at least in principal reducible.
Some of us answered, no and can be called "non-physicalist" or "something-others." Of this group some say that everything can not be reduced to Pure Physics because there are some things that Pure Physics does not address, investigate or acknowledge, there are somethings that exist that are outside the purview of science which of course includes pure physics. Others say that there are something that by their very nature are irreducible, to attempt to reduce them destroys them or we lose sight of what we are attempting to study in the first place.
The "something-others" point mainly to two different but related things known to exist that cannot be explained, reproduced or demonstrated by physical science and they are life itself and consciousness which includes self awareness. Some of us might add evolution also as it demonstratively moves from less complex to more complex eventuating in sentient beings such as ourselves. This indicated an arrow, direction and/or included purpose to evolution.
The "physicalist" say that all of the above are simply products of random physical processes, emergent properties inevitable due to increased complexity and that there is scientific and technological indications that in principle this is true.
The "something-others" deny that neither science nor technology have proven or demonstrated the points satisfactorily as the indications are meager, simplistic and reaching for conclusions not in evidence. They state that purpose, intent and free will inherent in life, consciousness and self awareness cannot be explained or demonstrated by the simple, inconclusive and limited, repetitive processes given by the physicalist as evidence.
This, I think, sums up this discussion to date. All of these points have been discussed at length in a number of other threads and no satisfactory conclusion or consensus has been reached either here in the PF's or out there in the real world of Philosophy and Physics although each group will claim proof just as vehemently as we do here.
It is my opinion the we, mankind, do not yet know enough or understand enough to come to a satisfactory conclusion or consensus. Science will have to expand its horizons to include non-physical phenomena in its studies before it can say for sure one way or the other. So long as science limits itself to physical and empirical studies it can not explain nor understand all of reality, especially life and consciousness.
Science has already breeched the realm of philosophy and consciousness in its exploration of Quantum Mechanics, Super String and Big Bang Theory even though many will deny that this is so. The hard questions keep rising up and slapping investigative and theoretical scientists in the face and they are finding it harder and harder to ignore.
I predict that before science can make much more substantial and significant progress it is going to have to face the hard questions of life, consciousness, awareness and their interaction with the physical realm of reality. We can not know all of reality by simply looking at one aspect of it simply because it is the easiest to study and measure.

BoulderHead

Aug7-04, 02:42 PM

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone?
‘Everything’ makes this question all-inclusive. As such, I think it too broad to withstand philosophical attack.

Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim?
I don’t believe it does.

Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?
The problem with this question is that ‘everything’ has, of a sudden, been replaced by ‘physical reality’. It now becomes unclear what exactly is asked. Still, a short answer strictly to this last question can be given as “No”, and then justified by considering that only describing things mathematically omits the aspect of experiencing physical reality. IOW, it is one thing to mathematically describe going through a loop on a roller coaster, quite another to actually experience riding such a contraption. There are other considerations, but hopefully this one will make sense to the reader.

I see in reading the replies that definitions of ‘physical’ and ‘consciousness’ proved problematic. My reply, therefore, will be pursuing a different line in order to suggest the answer to the first question is also “No”.

Originally posted by Imparticle;
I should probably note as well that we cannot tell what anything is really; we can only infer what something may be by its characteristics.
Imparticle has put forward a foundation upon which I desire to build. Those ‘characteristics’ spoken of do not necessarily have to be all-inclusive of what exists to be known about an object. For example; one can know various aspects of certain phenomena by sight, by feel, by smell, etc. Consider what a sunset might be like for us were we only in possession of the senses attributed to an earthworm; do you suppose, in such capacity, our science might lead us to conclude it was possible for us to know everything about a sunset (let alone the universe)?

I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). I do not find sufficient reason for assuming the sum total of what we are capable of experiencing must necessarily be the sum total of all that is. Remove one of your senses and how much less would you know? Now remove another and yet another. In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same, and what any given piece of hardware provides us with is not a complete knowledge at all, but a specific aspect of what may exist to be known about a particular phenomena.
This can be expanded to suggest if we should lack what is required even to detect a single aspect of something, we will not be in a position to have any knowledge of it at all (indeed, we may never even be aware we’re missing out). Now, are we simply going to assume we may possess (now or in the future) all the apparatus needed for knowing (and then being able to explain mathematically) everything there is to know about the universe? And even if we actually were in possession of such capability, I’m not convinced it would be possible for us to know such must be the case. Neither does it seem reasonable to me that an inability, or just a simple failing, to detect any/all aspects of something should qualify to rule same out of all possible existence (although in at least the case of inability I would argue lack of knowledge makes it impossible even to imagine what might be missed). Accordingly, I am compelled to accept there may exist, not only the unknown, but even the unknowable (So to hell with all you people who would deny me a unicorn! :approve: ).

At any rate, science will no doubt develop a great many devices to aid in our ability to experience hitherto unknown facets of the universe. Theories will go, more accurate theories will come, overall ‘knowledge’ will increase, and many fantastic creations of innovation and technology will improve the lives of the living, but everything explained? You mean for example to ‘guess’ from a position of absolutely no experience, an unknown cause from its supposed effect? Cho !

*but enough of that disgusting little prophecy hour, haha* :biggrin:

Les Sleeth

Aug7-04, 03:29 PM

I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). . . . In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same . . .

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have." I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."

BoulderHead

Aug7-04, 03:49 PM

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have."
Ok
I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."
I would say that you may have at least partly failed to understand my meaning when I said; “regardless of the source” and “That which we can experience, and that which we cannot”, as you go on to speak of experiencing things...
I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

Les Sleeth

Aug7-04, 04:02 PM

I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.

BoulderHead

Aug7-04, 05:10 PM

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.
Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

Philocrat

Aug7-04, 10:52 PM

Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

Your 'devices' of experience consist in the very natural form that we take - that is, the 'human form'. One of the problems that we need to turn our attention to is for us to investigate and find out if there are natural forms wholly devoid of causal and relational limitations. I have pondered in my head over it for years and I haven't seem to find any. What I am trying to say is that the forms that things take when they are 'self-created' or 'randomly created' or even created by the so-called 'intelligent designer', carry with them all the natural limitations (relational and causal) that are specific to those forms. As a thing, by taking a form you are limiting yourself in one way or the other. This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?

VISUAL PERSPECTIVE.....WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Yes, visual persepctive decsively appears as a hindrance but evidence shows that it never completely undermines successful existence......that is, things successfully occupying space and moving harmlessly about that space. Well, yes, admittedly mindless entities do aimlessly move about the space that they occupy and tend to collide and get destroyed, but the conscious ones even when they rely nearly entirely on visual persepctive, do succeed getting arround their chaotic environment. The issue about qualia should not be about 'how what we find in all the visual persepctives are identical or explainable' but solely about 'how much of the content of a given number of visual persepctives' succeed in helping the conscious beings involved lead a normal life. If for an example, three people saw a dangerous bull charging towards them, the question is not about what each man in each visual frame of reference see or what it is like to see a bull, but wholly about how each one of them in a public domain is able to see the bull, recognise not only that it is a bull but also that it is a danger to be physically avoided, and actually able to physically avoid being injured or killed by this on-charging bull. I Think that the whole argument about qualia (hard or soft problem) is fundamentally very misleading and heading intellectually in the wrong direction.

BoulderHead

Aug7-04, 11:17 PM

This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?
I think this is interesting because I must admit my complete inability to conceptualize something which doesn’t exist in either space or time. I do not know for certain if this what you’re considering, but I’m inclined to run with Schopenhauer in at least the area of thought that a multiplicity of being cannot exist under such conditions.

Philocrat

Aug7-04, 11:43 PM

Multiciplicity of things is a mere safety device in originally defective process....and there is no guarantee that this 'habit' or possibility will have a place in the final sum totality of things. Who says that the population of things could not range between many and one? To depart many into one, yes, I can accept that, but to depart further into nothingness, that I am very much against.

Now my answer to your posting.....what you are suggesting seems like perfection itself.....or perhaps another kind of perfection. But what I am not sure of is whether taking a form in any creative process always involves occupying space and time. Can't you be formless and still blend in with time and space?

loseyourname

Aug8-04, 04:57 PM

You asked me if I could function when I was unconscious. The only time I am usually considered unconsiousness is when I am asleep. So how else was I to answer your question? And you also specifically mentioned sleepwalking.

Well, let's go back to this. Sleepwalking is the only example I can think of in which a human being performs motor functions not distinguishable from those of conscious humans despite not being conscious (at least of the fact that they are performing these functions and of their surroundings). As far as I can tell, that makes sleepwalking the best example of what a human could accomplish through physical interaction with its environment without consciousness. So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

You definitely aren't seeing the point I'm making or the cans of worms you're opening. I am not creating a hypothetical brain. What I am trying to point out is that we have a feature that is not addressed by any physical process of the brain. Yet, all the behavior that is being referenced as "useful" can be mapped to a brain process. You are only making an assumption that consciousness is useful because that is the way it seems to be working to you subjectively. How else could you possibly know this?

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes. Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware. Now I know that you're going to contend that such traits as the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror and to learn human languages are not conscious processes. Then what is? Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

Yes I can easily see the fallacy here. But this is not what I am doing. I have already responded to this comment by saying that this only works if consciousness is useful to begin with! Wings are useful regardless of whatever else one might have evolved to replace wings with. But you haven't given any examples of how consciousness is useful.

I will continue to contend that I have done this. Awareness of oneself is useful. There are plenty of brain processes that don't need to be conscious. I will agree with this. Pain and pleasure are obvious examples. We can see plenty of lower-level organisms responding to positive and negative stimuli without subjectively experiencing pain or pleasure. You can even argue that prairie voles respond to neuropeptides responsible for monogamous relationships and they may very well never subjectively experience any feeling of love. I would argue that they probably do, but either way, there are many matters that are not settled. But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

To do this, you will need to point to an activity that cannot be fully explained by some other process that has nothing to do with consciousness. Everything that has been listed here can be completely explained by physical processes of the brain that are not attributable to consciousness.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

loseyourname

Aug8-04, 05:07 PM

On second thought, forget about the learning of language example. Given that there are rare instances of people speaking languages that they don't remember learning, I suppose it is possible for a human to unconsciously learn a language.

I would like to point out one more thing. This discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

Les Sleeth

Aug8-04, 05:59 PM

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? . . . Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth. . . . No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. . . . . you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive. If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

loseyourname

Aug8-04, 09:03 PM

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

I agree. I'm not trying to say there is no hard problem. I just don't see any reason to think of consciousness as incompatible or irrelevant to evolution (non-guided evolution, that is). I think the problem lies in explaining the nature of subjective experience, not in explaining its usefulness.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive.

Following that line of reasoning, bacteria and plants don't have opposable thumbs, either. So there is no doubt that an opposable thumb is not needed to evolve and survive. It is, however, an important part of human evolution, as is the development of consciousness.

If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

Well, I think it has both evolutionary significance (in that conscious organisms do have increased fitness) and added significance as well. I think the initial advantage of consciousness probably had to do with developing strategies. Going back to the example of a human always beating a computer at the game of Go, there is clearly an advantage in the ability to integrate thought and sensory processes into a conscious moment, in being able to view a problem holistically. A non-conscious intelligence, such as a computer, is not able to do this. While it is entirely possible that some programmer will eventually come up with a computer capable of playing an elite-level game of Go, the computing power necessary (because of the near-infinite possibilities at each branch point of the game) is mind-boggling and well beyond the capabilities of any organic brain. It may very well be that a brain could have evolved in such a way that it could perform the strategizing functions that a human does without being conscious, but it is clear that the computational ability necessary would have been staggering and probably hundreds of millions of years off in the future. Consciousness was a far more economical, and attainable, if not necessarily a simpler, solution.

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

Well, it's rather Newtonian to suggest that physicalism necessarily implies mechanism. I don't see this dichotomy, though the question remains an interesting and difficult question. This problem extends beyond physics. Even if you assume consciousness to be non-physical, it's still a seeming paradox that it should behave in a non-deterministic manner. It is logic, not physics, that dictates every event should have a cause, and in such a manner it should be theoretically possible to know the outcome of every event that will ever take place from a set of first causes. Physics is becoming more probabilistic than deterministic.

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

I don't see any difficulty placing consciousness in an evolutionary context. I think it is very clear, and it seems that you agree, that it is an advantage that we are conscious. I still there is a hard problem, but it is a hard problem for any theory of consciousness, not just a physicalist theory.

Fliption

Aug8-04, 09:25 PM

So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware?
You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

Fliption

Aug8-04, 09:35 PM

discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

Just for the record, I'm not really interested in the link to evolution. I may personally believe that consciousness is useful. Therefore, it isn't a surprise that it would have survived. I'm just saying that this belief is just that. A belief.

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

loseyourname

Aug8-04, 10:11 PM

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

There is a process in charge of reproducing. It is partially controlled by the brain, and partially controlled by hormone levels that are effected by factors other than brain processes. I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness. I am saying that an unconscious human cannot survive or reproduce as well as a conscious human. Therefore, consciousness outcompetes unconsciousness in an evolutionary battle for the environmental niche filled by the human species.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Sorry about that. I was ambiguous. What I mean by "conscious brain process" is a brain process that a given organism is conscious of. Given that I am conscious of quite a few brain processes myself at this moment, I don't really feel the need to scientifically prove that such a phenomenon exists. I'm pretty certain you experience the same thing as well, so I don't feel the need to prove it to you either. If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

I don't recall saying I had solved the hard problem. I do contend that I have given more than enough examples of how consciousness could be an advantage and selected for through evolution. Read through my preceding post to Sleeth, where I hope I make it clear that I am claiming nothing beyond that one thing.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate? If by "know," you are expecting absolute certainty, science will not give you that. Science will also not prove to you that anyone other than yourself is conscious. However, the inductive process key to developing a scientific theory can help us out here. It goes something like this:

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I have not nor will I ever claim that I have proven anything. By the same token, I cannot even prove that other organisms exist, or for that matter, that the physical world exists. A meaningful existence, however, must be predicated on the inductive conclusion that the world I seem to be a part of does exist. The default state of affairs is basically that all members of the same species share the same traits unless there is good reason to believe they don't. There is good reason to believe that Veronica Lake had blonde hair, whereas I don't, so that trait is thrown out the window. I have never been presented with any good reason to think that there exists a functional human being that is not conscious. If you can give me one, go for it.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

You are acting as if no argument carries any weight unless it is backed by scientific confirmation. I think that is pretty clearly not the case. I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You can badger me all you want, but I really don't feel the need to do that. I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival. While it is not logically inconsistent to postulate the possibility that a sleepwalker might be able to perform these functions, all the evidence runs against it. While it might be possible for a computer to perform these functions, the computing power necessary is far beyond what is attainable by the human brain.

I don't know what else you want me to do. By the standards you seem to be setting, I cannot even prove to you that I am conscious myself. Yet you respond as if I am aware of what is being discussed.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

All right, see what I mean? Where do I go with this? If you're going to squabble over something as simple as the conclusion that you are conscious of your own thought processes, how are we to hold a meaningful discussion?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

Then solve for me the hard problem of the opposable thumb. In principle, evolution could have developed a method by which all of the motor functions performed with an opposable thumb could have been performed without it. In fact, I can't even prove that an opposable thumb is useful. Although I could cut off both my thumbs and lose the ability to perform crucial functions, this is apparently no more a piece of evidence than the inability of a sleepwalker to perform functions crucial to the sustained survival of a human being. In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

loseyourname

Aug8-04, 10:12 PM

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs.

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

Fliption

Aug8-04, 11:28 PM

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

I'm not ignoring your question. I'm trying to get you to see that it is irrelevant. Apparently, I'm just not doing a very good job of it.
(Of course, even a good saleman will sell nothing to a brick wall :biggrin: )

I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness.

When you claim that a conscious brain is performing activity that an unconscious brain is not capable of because of the fact that it is conscious, you are associating that activity with consciousness itself. But it doesn't matter. From your comments below I suspect we actually agree on what I've been trying to get across.

If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

I have never been conscious of a brain process. See how easy I tore down your knowledge base? Tis the nature of subjectivity.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

I really don't understand how you can say this and still believe there is a hard problem to solve. This obstinance that you speak of is the nature of the hard problem.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate?

I wasn't really trying to set up an obstinate standard of knowledge. I was only trying to make the claim for the hard problem, which is that brain processes don't entail consciousness. Your standard of induction whereby you just conclude that all solipsists are obstinate people seems to suggest a poor opinion of philosophical views. If we follow this method, I don't see why we can't inductively rationalize many philosophical problems.

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I agree with this. But does this tell us anything about consciousness? My point wasn't so much focusing on whether others have consciousness or not. I was attempting to focus on the very reason you have to inductively conclude such things. Which is that we know nothing about it. No brain process can be linked to it and as I state aboved, brain processes don't even entail consciousness.

I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

I agree with this. This is all I needed to hear. If you're claiming your comments about consciousness and evolution are subjective and non-scientific then I definitely agree.

I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

You think I am being obstinate because you don't understand my point. I am emphasizing phrases to attempt to lead you where I'm going and it's probably a bit confusing. What you are saying is exactly what I usually say to Mentat. He pretends that he doesn't know what consciousness is so that he can avoid the hard problem. He doesn't know what subjective experience is. He does this so that our inability to define it or reductively describe it can be used to prove it doesn't exists. I say he's being obstinate and just using the hard problem itself to prove the hard problem doesn't exists. But in the end, I think you and I agree. I personally and subjectively agree with you about consciousness and evolution. I just interpreted you to put some scientific credibility behind these comments. While I might agree with them, assumption and induction is the only way we can get there.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival.

Again, you realize that in principle these things can be done without consciousness. This is not intended to illustrate that consciousness isn't needed or useful. It is intended to illustrate that we cannot rely on these functions as proof of consciousness; thereby solving much of the hard problem. The linkage to consciousness is purely a subjective one we have inductively applied to everyone. Not because we can analyze a brain and see consciousness at work.

In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

Now this is obstinate. You agree that the quality of knowledge we have for carbon dioxide is different from the quality of the subjective induction you use for your conclusions don't you? Unless you really think there is a hard problem of chemistry, it seems you do.

Since I'm doing such a poor job of explaining this, I'll post a link to a thread about evolution from some time ago. This thread ended up talking about evolution and consciousness. Ironically, it is the science types who claimed that consciousness had no place in the study of evolution. I participated here and disgreed with them strongly claiming that consciousness shouldn't be ignored. The thread seemed to end when Hypnagogue finally came in and straigtened things out.

I'll quote a little of his opinion here...

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

That last sentence probably includes reproduction too. :approve:

This is what I've been trying to say. Perhaps his words or maybe the discussion in this thread in general will help communicate that point.

http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=16648&page=12&pp=15&highlight=evolution

Fliption

Aug8-04, 11:30 PM

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

loseyourname

Aug9-04, 02:14 PM

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do. This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument. There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study. Well, I don't even know if there has been a study. I can, however, design a study that would test this hypothesis. First, we would need to find a way to induce a sleepwalking state in one group of subjects. We observe them, specifically putting them in situations in which we can test survival and reproductive success. Let's say, we have groups of husbands and wives sleepwalking, and observe whether or not they ever make any moves towards engaging in intercourse. We take people that are hungry, put them in sleepwalking mode, and see how successful they are at obtaining food. We then perform these same tests with people that are in a waking state. My hypothesis is that the group in the waking state will be more successful at performing critical functions than those in the sleepwalking group.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious. I contend that solipsism as a theory holds no more creedence than theories of extreme skepticism that would hold no subjective experience as reliable, even the perception of having a body. Under such a system of skepticism, no scientific knowledge of any kind is reliable knowledge, including the laws of chemistry. So if you are going to use solipsism to argue against a test for the value of consciousness, I contend that, to be consistent, you must regard all scientific knowledge as equally flawed. If you won't allow the premise that all humans in a waking state are conscious to be the base of an experiment, then you can't allow the premise that human sense perception is inherently reliable or even that other humans exist. In fact, under these strict rules of skepticism, macro-evolution itself would not be an acceptable theory. The attempt to fit consciousness into an evolutionary framework then becomes meaningless from the outset.

loseyourname

Aug9-04, 02:35 PM

Another thing to keep in mind is that there exist many traits for which the evolutionary significance is not known. There are cases, as in the eyestalk, where gene loci are close to each other, and the evolution of a certain trait owes only to its linkage to another trait that has survival or reproductive value. This is fairly easy to determine for monogenetic traits. A trait such as consciousness, on the other hand, requires many interconnected systems to be operational at the same time. It is an emergent, polygenetic trait, such as the ability to walk, which requires the coordination of many aspects of the nervous and skeletomuscular systems.

Another thing to consider is that certain traits evolve as byproducts of other traits that have survival or reproducive value. Take dolphin song, for example. It is not necessary, from an evolutionary standpoint, for the song of a dolphin to be as complex as it is. All of the information that needs to be transmitted from one dolphin to another could easily be transmitted using a system as simple as that of a primate. Dolphins, however, have a far more complex larynx and nasal passage than does any primate. The reason for this is that dolphins use echolocation, in addition to sight, to navigate and find food. Echolocation requires a complex vocal and auditory apparatus. This apparatus was already in place because it served the evolutionary purpose of making echolocation possible, and it just so happened that it could be used to communicate as well. As such, dolphin song is an emergent trait that emerged, by chance, from a complex system that evolved for other purposes. It is entirely possible that consciousness evolved in a similiar manner. It could just be a trait that emerged, by chance, from the complexities of the human nervous system, which evolved for separate purposes (initially for navigating through trees and complex social and child-rearing behavior, later for problem-solving).

One such trait that I would argue is an example of this phenomenon in humans is culture. Culture does not serve any obvious survival or reproductive purpose. In fact, given the gross prejudice and even warfare that exists because of cultural differences, I think it could be argued that culture is detrimental to species fitness. The development of language and complex social behavior, however, did serve an obvious survival purpose. Culture simply could have emerged from language and social behavior as a secondary trait with no real survival value of its own.

Fliption

Aug9-04, 05:23 PM

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument.

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious.

Please see your own acknowledgement of the hard problem and point in that direction for any obstinance you see. It is my source.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

loseyourname

Aug9-04, 07:15 PM

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

Of course consciousness is more difficult to study scientifically then acid neutralization. I never claimed otherwise. All I have claimed in this thread - the only thing - is that consciousness probably can be accounted for in an evolutionary framework as something that would naturally be selected for because of the advantages it offers over non-consciousness. Everything else being brought up is a tangent, in particular since you seem to agree with me on the only point I am trying to make.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

But that's the only point I'm trying to make. If you have nothing to debate regarding that, why did you ever reply to me in the first place?

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

I don't see it as being relevant. I have explained why. If you read the texts (the few that are available) regarding scientific treatments of consciousness, they don't find the concerns of solipsists to be of any relevance either. There is concern as to whether or not subjective experience can ever be given a full account of on a physical basis, but there is certainly no concern over assuming other humans to be conscious. In fact, all of the major studies I know of have been conducted on chimps, because it is illegal to do these experiments on humans.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine? My point is that consciousness is useful and that we can conduct a study that would give confirmation of its usefulness. That is scientific. So do you now agree that it is possible to confirm the usefulness of consciousness scientifically? Or will you say that it is not possible because we can't know that the subjects being studies are conscious. I don't think you realize the consequences of doing this.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

I will end this by reiterating the only point I was ever trying to make. There is nothing, in principle, that disallows the accounting for of consciousness in an evolutionary framework. That is all. I think it clearly provides a survival and reproductive advantage over a non-conscious version of the same organism. That is, a conscious human will be more successful than a non-conscious human. As such, it is sensible that natural selection would result in the evolution of conscious humans. Furthermore, I have pointed out that a particular trait does not necessarily need to have a survival or reproductive value in order to be accounted for through natural selection. I make no claim beyond these.

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. As it is, you have done nothing but to say that we can be more certain of scientific theories than we can be of the conclusion that other humans are conscious. I would like to know why this is. If relying on our sensory perception to be accurate is not too big of a leap for you, then why is believing another human being when he says that he subjectively experiences, in addition to the inductive conclusion drawn from the fact that we are of the same species and have the same general nervous and bodily capabilities? What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

Fliption

Aug9-04, 10:22 PM

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

Calm Down? What makes you think I need to calm down?

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

I've already responded to this. I'm not arguing for solipsism. Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven. I was simply using solipsism as an attempt to demonstrate the philosphical issues you have claiming scientific facts about consciousness. Of course, if you deny the hard problem then at least you'll be consistent.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine?

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

You don't know what my point is? I've tried to explain it. I posted a thread where you could read the objections of others to your theory. I even cut and past a relevant section of Hypnagogue's post in that thread and and stated at the end of it that "This was the point I was trying to make". His post didn't make any sense to you either? I haven't seen any acknowledgement of anything that I've referenced for you, trying to make you understand my point and realize that it isn't just me that has an issue with the way you callously call things scientific. All of these references have just been ignored.

I've told you that I have not answered your questions because they are not relevant. They do not change the philosophical issue. They wouldn't change them even if I wanted them to.

So you won't mind if I don't explain my point again. I've referenced enough that you can research the philosophy if you choose to.

Fliption

Aug9-04, 10:26 PM

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

Egmont

Aug10-04, 10:15 AM

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven.

Solipsism can be disproven, only the reasoning is a bit complicated to understand, because it involves a somewhat novel approach in philosophy: linguistic analysis (I mean novel in the context of 3,000 years of philosophy; the approach is more than a century old already)

Imagine someone claiming that the world is filled with "gnooks". You ask the person what a gnook is, and they say a gnook is an entity that can't be perceived in any conceivable way; they can't be seen, touched, or heard. Can you convince this person that gnooks don't really exist except in their flawed imagination? It's impossible.

The miracle of linguistic analysis, which is still too young a discipline and has not yet found its way into popular culture, is that it helps us realize most traditional philosophical dilemmas are nothing but arguments about the existence of gnooks. They are pseudo-dilemmas, not real philosophical problems, and the reason they are still popular is because people often fail to understand how language confuses them. They think any sentence that seems gramatically correct is a valid philosophical proposition, and that is just not the case.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

Fliption

Aug10-04, 02:33 PM

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

I didn't say that loseyourname was bashing metaphysics. I was just pointing out the somewhat less sturdy than expected foundation on which those that do bash metaphysics base all their conclusions on.

And exactly what is it that he was explaining that few understand? I understand his point perfectly well. He just doesn't appear to understand the philosophical issues he creates. Having an opposing philosophical issue is one thing. Ignoring them altogether is very different.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

Well, having a different philosophical opinion is one thing. Claiming that opinion is correct and everyone else is just stuck in the stone ages is something quite different. Anytime you wish to actually argue the point go ahead. But this probably isn't the thread for it.

I would guess that probably 99% of the people who are interested in this topic are not what you would call "modern" so be prepared for that. I'd be interested to see if there is anything to it or if it's yet another cop-out language theory that attempts to avoid the issues.

vanesch

Aug10-04, 03:21 PM

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

I'd like to jump in here. As said in this thread, if we put aside the hypothesis that my own subjective experiences are not in any way related to an existing world, and that the ONLY thing I know for sure is that *I* am concious and that I have subjective experiences, whatever they may mean - as in "I think therefor I am" - if we can put that hypothesis aside because it leads us a priori nowhere and we take for granted that there is a world out there, then there *IS* still a problem with conciousness in my opinion. If, as said before, we proceed by induction, and we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness". All that is allright. But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it. Yes, we can measure brain processes. We can correlate certain brain activities with awake people, and assume they have something to do with conciousness.
But can we make one day a machine that is concious ? And if so, how would we know ? Of course you don't expect to see "brain processes" in, I don't know, a computer. We cannot hide our ignorance anymore behind the simple induction of: "I'm concious, he looks like me, so probably he's concious too."
Behaviouralism is probably not the right way to go, because we can mimick a lot of "concious behaviour" with cleverly designed a-consious algorithms. I take it that my PC is not concious (but HOW do I really know that ?). But it can simulate quite some behaviour that is "Turing test like". And wait for 20 or 30 more years, and machines will really behave "as if" they are concious. Are they ? Aren't they ? Up to now, we have no scientific clue as how to investigate this. I think this is THE fundamental, difficult issue, if any, that the physical sciences have to consider, if they want to claim (as I think they should do) to understand everything in this world, at least in principle.
A related question is: are higher animals concious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?
Ignoring the existance of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

cheers,
Patrick.

loseyourname

Aug10-04, 03:36 PM

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

Look Fliption, I told you I already went through this thread. I may have even participated in it, though I don't really remember. I have participated in other threads questioning the relevance of consciousness to evolution. I'll try to answer this again.

All I am doing is going out on a limb here to propose that p-consciousness is epiphenomenal, and I've also proposed a way to test this hypothesis. The hypothesis proposes that not only is p-consciousness efficacious, but it provides a clear advantage for a human organism. The test is not meant to be proof, which seems to be your quabble. It is confirmation of a hypothesis, meant only to show that consciousness is not in principle excluded from evolutionary analysis. Sleeth has proposed in his empirical induction thread that third-person testing may not be the only scientific way to test a hypothesis, in particular a hypothesis regarding a subjective phenomenon. I agree with him and I am basing further explanation on that idea. Proof of my hypothesis, in the traditional third-person sense employed by the scientific method, is not available unless the hard problem is solved. Confirmation, however, is possible, and even something approaching proof may be sought if we allow one small assumption that is not so much of a leap from the assumptions on which the epistemology of science is based in the first place. There are consciouness studies being performed at both Cal Tech and USC which are based on this simple assumption - that all humans, and even chimps in the case of these studies, are conscious. The researchers don't seem to be concerned that their work is unscientific, and neither am I. Here are links to the labs I am speaking of:

http://www.klab.caltech.edu/

http://ilab.usc.edu/

The reason I tell you to calm down is that you seem to be getting rather exacerbated and you're beginning to be a tad bit insulting. I understand fully what you are saying, and I understand the points you are trying to make. What I did have trouble understanding initially is how they were relevant to the points I was making and whether or not you agreed with the bulk of what I was saying. It is frustrating that it took so long for me to figure these things out, because it would have happened a lot sooner had you simply answered the few questions I asked. I will admit that I am rather frustrated that no person on an internet forum anywhere, and particular on this one, seems to ever give a direct answer to a direct question. They instead call the question irrelevant and restate what they have already stated. When an answer would further my understanding of another's position, it is not irrelevant, even if that other does not consider it pertinent to the point he is making. A good discussion is facilitated by open lines of communication. Even if you don't see the importance of a particular question or example, it is best to address it. Answering questions will always further a discussion, whereas questioning questions only causes it to go in circles.

Another thing - please don't bemoan what you find as the deplorable behavior of scientific minded persons on a metaphysics forum. Address my arguments and my examples and my questions. I am the only person you are having this discussion with. There is no need for you to point out that my position may be inconsistent with that of other posters. I am not denying the philosophical perpelxedness of the hard problem. My only position on that matter is that the hard problem of consciousness can be circumscribed by a scientific investigation in the same way that Descartes' problem of the evil demon can be circumscribed. Just as we must assume that human sense perception is basically reliable and that there is indeed an external world that we can have knowledge of, we must assume that other humans are indeed conscious. Neither proposition can be proven, but what can be had is functional knowledge built from a set of basic assumptions. Any epistemic system must have a certain set of foundational principles, and one of the principles for the system I am proposing is that all humans are conscious. What we can derive from this assumption is the same thing we can derive from any scientific enquiry - functional knowledge that can reasonably be believed to closely approximate the truth.

The examples of Descartes' evil demon, the gnooks that Egmont speaks of, and my own hard problem of the opposable thumb are simply meant to illustrate the fact that philosophy is capable of posing any number of unsolvable, sometimes paradoxical questions and problems, none of which are of too much concern to a scientific researcher. This seems to be where we disagree. You think it is an important question that must be solved, I think it is not. It is obvious at this point that our respective positions on this will not be reconciled. We are both intelligent people and intelligent people sometimes disagree. There is nothing further to be argued on this particular matter.

Fliption

Aug10-04, 03:40 PM

I think this is THE fundamental, difficult issue, if any, that the physical sciences have to consider, if they want to claim (as I think they should do) to understand everything in this world, at least in principle.

Oh come now. Don't you realize that this is just being obstinate and silly? It's obvious that everything behaving like me is conscious. :rofl:

loseyourname

Aug10-04, 03:43 PM

If, as said before, we proceed by induction, and we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness". All that is allright. But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it. Yes, we can measure brain processes. We can correlate certain brain activities with awake people, and assume they have something to do with conciousness.

I want to jump in and say that I have never argued with this. Solving the problem of what consciousness is and how it is generated is another question entirely from the only question I meant to address. The only point I was ever trying to make is that consciousness is not, in principle, excluded from consideration as a naturally selected trait because it has no obvious evolutionary value.

A related question is: are higher animals concious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?
Ignoring the existance of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

Actually, biologists assume that higher animals are conscious. In order for consciousness to be an evolved trait, like any other trait, it must have arisen gradually through many species to eventually emerge in the form which we experience as conscious humans. If biologists didn't believe higher animals to be conscious, then researchers at Cal Tech and USC would not be performing consciousness studies on non-human primates.

loseyourname

Aug10-04, 03:44 PM

Oh come now. Don't you realize that this is just being obstinate and silly? It's obvious that everything behaving like me is conscious. :rofl:

No, it isn't, and if you are referring anything I ever said, you have misinterpreted. I have said that it is obvious that other humans are conscious, not that any machine or creature that behaves like a human is conscious. If you can't see the difference, so be it. Just realize that the position you are mocking is not my position.

Fliption

Aug10-04, 03:56 PM

No, it isn't, and if you are referring anything I ever said, you have misinterpreted. I have said that it is obvious that other humans are conscious, not that any machine or creature that behaves like a human is conscious. If you can't see the difference, so be it. Just realize that the position you are mocking is not my position.

The inference that you make about humans is not exempt from the point that Vanesch is making, regarding our inability to identify consciousness. You are merely appealing to common sense. What I mock is the use of common sense as an exception to a real philosophical issue.

loseyourname

Aug10-04, 03:58 PM

And I don't think questioning whether or not other humans are conscious is a "real" issue. That is all. We disagree. I have people on my side, you have people on your side. All are intelligent people. So be it.

Egmont

Aug10-04, 04:38 PM

we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness".

It may be a bit difficult to understand why, but it's perfectly possible to know that other people are conscious. It's not an assumption, not a working hypothesis, but a well-established fact. If for some reason you find out that other people do not have what you call consciousness, it only means you didn't know what the word "consciousness" means. You learned it from other people, and they couldn't tell you they have something only you have. They would not have a word for it.

But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it.

It is wrong to think that we have a "problem of consciousness" just because we don't know what consciousness is. We don't know what most things "are" if taken in that sense. If we have a problem of consciousness because of that, then we also have a problem of space, a problem of time, a problem of object, a problem of language, a problem of numbers, a problem of intelligence... the list is endless!

But can we make one day a machine that is concious?

If we make a machine that appears to be conscious, we won't think it is conscious because we already know how to account for its behavior using other concepts. We need the concept of consciousness to explain why people do some things they do; we don't need the concept to explain how computers work, we already have simpler concepts like boolean logic and electricity.

We cannot hide our ignorance anymore behind the simple induction of: "I'm concious, he looks like me, so probably he's concious too."

When your computer says "You have mail", you don't think it's conscious, do you? That is because you fully understand why it is doing it without having to invoke a conscious entity inside the computer. It's misleading to think we will one day build a machine so complex we won't understand it, and will be forced to come up with a concept like consciousness to explain its behavior. The reason is simple: we can't build a machine we don't understand. In fact, it's hard enough to build machines we fully understand.

I take it that my PC is not concious (but HOW do I really know that ?).

You really know that because, if you claim your computer is conscious, an electrical engineer can explain to you what you mean by "conscious" in very precise terms (the same terms an engineer uses to build the computer in the first place). The concept of consciousness will then become a superfluous idea which can be stated in more precise, simpler terms.

A related question is: are higher animals concious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?

As far as humans go, consciousness implies the existence of language abilities. If you can communicate using symbols, then you're conscious; if you're not, then it's impossible to know.

To answer the question about animals, until we discover if they use language (they might; after all they make a lot of noises), we have no way to know if they are conscious.

Ignoring the existance of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

I never heard of anyone who denies the existence of consciousness. All I know about are people who don't subscribe to certain metaphysical views, but I never saw anyone claiming humans are not conscious.

vanesch

Aug10-04, 05:54 PM

It is wrong to think that we have a "problem of consciousness" just because we don't know what consciousness is. We don't know what most things "are" if taken in that sense.

Not really. We have a quite accurate working definition of, say, an ethanol molecule. We have techniques to measure the amount of ethanol in a given liquid. We don't have anything comparable for conciousness.

If we make a machine that appears to be conscious, we won't think it is conscious because we already know how to account for its behavior using other concepts.

That's a bit silly: you reduce conciousness to a behavioural mystery. If there is no behavioural mystery, then there cannot be conciousness. So that would mean that people who's behaviour is perfectly predictable aren't concious (so they don't feel pain when we hit them :Devil:)

When your computer says "You have mail", you don't think it's conscious, do you?

I don't know. If YOU tell me that I have mail, do I conclude from that that you are / aren't concious ? I don't think that behaviourism can indicate the presence or absence of conciousness. It is not impossible to think of machines that do what many people do, a lot of their time.

You really know that because, if you claim your computer is conscious, an electrical engineer can explain to you what you mean by "conscious" in very precise terms (the same terms an engineer uses to build the computer in the first place). The concept of consciousness will then become a superfluous idea which can be stated in more precise, simpler terms.

Again, you seem to equate conciousness with "cannot be explained". So some parts of my car are concious, until I find out how it works ?

As far as humans go, consciousness implies the existence of language abilities. If you can communicate using symbols, then you're conscious; if you're not, then it's impossible to know.

Again. That's not what conciousness is about. Computers talk to eachother over a network. Ants talk to eachother using pheromones. Is "establishing a communication protocol and link" the same as "conciousness" ?
You know in your bones that that's not it. It is this "awareness of existence" together with what can be qualified as "feelings" we're talking about.
Is a human being who lost his linguistic abilities by accident not a concious being anymore ?

To answer the question about animals, until we discover if they use language (they might; after all they make a lot of noises), we have no way to know if they are conscious.

We have no way, indeed. But linguistic abilities are not the same thing as conciousness. And, we might one day make machines that mimick so well ordinary human conversation, that you will be tricked into thinking they are concious. But all this is behaviourism. We're missing the point.

cheers,
Patrick.

Philocrat

Aug10-04, 10:40 PM

More Questions About Consciousness

1) What is the BENEFIT of People installed in seperate visual perspectives or spatiotemporal frames of reference feeling the same pain or seeing the same patch of red colour and knowing what it is like to do so? What will we now or in the end do with this sort of knowledge?

2) Does consciousness have VISUAL PRIORITY LEVELS extending outward and inward? For example, there are many physical events and actions in the human body that the body is already able to carry them out automatically that are claimed not to have any relations to consciousenss. If there are visual priority levels, ought we not to argue that somethings or events or actions in our body are given more visual attention than others, that things that the body is capable of doing without much visual attention are gracefully but naturally deprioritised? Could we not argue that despite the fact that they are visully deprioritised things or events, or actions nevertheless they are still conscious? And that at the outer higher conscious-level, more visual attentions are given to LIVE-CRITICAL things and events from within and from without? This question has serious implications on the need to reconcile 'SEQUENTIALISM' with 'SIMULTANEITY' in the overal mental and physical processes. Personally, I keep a very open mind on this, but if at all we still believe that there is a clear distinction between mental states and physical states, the pulling tension between Sequentialism and Simultaneity is a problem that plagues the two on equal terms. And I think that this problem has a connection with why we think of visually deprioritised things and events as unconscious or visually unattended, or even with why we created the gulf between physical states and mental states in the first place.

3) What PHYSICAL SIZE must anything have before it can qualify to possess or have consciousnes? Does size matter? I am asking this question because in nearly every discipline, we tend to erroneously believe that only the human form of a given or well-established 'SIZE' is capable of conscious existence. This now automatically invokes my next question.

4) Does Consciousness come in DEGREES or in different GRADES? Obviously this question depends on our answer to (3), or simply on accepting that different kinds of biological organisms, regardless of their forms, sizes, time scales or modes of existence, can possess consciousness of some sort in the first place. What I am getting at is this: couldn't we just accept and say that other organisims may or do possess consciousness but only that this comes in different grades or degrees? If this were to be the case we ought to then argue that consciousness has a unique purpose and that coming in different grades or categories it oughts to be structurally and fuctionally improveable towards some sort of structrual and fucntional 'perfection'. However, even if, this still leaves one outstanding question to be cleard up: If consciousness in the end survives destruction with the human in which it is a part, which aspect of it will remain, let alone be relevant?

5) Is 'COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'POOLED CONSCIOUSNESS' possible? If it exists will this solve the 'Qualia Problem'? I ask this question, because there are some scientists who are already attmepting to take it from the realm of paranormalism into the realm of 'science'. I will provide some postings later on this.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 12:03 AM

The only point I was ever trying to make is that consciousness is not, in principle, excluded from consideration as a naturally selected trait because it has no obvious evolutionary value.

I understood that by reading the previous posts in this monster thread. I have no hard opinion on the issue, but would like to raise a point. If something is to have evolutionary value, is it not more intelligence than conciousness ? Which then links to another question: is conciousness necessary for intelligence ? Personally, I don't think so, but I have no strong arguments. Intelligence is much more "measurable" than conciousness, and I think, in 20-30 years, we will have very intelligent machines, intelligent in the sense that they can do lots of "smart things". But to me, conciousness is that "other" aspect of our being, namely, as I wrote earlier, our "awareness", our "feelings", the fact that "pain hurts". I know this is vague, but that's exactly the problem !
There is something ethical about conciousness, because "pain hurts". Once we know that certain machines would be concious, I think ethically they should have fundamental rights, such as the right for not being tortured or so.
On the other hand, I don't think you can do unethical things to your PC. But maybe one day I will stand on trial because I made a big, concious computer in the basement, which I then tortured during years because I'm a perverted lunatic :-)

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 12:15 AM

If something is to have evolutionary value, is it not more intelligence than conciousness ?

I said the above, because I'm quite convinced that conciousness has nothing to do with behaviourism, in that conciousness _observes_ but does not necessarily _act_. If the acts come from intelligence, then the behaviour (and hence the survivalistic value) of an animal with or without conciousness, but with the same intelligence should be the same.

cheers,
patrick.

balkan

Aug11-04, 04:27 AM

is this a thread?

Egmont

Aug11-04, 08:55 AM

We have a quite accurate working definition of, say, an ethanol molecule. We have techniques to measure the amount of ethanol in a given liquid. We don't have anything comparable for conciousness.

That's not true. It's a lot easier for anyone to determine if a person is conscious, than it is for chemists to determine if a certain liquid contains ethanol. We don't have instruments to measure consciousness simply because we don't need them.

That's a bit silly: you reduce conciousness to a behavioural mystery. If there is no behavioural mystery, then there cannot be conciousness.

It's not silly but, as I said, it may be difficult to understand why. At least it was difficult for me. I will try and elaborate.

If you think about our knowledge, it consists primarily of two types of entities: things we can directly observe, and things we postulate to exist which cannot be directly observed. The former are what we call entities in the physical universe; the latter are called many different names: laws, principles, forces, and so on. This immediately begs the question: why do we need to postulate the existence of things which cannot be observed? Why not simply stick to what we observe?

The reason we come up with unobservable entities is quite simple: they are implied to exist as an explanation of what we observe. Here is an example: we observe objects falling to the ground all the time, but we don't understand why. Somehow it seems the fact that objects fall must necessarily imply the existence of some entity which is causing them to fall. As we all know, that entity is now known as "gravity", but it's an often ignored fact that the only way we can observe gravity is by observing its effects. To this day, no one has asserted the existence of gravity as an entity which exists on its own; in fact that is just impossible, given that the absence of observable effects implies the absence of gravity itself (one could say we have a "problem of gravity")

Back to consciousness. It certainly is not part of the physical universe, as it can't be directly observed. "Consciousness" is a postulate, an entity which we conceive of in an attempt to explain certain aspects of human behavior. And that being the case, like gravity, consciousness cannot be postulated to exist in the absence of observable effects.

So that would mean that people who's behaviour is perfectly predictable aren't concious

No, that is not what it means. The issue here is, how do we explain a certain behavior? Sometimes you have to invoke the unobservable entity called "consciousness", sometimes you can explain behavior invoking simpler, more intuitive concepts. The latter alternative is always preferrable.

It is not impossible to think of machines that do what many people do, a lot of their time.

Machines already do a lot of what people do, often better, yet no one seriously consider them to be conscious. The reason, as I said above, is simply because we have simpler, more intuitive explanations.

Again, you seem to equate conciousness with "cannot be explained". So some parts of my car are concious, until I find out how it works ?

Nope. If you are an educated person, you know that an explanation for the workings of you car exist, and you know that it doesn't involve consciousness. On the other hand, if you are an ignorant person, you may be tempted to do exactly what you said: invoke the existence of conscious entities that cause your car to behave the way it does. That's why primitive peoples tend to believe the world is filled with "spirits" - they lack better explanations, that's all.

You know in your bones that that's not it. It is this "awareness of existence" together with what can be qualified as "feelings" we're talking about.

In all honesty, I have no idea what "awareness of existence" means, so I can't really comment on that. As to "feelings", mine are always associated, without exceptions, with bodily sensations, so it's possible they are the same thing.

linguistic abilities are not the same thing as conciousness.

I didn't say they were the same thing, I said the only way to establish the presence of consciousness for sure is by checking for linguistic abilities. That is because most other behaviors can be explained without invoking the concept of consciousness, but language cannot.

And, we might one day make machines that mimick so well ordinary human conversation, that you will be tricked into thinking they are concious.

As I said, primitive peoples are often tricked into thinking inanimate objects are conscious. The only thing that may cause a human to think a computer is conscious is ignorance of the way the computer works.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 11:30 AM

As I said, primitive peoples are often tricked into thinking inanimate objects are conscious. The only thing that may cause a human to think a computer is conscious is ignorance of the way the computer works.

Ok, we have very different definitions of the word "conciousness" then.
Concerning your definition of what is part of the physical world (can be directly observed) and what are "explanatory concepts" (all the rest), I'm affraid that you also have a very different definition of "the physical world", a very restrictive one. You seem to say that the physical world contains only those entities that can directly influence your senses. Visible light exists, but UV light is an "explanatory concept". Rain drops exist, but water molecules are an explanatory concept. Indeed, if you reduce the physical world to this definition, then it is probably hopeless to talk about conciousness, which, if anything, you will for sure classify as an explanatory concept, together with gravity, EM waves, atoms, molecules, black holes, neutrinos and extrasolar planets.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 11:39 AM

In all honesty, I have no idea what "awareness of existence" means, so I can't really comment on that. As to "feelings", mine are always associated, without exceptions, with bodily sensations, so it's possible they are the same thing.

Yes, they are the same thing. That's part of my definition of conciousness. Does a human being have "bodily sensations" ? (yes) Does a monkey ? (highly probable) Does a rabbit ? (probably, I don't know) Does a mouse ? (probably, I don't know) Does a bird ? (probably, I don't know) Does a bee ? (don't think so, but maybe). An ant ? (don't think so) A microbe ? (don't think so) A virus ? (nope) An embryo ? (depends on the age ?) A computer ? (not for the moment) A brain ? (?)
Will it be possible, one day, to make a machine (not necessarily in silicon, might be molecular or biomolecular, but fully artificial) which is of the same complexity as an ant ? As a bee ? As a bird ? As a mouse ? As a rabbit ?
Do you see where I am aiming at ?

Also, you say that you have no idea of your awareness of existance, even when you are awake. You must not be serious when you claim that ! You are not aware that you exist ???

I have difficulties pinning down exactly my "definition" of conciousness, but that is not my fault, it is because it is a very slippery subject. But let me try to work with some of its properties. Probably the closest I come to conciousness is that "pain hurts". You can define "pain" in a behavioural way, in that an entity "tries to avoid" stimuli which are "painful". But that's of no use in itself: I can train a robot to run away from, say, a green ball, and then we should conclude that the view of a green ball is painfull for the robot.
You could also define something of the style that pain is what is conceived, correctly or incorrectly, by an entity, as something that is damageable.
But that's also not true: I can put you in an intense neutron beam, and you won't feel anything. However, you'll probably devellop a serious cancer withing the next months or years.
Conciousness is present when pain also hurts. If I hit your foot with a hammer, and when the nerve signals reach your brain, it hurts, then you are concious. The opposite is not necessarily true: it is not because you don't feel pain that you aren't concious, but if you DO feel pain, then you ARE concious. I don't think that a tree can feel pain. I'm not sure if an ant does, or a bee. A mouse, not really sure, it might be purely behavioural (a behavioural response to a stimulus which we associate with pain, by analogy, if "they would do that to us"), but you get the idea that a mouse might feel pain. A monkey, I think it does feel pain. I'm pretty sure you feel pain.

cheers,
Patrick.

Egmont

Aug11-04, 12:27 PM

Ok, we have very different definitions of the word "conciousness" then.

Who doesn't?

Concerning your definition of what is part of the physical world (can be directly observed) and what are "explanatory concepts" (all the rest), I'm affraid that you also have a very different definition of "the physical world", a very restrictive one.

I don't find it restrictive at all. There's plenty of stuff around me that I can see, hear, touch, smell, taste.

You seem to say that the physical world contains only those entities that can directly influence your senses.

Pretty much.

Visible light exists, but UV light is an "explanatory concept".

Actually, "light" is also an explanatory concept.

Rain drops exist, but water molecules are an explanatory concept.

Exactly. But you can't overlook an important aspect: so long as we don't have a better explanation, we are forced to acknowledge that "water molecules" must exist even if we can't observe them. At the same time, to assert that we know that water molecules exist with the same certainty we assert that rain drops exist is a bit of an oversight, in my opinion.

Indeed, if you reduce the physical world to this definition, then it is probably hopeless to talk about conciousness, which, if anything, you will for sure classify as an explanatory concept, together with gravity, EM waves, atoms, molecules, black holes, neutrinos and extrasolar planets.

I don't find it hopeless. Keeping in mind that consciousness is an explanatory concept helps understand why it generates so much heated debate. As you certainly are aware, asserting the existence of explanatory concepts can be troublesome at times. So long as there are alternative explanations, the world will always be filled with people who deny that consciousness exists. I don't think I'm one of these people because, as with molecules and UV rays, we are forced to accept the existence of consciousness because it is the best explanation for human behavior. I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it. The same reasoning could be used to assert the existence of a lot of stuff, like ghosts and lake monsters.

loseyourname

Aug11-04, 01:04 PM

I understood that by reading the previous posts in this monster thread. I have no hard opinion on the issue, but would like to raise a point. If something is to have evolutionary value, is it not more intelligence than conciousness ? Which then links to another question: is conciousness necessary for intelligence ? Personally, I don't think so, but I have no strong arguments. Intelligence is much more "measurable" than conciousness, and I think, in 20-30 years, we will have very intelligent machines, intelligent in the sense that they can do lots of "smart things". But to me, conciousness is that "other" aspect of our being, namely, as I wrote earlier, our "awareness", our "feelings", the fact that "pain hurts". I know this is vague, but that's exactly the problem !

A couple things about this. First, remember that a trait does not necessarily need to be of value to be fit into an evolutionary framework. There are other mechanisms I've spoken of by which relatively superfluous traits may evolve. That said, I do think that consciousness is of value. If you go back to my example of functionally conscious machines - that is, a machine that is capable of performing all of the functions that a conscious human can, but without having any subjective experience, you'll see a point I made about computing power. The ability to strategize holistically seems to still be fairly lost on computers, as evidenced by the fact that we have yet to design a program that can defeat a human skilled at the game of Go. I'm sure there are other examples, but that is the best one I can think of. A program that would be capable of doing this; that is, strategizing holistically about this very complex game at least as well as a human can, would require even more computing power than is currently available - but the most powerful computers already have far more computing power than does the human brain. So it is think it is clear that being conscious gives us the ability to economize - to perform these functions with minimal computing power. Without consciousness, I'd imagine our heads would be much larger and use up far more oxygen and ATP than they already do, which in and of itself is a disadvantage.

There is something ethical about conciousness, because "pain hurts". Once we know that certain machines would be concious, I think ethically they should have fundamental rights, such as the right for not being tortured or so.
On the other hand, I don't think you can do unethical things to your PC. But maybe one day I will stand on trial because I made a big, concious computer in the basement, which I then tortured during years because I'm a perverted lunatic :-)

You know, I hadn't even thought of that. There is clearly an advantage in having members of a species instilled with a certain sense of ethics, and that cannot be achieved unless individuals of that species are capable of "feeling" subjectively.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 01:55 PM

I don't think I'm one of these people because, as with molecules and UV rays, we are forced to accept the existence of consciousness because it is the best explanation for human behavior. I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it.

My opinion is exactly the opposite. Consciousness (I realize I've been misspelling the word all along ! English is not my mothertongue...) in the way I define it has absolutely no explanatory power, and - as I tried to point out - I think there is no link between consciousness and behaviourism. Probably if we will know the brain functions much better, the behaviour of a human being can be perfectly well explained as a function of these brain processes. So I don't need the concept to explain observations... except for the very observation that *I* am conscious (and by analogy, I assume you are too). It is not because a highly advanced medical science will be able to tell me that when you hit my foot with a hammer, a Sodium-Potassium ion density wave will propagate along the nerves, and then will release receptors in this part of the brain, and so pulses will go in that part of the brain, and that this will activate my voice control, and that I will pronounce the word "Aaah", and that other pulses will go to the muscles of my arm and try to grab the hammer out of your hand, and still other pulses will go to other muscles in my leg and my eyes will look at you and I will try to kick your bottom with my foot etc... that I will stop feeling the pain ! So if there is ONE thing I know for sure is that I am conscious, and I don't need that as an explanatory concept to explain my behaviour, I feel it.
In that view, the certified existence of consciousness is more a problem for the physical sciences if they want to explain it, than it is an explanatory tool, which, in my eyes, it isn't at all. If ever the physical sciences will have to admit that they cannot explain the whole universe, and that there is not only room for religion, but even necessity, then the issue of consciousness will be central to it. But there is still hope, we are far from having discovered everything the physical sciences can explain, no matter what naive string theorists seem to think.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug11-04, 02:33 PM

If you go back to my example of functionally conscious machines - that is, a machine that is capable of performing all of the functions that a conscious human can, but without having any subjective experience

Ah, at least someone who has about the same conceptual notion of consciousness as me ! I haven't seen your example, but the very fact that you consider (as I do) that you can have a machine that in every aspect behaves "as would behave a conscious being in the same context" and you consider the possibility that that machine might NOT be conscious means that you do not necessarily adhere to behaviourism (which I define as exactly the opposite: namely, if the behaviour is as "would behave a conscious being in the same circumstances", then it is conscious; which reduces "consciousness" to a set of behavioural patterns and denies anything else it might mean).

But if "conscious-like behaviour" and consciousness are not equivalent in meaning, then this also means that things that might not at all act "conscious-like" can be conscious, and vice versa, and we're back to my central problem: except for oneself, of which one KNOWS one is conscious, and except for other human beings, which we can assume they are conscious by analogy, how the hell are we going to find out if an entity is conscious or not.

Now that we've put behaviourism aside (a good thing, in my opinion), there are two possibilities left open:

1) consciousness can influence behaviour. That means that consciousness somehow acts upon the physical world. This is a difficult-to-accept notion if we look into the functioning of a conscious being (the only one we know of for sure is a human, actually, only white, male humans, because I'm not sure that people of aziatic or african origin are conscious, or whether women are conscious, because I'm a white male - no, just kidding :-))) because we might find a complete behavioural description of the conscious being without needing any interference in the physical laws gouverning that behavioural description (except if we accept that a conscious being can only be based upon a quantum phenomenon, in which the fundamental uncertainties of quantum theory give the room of action to a consciousness to intervene in the behaviour ; Roger Penrose takes this very seriously).

2) Consciousness is a passive observer within a conscious being, whose behaviour is entirely determined by physical processes that are happening in the physical construction making up the body of the conscious being. Our consciousness just undergoes, without any influence, what the body does, all by itself. In this case it will be very hard to determine whether something else than a human being is or isn't conscious.

The ability to strategize holistically seems to still be fairly lost on computers, as evidenced by the fact that we have yet to design a program that can defeat a human skilled at the game of Go.

I'm not convinced by that. It is not because we haven't yet found out HOW to build efficiently such a machine, that it cannot be done. The question will then be if the machine is, or isn't, conscious !

but the most powerful computers already have far more computing power than does the human brain.

I would be surprised by this. If some parts of the brain are quantum computers, then the computing power of the brain might be tremendiously higher than by considering that neurons are the equivalent of logic gates, as is usually done in this kind of comparison.

cheers,
Patrick.

selfAdjoint

Aug11-04, 03:07 PM

Neurons, even without quantum consideration are closer to analog cpus than to logic gates. They can have many inputs with variable and conditional outputs, just as if running a program.

Egmont

Aug11-04, 04:14 PM

So if there is ONE thing I know for sure is that I am conscious, and I don't need that as an explanatory concept to explain my behaviour, I feel it.

But how exactly do you know that whatever it is that you feel is actually called "consciousness"? Think about it, you learned what the word means from other people, but you never had a chance to observe how they feel when they say they are conscious. Do you think it's possible that you associated the word "consciousness" with the wrong feeling? How can you be sure that you experience what other people describe as "conscious" if you have no way of experiencing what they do?

Those are very valid questions, and they clearly show that no one can be sure they are conscious just because they feel it. The reason we know for sure we are conscious is because we behave the same way as people who claim to be conscious behave. It's not because we feel the same way, for we have no idea how they feel.

If ever the physical sciences will have to admit that they cannot explain the whole universe, and that there is not only room for religion, but even necessity, then the issue of consciousness will be central to it.

Well, anything physical can be explained in purely physical terms. To say that science must incorporate religion is equivalent to saying economics must incorporate chemistry, or that biology must incorporate astronomy. Our knowledge is segmented, and religion provides knowledge about questions which lay completely beyond the domain of science.

But there is still hope, we are far from having discovered everything the physical sciences can explain...

I used to think that witnessing a miracle (supposing they happen) could convince any die-hard skeptic that materialism is a false ideology. I later realized I was wrong: the world is full of miracles, they happen everyday right in front of our eyes. Materialism is simply the mistaken notion that simply because something happens everyday, then there's nothing special about it. If the sky was filled with a different poem everyday, materialists would still claim it is perfectly "natural".

I think it's better just to ignore the materialists; they are a small minority anyway.

Fliption

Aug11-04, 07:15 PM

It seems I overlooked this sermon I got.

All I am doing is going out on a limb here to propose that p-consciousness is epiphenomenal, and I've also proposed a way to test this hypothesis. The hypothesis proposes that not only is p-consciousness efficacious, but it provides a clear advantage for a human organism. The test is not meant to be proof, which seems to be your quabble.

My quabble is simply that I interpreted your original comments to be one that denies the hard problem. In the quote above you at least admit that you are going out on a limb and making some assumptions. I see nothing wrong with doing this btw. It's the only way to make progress in the real world. If we allow philosophy questions to stop us from acting, we'll never accomplish anything. But this quote above is very different from the original message I got earlier in the thread. Those statements sounded more like statements of fact and anyone who disagrees is just obviously not thinking very hard about it. It seemed to totally ignore the philosophical issues or even deny them altogether.

The reason I tell you to calm down is that you seem to be getting rather exacerbated and you're beginning to be a tad bit insulting.

I suppose I don't respond well to being called obstinate and silly when I can point to many people who agree with my position. Frustration is just a natural response when I perceive someone is being a bit egocentric.

When an answer would further my understanding of another's position, it is not irrelevant, even if that other does not consider it pertinent to the point he is making. A good discussion is facilitated by open lines of communication. Even if you don't see the importance of a particular question or example, it is best to address it. Answering questions will always further a discussion, whereas questioning questions only causes it to go in circles.

There is no hard and fast rule for communication. What you say is sometimes true but other times it is a waste of time. The questions you asked were irrelevant. They still are. If I answer them, it only serves to further lead you down the wrong path by giving you the impression that they are relevant. My point should have been obvious after I posted the other thread. Instead, the posting here still continued seemingly without a clue what I was talking about and with no reference to the other information. So I can understand frustration.

Another thing - please don't bemoan what you find as the deplorable behavior of scientific minded persons on a metaphysics forum. Address my arguments and my examples and my questions. I am the only person you are having this discussion with. There is no need for you to point out that my position may be inconsistent with that of other posters.

I pointed out where other posters disagreed with you to attempt to somehow get across the idea that your views were not without their problems and that one does not need to be obstinate to point them out.

And it is an open forum, with many readers. I try not to forget that. I make observations, including those about behavior, because it just might draw someone else on the sidelines into the discussion. So you won't mind if I don't do what you ask.

Just as we must assume that human sense perception is basically reliable and that there is indeed an external world that we can have knowledge of, we must assume that other humans are indeed conscious.

This is why I still insist your questions were not relevant. You still think I'm talking about whether other humans are conscious. As I've said before, that is merely a byproduct of the real issue, which I was using as an illustration. I couldn't care less about solipsism.

This seems to be where we disagree. You think it is an important question that must be solved, I think it is not.

I hope you see now after this response that this isn't true. I fully understand why certain scientific researchers don't care about such things. But making an assumption so that work can be carried out is very different from totally denying that an assumption was made. Originally, I thought you were doing the latter of the two. Now it seems you are not. So I' don't think we actually disagree.

Fliption

Aug11-04, 09:19 PM

I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it.

How else would you know of it? How else would you know of anything? Experience is your only access to anything.

Also, help me understand your position a little more. Help me reconcile the quote above, which seems to be open to consciousness not existing, with this quote:

It's a lot easier for anyone to determine if a person is conscious, than it is for chemists to determine if a certain liquid contains ethanol. We don't have instruments to measure consciousness simply because we don't need them.

How can you determine that someone has something when you aren't sure it exists? In other words, how is it the word consciousness being used in language is proof that everyone is conscious yet it isn't proof that "something" exists we are referring to as consciousness?

Also, IMO proving solipsism wrong doesn't end the hard problem. That's like taking a boat to work after a major flood and then once you get to work saying "What flood? There is no flood. See, I got to work!"

The issue with the hard problem is that there is no functional explanation for what each of us refer to as consciousness. Whether other people are conscious are not is simply a byproduct of this situation. You may find alternatives around this particular byproduct(like taking a boat) but it doesn't eliminate the source of the problem(the flood).

Also, I will argue that this method of using language to make a claim about consciousness can only be used, at the very least, to argue that at least two people are conscious. That's all that's needed to establish the concept. Everyone else can pick up the word and attach it to whatever they want to and just believe they are referring to the same thing. The issue still stands in that you cannot know whether any one person or thing is conscious. I may be the only person on the planet that isn't and you would never know because me not being conscious wouldn't impact the language at all.

But how exactly do you know that whatever it is that you feel is actually called "consciousness"? Think about it, you learned what the word means from other people, but you never had a chance to observe how they feel when they say they are conscious. Do you think it's possible that you associated the word "consciousness" with the wrong feeling? How can you be sure that you experience what other people describe as "conscious" if you have no way of experiencing what they do?

This is similar to the inverted spectrum scenario. This is a true situation we find oursleves in and fun to think about. But the only thing this explains is why there is so much confusion when people try to discuss things. It means nothing to the issues of consciosuness. I can, if I were a scientist, understand the materialistic principles by which I explain the nature of things around me. I can also understand that I have an experience of something that I refer to as "consciousness". So I can also see that these two don't connect and this creates a hard problem. I do not need to know what anyone else thinks consciousness is. I do not even need to have a word attached to my experience. I just need to notice it and establish it internally as a concept that needs explaining and then note that I can't explain it using the same materialistic techniques I've used to explain everything else.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 12:29 AM

But how exactly do you know that whatever it is that you feel is actually called "consciousness"?

Because that's what *I* call it ! But let us not do that, because apparently the word is already "occupied". Let us have instead a thread on the problem of knowing if an entity is "bewust". By "bewust" I mean the fact that an entity has subjective experiences and feelings, and that pain hurts. I know that *I* am bewust, it is the only thing I really know for sure. From analogy, I take it a reasonable assumption that other creatures around me, who look like me, and behave like me, should also be "bewust" ; at least some of them :wink: . This I don't know for sure, but I take it as an acceptable hypothesis. And now the question is: what exactly is causing this bewustness, and when can we know that something which DOESN'T look at all like a human being can have bewustness. As I explained above, it has nothing behavioural. Behavioural testing can test intelligence if you want, but not the fact whether or not the entity behaving that way has subjective experiences. So bewustness is not an explanatory concept for behaviour. We actually do not need the concept, if it weren't for the very fact that *I* know that I have subjective experiences and feelings.

And now that we have a new word for what I want to talk about, at least we won't be fighting with linguistic arguments about definitions ! I want to talk about the concept "bewust" as I defined above, not about how we should define an existing word. It's the concept, not the word, I'm interested in discussing.

I was assuming that what I defined above as "bewust" came pretty close to what people accept as the definition of conscious. But in order to be able to start reasoning around the same concept, I introduced a new, "virgin" word that should be free of any preconceptions that might differ from what I thought the word meant and hence bring in confusion in the arguments. The price to pay is that I will have to build up the entire definition of my new word myself.

So in order to add to my definition of "bewust", I can add the following: it is in general considered ethically a bad thing to inflict bad treatment on something that is supposed to have bewustness, much more so than just the consequences of material damage that might follow from this bad treatment, in the following way:
it is sometimes not considered "very nice" to cut down trees, but the reasons for that are that we like the sight of trees, that there are some ecological considerations and so on. But trees are cut down (for the wood and so on) and nobody is going to argue that at least, one should do it in a "quick and clean way".
But it IS strongly ethically disapproved to torture young children in your basement. The reason for that is NOT the loss in investment (it took time and money to make them and raise them) or that fact that if you don't kill them, they might turn into mentally desequilibrated persons or whatever... no, it is the very act of torture that is strongly disapproved. And this comes from the fact that we assume children to have bewustness.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 01:10 AM

I think it's better just to ignore the materialists; they are a small minority anyway.

I think it is better to ignore mathematicians. They are a small minority anyway.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 01:17 AM

I can, if I were a scientist, understand the materialistic principles by which I explain the nature of things around me. I can also understand that I have an experience of something that I refer to as "consciousness". So I can also see that these two don't connect and this creates a hard problem. I do not need to know what anyone else thinks consciousness is. I do not even need to have a word attached to my experience. I just need to notice it and establish it internally as a concept that needs explaining and then note that I can't explain it using the same materialistic techniques I've used to explain everything else.

You come to the essence of the point I was trying to make here. The only difference in opinion I might have is the following: I've not yet given up on scientific inquiry into consciousness. But we haven't even begun! Progress could be made, if one day, we could, say, link together two brains, or a brain and a conscious machine, and your conscious experience "merges" somehow with that of the other entity.

cheers,
Patrick.

Fliption

Aug12-04, 08:15 AM

You come to the essence of the point I was trying to make here. The only difference in opinion I might have is the following: I've not yet given up on scientific inquiry into consciousness. But we haven't even begun! Progress could be made, if one day, we could, say, link together two brains, or a brain and a conscious machine, and your conscious experience "merges" somehow with that of the other entity.

cheers,
Patrick.

Let me be more clear then, because I agree with this. I don't necessarily believe that we cannot one day find a place for consciousness and gain knowledge of it. I simply doubt that materialism can do it. Simply because it insists on doing it in a functional way and I don't believe that it can be reductively explained functionally. So this doesn't exclude science. It just means that there needs to be some assumption changes about what is fundamental in nature and what is emerging from those fundamental parts.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 08:21 AM

I simply doubt that materialism can do it.

I'm not well versed in philosophic terminology, so could you give me your definition of "materialism" ? I thought it meant that everything was explainable in physical laws, but probably it is more subtle than this.

cheers,
patrick.

Egmont

Aug12-04, 08:28 AM

Because that's what *I* call it !

OK, here's how I see it: when you claim you are sure you are conscious, at a minimum I can agree that there is at least one fact about which you have no doubt whatsoever. I can certainly agree with you that for each and every person, at least one fact is true beyond doubt. So for a while let's ignore what it is you are sure about, because it's easier to reach agreement that way.

But let us not do that, because apparently the word is already "occupied". Let us have instead a thread on the problem of knowing if an entity is "bewust".

Good, I like that. However...

By "bewust" I mean the fact that an entity has subjective experiences and feelings, and that pain hurts.

... this is unnecessary complication. You got rid of one problem by introducing a new concept - bewust. Now you introduced the problem back by implying that "bewust" is synonimous with "consciousness". Can we try a different approach?

I know that *I* am bewust, it is the only thing I really know for sure.

Now this is great. If you claim you know you are bewust, and that is the only thing you really know for sure, then no one can possibly have any issue with you. I certainly won't. The problem now is, how do I know what you mean by "bewust"? Well, I have a good starting point: "bewust" is something a person can be really sure they are. I can tell you right away that it doesn't map to my concept of "consciousness", because I don't know for sure if I am conscious, but it does map to something, because there are many things I am really sure I am.

Do you think this works?

From analogy, I take it a reasonable assumption that other creatures around me, who look like me, and behave like me, should also be "bewust" ; at least some of them

Sure, but you're only guessing and you may be wrong. Take me as a test - how can you know if I am "bewust" without guessing? You don't have to guess if it's raining, all you have to do is look outside the window. You don't have to guess if today is Thursday, all you have to do is look up a calendar. So how can you know I am "bewust" with the same level of certainty you know the weather or the day of the week?

This I don't know for sure, but I take it as an acceptable hypothesis.

What if I claim I am also "bewust" because, like you, there is one thing I really know for sure, and I wouldn't mind calling that thing "bewust", since I don't have a name for it. Do you think this works?

And now the question is: what exactly is causing this bewustness, and when can we know that something which DOESN'T look at all like a human being can have bewustness.

This is introducing problems which, at this point, are completely unsolvable. In a single sentence you came up with another concept, "bewustness", assumed it must have a causal relationship with another set of concepts, and started questioning whether things that cannot claim to really know for sure about one fact may be "bewust".

I don't deny your right to proceed that way, but I can guarantee you you will get absolutely nowhere. Trust me, millions of people already tried the same approach and they all failed miserably. Do you honestly think you can succeed?

As I explained above, it has nothing behavioural. Behavioural testing can test intelligence if you want, but not the fact whether or not the entity behaving that way has subjective experiences. So bewustness is not an explanatory concept for behaviour. We actually do not need the concept, if it weren't for the very fact that *I* know that I have subjective experiences and feelings.

Three paragraphs in your post and you completely lost me. This never gets anywhere; never did and never will.

I hope you don't think I'm being cynical or sarcastic - I'm not. What I'm trying to do is draw your attention to a problem that is so widespread, so ubiquitous, that very few people notice it.

And now that we have a new word for what I want to talk about, at least we won't be fighting with linguistic arguments about definitions

That happens to be exaclty the ubiquitous problem I just mentioned. Nobody wants to have arguments about definitions, everyone assumes everybody else understands what they mean when they use a word, even as they know it's wrong to assume that.

I want to talk about the concept "bewust" as I defined above, not about how we should define an existing word. It's the concept, not the word, I'm interested in discussing.

You haven't given me a concept, you have given me a word - "bewust". And in order to try and convey the concept you associate with that word, you have given me... more words! How in the world can anyone think language doesn't play any role in this?

I was assuming that what I defined above as "bewust" came pretty close to what people accept as the definition of conscious.

... in which case, why do we need another word?

But in order to be able to start reasoning around the same concept, I introduced a new, "virgin" word that should be free of any preconceptions that might differ from what I thought the word meant and hence bring in confusion in the arguments. The price to pay is that I will have to build up the entire definition of my new word myself.
So in order to add to my definition of "bewust", I can add the following: it is in general considered ethically a bad thing to inflict bad treatment on something that is supposed to have bewustness, much more so than just the consequences of material damage that might follow from this bad treatment, in the following way:
it is sometimes not considered "very nice" to cut down trees, but the reasons for that are that we like the sight of trees, that there are some ecological considerations and so on. But trees are cut down (for the wood and so on) and nobody is going to argue that at least, one should do it in a "quick and clean way".
But it IS strongly ethically disapproved to torture young children in your basement. The reason for that is NOT the loss in investment (it took time and money to make them and raise them) or that fact that if you don't kill them, they might turn into mentally desequilibrated persons or whatever... no, it is the very act of torture that is strongly disapproved. And this comes from the fact that we assume children to have bewustness.

Oh man... do you realize you just can't do that? If defining a new word requires the usage of about a hundred other words, many of them without clear meaning (ethical? ecological? disapproved? mentally desequilibrated?)

I hope you don't hate me for this. I once engaged in a similar endeavour, a few years ago. I tried to build precise definitions out of very clear concepts which everyone could understand, and after years of frustration I eventually concluded that it was possible, but it had already been done and it was called "physics".

Along those lines, I think it's perfectly possible to come up with a clear, precise definition of consciousness, but that is what scientific researchers and analytic philosophers are already doing. Unfortunately their work will necessarily fail to answer most questions we have about consciousness, but that is only because those questions just don't have answers, period.

Egmont

Aug12-04, 08:50 AM

How else would you know of it? How else would you know of anything? Experience is your only access to anything.

That is plain wrong. I've never experienced the earth from outerspace, but I know it looks blue.

How can you determine that someone has something when you aren't sure it exists?

Do you have nationality? Does "nationality" exist?

In other words, how is it the word consciousness being used in language is proof that everyone is conscious yet it isn't proof that "something" exists we are referring to as consciousness?

The word "God" being used in language is proof that people understand, to some extent, what God is, but it is not proof that God exists. You don't need a real God to be able to think about God. You don't need consciousness to be able to have beliefs about it - all you need is to know what consciousness is.

Also, IMO proving solipsism wrong doesn't end the hard problem.

What hard problem?

That's like taking a boat to work after a major flood and then once you get to work saying "What flood? There is no flood. See, I got to work!"

No, that is like taking a boat to work after a major flood and then saying, over the phone to a lazy colleague, "what do you mean you can't get here? I did!"

Rest assured nobody will take you where you don't want to go. Certainly not me.

Also, I will argue that this method of using language to make a claim about consciousness can only be used, at the very least, to argue that at least two people are conscious.

You clearly misunderstand the point of analytic philosophy. I suggest you read up on the subject. Russell, Wittgenstein, Frege, are always a good start.

The issue still stands in that you cannot know whether any one person or thing is conscious. I may be the only person on the planet that isn't and you would never know because me not being conscious wouldn't impact the language at all.

Well, you can say whatever you want. You can claim that the earth is flat, that the bible provides a literal account of biological history, that the United States is about to be taken over by the UN. You can make arguments out of knowledge, or you can make arguments out of ignorance. The choice is always yours.

Your statement above is just plain wrong.

Cheers :smile:

Fliption

Aug12-04, 08:51 AM

I'm not well versed in philosophic terminology, so could you give me your definition of "materialism" ? I thought it meant that everything was explainable in physical laws, but probably it is more subtle than this.

cheers,
patrick.

Well perhaps materialism isn't the exact word. I think your definition of materialism is probably close (if we can ever decide what physical means) but if we assume that to be physical means to be able to objectively observe and study, then this alone leaves consciousness out. We would just have to accept experience as a fundamental given in the universe. Now if things started happening like you descibe, i.e. consciousness merging, then this to me just confuses the definitions of physical and non-physical and they don't mean a whole lot at that point because would gaining knowledge this way be considered objective? Who knows. So the word materialism likely wouldn't mean much either.

Fliption

Aug12-04, 09:22 AM

That is plain wrong. I've never experienced the earth from outerspace, but I know it looks blue.

How did you come to know it is blue? Since you haven't seen it yourself then you probably learned it some other way. 1)Someone told you 2)You read it in a book 3) saw a picture of it on tv. Any will do. But they are all experiences. My statement stands. ALL your knowledge comes through experience.

Do you have nationality? Does "nationality" exist?

If I have it, then it exists as a concept that one can have. This is just word games that are meaningless to me.

You don't need consciousness to be able to have beliefs about it - all you need is to know what consciousness is.

But this directly contradicts what you were saying before. That the fact that everyone using the word consciousness was proof that solipsism was wrong and everyone really IS conscious. This is the contradiction I was attempting to point out.

Your god example is very different because now you seem to have switched your tune and no longer believe that having a conception of it equates to actually having it.

But I don't really think you have switched your tune. I'm just asking for clarification.

What hard problem?

The one that the scientist stranded all alone on an island has noticed while he studies in his laboratory..... all alone.

The crux of this seems to be that you claim that the hard problem is created by the semantic traps we fall into when communicating with one another. I'm claiming that the hard problem exists within each individual person and the communication issues are simply a byproduct of the hard problem itself.

No, that is like taking a boat to work after a major flood and then saying, over the phone to a lazy colleague, "what do you mean you can't get here? I did!"

Rest assured nobody will take you where you don't want to go. Certainly not me.

Didn't understand this. A bit cryptic.

You clearly misunderstand the point of analytic philosophy. I suggest you read up on the subject. Russell, Wittgenstein, Frege, are always a good start.

Hmm well whenever someone says things like this I usually will concede the point regardless of how much I have studied it because there's always the possibility that I don't understand. That's really why I'm discussing it. It seems like complete nonsense but part of me knows that there must be some reason why every 3 months some character comes in here swearing by it.

As info, I have read on this topic. I have read Wittgenstein. I will admit to you that from what I read, it's all word games. I've seen papers where people have tried to use Wittgenstein to prove materialism correct. I just think this is another attempt to avoid the issue. That's the way it appears to me. I will gladly consider any points and concede to them if they make sense to me though. I promise you that.

Well, you can say whatever you want. You can claim that the earth is flat, that the bible provides a literal account of biological history, that the United States is about to be taken over by the UN. You can make arguments out of knowledge, or you can make arguments out of ignorance. The choice is always yours.

Your statement above is just plain wrong.

But why is it wrong? Because it is a piece of knowledge that I cannot objectively justify with everyone else around me? Do you realize how much this sounds like the same argument some of the more extreme materialists in this forum make? Some of them even use this very point to deny that they have subjective experiences just to avoid having to concede that there is something about their existence that they cannot explain.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 10:15 AM

to be physical means to be able to objectively observe and study, then this alone leaves consciousness out.

To me, "physical" means: has a necessary description in a physical theory, based on mathematical reasoning, allowing to predict outcomes of experiments. Conceptually integrated in physics, if you want to.

cheers,
patrick.

Fliption

Aug12-04, 10:17 AM

To me, "physical" means: has a necessary description in a physical theory, based on mathematical reasoning, allowing to predict outcomes of experiments. Conceptually integrated in physics, if you want to.

cheers,
patrick.

Probably the same as the one I used. A physical thing is objectively(or is it inter-subjectively) observable.

Egmont

Aug12-04, 10:17 AM

How did you come to know it is blue? Since you haven't seen it yourself then you probably learned it some other way. 1)Someone told you 2)You read it in a book 3) saw a picture of it on tv. Any will do. But they are all experiences. My statement stands. ALL your knowledge comes through experience.

That is beside the point. The point is that most of our knowledge comes from experiencing verbal descriptions of phenomena rather than direct experience of the phenomena themselves. But if you want to think there's no essential difference between reading Masters & Johnson and experiencing the real thing, please don't let me stand in your way :smile:

If I have it, then it exists as a concept that one can have. This is just word games that are meaningless to me.

What is a word game?

But this directly contradicts what you were saying before. That the fact that everyone using the word consciousness was proof that solipsism was wrong and everyone really IS conscious.

You completely misinterpreted my argument. You were born a few decades ago, the word "conscious" existed way before you arrived on this planet. People have been using it quite effectively in their daily communication. If at some point in your life you decided you thought about what the word means and discovered that everyone who uses the word "conscious", except you, is in fact not conscious, you would be a fool. At best it would simply mean you did not understand what people meant when they used the word "conscious".

That is, in a simple presentation, the argument against solipsism. It is a foolish idea. You may well define "conscious" in a way that makes it possible, even if only in principle, that you are the only conscious being in the universe. But if you do that, the rest of us may simply ignore you. People are conscious, period. They say so themselves, and they are the ones who invented the word. If you think they might not be, that only means you don't know what they are talking about.

I don't agree with it but part of me knows that there must be some reason why every 3 months some character comes in here swearing by it.

That doesn't mean anything. I suppose people come here more often than that swearing you must accept Jesus as your personal savior. You should only accept an idea if it makes sense to you, not because a lot of people claim it's true.

I will not tell you analytic philosophy provides you a lot of answers (it does, but saying that would make me sound like a preacher), but I can tell you are very confused. That means there must be someting wrong with your approach.

I have read Wittgenstein. I will admit to you that from what I read, it's all word games.

This is a clear sign of your confusion. Wittgenstein is, quite simply, the most influential philosopher of the last century. The man practically reinvented philosophy with his concept of Sprachspiele ("language games", as it's often poorly translated in English). To dismiss his work as "all word games" is akin to dismissing Beethoven's symphonies as "a bunch of noise" or Van Gogh's paintings as "blobs".

I've seen papers where people have tried to use Wittgenstein to prove materialism correct.

You can't prevent people from putting a good idea to not-so-good uses. But a lot of what people like you perceive as proofs for the correctness of materialism are not what you think they are. The problem is not proving that materialism is correct, the problem is explaining why it seems correct. Because, like it or not, materialistic ideas are among the few certainties we have in life. So that's where analysis comes in, to demonstrate how materialistic may seem true in a non-materialistic universe (you knowledgeable ones out there, please allow me a bit of poetic license; I know I'm misrepresenting the position, but that's the best I can do in this context)

Do you realize how much this sounds like the same argument some of the more extreme materialists in this forum make? Some of them even use this very point to deny that they have subjective experiences just to avoid having to concede that there is something about their existence that they cannot explain.

I haven't seen anything like that, on this forum or anywhere else. Of course there are always the fools shouting from their soapboxes, but no one takes them seriously. Do you have a case in point?

Fliption

Aug12-04, 11:24 AM

That is beside the point. The point is that most of our knowledge comes from experiencing verbal descriptions of phenomena rather than direct experience of the phenomena themselves. But if you want to think there's no essential difference between reading Masters & Johnson and experiencing the real thing, please don't let me stand in your way :smile:

I'm not claiming there isn't difference in the quality of knowledge based on how the knowledge is experienced. I'm only claiming that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind. It seems you agree with this now. Experiencing verbal descriptions versus direct experience. So this seems inconsistent with this quote that I was responding to:

I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it.

Given that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind, I can make this statement about anything.

What is a word game?

Defining words in whatever way required to make a specific ontological point. Especially when most reasonable people don't have the same definition.

That is, in a simple presentation, the argument against solipsism. It is a foolish idea. You may well define "conscious" in a way that makes it possible, even if only in principle, that you are the only conscious being in the universe. But if you do that, the rest of us may simply ignore you. People are conscious, period. They say so themselves, and they are the ones who invented the word. If you think they might not be, that only means you don't know what they are talking about.

Ok, I understand you and agree. But help me understand how this statement above is consistent with this one below.

You don't need consciousness to be able to have beliefs about it - all you need is to know what consciousness is.

My original question was how can you claim that people are conscious because they are the ones that invented the word and then claim that they don't need consciousness to have beliefs about the concept? I still see inconsistency. Maybe I'm not understanding the point of the latter quote?

You should only accept an idea if it makes sense to you, not because a lot of people claim it's true.

That's exactly what I'm doing. But unlike many, I will attempt an open minded discussion to be sure of my own position. I see that as a good thing.

but I can tell you are very confused. That means there must be someting wrong with your approach.

Now if we could only pinpoint what that "something wrong" is.

This is a clear sign of your confusion. Wittgenstein is, quite simply, the most influential philosopher of the last century. The man practically reinvented philosophy with his concept of Sprachspiele ("language games", as it's often poorly translated in English). To dismiss his work as "all word games" is akin to dismissing Beethoven's symphonies as "a bunch of noise" or Van Gogh's paintings as "blobs".

You misunderstood. I'm not talking about Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions in its entirety. I am talking about the specific application of it that I have seen to this specific topic of the hard problem. That is what I say appears to be word games. So now that the clear signs of my confusion are not true, am I still confused?

You can't prevent people from putting a good idea to not-so-good uses. But a lot of what people like you perceive as proofs for the correctness of materialism are not what you think they are.

When the paper itself claims that "therefore materialism is correct", I'm not sure how else to interpret it.

The problem is not proving that materialism is correct, the problem is explaining why it seems correct. Because, like it or not, materialistic ideas are among the few certainties we have in life. So that's where analysis comes in, to demonstrate how materialistic may seem true in a non-materialistic universe

I don't disagree.

(you knowledgeable ones out there, please allow me a bit of poetic license; I know I'm misrepresenting the position, but that's the best I can do in this context)

Ok, I forgive you.

I haven't seen anything like that, on this forum or anywhere else. Of course there are always the fools shouting from their soapboxes, but no one takes them seriously. Do you have a case in point?

Wow, there's a ton of this here. Just do a search on any topic on consciousness here and you'll see it. On my very first search I found this quote from a member named Mentat:

"You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman)."

http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=20842&page=1&highlight=subjective

Egmont

Aug12-04, 12:24 PM

I'm not claiming there isn't difference in the quality of knowledge based on how the knowledge is experienced. I'm only claiming that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind. It seems you agree with this now. Experiencing verbal descriptions versus direct experience.

Perhaps you don't realize, but you are simply playing a game with words here. You are defining "experience" in a way most people would disagree with you. Your proposition may be right, but it is irrelevant to anyone who disagrees with your definition.

Given that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind, I can make this statement about anything.

Well, you have defined "experience" as "acquisition of knowledge", and then made a tautological assertion. Of course you are correct, no point arguing it.

Defining words in whatever way required to make a specific ontological point. Especially when most reasonable people don't have the same definition.

What do you mean by "reasonable people"?

My original question was how can you claim that people are conscious because they are the ones that invented the word and then claim that they don't need consciousness to have beliefs about the concept? I still see inconsistency.

There is no contradiction. I didn't say people are conscious because they invented the word, I said you can't say they are not conscious because you did not invent the word. That is, it's not that solipsism is false, but rather if you lived in a solipsist universe where people describe themselves as conscious, the word "conscious" would have a different meaning. Solipsism is not possible in a solipsist universe. That logical fact has been overlooked for centuries.

You think those are "word games", and that is pretty much what they are. Many philosophical problems arise when people take a word in one context and apply to another where it means a completely different thing. That's why linguistic analysis has become so important to philosophy.

Now if we could only pinpoint what that "something wrong" is.

Simple: it's the fact that you pose questions that can't possibly be answered, not even in principle. It's a habit of thought as old as philosophy itself.

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious, then clain you are absolutely sure you are concious but you have no way to be sure if other people are conscious too. Of course not, you have introduced an unsolvable problem in your definition, how can you think the fact that you can't solve it has any relevance whatsoever? When other people define "consciousness" in a way that doesn't create unsolvable problems, you say "ha, but this is not the right way to define consciousness, because it doesn't lead to unsolvable problems".

I say, this is confusion, and the reason is simple: if "consciousness" were such an intractable concept, no one would be able to communicate the fact that they are conscious. When we use the word in daily conversation, there's no mystery at all. When you stop to think what the word means is when you get confused. Which is only natural, since we don't know what most of the words we use really mean anyway. Try and figure out what a simple word like "number" means. Or a word like "simple", for that matter. Or a word like "matter". Or a word like "word"... :smile:

You misunderstood. I'm not talking about Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions in its entirety. I am talking about the specific application of it that I have seen to this specific topic of the hard problem. That is what I say appears to be word games.

That is because this "hard problem" is but a plays with words. If you don't acknowledge the value of language to solve problems, you should not acknowledge its value to pose them.

At a minimum you should acknowledge that this "hard problem" is nowhere to be seen, except as a result of defining some words in a particular way. I live with my consciousness just fine and see no "hard problems" with it. There are things about my consciousness that I don't understand, but then again there are things about my hair that I don't understand, and I don't think we have a hard problem of hair.

"You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman)."

Exactly where is Mentat claiming that materialism is true? I don't see it anywhere. In my understanding, he's saying he doesn't understand what "subjective experience" is to the point where he can clearly assert it exists. What could possibly be wrong with that?

Fliption

Aug12-04, 02:19 PM

Perhaps you don't realize, but you are simply playing a game with words here. You are defining "experience" in a way most people would disagree with you. Your proposition may be right, but it is irrelevant to anyone who disagrees with your definition.

Well, you have defined "experience" as "acquisition of knowledge", and then made a tautological assertion. Of course you are correct, no point arguing it.

I don't believe I am doing that at all. I think most everyone who participates in this forum would agree with what I have stated. I suspect this because I've seen this discussed many times before and it was pretty clear that everyone understands this.

I would be glad to hear a definition of experience that would render my statement false. One that isn't a tautology.

What do you mean by "reasonable people"?

Don't worry. I'm not trying to slide anything by you here. I suspect most everyone that contributes here is reasonable. But if I leave that word out, it leaves the door open for a response about some wacko christian nutjob. I'm sure you know what I mean :wink:

That logical fact has been overlooked for centuries.

Or perhaps it isn't relevant to the real issue behind solipsism?

You think those are "word games", and that is pretty much what they are. Many philosophical problems arise when people take a word in one context and apply to another where it means a completely different thing. That's why linguistic analysis has become so important to philosophy.

You won't get an argument from me here. I'm always inserting into threads my opinion that semantic confusion is the only thing people are debating rather than the ontology they think they are debating. This whole physical versus non-physical thing is my favorite one.

Simple: it's the fact that you pose questions that can't possibly be answered, not even in principle. It's a habit of thought as old as philosophy itself.

What question have I posed that cannot be answered?

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious, then clain you are absolutely sure you are concious but you have no way to be sure if other people are conscious too. Of course not, you have introduced an unsolvable problem in your definition, how can you think the fact that you can't solve it has any relevance whatsoever?

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

When other people define "consciousness" in a way that doesn't create unsolvable problems, you say "ha, but this is not the right way to define consciousness, because it doesn't lead to unsolvable problems".

Not because they haven't created an unsolvable problem. Because they aren't describing the feature that I observe.

I say, this is confusion, and the reason is simple: if "consciousness" were such an intractable concept, no one would be able to communicate the fact that they are conscious. When we use the word in daily conversation, there's no mystery at all. When you stop to think what the word means is when you get confused. Which is only natural, since we don't know what most of the words we use really mean anyway. Try and figure out what a simple word like "number" means. Or a word like "simple", for that matter. Or a word like "matter". Or a word like "word"... :smile:

Words are simply defined or described reductively by using other words. Ultimately it is all circular. This is a fact whether we're talking about swiss cheese or consciousness. So why should I observe a hard problem with consciousness and not with swiss cheese?(I don't see a hard problem with swiss cheese btw.) It is because the hard problem I see has nothing to do with language.

That is because this "hard problem" is but a plays with words. If you don't acknowledge the value of language to solve problems, you should not acknowledge its value to pose them.

Explain what this means, please.

At a minimum you should acknowledge that this "hard problem" is nowhere to be seen, except as a result of defining some words in a particular way. I live with my consciousness just fine and see no "hard problems" with it. There are things about my consciousness that I don't understand, but then again there are things about my hair that I don't understand, and I don't think we have a hard problem of hair.

There are things about my consciousness and my hair that I don't understand. But the difference is that the current paradigm can in principle answer my hair questions. The current paradigm is not equipped to reconcile the issue I see with my consciousness. I do not need to know what your definitions are to observe my own existence and attempt to understand it using the same reductive approach I use to understand everything else.

Exactly where is Mentat claiming that materialism is true? I don't see it anywhere.

That's not what I was trying to find an example of. I was trying to show you someone who denies the existence of subjective experience.

In my understanding, he's saying he doesn't understand what "subjective experience" is to the point where he can clearly assert it exists. What could possibly be wrong with that?

You said you'd never seen anyone do it and so I am showing you someone doing it. I didn't say there was anything wrong with it. This is just an example of a person who denies the existence of something to avoid the hard problem it results in. Chalmers himself said the only way around the hard problem is to deny the existence of subjective experience. The problem with Mentats argument is that he denies it based on the inability to provide a scientific definition of it. What I've tried to point out to him is that a scientific definition would mean that it could be reductively explained, which is exactly what we're saying cannot be done. So he's basically using the hard problem to deny that the hard problem exists because he's still measuring it against the old materialist paradigm which claims that something must be reductively defined in order for it to really exists. This same argument could be made against the existence of all fundamental things. Which is absurd, at least to me.

vanesch

Aug12-04, 02:56 PM

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious

The whole point is that this impossibility comes not because of a formal definition, but seems to be a property of the subjectively observed phenomenon we are trying to pinpoint with the word. And _that_ property is the contents of the "hard problem".
You seem to think that a concept can only have existance when we have a word for it, and when we have a clear definition of that word. That is at least what you accused me of, when I used a new word "bewustness" for it.
The point is that concepts related to "things in the world" DO have a meaning, even if we cannot pinpoint it with a word which has a formal definition. In fact, it is a necessity that we cannot give a formal definition of the word, because otherwise we would just be doing formal logic, unrelated to the "thing in the world" we wanted to describe in the first place. It is only apprimatively, and in theoretical physics, that you can start to come close to bring into relation a formally defined word with a "thing in the world".

Back to consciousness: I assume that you experience subjective experiences, that you are aware of your existance, that you feel pain etc... I assume that, because I *DO* experience this. This subjectively clearly existing phenomenon and all that goes with it, I indicate it with the word "consciousness". I call the phenomenon of my awareness of existence, of the fact that I do feel pain etc... my consciousness. I am absolutely sure that that phenomenon exists, especially when I put my hand in boiling water.
I assume that other human beings have also similar experiences, and so I assume that they are "conscious".
The vagueness of my description does not indicate that the subjective experiences themselves are vague. It is simply that I don't have a good formal theory of the thing. However, I do know some things about it. Instead of always having to write tens of sentences of what I vaguely mean, in the hope that the other human being reading them starts associating with my vage description HIS subjective experiences that - I assume - have some similarity to mine, I put a word on it: consciousness. And as I am not the very first person to do that, I assume that I don't even have to give this vague definition, but that people instinctively know what is more or less meant.

If you are NOT conscious, of course, those descriptions are incomprehensible.

The point now is, that no matter the vagueness of the "definition" (it isn't a real formal definition - as I pointed out - it is a description with the hope that the reader will have an aha experience), there are some clear properties of the thing I describe with that word: namely that it is NOT an explanatory concept of behaviour. It is not introduced for that. It might, or might not, intervene in certain aspects of behaviour.

The trouble with that "thing" is that 1) I have it (I know that I am conscious) and probably most humans have it and 2) that it seems to be impossible to find out if something ELSE than a human has it because we have no idea at all how it influences the workings of an entity, if it influences it at all.

These two elements, namely knowing that something exists in several copies, and having fundamentally no clue as how to recognise it, it the hard problem I think Fliption talks about.

This hard problem has been "solved" in 2 ways:
saying that the "thing" doesn't exist, or saying that you know how to recognize it on behavioural basis.

Both approaches are wrong: I subjectively know it exists, eliminating the first "solution", and as I pointed out, there is not necessarily a link to behaviourism, which has not been mentioned at all in my vague defining phrases.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug13-04, 02:13 AM

Probably the same as the one I used. A physical thing is objectively(or is it inter-subjectively) observable.

Well, my hope is that one day, I don't know, 300 years from now, we might know enough of brain functions to interconnect 2 or more brains. Probably it is only in that circumstance that consciousness might become materialistic: if we can share conscious experiences inter-subjectively. It would probably even be more fun if we could do it with machines :biggrin:.
But my fear is that something fundamental might forbid such a linking.
And the fact is that I will be long dead before it could ever happen, so maybe I'm just wasting my time thinking about it :grumpy:

cheers,
Patrick.

Egmont

Aug13-04, 08:39 AM

I don't believe I am doing that at all. I think most everyone who participates in this forum would agree with what I have stated.

Yes, we do tend to believe everyone agrees with our views, until we find out they don't...

I would be glad to hear a definition of experience that would render my statement false. One that isn't a tautology.

I'm quite sure you would disagree with any definition of experience that would imply your statement is false.

What question have I posed that cannot be answered?

"Are other people conscious?"

You said you can guess but you can't know for sure. Guessing is not answering.

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

I'm quite sure you don't see it, which is why I think you need to learn about analytic philosophy. Then you'd see it.

Words are simply defined or described reductively by using other words.

Is that so? What does a word like "thing" reduce to?

Ultimately it is all circular. This is a fact whether we're talking about swiss cheese or consciousness.

You are terribly mistaken about that. Terribly mistaken.

So why should I observe a hard problem with consciousness and not with swiss cheese?(I don't see a hard problem with swiss cheese btw.) It is because the hard problem I see has nothing to do with language.

To start with, the "hard problem" can only be formulated in language. If you're trying to unscrew a light-bulb and it won't come out, then you're having a problem which exists even if you don't talk about it. With this "hard problem" though, as soon as we quit talking about it, it disappears, and that is because... well, I've said it too many times already.

There are things about my consciousness and my hair that I don't understand. But the difference is that the current paradigm can in principle answer my hair questions. The current paradigm is not equipped to reconcile the issue I see with my consciousness.

Exactly how do you know that with so much certainty? If you're following David Chalmers, this is his reasoning in a nutshell: any explanation of consciuosness will fail, because we can always look at it and say it doesn't make intuitive sense. But this is, in essence, no different from rejecting any explanation that the earth is round because any fool can see it is obviously flat.

It is a sad fact of life that when most people believed the earth was flat, the ones who knew it had to be round were simply ignored rather than heard. There are quite a few voices talking about how consciousness is not what most people think it is, but they won't be heard for as long as they can still cling to their old, outdated beliefs.

I do not need to know what your definitions are to observe my own existence and attempt to understand it using the same reductive approach I use to understand everything else.

I don't see you "observing your own existence" in that sentence, I only see words, and they do not make much sense. (by the way, I'm sure my words don't make much sense to you either; it's the whole problem with language, once you understand how it works you realize there's very little you can say that makes much sense)

That's not what I was trying to find an example of. I was trying to show you someone who denies the existence of subjective experience. You said you'd never seen anyone do it and so I am showing you someone doing it.

If you pardon my sincerity, you strike me as a very naive person. If you are absolutely sure Mentat has subjective experiences but denies it, then you are simply saying he must be lying to avoid acknowledging the certainty of your position. But at the same time you make the claim that it's impossible for you to know if anyone else (including Mentat!) has subjective experiences, and that necessarily implies he may not be lying after all. To be consistent with your own position, you should interpret Mentat's comments as evidence that some people may not have subjective experiences, but you take it as evidence that he's not intellectually honest.

I doubt you can understand the problem with your argument. If you could, you wouldn't be arguing it in the first place. Yet a problem exists.

Chalmers himself said the only way around the hard problem is to deny the existence of subjective experience.

Chalmers himself also says even zombies would believe they have subjective experience, that even zombies would have a hard problem of consciousness despite the fact that they don't have consciousness.

Methinks Chalmers is extremely confused.

The problem with Mentats argument is that he denies it based on the inability to provide a scientific definition of it. What I've tried to point out to him is that a scientific definition would mean that it could be reductively explained, which is exactly what we're saying cannot be done.

Methinks you are also extremely confused. You claim the hard problem can't be solved because any solution would imply it can be solved. That is like saying you have a nut that can't be cracked, and when someone manages to crack the nut right in front of your eyes you say, "ha, but you didn't really crack it, you just smashed it into pieces, it's not the same thing"

So he's basically using the hard problem to deny that the hard problem exists because he's still measuring it against the old materialist paradigm which claims that something must be reductively defined in order for it to really exists.

That is a gross misrepresentation of the materialist position. What the materialists say is simply this: if you claim something exists then you must prove it. Materialists believe in the existence of many things which cannot be "reductively defined", such as for instance the laws of physics. What materialists don't believe is that things like fairies exist simply because a few people insist they have seen them.

This same argument could be made against the existence of all fundamental things. Which is absurd, at least to me.

It would be absurd indeed, if that is what they were saying. But as I said, you don't really understand what they are saying. You clearly did not understand what Mentat said in that quote.

Egmont

Aug13-04, 09:10 AM

The whole point is that this impossibility comes not because of a formal definition

You are smart and I think you can understand what I'm trying to say. And you are right, coming up with a formal definition won't help at all.

but seems to be a property of the subjectively observed phenomenon we are trying to pinpoint with the word. And _that_ property is the contents of the "hard problem".

Would you agree with me then, that whatever _that_ property is, it's something that can't be communicated? And would you also agree that Chalmers and his followers think they are successful at communicating what the "hard problem" is about?

You seem to be close to grasping that the world is full of hard problems, but none of them are about things we can talk about. I hope you give the issue some more thought; you would be glad you did.

Now keep this in mind: there is something we can't talk about, but I can't tell you what that something is, you have to figure out by yourself. Anything I can describe to you in words is not something we can't talk about. I have no way to talk about this thing, but there is a way to see it, and it's possible to guide people so they can also see it for themselves.

You seem to think that a concept can only have existance when we have a word for it, and when we have a clear definition of that word. That is at least what you accused me of, when I used a new word "bewustness" for it.

I didn't accuse you of anything. All I said was, if I started talking about bewustness with you without fully understanding what you mean by it, we would end up disagreeing at some point. Which is exactly the situation concerning most philosophical issues.

The point is that concepts related to "things in the world" DO have a meaning, even if we cannot pinpoint it with a word which has a formal definition.

You are absolutely correct, but is "consciousness" one such thing or not? That is, is "consciousness" a concept that is related to "things in the world", or is it not?

In fact, it is a necessity that we cannot give a formal definition of the word, because otherwise we would just be doing formal logic, unrelated to the "thing in the world" we wanted to describe in the first place.

I am really impressed with that statement. Serious. So you see, we need a lot of concepts which lack formal definition in order for our communication to be meaningful, but at the same time concepts without a formal definition cannot be subject to scientific study. Doesn't that make you think? Doesn't it sound like science is only true to the extent that it restricts itself to formal logic?

It is only apprimatively, and in theoretical physics, that you can start to come close to bring into relation a formally defined word with a "thing in the world".

I hope we get a chance, one day, to talk about why I think physics doesn't have as much to do with "things in the world" as we usually think. The truths of physics, from my perspective, seem to come from formal logic, not from the nature of reality. But that's a discussion way ahead.

The vagueness of my description does not indicate that the subjective experiences themselves are vague.

But it does indicate that there's a huge gap between the experience and the description, doesn't it? And the issue is, that gap just can't be closed, period.

If you are NOT conscious, of course, those descriptions are incomprehensible.

So can we take the fact that someone understands our descriptions of consciousness as proof that they are conscious?

The trouble with that "thing" is that 1) I have it (I know that I am conscious) and probably most humans have it and 2) that it seems to be impossible to find out if something ELSE than a human has it because we have no idea at all how it influences the workings of an entity, if it influences it at all.

You are correct about that, but as stated it is a problem like any other. Like any scientific problem, it will take time to be worked on, a final, absolute answer will never be found, but there's nothing preventing us from learning a lot more than we currently know.

This hard problem has been "solved" in 2 ways: saying that the "thing" doesn't exist, or saying that you know how to recognize it on behavioural basis. Both approaches are wrong: I subjectively know it exists, eliminating the first "solution", and as I pointed out, there is not necessarily a link to behaviourism, which has not been mentioned at all in my vague defining phrases.

That really depends on what you mean by behaviourism. Using a computer to send messages to an internet forum on metaphysics sounds like "behaviour" to me. Granted, mention to behaviour is absent in your description, but the description itself is manifested behaviour of a conscious entity (yourself)

This is what many people don't see. Consciousness is related to behaviour, but in a very abstract way. The more abstract a concept, the harder it is to think about it, and the easier it is to get confused and see problems where they don't exist.

Fliption

Aug13-04, 11:26 AM

Yes, we do tend to believe everyone agrees with our views, until we find out they don't...

I'm quite sure you would disagree with any definition of experience that would imply your statement is false.

Well then let's see if they do. The reason I say that they do is because I can't think of a definition that would render my statement false and still resemble in any way the concept that people refer to when they say 'experience'. Rather than just assume I won't agree with the definition, let's see one. Seriously. I'm curious.

"Are other people conscious?"

You said you can guess but you can't know for sure. Guessing is not answering.

Heh well Vanesch has postulated some pretty wild stuff that may occur some time in the future when we are long gone that could solve this. I think my only point is that you can't know the answer to this question within materialists constraints. It is this paradigm that creates the problem; Not reality. As I said to Vanesch earlier, if his ideas ever did happen, then I think the concepts 'physical', 'non-physical', 'materialism' and therefore 'hard problem' may not really mean much anymore.

I'm quite sure you don't see it, which is why I think you need to learn about analytic philosophy. Then you'd see it.

You can't tell me what's wrong with it?

Is that so? What does a word like "thing" reduce to?

Quote from the dictionary:

"An entity, an idea, or a quality perceived, known, or thought to have its own existence"

That was easy.

And I can look up each word in the definition above and eventually we'd find that all definitions are circular.

You are terribly mistaken about that. Terribly mistaken.

Apparently this is easier to say than it is to prove.

To start with, the "hard problem" can only be formulated in language. If you're trying to unscrew a light-bulb and it won't come out, then you're having a problem which exists even if you don't talk about it. With this "hard problem" though, as soon as we quit talking about it, it disappears, and that is because... well, I've said it too many times already.

Yes I see what you mean. You know, I think we may be having some semantic problems here :biggrin: . I agree that unlike the light bulb, the hard problem is manufactured. But I believe it is manufactured by attempting to place constraints on reality. If we stop placing constraints on it, then these problems go away. I'm not saying that a structure to knowledge shouldn't exists. Just that we should pay more attention to making sure that that structure reflects reality instead of the other way around.

It is a sad fact of life that when most people believed the earth was flat, the ones who knew it had to be round were simply ignored rather than heard. There are quite a few voices talking about how consciousness is not what most people think it is, but they won't be heard for as long as they can still cling to their old, outdated beliefs.

Point taken. I can agree that Chalmers may be wrong. If I thought there was no possibility of that than I wouldn't be here in this forum discussing it. As I said earlier, I'm here discussing this with you because I do wonder if you have a point. But as you said, I shouldn't accept it until it makes sense to me. But, to your point, I will always concede that I may be wrong. I haven't seen anyone show how Chalmers is wrong but I have no certain argument against the "world is flat" example. The good thing about this lesson is that it applies to everyone .

If you pardon my sincerity, you strike me as a very naive person. If you are absolutely sure Mentat has subjective experiences but denies it, then you are simply saying he must be lying to avoid acknowledging the certainty of your position. But at the same time you make the claim that it's impossible for you to know if anyone else (including Mentat!) has subjective experiences, and that necessarily implies he may not be lying after all. To be consistent with your own position, you should interpret Mentat's comments as evidence that some people may not have subjective experiences, but you take it as evidence that he's not intellectually honest.

Naive? Why would you call someone who's words you admit you don't understand naive? You obviously assume you know my exact position. There is no inconsistency here. I do not assume that Mentat is lying. I have told him himself that his position is the result of one of two things. 1) He has no subjective experience. 2) He does and he is lying to avoid the conclusions. Now, in this thread you and others here have established that we clearly can know that others are conscious through induction. And I'm just saying that if this is true then it means number 2 above is the likely choice for Mentat. But I have never and will never claim he is definitely one or the other.

I doubt you can understand the problem with your argument. If you could, you wouldn't be arguing it in the first place. Yet a problem exists.

Another example of something that is apparently easier to say than to prove. I see a trend.

Chalmers himself also says even zombies would believe they have subjective experience, that even zombies would have a hard problem of consciousness despite the fact that they don't have consciousness.

Yes, this one stumped me too. It doesn't make any sense on the surface. I debated Hypnagogue on this very point in a thread and he eventually was able to get across to me the reason Chalmers makes this statement. You might want to take a look at that. Here's the link.

http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=20842&page=3&pp=15&highlight=zombie+p-consciousness
It started on page 3 and ended on Page 6. The posts between me and Hypnagogue are the most relevant.

Methinks you are also extremely confused. You claim the hard problem can't be solved because any solution would imply it can be solved. That is like saying you have a nut that can't be cracked, and when someone manages to crack the nut right in front of your eyes you say, "ha, but you didn't really crack it, you just smashed it into pieces, it's not the same thing"

I claim it can be solved. It can go away completely if we change the paradigm. And the nut cracking example is nothing like what my position is. That example just demonstrates someone being petty and unreasonable. My point is exactly the same as what Vanesch is saying. An attempt to solve this problem on the part of materialists that avoids or claims the non-existence of something that I personally know exists is not going to be sufficient. I don't understand why this is considered an unfair position to take.

That is a gross misrepresentation of the materialist position. What the materialists say is simply this: if you claim something exists then you must prove it. Materialists believe in the existence of many things which cannot be "reductively defined", such as for instance the laws of physics. What materialists don't believe is that things like fairies exist simply because a few people insist they have seen them.

OK here's a question for you. IF Materialism is wrong, do you think the evidence of it being wrong should meet the standards of materialism? Why should it?

It's like this dialogue:

Person 1: Your map is wrong because it leaves out a left turn.
Person 2: No, there is no left turn. See look here at the map.

Also, are you insinuating that "fairies" are like subjective experience? Because if you agree that it is natural for a materialists to deny subjective experience, then this is the exact opposite of what you were saying earlier. As a matter of fact, you claiming that you've never seen anyone deny subjective experience is the only reason I posted this example of Mentat.

It would be absurd indeed, if that is what they were saying. But as I said, you don't really understand what they are saying. You clearly did not understand what Mentat said in that quote.

Mentat is not a "they". His views are far more extreme than most of the other professed materialists posting here. As information, I've spent hundreds of posts communicating with Mentat so I have a very clear understanding of what his views are.

drag

Aug13-04, 11:37 AM

Greetings !

What a huge thread... By my old vurtual acquaintance Flipton.

Anyway, where's the option for "no explanation" ? :wink:

Live long and prosper.

Fliption

Aug13-04, 12:52 PM

Greetings !

What a huge thread... By my old vurtual acquaintance Flipton.

Anyway, where's the option for "no explanation" ? :wink:

Live long and prosper.

Wow. Haven't seen you in a while Drag.

selfAdjoint

Aug13-04, 02:24 PM

We have here a Philip K. Dick situation. We have two beings; both agree they have A-consciousness. Alice says she also has p-consciousness, and asks Bob if he does. He denies it. Which is the zombie? Since according to Chalmers zombies don't have p-consciousness but believe they do, Alice's statement doesn't rule out that she is a Zombie. On the other hand, Dennet, for example is not seriously called a Zombie although he denies the separate existance of p-consciouness. So maybe Bob isn't a Zombie either. Seems to me that the whole concept of Zombie is ill-defined. But it is a simple deduction from the idea of separate p-consciousness, so if it is fails to be well-defined so does separate p-consciousness.

My suggestion: p-consciousness is what an organism experiences while it is performing A-consciousness. And A-consciousness at any level produces a corresponding level of p-consciousness. If you can distinguish red from orange then you can form, and believe that you experience, a concept of redness. But if you can only tell bright from dark, then you feel yourself to be experiencing brightness and darkness.

Fliption

Aug13-04, 02:39 PM

Seems to me that the whole concept of Zombie is ill-defined. But it is a simple deduction from the idea of separate p-consciousness, so if it is fails to be well-defined so does separate p-consciousness.

I think the situation you have presented is not due to an ill-defined term. It is an illustration showing that A-consciousness does not entail P-consciousness. If we begin our analysis of definitions with the assumption that A-consciousness must entail P-consciousness then of course we will conclude ill defined terms.

Also, I think Chalmers claims that a zombie could claim that it has P-consciousness. But it doesn't necessarily have to. It could very well claim the opposite. This makes sense because we can program any computer to say it has P-consciousness whether it does or does not. So the claim that one has P-consciousness can be completely explained by actions in A-consciousness. P-Consciousness is not required.

selfAdjoint

Aug13-04, 08:38 PM

Also, I think Chalmers claims that a zombie could claim that it has P-consciousness. But it doesn't necessarily have to. It could very well claim the opposite. This makes sense because we can program any computer to say it has P-consciousness whether it does or does not. So the claim that one has P-consciousness can be completely explained by actions in A-consciousness. P-Consciousness is not required

As it was previously stated here, the Zombie could not only state that it had p-consciousness, but believe it to be so. We are presumed able to read the mind of a Zombie for purposes of discussion, I guess. If that is so, seeing that our only evidence for p-consciousness at all is introspection, we are all in the position of such a Zombie, and thus p-consciousnesss becomes an epiphenomenon, which makes no detectable difference in our inner lives, to say nothing of our behavior.

Fliption

Aug13-04, 11:12 PM

As it was previously stated here, the Zombie could not only state that it had p-consciousness, but believe it to be so. We are presumed able to read the mind of a Zombie for purposes of discussion, I guess. If that is so, seeing that our only evidence for p-consciousness at all is introspection, we are all in the position of such a Zombie, and thus p-consciousnesss becomes an epiphenomenon, which makes no detectable difference in our inner lives, to say nothing of our behavior.

Much of this was discussed in the thread I referenced above. My conclusion from that thread was that it is possible for a zombie to believe it has P-consciousness, but it need not necessarily be the case. In fact I would argue that it would never be the case, so my inner life is quite detectable. The zombie argument still holds because it illustrates that the behavior of someone claiming P-Consciousness can be completely explained by actions of A-consciousness. In other words, P-consciousness is sufficient to produce this behavior but it isn't necessary. It only makes an epistemic point about our access to explain P-consciousness. It is saying that if you copy all of my A-consciousness and inprint it onto another copy, we have no reason to believe that this copy will not say the same things that I say. But if I were born a zombie, I doubt very seriously I would believe in P-consciousness and say such things. But that point isn't really relevant.

BTW, when we say a zombie "believes", we're talking purely functional behaviour.

loseyourname

Aug14-04, 02:28 AM

My quabble is simply that I interpreted your original comments to be one that denies the hard problem. In the quote above you at least admit that you are going out on a limb and making some assumptions.

Looks like you made some assumptions yourself. No big deal.

I suppose I don't respond well to being called obstinate and silly when I can point to many people who agree with my position. Frustration is just a natural response when I perceive someone is being a bit egocentric.

Since we do seem to be in agreement, I take back calling you obstinate. The position you seemed to be holding (and yes, I would have been able to tell I was wrong about had you answered my questions) was that no meaningful research could be conducted on the basis of these assumptions that I make. That position is unreasonable, and I could care less how many people might hold it.

The questions you asked were irrelevant. They still are. If I answer them, it only serves to further lead you down the wrong path by giving you the impression that they are relevant. My point should have been obvious after I posted the other thread. Instead, the posting here still continued seemingly without a clue what I was talking about and with no reference to the other information. So I can understand frustration.

They are irrelevant now; they were not before. The issue was never the points you were trying to make. The issue was me attempting to figure out exactly where you stood - you, not the hard problem itself. Now that we have that out of the way, we can move on. We could have a long time ago.

I pointed out where other posters disagreed with you to attempt to somehow get across the idea that your views were not without their problems and that one does not need to be obstinate to point them out.

Any view that claims knowledge of any external reality is subject to problems. I can explain with a fairly simple example why I think p-consciousness is clearly efficacious. This is not a foolproof argument, nor is it proof. It is only a basis for further exploration.

Consider the knee-jerk reflex. The specific nerves and parts of the brain responsible for creating it are well known. When a strike is made just below the kneecap, the leg jerks forward. There is one way (without damaging the nerves) to circumvent this reflex. It is by consciously making the effort not to jerk the leg forward. This effort results in the nervous impulse from the strike being re-routed so that it never reaches the quadriceps muscles, where it would have jerked the leg forward. This can be observed happening in the nerves and the re-route command originates in the brain. It does not result from input to the brain, and so is not the result of a reaction to stimuli. It is an action. If this does not seem to be of any importance, think a little deeper about how this differs from the operation of clearly non-conscious neural process, such as those of a computer. A computer cannot act - it can only react. Only a subjectively conscious being can focus mentally on a bodily process and thereby keep that process from occuring. I bring this up for one primary reason: this is what researchers into the neuronal basis of consciousness look for, and it is also likely to be a pretty good jumping off point from which our views truly do digress. Though I freely admit that I could easily be wrong, my guess is that this phenomenon, and related phenomena, mean nothing to you. Studying the differences between the process by which an eye auto-focuses on a particular object vs. the process by which an eye focuses on an object that is consciously looked for (in technical terms, bottom-up vs. top-down control of visual awareness) probably also means nothing to you. These are, however, what is being studied. Personally, I think it's as good a place as any to start, and more likely to produce meaningful results than sitting around and talking.

This is why I still insist your questions were not relevant. You still think I'm talking about whether other humans are conscious. As I've said before, that is merely a byproduct of the real issue, which I was using as an illustration. I couldn't care less about solipsism.

There is only one thing that could render my proposed experiment (and the questions that go with them) meaningless. That would be for other humans to not be conscious. The possible effectiveness of p-consciousness is what the experiment is designed to investigate. So while I hold that the hypothesis may very well be false, and p-consciousness may not be efficacious, that certainly would not render the experiment meaningless - in fact, that finding would be the result of the experiment. Only solipsism could provide a problem with the setup of the experiment itself. Now it is entirely possible that I'm badly overlooking something and I'm dead wrong. If you think that is the case, however, and you wish to convince me, you'll need to address the experiment itself, not give me generalized statements about the hard problem and issues with effectiveness.

I hope you see now after this response that this isn't true. I fully understand why certain scientific researchers don't care about such things. But making an assumption so that work can be carried out is very different from totally denying that an assumption was made. Originally, I thought you were doing the latter of the two. Now it seems you are not. So I' don't think we actually disagree.

All of science, as well as any other epistemology, is based on assumptions. No foundation can be proven; a given system can only be shown to be internally consistent.

Fliption

Aug14-04, 09:48 AM

Looks like you made some assumptions yourself. No big deal.

That's the nature of communication I guess. All I can do is interpret what you say and the same for you with me. If that's called making assumptions then so be it.

The position you seemed to be holding (and yes, I would have been able to tell I was wrong about had you answered my questions) was that no meaningful research could be conducted on the basis of these assumptions that I make. That position is unreasonable, and I could care less how many people might hold it.

Correct, I absolutely DO NOT hold this position.

Consider the knee-jerk reflex. The specific nerves and parts of the brain responsible for creating it are well known. When a strike is made just below the kneecap, the leg jerks forward.

Personally, I think it's as good a place as any to start, and more likely to produce meaningful results than sitting around and talking.

I don't disagree these sorts of experiments can and should be done. Not because you're going to find what you think you're going to find, because the philosophical issues are evidence to me that it isn't there to find. But what very well may happen is that you learn something you never anticipated and perhaps this information renders the philosophical issues mute. So of course I agree that doing this research is better than doing nothing. I just originally thought that this statement:

"Do you honestly not see how being conscious of a potential mate's preferences and tastes and being conscious of your own looks and behavior would be helpful here?"

Was a bit presumptuous given the philosophical issues.

I like this atttitude better:

"So while I hold that the hypothesis may very well be false, and p-consciousness may not be efficacious, that certainly would not render the experiment meaningless - in fact, that finding would be the result of the experiment. "

selfAdjoint

Aug14-04, 03:32 PM

BTW, when we say a zombie "believes", we're talking purely functional behaviour.

Meaning what, exactly. Does the Zombie have any inner life? He sees blue things remembers blue things, can compare what he sees with what he remembers, can imagine a blue thing he has never seen, and so on. Right? But he just doesn't experience, or miss, blueness.

Philocrat

Aug14-04, 09:18 PM

We are heading in the wrong direction intellectually with this Qualia issue. Let's call a truce and start thinking differently. For why may indescribability of qualia to each other in the public realm hold us back? As I have pointed out many times above, the only fundamental benchmark in the measure and understanding of qualia is if it fails us in the most important aspect of the human existence: COLLECTIVE RESPOSIBILITY. If we fail to collectively look at things, recognise what they are and action or act upon them in the 'same' or equivalent way, then this would be the the most useful way to know that qualia as part of the human conscious existence is playing dirty tricks on us....and we may very legitimately declare its presence in our being fundamentally useless.

Yes, it would be fundamentally useless as it would have nothing sinificant to contribute to collective existence.

LANGUAGE AND QUALIA. Which language are we talking about? Verbal? Written? What about BODY LANGUAGE? Tell me which scientific discipline has made any attempt to conceive it, let alone study it? Tell me! Yes, oral or spoken language cannot explain qualia from one person to the next becuase qualia is self explanatory. If you see a red car just point at it and say 'that is a red car'! If a bystander points at it and says the same thing 'that is a red car', we ought to accept that they are seeing, recognising and understanding the same thing. Qualia in this sense serves only a 'Discriminatory value' to the overall human existence. If Qualia fundamentally fails to discriminate between the different states of the physical world, then it's in deep trouble as it will fail to be a reliable part of a conscious human self.

The job of the eye is to see and discriminate between differing visual states and not to explain them. It not only must be able to discriminate between the visual states that are already known to the perceiver, but also it must discriminate between new visual states that become available as the perceiver goes about his or her daily life. All that the spoken or written language does is to label things that come through the eyes and all other visual organs - the nose, the ears, the tongue, the skin, the memory cells etc - and use them in inquisitive, acquisitive and precuationary visual activities or should I vaguely say conscious activities.

CHANGE AND QUALIA. Qualias like all other visual states obey causal and relational laws and, most importantly, they stick to rules of logic. They rely on and deteriorate with visual states or organs. Well, I don't want to go through that route of things not being there when we are not looking at them, not feeling them or simply not experiencing them. I believe that they remain very much there except that faulty bodily organs just fail to display them. Qualias change according to the corresponding changes in the physical states of the body organs that perceive them. The reliance of qualias on the proper functionaing of the visual organs that display them makes qualia an engineering problem and quite naturally prone to change. The Question now is: which type of change? FUNCTIONAL CHANGE or STRUCTURAL CHANGE? So far, we tend to habitually waste a great deal of time in concentrating entirely on the functional change of things around us and naively hope that they stay changed or they improve the physical states of things for good. But we do know that that simply isn't the case. Structural change is entirely ignored for the usual naive reason of not wishing to interfer with nature. But I am arguing that the configurational relation between quailias and the physical body organs that display them can be improved by structural re-engineering of the entire human reality or should I say the human physical state. I predict that several aspects of qualia may very well be re-engineered out of place or existence not unless they can prove their continual usefulness in the end-state of man.

If Mary came out of the black and white room and she's confronted with a new visual information...so what? What is the big deal? The Inquisitive mode of consciousness treats all knowledge of enquiry as commulaltive. In the human realm, all knowledge is classified into (1) Useful and (2)Non-useful. Mary coming out to see other colours other than black and white is just an addition to her stock of knowledge. But the most important question that should concern Mary is this. HOW USEFUL THIS NEW KNOWLEDGE IS TO HER IN THE PUBLIC REALM WHERE SHE MUST PHYSICALLY SUCCEED IN SURVIVING IS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE AT STAKE HERE. Whatever happens to this knowledge inside her is irrelevant. The only signifacnt use of this knowledge is that she must be able to discriminate between different colours in the real world that she lives in. As she goes about her daily life, she will continue to come across new visual information that is either obvious and self-explanatory or is explainable by means of our natural Language or is by a combination of both.

SCIENCE AND QUALIA. The attitude of science and approach of science to dealing with qualia must change. Science must treat qualia as an engineering issue that is capable of being altered when the visual organs are physically interfered with at the structural engineering or re-engineering level. The only significant scientific research that is any use to the humans is structural engineering of bodily parts and seeing precisely how they affect the visual states of all kinds. And not the analysable components of qualia. This sort of experiment would make a huge difference. Also, it is the duty of science to investigate whether the increase or decrease in the number of visual organs in the human body has any effect on the quality of visual data or visual perception. For all we know, the current physical configuration of man with the current number of visual organs may very well be inadequate for climbing to a higher or superior state of being. Science must must recsue the human race from total destruction.....for the naive claim that we must leave every thing to nature is profoundly dangerous, if not wholly suicidal! For me, this amounts to what I habitually call 'DANGEROUS CONTENTMENT'.

QUESTION: Must science explain qualia first before making a genuine attempt improve the physical state of man? Science of man or science of needs: which one should science pursue?

Fliption

Aug15-04, 12:27 AM

Meaning what, exactly. Does the Zombie have any inner life? He sees blue things remembers blue things, can compare what he sees with what he remembers, can imagine a blue thing he has never seen, and so on. Right? But he just doesn't experience, or miss, blueness.

No inner life. It means that all the brain functions associated with believing are working but nothing else. Here's the way it was put in the thread I linked.

"Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)

balkan

Aug15-04, 05:21 AM

selfAdjoint

Aug15-04, 08:30 AM

No inner life. It means that all the brain functions associated with believing are working but nothing else. Here's the way it was put in the thread I linked.

"Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)

Well in that case it seems that you are using petitio principi to define p-consciousness; that is you are assuming on the one hand that p-consciousness is the presence of qualia, and on the other hand your definition of zombies as without p-consciousness takes away ALL inner life except belief. So p-c includes the features I mentioned, which have good neurochemical substrates; sensation, memory, imagination, mental comparison.

A materialist zombie would have to have those (sensation, memory of sensation, imagination of sensation, comparison of differently generated sensations) because the brain features that produce them are being actively studied, and if the hard problem means anything, it has to confine itself to the complement of those features.

Fliption

Aug15-04, 12:07 PM

Well in that case it seems that you are using petitio principi to define p-consciousness; that is you are assuming on the one hand that p-consciousness is the presence of qualia, and on the other hand your definition of zombies as without p-consciousness takes away ALL inner life except belief. So p-c includes the features I mentioned, which have good neurochemical substrates; sensation, memory, imagination, mental comparison.

I'm not understanding the definitional problem you're pointing out. Perhaps too much is being made of the word "belief"? The point is simply that there is no reason to believe that a zombie with identical A-consciousness to you would behave any differently from you. So if you believe you have P-consciousness, a zombie with identical A-consciousness must also behave as if it has the same belief. To suggest it really "believes" is a stumbing block because it implies an inner life, which by definition there is none. That's why I posted the clarification above that when we say belief, we are talking only about the functional aspects of it. It is probably best that the word not be used at all.

vanesch

Aug15-04, 02:09 PM

You are smart and I think you can understand what I'm trying to say.

If I can make a resume of our two different positions:
-you say that consciousness is an explanatory concept people have invented to explain the behavior of humans, until we will find out in more detail how they really work and can describe their behavior in "simpler" terms, at which point the concept of consciousness becomes irrelevant (in the same way phlogiston is).

-I claim that consciousness is something that exists in my world (and probably in yours too) which has nothing to do with the explanation of the behavior of humans, but which, in itself, needs an explanation, and that the non-behavioral property of consciousness makes that explanation very hard in scientific terms.

After that, we got into the issue of whether we are using the word "consciousness" in the same way.

Would you agree with me then, that whatever _that_ property is, it's something that can't be communicated? And would you also agree that Chalmers and his followers think they are successful at communicating what the "hard problem" is about?

I don't know Chalmers. I will not agree with you that that property is something that cannot be communicated. I hope that it can - even easily - be communicated between two entities who both have consciousness, and hence, after some thinking, should have the same "problem", and recognize that's what is being talked about.
However, it cannot be communicated in formal terms (you agreed upon that). In order to communicate it, you can only "reach out a helping hand" and hope that it clicks on the other side.

You seem to be close to grasping that the world is full of hard problems, but none of them are about things we can talk about. I hope you give the issue some more thought; you would be glad you did.

I don't know what you are talking about. I only see one hard problem in _that_ category. And as I pointed out, you CAN talk about it. Maybe you can enlighten me.

Now keep this in mind: there is something we can't talk about, but I can't tell you what that something is, you have to figure out by yourself. Anything I can describe to you in words is not something we can't talk about. I have no way to talk about this thing, but there is a way to see it, and it's possible to guide people so they can also see it for themselves.

I can talk about it, I can try to tell you what it is, but I cannot come up with a formal definition. I can - and that's the whole problem here - also not come up with an OBJECTIVE operational description. But I can come up with a subjective description, assuming that this also fits close YOUR subjective experiences. So it is not that I cannot talk about it at all. I only need "a little help from my friends".

I didn't accuse you of anything. All I said was, if I started talking about bewustness with you without fully understanding what you mean by it, we would end up disagreeing at some point. Which is exactly the situation concerning most philosophical issues.

But you DO know what I mean, because at a certain point you said you didn't see the point in defining a new word if it was "consciousness" that I was talking about. A Freudian slip ? :-)

You are absolutely correct, but is "consciousness" one such thing or not? That is, is "consciousness" a concept that is related to "things in the world", or is it not?

We're getting close. I am conscious. So it IS a thing in the world. I *HAVE* subjective experiences. I *DO* feel pain. It is something that exists in MY world. But - I think we agreed on this - so it must be in YOUR world.

I am really impressed with that statement. Serious. So you see, we need a lot of concepts which lack formal definition in order for our communication to be meaningful, but at the same time concepts without a formal definition cannot be subject to scientific study.

Wrong. All the objects of study of all natural sciences are such. It is only in mathematics (and in linguistics and law) that concepts have a formal definition. But that is because they don't describe things in the world, but formal systems (maths and languages). Take the concept of "electron". I can simply say that it is the particle we accept as the particle of the QED dirac spinor. I can formally define what we mean with a dirac spinor in QED, but that doesn't define the "physical" electron. To do that, I'd have to give you lots of descriptions: some experimental ones, like it is the particles that come out of a hot cathode in vacuum, and they happen to be the same particles we find in the outer regions of atoms etc..., they have charge -1, they have a mass (at low energies!) of about 511KeV etc.. but I cannot DEFINE what is an electron because there will always be instances where my definition will flunk. I do exactly the same with consciousness, except for one thing: I cannot describe OBJECTIVE measurements with instruments dealing with it.
And it is thanks to this lack of formal definition that scientific progress is possible. If we had FORMALLY DEFINED an electron as Thompson could have done it, then it would not have been compatible with its quantum mechanical or relativistic description ! We still mean the same "thing in the world" as Thompson with "electron" but its theoretical description has seriously altered.

Doesn't that make you think? Doesn't it sound like science is only true to the extent that it restricts itself to formal logic?

I tried to explain you exactly the opposite !

I hope we get a chance, one day, to talk about why I think physics doesn't have as much to do with "things in the world" as we usually think. The truths of physics, from my perspective, seem to come from formal logic, not from the nature of reality. But that's a discussion way ahead.

But I think you misunderstood what physics is about in that case ! It is in setting up RELATIONSHIPS between formally defined concepts in theories (Dirac spinor) with "things out there" (electrons).

So can we take the fact that someone understands our descriptions of consciousness as proof that they are conscious?

Yes, but we're back to the same difficulty. It is not because it APPEARS as if someone understands the concept, from its behavioral point of view, that he also DOES understand it. A very smart computer program might be generating all what I'm typing here, and as such have no clue as what it is talking about.

You are correct about that, but as stated it is a problem like any other. Like any scientific problem, it will take time to be worked on, a final, absolute answer will never be found, but there's nothing preventing us from learning a lot more than we currently know.

Ah, something we can agree upon. Only, the way things present themselves, we haven't even started. As I wrote somewhere, interconnecting consciousnesses could be a first step. If it can be done.

That really depends on what you mean by behaviourism. Using a computer to send messages to an internet forum on metaphysics sounds like "behaviour" to me. Granted, mention to behaviour is absent in your description, but the description itself is manifested behaviour of a conscious entity (yourself)

No, absolutely not. Our message exchanges are (to me) absolutely no indication that either of us has consciousness. The only thing that indicates me that you have consciousness is that you are a human being.

This is what many people don't see. Consciousness is related to behaviour, but in a very abstract way. The more abstract a concept, the harder it is to think about it, and the easier it is to get confused and see problems where they don't exist.

As I pointed out, I don't think that consciousness has much to do with behavior. I even envision the possibility that consciousness IN NO WAY influences our behavior which is probably dictated by the running of a biochemical computer program. Even our thinking is not influenced by our consciousness. Our consciousness just subjectively observes what our (non-conscious) body is doing and thinking.
I acknowledge that this is an extreme viewpoint, but I consider it an interesting thought that consciousness CANNOT influence the behavior of a human being. It's just there passively observing what's being done, said and thought. And undergoes feelings.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug15-04, 02:26 PM

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

EXACTLY. I think I'm on the same wavelength as Fliption (but he's putting his arguments in a much more professional way :-)

I would like to point out that the reasoning:
<<
a) with concept A we mean such and such.

b) clearly, concept A has property B.

c) now from property B, we can derive a difficult problem

so there's something wrong with the way you define concept A >>

as a wrong way of reasoning.

It is almost as if in mathematics, you write down a function,
f(x) = integral sin(t)/t dt

and then you say, yeah, well there's something wrong with your
definition of f(x) because I don't know how to work out the integral !

It is not because from some concepts follows a difficult problem that the statement of the problem is wrong (or the concepts).

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug15-04, 02:47 PM

because the brain features that produce them are being actively studied, and if the hard problem means anything, it has to confine itself to the complement of those features.

I think the ultimate conscious experience is the fact that pain hurts. Pain is the physiological manifestation (neurotransmitters etc...) and the behavioural consequences (trying to avoid it, and screaming if we can't avoid it) ; but the fact that it HURTS cannot be studied actually (except for ASKING "did it hurt?" and assuming the answer is honest ;-)

For instance, I am pretty convinced that trying to factorise big numbers on my PC does pain to my PC (it gets hot, it takes a long time to answer, everything seems to run slowly etc...). My PC even regularly reboots in order to avoid it (or I might have a virus). But I don't think my PC FEELS the pain. Although my program prints out that it does if the number is really big...

cheers,
Patrick.

selfAdjoint

Aug15-04, 03:05 PM

vanesch

Aug15-04, 03:19 PM

If you stick a pin in a baby, it will respond with behavior, but it can't tell you that it hurts. Neverthelass, because the baby is human, we INFER that it hurts, and say "Nasty man! Stop hurting that baby". When your PC indicates harm with behavior by getting warm, you don't infer pain because it is a machine. Maybe you should? After all it wouldn't be much of a programming job to adapt some natural language program to produce "Ow! That hurts!" from your PC's speakers when it overheats.

Right. That's exactly what the hard problem is all about :-)
In fact, I don't know if a newborn baby is conscious and feels pain. For all safety, I assume it does (because legally I think I'm in trouble if I'd act as if it wasn't 8-). But it might very well not. And only slowly turn on its conscousness, say, at 1 or 2 years old. How can we know ?

cheers,
patrick.

selfAdjoint

Aug15-04, 04:05 PM

I'm not understanding the definitional problem you're pointing out. Perhaps too much is being made of the word "belief"? The point is simply that there is no reason to believe that a zombie with identical A-consciousness to you would behave any differently from you. So if you believe you have P-consciousness, a zombie with identical A-consciousness must also behave as if it has the same belief. To suggest it really "believes" is a stumbing block because it implies an inner life, which by definition there is none. That's why I posted the clarification above that when we say belief, we are talking only about the functional aspects of it. It is probably best that the word not be used at all.

It is not the issue of belief but the definition of a zombie. Could you say clearly whether a zombie in your definition does or does not posses the properties of sensation, memory of particular sensation, imagination of sensation, and the ability to compare remembered, sensed and imagined sensations. I claim that AIs can be programmed to do these things (perhaps poorly, but it's the categories I'm talking about, not the efficiency). If your zombie has some of these but not others would you indicate which?

Thank you.

Fliption

Aug15-04, 06:26 PM

It is not the issue of belief but the definition of a zombie. Could you say clearly whether a zombie in your definition does or does not posses the properties of sensation, memory of particular sensation, imagination of sensation, and the ability to compare remembered, sensed and imagined sensations. I claim that AIs can be programmed to do these things (perhaps poorly, but it's the categories I'm talking about, not the efficiency). If your zombie has some of these but not others would you indicate which?

Thank you.

I would say it can do the functional aspects of all those things. But it has no experience of doing them.

Nereid

Aug15-04, 07:01 PM

Right. That's exactly what the hard problem is all about :-)
In fact, I don't know if a newborn baby is conscious and feels pain. For all safety, I assume it does (because legally I think I'm in trouble if I'd act as if it wasn't 8-). But it might very well not. And only slowly turn on its conscousness, say, at 1 or 2 years old. How can we know ?

cheers,
patrick.Did Homo erectus experience pain? Do chimpanzees experience pain? Do cats? mice? lizards? trees? mosquitos?

If you say that they do (never mind why you say they do), does that mean they also possess p-consciousness?

On the operating table, you do not experience pain (unless the anaesthetist fails to do her job!), and you are not conscious of your lack of consciousness. Do you possess p-consciousness? What if you're in a coma?

selfAdjoint

Aug15-04, 07:11 PM

I would say it can do the functional aspects of all those things. But it has no experience of doing them.

Ummm, OK. That leaves me with a problem. For in doing those things, it IS experiencing them in what I would call a reasonably not overspecialized use of the verb "to experience". Perhaps we could agree that it is not AWARE of experiencing them?

But awareness doesn't seem to require unphysical assumptions:

It is not impossible to bring the fact of experience in to an AI system as data, and to allow it to be "sensed, imagined, remembered, compared". I recall a couple of years ago a plan for self repairing satellites and rovers that would do just this; monitor their own behavior, compare it with norms, and apply problem solving algorithms to search the behavior stream to find and repair the cause of any devience. Yes, this is what our autonomic nervous systems do more or less, but I would argue that pace your philosophy there is no sharp line between this kind of thing and percieving one's feelings.

Feelings have recently been a hot study area in the fMRI brain scan field. Quite siimple physical processes in the hippocampus have resulted in complex reported feelings.

Fliption

Aug15-04, 07:40 PM

Ummm, OK. That leaves me with a problem. For in doing those things, it IS experiencing them in what I would call a reasonably not overspecialized use of the verb "to experience". Perhaps we could agree that it is not AWARE of experiencing them?

But awareness doesn't seem to require unphysical assumptions:

It is not impossible to bring the fact of experience in to an AI system as data, and to allow it to be "sensed, imagined, remembered, compared". I recall a couple of years ago a plan for self repairing satellites and rovers that would do just this; monitor their own behavior, compare it with norms, and apply problem solving algorithms to search the behavior stream to find and repair the cause of any devience. Yes, this is what our autonomic nervous systems do more or less, but I would argue that pace your philosophy there is no sharp line between this kind of thing and percieving one's feelings.

Feelings have recently been a hot study area in the fMRI brain scan field. Quite siimple physical processes in the hippocampus have resulted in complex reported feelings.

I think there are some semantic issues with using the words this way. Of course, you can use them however you like but I don't think using them in this context makes any philosophical issues go away. From what I've seen in discussions in this forum, I think people might reverse your use of the words awareness and experience. For example I've seen people say that a video camera is aware of the data it receives. But I've never seen the word experience used in the same way. Regardless of which word it is we use, there is a feature that seems to have no functional explanation such as "the hippocampus does x". That is the feature that we're calling P-consciousness.

Nereid

Aug15-04, 08:01 PM

But awareness doesn't seem to require unphysical assumptions:

It is not impossible to bring the fact of experience in to an AI system as data, and to allow it to be "sensed, imagined, remembered, compared". I recall a couple of years ago a plan for self repairing satellites and rovers that would do just this; monitor their own behavior, compare it with norms, and apply problem solving algorithms to search the behavior stream to find and repair the cause of any devience. Yes, this is what our autonomic nervous systems do more or less, but I would argue that pace your philosophy there is no sharp line between this kind of thing and percieving one's feelings.In another 'artificial machine' area, such awareness is already alive and flourishing ... in modern communications networks, the 'self-healing network' has been extensively researched, standards written, and commercial companies sell such systems to large telecom companies, who hire teams of SI experts to tweak these systems, so as to reduce even further the number of human techs needed to monitor and maintain such systems. Do such systems actually work? Yes, and you bet your life on them every day that you make a 000 (911 in the US) call!

vanesch

Aug15-04, 11:59 PM

Did Homo erectus experience pain? Do chimpanzees experience pain? Do cats? mice? lizards? trees? mosquitos?

If you say that they do (never mind why you say they do), does that mean they also possess p-consciousness?

I don't know what is meant with a-consciousness and p-consciousness. I'd only say that *IF* they experience pain, then they are conscious.
And the difficult problem is indeed, to find out if chimps, cats, mice, lizards, trees, and mosquitos feel pain. I'm not talking about their behavior that would "indicate us they'd feel pain".

As I said, I don't know these definitions of a and p consciousness. But I can guess it: It seems from what is said above, that "a-consciousness" is just the intelligence of a computer program to dictate behavior "as if" the entity were conscious, and "p-consciousness" is what I simply call consciousness, namely the awareness of it, and the subjective experiences. I think p-consciousness (for me for short consciousness) doesn't influence behavior, and a-consciousness is not consciousness but the physical description of the input-response mechanism, be it a computer program, a brain or whatever.

cheers,
Patrick.

Philocrat

Aug16-04, 12:54 AM

I think the ultimate conscious experience is the fact that pain hurts. Pain is the physiological manifestation (neurotransmitters etc...) and the behavioural consequences (trying to avoid it, and screaming if we can't avoid it) ; but the fact that it HURTS cannot be studied actually (except for ASKING "did it hurt?" and assuming the answer is honest ;-)

For instance, I am pretty convinced that trying to factorise big numbers on my PC does pain to my PC (it gets hot, it takes a long time to answer, everything seems to run slowly etc...). My PC even regularly reboots in order to avoid it (or I might have a virus). But I don't think my PC FEELS the pain. Although my program prints out that it does if the number is really big...

cheers,
Patrick.

Correct.....the computer probably does not feel any pain, have you or any of the learned members of this gathering thought of any additional ability or abilities at the engineering level to be given to this computer to enable it to feel pain? There is equally another consideration......perhaps pain may not be a requirement of an efficient or perfect state of being. Robots are now being made not only physically flexible but also are being empowered with more abilities that closely resemble those of the humans.

The debate tends to be moving from Mary to Zombie to computers without any readiness for anyone to commit him or herself as to what additional abilities are neended to make these different systems structurally and functionally more efficient. And in terms of the human system, there are so many displayed abilities and functions that cannot stand the test of efficiency, let alone be grounded as fundamentally necessary.

vanesch

Aug16-04, 01:06 AM

Correct.....the computer probably does not feel any pain, have you or any of the learned members of this gathering thought of any additional ability or abilities at the engineering level to be given to this computer to enable it to feel pain?

We can think of the following: I take a big metal box (say, 2m on 2m on 2m), in which I put my PC, with the original program, but with the display, speakers and keyboard outside of the box. I also bribe one of the doctors of the nearby hospital that when there's a hopeless case coming in the emergencies, with a broken spine, paralized and without a voice, that he quickly does the necessary reparations to the victim, and then handles her over to me. I put her in the box, put a few electrodes on her body and connect them to my computer. Now when I ask my computer to factorize a large number, it not only prints out "Aw, that hurt" on my screen, but also connects (through a simple controller card) the mains (220V) to the electrodes on the victim's body, which is conscious. She can't move and can't scream ; I don't see her, because she's inside the big box. But I'd say now that my "box computer", when it prints out "Aw, that hurt", feels pain...

cheers,
Patrick.

Philocrat

Aug16-04, 01:30 AM

Many contemporary philosophers have already suspected the concept of 'awareness of being aware' or 'self-awareness' as the essential component of consciousness in general. For those of you who understand computers up to the programming and engineering levels, you should know that many new generations of computers are already 'environmentally aware'. In fact on this aspect, many of these computers would outsmart or outfox the humans, as far as the notion of safety or avoidance of evironmental dangers is concerned. There are now so many sophisticated devices that if you fit them onto modern computers they would cause these computers to become 'Super aware' of their external environments.

The BIG question now is:

What technical difficulties do we have to overcome both at the detailed hardware engineering level and at the detailed schematic Programming level in order to empower computers with self-wareness.

The issue is no longer about argueing whether computers can think or be conscious. Computer is nearly human! The question should therefore concentrate on what is left to be done to make computers fully human, given that being human is thought to be the benchmark or measure of being alive. For all we know, being human may afterall not be the only route of getting to design superbeings. For it seems as if we are currently thinking that we must first design human-like machines before setting about the important yet well-overdue project of structurally and functionally improving the physical state of the human-like beings. I dont't know why we think in this way, but so it seems. Bad habits die hard!

vanesch

Aug16-04, 03:25 AM

The BIG question now is:

What technical difficulties do we have to overcome both at the detailed hardware engineering level and at the detailed schematic Programming level in order to empower computers with self-wareness.

The problem still stands: how would you know you've succeeded ?

There's no behavioral way to know. Look at my "computer in a box". The output on the screen (the only behavioral access I have) is identical: it prints out "aw that hurt!". But in the case the victim is connected to the mains, there is an awareness of pain in my box, and if the victim is not connected, it is a simple C-program line that printed out the message. The computer works in identical ways.
If you now replace that human victim (of which we can assume that it consciously experiences pain) by a machine, how can we know ? The behavir is identical.

cheers,
Patrick.

Rader

Aug16-04, 07:21 AM

As I pointed out, I don't think that consciousness has much to do with behavior. I even envision the possibility that consciousness IN NO WAY influences our behavior which is probably dictated by the running of a biochemical computer program. Even our thinking is not influenced by our consciousness. Our consciousness just subjectively observes what our (non-conscious) body is doing and thinking.
I acknowledge that this is an extreme viewpoint, but I consider it an interesting thought that consciousness CANNOT influence the behavior of a human being. It's just there passively observing what's being done, said and thought. And undergoes feelings.

Why would a biochemical computer program, have written into itself to self destruct?

How would you account for the fact that, I pushed my wife out of the way of getting hit by a car and almost getting killed myself? Why would I want to do that? What influenced my choice then?

vanesch

Aug16-04, 07:58 AM

How would you account for the fact that, I pushed my wife out of the way of getting hit by a car and almost getting killed myself? Why would I want to do that? What influenced my choice then?

Heroic behavior can be naturally selected for, in that related groups of individuals, of whom some have "heroic behaviour" (running the risk of sacrificing themselves for the well-being of the group), have a survivalistic advantage over a "bunch of cowards". The heroic subject diminishes of course his own chances of getting his genetic material to the next generation, but his relatives will have a higher chance in doing so.
Also, if a heroic subject *survives* to his heroic deed, often there is a lot of compensation, and even survivalistic advantage (success with members of opposite sex).

What makes you think that this behavior is unthinkable without consciousness ?

But the very behavioural observation for "altruistic selfdestruction" cannot be the proof of consciousness.
Dogs do this too. Some security systems do that too. Even a fuse does it, inside electronic equipment. Are fuses conscious ?

cheers,
Patrick.

Rader

Aug16-04, 01:21 PM

Heroic behavior can be naturally selected for, in that related groups of individuals, of whom some have "heroic behaviour" (running the risk of sacrificing themselves for the well-being of the group), have a survivalistic advantage over a "bunch of cowards". The heroic subject diminishes of course his own chances of getting his genetic material to the next generation, but his relatives will have a higher chance in doing so.
Also, if a heroic subject *survives* to his heroic deed, often there is a lot of compensation, and even survivalistic advantage (success with members of opposite sex).

I would agree with you, that all those factors could be computized in my brain subconciously but it was apparently overrided. My subconscious actions had nothing to do with calculations of survival of the human race. What went through my head was anxiety fear hate relief love, in that order.

It seems we never get past KP to KP4 with this issue of who is conscious. What if we could guess what is in each others head? Bobby Fisher seemed to, what of his competitors? Why did Big Blue beat Spatsky? Could anything be conscious, meat or machine?

What makes you think that this behavior is unthinkable without consciousness?

I am aware of being aware, is one primary reason. The second reason I would give is I never seen anyone walking around that had no consciounsess and was dead, doing these things. I realize I have no proof that anything is either conscious or alive. This could have consequence as you have stated in your previous post. Maybe your right, consciousness is observing but something is aware of being observed. I know that, from my own experience. The world is weird enough now without giving the property to consciousness of being able to descriminate, whereby I or maybe humans are only conscious.

But the very behavioural observation for "altruistic selfdestruction" cannot be the proof of consciousness.

Or you or I can know that.

Dogs do this too. Some security systems do that too. Even a fuse does it, inside electronic equipment. Are fuses conscious?

You know by your posts you seem to be very interested and educated to answer your last question and this one. Is not the basic difference between measurement of coherent states and non-cohent states, the observer? HUMANS DOGS FUSES show the same results, only if we can determine if they observe. Does it not come down to the fact that all elecromagnetic waves observe each other?

vanesch

Aug16-04, 01:38 PM

My subconscious actions had nothing to do with calculations of survival of the human race. What went through my head was anxiety fear hate relief love, in that order.

You misunderstood my point. If there is a natural selection for a certain behavior, then that behavior is not necessarily instilled with a conscious thought of "I have to optimize my natural selection" :-) You asked how it could be that you had an altruistic heroic behavior if it weren't for a conscious descision (against all odds) to act that way. I pointed out that your "biochemistry computer" could have been programmed to behave that way by natural selection, and that such behavior is no proof of consciousness.
There are now 2 possibilities left: one is that (as I propose) your "biochemistry computer" runs its unconscious program as any other computer, and your consciousness is just passively watching and having feelings associated with it, without the possibility of intervening. The other possibility is that your consciousness is "in charge" of your brain, and influences behavior.

cheers,
Patrick.

Rader

Aug16-04, 02:43 PM

You misunderstood my point. If there is a natural selection for a certain behavior, then that behavior is not necessarily instilled with a conscious thought of "I have to optimize my natural selection" :-) You asked how it could be that you had an altruistic heroic behavior if it weren't for a conscious descision (against all odds) to act that way. I pointed out that your "biochemistry computer" could have been programmed to behave that way by natural selection, and that such behavior is no proof of consciousness.

I think I understand you correctly but do you understand me. I could have let the car run over her if I was programed or not for this trait. I choose not to. If I was getting a divorce maybe I would have had a second thought about it and let the car run over her. Now do you understand my point. That takes a conscious thought.

There are now 2 possibilities left: one is that (as I propose) your "biochemistry computer" runs its unconscious program as any other computer, and your consciousness is just passively watching and having feelings associated with it, without the possibility of intervening. The other possibility is that your consciousness is "in charge" of your brain, and influences behavior.

01-The world would be totally deterministic and there be no choice. Your claiming then that a "biochemistry computer", I take that to mean the "brain parts" would cause consciousness while conciousness produced, looks on. This would be a classical explanation, and if the "biochemistry computer", was quantum in nature?

02-If your consciousness is "in charge" of your brain, and influences behavior, then all behavior would be totally deterministic, only if there was a classical explanation of the brain. If the brain was quantum in nature, then it would seem to be more understandable why we make choices.

Fliption

Aug16-04, 09:08 PM

Philocrat

Aug16-04, 11:32 PM

We can think of the following: I take a big metal box (say, 2m on 2m on 2m), in which I put my PC, with the original program, but with the display, speakers and keyboard outside of the box. I also bribe one of the doctors of the nearby hospital that when there's a hopeless case coming in the emergencies, with a broken spine, paralized and without a voice, that he quickly does the necessary reparations to the victim, and then handles her over to me. I put her in the box, put a few electrodes on her body and connect them to my computer. Now when I ask my computer to factorize a large number, it not only prints out "Aw, that hurt" on my screen, but also connects (through a simple controller card) the mains (220V) to the electrodes on the victim's body, which is conscious. She can't move and can't scream ; I don't see her, because she's inside the big box. But I'd say now that my "box computer", when it prints out "Aw, that hurt", feels pain...

cheers,
Patrick.

The scenario that you are describing here may very well reflect the current state of our progress at the design, engineering and programming levels. Yes, true this may very well be so, but it still doesn't alter the fact that we need to clearly state and classify the notions of (1) intelligence (2) thinking and (3) consciousness. For example, given that we knew what (1) or (2) or (3) clearly means, we need to take stock of all the things that humans can do that computers cannot do and vice versa and the things that both can equally do that come under (1), (2) or (3). All that I have seen so far is that people just argue away in a point-scoring manner without much attention to these questions. This problem is captured much more clearly in my next posting below.

The state that you are describing is admittedly problematic, but I am saying that we need to move away from this level of sentiment and take hard stock of what is going on at the detailed engineering and programming levels. As to the puzzle of why we want to first replicate the human-like intelligence, or thinking or consciousness in machines before thinking about any form of progress in the subject, well that's another matter. I leave that to your imagination.

Philocrat

Aug16-04, 11:53 PM

The problem still stands: how would you know you've succeeded ?

There's no behavioral way to know. Look at my "computer in a box". The output on the screen (the only behavioral access I have) is identical: it prints out "aw that hurt!". But in the case the victim is connected to the mains, there is an awareness of pain in my box, and if the victim is not connected, it is a simple C-program line that printed out the message. The computer works in identical ways.
If you now replace that human victim (of which we can assume that it consciously experiences pain) by a machine, how can we know ? The behavir is identical.

cheers,
Patrick.

How could we not know? Yes, I agree with you, behaviourism does have some drawbacks but it never completely undermines sucessful existence. In terms of the humans, we are naturally lazy and reluctant about taking control of things on our causal and relational pathways. The claim that we cannot intervene with our own nature and make an effort to re-negineer and improve our state of being is not only wrong but fundamentally dangerous. We do know, and have always known, when we succeed in the public realm, even behaviourally. If we could not do this, we would probably not be here today. Perhaps, the measure is only in degrees or minimal, but at least we are still here. On this very same token, when we do succeed in replicating human-like intelligence in other non-human systems, I personally see nothing that would stop us from knowing this. In fact this is even the more reason why we must have courage to take control and use the right and clear approach in dealing with this issue.

Philocrat

Aug17-04, 12:03 AM

The dispute is not, and has never been, about whether a machine can think or act intelligibly because the original Turing Machine had all the necessary ingredients to do so. Rather, it’s wholly about whether thinking or acting intelligibly is a conscious act. The notion of awareness (introspective or extro-spective) ought to already have been captured by the notion of thinking or intelligence, given that we knew what this meant in the first place. I am saying that it is more than well overdue for all the inter-disciplinary researchers to commence the process of schematically yet quite naturally coming to a concrete agreement on this subject. The agreement that I am referring to here could be captured in the following schema:

SCHEMA I

(1) A Conscious act is an intelligent act
(2) All intelligent acts are conscious acts
(3) Anything that can produce an intelligent act is conscious
(4) Computer can produce intelligent act
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, computer is conscious

Immediately after this argument, the next most important question to ask is this:

What then constitutes an intelligent act?

In an honest and genuine response to this question, the researchers on this subject should then move on to create a ‘reference table’ of all the things that count as intelligent acts.

This argument may equivalently be stated as:

(1) A conscious act is an act of thinking
(2) All acts of thinking are conscious acts
(3) Anything that can think is conscious
(4) Computer can think
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, computer is conscious

You are then required to state clearly:

What constitutes thinking?

The researcher must then create a reference table of all the things classed under thinking.

SCHEMA II

On the other hand, if it turns out that there are some thinking or intelligent acts that are conscious and some that are not, the schema should take the form:

(1) Some acts of thinking are conscious acts
(2) Thinking is conscious if you are aware not only of what your are thinking about but also of the fact that you are thinking
(3) Anything that can do this is conscious
(4) Computer has some thinking acts that are conscious
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, computer is conscious

The researchers who opt for this alternative schema must classify thinking acts or intelligent acts into (1) those that are conscious and (2) those that are not conscious. Perhaps there may be a third or more schmas to prove otherwise, but I am going to leave it at this point for now.

NOTE: The implication of the Universal Turing Machine (http://www.alanturing.net/turing_archive/pages/Reference%20Articles/What%20is%20a%20Turing%20Machine.html) is such that it does not presuppose consciousness, therefore any schema that any researcher may opt for still has to decide on the relevance or non-relevance of consciousness. Even if he or she successfully avoids the issue of consciousness at the level of engineering or re-engineering to improve the intelligent system in questions, he or she may not avoid this issue at the level of structural and functional comparison of the system in question to the human system. Researchers in the end must either accept it as relevant or reject it as not.

vanesch

Aug17-04, 12:30 AM

I think I understand you correctly but do you understand me. I could have let the car run over her if I was programed or not for this trait. I choose not to. If I was getting a divorce maybe I would have had a second thought about it and let the car run over her. Now do you understand my point. That takes a conscious thought.

How do you know your consciousness was MAKING the decision and your body was acting that way, or your body decided to act that way, and your consciousness was feeling all right with that decision (without a means of intervening) and "thought" it took it.

01-The world would be totally deterministic and there be no choice. Your claiming then that a "biochemistry computer", I take that to mean the "brain parts" would cause consciousness while conciousness produced, looks on. This would be a classical explanation, and if the "biochemistry computer", was quantum in nature?

02-If your consciousness is "in charge" of your brain, and influences behavior, then all behavior would be totally deterministic, only if there was a classical explanation of the brain. If the brain was quantum in nature, then it would seem to be more understandable why we make choices.
[/QUOTE]

This is indeed, more or less, the point. Although I do not need the idea of determinism: you can have randomly generated phenomena without conscious influence. I also tend to think - but I'm very careful here - that quantum theory might have something to say about the issue. But I think we are still very far from finding out, it is the "open door" in actual physics to consciousness.

Our mutual understanding of our viewpoints is converging, I think.

cheers,
patrick.

vanesch

Aug17-04, 12:51 AM

(2) All intelligent acts are conscious acts

I do not agree. I do not see the link between intelligence (the ability to solve difficult problems) and consciousness.

The researchers who opt for this alternative schema must classify thinking acts or intelligent acts into (1) those that are conscious and (2) those that are not conscious.

Hehe, yes, they have to solve the hard problem :-)
Because it is not the problem category, nor the problem solving strategy, that will indicate this. So what remains of the intelligent act on which we base the separation ? What will be the criterion ? Also, assuming we're talking about a Turing machine, do you mean it is the _software_ that is conscious ? Independent of the machine on which it runs ? When it is written on a CD ?
I have a hard time believing that a Turing machine, no matter how complex, can be conscious. But I agree that I cannot prove or disprove this.

But we should avoid the confusion between intelligence and consciousness here. Now it might very well be that certain levels of intelligence are only attainable if the entity is conscious. But personally, I do not see a link, especially if consciousness is just sitting there passively watching. You could just as well look at power consumption and say that if you reach the density of power consumption of a human brain, the machine is conscious, and then jump into the research on power resistors. I think that "intelligence" (the ability to solve difficult problems) is a property just as power consumption, when related to consciousness.

cheers,
Patrick.

Rader

Aug17-04, 11:09 AM

What is a conscious thought?

Cognitive awareness. http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/awconlang.html

All of the brain and biochemical acitvity required for you to "think" about this decision can, in principle, be completely accounted for. None of these activities have anything to do with consciousness. What Vanesch is saying is that there is no way for you to know whether your consciousness is actually participating in the process or whether it is just experiencing the physical activities that particpate in the process. The "conscious thought" you're referencing can be completely explained using physical processes of the brain; none of which are associated with consciousness. This is why there is a 'hard problem'.

Fliption, actually there seems to be evidence of both. When something is born into existence, it apppears to be conscious, until such time, I can say I am conscious. If this is explanable some how, some day, this will eliminate the "hard problem" This would explain what is conscious and what physcial states determine how much something is conscious. Consciouness would have to be a fundamental property of nature.

Rader

Aug17-04, 11:24 AM

How do you know your consciousness was MAKING the decision and your body was acting that way, or your body decided to act that way, and your consciousness was feeling all right with that decision (without a means of intervening) and "thought" it took it.

Good question, the only way for me to answer that is that, my consciounsess is aware of being aware and has evolved to an understanding of an order of the way the world ought to be. Sometimes my consciousness acts right but my body says no. Sometimes my body acts right when my consciousness knows better. So it appears that consciousness is watching and we make the decision how to act. :wink:

This is indeed, more or less, the point. Although I do not need the idea of determinism: you can have randomly generated phenomena without conscious influence. I also tend to think - but I'm very careful here - that quantum theory might have something to say about the issue. But I think we are still very far from finding out, it is the "open door" in actual physics to consciousness.
Our mutual understanding of our viewpoints is converging, I think.

That happens sometimes to our dissapointments later that nobody has the same view.

vanesch

Aug17-04, 12:04 PM

Cognitive awareness. http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/awconlang.html
.

I've read (part of) the article, and I think it completely misses the point. Not that I say that the scientific part of the article is wrong, but - unless I misunderstood it, I my opinion, it doesn't address the issue of consciousness as it has been adressed here on this forum. It is a technical description of brain functions.

Some quotes:
"On the other hand consciousness is an ordinary fact of life - babies are born without it and develop it over the first few years of life."

"The question of consciousness can therefore be approached by considering the general phenomenon of awareness, of which consciousness is one particular example. "

"And awareness has a quite exact definition: it is the ability selectively to direct attention to specific aspects of the environment, and to be able cognitively to manipulate these aspects over a more prolonged timescale than usual cognitive processing will allow. To hold in mind selected aspects of the perceptual landscape. Technically, awareness is attention plus working memory - ie. the ability to attend selectively among a range of perceived stimuli and a short term memory store into which several of these attended items can be 'loaded', held simultaneously, and combined. "
...
"While awareness is found in animals right across the animal kingdom; consciousness is of much more limited distribution. I suggest that consciousness is probably confined to a small number of recently-evolved social animals such as the great ape lineage - especially common chimpanzees and bonobos - and perhaps a few other recently-evolved social mammals such as elephants and dolphins."

"Consciousness arises when body state information becomes accessible to awareness. "
----

My comments:
Clearly, awareness as defined above has nothing to do with what has been meant here with consciousness. I need something that can hold information for a rather long time in memory, and access it selectively, and I have to be able to select amongst several stimuli.

In that case, I can make a machine with "awareness" using a PC, and, say, a webcam on a motor !

Moreover, if I write regularly information about power consumption, memory and CPU usage, temperature, fan speed etc... into the working memory of my PC, it is now conscious !

Come on !

Philocrat

Aug17-04, 10:22 PM

I do not agree. I do not see the link between intelligence (the ability to solve difficult problems) and consciousness.

Does it matter? Or are you implying that when you are solving complex problems (given that this is all what the term 'intelligence' means) you are not conscious of the complex problem that you are solving, let alone of the fact that you are actually doing so?

Hehe, yes, they have to solve the hard problem :-)
Because it is not the problem category, nor the problem solving strategy, that will indicate this. So what remains of the intelligent act on which we base the separation ? What will be the criterion ? Also, assuming we're talking about a Turing machine, do you mean it is the _software_ that is conscious ? Independent of the machine on which it runs ? When it is written on a CD ?

The schemas that I am suggesting make no claims about anything. They are a mere guide setting the stage for further arguments. Or you could say that it's an invitation for those going around in circles to commit themselves and commence the process of landing the argument in safer grounds. Either we accept that consciousness has some accountable relationship with intellgent or thinking acts or that there is no such relationship. Either way, we still have to say what counts as intelligence or thinking and subsequently state whether other systems, other than the a human system, are capable of possessing such an ability. I am inviting those involved in this subject to come clean of this fact. We cannot just let lose the argument and just let it run without taking a concrete stand and take stock. It is therefore irrelevant whether such an ability (intelligence) is successfully replicated as a software or as a hardwired system or as a combination of several kinds.

I have a hard time believing that a Turing machine, no matter how complex, can be conscious. But I agree that I cannot prove or disprove this.

As I have pointed it out above, the original Turing Machine does not presuppose consciousness....and it may not rule it out either. That's why I am calling for an agreement on the whole subject. We cannot just independently and non-directionally debate it away without eventually agreeing on something. Either consciousness is part of an intelligent system or it is simply not.

But we should avoid the confusion between intelligence and consciousness here. Now it might very well be that certain levels of intelligence are only attainable if the entity is conscious. But personally, I do not see a link, especially if consciousness is just sitting there passively watching. You could just as well look at power consumption and say that if you reach the density of power consumption of a human brain, the machine is conscious, and then jump into the research on power resistors. I think that "intelligence" (the ability to solve difficult problems) is a property just as power consumption, when related to consciousness.

Well, this drags you into interactionist nightmare!....."especially if consciousness is just sitting there passively watching". It seems as if you are inviting me to think that when aspects of physical states or events approache critical functional states mysterious immaterial entities manifest to interplay. Right? Critical functional states of the physical material world do not necessarily presuppose non-physicality, nor non-existent, nor any independence from their physical sources. I do not want to go down that route of the so-called 'existence and indendence' of immaterial, or non-physical or any mysterious kinds of states. That route is just too messy and delusory for me.

vanesch

Aug18-04, 12:20 AM

Either we accept that consciousness has some accountable relationship with intellgent or thinking acts or that there is no such relationship. Either way, we still have to say what counts as intelligence or thinking and subsequently state whether other systems, other than a human system, are capable of possessing such an ability.

Intelligence (defined as the ability to solve "difficult" problems) has, to me, no a priori relationship with consciousness. When I solve a difficult integral with paper and pencil, I absolutely have not the feeling to go through an "algorithmic mantra", but creatively find substitution rules etc... to solve it. It is an intellectual challenge as any. Well, if I type in the expression in Mathematica on my PC, it solves the same problem. I think that if you would have told someone in the 19th century that a machine could solve an integral, they would have classified that as an "intelligent act". So I'm pretty convinced that no matter where you put the bar for "human intelligence", a computer program will pass it, now, or in the near future.
So I think that the answer to your request above, is clearly that "other systems than the human system can possess this ability".

But it doesn't indicate at all anything about consciousness. I think from an engineering point of view, you don't give a damn about consciousness. You want intelligence! You want your machines to behave in certain ways. It doesn't matter if they behave "as if they were conscious" or if they "are conscious". My point here is that we don't know how to find out ! So we could ignore the problem and we don't need an IEEE standard for consciousness. But a moral issue comes up: if machines ARE conscious, should they have rights ? Is the concept of "torturing a conscious being" applicable ? Nobody in his right mind would be shocked of "torturing an intelligent being" because the concept doesn't make sense.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug18-04, 12:39 AM

It seems as if you are inviting me to think that when aspects of physical states or events approache critical functional states mysterious immaterial entities manifest to interplay. Right?

I do not necessarily claim that. Call it an "emerging property", in the same way phonons are an emerging property in the solid state. My hope is that it is somehow part of physics, but it is not sure. But the problem is not whether or not it IS physics, the problem is that we have no way of finding out, once we realize that consciousness has no necessarily link to behavior.
In ALL "solutions" I've seen proposed, people end up _redefining_ consciousness as something else, in order to have an operational definition.
Computer science people who work on artificial intelligence usually redefine it as 1) intelligence or 2) pure behaviorism, usually as a social intelligence (the Turing test, for instance).
If you read the article by the psychiatrist, to him, consciousness is "working memory that has access to internal body information". If you give that to a computer engineer, he quickly solders you some SRAM and a few sensors on a PCB :-)
Moreover, these people do useful work with their definition, because the concept they define IS interesting. But they miss the original meaning of consciousness. I think the philosophical problem stands there, untouched.

cheers,
Patrick.

Philocrat

Aug18-04, 11:22 PM

Intelligence (defined as the ability to solve "difficult" problems) has, to me, no a priori relationship with consciousness. When I solve a difficult integral with paper and pencil, I absolutely have not the feeling to go through an "algorithmic mantra", but creatively find substitution rules etc... to solve it. It is an intellectual challenge as any. Well, if I type in the expression in Mathematica on my PC, it solves the same problem. I think that if you would have told someone in the 19th century that a machine could solve an integral, they would have classified that as an "intelligent act". So I'm pretty convinced that no matter where you put the bar for "human intelligence", a computer program will pass it, now, or in the near future.
So I think that the answer to your request above, is clearly that "other systems than the human system can possess this ability".

But it doesn't indicate at all anything about consciousness. I think from an engineering point of view, you don't give a damn about consciousness. You want intelligence! You want your machines to behave in certain ways. It doesn't matter if they behave "as if they were conscious" or if they "are conscious". My point here is that we don't know how to find out ! So we could ignore the problem and we don't need an IEEE standard for consciousness. But a moral issue comes up: if machines ARE conscious, should they have rights ? Is the concept of "torturing a conscious being" applicable ? Nobody in his right mind would be shocked of "torturing an intelligent being" because the concept doesn't make sense.

cheers,
Patrick.

The answers to the moral questions are already automatically expected. It's just a matter of when, and not if. There will be no surprises. If many intelligent groups within the human system have faught for their rights in the past and succeeded, what would make computers or other systems who possess genuine consciousness or something equivalent to it not to do the same? Human beings have always had prejudices of this kind because of fear or lack of understanding of change. Well, that's normal.

Yes, in a way it doesn't make sense and what is even worst about this whole episode is why we want to replicate human intelligence or thinking or consciousness or whatever you wish to call it in other systems first before setting about the pressing need of correcting structural and functional errors and inadequacies in us. Why build these imitations machines first before re-engineering our own originally erroneous reality? This for me is puzzling bit and the most difficult one to comprehend.

Philocrat

Aug18-04, 11:59 PM

I do not necessarily claim that. Call it an "emerging property", in the same way phonons are an emerging property in the solid state. My hope is that it is somehow part of physics, but it is not sure. But the problem is not whether or not it IS physics, the problem is that we have no way of finding out, once we realize that consciousness has no necessarily link to behavior.
In ALL "solutions" I've seen proposed, people end up _redefining_ consciousness as something else, in order to have an operational definition.
Computer science people who work on artificial intelligence usually redefine it as 1) intelligence or 2) pure behaviorism, usually as a social intelligence (the Turing test, for instance).
If you read the article by the psychiatrist, to him, consciousness is "working memory that has access to internal body information". If you give that to a computer engineer, he quickly solders you some SRAM and a few sensors on a PCB :-)
Moreover, these people do useful work with their definition, because the concept they define IS interesting. But they miss the original meaning of consciousness. I think the philosophical problem stands there, untouched.

cheers,
Patrick.

But this is one discipline's response which must be welcomed. Though physicalist and behaviourist in scope, that guy does have something to contribute. He is stating a physicalist-bahviourist argumnets and you know as well as I do that, as inadequate as this might seem, it's never completely ruled out. In fact no one can successfully rule it out. His memory interpretation gives memory a better and more realistic role to play. From my own investigation, the natural functions of genes and memory centres in our physical material bodies are the most underated and neglected as very powerful multi-function, multipurpose coding and display systems. We naively but negligibly annex to them less than they are capable of doing. That is the problem that has tormented me over the years. Another area of gross negligence in the subject is wrong classification of conscious states that I have been struggling in this very thread and elsewhere to draw everyone's attention to without much success.

I am saying that the time for debate is over.....we should start classifying and then schematically map the results into the underlying states. There some real links should be found. I have also looked at the whole concept of independence, non-existence, non-physical, interactionist or immaterial nature of consciousness, but I have always found it quantitativelly, analytically and logically absurd. Call me naive or any name you might wish, I just have not found the link, that's why I find it very difficult to accept.

Don't forget that consciousness is now a multi-discilinary project. It's no longer exclusive to philosophy. Nearly every discipline now wants a slice of it. And that's why we can no longer afford to be snobbish. I urge that all the research data from all the disciplines must be respected and rigorously but cautiously looked at and collated.

Philocrat

Aug19-04, 12:11 AM

In the Book of Nature there are many classes of laws that are interfaced with man-made laws, when it comes to things and what natural laws govern or affect them, consciousness in my opinion is no exception. The fundamental law that I specifically intend to invoke from the book of nature that governs consciousness is the ‘LAW OF RATIONALITY’. This law does not in any way assumes the falsity or truthfulness of any type of explanations or notions that we may already have about consciousness, rather it merely states the fundamental purpose and logical specification of it as applied at the practical human level (see the notes below for its clarification).

In the first part of this piece, I deliberately make blind logical assumptions that collect into what looks like a logical argument about the nature of thinking or intelligence. In the second part I am interested in finding out not only about what counts as consciousness but also whether any of the things listed about thinking or intelligence in the first part is conscious. So is a thinking or intelligent act a conscious act?

What are the things that count as Intelligence or Thinking?

I will start this marathon task by making very simple but very open-minded assumptions:

1) That any act of intelligence or thinking must be construed as an ability of some sort (presumably a functional kind)

2) That this ability allows anything that possesses it to function and behave the way it was originally designed to do, regardless of if such a thing was self-created, randomly or accidentally created, or created by the so-called intelligent designer.

3) Intelligent acts are purposive, empowering and progressive.

4) Storing and recalling information (memorising and remembering) is a thinking or intelligent act.

5) Feeling something and reacting to or acting upon that thing is a thinking or intelligent act.

6) Seeing something and reacting to or acting upon it is a thinking or intelligent act.

7) Hearing something and reacting to or acting upon it is a thinking or intelligent act.

8) Counting and calculating are thinking or intelligent acts

9) Following rules is a thinking or intelligent act.

10) Reasoning and making choices is a thinking or intelligent act.

11) Anything that possesses some or all of these abilities is intelligent or can think

12) Machines possess some or all of these abilities

13) Humans possess some or all of these abilities

14) Other living organisms possess some or all of these abilities
__________________________________________________ ___________
Therefore, machines, humans and other living organisms are intelligent or can think.

NOTE: The problem of seeing, or hearing or feeling something and reacting to it is that it is fundamentally governed by the Law of Rationality upon which Man-made law itself is based. The Law of Rationality says that there must be sufficient time intervals between seeing something, thinking about that thing, forming a belief about it, memorising it and physically acting upon it. But in practice this is never really the case. For example, in man-made law this is even more problematic as the law of rationality is not clear by interpretation. This implies that the time intervals between the listed mental and physical events can collapse into oblivion where they become temporally and functionally inadequate for a rational being to exercise self-restraint or control. In criminal law no crime is committed unless premeditated or intended, hence a criminal act devoid of intention (the mental aspect), unless proven otherwise, is no crime. Conversely, a criminal intention devoid of a criminal act (the physical aspect), unless proven otherwise, is no crime. And the standard presumption here is that to commit a physical criminal act one ought to have thought of it and formed a clear intention to do so. When the prosecution raises this charge in court, the burden of proof is upon the defence to proof otherwise. However, there is a controversial aspect of this with regards to the idea of ‘seeing and thinking before you act’. There is an aspect of the law, which assumes that there is an occasion when we can act without thinking such as during ‘provocation’. When provocation is raised in a criminal case, if successfully proved, the immediate consequence is to either acquit the accused or limit the severity of the punishment. It seems therefore as if though the law makers believe that the coincidence of thought and action as is in the case of provocation is a violation of the law of rationality, and hence anyone who finds him or herself in this situation has no case to answer. I see no benefit in intensifying this controversy, but it is important to understand the correct sequence of things in the process of seeing, thinking and acting. The correct sequence is this:

(1) You see something or experience something;
(2) You think using the contents of your experience (immediate, historical or a combination of both);
(3) You memorize by forming a belief or beliefs from your thought about that thing;
(4) And you act for or against the thing on the basis of that belief or beliefs.

According to the law of rationality not only are there clearly quantifiable time intervals between thinking, forming and memorizing the resultant beliefs and acting on those beliefs, but also these time intervals must be sufficient. However, what is not clear is whether the lawmakers believe that during provocation there is a complete absence of time intervals between thinking, belief formation and action, or whether they believe that although the time intervals do exist during provocation but nevertheless they are insufficient for a rational man to exercise self-control. The question I have always asked is this: does it make any difference whether the law as it currently stands is based on the former or the latter? This is the question that has occupied my mind for some years now.

Continue in par II below.....

Philocrat

Aug19-04, 12:12 AM

What are the things that count as consciousness?

I will equally make the following open-minded assumptions without any commitment to their falsity or validity. I am merely setting the stage for classification and analysis proper to begin:

1) Consciousness is an ability to be aware of what you are doing. If you are thinking, you must be aware not only of what you thinking about but also of the fact that you are thinking. If you are acting in an intelligent way, you must also be able to be aware not only of what you are intelligently acting upon, but also of the fact that you are doing so.

2) To see is to be aware

3) To hear is to be aware

4) To feel is to be ware

5) To store and recall (memorise and remember) is to be aware

6) To Repeat a task or a set of tasks a number of times is to be aware

7) To follow rules is to be aware

8) To pass information from one position in space and time to the next (communicate) is to be aware

9) To count and calculate is to be aware

10) To reason following a set of logical steps or procedures is to be aware

11) To make a choice or a decision from a list of alternative choices is to be aware.

12) Anything that can see, feel, hear, store and recall information, count and calculate, reason, and make choices is conscious

13) Human beings can do all these things

14) Computers can do all these things

15) Animals, insects and fishes can do all these things

16) Microscopic organisms can do all these things
__________________________________________________ __________
Therefore, Human beings, Computers, Animals, insects, Fishes and Microscopic organisms are conscious.

I am not claiming that this argument is accurate, let alone any of its premises so. But I think the amount of information that I have packed into it is enough for us or those involved in this subject to start classifying, analysing and making concrete judgements about the nature and purpose of the human consciousness, and to state whether other systems other than the humans can have and make a purposeful use of it.

NOTE: The problem that we have in this discussion is that man-made law recognises the distinction between mental events and physical events and treats them as outwardly purposive and useful for measuring, monitoring and controlling rational behaviour needed for administering and enforcing ‘COLLECTIVE RESPOSNSIBILITY’, without making judgements about their true natures, causal roles, causal relations and origins. The Law of Rationality, though scientifically reducible and clear, seems to be given a very limited interpretation at the outer practical level. Perhaps this is the reason why scientific opinion is usually sought in some very hard and complicated cases, such as sleepwalking and mental illness cases. The lawmaker leaves the gab between the mental and the physical unclosed and does not pretend in any shape or form to close it, but nevertheless assumes a substantial degree of consciousness in the process. For the lawmaker, to commit an offence, both the MENTAL CONTENT (Intention) and the PHYSICAL CONTENT (Action) must exist and one must flow from the other …..and one devoid of the other is no crime. Either way the lawmaker assumes existence of consciousness…and in terms of the provocation example that I gave above, it seems as if the lawmaker takes provocation, if proved, to be an absence of consciousness – that is, absence of a conscious, fully thought out, decision to bring about a criminal or an unlawful act. In other words the lawmaker does not wait to establish or know how, say, pain is represented in the minds or bodies of both the offender and the offended before stating and enforcing the law, nor neither does he waits to know whether both the offender and the offended feel pain in the same way or differently before acting as so stated. He resumes his interpretation and enforcement of the law from the point (practical, non-scientific level) where he thinks ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’, without assuming any knowledge of what is going on at the scientific level.

This problem that I have just highlighted is summarised in law as:

“everyman is presumed to intend the consequence of his act”

The fundamental question that confronts all the multi-disciplinary researchers on this subject is this:

When will they turn ordinary assumptions into hard scientific facts?

If we consider the lawmaker’s standpoint (the interpretation and enforcement of collective responsibility by a device of behaviourism alone) as functionally inadequate, then we ought to look for a way of correcting the occasional errors in the process scientifically, such as those errors that usually plaque the system and subsequently manifest into wrongful convictions and miscarriage of justice. Conversely, if we reject the system as being structurally and functionally fatalistic or very dangerous in scope and in substance, then we ought to consider the total overhauling and re-engineering of it at the structural underlying level. I cannot imagine anyone immediately opting for the former, let alone the latter……but they are unquestionably very important issues that sooner or later we would have to unavoidably confront in a multi-disciplinary manner.

And so is the notion of 'COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS’, if at all it is structurally and functionally possible in the first place.

vanesch

Aug19-04, 01:35 AM

Don't forget that consciousness is now a multi-discilinary project. It's no longer exclusive to philosophy. Nearly every discipline now wants a slice of it. And that's why we can no longer afford to be snobbish.

*We* cannot be snobbish as philosophers, because I'm not a philosopher, for the record, I'm a physicist :-) However, the "multidisciplinary" effort seems to me, for its own convenience, to *redefine* consciousness in the behavioral way. I can very well understand the idea: otherwise one quickly runs out of "things to do", and at the end of the year, one needs to write papers!
In a lot of situations, as with the psychiatrist, "awareness" is set equal to "having access to data and responding in a "thoughtfull matter" to these data". And, as I said, all this is fine and well, and gives rise to useful scientific knowledge.

But what all these people seem to miss, is that the ONLY reason for consciousness to exist as a concept, is that *I AM CONSCIOUS*. If I weren't conscious, as far as any scientifically falsiable statement goes, the concept doesn't make sense, exactly because it doesn't have any operational definition, besides the obvious fact that I know I'm conscious. And the strategy in all these multidisciplinary efforts is to, rather randomly, add an operational definition to it (memory function/Turing test/behaviorism/intelligence...) in order to render it a concept that can enter into falsifiable theories. The funny thing is that each discipline has its own added operational definition and they are sometimes incompatible. I'm sure that, if one follows your way of reasoning, we will soon have an IEEE standard of when a machine is conscious.

But the contents of the hard problem is untouched, exactly because of this: without adding an operational definition, consciousness hasn't got any, because its operational definition is purely subjective. It is this notion, by itself, the fact that what we call consciousness is inherently subjective, that makes that it cannot be part of a falsifiable scientific theory. Normally one rejects such notions. The only reason I cannot reject it is that subjectively, the concept that I'm conscious DOES make sense. In fact, it is the ONLY scientifically non-falsifiable notion that cannot be rejected.

Now I'm a physicist, so I can also contribute to the multidisciplinary effort :-) I'm very happy, because in physics, there is another _hard problem_. It is called the measurement problem in quantum theory.
A well-known strategy of impressing your environment is to take two impossible-to-solve problems, and say that they are the same thing, so that's what I do, for the moment. I think - but I'm open to it - that, just as Penrose, there is a link between the measurement problem in quantum theory and the problem of consciousness.

cheers,
Patrick.

Nereid

Aug19-04, 02:40 AM

Now I'm a physicist, so I can also contribute to the multidisciplinary effort :-) I'm very happy, because in physics, there is another _hard problem_. It is called the measurement problem in quantum theory.
A well-known strategy of impressing your environment is to take two impossible-to-solve problems, and say that they are the same thing, so that's what I do, for the moment. I think - but I'm open to it - that, just as Penrose, there is a link between the measurement problem in quantum theory and the problem of consciousness.

cheers,
Patrick.The difficult we can do immediately, the impossible takes just a little longer.

Other than that they're both 'impossible-to-solve', why link the two? Does linking the two allow you to have an objective criterion for determining the presence of consciousness? For example, "if it says it's conscious, and there's clearly some quantum measurement thingy involved in how it works, then it truly is conscious."

selfAdjoint

Aug19-04, 10:05 AM

It's just a search strategy - parsimony. Suppose all our unsolvable problems are unsolvable for the same reason. Penrose made quite a run with it, but seems to have become seduced into doing QFT on microtubules.

Philocrat

Aug19-04, 10:48 PM

*We* cannot be snobbish as philosophers, because I'm not a philosopher, for the record, I'm a physicist :-) However, the "multidisciplinary" effort seems to me, for its own convenience, to *redefine* consciousness in the behavioral way. I can very well understand the idea: otherwise one quickly runs out of "things to do", and at the end of the year, one needs to write papers!
In a lot of situations, as with the psychiatrist, "awareness" is set equal to "having access to data and responding in a "thoughtfull matter" to these data". And, as I said, all this is fine and well, and gives rise to useful scientific knowledge.

But what all these people seem to miss, is that the ONLY reason for consciousness to exist as a concept, is that *I AM CONSCIOUS*. If I weren't conscious, as far as any scientifically falsiable statement goes, the concept doesn't make sense, exactly because it doesn't have any operational definition, besides the obvious fact that I know I'm conscious. And the strategy in all these multidisciplinary efforts is to, rather randomly, add an operational definition to it (memory function/Turing test/behaviorism/intelligence...) in order to render it a concept that can enter into falsifiable theories. The funny thing is that each discipline has its own added operational definition and they are sometimes incompatible. I'm sure that, if one follows your way of reasoning, we will soon have an IEEE standard of when a machine is conscious.

But the contents of the hard problem is untouched, exactly because of this: without adding an operational definition, consciousness hasn't got any, because its operational definition is purely subjective. It is this notion, by itself, the fact that what we call consciousness is inherently subjective, that makes that it cannot be part of a falsifiable scientific theory. Normally one rejects such notions. The only reason I cannot reject it is that subjectively, the concept that I'm conscious DOES make sense. In fact, it is the ONLY scientifically non-falsifiable notion that cannot be rejected.

Now I'm a physicist, so I can also contribute to the multidisciplinary effort :-) I'm very happy, because in physics, there is another _hard problem_. It is called the measurement problem in quantum theory.
A well-known strategy of impressing your environment is to take two impossible-to-solve problems, and say that they are the same thing, so that's what I do, for the moment. I think - but I'm open to it - that, just as Penrose, there is a link between the measurement problem in quantum theory and the problem of consciousness.

cheers,
Patrick.

I understand all what you are saying and what your key concerns are about the 'hard problem' of consciousness....and I appreciate your own effort on the subject totally. But the questions that still bother me are these:

1) SUBJECTIVITY

If consciousness or an aspect of it is wholly subjective why does it make persistent objective demands on the physical world? Why does it interplay in the public realm?

2) PRODUCTION AND FORM

If Consciousness or an aspect of it has no physical orgin, where does it come from? What produces it? If it is non-physical, what is it made of?

3) INDEPENDENCE AND INTERACTION

How does it in its non-physical, non-material state interact with a purely but clearly accounable physical system like the human?

I am sorry to be this persistent, but my main concern is that by dwelling too much on the hard problem of consciousness, we may waste so much time such that we lose touch of the fact that the volume of research data accumulated in different disciplines on the subject must start converging. These data must start converging, not yesterday, but now!

Or we might as well retire into ourselves and admit that qualia needs a brand new discipline to expalin it.

vanesch

Aug19-04, 11:34 PM

The difficult we can do immediately, the impossible takes just a little longer.

Other than that they're both 'impossible-to-solve', why link the two?

As I said, because that's a technique to impress your environment :tongue2:

Does linking the two allow you to have an objective criterion for determining the presence of consciousness? For example, "if it says it's conscious, and there's clearly some quantum measurement thingy involved in how it works, then it truly is conscious."

No, it is not in that way that I saw the link. The problem in QM is the fact that apparently, you need "other physics" for observers than for "systems", namely the Born probability rule (and projection) versus unitary evolution. You could argue that the observation is not made by a conscious being but by a measurement apparatus, but - as you know - decoherence theory shows us that you can simply allow unitary evolution, and then your system+measurement apparatus becomes in a superposition of states which, for all practical purposes, will not interfere anymore. We call the non-interfering component vectors, branches. If on a higher level, a projection is made and probabilities are assigned, then we will select a probable branch.
In that case we will also find that the measurement apparatus, as selected by that projection, applied exactly the same scheme. So you're free to postpone the projection up to conscious observation, or to consider that it happened already at the level of the apparatus. But you need a projection between here and there, because it is the only way to get out probabilities in the von Neuman way. (the MWI says otherwise, but I think it is flawed, in that whenever they find that you should have a history according to the von Neuman rule, they have sneaked in a preference for a high-probability state according to von Neuman!)

Now let us compare.
The essential element of consciousness (that made it difficult to handle) was that there was a subjective "observation". The essential difficulty in QM is that somewhere along the chain, you need to postulate "an observation".
Allow me to point out that it is tempting to say that both are linked. So consciousness is "that which applies the projection in QM". In that case, there is needs only be one consciousness in the world, namely mine (and I should stop talking to you guys about it, because you haven't got any and so you can't possibly know what I'm talking about :biggrin:).
The nasty thing is that decoherence has then also as a corrolary that anything else which applies the projection (and hence has a consciousness) cannot be recognized (because once branches decohere, everything happens exactly in the same way whether we consider that a machine projected or not, as long as we project, afterwards). So associating consciousness with "that what projects" also links the fundamental difficulty of recognizing something similar somewhere else (a consciousness has difficulty recognizing another consciousness, and a projector has difficulties recognizing another projector).
I don't claim "truth" for my statements here, but I think they are intriguing, no ?

cheers,
patrick.

misogynisticfeminist

Aug20-04, 08:16 AM

Nereid

Aug20-04, 11:30 AM

As I said, because that's a technique to impress your environment :tongue2:

No, it is not in that way that I saw the link. The problem in QM is the fact that apparently, you need "other physics" for observers than for "systems", namely the Born probability rule (and projection) versus unitary evolution. You could argue that the observation is not made by a conscious being but by a measurement apparatus, but - as you know - decoherence theory shows us that you can simply allow unitary evolution, and then your system+measurement apparatus becomes in a superposition of states which, for all practical purposes, will not interfere anymore. We call the non-interfering component vectors, branches. If on a higher level, a projection is made and probabilities are assigned, then we will select a probable branch.
In that case we will also find that the measurement apparatus, as selected by that projection, applied exactly the same scheme. So you're free to postpone the projection up to conscious observation, or to consider that it happened already at the level of the apparatus. But you need a projection between here and there, because it is the only way to get out probabilities in the von Neuman way. (the MWI says otherwise, but I think it is flawed, in that whenever they find that you should have a history according to the von Neuman rule, they have sneaked in a preference for a high-probability state according to von Neuman!)

Now let us compare.
The essential element of consciousness (that made it difficult to handle) was that there was a subjective "observation". The essential difficulty in QM is that somewhere along the chain, you need to postulate "an observation".
Allow me to point out that it is tempting to say that both are linked. So consciousness is "that which applies the projection in QM". In that case, there is needs only be one consciousness in the world, namely mine (and I should stop talking to you guys about it, because you haven't got any and so you can't possibly know what I'm talking about :biggrin:).
The nasty thing is that decoherence has then also as a corrolary that anything else which applies the projection (and hence has a consciousness) cannot be recognized (because once branches decohere, everything happens exactly in the same way whether we consider that a machine projected or not, as long as we project, afterwards). So associating consciousness with "that what projects" also links the fundamental difficulty of recognizing something similar somewhere else (a consciousness has difficulty recognizing another consciousness, and a projector has difficulties recognizing another projector).
I don't claim "truth" for my statements here, but I think they are intriguing, no ?At the risk of horribly oversimplifying (or maybe distorting?) - and leaving completely aside the problem of you (or me, or Radar, etc) determining that there's only one consciousness in the universe - this QM measurement thingy just moves the objective criterion a tiny bit on from what I said earlier (which was (Version001): "if it says it's conscious, and there's clearly some quantum measurement thingy involved in how it works, then it truly is conscious.")
Version002: "if it says it's conscious, and says that every time it looked, there was either a dead cat or a live one (never a superposition of dead and live cat), and there's clearly some quantum measurement thingy involved in how it works, then it truly is conscious."

vanesch

Aug21-04, 02:21 AM

Version002: "if it says it's conscious, and says that every time it looked, there was either a dead cat or a live one (never a superposition of dead and live cat), and there's clearly some quantum measurement thingy involved in how it works, then it truly is conscious."

No, because of decoherence. If you are conscious, and you observe the thing that looked at the cat, it will have said that it is either alive or death.
But that doesn't mean that the thing itself wasn't in a superposition of states (correlated with a dead cat and with a live cat) ; in fact it was YOU who selected one of the two branches. Decoherence theory simply states that all possible measurements you can do give exactly the same results. So you'll never find out.

cheers,
Patrick.

Rader

Aug21-04, 02:45 AM

I've read (part of) the article, and I think it completely misses the point. Not that I say that the scientific part of the article is wrong, but - unless I misunderstood it, I my opinion, it doesn't address the issue of consciousness as it has been adressed here on this forum. It is a technical description of brain functions.

There was a reason why I posted it. Well, so this article and whole lot more, using technical descriptions of brain functions, are only useful to explain how a ghost in the machine, observes and has subjective experiences After all at least I can say that about explanations of myself.

My comments:
Clearly, awareness as defined above has nothing to do with what has been meant here with consciousness. I need something that can hold information for a rather long time in memory, and access it selectively, and I have to be able to select amongst several stimuli.

In that case, I can make a machine with "awareness" using a PC, and, say, a webcam on a motor !

Moreover, if I write regularly information about power consumption, memory and CPU usage, temperature, fan speed etc... into the working memory of my PC, it is now conscious !
Come on !

Would it make a difference what components, a consciousness would use to interact with it? If its purpose was only, using the components to peer and act through?

As I pointed out, I don't think that consciousness has much to do with behavior. I even envision the possibility that consciousness IN NO WAY influences our behavior which is probably dictated by the running of a biochemical computer program. Even our thinking is not influenced by our consciousness. Our consciousness just subjectively observes what our (non-conscious) body is doing and thinking.
I acknowledge that this is an extreme viewpoint, but I consider it an interesting thought that consciousness CANNOT influence the behavior of a human being. It's just there passively observing what's being done, said and thought. And undergoes feelings.

Then what do you think consciousness is, physical or nonphysical, or both?

For instance, I am pretty convinced that trying to factorize big numbers on my PC does pain to my PC (it gets hot, it takes a long time to answer, everything seems to run slowly etc...). My PC even regularly reboots in order to avoid it (or I might have a virus). But I don't think my PC FEELS the pain. Although my program prints out that it does if the number is really big...

The creation of particles to humans use the same physical laws, by what physical law do we make this assumption? There is no reason why my brain processes should create subjective experiences, why would anything else not produce them?

Nereid

Aug21-04, 08:36 AM

No, because of decoherence. If you are conscious, and you observe the thing that looked at the cat, it will have said that it is either alive or death.
But that doesn't mean that the thing itself wasn't in a superposition of states (correlated with a dead cat and with a live cat) ; in fact it was YOU who selected one of the two branches. Decoherence theory simply states that all possible measurements you can do give exactly the same results. So you'll never find out.

cheers,
Patrick.So, let me understand quite clearly ... if 'the thing' is Philocrat, there's no way for you (or me) to determine that "[Philocrat] wasn't in a superposition of states (correlated with a dead cat and with a live cat)"?

If so, I'm not sure how bringing in the quantum measurement thingy helps in any way; as I understand it, those who discuss this consciousness thingy in great seriousness do not doubt that (most?) humans have consciousness.

Rader

Aug21-04, 09:05 AM

So, let me understand quite clearly ... if 'the thing' is Philocrat, there's no way for you (or me) to determine that "[Philocrat] wasn't in a superposition of states (correlated with a dead cat and with a live cat)"?

If so, I'm not sure how bringing in the quantum measurement thingy helps in any way; as I understand it, those who discuss this consciousness thingy in great seriousness do not doubt that (most?) humans have consciousness.

There seems to be more than one way to understand this.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-decoherence/

vanesch

Aug21-04, 02:12 PM

If so, I'm not sure how bringing in the quantum measurement thingy helps in any way; as I understand it, those who discuss this consciousness thingy in great seriousness do not doubt that (most?) humans have consciousness.

Well, it brings us back to case 1: it is impossible to find out if Philocrat is conscious or not. We only assume it, because it is a human being, and by induction we think that he is conscious just as we are.
(maybe Philocrat is a bot on a server somewhere :-)

I didn't pretend to SOLVE 2 problems, I just wanted to indicate a relation, because one must admit that there is some similarity to both problems (the consciousness problem and the measurement problem in QM). Moreover, it would completely incorporate the concept of consciousness into physics: consciousness is the projection of the wavefunction.

cheers,
Patrick.

vanesch

Aug21-04, 02:25 PM

The creation of particles to humans use the same physical laws, by what physical law do we make this assumption?

Well, the physical process is clearly process I by von Neuman (random selection of quantum projection). So certain measurement systems are conscious. We'll never know which ones. The problem is that the projection operator itself is absolutely not related to a physical quantity itself, so it is hard to say "where" it is located. In a Matrix-like situation, it is "not of this physical world".

cheers,
Patrick.

Philocrat

Aug21-04, 04:23 PM

You can always talk about sounds in waveforms, and yea, you can get a pretty much complete picture, but you can never understand how to use a harmonic minor, or how abstract art is interpreted.

Sounds in all their forms and variations have multi-valent pigeonholes both in the physical space-time and in abstract logical space. It's just a matter of abstractions and compositional arragements of which the instrument of understanding is a mere vehicle that obeys completely causal and relational laws just like everything else. To treat this vehicle of abstractions and systematic arragements as unique and beyond the ordinary is fundamentally flawed. Abstract entities are real and are pictorial copies of reality produced by the physical things themselves, whose lives begin and end in the memory centres of our physical bodies. To treat them as separate, non-accountable entities that are merely intervening or looking in, as it's currently being suggested, is absurd. As I have suggested many times, if we think of consciousness or any aspect of it as something over and above the physical, then we are better off dissolving our current physical human form and redesigning it from scratch.

Philocrat

Aug21-04, 04:39 PM

I have asked this question before and I am going to ask it again: Is there a 'PROBLEM-FREE FORM' that things can take that would make them fully explainable? If such a form did exist, would this amount to what may be truely called 'THE PERFECT STATE OF BEING'?

Philocrat

Aug21-04, 05:26 PM

.....Inforamtion theory says that you can compose information or an idea from the immediate data that are available to you regardless of sources, display that information for your own self to see and validate, display the same information for the outside world to see (if you wish or are physically configured to do so), memorise it in the most sensible form possible and recall it whenever and wherever you want it......

The question now is does this apply to all systems, including man and machines? Is the Information Theory comaptible with consciousness?

Philocrat

Aug31-04, 10:58 AM

THE CURRENT RESULT OF THE VOTE: What Does This Mean?

Can Physics Explain Everything? (45.24%)

Well, the result suggests that there is a strong believe in this, but nevertheless this result alone is insufficient to completely ground it.

Can Religion alone Explain? (2.38%)

The voting result of this tends to suggest otherwise, but is this really the case? What about many strong arguments in the debate which tend to suggest that the possibility of an INTELLIGENT DESIGNER is not ruled out either? Many claims in science or physics in itself are as mysterious and inexplicable as the notion of an Intelligence Designer. So why are people ignoring this possibility in the Vote?

Can any other Discipline on its own Explain Everything? (2.38%)

Someone did vote on this and the result is very discouraging. It would be interesting to know who voted on this and which discipline is the person suggesting. I am not quite sure which discipline makes such a claim.....is it a Voodoo Discipline? Biology on its own does make similar claim but I do not know of it being strong enough to warrant it.

Can Multi-disciplinary efforts alone do so? (50.00%)

Yes, the current result seems to suggest this. Many arguments given in favour of the 'OVER AND ABOVE THE PHYSICAL' theory seems to have contributed to this result. Perhaps, equally due to a high level or disagreement with physics on it as well.

QUESTION: Are we to leave this debate as it is and take my advise that we should stop debating and start converging on what is already known about consciousness or the over and above the physical thesis?

Fliption

Aug31-04, 11:41 PM

QUESTION: Are we to leave this debate as it is and take my advise that we should stop debating and start converging on what is already known about consciousness or the over and above the physical thesis?

No. We will continue to debate it.

Philocrat

Sep1-04, 11:40 PM

I am glad you think so because by converging I am merely suggesting that we should (1) stop neglecting data from other disciplines and (2) start co-operating more on the subject. We may even tumble across something very concrete, or we may very well continue on the current footing. Who knows? But it's worth trying!

Rader

Sep2-04, 08:04 AM

arildno

Sep2-04, 02:35 PM

Why is it always talk about whether everything could be REDUCED to pure physics??
This is, IMO, sheer negative rhetoric about physics!!
Why not:
Can everything be ENRICHED through a pure, applicable physical theory about it?
I mean, will we stop loving, remain unawed at the sight of Grand Canyon just because of a valid, mathematical/physical theory of consciousness?
Is it not more probable that a good physical theory about some existent could more easily point out to us hitherto unexplored territories and untapped potentials?
just a thought..

Philocrat

Sep2-04, 08:24 PM

Your answer might be in Penroses new book. I have not read it yet but from what I have heard, I will read it.
The Road to Reality ~ Roger Penrose -- (Paperback - September 1, 2005)

Thanks for this info.....i'll check it out. I just hope that the book tells us how to reduce everything to physics, or how an alternative discipline can explain the remainder, if any.

Philocrat

Sep2-04, 08:54 PM

Why is it always talk about whether everything could be REDUCED to pure physics??

Good question.....but to be honest with you, I have no idea.

Can everything be ENRICHED through a pure, applicable physical theory about it?

I am a great believer in this, and this is what has puzzled me all along. In fact, that's why I have complained many times in this forum and elsewhere as to 'why the need to explain the so-called remainder' before proceeding to execute what you are proposing here. By this, I am taking it to imply that by enriching things through proper conduct of the physical theory, the remainder itself may consequentially be altered. My own prediction is that, through doing what you are suggesting, we may even end up writing off the vexing remainder itself, or even discover the the connection of it to the physical. Who knows?

An even more problematic aspect of the whole episode is lack of co-operation in the study of the remainder and in the evaluation of the resulting multi-disciplinary data. The logic is this: if something remains, we must find a solid way to study it and all the data resutling from it from different disciplines must be equally but rigorously looked at and converged where significant relations are found.

Fliption

Sep2-04, 10:49 PM

Why is it always talk about whether everything could be REDUCED to pure physics??
This is, IMO, sheer negative rhetoric about physics!!
Why not:

I don't think the word "reduced" is intended in a negative way. I think it is just referring to the reductionist methods of physics.

Fliption

Sep2-04, 10:58 PM

I'm not sure I understand the objection being posted here. This is a philosophical discussion. It is not the authority that is keeping science from exploring it's potential in anyway it sees fit. The idea that "the remainder" may be able to be explained or dismissed via some other approach that science hasn't entertained is always a possibility. But this can be claimed to justify almost any belief. At the moment we have good philosophical reason to believe that certain aspects of reality will likely never be explained by the current paradigm of physics. Could something happen one day to change that position? Perhaps. But the possibilities of science should not stop us from practicing good philosophy, should it?

Philocrat

Sep3-04, 10:50 PM

Fliption

Sep6-04, 05:27 PM

The Job of philosophy is not to extend or revise the scope of any discipline, but only to inspect and examine their methodologies and statements of facts. Is Phyiscs, for example, extendable, or revisable to accommodate the remainder, if any?

Isn't that what this conversation is about? I don't think anyone has tried to change the scope of science. Most of the threads on this topic are similar to this one in that they are discussing whether science "can" explain the gaps. All this seems within the realm of philosophy to me.

Tom McCurdy

Sep6-04, 08:02 PM

Everything theortically could be broken down into pure physics, that does not however imply that we will ever even come close to being able to do this.

Philocrat

Sep6-04, 08:15 PM

Isn't that what this conversation is about? I don't think anyone has tried to change the scope of science. Most of the threads on this topic are similar to this one in that they are discussing whether science "can" explain the gaps. All this seems within the realm of philosophy to me.

True.....but has philosophy as of yet been able to explain the remainder? Would you then accept that philosophy has its own headaches too; often riddled with a huge catalogue of unsolved issues that run time and time again into a stalemate, and, in some very notorious instances, into 'HARDCORE SCEPTICISM'? This is why I pointed out earlier on that explaining the remainder is no longer exclusive to philosophy; it is now a multidisciplinary venture! Either we accept this, or a seperate discipline be created to explain it, or equally science itself be revised and extended to do so. I am sorry to sitll put my finger on this button....they look more and more like plausible alternitives.

Fliption

Sep7-04, 10:52 AM

True.....but has philosophy as of yet been able to explain the remainder? Would you then accept that philosophy has its own headaches too; often riddled with a huge catalogue of unsolved issues that run time and time again into a stalemate, and, in some very notorious instances, into 'HARDCORE SCEPTICISM'? This is why I pointed out earlier on that explaining the remainder is no longer exclusive to philosophy; it is now a multidisciplinary venture! Either we accept this, or a seperate discipline be created to explain it, or equally science itself be revised and extended to do so. I am sorry to sitll put my finger on this button....they look more and more like plausible alternitives.

Philosphy is not a separate branch of study distinguished from any science. Philosophy has an encompassing scope of all branches of study. Science is simply an investigative tool of philosphy. Currently there is an explanatory gap in science with regard to consciousness. The role and scope of the philosopher is to analyze that fact with the methods of inquiry and adjust if necessary. That is exactly what's happening here. The suggestion has been made by philosophers that the reason there is an explanatory gap is because there is a tool missing in the toolbox of fundamental parts that science currently uses.

Philocrat

Sep7-04, 09:57 PM

What missing tool may that be exaclty? If there is one, it seems to point to the second or third explanatory option that I suggested above......Create a separate discipline to close the gap or extend physics or science as a whole to do so. Who says that a voodoo discipline might not explain it either? But supposing you did all these things and the vexing gap still remained? What would you do? Well, an even more chilling suggestion that I made earlier and elsewhere is that, we may have to disolve the human form and redesign it from cratch in order to close that gap, should all the attempts in our present human form fail.

Fliption

Sep7-04, 10:26 PM

It is simple really. Science cannot reductively explain consciousness perhaps because it cannot be reduced. It's the same for all fundamental elements.

Philocrat

Sep7-04, 10:27 PM

Philosphy is not a separate branch of study distinguished from any science. Philosophy has an encompassing scope of all branches of study. Science is simply an investigative tool of philosphy.

On this, you are right to a degree. Russell's observation of this in 1912 seems to be to the contrary. That is, all other disciplines detached themselves from philosophy as soon as they found their 'practicality'. That one day the term 'philosophy' may very well evaporate. I am still undecided as to whether to tow your line or Russell's. It seems as if in Russll's version, why philosophy still hangs around is mainly to inspect and ensure that all its children that divorced from it can survive on their own without any further help. Your version is new to me, that's why I am curious.

Admittedly, either way, the inspectory role of philosophy is without any dispute, except only on the question of its shelf life.

Philocrat

Sep7-04, 11:05 PM

It is simple really. Science cannot reductively explain consciousness perhaps because it cannot be reduced. It's the same for all fundamental elements.

What I am currently curious about is you calling philosophy science, as there are other disciplines other than science disciplines (physics, biology, psychology etc) that were also once part of philosophy. Theology is one such candidate. Is Theology, the intellectual wing of religion, science? In fact, you hit it on the head, for this is precisely what the American Chrisitians are currently trying to do. While Christianity in Europe remains predominantly orthodoxical, American Christianity is turning itself into science.....mostly brought about by the fierce intellectual battle between the creationists and evolutionists.
______________________________________________
The Religious Theory: This fundamentally states that God is the Prime Mover (a self-created Being) and that God is the creator of everything else, our universe especially. God is an intelligent designer. The term creationism is the name currently used to label this claim.

http://www.icr.org/creationscientists/physicalscientists.html (Physical Scientists who are also creationists or ‘Creation Scientists’ as they are otherwise preferably called)

http://www.icr.org/creationscientists/biologicalscientists.html (Biologists as creationists).
__________________________________________________ _

As the above links suggest, the creationists are now adopting sceintific methods to justify thier thesis, and from the above links, it is not clear whether scientists listed on those sites are recruited to investigate the creationist thesis further or as a mere endorsemnet of their thesis.

However, whatever is the case, this does highlight my point about the need for you to clarify your position with regards to calling philosophy science.

Fliption

Sep8-04, 08:25 AM

It seems as if in Russll's version, why philosophy still hangs around is mainly to inspect and ensure that all its children that divorced from it can survive on their own without any further help. Your version is new to me, that's why I am curious.

Admittedly, either way, the inspectory role of philosophy is without any dispute, except only on the question of its shelf life.

There will always be the activities that I am calling philosophy. Could it be called something else one day? Sure. But the actions of stepping outside of our methods of inquiry and judging their relevance will always be valid. I'd hate to see the day this isn't the case. Scientists have been preoccupied with practicality because thats what science does. But once that progress slows in certain areas (consciousness), then it is natural for us as seekers of knowledge to start questioning some assumptions. This act is what I call philosophy. We all do it eventually, even scientists.

Philocrat

Sep8-04, 11:13 AM

There will always be the activities that I am calling philosophy. Could it be called something else one day? Sure. But the actions of stepping outside of our methods of inquiry and judging their relevance will always be valid. I'd hate to see the day this isn't the case. Scientists have been preoccupied with practicality because thats what science does. But once that progress slows in certain areas (consciousness), then it is natural for us as seekers of knowledge to start questioning some assumptions. This act is what I call philosophy. We all do it eventually, even scientists.

Your version is quite interesting and is beginning to affect Russell's version in my head. Let's clear up a few things:

1) Are you re-defining philosophy? For so it seems. Come to think of it, I never really thought of the proper definition of it. I just went by what the ancient philosophers said of it (the Love of wisdom) and by Russell's account in 1912 of the nature and fate of philosophy.

2) Are you saying that not only is philosophy the love of and search for knowledge, but also it is frankly science and that any new discipline that comes into existence automatically becomes part of it?

3) If so, would theology or a voodoo discipline pass as one? I am still as curious as ever on this one.

Problem: Well, Russell's version suggests that many topics are constantly detaching themselves from philosophy as soon as they find their practicalities, and that sooner or later there may no more be any philosophy. Well, if your answers to questions (1), (2) and (3) are what I am suspecting, it means that you are implying that philosophy is here to stay. Well, which version should we choose?

Fliption

Sep9-04, 05:37 PM

1) Are you re-defining philosophy? For so it seems. Come to think of it, I never really thought of the proper definition of it. I just went by what the ancient philosophers said of it (the Love of wisdom) and by Russell's account in 1912 of the nature and fate of philosophy.

I don't believe I am redefining it. The love and pursuit of wisdom and knowledge is exactly what I think it is. So the act of creating and critiquing the scientific method is a philosophical exercise. Science itself is merely one method for obtaining knowledge.

2) Are you saying that not only is philosophy the love of and search for knowledge, but also it is frankly science and that any new discipline that comes into existence automatically becomes part of it?

Any disciplline that contributes to "knowledge" would be a tool of philosophy and therefore critique of this new discipline is within the scope of philosophy.

3) If so, would theology or a voodoo discipline pass as one? I am still as curious as ever on this one.

If these disciplines contribute to knowledge then they would indeed be tools of philosophy. How do we know whether they truly contribute to knowledge? This question too is a question for philosophy.

Problem: Well, Russell's version suggests that many topics are constantly detaching themselves from philosophy as soon as they find their practicalities, and that sooner or later there may no more be any philosophy. Well, if your answers to questions (1), (2) and (3) are what I am suspecting, it means that you are implying that philosophy is here to stay. Well, which version should we choose?

It sounds as if the usage you're referring to is treating philosphy as if it is a topic that one prints into a text book. This is a topic that one can choose to study or "major in". I can definitely see how this separate field of study could become useless as a distinct entity if enough people thought it wasn't practical to study what Descarte thought centuries ago. But anytime someone reasons through an answer to the question "Can science tell us X?", this is a philosphical act. If all disclipines split off from philosophy then they will either adopt this responsibility on their own to answer these types of questions or our "knowledge" will have very little credibility.

Philocrat

Sep11-04, 06:46 PM

(1) The love and pursuit of wisdom and knowledge is exactly what I think it is. So the act of creating and critiquing the scientific method is a philosophical exercise. Science itself is merely one method for obtaining knowledge.

(2) Any disciplline that contributes to "knowledge" would be a tool of philosophy and therefore critique of this new discipline is within the scope of philosophy.

(3) If these disciplines contribute to knowledge then they would indeed be tools of philosophy. How do we know whether they truly contribute to knowledge? This question too is a question for philosophy.

(4) But anytime someone reasons through an answer to the question "Can science tell us X?", this is a philosphical act. If all disclipines split off from philosophy then they will either adopt this responsibility on their own to answer these types of questions or our "knowledge" will have very little credibility.

So, (1) to (4) must so be what philosophy is.......I am now settled in my head what philosophy is. I agree with you that philosophy must hang around until the whole business of knowing all there is to be known is done. Yes, philosophy is here to stay:

1) To inspect the inspector

2) To examine the examiner

3) To subject all statements of fact (existential, declaratory, logical and quantitative claims), regardless of the discipline, to critical scrutiny.

Outstanding Question: Can philosophy inspect, examine, and scrutinise without being prescriptive? That is, can it describe without prescribing?

Philocrat

Sep11-04, 07:46 PM

Now, Let us return back to the question: 'can everything be reduced to pure physics? The voting result as it currently stands seems to suggest precisely this. What does this mean?

1) Inter-disciplinary reductions are possible?

2) Everything learned in every other discipline is reducible to physics?

Well, this voting result apart, this does not eliminate the outstanding belief that there is a remainder or an explanatory gab, or the hard problem or whatever we might wish to call it. The question now is shouldn't we approach this question in a different way? For example, start by examining the possibility of (1) and (2)? If inter-disciplinary reductionism is a viable venture, shouldn't we start by looking at how one disicipline reduces to another and finally to physics? At the moment, it looks as if there is a disagreement on this. Some disciplines don't even like the idea, let alone putting their heards together to look at its possbility. Take, for example, the notion of reduction of Biology to physics (http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evolphil/reduction.html), it looks as if the biologists are unhappy with this idea.

THE LOGICAL PROBLEM: If everything is reducible to physics, from discipline to discipline to physics, then there is no such thing as 'inter-disciplinary explanation' that the voting demands. The voting should not include an option for a multi-disciplinary explanation, since interdisciplinary reductionism would transport all exaplantions to physics? But is this really the case?

Les Sleeth

Sep12-04, 02:51 PM

Outstanding Question: Can philosophy inspect, examine, and scrutinise without being prescriptive? That is, can it describe without prescribing?

Of course it can, but then what's the point of having philosophy? If the goal of philosophy is wisdom, isn't the reason for valuing wisdom because of its ability to improve the quality of one's personal conscious experience? I do know some philosophy professor-types whose heads are filled with just about nothing but "descriptions," but never seem to have experimented with any of it. Nerds and curmudgeons the lot!

The idea of someone being merely an "expert" in others' philosophy seems like a contradiction to the original meaning of the word. Philosophy is a way to predict how aspects of reality work which we are uncertain of, that have consequences to our lives, and which we have an opportunity to either affect or adjust to. If we say a human being is most fulfilled when indulging in every possible sensual pleasure, how can we find out if that is a good philosophy? As long as it remains only a description, we will never know. But once, as a seeker of truth, we try out our descriptive concepts, then they become prescriptive in our own personal laboratory of life. Of course, then the responsibility is on us to honestly evaluate how our philosophy is working.

Back to the point of this thread, in science one often runs into a type of mind that is content with understanding the mechanical relationships between physical things, and in fact insist there is nothing more (mostly because they never thing about anything else). If you try to talk about "what it means" (i.e., something relevant to the development of one's own consciousness), you may find yourself listening to a lecture about neuronal processes, or how evolution has shaped consciousness, or just the person you are talking to snoring :zzz:. So be it. Either one is interested in wisdom or one isn't.

Philocrat

Sep12-04, 11:35 PM

Of course it can, but then what's the point of having philosophy? If the goal of philosophy is wisdom, isn't the reason for valuing wisdom because of its ability to improve the quality of one's personal conscious experience? I do know some philosophy professor-types whose heads are filled with just about nothing but "descriptions," but never seem to have experimented with any of it. Nerds and curmudgeons the lot!

The idea of someone being merely an "expert" in others' philosophy seems like a contradiction to the original meaning of the word. Philosophy is a way to predict how aspects of reality work which we are uncertain of, that have consequences to our lives, and which we have an opportunity to either affect or adjust to. If we say a human being is most fulfilled when indulging in every possible sensual pleasure, how can we find out if that is a good philosophy? As long as it remains only a description, we will never know. But once, as a seeker of truth, we try out our descriptive concepts, then they become prescriptive in our own personal laboratory of life. Of course, then the responsibility is on us to honestly evaluate how our philosophy is working.

Back to the point of this thread, in science one often runs into a type of mind that is content with understanding the mechanical relationships between physical things, and in fact insist there is nothing more (mostly because they never thing about anything else). If you try to talk about "what it means" (i.e., something relevant to the development of one's own consciousness), you may find yourself listening to a lecture about neuronal processes, or how evolution has shaped consciousness, or just the person you are talking to snoring :zzz:. So be it. Either one is interested in wisdom or one isn't.

Precisely the point......that's the puzzling feature of philosophy that often frustrates me like a jungle. It's like a plane that flies endlessly and refusing to land. When philosophical arguments descriptively hang in a logical space endlessly, refusing to ground themselves, I just feel profoundly frustrated and edgy. So, philosophy, being the love of wisdom and with its inspectory role well-established within the intellectual realm, oughts to be able to ground at least some of its arguments, even when it's only inspecting what is stated or given.

Philocrat

Sep12-04, 11:45 PM

Should we give up the notion of reductionism? How should Reductionism be approached in the context of discipline-to-discipline and to physics, if any?

Les Sleeth

Sep13-04, 12:23 AM

Precisely the point......that's the puzzling feature of philosophy that often frustrates me like a jungle. It's like a plane that flies endlessly and refusing to land. When philosophical arguments descriptively hang in a logical space endlessly, refusing to ground themselves, I just feel profoundly frustrated and edgy. So, philosophy, being the love of wisdom and with its inspectory role well-established within the intellectual realm, oughts to be able to ground at least some of its arguments, even when it's only inspecting what is stated or given.

If you had a boat on a planet that was only made up of water, then you would be happy that it never "landed" since the only land to be found is at the bottom of the oceans. If you will allow my humble opinion, the problem you are having stems from insisting only something final, definite, decided, settled has value. And true, with science one can come fairly close to that. That's the great thing about science.

But philosophy is the thing that stays open, searching, undecided. It is precisely those qualities which appeal to wisdom seekers. Do you want a world all settled, without art or intuition or love? Why not appreciate both that which can give closure, as well as that which leaves things open?

Philocrat

Sep13-04, 12:44 AM

Les Sleeth

Sep13-04, 12:31 PM

But a 'settled state' tends to have always been the most desirable one. Why float aimlessly? Settled state has many names. Some call it perfection and some call it whatever they like, yet all these names aim at one thing: to be and always be. The standard assumption is that science and all other disciplines that seek knowledge should aim to do so progressively. Philosophy should play and continue to play the supervisory role to bring this to fruition. Should this be true, then philosophy should not avoid being prescriptive. Infact, I don't even think that philosophy can avoid being prescriptive, especially when examining and analysing statements of fact from other disciplines.

Well, I wasn't recommending aimlessness, I talking about openness. Regarding a "settled state," I assumed we were talking about the learning condition of one's consciousness and not, say, things like one's living conditions or making a decision about something that needs to be done, etc. Of course then one needs to decide things to get anything practical accomplished.

So if it is the learning/developmental condition of one's consciousness we are talking about, look at the adults you know, and how many do you see still open to learning any and everything possible to learn? Most I know have "settled" all sorts of issues in their own minds which really should be left open for new information they might not know about. Decided, opinionated, conditioned . . . that is the state of the average human mind I encounter.

And "perfection" in terms of philosophy, now that seems quite the illusion. There is becoming; but what is perfection other than the belief "I've got it all figured out so now I can stop learning"??? Perfect to me is the consciousness perfectly willing to learn.

That's the ideal philosophic attitude IMO -- the openness and willingness to never stop learning, and the courage to learn anything no matter how threatening it seems to one's current belief system. I can't see how that kind of attitude comes from those intent on settling everything. With an "infinite learning" approach, things which get settled that way have naturally settled themselves! One doesn't need to interfere with the process and impose one's need for everything to be neatly in place. And then if new information comes my way that affects something's settled-ness, okay then! Who cares, it is what it is.

Finally, I don't understand why you say "philosophy should. . ." Each person runs his own life, and so decides what he will do to develop his consciousness. Sure we can read what others have discovered, but people have to determine their own philosophy. So I don't see how "philosophy should play the supervisory role," as you suggest. Who the heck is going to run that program? :confused:

Philocrat

Sep13-04, 11:53 PM

Well, I wasn't recommending aimlessness, I talking about openness. Regarding a "settled state," I assumed we were talking about the learning condition of one's consciousness and not, say, things like one's living conditions or making a decision about something that needs to be done, etc. Of course then one needs to decide things to get anything practical accomplished.

So if it is the learning/developmental condition of one's consciousness we are talking about, look at the adults you know, and how many do you see still open to learning any and everything possible to learn? Most I know have "settled" all sorts of issues in their own minds which really should be left open for new information they might not know about. Decided, opinionated, conditioned . . . that is the state of the average human mind I encounter.

And "perfection" in terms of philosophy, now that seems quite the illusion. There is becoming; but what is perfection other than the belief "I've got it all figured out so now I can stop learning"??? Perfect to me is the consciousness perfectly willing to learn.

That's the ideal philosophic attitude IMO -- the openness and willingness to never stop learning, and the courage to learn anything no matter how threatening it seems to one's current belief system. I can't see how that kind of attitude comes from those intent on settling everything. With an "infinite learning" approach, things which get settled that way have naturally settled themselves! One doesn't need to interfere with the process and impose one's need for everything to be neatly in place. And then if new information comes my way that affects something's settled-ness, okay then! Who cares, it is what it is.

Finally, I don't understand why you say "philosophy should. . ." Each person runs his own life, and so decides what he will do to develop his consciousness. Sure we can read what others have discovered, but people have to determine their own philosophy. So I don't see how "philosophy should play the supervisory role," as you suggest. Who the heck is going to run that program? :confused:

Well, what you are describing here is what I habitually call "FALSELY CONSTITUTED SENSE OF NORMALITY". I think I have used this term to illustrate similar poits in many places on this physics forum and elsewhere on the internet. This is the problem. This naive overdependence on 'FIXED POINTS' 'COMFORT ZONES' and the 'SETTLED STATES' that we talked about above is precisely the point. Worst still, this amounts to an abuse of logic when they loosely use the term 'PERFECTION' to imply 'AVERAGE' or 'MODERATE' state of the given.

Anyawy, when I use the term 'SETTLED STATE' or 'PERFECTION', I always use this to imply the final or end state of the given. In the context of life forms, such as the human life form, I always use this to imply a progressively dervived final form in which the life form conernced subsequently survives physical destruction along with whatever is left of its final physical properties. With all the debates that are going on in physics, philosophy and every other related discipline, this in my opinion, is the only benchmark or a warrant for anyone laying claims to these terms. That is, perfection is not something that we have at the moment.....rather, it is something that must be progressivelly derived at. It is a possibility that lies in wait in the future. I know many people are very sceptical about this possibility, but for me I always remain optimistic aboit it. It must be possible, otherwise life itself would be a worthless venture.

PROBLEM: We have created a situation whereby ordinary members of the world societies (those that you said are unwilling to make an effort to continue to learn) are increasingly depending on science to spin the magic wand to rescue the human race not only from a possible senselsess CIRCULARISM, but also from a possible TOTAL EXTINCTION of the human race. The question is: can science under this new development afford to think and act regressively? Even if life as a whole in the end turns out to be a pointless or hopeless venture, should not science contunue to lead the way and be optimistic?

nightlight

Sep24-04, 07:07 PM

saviourmachine

Sep25-04, 03:39 AM

Anyawy, when I use the term 'SETTLED STATE' or 'PERFECTION', I always use this to imply the final or end state of the given. In the context of life forms, such as the human life form, I always use this to imply a progressively dervived final form in which the life form conernced subsequently survives physical destruction along with whatever is left of its final physical properties.The quest to perfection
So, do you see eternal existence of the human specie - evolved unto Ubermensch :devil: - as perfect? What is so nice about this 'perfection' idea? I agree with Les Sleeth, that the quest itself is worthwhile. 'Practicalists' think that philosophy is valuable when it has consequences in our physical human world. But, it's also possible to enjoy philosophy because of its aesthetic value. Philosophy systems are huge cathedrals of human innovativeness, beautiful like art. Useful? Maybe.

That is, perfection is not something that we have at the moment.....rather, it is something that must be progressivelly derived at. ... It must be possible, otherwise life itself would be a worthless venture.Life is worthwhile for the living
Life is also inherently worthwhile. Who/what would have advantage out of the existence of life? If the human specie doesn't enjoy life itself, it's on the wrong way (IMHO). People that aren't willing to change their minds aren't the ones that build mental cathedrals, but maybe they are even better in enjoying life itself. :biggrin:

dekoi

Sep25-04, 07:34 PM

The universe is complex beyond our comprehension. Beyond any human's comprehension. We can not use the same principle to explain the universe. Just as we could live a life solely on one certain, specific principle. We need a combination of methods. One can not explain life using only the scientific method; nor only theology, or only philosophy. It is a combination of these which demonstrates the complex nature of the universe. Physics (or more generally, 'science',) is a simple tool, used to describe simple situations. It is productive. In fact, the most productive of anything known to humans. Yet philosophy allows us to earn knowledge beyond the scientific knowledge. We become aware of not only our external, physical surrounding and of specific things, but of our general meaning.

The unimportant questions are answered by science. Science can not answer the most important questions because its method does not allow it. Science is pure physical. Philosophy answers the questions which scence fails to answers in a valid, clear, definite way. What philosophy does not answer, theology answers. Each of these: science, philosophy, and theology, has its own way of answering questions. Its own 'method' if you will. You would not, for example, ask a physician to fix your car, because it is not his nature. You would ask a mechanic instead. Similarly, you would not ask a mechanical to perscribe you medicine. It is in no way, related to his method of work. Science is not sufficient enough for living a good life, and creating a good society. While humanity progresses, it realizes the questions which philosophy can answer, and those which science can. And when that is realized, the question will be sufficiently answered by a specific method. Science investigates. Philosophy does not. Philosophy goes beyond the senses. Science is trapped inside the senses and human experience. Science can only investigate the phenomenal world. Everything beyond, is in fact, beyond its comprehension.

Science is a means of producing. Philosophy does not produce anything at all. But knowledge is not only science. There is another use of knowledge. That use is philosphy. This philosophical knowledge directs us. Directs us towards the good; towards our meaning.

We should not look at philosophy as a shadow of physics or science. Philosophy is not the means of answering questions which science, in time, will answer anyway. We must come to realize they are two completely distinct methods of human intelligence. We do not philosophize and then use science to explain our philosophy. Science only attempts to answer what philosophy states. Similarly, philosophy sometimes attempts to answer what science can. "There is no dialogue between them".

dekoi

Sep25-04, 08:16 PM

Science is believed to be a means to give reason for once unexplainable phenomenon. It promises validity and preciseness. Some even state that science is an omnipotent method, which lives in the foreground of knowledge. It is beyond philosophy, as philosophy only lives in its unnoticed shadow, theorizing what science promises to eventually prove. The arisen conflict is not the dispute of science as a means of knowledge, but its claim to be an omnipotent source of this knowledge. Perhaps, it is the origin of scientific knowledge, but certainly not knowledge altogether. Since scientific knowledge only proves the most naïve and minor questions – which might at that certain moment, seem like enormously important ones --- while philosophy is a completely distinct method; a method which explains what science cannot.

The importance of philosophy should not be ignored. It is of course, greatly ignored in our civilization. Though, the most previous statement is ignored as well. It is difficult to communicate such messages to such narrow minded humans – who have devoted their entire life to one methodology of knowledge. These “automata” have been programmed by everything ranging from their education system to their media’s commandments. Once children who believe in epistemology as a synonym for scientific explanation, now are completely independent adults, who adapt to this perverse notion of complete scientific knowledge.

The universe is complex beyond our comprehension. The most intelligent of our civilization have been stuck in dazed state, where everything seems to be designed for something else in this infinite universe-puzzle, yet simultaneously, nothing seems to be related to anything else. The world appears strangely interconnected and disconnected at the same instant; scientific knowledge creates this perception. These people have failed to realize what is already in our nature. They have not understood, and therefore appreciated, human’s quest and hunger for knowledge; and not only scientific, but universal knowledge. Intellect which could explain the reason for Mars’s atmosphere, just as well as it could give meaning to our lives. Scientific, as well philosophical and theological knowledge is what we have been gifted with in our own human nature.

We can not use the same principle to explain the universe. Just as we could not live a life solely on one certain, specific principle. We need a combination of methods. One can not explain life using only the scientific method; nor only theology, or only philosophy. It is a combination of these which demonstrates the complex nature of the universe. Physics (or more generally, 'science',) is a simple tool, used to describe simple situations. It is productive – in fact, the most productive of anything known to humans. Yet philosophy allows us to produce knowledge beyond the scientific. We become aware of not only our external, physical surrounding and of specific occurrences and objects, but of our general meaning. The unimportant questions are answered by science. Science can not answer the most important questions because its method does not allow it. Science is pure physicality. Philosophy answers the questions which science fails to answers in a valid, clear, definite way. What philosophy does not answer, theology does. Each of these: science, philosophy, and theology, has its own way of answering questions. Its own 'method' if you will. You would not, for example, ask a physician to fix your car, because it is not his field of knowledge. You would ask a mechanic instead. Similarly, you would not ask a mechanic to prescribe you medicine. It is in no way, related to his method of work. Science is not sufficient enough for living a good life, and creating a good society. While humanity progresses, it realizes the questions which philosophy can answer, and those which science can. When that is realized, the question will be sufficiently answered by a specific method. Science investigates. Philosophy does not. Science is trapped inside the senses and human experience. Philosophy goes beyond the senses, and travels into the realms of reason and profound thought. Science can only investigate the phenomenal world. Everything beyond, is in fact, beyond its comprehension.

We should not look at philosophy as a shadow of physics or science. Philosophy is not the means of answering questions which science, in time, will answer anyway. We must come to realize they are two completely distinct methods of human intelligence. We do not philosophize and then use science to explain our philosophy. Science only attempts to answer what philosophy states. Similarly, philosophy sometimes attempts to answer what science can. "There is no dialogue between them".

Science is a means of producing. Philosophy does not produce anything at all. But knowledge is not only science. There is another use of knowledge. That use is philosophy. This philosophical knowledge directs us – directs us towards the good; towards our meaning. “The utility of science is production, and the utility of philosophy is direction.” Consequently, religion gives us the grace and faith to follow the directions with.

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 08:35 PM

Physical laws capture only a tiny fraction of the lawfullness/pattern of reality. The stuff physics doesn't say or know anything about is called "boundary and initial conditions" i.e. the external (outside of the physical laws) data that has to be put in by hand into the equations to make concrete predictions. In the hiearchy of natural sciences, each higher level science establishes its domain by identifying further patterns in the "initial & boundary conditions" (the silent part) of the lower level (more fundamental) discipline.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE PHYSICAL

Nightlife, welcome to the debate! Well, this is the nightmare that we have been battling with for the last 30 pages. The prolific and forceful arguments and counter arguments of the participants have resulted in a notorious puzzle or dilemma:

1) If there is something over and above the physical as it is being persistently suggested, should physics or science in general be revised and extended to accommodate and account for the non-physical remainder, if any?

2) Alternatively, should a separate and totally independent discipline be created to explain the non-physical remainder?

3) Or should we just retire to the physicalist position and claim that whatever remains is physical?

Well, if you read all the postings in this thread carefully, you should notice how people systematically but very cleverly avoid these three points. Personally, I think that we should come to some sort of agreement on these three points.

For me, option (1) seems to be labouring under over-definition: physics or science in general is over-defined. In the process, we unconsciously ignore the need to make the definition flexible enough to accommodate our own natural visual limitations. We define science beyond the natural limitations of the human visual faculties.

Option (2) on the other hand seems to be somewhat ruled out due to the fact that many other disciplines that attempt to explain the mysterious remainder already exist, except that elitism does not permit us to respect them. We tend to automatically snub and ignore all these 'Quango Disciplines'. We don't even look at them, let alone the possibility of adopting one of them as a potential explanatory device.

Finally, option (3) is by far the most problamtic, not because the underslying thesis of it is very wrong, but mainly because of false assumptions from passive presuppositions that are not logically and quantitatively ruled out. This problem is rooted in the fundamental questions that I have repeatedly asked on this physics forum, and which everyone seems to be sly about and systematically avoid facing head on:

(a) Does invisibility or unobservability of a thing make it non-Physical?

(b) Does invisibility or unobservability of a thing make it non-existent?

(c) Does invisibility or unobservability of an over-speeding moving object make it non-Physical?

(d) Does invisibility or unobservability of an over-speeding moving object make it non-existent?

THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONISM

On this, it is not clear as to the followings:

1) Is interdisciplinary reductionism possible at all, given all the claims already made on this. Should we, for example, start developing clear logical and quantitative notations for this?

2) The Reduction of every other discipline into physics as forcefully claimed in physics, which is what this thread is attempting to discover.

My own argument is that since there is still an insistance on the notion of the mysterious remainder, this is now the time for us to start looking at the possibility of (1) and (2). We need to start looking at how they are possible, given what is claimed in physics and elsewherwe.

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 09:07 PM

The quest to perfection
So, do you see eternal existence of the human specie - evolved unto Ubermensch :devil: - as perfect?

Only if the term 'Ubermensch' is by definition equivalent to what my notion of perfection implies. If it is, then it is inevitable that we ought to evolve to it, otherwise life as a whole would be a worthless venture.

Life is worthwhile for the living
Life is also inherently worthwhile. Who/what would have advantage out of the existence of life? If the human specie doesn't enjoy life itself, it's on the wrong way (IMHO). People that aren't willing to change their minds aren't the ones that build mental cathedrals, but maybe they are even better in enjoying life itself. :biggrin:

Pleasure and pleasure alone is what life is all about, but the stupid structures that we have naively or unconsciously created are, admittedly, currently preventing this from happening. We have created complex but very problematic structures that would take generations of wars to disentangle, unless intellectuals of all disciplines outfox these moronic structures on the surface by fighting their own intellectual wars at the background and turning up with faster and ever faster surprises. Let these weird creatures who created these nightmares at the naive surface level wake up one day, and the very world they thought they once knew has changed, and changed for permanent good, under their own feet! We must, and should, physically progress to a state of permanent pleasure!

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 09:50 PM

dekoi

Sep25-04, 10:00 PM

Thank you Philocrat.

there is no line dividing religious facts from scientific facts

So you reason religious knowledge is somehow connected to scientific knowledge? Well i would say they are connected because they both produce a source of intellect, and thus, they are both striving for a general truth; yet they both answer completely distinct answers. Thus, one can say they are both connected as well as disconnected in a particular way.

----

Philocrat, just out of curiosity, which option in the poll did you vote for?

nightlight

Sep25-04, 10:22 PM

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 10:24 PM

Thank you Philocrat.

So you reason religious knowledge is somehow connected to scientific knowledge? Well i would say they are connected because they both produce a source of intellect, and thus, they are both striving for a general truth; yet they both answer completely distinct answers. Thus, one can say they are both connected as well as disconnected in a particular way.

Yes, I have gone down on record for advocating this. In my philosophy, your God is safe and sound.....so, go ahead and sleep well at night!

----

Philocrat, just out of curiosity, which option in the poll did you vote for?

Come on, be a good sport.....guess!

dekoi

Sep25-04, 10:40 PM

"By Multi-disciplinary efforts? "

Would be my guess. :)

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 11:04 PM

Philocrat: 1) If there is something over and above the physical as it is being persistently suggested, should physics or science in general be revised and extended to acommodate and account for the non-physical remainder, if any?

The laws of physics are a minuscule fraction of the regularity/pattern in the universe. The relation of physics to other disciplines is like the relation of letter frequencies of English alphabet to English literature. The alphabet and letter counts don't place practically any constraints on what can be written in English. Similarly, the laws of physics place no constraint on the initial and boundary conditions that yield laws of chemistry, biology, medicine, psychology, sociology, economy,...

In other words, if you take all the data which describe the lawfulness/patterns/regularities of the universe, the physics laws make only a small part of this data set. A physicists looking through a microsopic physics pinhole calls the rest of the data "boundary and initial conditions", the stuff outside of the physics. Only for relatively simple (such as atom) or in some way very regular (such as crystal lattice or ideal gas) systems he can specify either explicit B/I conditions (such as that wave functions vanish in infinity or that they satisfy periodicity conditions or some simple distribution, etc.) and produce specific predictions.

In the alphabet analogy one could compare this kind of data to counting the frequencies of the letters -- the frequencies, valid as they may be, are still a negligible part of the content and patterns of the overall output in the English language. The 99.999...9... percent of the data is outside of the frequency data.

2) Alternatively, should a separate and totally independent discipline be created to explain the non-physical remainder?

Physical laws are an extremely weak constraint on what can be or what is. Many disciplines already exist with their own laws. Someone claiming that laws of biology are part of the physics is like someone claiming that his letter frequency theory explains everything written in English, and to prove that, he takes some book and counts the letters and proclaims -- see, I predicted these frequences, so this book is a part of my letter frequency theory. What do you say to such one trick robot? Whatever you say, he'll start counting letters in your sentences to proclaim that your response is predicted by his theory within the sample size error, etc.

Well, in every analysis, be it logical or quantitative or in plain language, I always distinguish between (1) INTERMEDIATE TRUTHS and (2) FINAL TRUTHS. Admittedly, people habitually mix up and confuse the two, and in some very mixed up cases naively treat intermediate truths (conveyed by intermediate transportational causes) as if they are untrue and therefore irrelevant. Yes, intermediate truths may be ephemeral in substance and in scope, yet they are still truths in their own right that must be equally acknowledged and analytically accommodated.

On the issue of Final truths, most of which I have personally observed to be contained in a distanced future, at least as far as the human reality is concerned, I am in the opinion that science and every other related disciplines start working towards achieving them. We cannot just continue to be pessimistic about them. They say that optimism and science don't mix. I do not think this is true. I agree with some of the things that you are saying, but my main concern is the overall attitude of science to explaining things and events that range over the human reality. The fundamental problem that I am rasing in my above posting to you is whether physics or science in general should continue avoiding the explanation of things and events that range beyond human observation or perception. Should it? And if reductionism of any form is possible, should we now start examining its viability? Or are you completely ruling this out?

Philocrat

Sep25-04, 11:21 PM

"By Multi-disciplinary efforts? "

Would be my guess. :)

You've guessed well. Thanks.

Nereid

Sep28-04, 11:21 AM

Welcome to this discussion dekoi!Science is believed to be a means to give reason for once unexplainable phenomenon. It promises validity and preciseness.AFAIK, this applies only to that which is objective and physical. Of course, in the past 50 and more years, the domain which is objective and physical has expanded enormously; with neuroscience, even a great deal of humans' - and other mammals' - subjective experiences are now better understood.Some even state that science is an omnipotent method, which lives in the foreground of knowledge. It is beyond philosophy, as philosophy only lives in its unnoticed shadow, theorizing what science promises to eventually prove. The arisen conflict is not the dispute of science as a means of knowledge, but its claim to be an omnipotent source of this knowledge. Perhaps, it is the origin of scientific knowledge, but certainly not knowledge altogether. Since scientific knowledge only proves the most naïve and minor questions – which might at that certain moment, seem like enormously important ones --- while philosophy is a completely distinct method; a method which explains what science cannot.There's a pretty fundamental misunderstanding of what we current see as the nature of science in this sentence! Can you point to any serious student of science, or philosophy, who would claim 'that science is an omnipotent method, which lives in the foreground of knowledge. It is beyond philosophy, as philosophy only lives in its unnoticed shadow, theorizing what science promises to eventually prove'? That seems like a very poor strawman.The importance of philosophy should not be ignored. It is of course, greatly ignored in our civilization. Though, the most previous statement is ignored as well. It is difficult to communicate such messages to such narrow minded humans – who have devoted their entire life to one methodology of knowledge. These “automata” have been programmed by everything ranging from their education system to their media’s commandments. Once children who believe in epistemology as a synonym for scientific explanation, now are completely independent adults, who adapt to this perverse notion of complete scientific knowledge.

The universe is complex beyond our comprehension. The most intelligent of our civilization have been stuck in dazed state, where everything seems to be designed for something else in this infinite universe-puzzle, yet simultaneously, nothing seems to be related to anything else. The world appears strangely interconnected and disconnected at the same instant; scientific knowledge creates this perception. These people have failed to realize what is already in our nature.They have not understood, and therefore appreciated, human’s quest and hunger for knowledge; and not only scientific, but universal knowledge. Intellect which could explain the reason for Mars’s atmosphere, just as well as it could give meaning to our lives. Scientific, as well philosophical and theological knowledge is what we have been gifted with in our own human nature.A great deal is becoming clearer about 'our nature'; the other day I even saw a review of a book called "The God Gene" (or something similar), in which the author (so the review said) describes and discusses some recent research which shows that the feeling of spirituality are inheritable, and that there is a gene for this!We can not use the same principle to explain the universe. Just as we could not live a life solely on one certain, specific principle. We need a combination of methods. One can not explain life using only the scientific method; nor only theology, or only philosophy. It is a combination of these which demonstrates the complex nature of the universe.My reading of the earlier pages in this thread is that there is a general consensus that, while there may be parallel or alternative frameworks, so far as that which can be seen and touched is concerned, only 'the hard problem of consciousness' and (maybe) abiogenesis appear to be beyond the reach of an extrapolated contemporary application of the scientific method. So far as the subjective is concerned, it seems to me that if romantic love becomes understandable as drug addiction (as it seems it might be), then there isn't much else for philosophy (etc) to play with than inter-relationships among subjective experiences (and the 'hard' problem of consciousness).Physics (or more generally, 'science',) is a simple tool, used to describe simple situations. It is productive – in fact, the most productive of anything known to humans. Yet philosophy allows us to produce knowledge beyond the scientific. We become aware of not only our external, physical surrounding and of specific occurrences and objects, but of our general meaning. The unimportant questions are answered by science. Science can not answer the most important questions because its method does not allow it.You've mentioned this several times; can we please have an example of 'the most important questions' which science cannot answer?

dekoi

Sep28-04, 07:38 PM

There's a pretty fundamental misunderstanding of what we current see as the nature of science in this sentence! Can you point to any serious student of science, or philosophy, who would claim 'that science is an omnipotent method, which lives in the foreground of knowledge. It is beyond philosophy, as philosophy only lives in its unnoticed shadow, theorizing what science promises to eventually prove'? That seems like a very poor strawman.

I was not referring to the educated student. I was referring -- i'm sorry for not being completely clear -- to the general population, and therefore the majority. Wouldn't you agree the majority of nations such as the United States are secular humanists or even Cafeteria Christians who believe science can prove anything (as long as the sufficient time is supplied)?

A great deal is becoming clearer about 'our nature'; the other day I even saw a review of a book called "The God Gene" (or something similar), in which the author (so the review said) describes and discusses some recent research which shows that the feeling of spirituality are inheritable, and that there is a gene for this!

Who said anything about spirituality? Spirituality is what our secular society is greatly in admiration with. Spirituality, on the same level as sexuality. There is a different between this version of "spirituality" and true theism.

My reading of the earlier pages in this thread is that there is a general consensus that, while there may be parallel or alternative frameworks, so far as that which can be seen and touched is concerned, only 'the hard problem of consciousness' and (maybe) abiogenesis appear to be beyond the reach of an extrapolated contemporary application of the scientific method. So far as the subjective is concerned, it seems to me that if romantic love becomes understandable as drug addiction (as it seems it might be), then there isn't much else for philosophy (etc) to play with than inter-relationships among subjective experiences (and the 'hard' problem of consciousness).

What makes you reason philosophy only deals with these metaphysical factors? Philosophy (quite simply put, and of course not the only part of the definition) is asking the questions which are greatly ignored in contemporary human civilization. To philosophize is to ask questions which science can not have an answer to. Surely, consciousness, abiogenesis , and love are not the only things we can philosophize about.

Apart from that, how could you possibly think of "love" as a possible version of a drug addiction. Have you confused Lust with Love? Do you not know what Love truly is?

(no arrogance intended :smile: )

You've mentioned this several times; can we please have an example of 'the most important questions' which science cannot answer?

I will reprhase my previous statement.
Philosophy can open one’s eyes to their existence as well as to human existence in general. It could give answers to the most profound of questions: What is Life?, What/Who is God?, Does God exist?, Does morality exist?, Do humans have a conscience, or merely an instinct? Contrary to philosophy, the unimportant questions are answered by science; and not to say these kinds of questions are generally unimportant, but they are much less vital to humanity than the philosophical breed.

Thanks for the welcoming Nereid. :redface:

Nereid

Sep29-04, 08:27 AM

I was not referring to the educated student. I was referring -- i'm sorry for not being completely clear -- to the general population, and therefore the majority. Wouldn't you agree the majority of nations such as the United States are secular humanists or even Cafeteria Christians who believe science can prove anything (as long as the sufficient time is supplied)?Fortunately, or otherwise, this is Physics Forums, and we try to take our science (and philosophy) a lot more seriously.

Personally, I'd like to see a section in PF devoted to discussion of science education, popular misconceptions, etc. Maybe I'll make a suggestion or three.Who said anything about spirituality? Spirituality is what our secular society is greatly in admiration with. Spirituality, on the same level as sexuality. There is a different between this version of "spirituality" and true theism.I was merely giving an example of some of the interesting results being reported, for recent studies into the neurophysiological and genetic bases of aspects of the human experience that were, at one time, thought to be well beyond the domain of science.What makes you reason philosophy only deals with these metaphysical factors? Philosophy (quite simply put, and of course not the only part of the definition) is asking the questions which are greatly ignored in contemporary human civilization. To philosophize is to ask questions which science can not have an answer to. Surely, consciousness, abiogenesis , and love are not the only things we can philosophize about.I'll come back to this later.Apart from that, how could you possibly think of "love" as a possible version of a drug addiction. Have you confused Lust with Love? Do you not know what Love truly is?Googling on 'romantic love brain chemistry' and many links refer to a recent book by Helen Fisher "Why We Love: The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love (http://www.bookideas.com/reviews/index.cfm?fuseaction=displayReview&id=1974)"; here (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?holding=npg&cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15006682&dopt=Abstract) is the abstract of a study into "the neural correlates of maternal and romantic love"; sure it's early days - give it another 20 years or so for solid results to crystalise - but it does seem that chemistry can account for much observable phenomena ("drug addiction" comes into play in that the bond between two people in love is, crudely, an addiction to each other, mediated by chemicals, utilising the same or similar brain processes that 'cause' cocaine or alcohol addiction).I will reprhase my previous statement.
Philosophy can open one’s eyes to their existence as well as to human existence in general. It could give answers to the most profound of questions: What is Life?, What/Who is God?, Does God exist?, Does morality exist?, Do humans have a conscience, or merely an instinct? Contrary to philosophy, the unimportant questions are answered by science; and not to say these kinds of questions are generally unimportant, but they are much less vital to humanity than the philosophical breed.So I can surely find a dozen people who will truthfully say (and I can objectively test their truthfullness) that they feel these questions are *not* the most profound, that the questions which 'science can answer' are much more profound, that to them their health and physical comfort - the result of 'science' - are far more 'vital' than whether or not there is a god (or 20 million gods).

Does our discussion then turn on the weight of the self-declared opinions of a group of individuals of the mammal Homo sap.? What is the framework within which our friend, the lady from Venus (this is a PC world; the Man from Mars has been banished as being too warlike :wink:), can assess the merits of the ardent words from these individuals (or groups)? How could our lady from Venus conclude anything other than that there's only science, the 'hard problem of consciousness' and intricate relationships among subjective experiences?

Les Sleeth

Sep29-04, 12:10 PM

A great deal is becoming clearer about 'our nature'; the other day I even saw a review of a book called "The God Gene" (or something similar), in which the author (so the review said) describes and discusses some recent research which shows that the feeling of spirituality are inheritable, and that there is a gene for this!

The God gene is about as provable as God is right now. And spirituality . . . what makes scientists think they can evaluate that with science?

What I have been utterly unsuccessful in getting any devoted empiricist to admit is the illogic found in the approach of science toward spirituality. First, just like one must separate the pseudoscience some uneducated people spout from real science practitioners, one must separate the spiritual nonsense the masses indulge in from serious practitioners. Can you do that? Do you know anyone here at PF (or anywhere in the science world) qualified to select the right person and practice for study? If one cannot even recognize what a genuine spiritual practice is, then how can one evaluate? :confused:

One of the trademarks of a serious spiritual practice is that to practice one disassociates from the senses to experience what consciousness becomes aware of. I myself have practiced daily for decades and can report the experience is not leisurely learned or understood. It takes years of hard work to get anywhere and years more to become good at it. Who do you know that practices like that? How many studies have been conducted on such practitioners?

Next add to that the fact that science requires full participation in sense experience to practice. So tell me, how is a discipline requiring sense experience to practice going to evaluate something that requires disassociating from sense experience to practice? It is a very specific inner experience which is the heart of genuine spirituality, not just any old weirdness scientists want to put in the laboratory and ridicule as nonsense.

Science studying spirituality reminds me of a joke:

Mike and Maureen landed on Mars after accumulating enough frequent flier miles. They met a Martian couple and were talking about all sorts of things. Mike asked if Mars had a stock market or if they had laptop computers and how they made money. Finally Maureen brought up the subject of sex. "Just how do you guys do it?" asked Maureen. The male Martian responded "Pretty much the way you do." A discussion ensued and finally the couples decided to swap partners for the night (for the sake of scientific research, of course).
Maureen and the male Martian went off to a bedroom where the Martian stripped. Maureen was disappointed to find that he had a teeny weeny member about half an inch long and just a quarter inch thick. "I don't think this is going to work," said Maureen. "Why?" he asked. "What's the matter?"
"Well, " she replied "it's just not long enough to reach me!" "No problem," he said and proceeded to slap his forehead with his palm. With each slap his member grew until it was impressively long.
"Well," she said "that's quite impressive, but it's still pretty narrow." "No problem," he said and started pulling his ears. With each pull his member grew wider and wider. "Wow!" she exclaimed. They fell into bed and made mad passionate love.
The next day the couples joined their normal partners and went their separate ways. As they walked along Mike asked, "Well was it any good?" "I hate to say it," said Maureen "but it was pretty wonderful. How about you?" "It was horrible," he replied. "All I got was a headache. She kept slapping my forehead and pulling my ears.

Similarly, I say science will never “get it” using the head-slapping, ear-pulling methods of empiricism because the techniques of science are not appropriate for the job. :wink:

So far as the subjective is concerned, it seems to me that if romantic love becomes understandable as drug addiction (as it seems it might be), then there isn't much else for philosophy (etc) to play with than inter-relationships among subjective experiences (and the 'hard' problem of consciousness). . . . Googling on 'romantic love brain chemistry' and many links refer to a recent book by Helen Fisher "Why We Love: The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love"; here is the abstract of a study into "the neural correlates of maternal and romantic love"; sure it's early days - give it another 20 years or so for solid results to crystalise - but it does seem that chemistry can account for much observable phenomena ("drug addiction" comes into play in that the bond between two people in love is, crudely, an addiction to each other, mediated by chemicals, utilising the same or similar brain processes that 'cause' cocaine or alcohol addiction).

If you take a painting by Vermeer and analyze the chemistry of the paint until you can explain every single reason why it appears as it does, have you thoroughly accounted for the presence of that painting? That’s what science is doing with romantic love and other consciousness traits. True, hormones are causing the physical attraction, but what is love? The painting’s physical look is explained by chemistry and physics, but what variety of chemistry and physics explains the creativity which produced it? :rolleyes:

The reasoning in that case is more illogic, this time how certain scientific conclusions are reached about life and consciousness. If you have a discipline (science) which by its nature can ONLY see the physical relationship between things, then is it logical to assume that when all you find is physical stuff in life/consciousness it’s because that is all there is to it? If I only look through a kaleidoscope, should I conclude the world is nothing but pretty patterns? The proper conclusion is that there is a physical aspect to life and consciousness, and that is all science can say. The extension of logic to say life and consciousness are entirely physicalistic exposes the loss of objectivity due to 1) exclusive participation in a particular mental discipline, and 2) the inherent physicalistic “filter” such a perspective naturally maintains.

So I can surely find a dozen people who will truthfully say (and I can objectively test their truthfullness) that they feel these questions are *not* the most profound, that the questions which 'science can answer' are much more profound, that to them their health and physical comfort - the result of 'science' - are far more 'vital' than whether or not there is a god (or 20 million gods). . . . can we please have an example of 'the most important questions' which science cannot answer?

Well, it depends on one’s priorities in life doesn’t it? I want to understand how the universe works; I want to understand my psychology and how my physiology affects it; I am grateful for anything science discovers useful to improving the quality of my life. It is wonderful, it is great, I love it.

However, science hasn’t given me my most valued insights about how to be happy or conscious. What I’ve learned about these things have come far more from looking inside myself. If I were forced to choose between the benefits of science or introspection, I would choose introspection in a heartbeat. Maybe others wouldn’t, and that’s fine with me. Fortunately, we aren’t forced to choose one or the other, and so we are free to enjoy and learn from it all! :cool:

Nereid

Sep29-04, 12:46 PM

Good to be having a discussion with you again Les!The God gene is about as provable as God is right now. And spirituality . . . what makes scientists think they can evaluate that with science?

What I have been utterly unsuccessful in getting any devoted empiricist to admit is the illogic found in the approach of science toward spirituality. First, just like one must separate the pseudoscience some uneducated people spout from real science practitioners, one must separate the spiritual nonsense the masses indulge in from serious practitioners. Can you do that? Do you know anyone here at PF (or anywhere in the science world) qualified to select the right person and practice for study? If one cannot even recognize what a genuine spiritual practice is, then how can one evaluate? :confused:Hey, I didn't write that book :wink: As I think I said, it would seem that there are interesting new domains which may be coming into the reach of serious study, using the scientific method, which our great-grandparents would've considered to be well beyond its scope.If you take a painting by Vermeer and analyze the chemistry of the paint until you can explain every single reason why it appears as it does, have you thoroughly accounted for the presence of that painting? That’s what science is doing with romantic love and other consciousness traits. True, hormones are causing the physical attraction, but what is love? The painting’s physical look is explained by chemistry and physics, but what variety of chemistry and physics explains the creativity which produced it? :rolleyes:Of course it doesn't, but isn't this somewhat of a strawman (or strawpainting)?

I thought I was careful to say that 'the hard problem of consciousness' is clearly beyond the realm of science (at least, as we currently understand and practice it), so whatever the subjective experience *is* it's not chemistry. However, what one *can* study (and maybe get some answers; again, I think it's at least 20 years too soon to say with much confidence) is how brain chemistry, physiology, etc and concepts which Homo sap. individuals reliably report as 'romantic love', 'the feeling of spirituality', 'anger', 'the colour puce', 'the feeling of betrayal', and so on are related. Surely you agree that we're well on the way to this (non-subjective) kind of understanding? For example, look at the work on how the visual system works in mammals, or how the brain 'does' language, or the origin and control of (some) pain! To repeat, knowing 'all about' pain in a physiological sense doesn't address the subjective experience in any way; however knowing 'all about' pain *can* lead to means by which an individual Homo sap. may report that 'the pain has gone away'.The reasoning in that case is more illogic, this time how certain scientific conclusions are reached about life and consciousness. If you have a discipline (science) which by its nature can ONLY see the physical relationship between things, then is it logical to assume that when all you find is physical stuff in life/consciousness it’s because that is all there is to it? If I only look through a kaleidoscope, should I conclude the world is nothing but pretty patterns? The proper conclusion is that there is a physical aspect to life and consciousness, and that is all science can say. The extension of logic to say life and consciousness are entirely physicalistic exposes the loss of objectivity due to 1) exclusive participation in a particular mental discipline, and 2) the inherent physicalistic “filter” such a perspective naturally maintains.wrt (the hard part of) consciousness, I think we agree; IIRC several pages earlier in this thread were devoted to the 'life' part, and we probably ended up disagreeing.Well, it depends on one’s priorities in life doesn’t it? I want to understand how the universe works; I want to understand my psychology and how my physiology affects it; I am grateful for anything science discovers useful to improving the quality of my life. It is wonderful, it is great, I love it.

However, science hasn’t given me my most valued insights about how to be happy or conscious. What I’ve learned about these things have come far more from looking inside myself. If I were forced to choose between the benefits of science or introspection, I would choose introspection in a heartbeat. Maybe others wouldn’t, and that’s fine with me. Fortunately, we aren’t forced to choose one or the other, and so we are free to enjoy and learn from it all! :cool:Yes, and that's the point ... thank you for agreeing with me :wink:

Whether a question is 'profound' or 'totally banal' is (entirely?) subjective; if dekoi had said "I think that science can address only unimportant questions" or "I think the most important questions can only be answered by philosophy and religion" (note, I'm NOT saying she said these things!), then that's OK (I can reply, "well, I think differently!"). However, if it's to be anything but a personal, subjective opinion, let's have the basis for deciding, and let's have it on the table so we can discuss it!

omin

Sep29-04, 01:07 PM

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone? How realistic is this claim? Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim? Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?

All humans have five senses, and only thoughts represent those senses.

Our brain has the capacity to qualify things we sense, which is comparison, the principle in physics.

With more precision, we use the quantifying aspect, which gives our comparisons numbers.

Every thought really is a number. Numbers may represent any of the fives senses (qualification) and the amount (quantification), so numbers may comprise all we ever think. All English words are qualifications, in essense estimated numbers of some physical things we have sensed. Want me to prove it? Just try to think of something you can't count or compare as different from something else. You can't. It all adds up. Everything is qualifiable and quantifiable.

All things in the world that can be sensed are physical. We are bound to qualify by our five senses and the organization of how those senses arrive. Our ability to quantify is bound the precision of our senses. (Instruments do help magnify what can be sensed).

Physics is the heart of honesty about explaining the world, unless you still are captivated by imprecision and disorder. Physics is the only way to tell it like it REALLY is, and in the order it is, because numbers tell it all, to the maximum extent of human sense. When you understand this, you have arrived. When you don't, you just aren't expressing it in the right amount and in the right order. If you actually believe the wrong amount or the wrong order represents the physical world, we call this is mental disorder. Mental disorder is a theory of the world that does not acurately represent the world. Physics has the highest capacity of any mental discipline to be honest and represent the truth about anything! That would be telling like it is.

russ_watters

Sep29-04, 01:30 PM

... It[science] promises validity and preciseness. Some even state that science is an omnipotent method, which lives in the foreground of knowledge. It is beyond philosophy, as philosophy only lives in its unnoticed shadow, theorizing what science promises to eventually prove. The arisen conflict is not the dispute of science as a means of knowledge, but its claim to be an omnipotent source of this knowledge. Perhaps, it is the origin of scientific knowledge, but certainly not knowledge altogether. Since scientific knowledge only proves the most naïve and minor questions – which might at that certain moment, seem like enormously important ones --- while philosophy is a completely distinct method; a method which explains what science cannot. As I alluded to in the other thread, the conflict (to me) appears to be a one-sided one. Scientists don't object to philosophy per se, its just that its not relevant to the pursuit of science. They tend to ignore it and follow their science were-ever it leads them. But that can be threatening to people who already have territory (the subject of love, for exmple) staked-out for philosophy. Those who prefer the subjectivity of philosophy object to the gradual erosion of the domain of philosophy as scientific knowledge has expanded to encompass much of what used to be studied only in philosophy.

Aristotle thought that philosophy could provide all the answers (not just the ones you consider important). He reasoned things like the idea of inertia: objects in motion will stop unless acted upon by an outside force. Of course, his idea of inertia was proven to be wrong once Galileo started approaching the issue scientifically. (edit: another aside - would Aristotle have felt threatened by Galileo's, and later Newton's research? If so, is that intellectually honest...?)

When the scientific method coalesced and asserted itself about 500 years ago, the domain of what could be investigated philosophically quickly went from 'everything' to 'what exists only in your mind.' But it hasn't stopped there: 'what is love?' and 'why are people spiritual' are questionsthat are now, quite reasonably, being tackled by biologists and psychologists.

Could, one day, all questions be answered by science? Probably not. But there are only one or two that I can think of that we may never be able to difinitively answer with science. 'Is there a god?' for example (of course, if He reveals himself to us, He will become a subject of science).

IMO, the one-way conflict is based on a percieved threat/fear: people want freewill (though ironically, religion would tend to preclude it) and science seems too deterministic. Would it scare you to have a psychologist talk to you for a few minutes and then lay-out a complete personality profile for you?

I'm a member of Eharmony.com (yes, I am utterly incapable of picking up a girl at a bar). For those not familiar with it, its a dating site that matches potential partners through a complex personality profile created by a psychologist. After answering an hour's worth of questions, it generated a 1 page personality profile that was, actually, a little scary in how well it pegged my personality.

Of my friends, there is one who objects to Eharmony.com rather strongly - she says its unnatural and gets in the way of fate. Well...maybe that contradicts what I said above. Do philosophical people really want freewill or do they want fate? Or do they want a self-contradictory combination of the two? Maybe I need to start a new thread about that. [/digression]

The point is, it seems to me that philosophical objections to science are based on a (somewhat self-contradictory) fear that philosophically-minded people will lose control of, not just fields of study, but their minds themselves.

I heard a great speech from a Vietnam POW and one of the things he said was that after years of captivity/torture, most POW's came out psychologically healthy (they were, of course, studied by psychologists). Why? Each of them eventually came to the realization that the only thing in life you have complete control over is what is going on inside your head and psychologically they retreated into their own minds for protection. Trouble is, that severely limits the domain of applicability of philosophy: As soon as another person gets involved, ie you tell someone or write down what you are thinking, your thoughts and feelings can be studied scientifically.

russ_watters

Sep29-04, 01:47 PM

Whether a question is 'profound' or 'totally banal' is (entirely?) subjective; if dekoi had said "I think that science can address only unimportant questions" or "I think the most important questions can only be answered by philosophy and religion" (note, I'm NOT saying she said these things!), then that's OK (I can reply, "well, I think differently!"). However, if it's to be anything but a personal, subjective opinion, let's have the basis for deciding, and let's have it on the table so we can discuss it! I agree that subjective claim such as this is totally useless. May I suggest an objective critereon for the domain of applicability of one of the two? Science can study only that which has/can have a physical manifestation.

Careful though, dekoi and Les Sleeth - I think you will find that you can attach a physical manifestation to a great many things that you may consider, at first glance, to be completely ethereal. For example, does love have any physical consequences?

Les Sleeth

Sep29-04, 04:17 PM

Good to be having a discussion with you again Les!

Why thank you. I meant to drop out, but apparently I couldn't stay away.

Hey, I didn't write that book :wink: As I think I said, it would seem that there are interesting new domains which may be coming into the reach of serious study, using the scientific method, which our great-grandparents would've considered to be well beyond its scope. . . .Of course it doesn't, but isn't this somewhat of a strawman (or strawpainting)?

If it was a strawman argument, I apologize, it wasn't intentional (I hate it when someone does that). I was responding mostly to what I interpreted as your infatuation with the idea of a God gene, and this statement: "So far as the subjective is concerned, it seems to me that if romantic love becomes understandable as drug addiction (as it seems it might be), then there isn't much else for philosophy (etc) to play with than inter-relationships among subjective experiences (and the 'hard' problem of consciousness)."

It seems to me that if we boil philosophy down to that, it's almost the same as saying we should elevate science to the status of what dekoi was suggesting and then find a little corner in the science perspective where philosophy can "play."

Surely you agree that we're well on the way to this (non-subjective) kind of understanding?

Yes, I do agree. But you may not realize how much discussions about the physical side end up implying that's all there is, and that even the subjective aspect and life will one day be shown to be a consequence of physical processes. That idea of a god gene, for instance, is exactly that route to eliminating the subject altogether, and already a great many scientists "dismiss" the notion of some distinct vital principle. They say they don't need it to explain life. This is where my painting analogy applies quite well in my opinion because guess how they've gotten rid of the vital concept? Well, they claim because they can describe all the crucial physical interactions in life, they've explained "living."

Whether a question is 'profound' or 'totally banal' is (entirely?) subjective; if dekoi had said "I think that science can address only unimportant questions" or "I think the most important questions can only be answered by philosophy and religion" (note, I'm NOT saying she said these things!), then that's OK (I can reply, "well, I think differently!"). However, if it's to be anything but a personal, subjective opinion, let's have the basis for deciding, and let's have it on the table so we can discuss it!

Yes, I think I understand your response to dekoi better now, and it seems more balanced than I originally thought. (Hey, did you like that joke?)

Les Sleeth

Sep29-04, 04:33 PM

I agree that subjective claim such as this is totally useless. May I suggest an objective critereon for the domain of applicability of one of the two? Science can study only that which has/can have a physical manifestation.

Careful though, dekoi and Les Sleeth - I think you will find that you can attach a physical manifestation to a great many things that you may consider, at first glance, to be completely ethereal. For example, does love have any physical consequences?

I agree totally. But in this thread the question has been whether or not the physical is causing all manifestations, or if some manifestations have sn inherent nature. I will try an analogy. If I cause a room to suddenly be at a sub-freezing temperature, and small bits of ice form on walls, do I say that low temperature alone creates ice? To be sure temperature has manifested ice, but water (moisture) was there in the first place, and it was the inherent nature of water which allowed low temperature to manifest it as ice.

My point is, I think part of the objection to the physicalist perspective is that it implies or outright claims the physical conditions causing certain manifestations are not only the cause, but also the whole ball of wax. Others of us think there may be "something more" which the physical is acting upon. And of course, there is also the question of if "something more" has the ability to affect the physical.

Nereid

Sep29-04, 05:01 PM

Why thank you. I meant to drop out, but apparently I couldn't stay away.PF is the richer for your second, involuntary, decision :approve:If it was a strawman argument, I apologize, it wasn't intentional (I hate it when someone does that). I was responding mostly to what I interpreted as your infatuation with the idea of a God gene, and this statement: "So far as the subjective is concerned, it seems to me that if romantic love becomes understandable as drug addiction (as it seems it might be), then there isn't much else for philosophy (etc) to play with than inter-relationships among subjective experiences (and the 'hard' problem of consciousness)."Provocative, can I be.

Re "The God Gene" (Dean Hamer, Doubleday): it wouldn't surprise me in the least if the 'The' was added by the marketing department. Certainly the review I read made the point quite strongly (as does Hamer, though less strongly) that it's very early days. To quote one part of the review "It is reasonable to ask, as Hamer does, whether certain genes [note the plural] play a significant role in faith. But he is a long way from providing an answer."

However, since we are exploring the limits of science in this thread, I'm sure you'd agree that a certain flexibility (shall we say) wrt extrapolating today's well-established neuroscience and genetics isn't inappropriate.Yes, I do agree. But you may not realize how much discussions about the physical side end up implying that's all there is, and that even the subjective aspect and life will one day be shown to be a consequence of physical processes.Oh dear. Surely there are no such silly people here? I mean, an excruciatingly boring, detailed exposition on what the subjective experience of eating a good Belgium chocolate, or drinking a glass of 2003 Spy Valley Sauvignon Blanc is, in terms of bigLatinnamedpartsofthebrain and dryasdustverylongchemicalnames and morestuffthatsurelyonlyasadistwouldinflictonus, as a substitute for the real things? *shudder* That someone might be able to make such an exposition, and even show that it is a very good account of the subjective experience, maybe; that that's all there is?? In any case, as I said before, it'll be long after I'm gone that the 'hard problem of consciousness' joins 'origin of Homo sap.' on the science shelves of your local library.That idea of a god gene, for instance, is exactly that route to eliminating the subject altogether, and already a great many scientists "dismiss" the notion of some distinct vital principle. They say they don't need it to explain life. This is where my painting analogy applies quite well in my opinion because guess how they've gotten rid of the vital concept? Well, they claim because they can describe all the crucial physical interactions in life, they've explained "living."We may well differ here Les; not in the 'subjective' parts, but in the 'vital' part.(Hey, did you like that joke?)I laughed and laughed and laughed!

hypnagogue

Sep29-04, 07:09 PM

Gregg Rosenberg's newly released "A Place for Consciousness" should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in this issue of the relationship between physics and consciousness. In short, Rosenberg motivates the case against physicalism being able to account for phenomenal consciousness, then constructs a new theoretical framework of causation that accomodates consciousness quite well while simultaneously leaving physics intact. Rosenberg's framework provides a new way of seeing many of the classical problems of consciousness, in such a manner that what once seemed intractable melts away into a natural and pleasing picture of how it all works.

Even if one rejects Rosenberg's framework, it can still come to bear upon this discussion in an important way. The conventional way of thinking holds that if phenomenal consciousness is to be considered causally efficacious (which it seems to be from the 1st person case), then it must somehow 'interact' with the physical substrate of the brain; otherwise, it must be epiphenomenal, a mere causally insignificant 'byproduct' or 'side effect' of physical brain processes. Indeed, this conceptual dichotomy has popped up on both sides of this discussion recently, and for good reason: on the face of it, it appears as if we ultimately are forced to choose one of the two rather counterintuitive proposals, since there seems to be no coherent alternative. Even if Rosenberg is wrong, what he has done is provide an existence proof of exactly such a coherent alternative, where phenomenal consciousness neither interacts with brain processes nor falls prey to epiphenomenalism.

The key intuition is to reconceptualize how consciousness might fit into the causal chain. Both interactionism and epiphenomenalism suppose that consciousness fits into the causal chain of physics very much like any other physical phenomenon. To use a metaphor, if we picture the causal chain literally as a chain, each of whose links is a physical event, then both interactionsim and epiphenomenalism depict consciousness as just another link on the chain, alongside brain activity, the environment, etc. (They only differ insofar as how they place the consciousness 'link' on the chain with respect to the other links.)

In Rosenberg's framework, loosely speaking, phenomenal consciousness is not a link in the chain, but rather the material from which the chain is made. Thus it does not 'interact' with the physical, anymore than we would say that the metal from which a chain is made 'interacts' with the links. Nor is it causally insignificant with respect to physical phenomena, anymore than we would say that the metal from which a chain is fashioned is causally insignificant to the structure and relations of its links.

It's well worth noting that this move fells two philosophical albatrosses with one stone. Physics is entirely an extrinsic theory, describing structures, functions, and relationships only, with no mention of anything that is fundamentally intrinsic to play the role of things-being-structured-and-doing-the-relating. This problem has been recognized both by philosophers (eg Bertrand Russell) and physicists (eg Hawking: "Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"). In Rosenberg's framework, something like a very primitive form of phenomenal consciousness is precisely the thing that breathes fire into the equations and plays the role of things-being-related, and this move also winds up making the causal role of consciousness more intelligible.

Les Sleeth

Sep29-04, 09:09 PM

PF is the richer for your second, involuntary, decision

My genes made me do it.

We may well differ here Les; not in the 'subjective' parts, but in the 'vital' part.

Well, regarding vitalism, you are dead wrong. :smile:

Les Sleeth

Sep29-04, 09:42 PM

In Rosenberg's framework, loosely speaking, phenomenal consciousness is not a link in the chain, but rather the material from which the chain is made. Thus it does not 'interact' with the physical, anymore than we would say that the metal from which a chain is made 'interacts' with the links. Nor is it causally insignificant with respect to physical phenomena, anymore than we would say that the metal from which a chain is fashioned is causally insignificant to the structure and relations of its links.

If you will allow me to represent the point of view shaped by introspection, then I can unabashedly report that consciousness does appear to be the "material from which the chain is made." My experience makes me believe that something precedes the physical effects the brain is causing; something is "there" already which the brain is shaping, organizing, and almost teaching what's "there" a wonderful variety of mental skills.

hypnagogue

Sep29-04, 10:33 PM

If you will allow me to represent the point of view shaped by introspection, then I can unabashedly report that consciousness does appear to be the "material from which the chain is made." My experience makes me believe that something precedes the physical effects the brain is causing; something is "there" already which the brain is shaping, organizing, and almost teaching what's "there" a wonderful variety of mental skills.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but the way you phrased that-- consciousness being shaped, i.e. being on the direct receiving end of physical causes-- makes it sound (to extend the metaphor for ease of discussion) like you're thinking of consciousness as a link and not as the metal.

For the sake of comparison, Rosenberg wouldn't conceive of some kind of phenomenal essence preceding and being shaped by the brain-- rather, his hypothesis would say that physical phenomena themselves, including the brain, are realized by / carried by / made possible by / have fire breathed into them by protophenomenal properties themselves. The physical phenomena quite literally are the (proto)phenomenal phenomena-- or more accurately, they are a particular aspect of those protophenomenal phenomena: physical phenomena are the extrinsic relationships that these protophenomenal properties engage in. Thus, on this hypothesis, studying the structure and function of the brain would quite literally be seeing consciousness "from the outside."

hypnagogue

Sep30-04, 02:04 AM

Thus far I've only given a rather narrow and shallow account of Rosenberg's ideas, of necessity, since in total they are rather broad and deep. To get a much better understanding of what makes his ideas so compelling and elegant, I advise reading what apparently was a poster at the 3rd Tucson consciousness convention: On the Intrinsic Nature of the Physical (http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Rosenberg.html). This poster serves as a pretty good nut-shell account of his book A Place for Consciousness, although at some points it might get a bit dense or confusing without prior introduction to his material. I still recommend that anyone interested read the book, but at least this poster gives the opportunity to get an overview of his ideas in one sitting.

Les Sleeth

Sep30-04, 01:01 PM

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but the way you phrased that-- consciousness being shaped, i.e. being on the direct receiving end of physical causes-- makes it sound (to extend the metaphor for ease of discussion) like you're thinking of consciousness as a link and not as the metal.

For the sake of comparison, Rosenberg wouldn't conceive of some kind of phenomenal essence preceding and being shaped by the brain-- rather, his hypothesis would say that physical phenomena themselves, including the brain, are realized by / carried by / made possible by / have fire breathed into them by protophenomenal properties themselves. The physical phenomena quite literally are the (proto)phenomenal phenomena-- or more accurately, they are a particular aspect of those protophenomenal phenomena: physical phenomena are the extrinsic relationships that these protophenomenal properties engage in. Thus, on this hypothesis, studying the structure and function of the brain would quite literally be seeing consciousness "from the outside."

Right, I didn’t understand your original post very well, but I’ve read the link you recommended and can now disagree. :wink:

I have three problems with Rosenberg’s approach. First, he has the basis of consciousness as physical; second, he assumes consciousness is “study-able”; and third, his model is contrary to my experience.

Regarding my first objection, it seems to me that before we can hypothesize that the physical has “two faces,” we have to understand what the essence of the physical is. Consider this absurdity of physics. Currently we say matter is energy, but then go on to say in another context that energy is a mere abstraction, and really has no reality beyond how it helps explain the behavior of matter. This is an inconsistency which has confused many a layperson about the physical universe. Here’s how science writer Paul Davies explains it, “When an abstract concept becomes so successful that it permeates through to the general public, the distinction between real and imaginary becomes blurred. . . . This is what happened in the case of energy. . . . Energy is . . . an imaginary, abstract concept which nevertheless has become so much a part of our everyday vocabulary that we imbue it with concrete existence.”

But how can that which is absolutely essential to matter be only a concept? If nothing definitive can be said about that which supposedly constitutes matter other than it’s just an explanatory convenience, then in a sense physics is pure functionalism. We describe how things happen, but we don’t know what it is that is driving it, or that which the physical is made up of. It behaves but it has no “is-ness”??? To me, this is a crucial aspect of the problem Hawking addresses when he asks, “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"

So the first problem is that if we are going to use the physical as the starting place for consciousness, then I say we are right back to functionalism; true, we’ve managed to move it quite a few steps more fundamental, but we still don’t reach the nature of what’s causing it all. I think Rosenberg gives us clues he is opting for functionalism with his “life world” analogy, and when he distinguishes between human and animal consciousness. The on-off basis of life world sounds like the functionalist consciousness-as-computer model, and distinguishing the human from animal seems to be elevating the human intellect to what consciousness is, rather than something it can do. To me Rosenberg’s model is like getting around the “hard problem” of abiogenesis by saying life arrived here on an asteroid.

The second problem I have with Rosenberg’s model is that he assumes that consciousness can be studied; and you can see from how he is talking about it that by “study” he means the ability to objectify it for scrutiny. Built into his assumption is another assumption, reductionist in nature, which is that consciousness has “parts” which cause it. But what if consciousness has no parts, is instead homogeneous, and so can’t be studied in a reductionist way?

And this brings me to my third objection, which is that Rosenberg’s model contradicts my experience. Since I’ve asked to represent the introspective view, let me cite an experience I’ve repeatedly had during the meditation I do. When beginning, I can see my consciousness is there a certain way; after practicing, I experience my consciousness as more expanded than when I began. Diagram 1 represents this shift:

See Diagram 1 below

The impression I have is that consciousness is “compressed” by the physical processes of the brain. By disassociating from the brain, expansion happens and consciousness “brightens” somewhat. In some of the more powerful expansion experiences, not only does one become aware of being expanded from a formerly compressed state, one also becomes aware that one has expanded into a much more expanded (and brighter) environment, as Diagram 2 represents:

See Diagram 2 below

In terms of duality, my sense is that the physicalness of the brain is not in essence different from my consciousness, but rather the brain is a structured form of what my consciousness is also. In other words, neither consciousness nor the physical is most basic; both are “forms” of something even more basic. That’s the reason my consciousness can be part of the physicality of the brain . . . because they share a common essence, with the brain being in a far more compressed and structured condition than consciousness.

And why doesn’t Rosenberg offer this as a possibility? I’d say this last is the problem I have in general with “consciousness studies,” which is that none of the theorists seem to think it necessary to look within and directly experience what the nature of their own consciousness is like. They know there is physics, they know there is consciousness, they know some of the things consciousness can do, but like the energy-matter irony, they don’t know what consciousness IS. Where’s the experience that is going to convert this currently rationalistic field into something empirical?

I suspect you and I are approaching this subject in different ways. I am relying very much on my personal experience with my own consciousness first, and objective data second. If I were to choose someone from that Arizona conference who seemed to feel angst similar to mine over the lack of is-ness and personal experience in models, I might choose:

http://www.ca-sps.org/Jon-Klimo_PROBLEMS_AND_CHALLENGES_IN_CONSCIOUSNESS_RES EARCH_3-18-2002.html

hypnagogue

Sep30-04, 03:01 PM

Les, I think you misread the poster. I would recommend rereading it after you read my reply to your post. Perhaps the material is a little obtuse if you haven't read the book yet-- I can't tell for certain, having already read the book. Also, I think you may have been thrown off a bit when I spoke so strongly of studying the brain as (in some partial sense) literally studying consciousness, but trust me that this theory comes to that sort of statement in a way much more interesting and motivated (and modest!) than your average physicalism or functionalism.

But how can that which is absolutely essential to matter be only a concept? If nothing definitive can be said about that which supposedly constitutes matter other than it’s just an explanatory convenience, then in a sense physics is pure functionalism. We describe how things happen, but we don’t know what it is that is driving it, or that which the physical is made up of. It behaves but it has no “is-ness”??? To me, this is a crucial aspect of the problem Hawking addresses when he asks, “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?"

This is more or less exactly what Rosenberg says. He argues that

* schematic systems built on contrastive circularity posit a kind of barren ontology consisting of 'bare differences' (an 'is-related-to' without an 'is');

* modern physics is just such a system consisting ultimately of bare differences;

* such bare differences necessarily require 'carriers,' phenomena which can coherently instantiate bare differences in virtue of their own, internal contrasts that outrun the categories defined by the system (such as how the bare difference 'on' and 'off' of Life can be carried by red and black checkers-- redness and blackness outrun the categories specified by Life, and in virtue of their own internal contrasts (red is distinct from black) they can carry or instantiate the bare difference relations stipulated by Life);

* physical theory is in conceptual need of carriers, of an 'is' to be doing the 'relating,' or a 'fire' to be doing the 'breathing';

* carriers for physics would need to have a kind of bottom line intrinsic nature; they would need to be such that, if a difference obtains between carrier A and B, then it is not a bare or stipulative difference, but rather a difference that must directly follow from their intrinsic natures;

* something like phenomenal consciousness appears to be just the sort of thing that could play the role of intrinsic carrier for physics.

So the first problem is that if we are going to use the physical as the starting place for consciousness, then I say we are right back to functionalism; true, we’ve managed to move it quite a few steps more fundamental, but we still don’t reach the nature of what’s causing it all.

The physical is not the starting place here; it is not fundamental in Rosenberg's analysis. The carriers are what is fundamental. Insofar as physics is a schematic system of bare differences, at most it describes the functional relationships that its carriers engage in. Physics is a kind of functionalism, in the way you're using the word, but physics cum carriers is not.

I think Rosenberg gives us clues he is opting for functionalism with his “life world” analogy, and when he distinguishes between human and animal consciousness. The on-off basis of life world sounds like the functionalist consciousness-as-computer model, and distinguishing the human from animal seems to be elevating the human intellect to what consciousness is, rather than something it can do. To me Rosenberg’s model is like getting around the “hard problem” of abiogenesis by saying life arrived here on an asteroid.

Rosenberg never differentiates between animal consciousness and human consciousness. When he says animal consciousness, he is referring to the kind of rich, higher-order consciousness that exists in humans and, presumably, other animals. He uses this term to distinguish this kind of 'macroscopic' consciousness from the kind of protophenomenal carriers that his hypothesis posits-- he wants to emphasize that such things would be like human consciousness only insofar as they would be phenomenal/experiential, and that their exact qualities would probably be really alien to us.

As for the Life world, Rosenberg uses it to illustrate problems that exist with physical theory: the lack of carriers, and the seeming impossibility to account for consciousness. He doesn't use it as a model of how his framework actually explains consciousness, as you seem to imply; quite the contrary, he uses as a model of how traditional physicalist / functionalist explanations are counterintuitive, conceptually problematic, and ultimately wrong.

The second problem I have with Rosenberg’s model is that he assumes that consciousness can be studied; and you can see from how he is talking about it that by “study” he means the ability to objectify it for scrutiny. Built into his assumption is another assumption, reductionist in nature, which is that consciousness has “parts” which cause it. But what if consciousness has no parts, is instead homogeneous, and so can’t be studied in a reductionist way?

Rosenberg identifies experience with the 'receptive face' of causation, and claims that both are strongly emergent phenomena, i.e. completely novel and irreducible aspects of nature. He also argues (in his book, at least) that this receptive side is, of necessity, beyond objective, empirical investigation. Only the structure and function of the 'effective face' of causation is amenable to empirical study, and this is precisely the domain of physics: studying the structure and function of effective properties. There is a pretty simple reasoning behind this: you can only empirically study something that will make its effects felt on your measuring instruments, and only effective properties will fit the bill here, by definition of what it means to be effective vs. receptive.

Also in his book, he gives an argument that different phenomenal properties may also be strongly emergent, in the sense that the higher order phenomenal properties of human consciousness may not be reducible to / explicable in terms of some literal compositional combination of protophenomenal properties.

The impression I have is that consciousness is “compressed” by the physical processes of the brain. By disassociating from the brain, expansion happens and consciousness “brightens” somewhat. In some of the more powerful expansion experiences, not only does one become aware of being expanded from a formerly compressed state, one also becomes aware that one has expanded into a much more expanded (and brighter) environment, as Diagram 2 represents:

I don't think this is all that much incompatible with Rosenberg's framework. The metaphysical explanation is a little different, insofar as Rosenberg might picture a tighter relationship between brain and mind. He wouldn't speak of dissociation from the brain, but rather, different effective and receptive relationships between the phenomenal/experiential carriers. This different relationship would manifest itself as a different physical brain process, since ex hypothesi physical phenomena are just the structural and functional relationships obtaining among effective properties.

In terms of duality, my sense is that the physicalness of the brain is not in essence different from my consciousness, but rather the brain is a structured form of what my consciousness is also. In other words, neither consciousness nor the physical is most basic; both are “forms” of something even more basic. That’s the reason my consciousness can be part of the physicality of the brain . . . because they share a common essence, with the brain being in a far more compressed and structured condition than consciousness.

This, too, might not be all that far off from what Rosenberg proposes. For him, physical phenomena are certainly not the most basic kinds of phenomena, but neither is human consciousness. The most basic phenomena would be protophenomenal/protoexperiential properties, which is proposed to be analagous to human phenemonal experience in only the a very general and basic sense; if we could experience such things ourselves, we might not even recognize them as forms of consciousness.

"The brain is a structured form of what my consciousness is also": this is also similar to what Rosenberg is proposing, except he would say that the brain, qua physical object, literally is the raw, 'bare difference' structure of consciousness as it is seen from the outside.

In a rough analogy, suppose we think of Jane's consciousness as a house. Jane is free to move around inside her house and observe both its intrinsic properties, which we'll represent with its various colors, and its structural properties, which we'll say is the framework of the house (walls, floors, ceilings, the angles at which they meet, etc). Now when Bob looks at Jane's house, he has no access to its intrinsic properties, nor can he see it from the inside; all he can see is a line-drawing of the structure of its facade. Bob calls this line-drawing of the structure of its facade Jane's brain.

Les Sleeth

Oct1-04, 11:02 AM

hypnagogue

Oct1-04, 12:49 PM

You said, "Rosenberg identifies experience with the 'receptive face' of causation, and claims that both are strongly emergent phenomena, i.e. completely novel and irreducible aspects of nature. . . . Also in his book, he gives an argument that different phenomenal properties may also be strongly emergent." My understanding of how most thinkers use the terms "emergent" and "nature" is physicalistic. It is to say consciousness has emerged from the physics of the brain, and nature is what the universe's physical processes produced here on planet Earth which established the biosphere. Is that what do you mean by emergent and nature?

In philosophy, nature is just a general term for what exists, the totality of existence. A physicalist would strongly identify nature with physics, but Rosenberg isn't a physicalist. His ontology has metaphysics that goes well beyond physical phenomena.

Emergence, too, need not refer to physical phenomena. It is just a general term for how different levels of nature are related to eachother, how we can think of one level in terms of another. Emergence can be divided into two types, weak and strong. Here is how Rosenberg explains them in his book:

There are two notions of emergence. The first notion, which I will call weak emergence, is non-controversial. It refers to non-fundamental properties like liquidity, shape, solidity, and flammability that emerge in a constitutive way from the organizations and interactions of lower-level entities. In the terminology of chapters two and three, the lower-level facts entail the facts about these properties. They “emerge” in the sense that they are numerically different from any lower-level properties, but they are not radically novel properties because their instances are explicable as the inevitable consequences of the activity at the lower levels.

The second notion of emergence, which I will call strong emergence, refers to the appearance of new fundamental properties that only exist at the higher-levels of nature. It is controversial whether any strongly emergent properties exist, and orthodox belief is that they do not. Strongly emergent properties are properties whose instances, if they exist, are not wholly constituted by the organizations and interactions of lower-level entities, although their existence may be a consequence of the lower-level activity in conjunction with suitable fundamental laws applying specifically to the situations in which they emerge. One might say that the strongly emergent properties are not constituted from lower-level activity, but they are generated by that activity.

Weak emergence is readily amenable to reductionist analysis, and indeed physicalism would hold that only weak emergence exists, but a strongly emergent phenomenon is not completely amenable to reduction.

Rosenberg defines the 'receptive face' of causation as that aspect of causation that allows things to be effected, i.e. that which feels the effect of, or receives the work done by, effective properties (such as charge or mass). Physics speaks only of effective properties, so receptivity is necessarily outside of the scope of physics. Thus the strong emergence of receptivity is an example of emergence occuring outside of the scope of physics.

I got confused when you labeled two things as fundamental. You said, "The most basic phenomena would be protophenomenal/protoexperiential properties," and "The physical is not the starting place here . . . the carriers are what is fundamental." Are the "protophenomenal/protoexperiential properties," what carriers are carrying, or is this another way of describing a carrier? If it is another way of describing a carrier, what is the origin of the carriers? What created and composes them?

The protophenomenal/protoexperiential properties are the carriers themselves. They carry instances of effective properties and receptivity, respectively, which are the two components of causation. Since physical phenomena (as modeled in physical theory) are just the effective properties, protophenomenal properties carry physical properties.

It's kind of difficult to convey concisely what a carrier is, what it's supposed to do, and why it is conceptually important. Rather than try to explain it imperfectly myself, I think it would be better if you got a thorough treatment from the source. So for now I would advise that you read chapter 12 of A Place for Consciousness: The Carrier Theory Of Causation (http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm). You will run into a bit of terminology that is unfamiliar without having read previous chapters (for instance, the concept of a 'natural individual' or just 'individual'), and much of the second half of section 12.4 in particular will probably be largely unintelligible, but for the most part you should be able to make sense of it. I think after reading this you will have a much clearer idea of carriers and of the overall flavor of Rosenberg's framework in general.

When you say, "Insofar as physics is a schematic system of bare differences, at most it describes the functional relationships that its carriers engage in. Physics is a kind of functionalism, in the way you're using the word, but physics cum carriers is not," it seems you are suggesting consciousness is not possible without physics, that the materials of consciousness, "carriers," are pulled together and synthesized by brain physics and chemistry. My impression is that you are almost saying carriers are the quanta of consciousness which would be wandering around in space unless a nervous system pulls them into biology and organizes them into consciousness. Is that what you mean?

Not quite. From what you're saying, it sounds like you conceive of the carriers existing outside of and being operated on by physics-- floating in space and being subject to physical laws. But in Rosenberg's picture, physical phenomena (even spacetime) are viewed as being constituted (in a sense) by the carriers. Thus it's not so much that the physical structure and functional organization of the brain is organizing the carriers, but rather that the brain (in its purely physical sense) literally is the structural and functional organization of the carriers.

Maybe another rough analogy will help here. Suppose we conceive of the carriers as being the material of a tapestry, and that their interactions and relationships are represented by patterns on the tapestry. It sounds like you would conceive of the physical structures and functions of the brain as the weaver who creates the patterns. In Rosenberg's picture, the physical structure and functions of the brain are the patterns. We seem to agree that physics describes an abstract set of relationships without mentioning an 'essence' or an 'is-ness'; here, the 'physics' of the tapestry would do essentially the same thing, describing the patterns on the tapestry in an abstract way, without mentioning the cloth (carriers) that instantiate the patterns and make them possible. (Rosenberg would explain the creation of this pattern itself in terms of causal laws of interaction among the carriers, which are of a different and more fundamental type than physical laws.)

Les Sleeth

Oct1-04, 03:37 PM

So for now I would advise that you read chapter 12 of A Place for Consciousness: [URL=http://www.ai.uga.edu/~ghrosenb/chptr12.htm]

Thank you for the reference. After reading it I can see I don't have time right now to give it the attention needed for an intelligent critique. It should be interesting to see how Rosenberg's ideas are accepted by other thinkers.

Philocrat

Oct3-04, 07:41 PM

Thanks guys for beginning to dive a little deeper into the Reductionism issue. If you come across more materials and concrete data on the subject, please don't hesitating drawing our attention to them. Why reductionism is such an important issue is frankly because that is what this thread demands to know. All the related disciplines must start making some concrete commitments as to the nature of the reductionist theories or theses raised there. Meanwhile, I will keep an eye on some myself.

Rader

Oct6-04, 05:25 PM

Gregg Rosenberg's newly released "A Place for Consciousness" should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in this issue of the relationship between physics and consciousness.

Can you post the ISBN number of the book? Not sure if this is the correct book, does he go by Jacob also?

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195168143/qid=1097100608/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_16_1/026-5304565-6581258

Thanks

hypnagogue

Oct8-04, 06:10 PM

Can you post the ISBN number of the book? Not sure if this is the correct book, does he go by Jacob also?

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195168143/qid=1097100608/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_16_1/026-5304565-6581258

Thanks

I have no idea why he's listed as Jacob Rosenberg on that link, but the ISBN listed there matches the one I found at two other sites (0195168143). I'm not sure what's going on with the actual publishing; I thought it was supposed to have been published this past September, but I keep seeing varying release dates.

Rader

Oct8-04, 06:45 PM

balkan

Oct13-04, 04:46 PM

oh my god.... is this thread powered by DuraCell?

jaguar99

Oct27-04, 04:40 PM

My answer is no. Because you would be explaining forever without actually stopping.

zhaggy

Oct28-04, 07:59 AM

although i try my best to prove to myself that the universe can be explained by pure physics alone, i doubt there can ever be a pure mathematical equation to substantiate it. the closest we come to actually getting a near enough equation is "1+1=2".
all we can do is believe.
and have faith in our belief... but that then deviates towards spirituality/religion which is no good.
so is the answer then in the unanswerable(read as God), i hope not!

hypnagogue

Oct31-04, 10:42 PM

I have no idea why he's listed as Jacob Rosenberg on that link, but the ISBN listed there matches the one I found at two other sites (0195168143). I'm not sure what's going on with the actual publishing; I thought it was supposed to have been published this past September, but I keep seeing varying release dates.

I've just received confirmation from Gregg himself that his book A Place for Consciousness has just recently been released officially. It's available directly from the publisher here (http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?ci=0195168143&view=usa). (It's also available on Amazon, although they seem to have listed an incorrect release date.) In any case, the ISBN number is indeed 0195168143.

docbill

Nov3-04, 01:26 PM

> In which other ways can the Physical world be explained?
> By Physics alone?

Physics explains nothing. It is not the job of science to explain, but only to describe.

> By Religion alone?

Religion is believed, not explained.

> By any other discipline?

Purhaps some things could be explained by phillosophy, but I doubt you could even reach a consensious there is a physical world.

> By Multi-disciplinary efforts?

I would have to take that as an axium.

Man A jumps from a cliff at exactly 12:00 noon and falls seven hundred feet to his death.
1. How long did he fall before hitting the ground?
2. At what velocity did he hit?
3. Why did he jump?
4. Did the man really exist?
5. Do you, the reader of this question really exist?

toasty

Nov7-04, 08:52 PM

Our nature determines how we interact with the Universe, because we are part of it.

Then there's the fact that if every motion stopped, it - and us with it - would simply evaporate into nothing.

For all practical purposes there is no real benefit in such things.

geraldmcgarvey

Nov20-04, 05:10 PM

I don't think so.

How can qualitative experiences (qualia), such as the experience of colors, emotions, tones, etc. be described quantitatively? Maybe they can be correlated to triggers that can be described quantitatively, but that is different than actually describing them.

We can quantify aspects of the physical world, e.g. energy, matter, etc. but does that say what the stuff really is?

I love mathematics, but it has its limits.

evagriselda

Nov20-04, 09:17 PM

Wonder about the answers of the Chemists... Ontologists... that's nice too.

Andrew Stengel

Nov22-04, 04:19 AM

Canute

Nov22-04, 07:22 AM

A few other opinions on physics and reality.

"Up to now, most people have implicitly assumed that there is an ultimate theory, that we will eventually discover. Indeed, I myself have suggested we might find it quite soon. However, M-theory has made me wonder if this is true. Maybe it is not possible to formulate the theory of the universe in a finite number of statements. This is very reminiscent of Goedel's theorem. This says that any finite system of axioms is not sufficient to prove every result in mathematics.

Stephen Hawking
Goedel and The End of Physics

"Might it not be the case that the reason for existence has no explanation in the usual sense? This does not mean that the universe is absurd or meaningless, only that an understanding of its existence and properties lies outside the usual categories of human thought."

Paul Davies
The Mind of God

"…as I explained in the first lecture, the way we have to describe Nature is generally incomprehensible to us."

Richard Feynman
QED - The Strange Theory of Light and Matter

"We should suspect an intention to reduce God to a system of differential equations. That fiasco at any rate [must be] avoided. However much the ramifications of [physics] may be extended by further scientific discovery, they cannot from their very nature trench on the background on which they have their being. . . We have learnt that the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadowy world of symbols beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating."

Sir Arthur Eddington
The Nature of the Physical World (p 282)

"Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of relativity with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of quanta with its present apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the dissection of the atom with the resultant discovery that things are not what they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality. We are still imprisoned in our cave, with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall."

Sir James Jeans
The Mysterious Universe (1931)

Canute

Nov22-04, 07:53 AM

James W. Pugh

Nov22-04, 06:30 PM

Philocrat

Nov25-04, 08:47 AM

Good information can come from a vast number of relevant sources. Why would we want to dismiss any point of view that might have some factual basis. The whole is the sum of many parts is also true in science.

But science is guilty of one fundamental charge: IT WHOLLY NEGLECTS A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PART-WHOLE RELATIONS! How could science coherently explain reality when it is neglecting the purposes of things in a given relation? My investigation of the scientific account of the Part-Whole Relations suggests that this inevitably leads to explanatory deficits, which is what I having been trying to point out throughtout my postings on PF and elsewhere. Sooner or later science must take a concrete stand on this!

Philocrat

Nov25-04, 08:59 AM

Science should start interpreting ( or should I say explaining) the whole of reality PURPOSIVELY! The whole approach should fundamentally shift from 'HOW' to 'WHY'! Infact, we should kiss goodbye to any hope of scientific progress PROPER, let alone the human progress, without this approach!

JonahHex

Nov28-04, 06:30 PM

Philocrat

Nov29-04, 07:40 PM

Why?

Purpose has religion implied. If not God's, whose purpose?

Mine, perhaps? As nearly as I can tell, the purpose of the Universe is to inconvience and annoy me.

Is that purposive enough for you?

JonahHex, for goodness' sake, don't get upset about it! The issue that I am rasing here has nothing to do with religion. It seems that every time an issue of the HUMAN PROGRESS is raised in any discipline, our first stroke of thought seems to point an accusing finger at religion. Why must the notion of human progress always be about religion? Perhaps, it does genuinely concern religion, but that's only a tiny portion of the whole picture, as James W. Pugh's posting tends to suggest.

All that I am saying is that if science is genuinely seeking to explain how parts fit together in the sum totality of a whole, if the notion of the human progress, let alone survival, is worth anything at all, then science must do so purposively. For if you don't know why things are given temporal, spatial and causal positions in a whole, how would you know what to do next, let alone re-engineer and action them in a progressive way or manner? This is the BIG question that is being constantly played down within the science community.

Every time we start talking about this, some scientists start to talk about uncertainty principle, Blind designs, fluxes, Big bangs, infinities and all what not, as if these are the final truths. And then we are told about the 'SAVED-BY-THE-BELL RULE' as the golden rule, or should I say the governing rule, of our own human form of life. That our own form of life happens to be possible by accidentally occupying a planet on our solar system with the right distance to the sun.....the so-called 'RIGHT CONDITIONS FOR LIFE'.

Even more so, some scientists seem to feel that when they ask such question as:

"WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PLANET MARS IN OUR SOLAR SYSTEM?"

that they would be seen by their colleagues as being stupid or as asking a religious question as you have just quite rightly demonstrated by your outrage over my postulate. How can this question be stupid or religious, let alone any attempt to figure out its answer? My suggestion is that any attempt to answer a quesation of this kind is a time well spent, and it must activate progressive thoughts and actions in us. Give it a try!

Philocrat

Nov29-04, 07:59 PM

Even more chilling is the fact that we are currently 'DANGEROUSLY CONTENTED' with the way things are........gracefully going with the flow, and comfortably settling in with 'SOFT SCIENCE'. Sadly, it seems that we are not yet ready to do 'HARD SCIENCE'. And try pointing this out to members of the diciplines concerned and they would accuse you of starting a new theory.......as if though they are naturally frightened of theories!

loseyourname

Dec2-04, 10:43 PM

But science is guilty of one fundamental charge: IT WHOLLY NEGLECTS A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PART-WHOLE RELATIONS! How could science coherently explain reality when it is neglecting the purposes of things in a given relation? My investigation of the scientific account of the Part-Whole Relations suggests that this inevitably leads to explanatory deficits, which is what I having been trying to point out throughtout my postings on PF and elsewhere. Sooner or later science must take a concrete stand on this!

Philo, science is not meant to deal with questions of purpose. Science is descriptive only of physical processes in terms of cause and effect. In this sense it is defective as a means of describing all of reality, but this is an intentional defect! Science is not neglecting anything; it is simply incapable of answering questions of purpose. Purpose is an entirely subjective thing. Whether or not purposive action exists in a contracausal, non-physical sense isn't even known, and I would say cannot be known through empirical means, including the scientific method. These explanatory deficits you speak of are well known and well discussed here, but how are they relevant to the efficacy of science? Science cannot explain the experience of listening to a great opera, or any subjective experience for that matter, but that does not make it deficient any more than poetics is deficient because it can't explain why some ink dries faster than others.

Doctordick

Dec3-04, 09:01 PM

I claim that physics (or shall we say "hard science" since the current state of physics has become rather senile in many respects) can explain anything. Not only do I make that claim but I also claim I can show anyone interested in the issue exactly how the truth of that claim can be proved. The subject of this endeavor seems to be "metaphysics" and thus willfully to be avoided by any trained hard scientists. I myself have not studied the subject other than to think about the issues themselves.

The idea of metaphysics was introduced by Aristotle some 2300 years ago. His interest was in the foundations on which the science of physics should be based. Though many people have held the subject to be a very important issue, its actual study has generally been relegated to the field of philosophy. The problem is that in today's world of "hard science" philosophy is generally considered an unscientific pursuit. Certainly no graduate school of modern physics that I am aware of includes any requirement of "metaphysics" in its curriculum.

The central problem of explanation itself is, exactly how do you defend your starting position. In many respects this is the central (unresolved issue) of metaphysics clearly comes to bear directly on Aristotle's basis of physics. That this is the case is easily defended through the following observation taken directly from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

********************
In Posterior Analytics I.2, Aristotle considers two challenges to the possibility of science. One party (dubbed the "agnostics" by Jonathan Barnes) began with the following two premises:

1. Whatever is scientifically known must be demonstrated.
2. The premises of a demonstration must be scientifically known.

They then argued that demonstration is impossible with the following dilemma:

1. If the premises of a demonstration are scientifically known, then they must be demonstrated.
2. The premises from which each premise are demonstrated must be scientifically known.
3. Either this process continues forever, creating an infinite regress of premises, or it comes to a stop at some point.
4. If it continues forever, then there are no first premises from which the subsequent ones are demonstrated, and so nothing is demonstrated.
5. On the other hand, if it comes to a stop at some point, then the premises at which it comes to a stop are undemonstrated and therefore not scientifically known; consequently, neither are any of the others deduced from them.
6. Therefore, nothing can be demonstrated.

A second group accepted the agnostics' view that scientific knowledge comes only from demonstration but rejected their conclusion by rejecting the dilemma. Instead, they maintained:

Demonstration "in a circle" is possible, so that it is possible for all premises also to be conclusions and therefore demonstrated.

Aristotle does not give us much information about how circular demonstration was supposed to work, but the most plausible interpretation would be supposing that at least for some set of fundamental principles, each principle could be deduced from the others.

Aristotle rejects circular demonstration as an incoherent notion on the grounds that the premises of any demonstration must be prior (in an appropriate sense) to the conclusion, whereas a circular demonstration would make the same premises both prior and posterior to one another (and indeed every premise prior and posterior to itself). He agrees with the agnostics' analysis of the regress problem: the only plausible options are that it continues indefinitely or that it "comes to a stop" at some point. However, he thinks both the agnostics and the circular demonstrators are wrong in maintaining that scientific knowledge is only possible by demonstration from premises scientifically known: instead, he claims, there is another form of knowledge possible for the first premises, and this provides the starting points for demonstrations.

****************** Cohen, S. Marc, "Aristotle's Metaphysics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>.

Modern physics presumes that Aristotle's conundrum is of no real importance as physics is merely concerned with useful descriptions physical processes and the issues of cause and effect. However, if one considers the fundamental defense of a "Theory of Everything", the issue brought up here is the basis of science itself.

Hard science has essentially leapt, without serious thought, to Aristotle's position that there is another form of knowledge which provides the starting point. No thought or discussion is given to exactly how one becomes aware of this alternate form of knowledge. I think it requires a serious examination.

We all started life as mere fetuses, presented with exactly that problem: acquiring the knowledge necessary to provide that starting point for serious examination of the universe. And, in a matter of months, we all solved it without a conscious effort at all. If nothing else, that proves the problem is solvable.

We use the word "intuitive" to describe such solutions. The only problem with "intuitive" solutions is that they can often be erroneous (and any hard scientist will agree with that assessment). Yet all scientists take the position that each and every perception (intuitive constructs every one) is absolutely correct unless it can be proved that one is an illusion. It seems to me that the opposite position is the only one acceptable to "hard science": i.e., each and every perception is an illusion unless one can prove it is not.

It is through careful (exact) examination of the above position that I came to discover a solution to that original problem. If there is anyone interested in examining that solution who has the mental proclivities and patience to follow a complex exact development, let me know and I will do my best to guide you through my thoughts.

Have fun – Dick

P.S. I have another philosophical carrot for anyone with the attention span to follow my work. I will explain how free will comes to exist, in an exact manner.

Nereid

Dec3-04, 09:20 PM

Good to see that you're still around Dr Dick!

You've probably not had a chance to read through this whole thread, but I'd personally be interested to see (hear?) what you think about what seems to me to be something of a consensus, many pages back ... there are really only two domains where 'physics' may not rule - 'life' and the hard problem of consciousness. There are some (myself included) who feel that the 'life' area may well yield to 'physics' in the next hundred years or three; there are others (e.g. Les) who contend that it cannot, even in principle (he presents a cogent argument to support his idea). On the 'hard problem of consciousness', hypnogogue introduced us to some very recent thinking (a book) which may hint at a possible approach to bring this into the domain of 'physics'.

Les Sleeth

Dec3-04, 10:47 PM

If there is anyone interested in examining that solution who has the mental proclivities and patience to follow a complex exact development, let me know and I will do my best to guide you through my thoughts.

Personally I wouldn't be interested in having you guide me through any of your thoughts unless they achieve what you claim they can when you say:

I claim that physics (or shall we say "hard science" since the current state of physics has become rather senile in many respects) can explain anything. Not only do I make that claim but I also claim I can show anyone interested in the issue exactly how the truth of that claim can be proved. . . .

Since you have allied yourself with hard science, and we know there are exact standards for proof in hard science (i.e., that what's hypothesized to be true can be observed), I challenge you to prove that physics can "explain anything."

Now, if you mean by "proved" that you can demonstrate a valid logical argument, then forget my challenge. If you have facts that prove, not just indicate, consciousness is the result of physical processes, that life can come about through abiogenesis, that physical processes are the sole first cause of the universe's origin and the only influence which has made it develop the way it has . . . then that would be interesting indeed!

printf("Q&A")

Dec5-04, 03:24 PM

Phjysics has limits.
These limits are set by the nature it-self.

One of the example is the uncertainly principle in quantum mechanics.

let say we have two slit and a particle. Physics can explain the probability of the particle exit via any one of the two slits. But, when we do see it exit at one of the slit, we cannot explain why it doesn't go through the other one instead. That's the limit how far physics can go.

On the other hand, away from nature's limits, yes everything you can learn in a universtiy (except art and philosophy) can be reduces to pure physics

Doctordick

Dec5-04, 05:14 PM

Good to see that you're still around Dr Dick!Well, that's a comment I've not heard in a long while! Thank you very much.
... there are really only two domains where 'physics' may not rule - 'life' and the hard problem of consciousness.Perhaps one might propose a new name for "the hard science study of fundamentals" since, as I said, "the current state of physics has become rather senile in many respects". I would call the field "metaphysics" except for the fact that metaphysics has already established itself as a "soft science". How about "HARD" metaphysics?
There are some (myself included) who feel that the 'life' area may well yield to 'physics' in the next hundred years or three; there are others (e.g. Les) who contend that it cannot, even in principle (he presents a cogent argument to support his idea).I have spent today reading the entire thread (Oh, I have just perused a great number of posts). Les seems to be a rational person but I like things more exactly defined then he requires. For example:
…especially if when you use the term "explain" you mean prove.I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. A good explanation is one where the expectations are consistent with observations (and "observations" are additions to that "known information"). Anyone, let me know if you find fault with that definition!
It seems the rarest thinker and investigator is one determined to find and accept the truth no matter what it may be, and who in pursuit of the truth is willing to investigate every facet of existence, again, no matter what it may be.I agree 100% and wish I could find one. I have never met such a person in my life; at least not one with an education. Education tends to stifle such proclivities. I also suspect Les would baulk at living up to it.

On the "hard problem of consciousness", I think we need an exact definition of what one means by "consciousness". I have my idea but I suspect most here would baulk at using it. (I have not examined hypnogogue's refrence!)
one would have to wonder why human consciousness should have evolved.Before one can wonder seriously, one needs to know exactly what you are talking about: define "consciousness".
Personally I wouldn't be interested in having you guide me through any of your thoughts unless they achieve what you claim they can when you say…And I wouldn't expect you be interested if I could not do what I say.
Since you have allied yourself with hard science, and we know there are exact standards for proof in hard science (i.e., that what's hypothesized to be true can be observed), I challenge you to prove that physics can "explain anything."That's what I offered to do isn't it? However, the proof is not trivial and it requires some serious thought. Are you really ready?
Now, if you mean by "proved" that you can demonstrate a valid logical argument, then forget my challenge.Well now, I certainly am confident that I can demonstrate a "valid logical argument"! If that is grounds for dismissal then your idea of hard science and mine seem to be quite far apart.
If you have facts that prove, not just indicate, consciousness is the result of physical processes, that life can come about through abiogenesis, that physical processes are the sole first cause of the universe's origin and the only influence which has made it develop the way it has . . . then that would be interesting indeed!What you seem to be saying here is that you need your intuitive position on what's right to yield the result or you won't accept it. One would conclude that you certainly are not a person "determined to find and accept the truth no matter what it may be, and who in pursuit of the truth is willing to investigate every facet of existence."

The requirement you state is not the one I claimed to be able to perform. I claim to have discovered a solution to a very specific problem: the problem of explanation itself. If you are willing to accept my definition of "an explanation", then I can show you how to construct an absolutely general "mechanical" model of any possible explanation of anything.

Unless there is an error in my construction procedure, there exists no explanation of anything which can not be mapped into the "mechanical" solutions of that model. The conclusion is that "hard science" is applicable to any problem, philosophical or otherwise. It is the nature of explanation itself.

I am looking for someone who, "in pursuit of the truth", "is willing to investigate every facet of existence, again, no matter what it may be".

I'll be out of town for a week so think about the issue a little before you comment. Again, I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. If you don't like my definition, please give me an example of an explanation which provides nothing regarding your expectations. Or one which provides something which cannot be interpreted as saying something about your expectations.

Have fun guys -- Dick

Rothiemurchus

Dec5-04, 05:53 PM

DoctorDick:
The problem is that in today's world of "hard science" philosophy is generally considered an unscientific pursuit. Certainly no graduate school of modern physics that I am aware of includes any requirement of "metaphysics" in its curriculum.

Rothie M:
You're right about this DD and it's a bad thing because universities
are detatching students from the ability to use and argue with language,
to be creative and to consider other people's points of view.
Great physicists like Einstein took philosophers seriously e.g Mach.
My old university still calls its department of physics
"The Department of Natural Philosophy."
Good on them!
And it's great to have your expertise back on these forums.

Rader

Dec5-04, 06:02 PM

On the "hard problem of consciousness", I think we need an exact definition of what one means by "consciousness". I have my idea but I suspect most here would baulk at using it.

I agree. Would you mind posting it when you get back, I will read it, not sure if I would use it, until I read it.

loseyourname

Dec5-04, 06:46 PM

DoctorDick:
The problem is that in today's world of "hard science" philosophy is generally considered an unscientific pursuit. Certainly no graduate school of modern physics that I am aware of includes any requirement of "metaphysics" in its curriculum.

This is off-topic, but I really like the grad program at the University of Arizona. It allows you to major in the philosophy of mind while minoring in cognitive science. The only program I know of where you can actually get a taste of both sides.

Also, regarding the question about why human consciousness should have evolved, I think it's important to note again that a given trait does not need to provide any selective advantage. Many evolved traits simply emerged from other traits or evolved because of gene-linkage. Trying to fit every trait that a human being has into a theory of evolutionary selection is dubious at best. The vast majority can be, but not all.

Bobby R

Dec5-04, 08:07 PM

By restricting yourself to pure Physics you run the risk of limiting thought in order to keep your solution in the box. Is that where you want to be?
Bob Rollins
:rolleyes:

loseyourname

Dec5-04, 08:18 PM

I've just received confirmation from Gregg himself that his book A Place for Consciousness has just recently been released officially. It's available directly from the publisher here (http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?ci=0195168143&view=usa). (It's also available on Amazon, although they seem to have listed an incorrect release date.) In any case, the ISBN number is indeed 0195168143.

Just ordered a copy. Is this why you were calling yourself "Liberal Naturalist" back in the day?

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 11:31 AM

I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. If you don't like my definition, please give me an example of an explanation which provides nothing regarding your expectations. Or one which provides something which cannot be interpreted as saying something about your expectations.

I hope you don’t mind that I mixed up the order of your comments to help me answer them more logically.

Within the context of empiricism’s own standards, a proof requires the observation of what is hypothesized to be true. A theory, no matter how brilliant, is not a proof unless we can observe all relevant aspects. It might be that the title of this thread gave you the impression that a plausible explanation would do; but I think everyone agreed early on that we were debating if physicalists could prove all existence was strictly physical since we already know there are plenty of theories (i.e., “explanations”) floating around.

Now, to me your post seems a little ambiguous about if you are ready to provide a proof. For example, when I asked you if that’s what you were going to provide you said:

That's what I offered to do isn't it? However, the proof is not trivial and it requires some serious thought. Are you really ready?

Well now, I certainly am confident that I can demonstrate a "valid logical argument"! If that is grounds for dismissal then your idea of hard science and mine seem to be quite far apart.

I was ready to retreat, thinking maybe rather than actual proof you meant merely a logical explanation. But you repeated you could “prove” physical processes can account for all aspects of reality.

Regarding logical validity, as most logic students can attest to, a valid argument is not necessarily a sound argument. An argument is valid as long as it obeys the rules of logic, and it isn’t dependent upon the premises of the argument being true. An example is: all dogs are white, Rover is a dog, therefore Rover is white. That is a perfectly valid argument, but unsound since all dogs are not white.

Anyway, after confirming you would provide proof you go on to say:

I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. A good explanation is one where the expectations are consistent with observations (and "observations" are additions to that "known information"). Anyone, let me know if you find fault with that definition!

That’s a satisfactory definition of an explanation. It is most definitely not a definition of an empirical proof, which is the basis of “hard science” you said you were going to make your case from.

In addition you say:

The requirement you state is not the one I claimed to be able to perform. I claim to have discovered a solution to a very specific problem: the problem of explanation itself. If you are willing to accept my definition of "an explanation", then I can show you how to construct an absolutely general "mechanical" model of any possible explanation of anything.

Now that sounds like you are backtracking from the standards of proof. Within the context of this thread’s theme, I wouldn’t accept any “proof” that varies from empirical standards. Either you can prove it or not. I already understand the value of a good inductive argument, and I don’t doubt that you might have one. But that wasn’t what you were offering (or at least so I thought). If you simply meant that you have a compelling theory, then maybe you could start a thread to discuss it where I’d be happy to reflect on your concepts.

Unless there is an error in my construction procedure, there exists no explanation of anything which can not be mapped into the "mechanical" solutions of that model. The conclusion is that "hard science" is applicable to any problem, philosophical or otherwise. It is the nature of explanation itself.

Well, that’s what this debate is about. If you mean that life and consciousness, for example, have physical aspects to them, I don’t think anyone would disagree with that. But if you mean every aspect of life and consciousness can be accounted for with physical processes alone, then I do dispute that.

On the "hard problem of consciousness", I think we need an exact definition of what one means by "consciousness". I have my idea but I suspect most here would baulk at using it.

I think you have to understand the hard problem since it specifically addresses why physical processes currently cannot explain consciousness. Here’s a reference to a Chalmer’s paper that explains the hard problem: http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

What you seem to be saying here . . .
If you have facts that prove, not just indicate, consciousness is the result of physical processes, that life can come about through abiogenesis, that physical processes are the sole first cause of the universe's origin and the only influence which has made it develop the way it has . . . then that would be interesting indeed
. . . is that you need your intuitive position on what's right to yield the result or you won't accept it. One would conclude that you certainly are not a person "determined to find and accept the truth no matter what it may be, and who in pursuit of the truth is willing to investigate every facet of existence."

Why would you assume my position is intuitive? I have not claimed I can “prove” or personally know how life and consciousness originated. I am the skeptic here, you are the one who has offered a proof. I don’t think you or anyone else in the world can prove, through the empirical standards of hard science, that life and consciousness are purely physical. But if you can, I am open to that proof (and hey, if you need a ride to the Nobel Prize ceremonies . . . . :smile: ).

I am looking for someone who, "in pursuit of the truth", "is willing to investigate every facet of existence, again, no matter what it may be".

Are you certain you’ve open-mindedly examined every facet of existence? Or have you looked primarily at physical factors?

I have never met such a person in my life; at least not one with an education. Education tends to stifle such proclivities. I also suspect Les would baulk at living up to it.

I have a fine education, but for me there is nothing to live up to. Why should I care, or resist, what the truth is? Reality is the way it is, and no amount of wishing it fits my personal theories or prejudices will change that. I am just trying to weigh the evidence. I will stay uncommitted to “belief” until I know what the truth is, and feel just fine about it too.

I can tell you, however, that I am skeptical of any theory developed by someone who has mostly studied physics in an attempt to understand the nature of reality. To me it’s like trying to get an objective opinion about political philosophies from a committed Marxist.

Also, if I seem resistant to signing on for your explanation, it’s because I’ve had one too many lectures from physicalists telling me I need to understand physicalness better simply because I think physicalist theory currently lacks a couple of facts it needs to make sense. :rolleyes: I thought I detected that tone in your initial post, but if I am wrong you have my apologies. I have debated these issues for a couple of years here, and for the areas where I am critical, my science understanding has proven more than adequate.

Taoist

Dec6-04, 12:56 PM

“It seems the rarest thinker and investigator is one determined to find and accept the truth no matter what it may be, and who in pursuit of the truth is willing to investigate every facet of existence, again, no matter what it may be.”

This view will ultimately birth the intuitive side of our existence. Way2go!

Déjà vu is self generated fact(s) giving a glimpse of a capability unknown in any physical explanation still a known fact to every human.

Aristotle had used intuition in interpreting arguments which had taken the eye of the observer into the process of explanation in a way leaving the objective viewpoint open to the argument. Einstein also left room for this debate knowing the incomprehensible amount of variables even now still appearing in new observations. It was this acknowledgement of variant observational attributes that makes the observer a part of the equation. This needs to bring into account the situations having been realized by the observer or the observer(s) history in its entirety.

So I pose to summarize these “illusions” that offer the path of cognizant reasoning still maintain the perspective of a longtime parable of the Upanishads, “he who states they know, knoweth not” since the interpretation has limits in today’s explanations based on limited sight of relative education or experience. Try and explain déjà vu. Two theories authored offer a logical view but quantum mechanics or either relativistic theory has not been able to acknowledge life’s complexities.

Today’s acceptance of metaphysics as a philosophical method of explanation is founded in relativistic review of the process to explain the event. Intuition seems to represent itself when the brick wall appears, not just because of lack of knowledge but comprehension. The point of humility (honest and true), offers that entry point to observe or realize the answer, although not easy to represent in calculations or drill-downs, but easy to know.

This combination of metaphysical or physical explanation and mortal being is where the next generation of our scientific interpretations will surface. Being able to apprehend a scientific interpretation will ultimately require a theological aptitude to comprehend.

Let’s take into account the fourth dimension with all its complexities intertwining all events with all explanations at a given point and you will be able to predict where that proton will appear. Not being capable, intellectually, of comprehensibly taking all into account resoundingly makes the answer the question “Can everything be reduced to pure physics?” a moot point!

"Avoid living at all costs." Why?????? Are you missing the jack of spades?

Seafang

Dec6-04, 04:04 PM

well... even if we could make a fairly good representation of everything in the entire universe, it would still be subject to our translations and be an approximation... approximations leaves errors, and thus, nothing can be fully explained by physics...

a precise model would demand infinite accuracy and like heisenberg stated, that leaves other faults... you people should know this...

so no...
but one day in the future perhaps, scientists will have made fairly good representations of everything in the universe, but they will not be 100% accurate and can thus never be used to explain every aspect without fault...

Well I think it is necessary to distinguish between Physics and Mathematics.
Physics is presumably the study of observable phenomena; things we can actually 'see' and 'measure'.

Mathematics on the other hand is pure fiction; we made it all up in our heads. There is absolutely nothing in mathematics which exists in the real universe.

There are NO points, NO lines, NO spheres, or any of the other creations of mathematics. Now we made up our mathematics largely to try and explain the universe, and mathematics does exactly describe the models which we also made up to describe the universe; but it doesn't describe the real universe; merely approximates it.

Somebody already mentioned Heisenberg who pointed out that we can never know everything about even the simplest physical system; a single particle. We can't observe its present state completely, and hence we can't predict its future state either. Even as simple a dynamic problem as the general problem of three bodies in relative motion under the laws of physics. Even within the limitations of Newtonian physics no general solution exists, although special case solutions are known; in particular three bodies moving in a plane at the vertices of an equilateral triangle. The 'Trojan' asteroids which group along the orbit of Jupiter, sixty degrees ahead and 60 degrees behind the planet are examples of stable three body trajectories (including the sun).

The failure of our analysis is more substantial than even Heisenberg since Kurt Godel showed that certain postulates are quite undecidable anyway. Mathematical systems which are completely consistent within their own rules evidently don't exist.

There is an even bigger issue than the accuracy of our 'physical' models of reality. In the real world we observe things and we measure things, and we can perform all manner of experiments and note the outcome. But that is too much stuff to note down in some 'compendium of all knowledge'. We simply can't do every possible experiment to find the outcome; so we create theories to relate experiments with similar ones and try to predict the likely outcome of even experiments no one has ever performed.
Our only interest in these theories is that they correctly predict the outcome of experiment yet to be performed. So as a practical matter we don't even care whether 'theories' are 'unique', or follow everyday common sense, or not. They survive based only on their ability to save space in our compendium by accurately predicting the outcome of an experiment.

So we have both particle and wave theories which describe elecromagnetic phenomena in two different ways and each useful in certain regimes.

So theories can be as arcane or as silly and unintuitive as we like so long as they correctly foretell the future result of an experiment.

So we need to get away from asking whether physical theories are real or not; it matters only if they correctly deduce the outcome of a real experiment which we can conduct, and if we have a half dozen different theories that describe the same set of experiments, they are all good theories, and maybe some better than others in usability.

So the universe is real, our models and theories of it are not real, and nor is the mathematics which governs the behavior of the models.

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 04:34 PM

So we need to get away from asking whether physical theories are real or not; it matters only if they correctly deduce the outcome of a real experiment which we can conduct, and if we have a half dozen different theories that describe the same set of experiments, they are all good theories, and maybe some better than others in usability.

So the universe is real, our models and theories of it are not real, and nor is the mathematics which governs the behavior of the models.

I agree that theoretical models, mathematical or any other sort, are not the reality they represent. Since this debate has primarily become whether there's enough evidence to prove existence is the result of only physical processes/laws, it seems you are agreeing with those who say we can't yet prove everything can be "reduced to pure physics."

Doctordick

Dec6-04, 09:18 PM

Hi Les,

No, I don't mind you mixing up the order of things at all. I am gone but I had access to the web tonight and thought I might look at the thread. Actually I was quite surprised by the activity here. I thought maybe a quick response was called for (for the next four days, I doubt I will have any access to the net at all).
A theory, no matter how brilliant, is not a proof unless we can observe all relevant aspects. It might be that the title of this thread gave you the impression that a plausible explanation would do; but I think everyone agreed early on that we were debating if physicalists could prove all existence was strictly physical since we already know there are plenty of theories (i.e., “explanations”) floating around.I have no argument with you here. On the other hand, I do not mean merely a logical explanation. I have a very logical proof (at least no one has yet pointed out a flaw) of a subtle relation inherent in any examination of anything (insofar as that examination is to produce an explanation of something). My post seems ambiguous because removing the ambiguities is not an easy process.

The proof amounts to a demonstration that absolutely any explanation of anything in any subject can be mapped into the consequences of a "physical process". If my proof is correct, since I can explicitly show the mapping of a perfectly general explanation into physics terms, it follows directly that all explanations can be mapped into physics terms.
That’s a satisfactory definition of an explanation.Thank you! What that does is provide me with a starting position. Now that I know exactly what an explanation is, I can present an abstract model of an explanation which is applicable to any explanation conceivable.
Well, that’s what this debate is about. If you mean that life and consciousness, for example, have physical aspects to them, I don’t think anyone would disagree with that. But if you mean every aspect of life and consciousness can be accounted for with physical processes alone, then I do dispute that.I think I can prove exactly that (or rather, if they cannot, they cannot be explained by any process)! Now the arguments are subtle; but I hold that they are exact.

With regard to Chalmer's work (I believe I have read the paper you refer to), I had considerable exchange with Chalmer a number of years ago and he simply refused to look at my work under the personal conviction that what I said I could do could not be done.
Why would you assume my position is intuitive?This is an entirely different subject and I would love to discuss the impact of intuition on ones thoughts. But, let's do that at some later date. I respect you as a careful thinker and I did not mean to be at all disrespectful.
Are you certain you’ve open-mindedly examined every facet of existence? Or have you looked primarily at physical factors?I have a Ph.D. in theoretical physics and the main reason I did not pursue a profession in the field is that I disagreed with the philosophical basis of the physicists beliefs. Physicists are not near the gods of rational thought they would have you think.
Why should I care, or resist, what the truth is?Because it is hard to believe! Try explaining statistical analysis to an astrologer. Do you realize that professional astrologers still make good livings, thousands of years after it is well shown to be of no predictive value? People stick to their beliefs very strongly.
I think physicalist theory currently lacks a couple of facts it needs to make sense. :rolleyes: I thought I detected that tone in your initial post, but if I am wrong you have my apologies.You owe me no apologies. I have no knowledge of your education. A bit of familiarity with partial differential equations would be nice.

I will be back in five days and look forward to further discussion. I would just like to get some of the parameters of the discussion a little more refined before tripping off to the light fantastic.

Have fun -- Dick

Les Sleeth

Dec6-04, 10:22 PM

The proof amounts to a demonstration that absolutely any explanation of anything in any subject can be mapped into the consequences of a "physical process". If my proof is correct, since I can explicitly show the mapping of a perfectly general explanation into physics terms, it follows directly that all explanations can be mapped into physics terms.

I sort of feel sorry for you if you want to convince me a logical proof is really a proof. I am working on a thread idea now I probably will call "Radical Experientialism." In it I will state my own standard for proof which is only one thing . . . experience. I can not accept inference or logic, no matter how well supported by evidence, as proof. The only thing that convinces me to the level of proof is if something claimed to be true can be personally experienced.

If you hadn't put the word "proof" in there, I'd be more open to hearing a new epistomological theory. But once you claim you can achieve a proof, like a bulldog I clamp down on the experience requirement and won't let go until you make your hypothesis observable, or admit you can't do it. :smile:

Taoist

Dec7-04, 09:29 AM

Taoist

Dec7-04, 10:06 AM

Les you stated

"In it I state my own standard for proof which is one, and only one, thing . . . experience. I do not accept inference, no matter how well supported by evidence, as proof. I do not accept logic, no matter how brilliant, as proof. The ONLY thing I accept as proof is if something claimed to be true can be personally experienced."

This is your limiting factor. Explain deja vu; it cannot be explained yet you and every human alive has experienced it.

This is just one of the "proofs" that has made the path of mathematical explanations fall short of completing the equation. There is no way of bringing all of the variables into a "simple equation" as Einstein or Hawkins let alone the world is looking for.

As far fetched and all encumbering as it reflects it also brings into play another fact; every particle that is has always been and every bit of energy affects every other.

These are proven facts but not very well comprehended especially knowing that we are mere specs in the scope of the known universe. So probabilities have been the norm in explanations as quantum mechanics tends to address for our limited resources. We work from probabilities in which a variant is sought versus a specific answer.

So can we explain the universe in pure mathmatics? Not with today's availability of the known variables BUT the answer can be realized with further understanding or theological diciplines.

As strange as it is that spot in between conscious thought and intuition is where the answers appear but good luck putting an equation to it. I have tried for over 25 years. Unable to do so but look at the work of Einstein and Tesla, not the published abstracts but the quotes taken. They knew the same thing I state but are not willing to stake a reputation on it.

These 2 example have given more to us than is available to the general public. In fact go into Tesla's work and you would find he was far ahead of even Einstein in using his intellect for mankind.

locate the plans on the stagmatic generator and cure the need for nuclear power ....... a prime example of using intuitive understanding in practicle application and even now since it cannot be broken down it will continue to be surpressed.

Taoist

Dec7-04, 10:24 AM

Finally look at the pole.... it appears the majority agrees with me. Multi-disciplinary efforts will offer the best explanation.

I have always believed true mathematicians are the thoroughbred's of intellectual reasoning with blinders on. They just cannot allow theological views to the table.

A loss to us all!

hypnagogue

Dec7-04, 11:57 AM

Hypnagogue

Thanks for all the stuff on Rosenberg. I think you ought to write a book explaining his. I attempted his (its downloadable as a pdf for anyone who wants to check it out) but after about a third of the way I lost track of what he was talking about and skimmed the rest. I instinctively liked his approach to causation, a topic that IMO physicists have not yet addressed properly, but in the end I didn't understand it. Is he proposing microphenominalism? It seems like it, but I'm very confused as to what he is really saying. I don't think my brain is quite up to understanding his arguments, which to me seem gratuitously complex. (I felt he had modelled it on Hofstedters GEB, which I felt also buried the key issues under the details). I wouldn't criticise it though, not without reading it again a few times.

Yes, it can get difficult at times, but I'm glad you were interested and gave it a shot. If you're still interested in exploring his ideas more thoroughly, please see http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=55766 and post your thoughts there.

What are the metaphysical consequences of his ideas? That is, what do they suggest for cosmogeny and the ontology of matter and consciousness?

In brief, Rosenberg suggests that something like consciousness is the fundamental kind of 'stuff' that exists in the universe. The rich network of relationships described by physical theory is nothing more than the system of relationships that this underlying 'stuff' engages in. So physicalism is essentially characterized as a kind of functionalism, describing a purely abstract network of relationships but not mentioning that which instantiates those relationships. Rosenberg motivates the case for something like consciousness being that phenomenon which actually carries out and realizes the abstract system of relationships described by physics.

With respect to cosmogeny, Rosenberg toys with the idea of using his theory of causation to construct a background-independent spacetime. That is, he sketches some ideas of how causal relationships could account for the kind of structures we see in space and time. Traditionally, we see causation as taking place in and being conditioned by spacetime, but this approach tries to turn the tables and show how spacetime is conditioned by causal relationships.

He also has a metaphysical picture which takes a realist position with respect to possibility. That is, he conceives of sets of possible states for phenomena as in some sense actually existent (as opposed to pure abstractions), and views causation merely as an operator of constraint on a given domain of possible states. So in this view, to cause something is to constrain its possible states to the extent that only one possible state/event/outcome remains. This metaphysical picture of causation and possibility winds up dovetailing very nicely with quantum physics, where we see the existence of sufficiently unconstrained systems that appear to exist in several different possible states simultaneously, until some causal mechanism winds up constraining the system to only one possible determinate state.

Seafang

Dec7-04, 12:45 PM

[QUOTE=Seafang]Well I think it is necessary to distinguish between Physics and Mathematics.
Physics is presumably the study of observable phenomena; things we can actually 'see' and 'measure'.

Mathematics on the other hand is pure fiction; we made it all up in our heads. There is absolutely nothing in mathematics which exists in the real universe.

Nice statement! Where did this come from?

Let try
phys·ics (fzks)
(Physics)
n.
1. (used with a sing. verb) The science of matter and energy and of interactions between the two, grouped in traditional fields such as acoustics, optics, mechanics, thermodynamics, and electromagnetism, as well as in modern extensions including atomic and nuclear physics, cryogenics, solid-state physics, particle physics, and plasma physics.

And Mathematics is the universal language that this thread is requesting an answer for the age old question. The problem is the variant minds who offer their interpretation; do they know enough language to address this question?

Well Taoist, I am not sure of the meaning of your question; "where did this come from ?"

I thought it came from a post I just typed in and which you cited; that is where it came from. Does 'stuff' need some annointed source before it can be understood?

As for mathematics being a "Universal Language", nothing could be further from the truth. As I said it is all fictional and we humans made it up in our head. There's nothing fundamental about it.

Anybody can invent their own mathematics merely by stating some axioms, which then become assertions of truth, and then based on that you can twiddle knobs and see where it all leads.

For example suppose I assert the following axioms:

1/ Two points define a line, which passes through the two points.

2/ Two lines define a point, which lies at the intersection of the two lines.

3/ There are at least four points.

Can I do anything mathematically interesting with that set of axioms.

Well yes I can. For a start axiom 2 establishes that this must be a two dimensional mathematics, since in ordinary Euclidean geometry, I could have two lines which lie in different planes and never intersect anywhere, but when confined to a plane, any two lines intersect as asserted by the second axiom.

What about parallel lines you might ask; they don't intersect. Well maybe they don't in Euclidean geometry, but in this mathematics they do; axiom two says so. Does that mean there are no parallel lines in this mathematics? No it doesn't ; parallel lines exist, and they do intersect, in fact parallel lines intersect at a point on 'the line at infinity'. Which is the definition of the line at infinity. so now I have removed the parallel line anomaly, but can I do anything or prove anything with thatset of axioms.

Well I can prove as the first theorem, that there are at least seven points. This comes very simply from drawing the four points which axiom 3 says exist, (I suggest an irregular quadrilateral shape) and then using axiom 1 to draw the lines that form the four sides of that polygon.

Two more lines can be drawn namely the diagonals of the quadrilateral, and you will see that three new points exist, making a total of seven.

Unfortunately, I cannot prove that there are any more points than seven, but there are at least seven points.

Sounds pretty useless doesn't it. But in fact every single theorem of Euclidean plane geometry can be rigorously proved within the confines of this decidedly non-Euclidean geometrry. There are some surprises. Circles and the conic sections ellipse, parabola and hyperbola exist, although cones don't, and most surprising; whereas in Euclidean geometry, a circle is a special case of an ellipse, that is not true in this geometry, a circle becomes a special case of a hyperbola. Even more strange is that all possible circles intersect each other, and they do so at two special points called the circular points at infinity (they lie on the line at infinity).

Ellipses don't touch the line at infinity, parabolas touch the line at infinity at two coincident points, and hyperbolas cut the line at infinity at two points. If those two points are the circular points at infinity, the hyperbola is also a circle.

Now try findng something elsewhere in the universe that corresponds even vaguely to this mathematics which somebody a long time ago, made up from those three simple axioms.

Mathematics is about as universal as the baseball world series.

Les Sleeth

Dec7-04, 01:20 PM

loseyourname

Dec8-04, 12:14 AM

Les Sleeth

Dec8-04, 06:37 PM

I am curious as to whether or not you consider indirect observation to be as epistemologically sound with respect to establishing reality-correspondence as direct experience. For instance, we cannot see black holes or electrons, but we can observe the effects of causal relationships they have with surrounding elements in any given system in which they are postulated to exist. Do you consider this proof that black holes and electrons do indeed exist?

No I do not. I will try to post a thread about this in the next week, but a short answer is, for practical purposes we have to proceed with what has been indicated is true. So I realize treat some things as proven even if they are not.

But to get precise about your examples, what would I say about having observed the effects of something theorized to be true, say a black hole, on its surroundings? I'd say that observations are consistant with the theory of a black hole, but that until we can actually observe a black hole, it is not proven. The more indirect evidence we have that supports a black hole, the stronger becomes, not a proof, but the reasonableness of an assumption.

Then you might ask, so what do those indirect observations prove? What is proven are that effects have been observed. That's it, nothing more. All else remains in the category of theory.

Taoist

Dec8-04, 09:52 PM

Well Taoist, I am not sure of the meaning of your question; "where did this come from ?"

I thought it came from a post I just typed in and which you cited; that is where it came from. Does 'stuff' need some annointed source before it can be understood?

As for mathematics being a "Universal Language", nothing could be further from the truth. As I said it is all fictional and we humans made it up in our head. There's nothing fundamental about it.

Anybody can invent their own mathematics merely by stating some axioms, which then become assertions of truth, and then based on that you can twiddle knobs and see where it all leads.

Mathematics is about as universal as the baseball world series.

There are many theorems within mathematics and many may choose what works for them but when buying a plane ticket to anywhere in the world please be sure to count your money at the appropriate exchange rate. I can assure you the index will be different but a value will be required as a universal language. :bugeye:

Taoist

Dec8-04, 10:35 PM

I haven't put any limitations on the kind of experience I will accept as real. If you told me you were going to prove deja vu or the value of intuition, then I would consider it proof if I could experience them (which I have). I am simply saying that I don't accept logic alone as proof. If you reasoned to me how deju vu makes sense, but I can't experience it myself or observe anyone else experiencing it, then I'd say deju vu might make sense as a theory but it hasn't been proven it exists.

So let’s theorize a little; the universe cannot be simply explained within physics without the intuitive side of the mind properly conditioned notwithstanding the limitations of empirical data or specific theological views in reasoning.

Using logic as a single point of an analysis is where the blinders begin to form. Having both an “intuitive” and logical experience in mental synthesis simplifies the understanding.

Factual belief in itself as seen in black and white also can be thrown off keel if any single sense is subject to an unknown interference during the experience or experiment. So let’s suppose that statements of fact are in itself subject to its exposition but further disseminated through intuitive analysis is quicker to the actuality then reason. Or simply said, “your first impression is usually the right one.”

All humans have answers within, universal as fact, yet unrealized by most simply because the articulation of the occurrences have never been truly understood or furthered in study.

Futobingoro

Dec9-04, 06:43 PM

It is the ability to describe every mathematical concept which would comprise a God.

3 Steps to Build God:
1. Count up all matter/energy and its position. (bear with me here)
2. Compile all mathematical equations that deal with the universe.
3. Enter them into one huge computer.

What this will do is that you could know what color shoes Billy Bob in a town on the other side of the world is wearing. One could find the composition of the rock in the road of Mile 16 of any highway. One could determine what someone will say and say it synchronous to their speech, and follow up with a synchronous "How did you know what I was going to say?"

That is very shallow though, that is only "graphing" the grand equation of the universe at one point.

One could take the equation backwards to learn every mystery of the universe.

In other words, you could take all your books and burn them, and then go into the computer and read them as they were in the past.

No history is gone forever, because if we work hard enough, we can find the missing level in the level-by-level structure of time. I believe Mendeleev was able to do a similar thing with elements...

Because fate only plays out one way, the equation would include itself, and could therefore go into the future.

Don't believe in fate? You are destined to believe so.

...I know that the ability to run such a program is beyond our imaginations, but isn't that the topic of this thread?

Les Sleeth

Dec9-04, 07:30 PM

It is the ability to describe every mathematical concept which would comprise a God.

3 Steps to Build God:
1. Count up all matter/energy and its position. (bear with me here)

Just a question about the first step. You can represent quantities with math, but what about qualities of existence . . . like, say, creativity? That's in the universe, so you cannot not represent it.

Then regarding "position," how do you mathematically represent the connectedness that's in between the positions? There is no possible way to give coordinates for two positions, and also not have a space in between. No matter how small you go, there is still an unrepresented space.

So, I don't see how you are going to represent everything that is present in the universe with math.

Nereid

Dec9-04, 08:14 PM

Futobingoro

Dec9-04, 08:19 PM

Point #1: Volume that has no energy or matter present in it is outside our universe.
Point #2: Positions outside our universe do not have to obey our universe's laws.
Point #3: Our universe once did not exist. (theoretically)
Point #4: Matter was sponaneously created outside our "universe", creating our universe.
Point #5: The zero dimension is a point. (Point or y=n line)
Point #6: The first dimension is a line. (Straight line relation x^1)
Point #7: The second dimension is a wireframe. (let's use a circle to represent a view of the universe) (Curved line relation x^2)
Point #8: The third dimension is a shape. (Let's use a sphere to represent a view of the universe) (Curved line relation x^3)

Intermission: The universe is expanding. To expand, the universe has to convert volume that is outside our universe and consolidate it by adding either energy or matter to it. It is my belief that the volume of the universe is what causes time, or to be more specific the rate of increase of the volume, which with a sphere whose volume can be defined as (4/3)pi*r^3 has a derivative of 4pi*r^2, which is the formula for surface area. So the formula for surface area of the universe is what defines the fourth dimension, according to my current theory.

Point #9: The fourth dimension is the surface area of the universe. (Curved line relation x^2)

Intermission: Relativity comes into play here. If our galaxy is moving at x velocity, and the universe is expanding at 1000x velocity, the velocities are in fact different. However, the volumes and surface areas of the "spheres" encompassed by the "radii" always have the same ratio. Therefore as long as we neither accelerate nor decelerate on our "radius", our ratio of relativity of the expansion of the universe is always the same, giving us a 1:1 time ratio.

Point #10: The fifth dimension is the rate of change of the rate of change of the volume of the universe (acceleration). (Straight line relation x^1)
Point #11: The sixth/zero dimension is the jerk of the volume of the universe. (Point or y=n line)

So what might time be then? How about the circular passage of matter/energy through all seven dimensions? ...Or the relativity ratio to the surface area of the universe?

I know that theories are just that: theories. I also know that everyone (including me) can be wrong. I posted this to see what your opinion is on this theory.

Taoist

Dec10-04, 01:18 PM

Futobingoro, it works fine on a chalk board or if you were holding the universe in your hand but you left yourself out.

First “outside our universe” must be addressed if so identified, place a value!
Second, all positions must apply, including the observation platform.
Third, existence in itself theoretically is but also becomes its ending.
Fourth, Point 3 and 4 are a big question which continues to obstruct any definition unless you use a value >0 which is arbitrary. It makes it so the observer just CREATES a value.

This quote, “So the formula for surface area of the universe is what defines the fourth dimension, according to my current theory.” Which is still unaccounted for within the “First and Second” question.

This separation as if to hold the universe in your hand looses the flavor of including the observer within the result of 1. Einstein’s suggested the same point the observer is apparent and needs to be reckoned.

Time is that fourth dimension which uniformly brings each variable together at a singular point which continues to support to the “Big Bang.” Which still offers the question where did 1 evolve from? Again a value that is still equals greater then 0.

Biblically we are still at “in the beginning,” which suggests that the starting point began at a creation! An area I still cannot fathom because this still institutes an outside observation.

Time began with both poles separating from the existence of a value >0 suggests this theological beginning, which causes a reflective return to consciousness as a value to be added to any equation of any explanation.

This consciousness has been said to be the lifeblood of the creator himself but if the creator is unto itself then we are back to the outside observer ruthlessly omitted as a value. :cry:

juju

Dec10-04, 03:56 PM

Hi,

Physics alone is not enough. You must take into account the True Will of the True Self and its consciousness and awareness state.

When that is done anomalous events, magical occurances and mystical happenings can be accepted as real and transcending science.

juju

Les Sleeth

Dec10-04, 04:32 PM

Pavel

Dec11-04, 11:37 AM

In brief, Rosenberg suggests that something like consciousness is the fundamental kind of 'stuff' that exists in the universe.

I'm sorry I didn't read the whole thread, so if you already addressed this elsewhere, please ignore the question or direct me to the answer.

This is not the first time I see an explananation such as the above quote. I just read Chalmers's paper on consciousness who similarly believes it's fundamental. Chalmers very carefully danced around the metaphysics of it, in fear that he might suggest something that is not accepted in the scientific community. I'm not sure about Rosenberg's friendship with the scientific paradigm, but this is what puzzles me. Physicists don't like too many fundamentals, it creates problems. In fact, even the 4 fundamental forces of nature are being attempted to be untied at very high energies. It all has to come together at the Big Bang. With all due respect, I never see consciousness being one of those fundamentals. If you believe it's all reduced to physics and particles and forces, shouldn't you say to the physicists something like "Hey guys! wait, don't forget to incorporate another fundamental into your superforce theory" Or raise the question to the string theorists: "well, you guys did a good job explaining these fundamental particles in terms of open and closed loop strings, but you forgot to explain one more fundamental - consciousness, or perhaps you should add it to your string collection..." Am I being naive and unreasonable? I mean if you don't believe in metaphysics, shouldn't you be concerned about how your fundamental plays with other physical fundamentals? Otherwise, it's nothing else but a convenient way to explain away something you can't give a choherent explanation to - let's just make it a fundamental. Don't you think?

Thanks,

Pavel.

Les Sleeth

Dec11-04, 01:40 PM

Physicists don't like too many fundamentals, it creates problems. In fact, even the 4 fundamental forces of nature are being attempted to be untied at very high energies. It all has to come together at the Big Bang. With all due respect, I never see consciousness being one of those fundamentals. If you believe it's all reduced to physics and particles and forces, shouldn't you say to the physicists something like "Hey guys! wait, don't forget to incorporate another fundamental into your superforce theory" Or raise the question to the string theorists: "well, you guys did a good job explaining these fundamental particles in terms of open and closed loop strings, but you forgot to explain one more fundamental - consciousness, or perhaps you should add it to your string collection..." Am I being naive and unreasonable? I mean if you don't believe in metaphysics, shouldn't you be concerned about how your fundamental plays with other physical fundamentals? Otherwise, it's nothing else but a convenient way to explain away something you can't give a choherent explanation to - let's just make it a fundamental. Don't you think?

The argument is, consciousness is not explained with the current fundamentals. If it were, there would be no reason to add another.

As to why physicists don't mention "consciousness being one of those fundamentals," it's because they aren't studying consciousness, they are studying physics.

Even if consciousness is actually entwined in all physicalness, there is so much to discover about the physical aspects alone that no one has been very interested in if there is another fundamental there. Maybe in a few hundred years if physics has still been unable to explain every single thing that exists in this universe, more people will begin to wonder if there is "something more."

Pavel

Dec11-04, 03:40 PM

The argument is, consciousness is not explained with the current fundamentals. If it were, there would be no reason to add another.
I realize that, but my question is what makes you believe it's "is not explained" in a sense as there's no way to explain it, as opposed to "we don't know how". I get an impression it's the latter and making it a fundamental sounds more of an escape from having to deal with the question. If you want to prove that it's not an escape, show how your fundamental plays along with other fundamentals in the big picture, don't leave it on its own island.

As to why physicists don't mention "consciousness being one of those fundamentals," it's because they aren't studying consciousness, they are studying physics.
Well, I'm not asking physicists to study a piece of literature or compare two cultures. I'm asking them to explain a physical phenomenon - consciousness. If you don't believe there's anything beoynd physical, then you need to explain consciousness in terms of physics. I have no problem with accepting it as a fundamental as long as you explain if it's another kind of force, then how does it play with other forces, at what tempeartures, can we put it to test in the particle accelerator. If it's a matter particle, then is it a lepton, hardon .... what spin, what color, blah blah blah. If it's a third kind of fundamental, then how did it come out from the primodorial soup, when did it come into existence after the Big Bang? That would be giving an explanation for a physical phenomenon, rather than conveniently set it aside and say, well, we don't know what it is, but we're sure it's physical, let's just consider it irreducable.

Even if consciousness is actually entwined in all physicalness, there is so much to discover about the physical aspects alone that no one has been very interested in if there is another fundamental there. Maybe in a few hundred years if physics has still been unable to explain every single thing that exists in this universe, more people will begin to wonder if there is "something more."

hehe, oh I see, so now instead of expalining it away as a fundamental, we're saying we're just not interested in looking at it??? we'll get to it when we have time?? :smile:

Pavel.

Doctordick

Dec11-04, 06:17 PM

Well, there seems to be quite a little discussion going on here but little I would consider worth concerning one's self with. On the other hand, imbedded in the confused thinking are some pearls worth getting attention (things often said but little thought about).

Well I think it is necessary to distinguish between Physics and Mathematics.
Physics is presumably the study of observable phenomena; things we can actually 'see' and 'measure'.I would define physics as an attempt to understand and explain "reality".
Mathematics on the other hand is pure fiction; we made it all up in our heads. There is absolutely nothing in mathematics which exists in the real universe.Other than our ability to construct mathematical ideas. I define mathematics as the invention and study of self consistent systems.
There are NO points, NO lines, NO spheres, or any of the other creations of mathematics. Now we made up our mathematics largely to try and explain the universe, and mathematics does exactly describe the models which we also made up to describe the universe; but it doesn't describe the real universe; merely approximates it.That is a very sloppy statement, poorly thought out (though I certainly agree with the basic impact of it). Can you prove there are no points, no lines, no ... or is this merely an intuitive opinion? And, have you asked yourself the question "why" mathematics is so prevalent in the "hard sciences"?
We simply can't do every possible experiment to find the outcome; so we create theories to relate experiments with similar ones and try to predict the likely outcome of even experiments no one has ever performed.You should add "and assume that our ideas about what is going on when we are not looking are correct!"
Our only interest in these theories is that they correctly predict the outcome of experiment yet to be performed.This is exactly the first requirement of any explanation of reality. They survive based only on their ability to save space in our compendium by accurately predicting the outcome of an experiment.This is very well put, they are a sort of data compression mechanism. If we knew everything, we wouldn't need any explanations at all would we?
So we need to get away from asking whether physical theories are real or not; it matters only if they correctly deduce the outcome of a real experiment which we can conduct, and if we have a half dozen different theories that describe the same set of experiments, they are all good theories, and maybe some better than others in usability.And would you admit of the possibility of uncountable numbers of explanations not yet thought of by man?
So the universe is real, our models and theories of it are not real, and nor is the mathematics which governs the behavior of the models.In my opinion, the issue of real and imagined is a very real issue (is there a joke in there?), though there is no way to prove any imagined division.
I sort of feel sorry for you if you want to convince me a logical proof is really a proof. I am working on a thread idea now I probably will call "Radical Experientialism." In it I will state my own standard for proof which is only one thing . . . experience. I can not accept inference or logic, no matter how well supported by evidence, as proof. The only thing that convinces me to the level of proof is if something claimed to be true can be personally experienced.My understanding of what you just said is that you will accept something as a proof only if you "intuitively" feel it has been proved. Logic seems not to be an issue worth concerning yourself with. I am sorry to hear that.
I am curious as to whether or not you consider indirect observation to be as epistemologically sound with respect to establishing reality-correspondence as direct experience.You should spend a little time thinking about "direct" observation. I presume you are reading this on a screen of a monitor. Now, even by your accepted mental model of reality that image you are reading is an illusion created by your brain. The actual fact (in your mental model at least) is that photons emitted by the screen impinge on the rods and cones in your retina causing nerves to send signals to your brain. Yet I know of no one who can actually perceive those nerve impulses themselves. It follows that the nerve impulses are indirect observation: i.e., their existence is logically deduced from other observations. Now, the image of the screen itself is most certainly an illusion so that observation can not be described as "direct".

Another example of the same thing arises from amputations. Would anyone here hold that a perfectly consistent illusion is any less an illusion? I personally posses an amputated digit: the index finger on my right hand. In place of that finger, I possess what is normally called a phantom finger. I can straighten it out, I can curl it up; I can even occasionally feel pangs of pain. I know it is a phantom because I can not see it and I can not feel physical objects with it. None the less, the illusion that it exists (when I am not looking at it) is quite overwhelming. When I try to touch something, the illusion is that the object has a hole which allows my finger to penetrate without touching anything (the edge of the hole is clearly perceived by what remains of the stump). Now my question is, was that index finger any less of an illusion when it was totally consistent with my mental image of reality? Is touching really a direct measurement or a mentally created illusion?
Then you might ask, so what do those indirect observations prove? What is proven are that effects have been observed. That's it, nothing more. All else remains in the category of theory.What is proved is that what is observed is real or, if not real, a rather internally consistent illusion? Anyone who thinks there exists a mechanism to differentiate between reality and illusion just hasn't thought the issue through. The only fact that differentiates between them is that reality cannot change from one valid (by valid I mean 100% internally consistent) mental image to another. Those aspects which change from one valid mental image to another are illusions which are part and parcel of the mental image.
Using logic as a single point of an analysis is where the blinders begin to form.No, I would say the blinders come on the moment you accept your intuitive mental model of reality to be correct.
All humans have answers within, universal as fact, yet unrealized by most simply because the articulation of the occurrences have never been truly understood or furthered in study.I would rather suggest that all human beings have an intuitive mental image of reality which is quite consistent with their anthropomorphic experiences. It's a very internally consistent image.
Just a question about the first step. You can represent quantities with math, but what about qualities of existence . . . like, say, creativity? That's in the universe, so you cannot not represent it.Sorry Les, but you just represented it via the symbol "creativity". And, if questioned about what you mean by that symbol, I am sure you will supply me with more symbols (a discussion so to speak). Just because the process is complex does not mean it cannot occur.
Then regarding "position," how do you mathematically represent the connectedness that's in between the positions? There is no possible way to give coordinates for two positions, and also not have a space in between. No matter how small you go, there is still an unrepresented space.Now here you are complaining about internal consistentcy of your personal mental image of reality.
So, I don't see how you are going to represent everything that is present in the universe with math.That's because you lack imagination. Just because you can't do does not qualify as a proof that it cannot be done.

Think a little about my comments!

Have fun -- Dick

Les Sleeth

Dec11-04, 06:29 PM

I realize that, but my question is what makes you believe it's "is not explained" in a sense as there's no way to explain it, as opposed to "we don't know how". I get an impression it's the latter and making it a fundamental sounds more of an escape from having to deal with the question.

I did not mean to imply there will never be a physical way to explain consciousness. I am only saying there is no way to physically account for it now.

If you want to prove that it's not an escape, show how your fundamental plays along with other fundamentals in the big picture, don't leave it on its own island.

Nope. This isn't my thread. I have been arguing that everything cannot currently be reduced to pure physics. If I want to do what you say, then I'll start my own thread. . . . maybe something like this?

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=30762

. . . if it's another kind of force, then how does it play with other forces, at what tempeartures, can we put it to test in the particle accelerator. If it's a matter particle, then is it a lepton, hardon .... what spin, what color, blah blah blah. If it's a third kind of fundamental, then how did it come out from the primodorial soup, when did it come into existence after the Big Bang? That would be giving an explanation for a physical phenomenon, rather than conveniently set it aside and say, well, we don't know what it is, but we're sure it's physical, let's just consider it irreducable.

I never said it was physical, or a physical force. I just meant it was fundamental to the universe. Personally I don't think it fits the definition of physical.

hehe, oh I see, so now instead of expalining it away as a fundamental, we're saying we're just not interested in looking at it??? we'll get to it when we have time?? :smile:

Not me. I am saying that physical scientists are trained to look at just the physical. Some of them think everything that exists, and that includes consciousness, can be explained with physical principles. For the most part, they are not even looking at the question of consciousness. Take a look at where all the progress is being made in physics, and it has nothing to do with consciousness studies.

My point was, if those who think that everything can be explained with physical principles fail to do so, maybe one day they will look for something else to help them explain unexplained aspects of the universe.

Pavel

Dec11-04, 08:50 PM

Nope. This isn't my thread. I have been arguing that everything cannot currently be reduced to pure physics. If I want to do what you say, then I'll start my own thread. . . . maybe something like this?

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=30762

Thanks, looks like a serious paper by you Les, I'll definitely check it out.

Not me. I am saying that physical scientists are trained to look at just the physical. Some of them think everything that exists, and that includes consciousness, can be explained with physical principles. For the most part, they are not even looking at the question of consciousness. Take a look at where all the progress is being made in physics, and it has nothing to do with consciousness studies.

So, those "some" are trained to look at the physical, they believe consciousness is physical, but they're not looking at it because their focus is on something else. That all makes sense to me but I don't believe that's the case. Think about it. You're struggling hard to come up with a unified theory, trying to make QM and GR play together, unite all the forces, explain the very first moments after the Big Bang and you run into problems. So, here you have another fundamental sitting and you say "nah... I'll get to it some time later..." So, you either do not consider consciousness to be fundamental and you think it won't help you unite all the forces, or you pretend to believe it's fundamental because you can't explain it, and that's why you don't want to focus on it at this time because you know it's not going to help you. You know I have no problem with them coming out and say "we don't think it's fundamental, but we believe it's physical, we just can't explain it, but we'll get to it some time". Clear and reasonable. But I got an impression that writers, like Chalmers, claim they can explain it, but they don't want to be considered potheads by the scientists for suggesting something that can be metaphysical. So what do they do? They make consciousnes an irreducable physcial fundamental. In fact, CHalmers compared this fundamental of consciousness to an electromagnetic force, another fundamental. But we all know that scientists try to explain the EM force as united with the Weak force at certain energies, making it "electroweak force", and then, even at higher energies, make it one with the Strong force... you get the point. So, if you want to make it a fundamental in the physical world, suggest a way of incorporating it with other fundamentals. Otherwise, let's not pretend; let's call things their proper names. :smile:

Pavel.

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 10:11 AM

But I got an impression that writers, like Chalmers, claim they can explain it, but they don't want to be considered potheads by the scientists for suggesting something that can be metaphysical. So what do they do? They make consciousnes an irreducable physcial fundamental. In fact, CHalmers compared this fundamental of consciousness to an electromagnetic force, another fundamental. But we all know that scientists try to explain the EM force as united with the Weak force at certain energies, making it "electroweak force", and then, even at higher energies, make it one with the Strong force... you get the point. So, if you want to make it a fundamental in the physical world, suggest a way of incorporating it with other fundamentals. Otherwise, let's not pretend; let's call things their proper names.

I can't speak for Chalmers, but here's my little story.

I don't think consciousness is fundamental the same way the physical forces are. To use an analogy, let's say right now you picture a woman in your mind who is the ideal of feminine beauty for you. Let's also say, to simply this analogy, that we agree the composition of the image you create is photons. Now, if the image is photons, and if we can explain the nature of photons and the relatonships between them all, have we fully explained your image? No we haven't because we have not explained how those photons got organized into the shape of a woman.

Simiilarly, when I use the word "fundamental" I am using its general definition, which is simply to say something is basic. Now, fundamental can also mean indispensible, and so is consciousness necessary to explain creation?

What's interesting to me is how when physicalists can explain the structure or functioning of things, we think we're done. But we have huge mysteries outside our structural discoveries. What established that overall structure and functionality in the first place (i.e. like gravity, the balance of forces in the atom, the constancy of physical laws, etc.)? And then, what is all that stuff made out of (don't say energy because then I'll want you to show it to me), and where did the stuff of creation all come from?

There are more mysteries. In the case of life and consciousness (and this is more related to the "image" analogy above), what caused the quality of organization that led to living systems? So physicalists think that because after putting a few chemicals in a jar and running electricity through it amino acids formed, that's really significant evidence that chemistry and physical processes could have self-organized themselves into a living system. To that I enjoy saying "hogwash." :biggrin:

They have never, not once, got any chemistry to keep self organizing in such a way that it would lead to systems. To ignore the incredibly physically atypical quality of organization found in life by pointing to the Miller-Urey experiment amounts to a red herring. The chemists and the computer programmers who have such faith in their physicalist metaphysics have yet to demonstrate any self-organizing capacity in physical processes that doesn't turn repetitive when left on its own.

So to me, the idea of consciousness being fundamental isn't like a fundamental physical "force." Instead I see it more as organizing guidance, guidance that led evolution toward the development of a central nervous system, which in turn allowed that organizing guidance to emerge through the CNS to be what its nature is: consciousness.

The End. :smile:

Nereid

Dec12-04, 11:35 AM

First, I don't know if these 11 points are a chain - break one link and the whole thing falls apart - or 11 motes floating in a sea of discussion looking for someone to examine their mtDNA and establish a relationship.

Let's take a cursory glance at each in turn.Point #1: Volume that has no energy or matter present in it is outside our universe.Maybe, maybe not; perhaps such volumes have no existence outside the creativity of certain philosophers and mathematicians? After all, I can conjure up a dozen wholly imaginary things; and writers through the ages - SF ones included - have surely done a far better job than I. :cry: Can you give us any reasons Futobobingoro as to why such volume may have a 'physical' existence?Point #2: Positions outside our universe do not have to obey our universe's laws.Presumably I can infer from this that outside our universe 'positions' do not exist; those things we call 'positions' are 'only' constructs of beings who have a physical reality in our universe. Indeed, once you open the box called 'do not have to obey our universe's laws', how can you have a discussion? on any topic? Certainly one here in Philosophy PF would be trivially narrow - we insist upon 'logic', whose 'laws' may not exist outside 'our universe'. Or have I misunderstood?Point #3: Our universe once did not exist. (theoretically)Hmm, if 'once' has something to do with time, then if GR describes the universe (and we know it may not, in the first Planck 'second'), then time began with the Big Bang. If we broaden our 'theoretical' horizons, there are lots of theories in which the universe had no beginning, e.g. before the Big Bang, there was a Big Crunch (and there will be one again, some trillions of years in the future), and before that ...Point #4: Matter was sponaneously created outside our "universe", creating our universe.Maybe, maybe not; how could you tell?Point #5: The zero dimension is a point. (Point or y=n line)That sounds like a (mathematical) definition; its relevance is ... ?Point #6: The first dimension is a line. (Straight line relation x^1)
Point #7: The second dimension is a wireframe. (let's use a circle to represent a view of the universe) (Curved line relation x^2)
Point #8: The third dimension is a shape. (Let's use a sphere to represent a view of the universe) (Curved line relation x^3)seems like more definitions in math; their axiomatic bases, variations on a theme, etc have been intensely explored this last century or so; as I understand it, you can put points 6, 7, and 8 into a much more rigourous framework (but still all tied together with 'logic')Intermission: The universe is expanding. To expand, the universe has to convert volume that is outside our universe and consolidate it by adding either energy or matter to it. It is my belief that the volume of the universe is what causes time, or to be more specific the rate of increase of the volume, which with a sphere whose volume can be defined as (4/3)pi*r^3 has a derivative of 4pi*r^2, which is the formula for surface area. So the formula for surface area of the universe is what defines the fourth dimension, according to my current theory.Well, something testable! Yes, 'the universe is expanding' is not, AFAIK, inconsistent with any good observational results. However, AFAIK, there are no cosmological models (based on GR - or a variant) that include 'the universe has to convert volume that is outside our universe and consolidate it by adding either energy or matter to it' (do you know of any Futobingoro? Please give us a reference, preferably a peer-reviewed paper). Going further, can you show how your belief ('that the volume of the universe is what causes time') is consistent with GR? good observational results?Point #9: The fourth dimension is the surface area of the universe. (Curved line relation x^2)

Intermission: Relativity comes into play here. If our galaxy is moving at x velocity, and the universe is expanding at 1000x velocity, the velocities are in fact different. However, the volumes and surface areas of the "spheres" encompassed by the "radii" always have the same ratio. Therefore as long as we neither accelerate nor decelerate on our "radius", our ratio of relativity of the expansion of the universe is always the same, giving us a 1:1 time ratio.I'm not sure what to make of this; if you could point out for us how this relates to the concordance model in cosmology that might help (a good place to start might be Ned Wright's Cosmology Tutorial (http://www.astro.ucla.edu/~wright/cosmolog.htm)).

I think I'll leave it here ... IMHO, these 11 points do not make a 'theory', by any stretch of the imagination.

Nereid

Dec12-04, 11:50 AM

*SNIP

There are more mysteries. In the case of life and consciousness (and this is more related to the "image" analogy above), what caused the quality of organization that led to living systems? So physicalists think that because after putting a few chemicals in a jar and running electricity through it amino acids formed, that's really significant evidence that chemistry and physical processes could have self-organized themselves into a living system. To that I enjoy saying "hogwash." :biggrin:

They have never, not once, got any chemistry to keep self organizing in such a way that it would lead to systems. To ignore the incredibly physically atypical quality of organization found in life by pointing to the Miller-Urey experiment amounts to a red herring. The chemists and the computer programmers who have such faith in their physicalist metaphysics have yet to demonstrate any self-organizing capacity in physical processes that doesn't turn repetitive when left on its own.As regular readers will already know (Les certainly does), some other posters here have a different view on this (loseyourname, for example, has several excellent posts on this topic ... well, I think they're excellent, I'm not sure Les would fully agree :biggrin:). However, I've long thought that us 'physicalists' would take at least another century to be able to begin to meet Les' challenge (make life in a testube; OK, that's a crude simplification).

Well, it seems things have been moving along faster than I'd imagined - see the Can scientists 'create' life yet? (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=55818) thread over in Biology to get some idea of progress on mixing some chemicals to make a living bacterium :smile:

(For avoidance of doubt, this does NOT say anything (much) about abiogenesis - how life ACTUALLY got started here on Earth (or on Mars, or on some nameless, unknown, possibly long gone planet somewhere else in the universe (and came to Earth in an interstellar meteorite))).

Les Sleeth

Dec12-04, 02:45 PM

As regular readers will already know (Les certainly does), some other posters here have a different view on this (loseyourname, for example, has several excellent posts on this topic ... well, I think they're excellent, I'm not sure Les would fully agree :biggrin:). However, I've long thought that us 'physicalists' would take at least another century to be able to begin to meet Les' challenge (make life in a testube; OK, that's a crude simplification).

Well, it seems things have been moving along faster than I'd imagined - see the Can scientists 'create' life yet? (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=55818) thread over in Biology to get some idea of progress on mixing some chemicals to make a living bacterium :smile:

(For avoidance of doubt, this does NOT say anything (much) about abiogenesis - how life ACTUALLY got started here on Earth (or on Mars, or on some nameless, unknown, possibly long gone planet somewhere else in the universe (and came to Earth in an interstellar meteorite))).

Yep, I've been arguing the same, single point from day one. But before reiterating that, let me point out that the test for abiogenesis isn't to make "life in a testube," as you say. If substantial conscious intervention is required to make that life happen, it only demonstrates life can be brought about through a combination of chemistry and conscious intervention unless the intervention is of the sort that we can expect to occur naturally through chemistry somewhere.

In that thread you referenced SelfAdjoint expresses the common physicalist view: "It's just a claim of ignorance that if scientists can't yet duplicate the complicated chemistry of life that therefore life requires a divine act to generate it. If you study what is really known about that chemistry you come away with a repect for how intricate it is, and a clear understanding that it is, at bottom, just chemistry."

Very rarely does anyone actually answer my only reason for doubting abiogenesis (not that SelfAdjoint was talking to me). In another thread I pointed out that the type of argument he is using is a "compositional fallacy," or argument that assumes what is true of each part of a whole, is also true of the whole itself.

He is absolutely correct about life's composition, but that isn't all there is to life. What he nor anyone else can explain, nor does anyone seem to want to acknowledge the significance of, is the organizational quality of life which physicalists expect us to believe was achieved by chemistry itself.

Now, if you as consciousness take various parts of a cell, synthesize others, and through rather signficant conscious efforts manage to get something "living," you still haven't accounted for how chemistry got organized into the first cell. You are still missing a SELF-organization principle, which you, consciousness provided.

SelfAdjoint talks about needing something "divine," but I don't say that. I just say there is no known physical principles which can account for the organizational quality of life. How is that "a claim of ignorance"?

However, there is something that resembles the missing organizational trait, and that is consciousness. Is it just a coincidence that on top of the several billion years of evolution sits human consciousness? Might not what we call "consciousnss" be an organizating force that has been part of the development of life all along, providing that organization quality, and finally emerging through the CNS?

Since we can observe consciousness, I am not introducing a new component; and since we do not have any way to explain life's organization, we need an explanation. I am just pointing to the most obvious candidate. It's the physicalists who believe in some unknown, unseen, imaginary self-organizing potential of physicalness (but I won't label it "a claim of ignorance"). :smile:

RingoKid

Dec12-04, 04:39 PM

stunning Les...

I was thinking the same thing last night without ever having read any of this thread except your last post just now...

consciousness is a self organizing principle that wills entities into life to serve its own purpose and that is to evolve the entity to a point where it can understand consciousness in its own realm...

...and yes i was licking the chalice while thinking it

Futobingoro

Dec12-04, 08:06 PM

Not that I want to derail this thread, but I believe I have some questions to answer.

The point of relativity for that theory would be the only stationary point: the center of the "big bang," which may or may not be the center of the universe.

As to the statement I made about "outside" the universe, it can be summarized as follows: "Volume outside the universe must not be connected to our universe by way of energy or matter. Volume outside our universe is outside our universe and is therefore outside our universe. Volume outside our universe is not obligated to follow the laws of our universe. It might be able to produce matter spontaneously, but if you ask "Why does not it do that all the time?" you are trying to add temporal sequence to what might be a completely spontaneous process.]

Attempts to explain the universe always raise more questions than they answer but:

To provide balance, doesn't every dimension need a counter-dimension? Some kind of inverse?

RingoKid

Dec12-04, 11:23 PM

loop gravitists would have the big bang as an everse, a mirror image forced through the point of a big bang and reversing left to right as opposed to an inverse which is to say turned inside out rather than upside down...

white hole theory, where on the other side of a black hole sucking in matter in our universe is a white hole pushing out matter into another...

welcome to the baby universe factory which accounts for a multiverse scenario in LQG and conveniently eliminates the singularity until you ask for a first cause

Nereid

Dec14-04, 08:18 AM

Yep, I've been arguing the same, single point from day one. But before reiterating that, let me point out that the test for abiogenesis isn't to make "life in a testube," as you say. If substantial conscious intervention is required to make that life happen, it only demonstrates life can be brought about through a combination of chemistry and conscious intervention unless the intervention is of the sort that we can expect to occur naturally through chemistry somewhere.

In that thread you referenced SelfAdjoint expresses the common physicalist view: "It's just a claim of ignorance that if scientists can't yet duplicate the complicated chemistry of life that therefore life requires a divine act to generate it. If you study what is really known about that chemistry you come away with a repect for how intricate it is, and a clear understanding that it is, at bottom, just chemistry."

Very rarely does anyone actually answer my only reason for doubting abiogenesis (not that SelfAdjoint was talking to me). In another thread I pointed out that the type of argument he is using is a "compositional fallacy," or argument that assumes what is true of each part of a whole, is also true of the whole itself.

He is absolutely correct about life's composition, but that isn't all there is to life. What he nor anyone else can explain, nor does anyone seem to want to acknowledge the significance of, is the organizational quality of life which physicalists expect us to believe was achieved by chemistry itself.

Now, if you as consciousness take various parts of a cell, synthesize others, and through rather signficant conscious efforts manage to get something "living," you still haven't accounted for how chemistry got organized into the first cell. You are still missing a SELF-organization principle, which you, consciousness provided.

SelfAdjoint talks about needing something "divine," but I don't say that. I just say there is no known physical principles which can account for the organizational quality of life. How is that "a claim of ignorance"?

However, there is something that resembles the missing organizational trait, and that is consciousness. Is it just a coincidence that on top of the several billion years of evolution sits human consciousness? Might not what we call "consciousnss" be an organizating force that has been part of the development of life all along, providing that organization quality, and finally emerging through the CNS?

Since we can observe consciousness, I am not introducing a new component; and since we do not have any way to explain life's organization, we need an explanation. I am just pointing to the most obvious candidate. It's the physicalists who believe in some unknown, unseen, imaginary self-organizing potential of physicalness (but I won't label it "a claim of ignorance"). :smile:Distilled clarity, just what we expect from, and love about, you Les!

At a leisurely pace - perhaps in a different thread - it might be interesting to discuss what you would accept as a convincing demonstration of abiogenesis - surely whatever Venter manages to produce, abiogenesis it will not be! I suspect that it would be far more than just a stunning demonstration that 'chemistry rules, OK?'

Maybe we could so the same thing re the third area (I'd forgotten that you also had doubts about a physicalist approach to the origin of the universe)?

At the risk of boring everyone by repetition, I don't expect two of Les' trio to be well addressed in my lifetime (abiogenesis and the hard problem of consciousness) - baring an unexpected breakthrough or three; re the origin of the universe, well, I'm more hopeful (of course, if it turns out we live in a multiverse, or some kind of cyclical universe, then resolution of 'the ultimate origin' will again recede from the physicalists' agenda - for a century or millenium or more).

Nereid

Dec14-04, 08:21 AM

To provide balance, doesn't every dimension need a counter-dimension? Some kind of inverse?Why? To satisfy some personal feeling? or to account for a body of good experimental or observational results?

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 10:25 AM

Distilled clarity, just what we expect from, and love about, you Les!

When my wife read "distilled clarity," she said "Nereid thinks you wrote it drunk." I can't get no respect :cry: (hey, maybe that's why they won't give me the Philosophy medal . . . naaaaa, somebody up there doesn't like me :frown:).

At a leisurely pace - perhaps in a different thread - it might be interesting to discuss what you would accept as a convincing demonstration of abiogenesis . . . Maybe we could so the same thing re the third area (I'd forgotten that you also had doubts about a physicalist approach to the origin of the universe).

That sounds like fun. In terms of the third area (how the Big Bang came about), the only thing I tend to say is that all the explanations are overly speculative and don't make sense to me. I don't have any reason to question the Big Bang itself. Probably the biggest doubt I have is due to the lack of any basic "stuff" of existence in the physicalist model. It's like, we have all this matter, we say it can all be converted to energy, and then . . . what the heck is energy? No existential qualities, it just "does things," so basically we are left with a universe that has no actual foundation.

I think it makes more sense to say there is some basic, existential "stuff" that is too subtle to detect, of which all matter and structure is made. I don't think the idea is popular because such existential stuff would have no structure, and therefore would not be something that could be empirically studied.

You know, my anti-physicalist arguments aren't from hating the idea of physicalism per se. Given certain inner experiences I've had, and others in histroy have had, and what I see in creation that at least appears to behave in a non-physical manner, I honestly don't think physicalism makes sense at this time. If there were ever enough evidence to explain both my experience and the inconsistencies, then I would accept physicalism as likely true. :smile:

UltraPi1

Dec14-04, 12:02 PM

Seafang

Dec14-04, 12:15 PM

I am curious as to whether or not you consider indirect observation to be as epistemologically sound with respect to establishing reality-correspondence as direct experience. For instance, we cannot see black holes or electrons, but we can observe the effects of causal relationships they have with surrounding elements in any given system in which they are postulated to exist. Do you consider this proof that black holes and electrons do indeed exist?

Lose, you are being too restrictive in your use of the word 'see', as in "we cannot see black holes or electrons".

Well of course we can see them; at least I believe there are some astronomers or cosmologists who claim they have 'seen' black holes.

The spectrum of electromagnetic radiation for example extends from the milliHerz region to at least 10^24 Herz and one single octave of that spectrum from 375 THz to 750 THz can be 'seen' by human eyes. But the rest of that spectrum can still be 'seen' just not by human eyes.

The portion of the spectrum below that 'visible' octave can be seen by our skin, in the form of the feeling of heat.

All of it can be seen in the form of the phenomena that are the sources of that radiation. But even outside of electromagnetism, other forces manifest the existence of other things we can see.

Anything we cannot 'see' manifesting itself in some way, is not a part of the physical universe, and has no place in physics.

Seafang

Dec14-04, 12:31 PM

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 01:02 PM

Anything we cannot 'see' manifesting itself in some way, is not a part of the physical universe, and has no place in physics.

You may never surpass the major nonsense stated there. :tongue2: Are you saying that before we detected virtual particles they didn't exist? Are you arguing the existence of things are dependent on our observation of them?

There is nothing (physical) outside the universe; never has been; never will be. If 'something' (physical) existed outside the universe we would know about it, otherwise it would not exist; and if we know about it it is a part of the universe; contradicting the postulate that it was outside the universe.

You've surpassed yourself! :yuck: Talk about nonsense!!! You have no knowledge of what we don't know, and you have no knowledge of what's outside or was before the universe, or even all that is inside the universe.

Les Sleeth

Dec14-04, 01:09 PM

I'll chime in once again to say that physical reality is a misdiagnosis. All things thought to be physical, are in reality conceptual entities. That is to say that the Earth is not a physical entity, nor is any other thing that comes to mind. The universe is a purely conceptual entity completely void of physical phenomenon.

Just saying it so doesn't make it so. Nobody can even get close to discussing that proposition seriously because your can't offer evidence, it cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified. :rolleyes:

My knell is to say that this thread is a flawless example of a merry-go-round. How many times must you go round before it all looks the same? Les Sleeth knows this ride all to well. Just a suggestion - Get off the ride and explore your alternatives! Get your feet wet? Escape your time warp? Gaze in a new direction?

This is merely one direction in which to gaze. Because we discuss things on the basis of evidence and logic in a science-philosophy forum, doesn't mean people are only doing this. I might suggest you practice a little evidence plus logical reasoning yourself, because if you can't make your case to intelligent people, they aren't going to listen for long (unless you are gathering members for a cult). :wink:

Futobingoro

Dec14-04, 07:41 PM

Well I don't agree with your first premise. (point #1)

There is nothing (physical) outside the universe; never has been; never will be. If 'something' (physical) existed outside the universe we would know about it, otherwise it would not exist; and if we know about it it is a part of the universe; contradicting the postulate that it was outside the universe.

The so-called 'Big Bang', if you believe in it, did not happen at some point within the universe; the center of the universe shall we say; it happened EVERYWHERE inside the universe at the same time.

As for places that hold no energy or matter; that describes most of the universe; which by and large is simply empty 'space'. Even atoms are mostly empty space.

My first point states that points that have no matter or energy in them are outside our universe. A vacuum can still be a medium for energy, so even "empty" spaces in atoms and deeps space are still in our universe. If a space has some kind of energy passing through it or has some matter, it is within our universe. In other words, if you can see a star, you are in the universe.

You must have misread my postulates. I stated that if something is physical, it is in the universe. I also stated that if something is outside our universe, then, well, it is outside our universe. Doesn't that make sense? I also defined what "physical" is: a space filled with matter and/or energy, although "physical" does not adequately describe the latter.

If the big bang theory is true, then the universe once did not exist.

If the universe once did not exist, the big bang would have needed to have taken place outside our universe.

The result, our universe, is the result. It is convenient how now all that happens in our universe can possibly be accounted for because it is in the universe.

Most of the confusion stemming from my points is that it seems nobody thinks that there are any implications resulting from a space outside our universe becoming a space within our universe. If our universe is expanding, volume outside our universe must inevitably be "consolidated."

So most people think that there is no transition fron non-Newtonian to Newtonian?

UltraPi1

Dec15-04, 01:44 AM

Just saying it so doesn't make it so. I can equally say this if someone says that reality is physical. Nobody can even get close to discussing that proposition seriously because you can't offer evidence, it cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified. :rolleyes: The evidence is everywhere apparent. If all of reality is conceptual - How can you miss it?

What evidence is there for physical reality that can't also be explained by conceptual means?

Nereid

Dec15-04, 03:04 AM

My first point states that points that have no matter or energy in them are outside our universe.What leads you to think such points have any existence (outside your - or my - imagination)?You must have misread my postulates. I stated that if something is physical, it is in the universe. I also stated that if something is outside our universe, then, well, it is outside our universe. Doesn't that make sense? I also defined what "physical" is: a space filled with matter and/or energy, although "physical" does not adequately describe the latter.So how can we tell if 'something' is 'a space'? whether it is 'filled with matter and/or energy"? Surely all three terms are 'just' convenient shorthands within certain models of reality constructed by a minor carbon-based lifeform which has been living on a minor planet for a trivially short period of time?If the big bang theory is true, then the universe once did not exist.

If the universe once did not exist, the big bang would have needed to have taken place outside our universe.Perhaps you could take another look at the Big Bang theory? The common words in English (and no doubt other languages) - 'once', 'exist', 'take place', 'outside' - may be leading you to make statements that are somewhat at odds with the theory.Most of the confusion stemming from my points is that it seems nobody thinks that there are any implications resulting from a space outside our universe becoming a space within our universe. If our universe is expanding, volume outside our universe must inevitably be "consolidated."I'd rather put it that these ideas are a) not at all self-evident, b) inconsistent with GR, and c) insufficient to constitute an alternative cosmological theory (to one built from GR).So most people think that there is no transition fron non-Newtonian to Newtonian?What does this mean? :confused:

Canute

Dec15-04, 08:09 AM

By Seafang: There is nothing (physical) outside the universe; never has been; never will be. If 'something' (physical) existed outside the universe we would know about it, otherwise it would not exist; and if we know about it it is a part of the universe; contradicting the postulate that it was outside the universe.

Les's reply: You've surpassed yourself! Talk about nonsense!!! You have no knowledge of what we don't know, and you have no knowledge of what's outside or was before the universe, or even all that is inside the universe
Les - are you sure about your reply here? I see why you said what you did, but what Seafang says is what Buddhists and Taoists say, what I believe, and what I thought you believed also. Perhaps I've misunderstood your position. Do you not agree that what is outside the world of appearances neither exists nor not-exists?

Les Sleeth

Dec15-04, 10:44 AM

Les - are you sure about your reply here? I see why you said what you did, but what Seafang says is what Buddhists and Taoists say, what I believe, and what I thought you believed also. Perhaps I've misunderstood your position. Do you not agree that what is outside the world of appearances neither exists nor not-exists?

My objection is to stating something is true when there is no possible way to know, and to also claim that if something exists we would know it. In terms of being something outside the universe which is physical, there could be, for instance, another physical universe a zillion miles from ours. What prohibits that? And if there is, whether we observe it or not has no bearing on if it exists -- that in particular is hugely nonsensical (i.e., to insist if something exists we would know it).

Regarding the Buddhist concept of appearances, that again is an entirely different subject, in my opinion. I don't think it has anything to do with what actually exists or doesn't outside oneself. It has to do with how consciousness relates to what's outside oneself in the practices involved in working toward enlightenment.

Once I got involved in a debate with some meditators about the Indian concept of Maya. They claimed it meant the world of appearances is an illusion. I said no, the world of appearances are real; the illusion is how consciousness views the world of appearances.

Part of the concept derives from the inner understanding that the world of appearances are temporary, and in the case of social appearances, often arbitrary since they are created by humans. But a person being taught the methods of enlightenment is being directed toward what is permanent, lasting. My point to my friends was, it isn’t that external reality isn’t there, its that relating to it as though it is the most important thing that’s the illusion. It is thinking lasting happiness can be found there, and not realizing attachment to the ups and downs of appearances creates that desire which leads to suffering.

In terms of the conscious practice, it is a way of saying don’t get caught up in appearances, either believing in them or disbelieving in them. The entire issue is irrelevant to what the person learning to turn inward needs, and so can be nothing but an distraction. But that practice is entirely different from the world of appearances actually exist.

Quoting the Buddha himself, “Material shape and the other [externals] are impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering . . .” The Buddha taught followers to understand that, “This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self, so that when the material shape and so on change and become otherwise, there arise not for him grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair.” In contrast to that Buddha prescribed something which will not leave us at the mercy of change by saying, “There is, monks, that plane where there is neither extension nor motion. . . there is no coming or going or remaining or deceasing or uprising. . . . There is, monks, an unborn, not become, not made, uncompounded . . . [and] because [that exists] . . . an escape can be shown for what is born, has become, is made, is compounded.”

I’m sure you are familiar with Kabir. Something he said that I like is, “I always laugh when I think of fish in the ocean getting thirsty.” Another very old Indian allegory is that of the musk deer searching everywhere for the source of its own scent. To me that describes how we search through the clutter of creation for the contentment we carry around inside us all the time, and what the teaching about appearances mostly concerns.

Philocrat

Dec15-04, 10:07 PM

Well, that's a comment I've not heard in a long while! Thank you very much.
Perhaps one might propose a new name for "the hard science study of fundamentals" since, as I said, "the current state of physics has become rather senile in many respects". I would call the field "metaphysics" except for the fact that metaphysics has already established itself as a "soft science". How about "HARD" metaphysics?
I have spent today reading the entire thread (Oh, I have just perused a great number of posts). Les seems to be a rational person but I like things more exactly defined then he requires. For example:
I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. A good explanation is one where the expectations are consistent with observations (and "observations" are additions to that "known information"). Anyone, let me know if you find fault with that definition!
I agree 100% and wish I could find one. I have never met such a person in my life; at least not one with an education. Education tends to stifle such proclivities. I also suspect Les would baulk at living up to it.

On the "hard problem of consciousness", I think we need an exact definition of what one means by "consciousness". I have my idea but I suspect most here would baulk at using it. (I have not examined hypnogogue's refrence!)
Before one can wonder seriously, one needs to know exactly what you are talking about: define "consciousness".
And I wouldn't expect you be interested if I could not do what I say.
That's what I offered to do isn't it? However, the proof is not trivial and it requires some serious thought. Are you really ready?
Well now, I certainly am confident that I can demonstrate a "valid logical argument"! If that is grounds for dismissal then your idea of hard science and mine seem to be quite far apart.
What you seem to be saying here is that you need your intuitive position on what's right to yield the result or you won't accept it. One would conclude that you certainly are not a person "determined to find and accept the truth no matter what it may be, and who in pursuit of the truth is willing to investigate every facet of existence."

The requirement you state is not the one I claimed to be able to perform. I claim to have discovered a solution to a very specific problem: the problem of explanation itself. If you are willing to accept my definition of "an explanation", then I can show you how to construct an absolutely general "mechanical" model of any possible explanation of anything.

Unless there is an error in my construction procedure, there exists no explanation of anything which can not be mapped into the "mechanical" solutions of that model. The conclusion is that "hard science" is applicable to any problem, philosophical or otherwise. It is the nature of explanation itself.

I am looking for someone who, "in pursuit of the truth", "is willing to investigate every facet of existence, again, no matter what it may be".

I'll be out of town for a week so think about the issue a little before you comment. Again, I define an explanation to be a description of the procedure for obtaining expectations of unknown information from given known information. If you don't like my definition, please give me an example of an explanation which provides nothing regarding your expectations. Or one which provides something which cannot be interpreted as saying something about your expectations.

Have fun guys -- Dick

And consequently, when NEW information is added to the knowledge base, fundamentally, this must accumulate overtime. A good theory, therefore, that is consistent with your definitition of explanation should insist that:

THE KNOWLEDGE BASE SHOULD CONSISTENTLY ACCUMULATE OVER TIME TOWARDS EVERYTHING BEING COMPLETELY KNOWN BY THE PERCEIVER.

Well, my argument to this over the years is that whoever that final individual would be must inevitably (and perhapds irreversibly as well) be wholly structurally and functionally perfect both in substance and in scope.

On the issue of 'Hard Science', the fantasists are currently escaping it using all kinds of sly and dudgy arguments. It is one hell of issue that sooner or later all the intellectual communities must confront. I have been trying to draw everyone's attention to the problem of 'FORMS' that things take when they come into existence, including the form of our current universe. When people talk about Logic, mathematics, mechanical, mutational, causal and relational pathways in relation to the problem of explanation, I always try to redirect their attention to the problem of forms. If people say that they have problems with explanation via the devices of logic, mathematics and other forms of language, then we may have to return back to the drawing board and, as I have said it before, this may involve interfering with things structurally up to the level of forms that those things take when they come into existence. Call me a skeptic if you like, we may have to re-engineer the entire human reality if we were to make any structural and functional progress at all, let alone finally survive physical destruction that may subsequently manifest.

Philocrat

Dec15-04, 11:17 PM

Philo, science is not meant to deal with questions of purpose. Science is descriptive only of physical processes in terms of cause and effect. In this sense it is defective as a means of describing all of reality, but this is an intentional defect! Science is not neglecting anything; it is simply incapable of answering questions of purpose. Purpose is an entirely subjective thing. Whether or not purposive action exists in a contracausal, non-physical sense isn't even known, and I would say cannot be known through empirical means, including the scientific method. These explanatory deficits you speak of are well known and well discussed here, but how are they relevant to the efficacy of science? Science cannot explain the experience of listening to a great opera, or any subjective experience for that matter, but that does not make it deficient any more than poetics is deficient because it can't explain why some ink dries faster than others.

As a scientist, you should be asking youself:

'WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF PLANET MARS WERE TO BE KNOCKED OFF OR THROWN OUT OF OUR SOLAR SYSTEM BY SOME COSMOLOGICAL EVENT?"

You might perhaps responded by arguing that this could never happen because there is no such known event or because such an event could not be imagined. But how could you know this? This would be a misleading response, for I would expect you to give some thoughts to this question and make an attempt to answer it, at least experimentally in a controlled lab condition. It would be intellectually insufficient to simply ingore it as irrelevant.

However, if you were to look at the question closely and at least experimentally responded to it, I argue that your response cannot just give rise to a 'HOW' answer but must also produce a 'WHY' answer too. So that if someone were to ask you the same question again you would not just give a functional account but also a purposive one as well, even where your experiment shows planet Mars to be functionally, causally and relationally redundant in the grand scale of things, in this very case in our solar system. This purposive analysis allows you to say that:

1) The Planet Mars serves a specific purpose or purposes in our solar system because when you remove it this is what would happen to our solar system

or;

2) The Planet Mars serves no known purpose in our solar system because when you remove it nothing happens....our solar systems just continues normally.

If this is the way you would approach it, then science cannot just prentend to interpret or explain things in nature in a non-purposive way. This approach allows you to think about improving things, making contingency plans, and so on. I call this a PROGRESSIVE SCIENTIFIC METHOD, that is, a method by which you look at how things work or are configured scientifically and equally why they are so, such that this would triger progressive thoughts and actions in you. To pretend that it is doing us any good for science to continue to look at things in an artificial way seems to me to be contrary to the norm.......rather regressive instead of progressive in scope and in substance.

honestrosewater

Dec16-04, 03:18 PM

At a leisurely pace - perhaps in a different thread - it might be interesting to discuss what you would accept as a convincing demonstration of abiogenesis . . . Maybe we could so the same thing re the third area (I'd forgotten that you also had doubts about a physicalist approach to the origin of the universe).
That sounds like fun.
Where's the party?

loseyourname

Dec16-04, 06:35 PM

As a scientist, you should be asking youself:

'WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF PLANET MARS WERE TO BE KNOCKED OFF OR THROWN OUT OF OUR SOLAR SYSTEM BY SOME COSMOLOGICAL EVENT?"

You might perhaps responded by arguing that this could never happen because there is no such known event or because such an event could not be imagined. But how could you know this? This would be a misleading response, for I would expect you to give some thoughts to this question and make an attempt to answer it, at least experimentally in a controlled lab condition. It would be intellectually insufficient to simply ingore it as irrelevant.

Well, actually a scientist should not be asking that question unless he has a lot of free time simply because that is not likely to ever happen and so funding for the research would be very difficult to come by. Also, I'm not a scientist.

1) The Planet Mars serves a specific purpose or purposes in our solar system because when you remove it this is what would happen to our solar system

or;

2) The Planet Mars serves no known purpose in our solar system because when you remove it nothing happens....our solar systems just continues normally.

If this is the way you would approach it, then science cannot just prentend to interpret or explain things in nature in a non-purposive way. This approach allows you to think about improving things, making contingency plans, and so on. I call this a PROGRESSIVE SCIENTIFIC METHOD, that is, a method by which you look at how things work or are configured scientifically and equally why they are so, such that this would triger progressive thoughts and actions in you. To pretend that it is doing us any good for science to continue to look at things in an artificial way seems to me to be contrary to the norm.......rather regressive instead of progressive in scope and in substance.

You know, if that's all you mean by "purpose," then you might want to look into ethology and ecology, both of which deal with this pretty well. It is well known that interconnected parts in a given system all function to keep the system working a certain way. Scientists aren't generally going to refer to this as the "purpose" of any of these given elements, but the choice of words really doesn't make a difference.

Philocrat

Dec16-04, 11:32 PM

Well, actually a scientist should not be asking that question unless he has a lot of free time simply because that is not likely to ever happen and so funding for the research would be very difficult to come by. Also, I'm not a scientist.

You know, if that's all you mean by "purpose," then you might want to look into ethology and ecology, both of which deal with this pretty well. It is well known that interconnected parts in a given system all function to keep the system working a certain way. Scientists aren't generally going to refer to this as the "purpose" of any of these given elements, but the choice of words really doesn't make a difference.

The issue that I am raising here is beyond the careless notion of 'Availability of Fundings'. In fact, the laymembers of the the world societies (some of whom we know sit naively on tons of money) should be very glad that there are at least a few people around the planet who go out of their ways to ask these sorts of questions. If money is the reason why the intellectual communities are unwilling to answer these 'LIFE-CRITICAL' questions, they too are twice as wrong. Infact, this is one of the reasons why I distinguished between 'FUNDS-DEPENDENT SCIENTISTS' and 'REAL SCIENTISTS' in a UK hosted forums a year ago, or should I say between 'PROCEDURAL' and NON-PROCEDURAL' scientists. My investigation shows that real scientists are those who are motivated by selfless quest for the truth, who often work under the harshest conditions imaginable. They never wait for cosy labs and sophisticated machineries to be available before they are motivated to seek the best of answers to the human problems.

Regardless of this sort of distinction, somewhere along the line someone somewhere must have all the good will in the world and be prepared to find answers to these questions. These are no child's play questions. They are the sorts of questions upon which the entire human existence, let alone survival, may very well depend. So, we ought to desire and genuinely will to answer these question for the collective benefit of all mankind.

Philocrat

Dec17-04, 12:11 AM

IS MONEY REALLY THE CONSTRAINT?

In the world we have now countless instances of where millions of pounds/dolars are being inherited by cats, dogs, ants and cocroaches. We give billions of pounds in donations to all sorts of noble courses around the planet. We waste incalculable sums annually on pointless wars against ourselves.

Admitttedly, there is nothing wrong with natural creatures inheriting money from their natural lovers. But it is the obsenity of the sums that are often involved that I am concerned. Equally, there is nothing wrong in spending the sort of money that we are now spnding on all the good courses -- it is our natural responsibilty to do so. In fact I am one of the defenders of these sorts of human positive actions.

But the key question is this:

If we can raise money for all these human deeds, why are we unable to do so for the most important human project.....THE PROJECT OF ASKING AND ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WHOLE HUMAN PROGRESS AND SURVIVAL?

Clear thinking and intelligence suggest that we should be very glad and be willing to divert all human efforts and resources (with no price tags attached) to such an important project.

The more I think of this, the more I become skeptical as to whether lack of meony is the main reason why we are unwilling to ask the right questions, let alone any attempt and will to answer them in the correct way. Perhaps there is more to this problem than money.

Whatever the problem, however, one thing is now fundamentally clear:

The time is now right for us to start asking the 'WHAT-HOW-WHY' questions and making genuine human efforts to answer them in the most appropriate ways.

Philocrat

Dec17-04, 01:15 AM

STANDARD DEFINITIONS: How Science Should Ask and Answer Questions.

The golden rule is that science must ask the correct questions and answer them in the most consistent and reliable ways.

1) THE 'WHAT' QUESTION

This investigates the notion of existence. For example, does anything exist at all, and if it does what is it? This is the process of identifying things by their forms or types and sub-classes of types.

2) THE 'HOW' QUESTION

This type of question investigates how anything identified and known, or even suspected to exist, works in relation to other things in time and space. When dealing with this question, the inevitable consequence is to do so in the context of 'PART-WHOLE RELATIONS' in terms of temporal and spatial positions, size, motion, change etc. The How question therefore must aim at underpinning the structural and causal relations of the thing or things concerned.That is, how does anything fit in and work together within the grand scale of things?

3) THE 'WHY' QUESTION

This investigates the outward purpose of a given entity in the part-whole relation or in the grand scale of things. When the what and how questions are raised and made apparent, the why question automatically becomes self-installed and rendered relevant. And the beauty of this is that when we start asking the why question we begin to tumble across such notions as 'Self-improvements', 'causal and relational error corrections', 'structural and functional re-engineering', 'structural and functional progress', 'survival' and so on. And this must happen in a cautious, systematic and all inclusive ways.

The danger in asking the how question without the what and why questions is that the resulting outcome may fail to triger progressive thoughts and actions in us. We may lose momentum and the desires to improve things that we look at in this way that are fundamental and relevant to the human progress and survival. To this end, I argue that the three questions must always be asked and answered in unison. At the moment several postings in this thread tend to suggest that science, for example, can only afford to ask the how question without the what and why ones. Well, to delude ourselves that we can ask and answer one without the other, I guess, is a fundamental intellectual error.

loseyourname

Dec17-04, 04:55 PM

nickdanger

Dec18-04, 05:34 AM

Doctordick

Dec18-04, 11:14 AM

Philocrat, I have real trouble understanding what you are trying to say!
A good theory, therefore, that is consistent with your definitition of explanation should insist that:

THE KNOWLEDGE BASE SHOULD CONSISTENTLY ACCUMULATE OVER TIME TOWARDS EVERYTHING BEING COMPLETELY KNOWN BY THE PERCEIVER.You wish to add something to my definition of an explanation? (Note a definition and a theory are not the same thing!) And, if you add such a thing, it implies an explanation which is based on an unchanging knowledge base is not an explanation! That kind of removes the general nature of the definition doesn't it?
Well, my argument to this over the years is...Exactly what does argument 'to' something mean? Is this to be a defense of a position or a refutation?

And I do not understand what you mean by the word "forms".

For the time being, I will presume you are confused. Take a look at

http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm

If you can understand that presentation I will be surprised!

On nickdanger's comment to loseyourname:
I like your tag lines quoting Einstein. It orients us a bit doesn't it.That orientation is a little askew of "scientific" isn't it?

The more information you have, the more patterns you are apt to discover. A verbal explanation constitutes attaching symbols to repeated chunks of information. Then one begins to find repeated similar relationships between these named chunks (and one attaches symbols to these, names for relationships). Verbal explanations are nothing more than such constructs which define your expectations. Under that view of "language" (which includes scientific and unscientific language growth), the comment "It would be description without meaning" sort of descends into drivel doesn't it?

If anyone is interested, the above comment is almost a direct quote taken from a philosophical discussion of "explanation" which begins at:

http://www.astronomy.net/forums/general/messages/4468.shtml

Have fun everyone -- Dick

Philocrat

Dec18-04, 09:50 PM

Philocrat, I have real trouble understanding what you are trying to say!
You wish to add something to my definition of an explanation? (Note a definition and a theory are not the same thing!) And, if you add such a thing, it implies an explanation which is based on an unchanging knowledge base is not an explanation! That kind of removes the general nature of the definition doesn't it?
Exactly what does argument 'to' something mean? Is this to be a defense of a position or a refutation?

And I do not understand what you mean by the word "forms".

For the time being, I will presume you are confused. Take a look at

http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm

If you can understand that presentation I will be surprised!

On nickdanger's comment to loseyourname:
That orientation is a little askew of "scientific" isn't it?

The more information you have, the more patterns you are apt to discover. A verbal explanation constitutes attaching symbols to repeated chunks of information. Then one begins to find repeated similar relationships between these named chunks (and one attaches symbols to these, names for relationships). Verbal explanations are nothing more than such constructs which define your expectations. Under that view of "language" (which includes scientific and unscientific language growth), the comment "It would be description without meaning" sort of descends into drivel doesn't it?

If anyone is interested, the above comment is almost a direct quote taken from a philosophical discussion of "explanation" which begins at:

http://www.astronomy.net/forums/general/messages/4468.shtml

Have fun everyone -- Dick

What I was doing here was not to add to your thoughts or definition of explanation. Quite the contrary. All that it was meant to do was to provide a sort of guide as to what a good theory or definition of the term must envitably encopmpass. We cannot complicate things at all nor should we ever pretend to do so. Even a child understands that all there is to explanation is to add somethning new to what is already known and what is added must be coherent and logically consistent with what is elready known, the content of which I habitually call 'THE KNOWLEDGE BASE'.

In my own school of thought there is only one knowledge base and all the things in it have logically consistent relations, and this is equivalent to a single 'UNIVERSAL SET'. This contains everything there is to be known about the world. All other deductions using set theories, including what your companion is attempting to do here (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm), must totally and invetably adher to this single Universal set or knowledge base.

A knowldege base or Universal set becomes inconsistent when you model or sample knowledge or what is explainable in a way that is fundamentally vague such that it logically disconnects what you claim to be explaining from everything else in the knowledge base. So, when you claim to have successfully explained something using all your sophisticated modelling, sampling and explanatory devices, the next questions you must ask yourself are these:

1) Does my sampled or modelled explanation results in what I have been calling in this PF 'THE EXPLANATORY DEFICITS'. You have to ask yourself this question otherwise you may very well fall prey to self-deception.

2) Does what results from my proclaimed explanation logically and consistenly connect to every other piece of information in the knowledge base? Don't forget that by explaining, or claiming to explain, you are adding something new (new piece of information) either into your own knowldege base or into the knowledge base of a bystander, both of which have a UNIVERSAL LOGICAL CONNECTION to each other. For nothing which you know, or claim to know, can by enumeration of the SUM TOTALITY OF THE HUMAN EXISTENCE be contemplated and construed in isolation from everything esle!

I claim that whatever we know through explanation ( if at all the notion of the term itself is possible in the first place), or claim to be explaining to ourselves and others, must in the end universally connect and make a final sense to what I always call 'THE FINAL PERCEIVER(S)'. And the argument that I have consistently put across in this PF and elsewhere is that, whoever this Final Perceiver or Perceivers would be must be construed as possessing a complete knowledge base or a universal set of all there is to be known.

Philocrat

Dec18-04, 11:36 PM

I'm still not sure what you want. Do you want to see more emphasis on ecology and integrated sciences as opposed to reductionist subspecialties? It would be nice if you could formulate your theses using existing, well-defined terminology. For instance, when you say purpose, are you referring to teleology, or simply to function within a context?

I am not in anyway denying that certain processes in nature do contain redundant states or functional elements. Even Aristotle, who can quite rightly be construed as the first true scientist, understood and wholly accpeted this. This is made very clear in Aristotle's teleology, often signatured by his famous slogan 'Nature Does Nothing in Vain". Although, his teleology is contracted to assign functional purposes to things and many people would probably discredit this as merely talking about things and their fucntions, the reality is that Aristotle's teleology has wider and far-reaching implications, especially when you are looking at the ordering of the world in an holistic way using 'Transitional Logic' (TL). If you take Aristotle's teleology a step further, you just cannot afford not to classify the purposes of things that are purportedly in universal relations into (1) those with ephemeral Purposes and (2) those with Permanent Purposes. Often, it appears as if Aristotle teleology is mistaken to cover only things with ephemeral purposes in nature. I hope that this is not the case, because in actual fact it does extend to cover things with permanent purposes.

This fact can be traced to Aristotle's notion of change. When he was discussing change in relation to causes and effects, surely we could not have have mistaken him to be talking about the kind of change that results in regressive consequences alone, or even the sort that derails into circularism. He must have also been thinking about the sort of change that follow a consistent logical but progressive pathway, or pathways, to structural and functional perfection of things in the world. Should this be the case, and hopefully so, ought we not to insist that the modern science must embrace and uphold methodolgies and analytical procedures that look at things in terms:

(1) WHAT they are?
(2) HOW they work and fit in with everything else?; and
(3) WHY they play the role they are currently playing?

My argument is that the kind of science that looks at the HOW question alone without the WHAT and WHY questions being contemporaneously dealt with, is intellectually insufficient. It is frankly performing a misguided role in the society and doing a great disservice to humanity.

Jeff Lawson

Dec19-04, 03:29 PM

Can everything be reduced to pure physics? Who cares.

You guys think far too much!

Ultimately, are we not considering which belief system has merit? It seems irrelevant to me whether we choose to delineate branches of science or not. What is at stake here is the scientific method versus superstition.

For me, the scientific belief system has as its basis that: physical reality is that which exists independently of thought (I told you you think too much!) and we can make discoveries about reality be carefully interpreting the data we receive through our senses, albeit as the result of interacting with reality (experimentation).

(I don't buy the collapse of the wave function crap that requires human intervention. Nor, for that matter do I accept that the Uncertainty Principle is necessarily ultimately all that accurate. The fact is that human beings have barely begun to understand reality and the theories we have so far cannot be assumed, a priori, to be anything other than rough approximations. Science has a long way to go but already it’s results transcend those all other belief systems put together and does so by an almost infinite margin, the others, by and large, not so much contributing as detracting from human progress.)

As I see it, the important issue for human beings at the moment is: do we follow a belief system predicated on fantasy, e.g. belief in a god, or do we follow a belief system that is grounded in empiricism. The latter is reliable and productive, the former is positively insane.

Les Sleeth

Dec19-04, 04:18 PM

Can everything be reduced to pure physics? Who cares.

You guys think far too much!

Hi Jeff, welcome to PF. As far as "thinking too much," well you are in the philosophy section. :smile:

Ultimately, are we not considering which belief system has merit? It seems irrelevant to me whether we choose to delineate branches of science or not. What is at stake here is the scientific method versus superstition.

I'd say you aren't being fair with that. While some belief in a conscious creationary force may be superstition, you shouldn't assume all of it is.

However, the question isn't "which belief system has merit," the question is if physics can explain everything. Currently it cannot. Maybe one day it will, but maybe it won't. If you were to review some of things physics cannot explain (talked about extensively here in PF philosophy) you'd find consciousness at the top of the list (I also include the self-organization principle needed for abiogenesis to be a sound theory for the origin of life).

For me, the scientific belief system has as its basis that: physical reality is that which exists independently of thought (I told you you think too much!) and we can make discoveries about reality be carefully interpreting the data we receive through our senses, albeit as the result of interacting with reality (experimentation).

True. But what if there are aspects of reality which aren't availble to sense experience? If sense experience only reveals physicalness, all that proves is the limitations of sense experience. It doesn't prove there isn't "something more."

As I see it, the important issue for human beings at the moment is: do we follow a belief system predicated on fantasy, e.g. belief in a god, or do we follow a belief system that is grounded in empiricism. The latter is reliable and productive, the former is positively insane.

Hmmmm. I suspect your bias is showing. There is no reason a person can't rely on empiricism for everything it can explain (which is lots). But what about what it cannot explain? You don't have to believe in the Christian version of God to remain open to the possibility that there is "something more" going on than physical processes.

Jeff Lawson

Dec19-04, 04:51 PM

Hi Les

what if there are aspects of reality which aren't availble to sense experience?

By assertion, such reality, if it exists, impinges upon us not at all. It would, therefore, be futile to attempt to characterize it and ridiculous to theorize about it.

Hmmmm. I suspect your bias is showing. There is no reason a person can't rely on empiricism for everything it can explain (which is lots). But what about what it cannot explain? You don't have to believe in the Christian version of God to remain open to the possibility that there is "something more" going on than physical processes.

Too right, I'm biased! I'm not just biased, I'm entirely one-sided: as far as I'm concerned, objective reality is all there is, by definition! Of course there are many things that science cannot explain and I did stress this in my original post. I am certainly open to there being much more than we have yet encountered but if we cannot detect it by empirical means then it may as well not exist for us and dwelling upon such thing leads us down a path to madness.

Let's be clear, the alternatives to scientific discovery (by which I include simply causal relationships that all infants encounter as they develop) have not only provided no satisfactory explanations whatsoever but they have, in the main, led people to act upon false premises that have often been the cause of human conflict.

Les Sleeth

Dec19-04, 05:32 PM

By assertion, such reality, if it exists, impinges upon us not at all. It would, therefore, be futile to attempt to characterize it and ridiculous to theorize about it.

How do you know there is no impingement when there are yet things to be explained by physicality alone? Let's take an example all of us have experienced. As a child grows and develops he finds all these systems in place for feeding him, clothing him, protecting him, giving him medical attention, educating him . . .

If he were able, he could study each of those systems and understand how they work. He could say that because he understands the mechanics of the systems, there is nothing more to be explained. However, what he hasn't explained is how those systems got organized so they could take care of him.

Similarly, you are ready to say you have got it all figured out because you can explain the mechanics of things. But let's see you prove that mechanics can, all on their own, organize themselves into life and consciousness. Since neither you nor anyone else can demonstrate how that happens, there might just be "something more" impinging.

Too right, I'm biased! I'm not just biased, I'm entirely one-sided: as far as I'm concerned, objective reality is all there is, by definition! Of course there are many things that science cannot explain and I did stress this in my original post. I am certainly open to there being much more than we have yet encountered but if we cannot detect it by empirical means then it may as well not exist for us and dwelling upon such thing leads us down a path to madness.

When I said sense experience might not detect something that exists, I didn't mean to say that some other kind of conscious experience wasn't available. I would agree that if we can't experience anything more than what's physical, and if physicalness can be shown to account for everything, then we don't need no stinkin' "something more."

loseyourname

Dec19-04, 05:47 PM

When I said sense experience might not detect something that exists, I didn't mean to say that some other kind of conscious experience wasn't available. I would agree that if we can't experience anything more than what's physical, and if physicalness can be shown to account for everything, then we don't need no stinkin' "something more."

I just want to quickly chime in and say that neuroscientists are beginning to realize there is a lot more to what the human brain can "sense" aside from the traditional five categories. Leaving aside the introspective ability to "sense" emotional feeling and personal belief and such, there is also a kinesthetic ability to sense equiblibria and disequilibria in the inner ear, as well as a whole host of tactile sensations of the inner body that are not anything like the sensations of the skin, despite the fact that we traditionally lump all of these sensations under the heading "touch." In fact, there is even the ability of the human mind to perceive aural and visual sensations from tactile input.

Jeff Lawson

Dec19-04, 06:19 PM

Les: first off, it occurs to me that I might not have been clear about things that are tractable to the senses. I include in the realm of human sensory observation, observations made by our instruments. Carefully constructed instrumentation, such as microscopes, act as an extension of our senses and ultimately involve some human observation, such as reading a meter.

How do you know there is no impingement when there are yet things to be explained by physicality alone?
By definition! We may not have advanced to the stage where our understanding of reality and command of the physical world enables us to detect such subtleties yet, nor may we ever do so, but, in principle, we must be able to detect something that exerts influence upon us. If we cannot then it is not worth considering. (An angel keeps blowing in my ear but I cannot feel it and it has no effect upon me that I am aware of…so, it may as well not be happening…what do I care!)

Let's take an example all of us have experienced. As a child grows and develops he finds all these systems in place for feeding him, clothing him, protecting him, giving him medical attention, educating him . . .
If he were able, he could study each of those systems and understand how they work. He could say that because he understands the mechanics of the systems, there is nothing more to be explained. However, what he hasn't explained is how those systems got organized so they could take care of him.
I fail to see that you are making any kind of progress here...

...He could say that because he understands the mechanics of the systems, there is nothing more to be explained.
It is valid to claim that there is nothing more to explain provided that the scope of explanation is precisely defined and all aspect within that realm are satisfactorily accounted for. Later, it might transpire that hitherto unknown observations are made within the system that prompt us to reconsider our explanation and possibly replace it entirely. (For example, consider how Newtonian gravity was replaced by Einsteinian gravity.)

However, what he hasn't explained is how those systems got organized so they could take care of him.
This is just negligence or inadequate observation. It doesn't mean that such systems cannot be detected and investigated.

Similarly, you are ready to say you have got it all figured out because you can explain the mechanics of things.
I didn't make any such claim, in fact, quite the opposite: I recognize that there are many things that we have not much idea about.

But let's see you prove that mechanics can, all on their own, organize themselves into life and consciousness. Since neither you nor anyone else can demonstrate how that happens, there might just be "something more" impinging.
Our inability to furnish satisfactory explanations does not mean that we will never be able to do so. It is very possible that some phenomena prove too difficult for human beings ever to understand but that doesn’t justify us adopting a supernatural approach. I’d rather not know anything about such phenomena than rely upon bogus superstition. We don’t have to have an explanation for everything but what explanations we do have must accord with reality. Talking abstractly about "something more" doesn't provide understanding, per se. For such an approach to be acceptable, we would have to see results. So, go ahead, enlighten me but if you fail to do so then don't blame me for discounting you as a crank!

Jeff Lawson

Dec19-04, 08:29 PM

Of course...

Okay, so what is the basis of your alternative approach? Please tell.

Les Sleeth

Dec19-04, 11:04 PM

Okay, so what is the basis of your alternative approach? Please tell.

First let me say that I appreciate someone who only believes what they can experience. I sense that is where you are coming from; that is, you can see physical reality, you can work with it, you can discover it . . . so that is "real" because it really does exist. Give me a realist any day of the week over baseless believers! :yuck:

I am hesitant to post my views now because my fellow PF members have seen them so many times. Let me say however that mine is not an "alternative approach." It is an additional approach. We don't need an alternative approach for studying physical reality because empiricism works awesomely well. I believe it it, I trust it, I consider it all but infallible for revealing the secrets of the physical aspects of reality.

A point I've made here a zillion times is, if you use a method that only reveals physical aspects of reality (i.e., empiricism) then what else should you expect to discover? If there is anything around besides physical aspects, it ain't gonna show up through science. So I cannot conclude that because science only reveals physical facts, that is all there is to reality.

If you look in the general philosophy area, you'll see an old thread of mine that's been resurrected. If you want to understand what "additional" way there might be for experiencing reality (i.e., besides through senses), check out my opening posts. Here in metaphysics & epistomology, you'll see another recently resurrected thread of mine, and that too will give you an idea of of what I value beyond science.

Of course, you don't have to agree I know anything other than what I've perceived through my senses for us to debate if physical principles and processes can explain everything. I am content to poke holes in physicalism without having anyone believe I have a viable alternative theory. :wink:

Seafang

Dec21-04, 11:25 AM

Les:

Our inability to furnish satisfactory explanations does not mean that we will never be able to do so. It is very possible that some phenomena prove too difficult for human beings ever to understand but that doesn’t justify us adopting a supernatural approach. I’d rather not know anything about such phenomena than rely upon bogus superstition. We don’t have to have an explanation for everything but what explanations we do have must accord with reality. Talking abstractly about "something more" doesn't provide understanding, per se. For such an approach to be acceptable, we would have to see results. So, go ahead, enlighten me but if you fail to do so then don't blame me for discounting you as a crank!

Well your first statement isn't necessarily true. Heisenberg tells us we can never exactly know the present state of even a single particle let alone the entire universe, so even if we had constructed the correct laws of physics, they would fail to predict the future properly. Besides that Godel teaches us that some questions are inherently undecideable; "no matter what" as William Shockley would put it.

But I agree with your main point; the failure to provide a rational explanation for some phenomenon or obsevation, does not justify the acceptance of a completely irrational explanation.

selfAdjoint

Dec21-04, 11:30 AM

Well your first statement isn't necessarily true. Heisenberg tells us we can never exactly know the present state of even a single particle let alone the entire universe, so even if we had constructed the correct laws of physics, they would fail to predict the future properly. Besides that Godel teaches us that some questions are inherently undecideable; "no matter what" as William Shockley would put it.

But I agree with your main point; the failure to provide a rational explanation for some phenomenon or obsevation, does not justify the acceptance of a completely irrational explanation.

Your version of the uncertainty principle is misleading. We can know some of the properties of a particle to arbitrarily high degrees of confindence, at the cost of being correspondingly ignorant about other properties.

Also Goedel does not apply to geometry or things derived from it, like real analysis. The question is still out on what this exception means for physics.

FulhamFan3

Dec27-04, 02:27 PM

The "natural" world can be explained entirely by physics. When it comes to emotion and life then that's the realm of philosophy/religion. I beleive that the probablities allowed by quantum mechanics allow whatever religion to have a validity.

Science explains how fish die, it doesn't explain why it's important to conserve them.

Nereid

Dec27-04, 08:37 PM

The "natural" world can be explained entirely by physics. When it comes to emotion and life then that's the realm of philosophy/religion. I beleive that the probablities allowed by quantum mechanics allow whatever religion to have a validity.And while I may respect your belief, I wonder why you hold it in the face of so much good science (e.g. the neurological/chemical/physical aspects of emotion - think drugs, neurotransmitters, etc). I also wonder how well you could make a case that 'the probablities allowed by quantum mechanics allow whatever religion to have a validity' - would you care to try?Science explains how fish die, it doesn't explain why it's important to conserve them.Leaving aside for the moment whether science 'explains' anything, there is a great deal that 'science' can tell us about why it's important to conserve fish ... assuming of course that we may wish that our children and grand-children have the opportunity to eat fish (and many other desirable things too no doubt).

Go37Pi

Dec28-04, 12:12 AM

FulhamFan3

Dec28-04, 12:42 AM

And while I may respect your belief, I wonder why you hold it in the face of so much good science (e.g. the neurological/chemical/physical aspects of emotion - think drugs, neurotransmitters, etc).

I'm not to sure what you think I'm negating here. I do acknowledge that emotions can be affected by drugs and other factors. However what makes someone perfer a blond over a brunette? This is something that drugs don't explain. What I actual meant was a conscience is more philosophy/religion.

there is a great deal that 'science' can tell us about why it's important to conserve fish ... assuming of course that we may wish that our children and grand-children have the opportunity to eat fish

What makes it important though? Wanting children and grand-children to eat fish is a matter of conscience, not science. Science can tell you the proper consevation methods and who will die out as a result of not taking those precautions. But the reason why we would take those measures to begin with has to do with conscience.

I also wonder how well you could make a case that 'the probablities allowed by quantum mechanics allow whatever religion to have a validity' - would you care to try?

That's wrong too. What I mean is that it allows for a supreme being of sorts if you beleive in one. Before you could predict everything about a system possible as long as you knew enough about a system to begin with. With QM probabilities are unavoidable and it is here where a supreme being decides the future of a particle.

I find it odd that evolution can be in complete conflict with christianity(or at least the really conservative christians) whereas it's completely compatible with buddism or shinto.

Les Sleeth

Dec28-04, 01:11 AM

. . . why it's important to conserve fish ... assuming of course that we may wish that our children and grand-children have the opportunity to eat fish (and many other desirable things too no doubt).

That's cold Nereid. Preserve poor little fishes so we can EAT THEM. :cry:

nightwing darknight

Dec28-04, 06:31 AM

there is another problem when talking about practically applying physics to the entire world

even though our laws of physics can almost predict the behavior of most of the observed phenomena "as much as the QM uncertainty would allow it anyway"

when talking about building a mathematical / physical model for something even as simple and un complex like car crash of 2 cars
you can never apply the rules to any systems more complex than a few particles
but when talking about the behavior of a macroscopic body which is consisted of billions of particles and its interaction with the surrounding its pretty tough to do so

but the question you would ask next is obviously if we cant apply the laws of physics to these systems then how do weather forecasts and the prediction of planetary orbits work

the answer is approximation and empirical equations
it so happens that the exact laws of physics are hard to apply to a large number of particles
but there also exist a number of approximate and empirical equations that can be readily applied

im saying so because i m as much an engineer as i am a physicist wannabe
so in a way i belong to both worlds
and i noticed in my work as a chemical engineer when designing reactors "chemical reactors because i know that stereotypically you guys hear reactor and you say nuclear"
lets take one aspect of reactor design
heat transfer
we have a multiple layer of laws and equations that govern heat transfer
from laws that work microscopically level and takes into consideration the movement and interaction of each particle
and although considered the most precise method when actually applying this method to something as simple as a tube inserted in hot medium with a cold fluid flowing inside
you would find that it would be a nightmare of equations
even for a computer
a computer could take years to solve such a model when applied to the entire reactor

so we turn to less precise simpler equations
and especially in hat transfer we have a very wide variety of substitute equations

some of them are derived theoretically while others are simply empirical

so when asking can everything be reduced to physics the answer is
even if we have the laws and necessary equations it could be impossible
and i remind you that even though it has been more than 90 yrs since the publication of the general relativity
there are only a considerable number of solutions to it
and by solutions i mean cases where the theory is applied and can be calculated

Nereid

Dec28-04, 03:29 PM

I think the crux of this argument lies in the question of consciousness, as a few people stated earlier. We cannot measure consciouness because only the individual feels consciousness. Therefore the only way to measure consciousness is to measure ourselves. But such a measurement would necessarily only apply to one individual and would differ from the representation of consciousness that another individual could have. Perhaps we have a bit of, "I think, therefore I am." in this debate. Can we really measure our own ability to measure? Perhaps there is a possible way, but I can't help but believe that we can never measure our consciousness, and thus never represent it mathematically.Welcome to Physics Forums Go37Pi!

I'm not sure if the 'crux' lies in consciousness, or if 'the hard problem of consciousness' is truly the only (likely) area that can't be 'reduced' to physics (all the while accepting Les' challenge that there are still open questions re life).

If the latter, I'm cool; if there's anything other than the hard problem of consciousness, let's put the cat on the table!

Nereid

Dec28-04, 03:38 PM

I'm not to sure what you think I'm negating here. I do acknowledge that emotions can be affected by drugs and other factors. However what makes someone perfer a blond over a brunette? This is something that drugs don't explain. What I actual meant was a conscience is more philosophy/religion.Are you sure? I'll be the first to say that neuroscience has a looong way to go, but other than 'the hard problem of consciousness', what appears to be an insurmountable problem for science? Goodness, there's been enough in the popular literature lately on 'the god gene', and various psychological finding on 'religious experience' to at least hint that religion and philosophy (formal systems excepted) are 'explainable'.What makes it important though? Wanting children and grand-children to eat fish is a matter of conscience, not science. Science can tell you the proper consevation methods and who will die out as a result of not taking those precautions. But the reason why we would take those measures to begin with has to do with conscience.On this we are in accord ... That's wrong too. What I mean is that it allows for a supreme being of sorts if you beleive in one. Before you could predict everything about a system possible as long as you knew enough about a system to begin with. With QM probabilities are unavoidable and it is here where a supreme being decides the future of a particle.Er, no (with respect). In any real sense 'a supreme being' is practically equivalent to 'hidden variables', and there've been several experiments now that show such alternatives aren't consistent with results. Of course, if 'supreme being' = 'random fluctuations', then why create a supreme being?I find it odd that evolution can be in complete conflict with christianity(or at least the really conservative christians) whereas it's completely compatible with buddism or shinto.Yes, I puzzle over why some christians get so worked up about evolution, yet those with deep faith in other religions find nothing to be troubled about.

Nereid

Dec28-04, 03:41 PM

That's cold Nereid. Preserve poor little fishes so we can EAT THEM. :cry:You don't have to Les, nor I ... but homo sap. is a carnivore (or at least an omnivore), and denying that lots of people would like their children to be able to eat fish seems to me a little, shall we say, like an ostrich?

Viper2838

Dec29-04, 12:22 AM

Yes, I puzzle over why some christians get so worked up about evolution, yet those with deep faith in other religions find nothing to be troubled about.

On the risk of turning this thread into a religious debate, i will try to explain this.
Many Christians are offended and become worked up over evolution because it goes aginst the foundations of the Religion. It says very clearly in Gensis ch. 2 that God made man. Jesus later references this in the New Testiment.

The idea of man evolving from organic matter that floated in some prehistoric sea seems to run slightly counter to this. The idea seems to go something like this: If man was made from sea sludge, in an apparently radnom matter of natural selection, then God didnt create man. This means that Genisis is not true, and must be disregarded, Which means God didnt create the world, and all that lives on it. If this is true, then whose to say that God is real, or omnipotent?

The argument and thought process continues and Chrsitianity as we know it ends.

Thats why some Christians are prone to getting worked up. Personally, I think evolution is no more than a therory, and has no impact on my life, so why bother?

Philocrat

Dec29-04, 01:09 AM

IS EVOLUTION COMPATIBLE WITH CHRISTIANITY?

Yes!

Philocrat

Dec29-04, 01:11 AM

The faction or divisionism betweein evolution and chritianity is pointless!

Philocrat

Dec29-04, 01:17 AM

Both Institutions must slow down and look CAREFULLY at the TYPE of Logic they use to conduct their arguments and derive at their current conclusions. For a different type of logic does not rule out the possibility of both. Instead, it renders both WHOLLY comaptible with each other!

Philocrat

Dec29-04, 01:58 AM

THE FOUNDATION ARGUMENTS FOR THE LOGICAL COMPATIBILITY OF GOD WITH THE PRODUCT OF HIS/HER CREATION

THE FOUNDATION ARGUMENTS (FA)

FA1 (God is incompatible with logic)

(a) God created the world
(b) If God has finished creating the world, then God is incompatible with logic
(c) If God is still creating the world, then God is compatible with Logic.
(d) God has finished creating the world
-------------------------------------
Therefore, God is incompatible with logic
-------------------------------------

FA2 (God is compatible with logic)

(a) God created the world
(b) If God has finished creating the world, then God is incompatible with logic
(c) If God is still creating the world, then God is compatible with Logic.
(d) God is still creating the world
--------------------------------------
Therefore, God is compatible with Logic
--------------------------------------

The standard assumption is that all other arguments about God's relatons to the world can be deduced from these master arguments.

INTERMEDIATE ARGUMENTS (IA)

IA1 (Evolution is incompatible with Creationism)

(a) God created the world
(b) If God has finished creating the world, then evolution is incompatible with creationism
(c) If God is still creating the world, then evolution is compatible with creationism.
(d) God has finished creating the world
--------------------------------------------------
Therefore, evolution is incompatible with creationism.
--------------------------------------------------

IA2 (Evolution is compatible with Creationism)

(a) God created the world
(b) If God has finished creating the world, then evolution is incompatible with creationism
(c) If God is still creating the world, then evolution is compatible with creationism.
(d) God is still creating the world
--------------------------------------------------
Therefore, evolution is compatible with creationism.
--------------------------------------------------

The question now is which of these alternative arguments do both parties apply to derive at their conclusions. For (FA2) and (IA2) seem to be the most reliable logical pathway to ply.

Les Sleeth

Dec29-04, 10:36 AM

You don't have to Les, nor I ... but homo sap. is a carnivore (or at least an omnivore), and denying that lots of people would like their children to be able to eat fish seems to me a little, shall we say, like an ostrich?

I was just teasing you of course, although I might point out flesh munchers are likely to eat the ostrich too. :tongue2:

Les Sleeth

Dec29-04, 12:15 PM

Many Christians are offended and become worked up over evolution because it goes aginst the foundations of the Religion. It says very clearly in Gensis ch. 2 that God made man. Jesus later references this in the New Testiment.

The idea of man evolving from organic matter that floated in some prehistoric sea seems to run slightly counter to this. The idea seems to go something like this: If man was made from sea sludge, in an apparently radnom matter of natural selection, then God didnt create man. This means that Genisis is not true, and must be disregarded, Which means God didnt create the world, and all that lives on it. If this is true, then whose to say that God is real, or omnipotent?

The argument and thought process continues and Chrsitianity as we know it ends.

It doesn't necessarily have to be as you predict. There is no reason why God, say as some highly evolved form of consciousness, couldn't have brought about creation in a natural way and over time.

In my opinion it isn't due to Christian belief in God or Jesus that makes them resist evolution, it is belief in the Bible. The logic of considering the Bible infallible should seem highly suspect after one studies the history of the Bible.

Genesis for example, has two creation stories. Scholars attribute the first version to a priestly writer, usually referred to as "P", and a second older version attributed to an author usually called "J". Moses is claimed to have written all the first five books of the Bible, but how could he have written his own death, plus there are anachronisms throughout the Torah (e.g. empires were mentioned that did exist when Moses lived, the king of Philistines is portrayed hundreds of years before he lived, camels were describd in use before they'd been domesticated, etc.).

In this so-called "documentary hypotheses" (taught at all major divinity schools) besides J and P, three other authors have been recognized (E, R, and D), who are believed to have written the Torah from 1000 to 400 BC.

It's not just the Torah, but throughout the Bible we find the problem of trying to figure out who wrote the various books. It was a Hebrew custom to attribute a literary work to revered Jewish figures, and this custom continued to be a problem for New Testament writings as well. That and the fact that none of the writers are believed to have been witnesses to Jesus' activities leave us with documents we cannot be sure of.

I am sure you are familiar with "Q" and Mark's version appearing in the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and with Luke's admission he'd taken his writings from written and oral traditions (Luke 1:1-4). If the gospel author Matthew was really the disciple Matthew (and therefore a witness) why did he rely on Q and Mark to write his story around (sometimes almost word for word, as in Chapter 6)? Plus the author doesn't claim to be Matthew (the title "The Gospel according to Matthew" was added long after the document's original composition).

The only documents we are certain are first hand accounts are those of Paul, who does not claim to have known Jesus. Luke, as a companion of Paul's (if he was) and Mark (as Peter's secretary) were not witnesses either. Of the four gospels, the book of John is least believed by scholars to be the disciple John. It was written by an educated person fluent in Greek at least half a century after Jesus, not by an illiterate fisherman (Mark 1:16-20) who spoke Arameic as the real disciple, John the son of Zebedee, was portrayed.

Now, I am not saying there aren't inspired and inspiring writings in the Bible. I love parts of the book myself. What I am saying it that once one learns the history of the Bible, it makes little sense to treat it as the infallible word of God. It is clearly revealed to be the word of men, sometime inspired, other times writing history or myth or speculation or (in the case of Revelation) senseless ravings from trance induced by fasting.

Evolution (and I would agree with most believers that evolution hasn't achieved what it has through chemistry and natural selection alone), doesn't contradict anything for a person of faith if that person's faith is in God. But if one's faith in God and Jesus is dependent on the perfect veracity and accuracy of the Bible, then I think one is on shakey ground.

connect

Jan1-05, 08:33 AM

The answer will come from the realm of computer programming, computer programmers model the world, a well done model is a more accurate description of all aspects of particular subject than its mathematical counterparts. Computer programmers cant make assumptions about what they are modelling, they have to consider every variable.

I put a very simple fact to a professor at my local university, although it was quite clearly fact and she agreed with that, her reply was that we assume it doesnt make a difference.

The problem with this assumption is that if it does infact make a difference then it sort of breaks the basic principle of imperical methods, the controlled experiment.

connect

Jan1-05, 09:53 AM

Further to my last point, a look at the framework of physics or 'physics in itself' i.e. mathematical structures, will probably provide hints towards understanding why things are like they are. I mean think about the common things in every equasion you look at, think about the very fact it is an equasion, all equasions are equasions, mathematical structures, in someway physics is already unified.

Mathematical expressions are twofold, on one side you have the numbers that express variable quantities and on the other you have the structral operaters that express the relationship between the quantities.

Maybe its the glue itself, the relationship the binds the quantities together that will provide the real clues.

Think about the root of numbers, it might seem obvious as to what they are, but a closer look at such a simple notion provides some very interesting features, especially to physics.

When you look at the world around you, numbers arise from counting objects, you might say there are three coins on the table infront of you. You could also say there are 3 items on the table and each item is different, I mean you could have 3 different coins, but they are still coins.

If you look at those 3 coins, in this case we will say they are all the same type of coin, same size, colour, markings etc. what is it that tells you the 3 coins are different coins, that there are in fact 3 coins on the table in front of you?

The single most apparent thing is that they are in different locations, if they where all in the same location they would be the same coin. We differientiate between the coins because they are in different locations, different spacial regions.

Liebnez spotted this weakness in Netwons studies and as a programmer I recognise the point Liebnez is trying to make. When modelling a moving object in a virtual world, its location becomes an internal rather than external property.

In games programming there is a concept called 'tile based worlds' where a world is made up by the sum of its tiles, the tiles are fixed in location but transform their state over time to represent whatever object is present at that location at that time, like a tv screen where the pixels are tiles and the screen is the world.

I think this is what Liebnez is hinting at, that all entities exist 'within' space.

The concept of numbers is inspired by the world we percieve, the model in our minds.

Numbers are units, objects that are distinct from one another but whos relationship is always the same. The relationship between any number is the distance between them.

1 unit of something
2 units of something
3 units of something

That 'something' is always the same thing, a metre, a minute, a degree.

This rule breaks down when it comes to relativity i.e. variable 'somethings' or time dialation.

Maybe its time to explore Liebnez's route because Netwon's has been explored extensivily, I think branes is simply a repetition of string theory abstracted on itself.

Leibnez's theory is by simple fact 'richer' in detail than Newtons.

The tv screen example illustrates the two's thinking:

Newton would look at a TV screen and tell you each pixel is exactly the same:

Same shape
Same size
Same behaviour (can display one colour at one time from a possible range)

Liebnez would go one step further and tell you that each pixel is in fact unique by virtue of its location, i.e. no two pixels share the same location.

Nereid

Jan1-05, 11:17 AM

loseyourname

Jan1-05, 05:55 PM

Philocrat

Jan1-05, 09:03 PM

Connect, your thesis has substantial elements of truth in it. When it comes to the issue of 'IDENTITY AND CAUSAL RELATIONS OF THINGS', Leibniz thesis is logically and quantitativelly clear:

A and B are identical if and only if:

1) A and B are STRUCTURALLY the same

2) A and B are FUNCTIONALLY the same

3) A and B are TEMPORALLY the same (same location in time)

4) A and B are SPATIALLY the same (same location in space)

So, in Leibniz's terms, conditions (1) to (4) must be contemporaneously true for two things to be absolutely identical. None can be true without the other, otherwise A and B must be declared different. For example, identical twins may be structually and functional identical, but as far as the reality of the external world is concerned, they are physically installed in separate time and space locations. There are quantifiable spatio-temporal distances between them!

Well, this is all well and good, but the 'OVER-ABOVE-THE-PHYSICAL' advocates may very well insist that this does not apply to the realm of consciousness or soul or mind or whatever you may wish to call it. Correct me if I am wrong, your thesis seems to suggest that all forms of the human reality and knowledge (as advocated and vehemently defended by JOHN LOCKE) have 'PHYSICAL EXPERIENTIAL ORIGINS'. And as the master himself actually put it 'The Mind is like a blank tablet upon which experience writes'. Right? Well, the over-and-above-the-physical theorists argue (as they have consistently argued in this thread and elsewhere) that this is not the case.

If you say to them, for example:

Here is a mental image of a horse in a man's heard and here is a mental image of a unicorn in the same man's head. Both mental images are in every bit and form identical, except that one has a horn and the other without. And you then ask them 'HOW DID THE UNICORN COME BY ITS HORN?', or 'HOW DID THE HOLDER OF THE MENTAL IMAGE OF A UNICORN DERIVE AT THE NOTION OF A HORN, LET ALONE PLACING IT ON THE HEAD OF A WELL KNOWN HORSE TO GET THE UNICORN?'

Well, nearly all the different versions of the 'Over-and-above-the-physical' thesis would claim that the 'HORN' has no physical sources. If you are lucky, they would admit that all other parts of the mental image of the unicorn, except the horn, came from the external visual observation of a real horse. Anyway, don't take my word for it, directly ask them yourself. Don't worry about them not responding. They are very much arround. They will respond.

Les Sleeth

Jan1-05, 09:48 PM

So back to the religious thing (no, this is not a religious discussion!) ... is there any particular reason why deep thinking believers of other faiths don't get worked up over evolution? After all, AFAIK, most have creation myths - which include stories of how people came to be - and there's no doubt a great deal of excellent science (biology, geology, astronomy, etc) to show large parts of those myths cannot possibly be true!

Fundamentalism in religion always tends to be the squeaky wheel. You are debating in Western culture where Christianity is the norm, so the fundamentalist Christians are going to speak up first and loudest. If you went to cultures full of fundamentalist Jews or Muslims or Sikhs and started talking the details of evolution, you'd run into the same thing (fundamentalist Buddhists or Hindus are usually less worried about an interpretation that isn't traditional).

However, there is a more relevant issue. The way one approaches science exploration (reduction, analysis) doesn't work for understanding the holistic, unified aspects of human consciousness. The modern adage that when the only tool one has is a hammer, then one goes around treating everything as a nail is truer than ever. Bam, bam, bam! Reduce it, take it apart, analyze it . . .

People who actually have had reason to suspect there is something more than physicalness felt it. That's how it is known -- through feeling and not analysis! So when someone doesn't find anything spiritual through the methods that work for science, they shouldn't blame the spiritual side. To understand the God thing, one has to feel, and feel deeply. That's it. It becomes a pointless discussion when someone insists that inner, holistic experience be converted into an outer, parts "thing."

Of course, if someone doesn't want to feel like that, it's their choice and no one should criticize that. The criticism comes when someone against trying to feel "something more" starts treating those who do enjoy feeling that as though they are lacking intelligence.

Philocrat

Jan1-05, 10:15 PM

OUTSTANDING PROBLEM

1 MATTER

This monumental creature is by far THE MOST INTELLECTUALLY DEGRADED ENTITY known to man. Matter is so intellectually degraded such that it has now got to a point where it is almost completely psychologically settled in our minds that it has the same outward value as a garment that you wear and throw away when it's torn or out of use. In religious scriptures after scriptures we describe matter and anything made of it as a source of sins, as ephemeral and as completely divorced from the human reality. In science, physics especially, we head in the direction of intutionist mathematics, where cosomological entities and events are described in a manner that neglects their material forms and natures.

Consequently, the MIND-BODY battle is now intellectually so fierce such that it now appears as if though the material or corporeal aspect of the notion of a 'PERSON' must be explained and done away with.

QUESTION:

DOES MATTER HAVE MULTIPLE FORMS? DOES IT EXIST IN DIFFERENT GUISES?

2 WHAT THE TERM 'PHYSICAL' MEAN

'Physical' tends to settle in meaning at anything that stays within the bounds of our five senses and their extensions (all known visual aids such as scientifc instruments and sensors)? The problems that I have pointed out in many places in this thread and elsewhere are these:

1) We tend to scientifically give up at COP (Critical Observation Point). We stop being logical.

2) After we have exceeded COP in observation and measurements we tend to suddenly start believing that the things that we are observing and measuring suddenly stop being logical, lose their snesibility, forms, sizes and shapes, and somewhat derail into total chaos, or, even worse, into absolute nothingness. How can something that you were observing and scientifically tracking from one scale of reference to the next suddenly vanish into oblovion? HOW and WHY should you lose track of it?

3) In all the scientific observations and measurements, we tend to almost completley neglect the logical and quantitative implications of the observer himself/herself. THE PERCEPTUAL CAPACITY OF THE OBSERVER is often not taken into account in nearly all these scientific measurements. We tend to always naively believe that everything in the observer's frame of reference is OK, hence nothing there should be taken into account. Well, my argument is that any PHYSICAL MEASUREMENT aimed at being logically consistent and accurate must take the quantitaive and logical contents of the observer's frame of reference into account. Otherwise, we would for ever be labouring under fundamental errors and ignorance.

Philocrat

Jan2-05, 01:34 AM

IMPORTANT NOTE:

Since we do not know enough about the exact nature of Matter, instead of intellectually degrading it to this level of worthlessness that we have done, wouldn't it be wiser for us to suspend all judgements about it until we manage to get to know enough about it in the nearest or distanced future? Equally, with all the degrading things we have said about matter, there is currently no single individual on this planet who can claim to to be the authority (alpha and omega) in knowing or accuratley predicting whether matter would form part of the 'FINAL PERFECT HUMAN BEING'. Is it not a good idea for us to slow down a little bit and give it a little bit more thought before jumping into premature conclusions with proscribed terminal consequences?

Fliption

Jan2-05, 12:52 PM

IMPORTANT NOTE:
Equally, with all the degrading things we have said about matter

Matter is degraded by the rules we use to study it. It will never be anything more than what it is unless we choose to look at it differently. That's what these discussions are attempting to suggest.

Seafang

Jan3-05, 01:11 PM

Your version of the uncertainty principle is misleading. We can know some of the properties of a particle to arbitrarily high degrees of confindence, at the cost of being correspondingly ignorant about other properties.

Also Goedel does not apply to geometry or things derived from it, like real analysis. The question is still out on what this exception means for physics.

My 'version' of the principle of 'Unbestimheit' as Heisenberg put it is not at all misleading. In order to be able to apply ALL the laws of physics, to some physical system to predict its future state, it is necessary to know the complete set of present physical parameters; not just some of them.

Every single problem in physics I was ever given on an exam paper to solve, gave me all the starting parameters necessary to solve the problem. Heisenberg merely says that in practice we can never know that information we were given on the exam paper about any real system. Nothing at all misleading about that.

Knowing ALL about a particle's position, and nothing about its momentum, gives us no way to determine where it will be at any future time; (except in a statistical sense).

As for Godel not being useful for physics; perhaps it IS useful for a discussion of whether 'physics can explain everything', which I understand was the premise at the start of this thread.

Philocrat

Jan4-05, 12:10 AM

Matter is degraded by the rules we use to study it. It will never be anything more than what it is unless we choose to look at it differently. That's what these discussions are attempting to suggest.

What are you suggesting? Should the 'EXPLANATORY RULES' of it be changed? WHO IS BRAVE ENOUGH TO CAST THE FIRST STONE? How are you going to convince the show runners? What happens to all the books in physics and in other science disciplines that have been wrriten about matter? All the equations, formulations and tables of constants and variables that were formulated and deduced from the original definition of matter?

What about in religion? Are you suggesting that scriptures that reduced matter to a state of worthlessness should all be re-written? Well, even if you succeeded in convincing any of these institutions about anything, that in itself would be a marathon task of indescribable scale.

My main interest in raising this point is to get these institutions to slow down a little bit and think.....and the main point of my argument is that it is just too early to rush to conclusions about the exact nature of matter until we come into possession of enough information to do so.

Fliption

Jan4-05, 08:11 AM

What are you suggesting? Should the 'EXPLANATORY RULES' of it be changed? WHO IS BRAVE ENOUGH TO CAST THE FIRST STONE? How are you going to convince the show runners? What happens to all the books in physics and in other science disciplines that have been wrriten about matter? All the equations, formulations and tables of constants and variables that were formulated and deduced from the original definition of matter?

What about in religion? Are you suggesting that scriptures that reduced matter to a state of worthlessness should all be re-written? Well, even if you succeeded in convincing any of these institutions about anything, that in itself would be a marathon task of indescribable scale.

I don't look at reality as a collection of semantic distinctions. Unlike many here, I don't like to think of reality as divided into categories like "physical" and "non-physical". Whatever reality is, it is surely a single paradigmatic operation. The distinctions are man-made and don't really have any meaning to me, except when communicating with others.

So when we talk about the nature of matter, I see it as simply a part of the grand scheme. The discussions in this forum about consciousness are generally suggesting that the current rules that we think of relating to matter cannot describe certain aspects of reality. So we now have a choice to make. Either reality is a collection of inconsistent distinctions all co-existing with one another, or the way we think of matter needs an overhaul.

My main interest in raising this point is to get these institutions to slow down a little bit and think.....and the main point of my argument is that it is just too early to rush to conclusions about the exact nature of matter until we come into possession of enough information to do so.

I would argue that this is exactly what these threads are doing. Asking people who think of things a certain way to slow down and think. The argument is that they are moving 100MPH in the wrong direction.

All of the changes that you have described as almost impossible have all happened before when science has made a paradigm shifting discovery. Think Relativity and Quantum physics. As for religion, theologians are constantly interpreting their scriptures as not inconsistent with science. Scriptures are simply a collection of words as they are understood at the time of writing in order to communcate. The word "matter" as described in sciptures can hardly be compared to a current scientific description. So the message of scriptures about matter may be perfectly consistent with reality. The only thing that isn't consistent is the semantic use of the word "matter".

Seafang

Jan4-05, 12:24 PM

It doesn't necessarily have to be as you predict. There is no reason why God, say as some highly evolved form of consciousness, couldn't have brought about creation in a natural way and over time.

In my opinion it isn't due to Christian belief in God or Jesus that makes them resist evolution, it is belief in the Bible. The logic of considering the Bible infallible should seem highly suspect after one studies the history of the Bible.

Genesis for example, has two creation stories. Scholars attribute the first version to a priestly writer, usually referred to as "P", and a second older version attributed to an author usually called "J". Moses is claimed to have written all the first five books of the Bible, but how could he have written his own death, plus there are anachronisms throughout the Torah (e.g. empires were mentioned that did exist when Moses lived, the king of Philistines is portrayed hundreds of years before he lived, camels were describd in use before they'd been domesticated, etc.).

In this so-called "documentary hypotheses" (taught at all major divinity schools) besides J and P, three other authors have been recognized (E, R, and D), who are believed to have written the Torah from 1000 to 400 BC.

It's not just the Torah, but throughout the Bible we find the problem of trying to figure out who wrote the various books. It was a Hebrew custom to attribute a literary work to revered Jewish figures, and this custom continued to be a problem for New Testament writings as well. That and the fact that none of the writers are believed to have been witnesses to Jesus' activities leave us with documents we cannot be sure of.

I am sure you are familiar with "Q" and Mark's version appearing in the gospels of Matthew and Luke, and with Luke's admission he'd taken his writings from written and oral traditions (Luke 1:1-4). If the gospel author Matthew was really the disciple Matthew (and therefore a witness) why did he rely on Q and Mark to write his story around (sometimes almost word for word, as in Chapter 6)? Plus the author doesn't claim to be Matthew (the title "The Gospel according to Matthew" was added long after the document's original composition).

The only documents we are certain are first hand accounts are those of Paul, who does not claim to have known Jesus. Luke, as a companion of Paul's (if he was) and Mark (as Peter's secretary) were not witnesses either. Of the four gospels, the book of John is least believed by scholars to be the disciple John. It was written by an educated person fluent in Greek at least half a century after Jesus, not by an illiterate fisherman (Mark 1:16-20) who spoke Arameic as the real disciple, John the son of Zebedee, was portrayed.

Now, I am not saying there aren't inspired and inspiring writings in the Bible. I love parts of the book myself. What I am saying it that once one learns the history of the Bible, it makes little sense to treat it as the infallible word of God. It is clearly revealed to be the word of men, sometime inspired, other times writing history or myth or speculation or (in the case of Revelation) senseless ravings from trance induced by fasting.

Evolution (and I would agree with most believers that evolution hasn't achieved what it has through chemistry and natural selection alone), doesn't contradict anything for a person of faith if that person's faith is in God. But if one's faith in God and Jesus is dependent on the perfect veracity and accuracy of the Bible, then I think one is on shakey ground.

Well if you remove humans and ALL evidence of their existence from the universe, and leave all else untouched you will discover that you have also eliminated god.

The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract. it simply goes about its business with the big fish eating the little fish in a perfectly amoral environment.

MAN created GOD; not the other way around !

Les Sleeth

Jan4-05, 01:51 PM

Well if you remove humans and ALL evidence of their existence from the universe, and leave all else untouched you will discover that you have also eliminated god.

You don't know that. It's never been done, no one has ever witnessed it. No one knows.

The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract.

You don't know that. Absent of humans means no one has ever observed those conditions. No one knows.

[the universe] . . . simply goes about its business with the big fish eating the little fish in a perfectly amoral environment.

You don't know that either. That is true of aspects of nature here on Earth, but not necessarily all consciousness or the entire universe. No one knows.

MAN created GOD; not the other way around !.

And you certainly don't know that. All you know is what at you DO know. You can't possibly be certain about what you DON'T know.

Royce

Jan5-05, 02:01 PM

It has been some time since I last visited this thread. I did a search for what I am about to post and it came up empty so if this is repetitive I apologize in advance.

If we apply Godel's Theorem to Physics, or any human study, as well as Mathematics then it can be shown that no subject such as "everything in the whole universe" can be completely reduced to any formal system such as Physics.

To rephrase the Theorem: "Rules can be a partial substitute for understanding (and insight) but can never replace it completely" from Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose. (contents of parens added by me.)

selfAdjoint

Jan5-05, 02:38 PM

Royce

Jan5-05, 07:02 PM

Contra Penrose, geometry and measure theory are decidable. So if brain processes are continuous ("analog") rather than discrete ("digital" or "arithmetic") then they are not restricted by Goedel's Theorem.

I don't know why they wouldn't be. Goedel's Theorem applies to geometry and measure theory also. I also think that the Uncertainty Principle is proof positive that the theorem applies to Physics. Also synapses fire or don't fire.
I don't know that there is any analog degree, big, medium, little or continuous scales to their firing or not, nor if the neuron can choose to fire some but not other synapses. At best I would say that the brain's a combination of analog and digital but it doesn't matter as it is computational processing or non-computational consciousness that we are talking about; but thats another thread. I just thought of this thread as I was reading the book and made this connection.

loseyourname

Jan6-05, 02:41 AM

I don't know why they wouldn't be. Goedel's Theorem applies to geometry and measure theory also. I also think that the Uncertainty Principle is proof positive that the theorem applies to Physics.

Uncertainty doesn't have a whole lot in common with incompleteness. Incompleteness has to do with the undecidability of entire formal systems; uncertainty only deals with four measurable quantities.

Also synapses fire or don't fire.
I don't know that there is any analog degree, big, medium, little or continuous scales to their firing or not, nor if the neuron can choose to fire some but not other synapses.

Brain activity is definitely analog. Action potentials are generated by continuous additive processes and can be stronger or weaker in varying degrees in both the positive and negative direction depending upon the computation performed. There are far more states a neuron can be in other than "on" and "off."

I think it should be noted that there doesn't seem to be much understanding of what "reducability" means. If all theories are reducable to theories of physics, then the answer to this question is "yes," even if the physical theories are themselves undecidable within any formal system and not all physical quantities can be measured with 100% accuracy. This doesn't necessarily mean that physics will explain everything, only that all theories of nature can ultimately be derived from physics. There can still be aspects to reality that are unexplainable through physics; they will just be unexplainable in any other manner as well.

selfAdjoint

Jan6-05, 10:09 AM

I don't know why they wouldn't be. Goedel's Theorem applies to geometry and measure theory also. I also think that the Uncertainty Principle is proof positive that the theorem applies to Physics.

The proof of Goedel's theorem uses the set quantifiers "For All" and "For Every" and the technique of mathematical induction. Without them, no Goedel. Tarski proved in the 1940s that any set-theoretic version of a geometric proof could have those quantifiers removed and still remain a proof of the same thing. In other words geometry, unlike arithmetic, can be developed from first order propositional logic, rather than second order which falls under the Goedel bane. And geometry just doesn't use mathematical induction.

In recent decades the work has been extended to measure theory over a complete algebra (like the real or complex numbers).

And as loseyourname said, their is no simple connection between undecidability and uncertainty, except they both have "un" in their names.

Royce

Jan6-05, 01:46 PM

All right both of you, loseyourname and selfAdjoint, it is a bit of a stretch I agree but I still maintain that in principle they are both formal systems with formal rules and physics is surely sufficiently complex enough to fall within Godel's theorem in that it cannot be complete. Whether you accept uncertainty as proof or not, physics has areas that are certainly incomplete, undecidable, unprovable and non-computational at this time.
As far a geometry is concerned it is a minor point and there is certainly more than one type of geometry, If geometry can be excluded from Godels theorem then perhaps that geometry is not of sufficient complexity. I don't know. I am certainly no expert in the subject.
Again analog or digital or both the processes of a machine are by definition computational. There are aspects of human mentality that are non- computational whether solely the operation of the physical brain or of something more.
The point of my post was that since there is at least one aspect of the universe that is non-computational then everything in the universe cannot be reduced to the laws or rules of physics and that this viewpoint could, just possibly, be supported by applying Godel's Theorem.

btw, is it spelled Goedel or Godel? I've seen both.

selfAdjoint

Jan6-05, 02:04 PM

It's spelled with a German umlaut (o with two dots over it). Pronunciattion varies but both Girdle and Gaydle are heard. When I learned German years ago, using oe to represent that in English was acceptible. Nowadays people conjure up the umlaut with keyboard tricks, but I can never retain those from one need to type Goedel to the next.

Next, both Goedel's theorem and Tarski's theorem (and the modern work by Smale and company) are theorems (duh). As such they are valid where their premises hold and are invalid where their premises don't hold. It isn't about compexity, it's about a particular kind of mathematical structure. And Goedel, in spite of tons of invocation by new agers, is strictly a mathematical thing. If you want to show it holds, you have to exhibit some branch of mathematics and prove it holds there.

Royce

Jan6-05, 05:22 PM

Roger Penrose is a new ager? Who knew! Oh well, it was just a thought. I thought it might be a new approach to an old subject. I guess, now is where Rosanne Rosanna Danna would say; "Never mind!"

Philocrat

Jan6-05, 09:35 PM

Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is incompatible with a 'PARAPLEXED UNIVERSE'. Ofcourse, I am not suggesting that our present universe is composed of 'PARAPLEXES' (perfect parts). The Engineering Principle of the 'PERFECT FIT' forces paraplexed systems to completely expel 'CAUSAL AND RELATIONAL DEFICITS' from their structures. This implies that no paraplex (perfect part) can form part of a non-paraplexed system.

The fundamental engineering argument is this:

If our present universe is paraplexed (all parts of it are paraplexes), then the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle is false.

It would mean that any part of the universe that appears uncertain or to function in an uncertain way is due to the human visual or obervational limitations. It would have no basis on the actual truth of the exact nature of our universe. Hence, the question that the Uncertainty principle advocates must now answer is whether our unverse (from the engineering point of view) is a 'PRARAPLEXED SYSTEM'. Is it?

Royce

Jan7-05, 09:17 AM

selfAdjoint, while I know that Goedel's Theorem was and is a purely mathematical theorem I do think that it is really a universal Truth that applies to all of reality and the universe. This is just my opinion and I of course can't prove it.
To me it simply says that we cannot ever know everything. There will always be more to learn and know and that some things in this universe and reality are unknowable to us at this time. Knowledge is not and can never be complete. It can not all be set down in a formal bunch of rules forever ending human inquiry and reduce us to data processors blindly following the complete book of rules.

Philocrat, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is just that a principle. Putting it very simply it says that we cannot know in principle the exact position and the exact momentum of a particle, an electron at the same time. It is not a limitation of mans ability or viewpoint but a confirmed fact, principle no matter how good or accurate our instruments become we can never know exactly both at the same time. So the universe can never be, in principle a 'PRARAPLEXED SYSTEM' which to my mind is the same as saying that it can never be, in principle determinant.

selfAdjoint

Jan7-05, 09:40 AM

selfAdjoint, while I know that Goedel's Theorem was and is a purely mathematical theorem I do think that it is really a universal Truth that applies to all of reality and the universe. This is just my opinion and I of course can't prove it.
To me it simply says that we cannot ever know everything. There will always be more to learn and know and that some things in this universe and reality are unknowable to us at this time. Knowledge is not and can never be complete. It can not all be set down in a formal bunch of rules forever ending human inquiry and reduce us to data processors blindly following the complete book of rules.

This is the HUmpty-Dumpty school of discourse. "When I use a word it means just what I want it to mean... It's just a question of who is to be master." (Probably misremembered from Carrol's, Through the Looking Glass).

Making up your own meaning for well established terms, inverting logical categories, using woulda-coulda arguments, and refusing to accept any new information at all; Royce you are a true defender of mysticism!:biggrin:

Royce

Jan7-05, 03:53 PM

My last post was meant only as a side comment of my personal opinion. From what I have just been reading Goedel was leaning a bit toward the mystical side himself.

I do not deserve your last post and it was beneath you, smiley face not with standing. Maybe its time you crawled out or your moldy textbook cave and watched the sun rise. There is a new age dawning whether you and other like you like it or not. :biggrin: :rofl:

selfAdjoint

Jan7-05, 05:11 PM

I apologize for the asperity. However I still don't think you are entitled to hijack Goedel's name for your own idea.

loseyourname

Jan7-05, 06:04 PM

He's right, Royce. When you take a mathematically proven theorem and hijack the name to apply to your own pet intuition, you give the false impression that your intuition is equally proven. Whether or not you intend it, this is intellectually dishonest and misleading.

Royce

Jan7-05, 08:36 PM

One of the wonderful things about pure mathematics and pure research is that it often applies or can be applied to the real world. As you both know I have been reading Shadows of the mind by Roger Penrose where he used Goedel's theorem to show that there are aspects of consciousness that are non-computational and thus according to him there is more to consciousness than can be duplicated by algorithms.
Reading this book, the thought came to me that this same approach might be applied to physics which is largely modeled, at least, by math and many if not most of the theories are given in mathematical forms. Thus physics is a form of a formal system that is largely mathematical and possibly Goedel's Theorem might be applicable to show that everything in the universe cannot be reduced by physics.

It was a thought that I thought was at least worth throwing out into the ring and see how well it stood up. It is not a pet theory of mine and I meant it in more of a dualist mode rather than spiritual or mystical mode which I no longer attempt to argue or discuss here. I had no intention of highjacking and thus soiling the name and work of a brilliant mathematician and sully pure mathematics by attempting to apply it to the mundane world of physics and philosophy.

If I have stepped on anyones toes, hurt their feelings or committed heresy in any way I apologize sincerely, profoundly and profusely.

(But, as I said earlier, according to Penrose, Goedel was at least dualistic and leaned toward mysticism himself. I really don't think that he would have been offended or would have minded one little bit.)

selfAdjoint

Jan7-05, 08:48 PM

The noncomputational proofs of Chaitin also depend on digital systems. Pensrose has never really treated the analog possibilities, because his chosen opponent, traditional AI, even the neural net kind, has always been resolutely digital.

loseyourname

Jan7-05, 08:59 PM

Reading this book, the thought came to me that this same approach might be applied to physics which is largely modeled, at least, by math and many if not most of the theories are given in mathematical forms. Thus physics is a form of a formal system that is largely mathematical and possibly Goedel's Theorem might be applicable to show that everything in the universe cannot be reduced by physics.

I still think you misunderstand the concept of theoretical reduction. Reduction does not mean that a complete proof of a formal system can be provided. If everything can be reduced to pure physics (as the title of thread suggests), that only means that all theories can be restated as theories of physics. Whether or not physics itself can be proven is not of consequence.

Royce

Jan8-05, 09:54 AM

Then, if that is case, yes, everything can be reduced to to a physical theory.
Will they be sound valid theories legitimately within the realm of physics?
I don't think so. There are studies which are not a legitimate study of physics such as art, philosophy, metaphysics, psychology to name a few. Just as Einstein's quote in your signature a physical theory of art would be meaningless and useless.

Nereid

Jan8-05, 08:59 PM

One of the wonderful things about pure mathematics and pure research is that it often applies or can be applied to the real world. As you both know I have been reading Shadows of the mind by Roger Penrose where he used Goedel's theorem to show that there are aspects of consciousness that are non-computational and thus according to him there is more to consciousness than can be duplicated by algorithms.An interesting idea, but with respect to Penrose and yourself, Roger most definitely did not show this! All he did, IMHO, was cobble together a bunch of ideas in a highly idiosyncratic way, and hope that not too many readers would realise how 'unclothed' the cobbling was. In particular, since we have barely scratched the surface on the neuro-chemistry, physiology, (etc) of consciousness, to assert that there are aspects which are non-computational is bold (shall we say).Reading this book, the thought came to me that this same approach might be applied to physics which is largely modeled, at least, by math and many if not most of the theories are given in mathematical forms. Thus physics is a form of a formal system that is largely mathematical and possibly Goedel's Theorem might be applicable to show that everything in the universe cannot be reduced by physics. Well, yes all this might be so. However, since (AFAIK) no one has attempted to do this - even superficially - we'll all have to wait for at least some 50k' details ... otherwise it's just pure speculation, n'est pas?

Oh, and given the provisional nature of all science, even if - in the 23rd century - your idea received a firm foundation in terms of the best physics of the day, no physicists (or Royce IV) could have any confidence that the new physics of the 24th century demolished the whole marvellous structure.

Royce

Jan9-05, 10:39 AM

selfAdjoint

Jan9-05, 10:48 AM

Yes, of course, it is pure speculation. I meant in no other way. Nor am I trying to demolish any structure. Did the advent of QM and Relitivity demolish classical physics?
May have dented it a little in extreme applications, but it didn't demolish it.

The advent of QM and relativity reduced classical physics to a subtheory, valid only under special conditions and up to a defined level of accuracy. And they introduced counter intuitive concepts like superposition and relative simultaneity, which directly contradict assumptions of classical physics and have attained very persuasive experimental support.

I think your posts would be stronger if you didn't bring in modern physics. The devil is in the details there, and this is not the thread to discuss them.

Seafang

Jan11-05, 11:27 AM

You don't know that. It's never been done, no one has ever witnessed it. No one knows.

You don't know that. Absent of humans means no one has ever observed those conditions. No one knows.

You don't know that either. That is true of aspects of nature here on Earth, but not necessarily all consciousness or the entire universe. No one knows.

And you certainly don't know that. All you know is what at you DO know. You can't possibly be certain about what you DON'T know.

Well to take YOUR assertions a bit further, YOU don't KNOW, any of the converses either.

So just what does KNOW mean to you; more importantly, what does KNOW mean in a universe devoid of Humans?

Inability to supply a rational explanation of something, does not justify blind acceptance of a completely irrational explanation.

Les Sleeth

Jan11-05, 12:59 PM

Well to take YOUR assertions a bit further, YOU don't KNOW, any of the converses either.

What assertions are you referring to? I don't claim to "know" anything about what you are commenting on. If I have an opinion, I'll state it as an opinion, not like I have the "truth," and I'll make an effort to support my opinion with facts.

So just what does KNOW mean to you; more importantly, what does KNOW mean in a universe devoid of Humans?

Those are two different issues. I know for myself when I've experienced something; I generally accept as "known" if I can confirm others have experienced something. That's it for me in terms of knowing.

But a universe devoid of humans doesn't mean the universe is devoid of some sort of consciousness, or devoid of beneficent purpose in some form or another. No one knows.

Inability to supply a rational explanation of something, does not justify blind acceptance of a completely irrational explanation.

Why don't you show me some of my "irrational explanations." Or any instance of my "blind acceptance." Your knee-jerk skepticism is just "blind" as mindless acceptance.

You are the one who made statements as though you know the TRUTH. You said, "Well if you remove humans and ALL evidence of their existence from the universe, and leave all else untouched you will discover that you have also eliminated god. The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract. it simply goes about its business with the big fish eating the little fish in a perfectly amoral environment. MAN created GOD; not the other way around!"

You don't know any of that, it's just your unsupported opinion. Either gives us facts to prove it is true, or state it as an opinion (rather than fact), and then give us evidence to show why your opinion is justified. Opinionated or pontificating posts say nothing of value philosophically.

Royce

Jan12-05, 07:36 AM

The advent of QM and relativity reduced classical physics to a subtheory, valid only under special conditions and up to a defined level of accuracy. And they introduced counter intuitive concepts like superposition and relative simultaneity, which directly contradict assumptions of classical physics and have attained very persuasive experimental support.

The last time I posted something to that effect I was figurative tarred and feathered and rode out of town on rail. I guess it depends on who is posting it.

I think your posts would be stronger if you didn't bring in modern physics. The devil is in the details there, and this is not the thread to discuss them.

It was just a comment in reply to Nereid's post, not germane to the subject of this thread at all. Cut me some slack, will you. Everything I post is not intended as gospel nor up for contention. It is simply conversational remarks.

Nereid

Jan12-05, 09:37 AM

DO until (Royce satisfied);
. slack := cut
END DO

Royce

Jan12-05, 07:10 PM

Thanks, Nereid. I feel better already.
So Penrose did not prove his point or, as you say, cobbled it. Do you then think that his point is not valid?

It seems to me another way of stating Goedel's Theorem is to say that in any given formal mathematical system of sufficient complexity there is that which is unknowable and/or non-computable, to use Penrose's terms. After all if a system could be complete then everything within the system would be both knowable and computable.

This, of course, would apply only to mathematics which is abstract and may not be directly applicable to the physical universe.

The Uncertainty Principle, however, is physics and physical; " Both the exact position and the exact momentum of a particle cannot, in principle, be known at the same time." We could say; "Okay, so what, we can know one or the other just know both." However, Richard Fineman in QED stated that because of uncertainty we cannot know or predict which path an electron will take to get from point A to point B. It can and will, in any given instance, take any and all possible paths. We can only compute the probabilities of the possible paths, add them up and give the probability of the path taken, the sum of histories.

This shows that there is that in the physical universe that cannot be known and can not be computed, which of course means that everything in the universe cannot be reduced to physics. There is that which is unknown and non-computable in the universe. I will not go as far as Penrose and say that therefore the floodgates are opened, but maybe it just sprang a little leak.

Philocrat

Jan15-05, 02:29 AM

Philocrat, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is just that a principle. Putting it very simply it says that we cannot know in principle the exact position and the exact momentum of a particle, an electron at the same time. It is not a limitation of mans ability or viewpoint but a confirmed fact, principle no matter how good or accurate our instruments become we can never know exactly both at the same time. So the universe can never be, in principle a 'PRARAPLEXED SYSTEM' which to my mind is the same as saying that it can never be, in principle determinant.

Ok, if our present Universe is not a paraplexed system, the next question is this:

Can a paraplex, let alone a system in which it's a part, be created under the present state of our universe? Or even more ambitiously, do things and events in the present universe (or the universe itself as a whole) have the potential of becoming paraplexes? Can the unverse be rendered paraplexed in the strongest sense of the word?

Well, Transitional Logic (TL) suggests that this may very wel be the case. Now, consider the following TL statements:

1) A Horse is potentially a Unicorn

2) Man is Potentially perfect

2) The Milky Way is potentially a Paraplex

Acccoding to TL, statments (1), (2) and (3) may be true in the presence of Change (the right kind of change for that matter). If this is true, it means that the three statements may be logically rescheduled thus to meet this criterion:

1) A Horse is potentially a Unicorn if, and only if, a Horse is changeable

2) Man is Potentially perfect if, and only if, man is changeable

2) The Milky Way is potentially a Paraplex if, and only if, the Milkyway is changeable

All well and good, but we have only attached conditons to the TL staments. For we still have to say something about change both in terms of the need to recommend the RIGHT kind of change and in terms of WHY Change is necessary in the overal concept at all in the first place. Well, with regards to the former, it is necessary to decide whether FUNCTIONAL CHANGE or STRUCTURAL CHANGE that is suitable for this conceptual scheme. For the purpose of definition, Functional change(s) are such things as learning, copying, teaching, penal sanctions, and the normal workings of things as they originally were without any alteration in their original forms and structures. Whereas, Strunctural Change is something equivalent to scientific interference with, or alterations in, the underlying physical structures and forms of things. Well, if you ask me what is the problem with both, my answer would be:

A) Functional Change appears somewhat Circular. It seems as if things are just going around in circles by repetitious recycling of their imperfect parts as a rather strange means of keeping them going for as long as they last. That is, without any real change.

B) Structural Change, on the other hand, seems to be permanently avoided by many people because of their unpredictable consequences, such as the long-standing fear that Frankenstein's Monster may result. Whenever you hear people repeatedly say 'Don't mess or interfer with nature', this is precisely what they are referring to. They are simply telling you, we do not want this kind of change.

With regards to Change Type-A, as far back as to socrates, many philosophers have asked whether you can change someone from an immoral person to a moral person by teaching or penal sanction? You only have to see the current state of the world to appreciate the implication of this question. We tend to repeatedly do things that we have instructed ourselves not to do - from repeated offenders to repeated and the never-ending war mongering. Up till today we are still as barbabric and viscious as we have ever been- we are still fighting and killiing each other in ever larger scale, and no amount of education had succeeded in shaking the human intelligence off the barbaric state of war. Hence, the standard suspicion that many philosophers hold is that Functional change leads to a fruitless circularism. That is, it is not the type of change that can shift the human progress proper from point A to point B. With regards Change Type-B, scientists tend to have fundamentally retired to the position of 'PREVENT AND CURE', and given in to the slogan 'Don't mess with nature!' Question: but what about if nature messes with you, who knows?, and maybe settles the scores with you in the same way that it did with the dinoseours? For there is nothing which logically rules this out!

So, as you can see both types of change are equally problematic.

On the Latter issue about change (i.e why change in the first place?), well the standard assumption in TL is that:

Anything that was originally perfect can never change

If this is true, then the three TL Conditional statements must be logically rescheduled thus:

ARGUMENT 1:

A Horse is potentially a Unicorn if, and only if, a Horse is changeable
A Horse is changeable if, and only if, a Horse is originally defective (both in structure and in function)

ARGUMENT 2:

Man is Potentially perfect if, and only if, man is changeable
Man is changeable if, and only if, man was originally defective (both in structure and in function)

ARGUMENT 3:

The Milky Way is potentially a Paraplex if, and only if, the Milkyway is changeable
The milky way is changeable if, and only if, the milky way was originally defective (in structure and in function)

This Schema in TL suggests that given the right type of change and given that things under change had built in natural potentilities for change, then potentially they could eventually in the end be anything they so desire.

QUESTIION: Given the long existing controversy over the type of change that is appropriate for this TL schema, which one should it actually be? Which one would you recommend? If we succeeded in recommending the right type of change, would this lead to the construction of genuine paraplexes, let alone paraplexed systems that they may finally collect into? And, ultemately, would Heisenberg uncertainty principle still hold?

Royce

Jan15-05, 10:34 AM

Philocrat

Jan16-05, 12:56 AM

I don't really think the term "defective can be legitimately applied to an evolving non- manufactured system.
One could rightly say that a system such as the Milkyway is perfect for the state that it is in at this point in its evolution, at any point in its evolution. If it weren't it wouldn't or couldn't evolve or continue to exist. How could we apply the terms perfect or defective to any system when we don't completely understand its purpose, if any, or its current state as compared to its ideal or perfect state? What does a perfect galaxy look like or do? I sure don't know, nor does anyone else. We don't even know if such a thing can exist.

Well, this now raises another fundamental question:

IS EVOLUTION PROGRESSIVE, LET ALONE PERFECTIBALE?

Or is it a mindless, purposeless and non-progresives or regressive venture in spacetime? Well, some of the earlier postings in this thread tend to suggest this. Would this be what you are also suggesting?

On the issue of the 'Milkyway being perfect', I am not quite sure of this given the way that I personally define and understand the terms 'perfect' and 'Paraplex' or 'Paraplexed System'. On this, it seems that both of us have different definitions of the term 'Perfect' or 'Perfection'. Well, if you are interested in knowing my own version of the term ‘PERFECTION’, I have defined it in many places on PF, but I will take this one to be my best estimate of the term 'Perfect' (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=416968#post416968 ) ( http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=416968#post416968 ) I appreciate the fact that many people would define it in their own ways. I have come across this term in countless threads on this PF, yet none even a single soul has made any attempt to give us at least a glimpse of what they mean, let alone define it in an appropriate way

My argument is that if the Milkyway were perfect in the strongest sense of the term, then, from the configuration point of view as strictly defined by the engineering principle of 'PERFECT FIT', it would be something equivalent to a paraplex. And as you suggested earlier that the Universe is not a paraplexed system and therefore the uncertainty principle is upheld. If this were true, then the Milky way would not be part of our universe, because the principle of the perfect fit, by definition, rigorously extrocises or excludes paraplexes from non-paraplexed systems.

When I first encountered Stephen Hawking's Black Hole theory many years ago through reading his best seller books (A Brief History of Time and Stephen Hawking's Universe), I honestly thought that Black Holes were paraplexes. I was deeply troubled by this, because this would suggest the possibility of paraplexes co-existing with non-paraplexes in a non-paraplexed system. I was even more troubled and confused when Stephen suggested in his theory that no information can come out of a black hole, but when he reversed this theory last year I breathed a sigh of relief. So, as you can see the possiblility of mistaking certain things and events for paraplexes in our universe does exist, and I wouldn't blame anyone for calling them 'perfect'

Philocrat

Jan16-05, 02:03 AM

I don't really think the term "defective can be legitimately applied to an evolving non- manufactured system.

Well, the only problem with this is that our mind for some strange inexplicable reasons seems to have already made a good estimate of how most existing things should work or be. Even with all the problems that we have with defining the term 'perfect', people do extrapolate and imagine things like these:

1) I wish there were no natural disasters (eathqaukes, horicanes, floods etc)

2) I wish I could live forever without ever dying

3) Why is a multi-condition form of life impossible?

4) Is a multi-condition form of life possible?

5) If the sun finally burns out and decays, what would happen to the human race?

6) Would the growth and decay of the sun (or any other cosmological catastrophies) lead to interplanetary migration of the human race?

And so on. That we are able to make these sorts of imginative estimates about how the world and the wider universe should be does suggests that we are naturally predisposed to hunger for 'SOMETHING MORE' than we currently experience. It seems as if we are always craving for purposive things and events that genuinely progress to greater things. My own view is that whatever we are always expecting is not only PURPOSIVE and PROGRESSIVE, but also PERFECTIBLE! I could be wrong, but that's my view anyway.

On the issue of what is naturally 'defective' and when things can be construed as defective, well, the fact that we are naturally predisposed to see less of what is already there and expect more from those things does appear as if though we are looking at such things as structurally and functionally inadequate, hence the need and perhaps the possiblity of changing or evolving them to structurally and functionally better states. Well, if this is true, then it is immaterial or irrelevant whether such things were manufactured or not. My argument is that if things were originally working well, the human beings (at least some of us) would not see less of those things, let alone our desire to change them to what we think better. There is more to change than things just going around in circles in what outwardly appears somewhat pointless or regressive.

Seafang

Jan18-05, 01:01 PM

loseyourname

Jan18-05, 07:17 PM

Philocrat

Jan18-05, 07:43 PM

loseyourname

Jan18-05, 08:06 PM

Loseyourname, that gravely worries me as well. I have had nightmares about it lately. I just gave up when people continuously dudged my questions. Even when I tried many pages back to remind people of exactly this, I just saw people like magicians cunningly took to their hills. Eventually, I just gave myself a 'holiday' and went with the flow. I share the blame, if there is one levied. Give me a few days and let me shake this 'holiday' out of my senses and I should come up with something.

Happy New Year to you and everyone!

Thanks Philo. Happy New Year to you, too.

I get the impression from these forums that a lot of the posters are going to turn every thread into the same debate between physicalist and anti-physicalist models of consciousness no matter the issue you are actually trying to bring up. If you are interested in looking for it, there was a thread in the biology forum a couple of months ago about whether or not biology had become too reductive in its recent emphasis on molecular biology. Many of the posters, myself included, agreed that it had, in that reductive techniques can tell you nothing about operational systems in context. Molecular biology is great for explaining proteins and nucleotides, but cellular biology is necessary to explain cells, physiology and anatomy are both necessary to explain tissues and organs, and many levels of medical science, evolution, and zoology are necessary to explain whole organisms. When we begin to discuss entire ecosystems in which many organism interact with each other and non-organic parts of their environment, the explanatory capacity of molecular techniques alone becomes almost non-existent. Any attempt to explain something like social behavior simply by citing neurophysiological processes is going to fall way short and miss much of the point.

A great scientist that is sympathetic to concerns like yours is Edward O. Wilson. I've always enjoyed reading him. Niles Eldredge touches on some of the same things as well - Wilson in the realms of social behavior and ecology, Eldredge mostly in behavior and specifically sexual behavior.

selfAdjoint

Jan18-05, 10:44 PM

Philocrat

Jan19-05, 12:31 AM

Thanks Philo. Happy New Year to you, too.

I get the impression from these forums that a lot of the posters are going to turn every thread into the same debate between physicalist and anti-physicalist models of consciousness no matter the issue you are actually trying to bring up. If you are interested in looking for it, there was a thread in the biology forum a couple of months ago about whether or not biology had become too reductive in its recent emphasis on molecular biology. Many of the posters, myself included, agreed that it had, in that reductive techniques can tell you nothing about operational systems in context. Molecular biology is great for explaining proteins and nucleotides, but cellular biology is necessary to explain cells, physiology and anatomy are both necessary to explain tissues and organs, and many levels of medical science, evolution, and zoology are necessary to explain whole organisms. When we begin to discuss entire ecosystems in which many organism interact with each other and non-organic parts of their environment, the explanatory capacity of molecular techniques alone becomes almost non-existent. Any attempt to explain something like social behavior simply by citing neurophysiological processes is going to fall way short and miss much of the point.

A great scientist that is sympathetic to concerns like yours is Edward O. Wilson. I've always enjoyed reading him. Niles Eldredge touches on some of the same things as well - Wilson in the realms of social behavior and ecology, Eldredge mostly in behavior and specifically sexual behavior.

This sounds as if biology is about to explain itself out of business. Let's say for an argument's sake that Biology can be wholly reduced to the next level, and perhaps rendered descriptively bankrupt, in your professional knowledge and honest opinion, what level down the 'Explanatory ladder' is biology? I am asking this question because, in my own limited understanding of the whole reductionsit process, it seems to me that even if biology were to be wholy reducible to the next scale, would it not be correct to say that biology still has an explanatory role to play in the process?

Another point is this. Let's say that it is possible to structurally and functionally improve the natural world at the cosmological or QM level, would this stop things from still happening at the biological level? If things are structurally improved at the QM level, would this not also autoamtically improve things at the biological level, or even higher up the explanatory ladder? This is one amongst many of the puzzling features of the whole of this Redunctionist Scheme.

Anyway, thanks for your suggestions and references. I will spend some time looking them up.

--------------------------
Save Our planet....stay green! May the book of nature serve you well, and bring you all that is good!

Philocrat

Jan19-05, 12:45 AM

I think that rather than say biology has become too reductive, we should encourage study of branches other than molecular biology alongside molecular biology. The knowledge that MB is returning is splendid, and we mustn't rest until we truly do understand protein dynamics, chemical pathways in the body, and all the rest. But behavior of animals, macroscopic physiology and the rest need to still be studied; they will return great knowledge too.

The whole reductionism versus higher level study looks like a pernicious blind alley to me.

Well, Loseyourname seems to think that, reductively, things are shaky in Bioology discipline, and this is why I am asking whther all the voluminous amounts of data amassed over the centuries in that discipline all comes to nothing. All wasted? I am going to read a little bit more on this.

----------------
Save our Planet......Stay Green!. May the 'Book of Nature' serve you well and bring you all that is good!

loseyourname

Jan19-05, 01:58 AM

I think that rather than say biology has become too reductive, we should encourage study of branches other than molecular biology alongside molecular biology. The knowledge that MB is returning is splendid, and we mustn't rest until we truly do understand protein dynamics, chemical pathways in the body, and all the rest. But behavior of animals, macroscopic physiology and the rest need to still be studied; they will return great knowledge too.

The whole reductionism versus higher level study looks like a pernicious blind alley to me.

I don't have any problem with molecular biology; it just seems that everyone who is studying biology these days is studying molecular biology and that's where all the money is going because of the potential returns in biotech. It's dominating the field. I think reductionism is very important, but it doesn't tell the whole story. Research needs to be conducted at all levels, though I do understand that, with funding set up the way it is, more research will always be conducted in fields that are more likely to produce a profit of some sort.

loseyourname

Jan19-05, 02:02 AM

Well, Loseyourname seems to think that, reductively, things are shaky in Bioology discipline, and this is why I am asking whther all the voluminous amounts of data amassed over the centuries in that discipline all comes to nothing. All wasted? I am going to read a little bit more on this.

No! I don't think it's wasted. I just think that a purely reductive understanding doesn't tell you much. I'm really just trying to answer the question. If all we know is physics, even if we have a perfect understanding, I don't think we would know a whole lot about the natural world. The interactions taking place at the biological level, especially at the interorganismic level, are so incredibly complex that a physical understanding alone tells you almost nothing. Still, it tells you plenty about the natural world at the lower levels of organization and complexity. Both are integral to a complete worldview.

Seafang

Jan19-05, 12:12 PM

You know, I just realized a funny thing. The question in this poll asks "In what other ways can the physical world be explained?" How ironic is it that almost the entire thread since has revolved around whether or not there are non-physical aspects to the world, and that isn't even what was asked. I think the author really meant to ask if certain physical phenomena can be better explained through disciplines like biology, ethology, and perhaps even psychology that have not traditionally been reductive, rather than reducing all scientific theories to theories of physics. It's funny that not a single person has answered that question.

Well I am not aware of anyone claiming that the answer to the question is 'yes'.

For those who interpret the word 'everything' to mean 'every THING', they might take the position that 'THINGS' are elements of the physical universe, and then assert that the answer is yes (well in principle), but if one interprets 'everything' to include nouns that are not objects in the universe; such as 'TERROR' for example, then the answer is clearly NO.

I choose to interpret the word 'everything' to mean the latter, since if it does not, then we need another word that does mean 'everything' in that definition, so it might as well be 'everything' as any other combination of symbols.

So NO; I do not believe everything can be reduced to pure physics.

Do I believe every THING in the physical universe can be reduced to pure physics; my answer is YES (in principle) but probably not by us, and certainly not by me.

That does not mean we can know everything about the physical universe; in other words it does not contradict Heisenberg. Heisenberg's principle of "Unbestimheit" (probably with an umlaut) IS a part of pure physics after all, not an antagonist to pure physics.

Les Sleeth

Jan19-05, 03:47 PM

[QUOTE=Les Sleeth]What assertions are you referring to? I don't claim to "know" anything about what you are commenting on. If I have an opinion, I'll state it as an opinion, not like I have the "truth," and I'll make an effort to support my opinion with facts.

>>Originally Posted by Les Sleeth
You don't know that. It's never been done, no one has ever witnessed it. No one knows.

(that's four assertions)

You don't know that. Absent of humans means no one has ever observed those conditions. No one knows.

(that's three assertions)

You don't know that either. That is true of aspects of nature here on Earth, but not necessarily all consciousness or the entire universe. No one knows.

(another five assertions)

And you certainly don't know that. All you know is what at you DO know. You can't possibly be certain about what you DON'T know.

(Three more assertions)

So about fifteen assertions in all (in just that one post).

The converse of each of those is easily deduced. Can you show that you KNOW any of them. ?

The converse of my statements are easily deduced? You can do it, but it won't make sense. And there aren't 15 different assertions. Mostly I am asserting the standards of proof and evidence, which requires observation. Most of what you said is just your opinion, yet you stated it as fact. THAT is my objection. If you want to assert something which isn't generally agreed upon (which all my assertions are) you have to back it up with evidence and logic to show us why it's true or at least plausible. Only God gets to talk in absolutes, and none of us agree he/she/it exists.

I liked your last response to Loseyourname. To me that is a careful and conservative statement about what is known. It contrasts sharply with your first comments.

loseyourname

Jan19-05, 03:53 PM

I choose to interpret the word 'everything' to mean the latter, since if it does not, then we need another word that does mean 'everything' in that definition, so it might as well be 'everything' as any other combination of symbols.

Okay, but did you look at the actual poll question? It only asks about physical things.

So NO; I do not believe everything can be reduced to pure physics.

Do you believe that all scientific theories can be reduced to theories of physics and that explanatory power would be retained? I'm pretty sure that is the question Philo was trying to ask.

Do I believe every THING in the physical universe can be reduced to pure physics; my answer is YES (in principle) but probably not by us, and certainly not by me.

Okay, again, you think it can be done, but do you think it will have any real explanatory power at high levels of complexity?

That does not mean we can know everything about the physical universe; in other words it does not contradict Heisenberg. Heisenberg's principle of "Unbestimheit" (probably with an umlaut) IS a part of pure physics after all, not an antagonist to pure physics.

That's fine. Neither reduction nor explanation entails knowing the precise position and momentum, or energy and time, of every particle in the universe.

saviourmachine

Jan25-05, 10:05 AM

...The question in this poll asks "In what other ways can the physical world be explained?"
...
I think the author really meant to ask if certain physical phenomena can be better explained through disciplines like biology, ethology, and perhaps even psychology that have not traditionally been reductive, rather than reducing all scientific theories to theories of physics...Given: physics. Asked: explanations.

So, indeed a quarrel about the given - as physics + metaphysics - doesn't belong to the topic.

Kind of explanations
But, what kind of explanations are asked for? Is asked for our description abilities of physics? The scope of natural/mathematical/physical language?
Is asked for the scope of physical description? Can we describe poems with physical language?
Is asked for a new kind of way to describe physics? Does exist beside the approach of physics by mathematicians, poets, and songwriters, another new kind of approach?
Is asked for the validness of an explanation of physics? Is it possible to 'explain' physics?
Personally I think that (2) is the question you pose, loseyourname. And I think the answer is clear: no. Physical statements as now posed are too narrow to describe 'most things'.

Explanation in a language - what is a language?
I'm very interested in the scope of language - if I may call it that. Sign language can be regarded as a creole, not a pidgin anymore. What makes a language a real language?

Explanation of the plurality of existing 'languages'
How did we obtain languages of different levels? Why is it easier for us to describe everything in its own, specific language, than in one uniform language? There are chemical, physical, dance (http://www.dancewriting.org/) notations; biological, personal names; spoken, written, gestured utterances; computer, natural, scientific languages and the list goes on.
However, even if we have a language to describe a domain, I doubt about (1): that we can explain if we had the appropriate language: "Give me a paint and I'll give you a painting." [nothing more]

Seafang

Jan25-05, 12:04 PM

The converse of my statements are easily deduced? You can do it, but it won't make sense. And there aren't 15 different assertions. Mostly I am asserting the standards of proof and evidence, which requires observation. Most of what you said is just your opinion, yet you stated it as fact. THAT is my objection. If you want to assert something which isn't generally agreed upon (which all my assertions are) you have to back it up with evidence and logic to show us why it's true or at least plausible. Only God gets "to talk in absolutes, and none of us agree he/she/it exists.

I liked your last response to Loseyourname. To me that is a careful and conservative statement about what is known. It contrasts sharply with your first comments.

I must be getting senile; I can't recall using the word "different" when I pointed out there were 15 assertions in that one post of yours.

As to whether MY statements are just MY opinions; you can't know that. They very well could be; and usually are, statements (or opinions) from other persons who KNOW far more than I do about the subject.

For some reason, it is impossible to have a rational conversation with some individuals without citing peer reviewed academic journals for evidence of any statement one might make. That leads to unreadable posts because every few words require a new citation and an addition to the bibliography, and it conveys no more information, and merely transfers responsibility or blame for the statement to some other person or source; who then becomes the natural target of reservations of credibility.

At least one poster who pops up now and then all over the place (fortunately not here (yet)) is quite incapable of saying so much as one complete sentence in his own words, on any subject he chooses to post about. He merely cites interminable lists of links to other places where one must spend endless hours looking for believable facts.

As I have told him on more than one occasion, getting an education means one is actually supposed to LEARN and remember some of these things, so that they can be retrieved without the internet to be used when out in the boonies, or lost on a desert island. Being able to cite sources for information is of no use when those sources become inaccessible, and aren't necessarily any more credible anyway.

So I don't cite a lot of sources, unless I also know in my head what those sources are. I remember the general sources I rely on, but not the specifics that can be listed in a bibliography, and I am too long in the tooth to care one whit, whether others believe anything I say or not. If they choose not to believe what I say, that's just fine with me; I start from the presumption, they probably wouldn't believe the source I got it from either; and I am not going to lose any sleep either way.

So fact or opinion; doesn't matter to me how you choose to interpret what I write.

Fliption

Jan25-05, 12:48 PM

As to whether MY statements are just MY opinions; you can't know that. They very well could be; and usually are, statements (or opinions) from other persons who KNOW far more than I do about the subject.

I think the point was simply that they were opinions; not just "YOUR" opinions. They are opinions nonetheless. This whole post seems a bit insincere considering the comments in question are these:

The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract. it simply goes about its business with the big fish eating the little fish in a perfectly amoral environment.

MAN created GOD; not the other way around !

I don't think there is a rational person alive who would agree that these statements are anything but unfalsifiable opinions. No credible source would claim otherwise even if you bothered to list them. Of course, many of these rational people may actually believe this statement. But this would be nothing but their opinion, as Les was saying.

Les Sleeth

Jan25-05, 02:13 PM

For some reason, it is impossible to have a rational conversation with some individuals without citing peer reviewed academic journals for evidence of any statement one might make. . . . I am too long in the tooth to care one whit, whether others believe anything I say or not. If they choose not to believe what I say, that's just fine with me; I start from the presumption, they probably wouldn't believe the source I got it from either; and I am not going to lose any sleep either way.

So fact or opinion; doesn't matter to me how you choose to interpret what I write.

You've missed the point. I wouldn't expect you to cite peer-reviewed academic journals, I just expect you to make your case. Often that does require a bit of evidence, but at the very minimum it requires a poster to demonstrate there are sound reasons for a stated opinion.

Just stating "The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract," or "MAN created GOD; not the other way around!" is saying nothing. Why should anyone care about what you think, and even if we did, how are we supposed to answer you? All someone can say is "Oh yeah, well God created man, naaaaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhh :yuck:, so there!"

If this were an "opinion" forum, then you could just drop in, lay your egg, and that would be it. But it is a philosophy area in the midst of a science forum! Call-in radio talk shows, or the General Discussion area here at PF are the places for unsupported opinions, not in philosophy (I wouldn't try it in any of the science forums either). No, tell us why your statements must be true, what facts support them, etc., and then we have the basis for a discussion.

loseyourname

Jan25-05, 03:36 PM

Is asked for the scope of physical description? Can we describe poems with physical language?

Personally I think that (2) is the question you pose, loseyourname. And I think the answer is clear: no. Physical statements as now posed are too narrow to describe 'most things'.

I was really asking more about reducing other sciences to physics, not the reduction of the arts and humanities. I suppose you can include social sciences. It's interesting to note that Wilson indicates a belief that the humanities and social sciences will eventually be reduced to biology, but that biology cannot be completely reduced to physics. Of course, he is a biologist. Both English professors and physicists may disagree with him.

Doctordick

Jan25-05, 09:59 PM

And I will come in on the other side. Rational thought and exact analysis can explain anything that can be explained. I can prove that statement is correct! What everyone will miss here is that a proof that something can be done does not necessarily mean one knows how to do it. Only an idiot equates the two concepts.

Have fun -- Dick

Les Sleeth

Jan26-05, 10:53 AM

saviourmachine

Jan26-05, 11:51 AM

I was really asking more about reducing other sciences to physics, not the reduction of the arts and humanities. I suppose you can include social sciences.

Do you believe that absolutely everything can be expressed scientifically?
-Hedwig Born to Albert Einstein

Yes, it would be possible, but it would make no sense. It would be description without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.
-Einstein's replyI'd agree with Einstein for the last part. But I'm not sure about the possibility to express everything scientifically, far less physically.

I think that e.g. the following concepts can be difficult to describe scientifically: chance, hierarchy, information.

And, can mathematics be reduced to physics? Or is it the other way around? And are there no different ways to describe something? You can choose the math/language you like: Clifford Algebra, Lambda calculus.

Doctordick

Jan27-05, 08:57 AM

And I will come in on the other side. Rational thought and exact analysis can explain anything that can be explained. I can prove that statement is correct! Most of us know that a rational explanation is possible for just about anything one can dream up. Most of are familiar too with physicalist theory, and we know where the evidence gaps are. Yes, those gaps can be filled in with a rational explanation, but a rational explanation doesn't mean it corresponds to reality, and correspondence is the standard for science. No matter how logical you are, your explanation is merely theory without evidence. :rolleyes: Now just read that over once. I did not say at all what you imply I said. I said that, "Rational thought and exact analysis can explain anything that can be explained": you show me how it is to be explained (that thing which can be explained) and I will show you how to transform your explanation into a mathematical expression. (One might think in terms of a Dewy decimal system of representing explanations or do you regard the "Dewy decimal system" to be a theory? :confused: )
What everyone will miss here is that a proof that something can be done does not necessarily mean one knows how to do it. Only an idiot equates the two concepts.Yeah, but I can't even see you are all that logical. I know for a fact you can neither "prove" (using empiricism's standard of proof) that reducing everything to physics "can be done" nor that anyone "knows how to do it." Further, if in a science discussion, you want to decide proofs on the basis of logical validity instead of proofs based on evidence and observation, then you are demonstrating your own lack of understanding of the scientific method. Yeh, I've noticed that you have difficulty recognizing logic. And, I didn't say everything can be reduced to physics. By the way, you seem to be saying that evidence and observation supersede logic: i.e., that an explanation need not be logical so long as it yields the observations used to support it. Sounds like astrology to me!! :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

Les Sleeth

Jan27-05, 10:09 AM

:rolleyes: Now just read that over once. I did not say at all what you imply I said. I said that, "Rational thought and exact analysis can explain anything that can be explained": you show me how it is to be explained (that thing which can be explained) and I will show you how to transform your explanation into a mathematical expression. (One might think in terms of a Dewy decimal system of representing explanations or do you regard the "Dewy decimal system" to be a theory? :confused: )

Of course you can represent any rational explanation mathematically. But the math corresponds to the explanation, not necessarily to reality. The over-used example is syllogisms like, "all dogs are white, Rover is a dog, therefore Rover is white." The logic of that statement is perfectly valid, but it is not true that all dogs are white. You can easily represent that statement with math, but the math isn't going to give an accurate picture of that aspect of reality.

Yeh, I've noticed that you have difficulty recognizing logic.

In your posts I do. However, I have recognized lots of condescension, and very little actual substance. I don't think I've seen a single post by you that doesn't imply your superiority and/or others ignorance. If you are as learned as you claim, then why don't you demonstrate it on a post by post basis?

And, I didn't say everything can be reduced to physics.

In an earlier post you did (I challenged your use of the word "prove" that time too), so I assumed you still held that conviction.

By the way, you seem to be saying that evidence and observation supersede logic: i.e., that an explanation need not be logical so long as it yields the observations used to support it.

That sort of statement right there (you've said similar before) is what makes me think you don't understand science. I've said no such thing, and if you can find me saying it, then please post it here so all the world can see I am a nitwit.

Let's say I ask you for a map of Napa California. You figure out the most logical place streets should be based on the terrain of the area, and then hand me that as a map of Napa. Does that method work to produce a document which corresponds to reality?

You act like you are an authority on science, but then don't seem to even understand its most elementary principles. What kind of Ph.D education in physics fails to instill that science demands a map be drawn in correspondence with observation? Yes, logic is used to help one understand where to search for the evidence, but alone it produces no proof about external reality. All logic and math alone can "prove" is the internal validity of their own operations.

Sounds like astrology to me!!

I don't know Doctordick, I'm afraid wanting to map by logic alone makes you the astrologer here. The direction this thread took early on was away from "explanations" and toward what can be proven with evidence. So I don't know why you are still pushing for a merely logical theory. If you want to present a theory, why not start your own thread and invite others to explore that theory with you?

Philocrat

Jan28-05, 12:08 AM

Well I am not aware of anyone claiming that the answer to the question is 'yes'.

For those who interpret the word 'everything' to mean 'every THING', they might take the position that 'THINGS' are elements of the physical universe, and then assert that the answer is yes (well in principle), but if one interprets 'everything' to include nouns that are not objects in the universe; such as 'TERROR' for example, then the answer is clearly NO.

I choose to interpret the word 'everything' to mean the latter, since if it does not, then we need another word that does mean 'everything' in that definition, so it might as well be 'everything' as any other combination of symbols.

So NO; I do not believe everything can be reduced to pure physics.

Do I believe every THING in the physical universe can be reduced to pure physics; my answer is YES (in principle) but probably not by us, and certainly not by me.

That does not mean we can know everything about the physical universe; in other words it does not contradict Heisenberg. Heisenberg's principle of "Unbestimheit" (probably with an umlaut) IS a part of pure physics after all, not an antagonist to pure physics.

The distinction is irrelevant since the abstract term 'TERROR' is logically and quantificationally (or should I say, reductively) useless without the physical action that gave rise to it. Yes, it is possible for you to make the distinction exactly as you have done, but then a hard-headed reductionist may still insist that you not only must show clearly:

(1) HOW THE ABTRACT TERM 'TERROR' IS REDUCIBLE TO A PHYSICAL ACTION THAT IT PURPORTEDLY LABELS,

but also;

(2) HOW ALL THE PHYSICAL ELEMENTS THAT ARE INVOLVED IN BRINGING ABOUT SUCH ACT OF TERROR (HUMAN BEINGS, GUNS, KNIIVES, WND'S, THUNDER, HORICANE, TSUNAMI, FLOODS, FIRE, POISON, ETC) ARE REDUCIBLE TO THINGS IN OTHER SCALES OF REFERENCE.

This very fact became clear to me when Looseyourname woke me up (and perhaps everyone else as well) from my intllectual slumber to the fact that there is more to reductionism than just endlessly and fruitlessly concentrating on consciousness-phyisical reductionism. From what I understand of this, reductionism exists in other disciplines as well, such as Biology, Psychology, philosophy, Mathematics, etc. If they do, it is now of urgent need for us to demonstrate (1) how certain notions are reducible from one to the next within each discipline, and (2) how certain notions are reducible from one discipline to the next down or up the scales of reference. This distinction is very important because, very often, they are mixed up and confused as to what is precisely being demanded. So, in this very sense, 'IN-DISCIPLINE REDUCTIONISM' is equally as important as 'INTER-DISCIPLINARY REDUCTIONISM'

In the case of your own distinction that you were trying to make between the LANGUAGE TERM "TERROR" and the actual 'PHYSICAL ACT OF TERROR', for the purpose of having a name, this is pure and simple 'LANGUAGE-TO-PHYSICAL WORLD REDFUCTIONISM'. Well, this is one of the biggest problems that philisophers have been battling from time immerrial to resolve. This problem shows up in many areas of philosophy, including Philosophy of Langauge, Epistemology, Ethics, Metaphysics etc. That is, how are propositions in our natural Langauge reducible to the very physical things and actions that they purportedly describle? Why should we trust propositions as correctly converying the truths about the world that they describe? Why should we take facts about the world conveyed in this manner as morally consistent or reliable? And when such propositions are turned into 'ACTIONABLE BELIEFS', the problems that philosophers face escalate twofold. The question now becomes: how do you prevent false propositions held in us in form of actionable beliefs from being externalised or actioned in the physical world? These are the key reductionist problems that all these different departments of philosophy are attempting to answer.

NOTE: How do I define the term 'SOMETHING'? Well, I define it as anything that has a connection (or connections) with anything else, regardless of its current 'Epistemological Status'. And my long-standing argument is that, if such connections exist, then such things are reducible from one to another up or down the scales reference. However, there is one type of connection or relationship that I personally find very difficult to comprehend, let alone accept, and that is the claim that there is a connection between 'SOMETHING' and 'NOTHING'. On this PF, I have gone down on record for vehemently denying the possibility of such connection. As far as I am concerned: 'SOMETHING' IS IRREDUCIBLE 'NOTHINGNESS' NOR 'NOTHINGNESS' TO 'SOMETHING'.

Canute

Jan29-05, 09:12 AM

How are you defining 'nothing' here? Do you mean really, really nothing, or just what appears to be nothing to a materialist?

Doctordick

Jan29-05, 07:55 PM

Of course you can represent any rational explanation mathematically. But the math corresponds to the explanation, not necessarily to reality.You don't think I know that? I am afraid I am just not as dumb as you seem to think I am. Now I do not know about you; you say "of course" to what I said and then you diligently avoid taking a closer look by instead adding a stupid non sequitur.
I have recognized lots of condescension, and very little actual substance.And you blame me for appearing a little arrogant? I keep reducing the amount of new information in my posts in an attempt to avoid exceeding your attention span and even the little bit of substance you happened to have picked up on appears to be too much.
If you are as learned as you claim, then why don't you demonstrate it on a post by post basis?Because there appears to be no one here who manages to pick up on the difference in what I say and the outlandish distortions they presume I am implying. Just as you added in that phrase "but the math corresponds to the explanation, not necessarily to reality". What was that all about if it wasn't a straw man you were setting up to justify not thinking about what I said?
And, I didn't say everything can be reduced to physics.In an earlier post you did (I challenged your use of the word "prove" that time too), so I assumed you still held that conviction.I suspect you are here referring to:
I claim that physics (or shall we say "hard science" since the current state of physics has become rather senile in many respects) can explain anything.You seem to omit that "hard science" comment! Did you think I just put that in because I liked to type? It didn't seem to stimulate any thought on your part. Just why did you think I pushed the point to "hard science" anyway; from my perspective you don't seem to be able to manage anything but emotional reactions to my comments.

Also, I never made the claim that you said an explanation need not be logical so long as it yields the observations used to support it; what I said was that you seemed to be saying that. The point I was trying to get across was that the first step in any approach to answering any scientific question is logic! If your ideas have no logical defense, you have to be an complete idiot to waste your time looking for experimental support. Without a logical basis, you don't even have the information necessary to suggest definitive experiments.

And I didn't say you said that for the very simple reason that I don't think you are a nitwit. I am trying very hard to get you to think about some simple things which are critical and everyone, including you, simply take for granted without a second thought.
Yeah, but I can't even see you are all that logical. I know for a fact you can neither "prove" (using empiricism's standard of proof) that reducing everything to [hard science] "can be done" nor that anyone "knows how to do it." Now just how did you come to know that when you refuse to even discuss a logical attack? I know; God told you I couldn't didn't he?
Further, if in a science discussion, you want to decide proofs on the basis of logical validity instead of proofs based on evidence and observation, then you are demonstrating your own lack of understanding of the scientific method.When I studied physics (of course that was a long long time ago and maybe standards have changed since then, but) we didn't use the word proof! Proof is a term people studying math and logic use. Physicists only use the ideas of proof when they are talking about extensions of their ideas into realms not yet examined: i.e., if they assume a specific theory is valid, they can prove some specific fact must be true. They then use that fact to check the original theory; it tells them what experiments to perform. Now, seriously, is that anything I should have to point out to you?
Yes, logic is used to help one understand where to search for the evidence, but alone it produces no proof about external reality. All logic and math alone can "prove" is the internal validity of their own operations.See, you are aware of the need for logic; however, I would raise it up quite a way from "used to help one understand". Lack of logic is the single most prevalent error in most crackpot propositions. I would rather say that, in a hard science, it is an absolutely necessary starting point. Again, I am trying very hard to get you to think about some things which are critical to the questions you ask and which utterly refused to think about.
I'm afraid wanting to map by logic alone makes you the astrologer here.Again, the same fabrication of straw men you like so well. I never said that I want to use logic alone; that idea comes totally out of your mind. You have decided that you know what I am trying to do and have no interest in learning any different. And again with this "theory" thing! I have never said anything about presenting a theory. I talk about proving something and theories can not be "proved"; the best one can do with a theory is demonstrate that it is consistent with reality!

The question on this thread is "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" and, of course, the answer depends on the definition as to what is and what is not physics. If one is going to treat physics as if it is no more than a specific field like dentistry (which seems to be where it is going) then the answer is clearly no. However, if by "physics" one means "hard analytical science" then the answer is yes and, as a matter of fact I can prove it. If "hard analytical science" cannot explain it, then it can not be explained! (Let me amend that to avoid misdirection by the simple minded and constrain the explanation to being a "valid" explanation by which I mean the conclusions of the explanation are consistent with reality; i.e., all the predictions logically implied by the explanation are consistent with the collection of experiments implied by that logical analysis,) Anything else is simply out and out BS.

Did you manage to follow any part of that? -- Dick

Canute

Jan30-05, 06:46 AM

The question on this thread is "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" and, of course, the answer depends on the definition as to what is and what is not physics. If one is going to treat physics as if it is no more than a specific field like dentistry (which seems to be where it is going) then the answer is clearly no. However, if by "physics" one means "hard analytical science" then the answer is yes and, as a matter of fact I can prove it.
I'd very much like to see this proof. I've always thought that "hard analytical science" (and in fact even 'hard analytical philosophy') gave rise to undecidable metaphysical questions.

Les Sleeth

Jan30-05, 11:37 AM

The question on this thread is "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" . . . if by "physics" one means "hard analytical science" then the answer is yes and, as a matter of fact I can prove it. If "hard analytical science" cannot explain it, then it can not be explained! (Let me amend that to avoid misdirection by the simple minded and constrain the explanation to being a "valid" explanation by which I mean the conclusions of the explanation are consistent with reality; i.e., all the predictions logically implied by the explanation are consistent with the collection of experiments implied by that logical analysis,) Anything else is simply out and out BS.

Did you manage to follow any part of that? -- Dick

I followed all of it and heard the same thing I've heard before. The rantings of someone who thinks he understands everything better than everyone else. As I said earlier, I've yet to see a post of yours where you don't slip that in somehow. It's really a turn off, no matter how brilliant you are. With that attitude I wouldn't let you instruct me on how to swat flies.

However, I also hear another of your repeated claims, which is that you can prove with hard science analysis that everything can be reduced to physics. That word "prove" is significant. If someone comes here and argues none of the predictions of GR have panned out, there are plenty of people around who can prove him wrong because because it's been demonstrated.

But no once can prove a physical basis of consciousness, that it's caused by neuronal complexity, for instance. No one can prove physical abiogenesis. You can prove there are physics involved in those circumstances, but you cannot reduce consciousness and abiogenesis to a physcial explanation AND also prove the explanation is true (not yet anyway). That "and" there is what I am debating with you about, and it seems to me you keep reaffirming your claim that you alone in this world do have that proof. If you did then you would be first to prove it, so why waste your time on me? Go tell it to the scientific community and collect your Nobel prize!

No. Since at least consciousness and life are part of "everything," and since they cannot yet be proven to be caused physicalness alone (either by way of "hard analysis" or by observation), your claim of having proof is clearly overconfidence. Like I suggested before too, why not start your own thread and show us this "proof" (and don't forget to account for the subjectivity of consciousness :wink:). I would read it, and enjoy ripping it to shreads if you continue to call it a proof rather than, at best, a reasonable explanation.

Doctordick

Jan30-05, 11:40 PM

With that attitude I wouldn't let you instruct me on how to swat flies.And considering your attitude, I wouldn't want to! :rofl:
I'd very much like to see this proof. I've always thought that "hard analytical science" (and in fact even 'hard analytical philosophy') gave rise to undecidable metaphysical questions.Some "hard analytical explanations" yield the existence of undecidable questions; i.e., the existence of undecidable questions does not violate my proof at all. Essentially what I said was, if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists. Now the proof is not trivial and it requires a patient and exacting mind to follow it. If you really are interested, I suggest you take a look at the "What is Evidence" thread starting with my post at:

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=441146#post441146

If you can follow my comments there and understand why I made them, there is a good chance you could follow the proof. If I can keep a decent interest there, I will lay out the proof. But I have no compunction to throw pearls before the thoughtless. :yuck:

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Jan31-05, 06:47 AM

And considering your attitude, I wouldn't want to! :rofl:
Some "hard analytical explanations" yield the existence of undecidable questions; i.e., the existence of undecidable questions does not violate my proof at all. Essentially what I said was, if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists.
Actually all strictly consistent explanations give rise to undecidable metaphysical questions, not just some. You are therefore arguing that the universe has no consistent explanation. I agree. However that does not mean that it does not have an explanation, nor that the explanation cannot be known. All it means is that a strictly consistent formal explanation cannot be given. Buddhists and many others would agree.

Now the proof is not trivial and it requires a patient and exacting mind to follow it. If you really are interested, I suggest you take a look at the "What is Evidence" thread starting with my post at:

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=441146#post441146

If you can follow my comments there and understand why I made them, there is a good chance you could follow the proof. If I can keep a decent interest there, I will lay out the proof. But I have no compunction to throw pearls before the thoughtless. :yuck:

Have fun -- Dick
Ok. I've browsed your posts. Now it's time to cast your pearls.

Les Sleeth

Jan31-05, 11:12 AM

And considering your attitude, I wouldn't want to!

What attitude is that, the failure to kiss your condenscending rear?

. . . I have no compunction to throw pearls before the thoughtless.

The onlyl pearls you've been throwing are pearls of self-aggrandizement.

Essentially what I said was, if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists. Now the proof is not trivial and it requires a patient and exacting mind to follow it.

Do you really think everyone around here is going to agree ". . . if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists"? If you start off with that a priori assumption, you are going to have a fight on your hands every step of the way from some of us.

If you really are interested, I suggest you take a look at the "What is Evidence" thread starting with my post at:http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=441146#post441146 . . . "This is a finite mechanical problem which we all know is solvable (we have all solved it via intuition); so why is no one interested in solving it via logic? Most tell me that's because it can't be solved and I am a crackpot for thinking it can be."

Maybe you should listen. It can't be done and still be called "scientific." It might be called philosophy, but who knows since all we've seen from you are attempts to get readers to commit to buying your approach wholesale, and calling them idiots for refusing of course, before you even have put out one substantial idea.

Some "hard analytical explanations" yield the existence of undecidable questions; i.e., the existence of undecidable questions does not violate my proof at all.

That is not the standard even for a good scientific theory, much less a proof. :confused:

The material below is a taken from a link provided by Tom (another supermentor...btw, Nereid is a woman) to a theorist hopeful. It's notes taken from a lecture (which explains the choppy writing) on Popper's falsification concept that is now accepted as the standard for a scientific theory. Nothing I've read of yours (or what you claim you want to do) approximates it:

What makes a theory scientific? Or, what distinguishes science from non-science? (The demarcation problem.) Initial proposals:

(1) Science offers explanations.
(2) Science is objective.
(3) Science is descriptive.
(4) Science makes predictions.
(5) Science proceeds from observation.

The trouble with the initial proposals: they don’t do any distinguishing.

Popper

The following is the wrong answer to the demarcation problem: science is inductive; it proceeds by observation and experiment. Why is that the wrong answer? Non-scientific theories can be based on observation and experiment, e.g., "…astrology with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation—on horoscopes and biographies.”

Popper’s 4 candidate theories:
(1) Einstein’s theory of relativity.
(2) Marx’s theory of history
(3) Freud’s psychoanalysis
(4) Adler’s individual psychology

Popper’s intuition: (1) is scientific, (2)-(4) not. Truth is not the issue. At the time, Popper didn’t believe that Einstein’s theory was true. Exactness also was not the issue. The appeal of (2)-(4): Their apparent explanatory power. Exposure brought about an “intellectual conversion” and confirming instances of the theory were seen everywhere. Indeed, nothing seemed to count as disconfirmation, as evidence against the theory. Every observation could be interpreted in light of the theory.

The difference with respect to (1)— Einstein’s theory: The theory makes risky predictions, predictions which, if false, sink the theory. Einstein’s theory has the result that light, like material bodies, is attracted by heavy bodies such as the sun. This led to the prediction that the light from certain stars—those which appear in the night sky as close to the sun—would appear, if observed in daylight, as slightly shifted away from their normal position, slightly further away from the sun.

This prediction can’t be tested in ordinary circumstances because of the sun’s brightness. But during an eclipse one can take a photograph of a star’s apparent position in the daytime sky. And then photos of the star taken in the day and in the night can be compared and its apparent distance from the sun can be measured. This is just what Eddington did. And the prediction of Einstein’s theory was shown to be correct. The significance of this, acc. to Popper: Einstein’s theory, unlike (3)-(4), is incompatible with certain possible results of observation.

In other words, Einstein’s theory is refutable or falsifiable (the term that has stuck). It is possibly false. If our observations had been different, it would have been shown to be false (though they weren’t and it wasn’t). This, then, is Popper’s solution to the demarcation problem: A theory is scientific just in case it is falsifiable.

Truth is not the issue for Popper. Accordingly, his solution to the demarcation problem doesn’t make being true a criterion for being science. Theories that are true may be falsifiable. But, equally, theories that are false may be falsifiable as well. Some consequences and corollaries of Popper’s solution to the demarcation problem:

Theories not falsifiable by any conceivable event are not scientific. (Thus, the naïve view that science strives for irrefutability gets things exactly the wrong way around.) Every good scientific theory is a prohibition--it denies that certain things may happen. A test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. “Confirming evidence” is too easy to come by and should only count towards the acceptability of a theory if it is the result of an attempt at falsification.

Some genuinely falsifiable theories, when falsified, are maintained by their admirers either by re-casting the theory or adding auxilliary assumptions. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory only by destroying or reducing the theory’s claim to scientific status. (Popper calls such rescue operations conventionalist twists.)

Who passes the falsification test?
(1)—Einstein’s theory of relativity—passes. It makes risky predictions (re: the apparent positions of stars, e.g.) Astrology fails. Vagueness of its predictions makes it unfalsifiable.
(2)—the Marxist theory of history—fails. It once passed, but it was given various conventionalist twists.
(3) and (4)—the psychoanalytic theories—fail. No conceivable bit of human behavior could refute them. Non-science but not unimportant. Analogy with primitive myths. These myths often shape later science (the ancient Greek examples).

saviourmachine

Feb1-05, 07:32 AM

Only explanations by hard analytical science count
Essentially what I said was, if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists.What is valid, what is valuable? Everything hard analytical science can explain nowadays? Everything hard analytical science can explain somewhere in the future? How do you know what will be explainable sometime?

I read through your linked post. What did catch my attention was: "A correct analysis should include all possible answers." If that is possible. That's a belief in mental (or even linguistic) reductionism (the physical plane can be mapped to the mental plane).
"Work out logical consequences." with which logic system? S5?
"When we find a difference , all we have to do is look at reality and see which consequence actually occurs." If there is sufficient and obtainable data.
"Existence of meaningless questions." If it is possible to decide what is meaningfull and what not. If the subjective viewpoint of mankind (or the individual) doesn't influence what is meaningfull.
The frequent use of 'possible'. That falls in the realm of potentiality, not of reality.
And I've a few questions. Do you think that the ambiguity in language doesn't have a function? Do you think that it's impossible to have ambiguity in physics itself? That never [i]different valid answers can be found in nature?
What is valid?

Seafang

Feb1-05, 12:58 PM

You've missed the point. I wouldn't expect you to cite peer-reviewed academic journals, I just expect you to make your case. Often that does require a bit of evidence, but at the very minimum it requires a poster to demonstrate there are sound reasons for a stated opinion.

Just stating "The universe absent humans has no morality or ethics or religion or philosophy or anything abstract," or "MAN created GOD; not the other way around!" is saying nothing. Why should anyone care about what you think, and even if we did, how are we supposed to answer you? All someone can say is "Oh yeah, well God created man, naaaaaaaaaaaaaahhhhhh :yuck:, so there!"

If this were an "opinion" forum, then you could just drop in, lay your egg, and that would be it. But it is a philosophy area in the midst of a science forum! Call-in radio talk shows, or the General Discussion area here at PF are the places for unsupported opinions, not in philosophy (I wouldn't try it in any of the science forums either). No, tell us why your statements must be true, what facts support them, etc., and then we have the basis for a discussion.
And here I thought the question was;- "Can everything be reduced to pure physics?". I don't see any mention of philosophy there.

At what point does an OPINION become a FACT? Is it when every sentient being in the universe; known or unknown, accepts it as his opinion, that makes it into a fact, or is just a plurality, or a majority, or some other quorum of opinion holders who turn opinions into facts.

The history of science is replete with examples of facts that turned out to be not facts; well in most people's opinion. I think they call it concensus or something like that. Is it a fact if the National Academy of Sciences says it is a fact, or is that just the opinions of a private club of individuals who self select their membership; which tends to be exclusive of dissenting opinions as to what the facts really are.

But to get back to one statement I made, which yes is my opinion; that MAN created GOD, there is plenty of historical evidence for that. The histories of social groups and cultures dating back to the dawn of history contain evidence of ordinary individuals essentially enslaving their fellow folks, and subjugating them to a life of fear and obeyance based on ignorance and fear of the unknown.

The manipulation of other people through fear is as old as history, and the number of 'gods' created in these endeavors, is as numerous as the different cultures of history and geography. One thing entirely missing from the concept of these 'gods' is any notion of universality. Even today, some presumably intelligent cultures have numerous gods all of which they created. And they all seem to have the purpose of enforcing compliance with preferred behavior.

Now all of that is simply my opinion based on my observations of people's behavior and my readings of their history and the behavior of their ancestors. None of that makes it a fact, because there will always be those who disagree, and disagreeing with someone else's opinion is a necessary and sufficient condition for an opinion not being a fact.

So perhaps there are NO facts, merely a concensus of opinion.

Doctordick

Feb1-05, 02:37 PM

Well "saviourmachine", my first impression on reading your post was that it was "Harv" (a pseudo intellectual from Chicago I am familiar with). When I discovered that you had only made 57 posts, I read them all (as I have no interest in responding to Harv). Actually, you sound like a very rational person and, barring my disillusionment, I think we could have an interesting conversation. My first comment is to point out that "only explanations by hard analytical science count" is not what I said though the position does receive a lot of support from my proof.

My second step is to first discuss your ending questions.
Do you think that the ambiguity in language doesn't have a function?Yes, in the interactions of human beings, it has a very significant function. It allows them a great range of ambiguity in their dealings with one another. Without it many institutions essential to civilization might not even exist. Now, we could spend our entire lives discussing the "good" and "bad" aspects of that. Some people enjoy the freedom to quibble (it seems to me it drives most of the posts on this forum). In fact, that's why I thought you might be Harv. One very significant aspect of that ambiguity is that it prevents communication.

One of the excellent consequences of preventing communication is the fact that it is impossible to communicate beliefs from one generation to another. Misunderstandings will invariably occur and, in an attempt to make sense of what they think the previous generation is saying, new unique perspectives will arise. Without that ambiguity I suspect intellectual advancement would soon cease.
Do you think that it's impossible to have ambiguity in physics itself? That never different valid answers can be found in nature?If you think what I said implies that, I have entirely failed to communicate my thoughts to you. In fact, my position is entirely opposite to that position. I am of the opinion that the entire scientific community has failed to take into account alternate interpretations of the "facts" they are trying to explain.
What is valid, what is valuable? Everything hard analytical science can explain nowadays? Everything hard analytical science can explain somewhere in the future? How do you know what will be explainable sometime?Aren't these exactly the questions the scientists should be asking themselves? Shouldn't they do their best to take these issues into account in their perspective of the problem they are trying to solve? That is my position; I became a pariah in the physics community because I felt these issues were more important than "current research".
"A correct analysis should include all possible answers." If that is possible. That's a belief in mental (or even linguistic) reductionism (the physical plane can be mapped to the mental plane). I think you are taking advantage of the ambiguity of language to misrepresent my position. How did "reductionism" get into my position that no possibilities should be omitted? Is it really your position that, in order to avoid being "reductionist" one must omit some possible answers? If so, would you clarify what answers you want to omit?
"Work out logical consequences." with which logic system? S5?Aren't you referring the need for reducing ambiguity here? Or is this rather an attempt to use ambiguity to avoid thinking? I would suggest that, if you have an issue you want to explain to me, you come up with the logic system you would like to express yourself in and then explain it to me. Hopefully we can reduce the ambiguity to a level where I can understand you. If not, well, that's life; some things are very hard to communicate.
"When we find a difference , all we have to do is look at reality and see which consequence actually occurs." If there is sufficient and obtainable data.Isn't the existence of "sufficient and obtainable data" part of reality? Or are you using ambiguity to muddy the waters? Apparently the only complaint you have concerning looking at reality arises from the same source.
"Existence of meaningless questions." If it is possible to decide what is meaningfull and what not. If the subjective viewpoint of mankind (or the individual) doesn't influence what is meaningfull.Even if it does my position is still valid! What is meaningful and what is not is very sensitive to what you know and what you don't. If the information necessary to answer a question cannot possibly exist in your view of reality, I think the question can easily be labeled "meaningless". It is little more than definition of the term. Almost all your complaints rest entirely on the existence of ambiguity. And I have no argument with that issue at all. It is a problem we have to deal with and I think I know how to deal with it. However, it still stands as a major barrier in trying to communicate my ideas: i.e., English is very ambiguous mode of communication; particularly with people whose interest is not in understanding.
The frequent use of 'possible'. That falls in the realm of potentiality, not of reality.So, if you don't want to consider all possibilities in a hard scientific attack, explain to me how you, in your great authority, decide which possibilities should be ignored. Again, I really get the feeling you are using the ambiguity in communications to avoid thinking.
[i]What is valid?Which this question simply verifies! If you were really trying to be clear, you would realize that it is exactly your definition of "valid" which provides you with the mechanism to defend omitting those unrealistic possibilities you are accusing me of improperly including. Again we are talking about the ambiguity of the English language; there are many definitions in English which are not at all clear. But, as I said earlier, life is tough. At the moment we have little else to use in our communications.

You said you read the post I referenced. Again ambiguity raises its ugly head. What I said was:
If you really are interested, I suggest you take a look at the "What is Evidence" thread starting with my post at:

http://www.physicsforums.com/showth...1146#post441146

If you can follow my comments there and understand why I made them, there is a good chance you could follow the proof.What I meant was for you to read the thread (or at least my posts), not just that single post. Of course, if that is too much for you I will accept it.

Have fun -- Dick

Fliption

Feb2-05, 10:24 PM

saviourmachine

Feb3-05, 07:25 AM

Hi Doctor,

"Ambiguity prevents communication", so you say, and "without ambiguity [from one generation to another] intellectual advancement would cease". That has more nuances than I could find in the thread you linked, sorry that I couldn't find that at first sight.

I agree with you with posing many answers to a question, trying to falsify them and so on. If there is ambiguity in physics itself, and science would find a way to handle that, it would be fine. I hope science will continue to pose (non-)standard answers.

That is something I hope for, not where I believe in. I am afraid that the current scientific way to look at things is too immature, that I've been born too early. For example, I am looking at the moment to definitions as: phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, lexicon, prosody, syllable, that all are defined (in different ways :eek:) in linguistics, but without taking in consideration sign languages or iconic* languages.

IMHO ambiguity has to be reduced generally, but not at all costs. And probably it will turn out, not to be possible either. Therefore we do have different logical systems, different physical theories, different opinions about self-arising systems and so on.
If I "use ambiguity to avoid thinking"? Maybe... I point to the plurality of opinions, theories, systems in advance, but when I've time, I try to go into depth.

* see thread on EvC forum (link (http://www.evcforum.net/cgi-bin/dm.cgi?action=msg&f=14&t=654&m=1)), actually, I am looking for a linguistic forum

quantumcarl

Feb3-05, 11:35 PM

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone? How realistic is this claim? Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim? Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?

The only way to describe our physical universe is by way of our experience of the physical universe which is often termed physics.

Even biology, psychology and other disciplines rely soley on physics for their very existence. Without the intracate mechanisms that arise from a physical existence no other science or study could exist.

I will even further suggest that ethics is governed by physics. I've seen the equasions and they make sense. If I must I will dig them up for you. But there are parallels in physics with ethical philosophy that leave little room for anything other than a strong suggestion of a governance of physics.

To site the numerous conjectures that claim higher powers have created and control existence in the physical universe is easy until you try to prove the contention.

The fact is that even if there are non-physical entities doing their dambedest to run the physical we cannot study them for the simple fact that we are physical and our physical nature would pollute our study results of the non-physical.

In conclusion I believe the zen approach is the best way to try to get a full understanding of whatever the universe throws at us... including spirit or non-physical realities. That approach entails studying, with great discipline, that which we have in front of us. Studying that which we can observe. Studying it until we know it like we know our own breath. Then, there will come a moment when we may have a glimpse of understanding with regard to other matters............ or non-matters!

loseyourname

Feb4-05, 02:18 PM

Even biology, psychology and other disciplines rely soley on physics for their very existence. Without the intracate mechanisms that arise from a physical existence no other science or study could exist.

Come on, that doesn't even answer his question. Do physicists really believe this? The entailment of other sciences by physical phenomena doesn't mean that an appeal to physics is enough to explain living systems. You can describe the quantum states of nucleotides, but is that really a good explanation of natural selection? Or is it better to say 'abundant population, scarce resources, leading to survival of the fittest?' Which approach gives us more useful information?

quantumcarl

Feb4-05, 02:47 PM

Come on, that doesn't even answer his question. Do physicists really believe this? The entailment of other sciences by physical phenomena doesn't mean that an appeal to physics is enough to explain living systems. You can describe the quantum states of nucleotides, but is that really a good explanation of natural selection? Or is it better to say 'abundant population, scarce resources, leading to survival of the fittest?' Which approach gives us more useful information?

Come on yourself. :surprised

If you look at the evolution of matter it is a macroscopic blueprint that matches the evolution of the neucliotide or the evolution of anything for that matter. Philosophically speaking.<p>The study of ethics is, in effect, a study of physics. Just type into Google something like "the physics equasion of ethics". Another search that turns up some rare and cool stuff is this phrase "the physics equasion for Karma". It gets very spooky but I have the confidence that you will approach it with an open mind.

loseyourname

Feb4-05, 03:36 PM

Come on yourself. :surprised

If you look at the evolution of matter it is a macroscopic blueprint that matches the evolution of the neucliotide or the evolution of anything for that matter. Philosophically speaking.<p>The study of ethics is, in effect, a study of physics. Just type into Google something like "the physics equasion of ethics". Another search that turns up some rare and cool stuff is this phrase "the physics equasion for Karma". It gets very spooky but I have the confidence that you will approach it with an open mind.

"Evolution of matter" hardly does the process justice, which is exactly my point. I really can't think of any way to explain why one type of gene proliferates rather than another without reference to how its phenotypic expression fits into a certain environmental niche, can you? There are certainly equations in population genetics (Hardy-Weinberg comes to mind), but they are not physics equations. Even reducing evolutionary biology entirely to molecular biology causes us to lose crucial information. There are phenomena in the world that are just emergent, and cannot be comprehended entirely by an appeal to their lower-order constituent pieces. These are discussed frequently around here, the latest being autocatalytic processes in chemistry and the non-linear dynamics of complex systems.

I'm not going to look at your example of karma and ethics, because they don't concern me for the purposes of this thread. I'm just bringing up other sciences that cannot be reduced to physics.

Doctordick

Feb4-05, 11:43 PM

Yes, one could talk a long time on the nuances of ambiguity; but what purpose would the discussion serve since, in all probability, anything one could say would be ambiguous. :rofl: The most general service ambiguity serves is that it allows idiot savants to appear rational: i.e., you can usually find an interpretation which makes some sense. I personally think there is a good approach to AI in there somewhere. :wink:
I agree with you with posing many answers to a question, trying to falsify them and so on.I am afraid that is not what I am trying to get across here. As I said, usually finding a single answer is so difficult that coming up with one is difficult enough. All I was doing in that post was pointing out that I was no more than restating the standard scientific method to bring attention to these issues. What I am talking about is the importance of creating methods of attack which will keep one's options open. I have a method of doing that I would like to communicate; but, I can't find anyone reasonable enough to follow my thoughts.

If you read that thread, you should have looked at my post on the differences between "squirrel thought" and "logical thought". I made that post over six months ago and it hasn't generated a single response either supporting or rejecting my position that the division is significant. I can only assume that no one who read it had any comprehension of the issues I was confronting. Without understanding those issues, it is not possible to think about mechanisms to get around them.

I had thought "honestrosewater" was at least trying to understand (based on the last response to my earlier post) so I tried to make the next step in my presentation. See my post at:

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=447328#post447328

All of this was to get down to one very simple statement: the first thing I want to define is, "the field of mathematics". Maybe I should have said, "put mathematics forward as a defined thing". I thought I had made the step clear!
I leave your understanding and facility in that area entirely to your personal "squirrel thought" capabilities. That is, I am essentially assuming that statements I make in mathematics are communicable; the procedures and relationships so expressed are "equivalent" in your world view and mine in spite of the fact that there might actually exist an alternate interpretation of that collective set of concepts and relationships. (And, if there are inconsistencies, people much more qualified than I am are already working hard to straighten it out.)Apparently no one understood why I went to the trouble to put what I said the way I said it. At least no one has responded to the post.

The issue is that we don't want to throw the baby out with the bath water so to speak. If we are going to communicate we must establish a set of tokens as unambiguous as possible and this most definitely requires us to depend on squirrel constructs (meanings which are established by intuition and impossible to check). Thus I begin by officially recognizing mathematics as the most unambiguous collection of symbols, procedures and relationships available to us. Very through men have spent thousands of years trying to make sure it is internally consistent .

I chose that as my starting point in order to clarify the fact that, even when it comes to mathematics (a field taken by most to be the very essence of exact), the fundamental issues of "logic", "common sense", "belief" and "knowledge" arise. This arises because it is based, as is everything, on "squirrel thought": the fundamental source of our beliefs. If the subject is mathematics, humanity has a more consistent belief set than any other field. In fact, most people cannot even comprehend the idea that an alternate interpretation of the field of mathematics might exist.
You should be able to comprehend that the fact that you cannot think of a totally consistent alternate interpretation of something is no evidence that such a thing does not exist.This is a specific, small but reasonable, example of the mechanisms I use to keep the important aspects of the situation open in spite of the fact that I have no alternate interpretation to offer.

I don't believe anyone on the forum has the slightest idea of what I am talking about. I do not know if the problem is their simple failure to pay any attention to what I say or an overwhelming desire to feed their egos by spouting ambiguous comments which hide their inability to think about it. I do note that a lot of people read the threads without posting. Perhaps one of them will eventually speak up. After all, you did. :!!)
IMHO ambiguity has to be reduced generally, but not at all costs. And probably it will turn out, not to be possible either. Therefore we do have different logical systems, different physical theories, different opinions about self-arising systems and so on.I am not arguing with you at all. All I am trying to do is lay out as unambiguous set of definition I can in order to present a very subtle argument in a very exact way.

I have looked at the forum you referred to and read a substantial number of the posts. I am afraid I found little which would interest me. I am an old man and my mental abilities are already beginning to deteriorate significantly. Many things which I found easy to think out forty years ago severely tax my attention now. I wish you luck in finding intelligent conversation. At least more luck than I have had. :yuck:
In conclusion I believe the zen approach is the best way to try to get a full understanding of whatever the universe throws at us... including spirit or non-physical realities. That approach entails studying, with great discipline, that which we have in front of us. Studying that which we can observe. Studying it until we know it like we know our own breath. Then, there will come a moment when we may have a glimpse of understanding with regard to other matters............ or non-matters!The whole field of "zen" illustrates the power of what I refer to as "squirrel thought". I would have called it "zen thought" except for the fact that the conotations of "zen" include not a touch of the fact that the correctness of zen cannot be proved and that is an important point when it comes to exact science. See the following and think about zen when I talk of "squirrel decisions":

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763

Have fun -- Dick :biggrin:

freemind

Feb5-05, 12:17 AM

If I understand Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem correctly (which I probably don't), it states - hand-wavingly - that mathematics is not a 'closed-consistent' system, that something beyond it is required for consistency. I'm thinking this is the reason why the universe cannot be explained purely by physical laws and properties. Or am I gravely mistaken?

Canute

Feb5-05, 08:37 AM

Not gravely, but perhaps slightly. What he showed is that no formal system of mathematics (or whatever, given the usual provisos) can be shown to be consistent unless it is incomplete (and so may in the end turn out to be inconsistent). This does have metaphysical/cosmological implications, some of which Goedel explored himself, but I don't think it quite shows that the universe (everything) cannot be explained by physical laws and properties.

Rather, it shows that the universe cannot be completely and consistently explained full stop. Perhaps it would be better to say that the universe cannot be modelled/represented completely by a consistent formal system of symbols, or modelled/represented consistently by a complete formal system of symbols. This is, for instance, what Stephen Hawkings concludes. It is what many people have been saying for the last three millenia.

saviourmachine

Feb5-05, 11:33 AM

Scientific method
I was no more than restating the standard scientific method to bring attention to these issues.So, okay, let us use the hypothetico-deductive method. And you want it to refine it according:My perspective puts major emphasis on existence of alternate answers and the existence of meaningless questions, two issues not seriously considered in the standard perspective.
Squirrel & Logical thought
"Logical thought" cannot solve the problem because "logical thought" is far too limited to encompass the totality of relationships involved. And "squirrel thought" cannot solve the problem because there exists no way to validate "squirrel thought". The solution can only be achieved through intimate cooperation between the two modes and that has to be done with full knowledge of the range of errors possible in each and a way of handling those errors such that the consequences are minimized (hopefully eliminated).I am very interested in your ideas about how to address scientific problems in both these modes.

Mathematics as language
Maybe I should have said, "put mathematics forward as a defined thing". I thought I had made the step clear!You may use mathematics as mean to formulate statements and assume I understand them as you do. Yes.

Unclear
In fact, most people cannot even comprehend the idea that an alternate interpretation of the field of mathematics might exist.I don't really understand what you want to say by this. :blushing: Do I belong to that group of people?

Doctordick

Feb6-05, 12:00 AM

I don't really understand what you want to say by this. :blushing: Do I belong to that group of people?I am not surprised and you shouldn't be embarrassed. :approve: The issue is actually quite simple. Everything we know arises from accepted truths generated by our intuition, zen comprehension or, as I call it "squirrel decisions". Everyone who has thought about this seriously admits that there exists no proof that these "truths" are true; they are merely "self-evident" which really means that we cannot comprehend them being false. :rofl:

Now, anyone familiar with the history of science is aware that the fact that we cannot comprehend something does not stand as a proof that it cannot be. There are lots of well understood phenomena today which our ancestors would have found incomprehensible. I can tell a number of stories on my grandmother (bless her soul). The point is that the only truth we can really stand behind is, none of us really "know" anything. Even mathematics must be included in that category. :surprised I personally cannot comprehend that the rules and relationships which constitute mathematics could be interpreted in a manner different from the way I see the field but I must (if I am to be exact) hold open the possibility that there could be such an interpretation. :redface:

Meanwhile, I will use mathematics as I understand it because I am confident that I will obtain almost universal agreement with any conclusions I can deduce consistent with that field of endeavorer.

Thus, if you agree with my definition of mathematics (that is, the symbols, operations and procedures commonly referred to as mathematics) we can consider the entire field to be, for all practical purposes, a well understood vocabulary (one must comprehend that communication is the central issue of everything). As I have said earlier (on a number of different occasions) I consider mathematics to be the invention and study of internally consistent systems. If you spend much time talking to professional mathematicians that seems to be very much the criteria they use to determine if a set of operations and/or relationships should be admitted into their field. :smile: Contrary to what a lot of people think, mathematics is not a closed and settled field; new research into new possibilities occurs every day. :cool:

Now, that paragraph is there because it clarifies something brought up by a great many scientists (including some held in great respect for their deep insights into how the universe functions). From time to time many scientists will ask why it is that mathematics, a construct purely created from the human mind, should play such an important role in exact sciences (another seemingly deep philosophical question). :confused: If one understands exactly what mathematics is all about (internal consistency if you have forgotten) then this question almost answers itself. :smile:

The single most important characteristic of any explanation of anything is that it answers some question. That is, it provides the person who understands the explanation a way of reaching an answer of some kind. If that procedure yields different answers depending on the persons path through the explanation then the explanation fails in its basic purpose: it fails to answer the question the explanation was created to answer. Now don't get confused here. The answer need not be a definitive prediction; the answer might be, "sometimes this occurs and sometimes that occurs". There is nothing inconsistent about not being able to make a specific prediction. On the other hand, if one path through the explanation yielded "'A' will definitely occur" while another approach (using the same explanation) yielded "sometimes 'A' will occur and sometimes 'B' will occur" then the explanation has failed in its purpose as it gives two different answers to the same question. :frown: What I am getting at here is the fact that "consistency" is also the central requirement of any acceptable explanation of anything. :cool:

If mathematics is the creation and study of self consistent systems, and usable explanations must be self consistent systems it becomes self evident (i.e. very difficult to comprehend being false :biggrin: ) that the only reason an explanation does not use mathematics is that the required mathematics has not yet been invented. It is important that this relationship between "mathematics" and "an explanation" be kept in mind at all times. :smile:

If what I have said above is understood, there is an area of mathematics which I need to make sure you understand clearly. The area is related to the concept of symmetry; an issue not clearly understood by a lot of professional scientists in spite of the fact that it is central to the most fundamental principals of physics. :devil:

I appreciate your interest and am looking forward to further exchanges. If we agree that what I have so far said makes sense to you and is consistent with your concept of reality, I will continue this discussion with an analysis of the power of symmetry considerations. Symmetry consideration are important as they are the only arguments which can generate truths from ignorance. (In actual fact, they can appear to generate truth from ignorance, a subtlety different statement which I will attempt to make clear). :wink:

I appreciate your attention very much -- Dick :!!)

Philocrat

Feb6-05, 12:33 AM

The only way to describe our physical universe is by way of our experience of the physical universe which is often termed physics.

Most philosophers have a problem with 'Experience'. One of the standard charges against Physicalism/Materialism (especially with regards to Explanation, Meaning and Truth) is that Experiance cannot be completely trusted. Your senses can transmit into your conscious expereince false information. Equally, the products of your thinking or reason such as Propositions and beliefs are capable of being false. Hard facts: the products of experience affect all disciplines in philosophy (Epistemology, Ethics, Philosophy of Mathematics, Formal Logic, Philosophical Logic, Philosophy of langauge, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, etc)

At what point does an OPINION become a FACT? Is it when every sentient being in the universe; known or unknown, accepts it as his opinion, that makes it into a fact, or is just a plurality, or a majority, or some other quorum of opinion holders who turn opinions into facts.

The history of science is replete with examples of facts that turned out to be not facts; well in most people's opinion. I think they call it concensus or something like that. Is it a fact if the National Academy of Sciences says it is a fact, or is that just the opinions of a private club of individuals who self select their membership; which tends to be exclusive of dissenting opinions as to what the facts really are.

Yes, substantially, you do have a point here. Yet, this needs to be put in clearer context:

a) Yes, there are many truths we now rely upon that started originally as ordinary opinions. There are several instances littererd about in the human history to at least indicate this. The perfect examples are all the disciplines that started as speculatory parts of Philosophy. As Bertrand Russell observed in 1912, as soon as any aspect of philosophy found practicality of some sort in the human experience, it systematically and seminally detaches itself from philosophy to establsih itself as separate self-sustaining discipline in its own right. I had a conversation with Les or someone else about this earlier on this thread. I am not quite sue whether Russell implied that aspects of philosophy detache themselves, leaving their opinionated and speculatory status behind, as soon as they find themselves or their truth-values to be materially and adiquately verifiable and consitent with what experience throws at us the perceivers. This suggests that we do have the capacity to know, even if it means starting from the point of ordinary commonsense and opinion, up to higher level of perceptual and intellectual rigour. Yes, it is undeniable that we do know at least enough to get us by in life, even while it is not 100% so!

b) Yes, equally, we do have many opinions and theories that we were very confident of as true and unfalsifiable, which eventually turned out to be false. This is typical of many theories in the sciences, and most importantly, countless ones in other disciplines that science rigorously examined and rendered them false later on in the human intellectual development. The perfect example of this are diseases that used to be ignorantly thought to be caused by witchcrats and evil demons of which we now have clear and undisputed scientific explanations for them. Even the incurable diseases that exist today, we have at least some good explanation of their causes, even though we are still searching for their cures. Upon the same token, we now know beyond doubt that the earth is not flat as it used to be ignorantly thought and believed earlier in the human existence.

So far, all well and good,....... but we still have to find some explanation as to why the sum totality of the human ability to perceive things in the physical world, evaluate them by means of thinking and explain them not only to ourselves but to others, tend to fluctuate between possibility (a) and possibility (b). Why are some things difficult to know? Is it the things themselves that are making themselves difficult to know? Or is it us, the perceivers, that have the problem of knowing? The fundamental issue that confronts us now is not to confuse issues and pretend that human beings are so blind and perceptually disadvantaged that we are incaplabe of knowing anything. I am always filled with utter disgust and horror when people go down this road of trying to degrade the human perceptual capacity to a point where it starts to look as if though we are incapable of knowing anything. As far as I am concerned this is logically and quantitativelly impossible. I am claiming that it is impossinle to render human beings perceptually useless while such human beings are claimed to exist. Even if I were an ordinary inanimate toy, I cannot say anything about myself and not exist. Leave that problem to stones! From the human sperspective, the most intelligible thing to do now is to do stock taking of the following things:

1) Make an estimate of 'WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW'

2) Make an estimate of 'WHAT IS KNOWABLE THAT IS YET TO BE KNOWN

3) And weigh against 'WHAT IS UNKNOWABLE THAT IS YET TO BE KNOWN

Well, someone once suggested to me and argued that (3) is irrelevant because if anything is unknowable, then it is irrelevant to the human existence. Well, I leave that one to everyone's taste. What do you guys think about this one. Is this a correct line of reasoning?

Philocrat

Feb6-05, 01:35 AM

But to get back to one statement I made, which yes is my opinion; that MAN created GOD, there is plenty of historical evidence for that. The histories of social groups and cultures dating back to the dawn of history contain evidence of ordinary individuals essentially enslaving their fellow folks, and subjugating them to a life of fear and obeyance based on ignorance and fear of the unknown.

I think Flipton's distinction between the notion of 'Man being the creator God' and a totallly independent fact that 'God may exist' (that needs to be epistemologically demonstratd) gives a clearer picture of what you were trying to do. Infact, many philosophers that I know would not lose sight of this distinction. They will always keep them seperate. When you hear people saying that philosophers do not believe in the existence of God, all that this means is that philosophers do so technically....from purely the point of view of Logic. Yet, there are many philosophers that do not rule out the possibility of God completely. Infact, depending on what type of logic you are versed in, such possibility is not logically ruled out either, just as many epistemologically problematic issues in science are not logically ruled out on the same note.

Yes, people that you accused of creating their own Gods usually have some logicaly basis for their own arguments and beliefs as well. The most famous one is the so-caled 'DESIGN ARGUMENT' which states that:

'EVERY DESIGN HAS A DESIGNER'

According to these people, just like a chair or table has a maker or a creator, so has the physical world that we purportedly experience in every moment of the human existence. From my own examination of this point of view, I think it would be ill-advised and a fatal error for anyone to playdown its logical and resolving power. Yes, logically, there may be things that have always been there without possible creators, yet it is equally not logically ruled out that there are vast majority of things that were created by whatever means.......and our physical world may be one of such created things. Nor neither is it logically ruled out that an independednt creative Agency may be respossible for bringing about our present world. The issue here seems to be that of misunderstanding and confusion over what type of creation that we are refering to or talking about:

1) Were some of these things SELF-CREATED (that is, certain things that had sufficient and efficient powers to do so)?

2) Were some of them RANDOMLY CREATED by some sort of interaction of a conglomeration of things that have always been wandering about a boundless and uncreated vacuum?

Or:

3) Were some of them created by a totally INDEPENDENT CREATIVE AGENCY that is structurally and functionally sefl-sufficient and efficient?

These are all likely possibilities that I personally do not see anyone qualified enough to completey logically destroy them. The question that I asked before now resurfaces here: (a) Are these things themselves that ingeniously hid thelselves away from the human perception and explanation?; or (b) Does the problem of perception and explanation of these things rest in the human beings themselves? Well, let me now admit for the first time that these two questions are precisely what I came onto PF to find out. If there is anyone out there who knows the answers to these two questions, let him or her table them now! For, as I have argued elsewhere, any attempt to find asnwers to these questions should trigger some sort of progressive thoughts and actions in us.

The manipulation of other people through fear is as old as history, and the number of 'gods' created in these endeavors, is as numerous as the different cultures of history and geography. One thing entirely missing from the concept of these 'gods' is any notion of universality. Even today, some presumably intelligent cultures have numerous gods all of which they created. And they all seem to have the purpose of enforcing compliance with preferred behavior.

Yes, controlling ourselves is crucial for sucessfull and peaceful co-existence. But the BIGGEST question that has confronted us since the advent of man is: HOW DO WE DO THIS? Many Political philosophers of all ages, from Plato to John Lokce, have all suggested the best ways for people collecting into a society to control themselves, yet none of these suggestions turned out to be sufficient, let alone efficient. One of the key arguments in philosophy is that if these political theories were sufficient and efficient, then one way we would be able to measure and know this is if there were no more misunderstadnings and conflicts in the societies concerned. But you know as well as I do that up to this very moment this is not actually the case. As much as we have managed to coexist and get on with life, we are still as confused and conflicts-prone as ever. We are still fightting and killing each other in hundreds of thousands, from character assassination and witch-hunting to brutal wars of WMD's scale.

Now all of that is simply my opinion based on my observations of people's behavior and my readings of their history and the behavior of their ancestors. None of that makes it a fact, because there will always be those who disagree, and disagreeing with someone else's opinion is a necessary and sufficient condition for an opinion not being a fact.

So perhaps there are NO facts, merely a concensus of opinion.

Everything we know today could not all amount to opinions only without some logically and consistently deduced facts from what we perceive of the world. At least some of what we perceive of the world must be and amount to concrete facts, otherwise it would logically and quantitatively imply that we are all blindly and non-directionally erring into oblovion. Life as a whole would be a meaningless, pointless venture in spacetime

saviourmachine

Feb7-05, 03:24 AM

If we agree that what I have so far said makes sense to you and is consistent with your concept of reality, I will continue this discussion with an analysis of the power of symmetry considerations. Symmetry consideration are important as they are the only arguments which can generate truths from ignorance. (In actual fact, they can appear to generate truth from ignorance, a subtlety different statement which I will attempt to make clear). :wink:Hi DoctorD, yes, it does all make sense to me. Mathematics as the study of (self) consistent systems.

If our dialogue does not infer with this very thread I appreciate further efforts to tell about symmetry in a scientific analysis (or in another thread if the other readers approve of that :wink:). I know only about symmetry in the field of group theory, although that's quite extensive field already.

Canute

Feb7-05, 07:58 AM

Unless a mathematical system is very simple then it cannot be shown to be self-consistent. Because of this I'm not sure it's correct to say that mathemtics studies self-consistent systems. Perhaps it's better to say that it studies systems which are as consistent as it can make them.

Tournesol

Feb7-05, 08:55 AM

Concepts could have laws that are followed implicitly - Same as you have physical laws. If conceptual geometric forms (made of nothing at all) obey what we term physical laws - Reality still looks and feels and acts the same as the physical one you adhere to.

I can conceive of things that don't exist, and I can conceive of things
that don't follow physical laws, or follow different ones. Yet only certain things exist, and only certain laws are followed. So the physical
is at least a subset of the conceptual -- and a rather stubborn subset
that doesn't change into sonething else when you decide to think differently.

In a physical reality you have a couple of choices. Either the entire panoply , including the vacuum of space is composed of physical entities by which movement seems unlikely to be even remotely possible, or we have physical entities opposed by nothing at all, by which we differentiate those physical entities?

You seem to have some problems with the way the physical world works, although I am not at all celar what they are. But if you replace physical entities with concepts that work exactly the sme way, surely the same problems will re-occur ?

saviourmachine

Feb7-05, 09:12 AM

A consistent framework
Mathematics as the study of (self) consistent systems.Unless a mathematical system is very simple then it cannot be shown to be self-consistent. Because of this I'm not sure it's correct to say that mathemtics studies self-consistent systems. Perhaps it's better to say that it studies systems which are as consistent as it can make them.1.) I used 'system' in the sense of 'framework'. 2.) I don't want to say that mathematics can prove consistency or not.

Creating an useful consistent framework
You see self-consistency as something that has to be shown / proved. I see mathematics as an analysis / method that creates frameworks that are consistent out of their very nature. Methods that result in inconsistent frameworks are generally not appreciated I think.

Creating an useful inconsistent framework
I am not aware of mathematics that is used to set up frameworks that are not consistent. If you know such kind of math, I am interested. Where can it used for?

-- Edit: I think this is exactly something I like. It's using a scientific manner to account for paradoxes. I already this a google on "Inconsistent Mathematics". Interesting.

Canute

Feb7-05, 10:33 AM

I suppose there's more than one way of looking at this. But we know that mathematical systems (if by that we mean formal axiomatic systems of a certain complexity etc) cannot be both complete and consistent. If we try to complete such a system then we find we can only do so inconsistently. In this sense mathematical systems are inevitably inconsistent or inevitably incomplete, depending on which way you want to look at it.

Stephen Hawkings discusses this online somewhere, and concludes that physics must remain incomplete, preferring this conclusion to the alternative. So it seems fair to say that mathematics studies inconsistent systems, although it would be equivalent to say that it studies incomplete ones.

However this is a minefield of a topic, so I wouldn't want to get into an argument about it. It's ever so easy to misinterpret the incompleteness theorem and maybe that's what I'm doing. Still, I agree with you about 'using the scientific method to account for paradoxes', which I take to mean using formal logic and reasoning to account for them. It's a fascinating pastime, since it's formal logic and reasoning that creates them. As I understand it this was Goedel's masterstroke, to turn logic back on itself to prove its own limitations by its own methods.

selfAdjoint

Feb7-05, 10:36 AM

A consistent framework
1.) I used 'system' in the sense of 'framework'. 2.) I don't want to say that mathematics can prove consistency or not.

Creating an useful consistent framework
You see self-consistency as something that has to be shown / proved. I see mathematics as an analysis / method that creates frameworks that are consistent out of their very nature. Methods that result in inconsistent frameworks are generally not appreciated I think.

Creating an useful inconsistent framework
I am not aware of mathematics that is used to set up frameworks that are not consistent. If you know such kind of math, I am interested. Where can it used for?

-- Edit: I think this is exactly something I like. It's using a scientific manner to account for paradoxes. I already this a google on "Inconsistent Mathematics". Interesting.

Mathematical systems that are complex enough to contain full-bore arithmetic are incomplete. That is Goedel's theorem. This means any attempt to prove them consistent will fail in principle. This is a fundamentally different condition than being consistent but not having any proof yet of that fact. The word you should google on is not inconsistent, but incomplete.

saviourmachine

Feb7-05, 02:20 PM

Definition mathematics
I'll give this definition: "Mathematics as the creation of coherent frameworks; with as few assumptions and contradictions (or none*) as possible."

But to narrow down to: "[i]Mathematics as the study of (self) consistent systems" is perfectly fine for me too. For the sake of the discussion with DoctorD.

Agreement of language to be used
I know Gödel's theorema. Who doesn't? I don't want to focus only on mathematics of complete systems. Again, for the discussion I only want to make clear that I accept DoctorD's language to communicate. I think your remarks - about that this language can't address everything - are important, but premature. We/I don't know what DoctorD wants to say yet.

Completeness & inconsistency
So it seems fair to say that mathematics studies inconsistent systems, although it would be equivalent to say that it studies incomplete ones.This isn't true. The 'inconsistent mathematics' I mentioned is complete, because it embeds inconsistencies! Completeness and inconsistency is different from each other.
I hope you don't want to say that mathematics studies only inconsistent systems.

* self-consistent frameworks

Canute

Feb8-05, 10:22 AM

I just meant that formal systems subject to the I-theorem are, at their best, either complete and inconsistent or consistent and incomplete. There's an ambiguity here for me about whether a system can be consistent even if we cannot prove within the system that it is, as Self-Adjoint seems to suggest, but I'm a bit unclear about that. I'd say not, but I'm happy to be corrected.

Philocrat

Feb9-05, 12:42 AM

GUIDLINES FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES

Mathematics must make distinction between systems and formulate formal procedures for studying each type in isolation, and then finally state the fundamental relations between those sytems.

There are fundamantally three types of system:

(1) OPEN SYSTEMS

A system is Mathematically Open if it is structurally and functionally open to change (It may be internally and externally reorganised to something completely different, or both its internal and external relations may be rendered fully dynamic.

A matheamatical study of an open system must describe:

a) How things and events are LINEARLY distributed, actioned and correlated

b) How Things and events are RANDOMLY distributed, actioned and correlated

c) How to reconcile SIMULTANEITY with SEQUENTIALISM interplaying in an open system.

d) And how structurally and functionally progressive things and events can be created from LINEARLY and RANDOMLY distributed, actioned and correlated things and events in an open sytem.

(2) SEMI-CLOSED/SEMI-OPEN SYSTEMS

A sytem is mathematically semi-closed or semi-open if its possesses needs that are internally fulfilable (or self-fulfilled) and needs that are externally fulfilable. (I am making this definination as wide as possible to give every intellectual discipline access to it. Every discipline should be able to derive their own tighter but relevant definition from it)

A Mathematical study of a Semi-closed or Semi-open system must describe:

a) How things and events are LINEARLY distributed, actioned and correlated in the overall internal organisation of a semi-closed system.

b) How Things and events are RANDOMLY distributed, actioned and correlated in the overall internal organisation of a semi-closed system.

c) How to reconcile SIMULTANEITY with SEQUENTIALISM interplaying in the internal organisation of things and events in a semi-closed system.

d) How INTERNAL DEPENDENCIES are quantitatively and logically interfaced with EXTERNAL DEPENDENCIES (or simply, how a semi-closed system is structurally and functionally dependent upon external systems of equivalent or different nature).

e) How to FORMALLY but SUFFICIENTLY render a semi-closed system structurally and functionally closed (call this 'THE FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR PERFECTING A SEMI-CLOSED SYSTEM' if you like, controversial though this may seem).

(3) CLOSED SYSTEMS

A system is mathematically closed if its possess neither needs that are exteranlly fulfilable nor needs that are externally desireable. It stays structurally and functionally closed and completely disconnected from everything outside it.

A mathematical study of a Closed system must describe:

a) How to reconcile SIMULTANEITY with SEQUENTIALISM interplaying in the internal organisation of things and events. And since it is externally disconnected from everything thing else, this remains the only problem for the mathematician to tackle.

NOTE: The Formal Mathematical Procedure must respect completetly the Engineering Principle of 'THE PERFECT FIT'. The Procedure must predict PARAPLEXES precisely engineered into a PRAPLEXED SYSTEM.

selfAdjoint

Feb9-05, 10:11 AM

A matheamatical study of an open system must describe:

a) How things and events are LINEARLY distributed, actioned and correlated

b) How Things and events are RANDOMLY distributed, actioned and correlated

c) How to reconcile SIMULTANEITY with SEQUENTIALISM interplaying in an open system.

d) And how structurally and functionally progressive things and events can be created from LINEARLY and RANDOMLY distributed, actioned and correlated things and events in an open sytem.

An open system can't be nonlinear or deterministic? Where do you get these ideas?

Philocrat

Feb9-05, 10:40 AM

An open system can't be nonlinear or deterministic? Where do you get these ideas?

Yes, I know that. I woke up early this morning, and sat there for hours trying to define it and couldn't, so I pulled a fast one as a means of inviting people to help me define it. I am not quite sure, but I think I may have succeeded in recognising that an open system is fundamental and different except that I can't define it. Well, I leave that one to you guys in the science community to define it. I do not mind being enlightened, So, please pardon me on this one.

quantumcarl

Feb9-05, 02:22 PM

Dr.D.

Zen thought. One way to prove it to yourself is to try it.

I get these dimwits telling me I can't prove the sky is blue because when someone expresses their impression of an experience it is not valid proof of the experience. One has to experience things for one's self. That's as far as it goes. You can write papers and poll populations til the cows come home but none of what you recover will be admissable as proof that experiences happen etc.

What I suggested was to study that which one can observe. And, of course that would mean observing the laws of physics. Beyond that there is only what you can imagine exists.

In fact, its not entirely certain that the physical world is not just a large artifact of mass hypnosis and active imagination.

CronoSpark

Feb9-05, 02:54 PM

Doctordick

Feb10-05, 10:12 AM

Hi saviormachine,

Actually, you need a better handle, like a nickname or such :yuck: ! I am very glad to hear you have some knowledge of symmetries. My interest concerns an aspect of symmetry very seldom brought to light. For the benefit of others, I will comment that the consequences of symmetry are fundamental to any study of mathematical physics. The relationship between symmetries and conserved quantities was laid out in detail through a theorem proved by Emmy Noether (http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Noether_Emmy.html) sometime around 1915. The essence of the proof can be found on John Baez's web site (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html). This is fundamental physics accepted by everyone. The problem is that very few students think about the underpinnings of the circumstance but rather just learn to use it. :frown:

You will hear many professors simply state that "symmetry arguments are the most powerful arguments which can be made" without explaining what makes them so powerful. They usually give fairly simple examples and walk the student through, displaying the result as a self evident conclusion. These examples almost always begin with the phrase, "assume we have [such and such] symmetry". Notice the opening to John Baez's proof starts exactly the same way:
Next, suppose the Lagrangian L has a symmetry, meaning that it doesn't change when you apply some one-parameter family of transformations sending q to some new position q(s).At least he tells you what he means by a symmetry. Symmetry is another of these things that is "understood" on an intuitive level without much thought. :redface:

What I would like to point out is that any symmetry is essentially an expression of a specific ignorance. For example, mirror symmetry means that there is no way to tell the difference between a given view of a problem and its mirror image: in effect you are in a state of enforced ignorance as to which view is being presented. Shift symmetry, the symmetry which yields conservation of momentum via Noether's theorem, arises if shifting the origin of your coordinate system has no impact on the nature of the problem: i.e., the information as to where the origin must be is unavailable to you. In a careful examination, every conceivable symmetry can be seen as a statement of some specific instance of ignorance. :biggrin:

The fundamental issue behind the power of symmetry arguments is the fact that information which is not available can not be produced by any algebraic procedure. It is a characteristic of mathematics that everything is deduced from a set of axioms; a proof amounts to a specific procedure which demonstrates that some piece of information is contained in a particular set of axioms. That being the case, how were we able to solve the problem above for specific expressions of q when changing q has no impact on the problem? The answer lies in Noether's theorem. There must be another relationship which relates the range of possibilities for q (the transformations Baez refers to) to the various specific solutions. In shift symmetry, this required relationship is conservation of momentum; in rotational symmetry, the required relationship is angular momentum.

The above can be seen as a means of obtaining information from ignorance. This is why it is called the most powerful argument which can be made. But let's think about that for a moment. Noether's theorem is a mathematical result and, as such, cannot produce anything which is not contained in the axioms. Ignorance cannot be the true source of our result; it must be arising from some other source. I will get into the real source of that result at a later date. For the moment, I want to get across the idea that symmetry is a form of ignorance. In many respects, Noether's theorem may be seen as a subtle result of conservation of ignorance. :devil:

There are about a half a dozen other fundamental observations (axioms ???) which I would like to get across before I step off into my proof.

Have fun -- Dick

selfAdjoint

Feb10-05, 11:01 AM

Hi saviormachine,

Actually, you need a better handle, like a nickname or such :yuck: ! I am very glad to hear you have some knowledge of symmetries. My interest concerns an aspect of symmetry very seldom brought to light. For the benefit of others, I will comment that the consequences of symmetry are fundamental to any study of mathematical physics. The relationship between symmetries and conserved quantities was laid out in detail through a theorem proved by Emmy Noether (http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Noether_Emmy.html) sometime around 1915. The essence of the proof can be found on John Baez's web site (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html). This is fundamental physics accepted by everyone. The problem is that very few students think about the underpinnings of the circumstance but rather just learn to use it. :frown:

You will hear many professors simply state that "symmetry arguments are the most powerful arguments which can be made" without explaining what makes them so powerful. They usually give fairly simple examples and walk the student through, displaying the result as a self evident conclusion. These examples almost always begin with the phrase, "assume we have [such and such] symmetry". Notice the opening to John Baez's proof starts exactly the same way:
At least he tells you what he means by a symmetry. Symmetry is another of these things that is "understood" on an intuitive level without much thought. :redface:

What I would like to point out is that any symmetry is essentially an expression of a specific ignorance. For example, mirror symmetry means that there is no way to tell the difference between a given view of a problem and its mirror image: in effect you are in a state of enforced ignorance as to which view is being presented. Shift symmetry, the symmetry which yields conservation of momentum via Noether's theorem, arises if shifting the origin of your coordinate system has no impact on the nature of the problem: i.e., the information as to where the origin must be is unavailable to you. In a careful examination, every conceivable symmetry can be seen as a statement of some specific instance of ignorance. :biggrin:

The fundamental issue behind the power of symmetry arguments is the fact that information which is not available can not be produced by any algebraic procedure. It is a characteristic of mathematics that everything is deduced from a set of axioms; a proof amounts to a specific procedure which demonstrates that some piece of information is contained in a particular set of axioms. That being the case, how were we able to solve the problem above for specific expressions of q when changing q has no impact on the problem? The answer lies in Noether's theorem. There must be another relationship which relates the range of possibilities for q (the transformations Baez refers to) to the various specific solutions. In shift symmetry, this required relationship is conservation of momentum; in rotational symmetry, the required relationship is angular momentum.

The above can be seen as a means of obtaining information from ignorance. This is why it is called the most powerful argument which can be made. But let's think about that for a moment. Noether's theorem is a mathematical result and, as such, cannot produce anything which is not contained in the axioms. Ignorance cannot be the true source of our result; it must be arising from some other source. I will get into the real source of that result at a later date. For the moment, I want to get across the idea that symmetry is a form of ignorance. In many respects, Noether's theorem may be seen as a subtle result of conservation of ignorance. :devil:

There are about a half a dozen other fundamental observations (axioms ???) which I would like to get across before I step off into my proof.

Have fun -- Dick

Good post. I have two comments.

1. What you have called ignorance could also be called indifference. In shift symmetry for example, there is no preferred place for the origin of our coordinate system. It is not the case that there is an origin around here somewhere but we don't know where it is; rather we can put the origin wherever we like and it won't make any difference to the physics.

2. There is an invisible elephant of assumed information in the whole Noether argument. That is that the Lagrangean works. This assumes that the "stationary action principle" describes the world, and that is not an obvious statement at all, and the original arguments for its ancestor the least action principle were theistic in nature.

quantumcarl

Feb10-05, 11:32 AM

"Evolution of matter" hardly does the process justice, which is exactly my point. I really can't think of any way to explain why one type of gene proliferates rather than another without reference to how its phenotypic expression fits into a certain environmental niche, can you? There are certainly equations in population genetics (Hardy-Weinberg comes to mind), but they are not physics equations. Even reducing evolutionary biology entirely to molecular biology causes us to lose crucial information. There are phenomena in the world that are just emergent, and cannot be comprehended entirely by an appeal to their lower-order constituent pieces. These are discussed frequently around here, the latest being autocatalytic processes in chemistry and the non-linear dynamics of complex systems.

I'm not going to look at your example of karma and ethics, because they don't concern me for the purposes of this thread. I'm just bringing up other sciences that cannot be reduced to physics.

The subjects of all the physical sciences are physical. All things physical are governed by the laws of physics. Two of the most basic princibles involved in all the physical subjects of scientific inquiry are efficiency and conservation. These two princibles apply to natural selection, evolution and all other observable phenomena. Correct me if I'm off here!

loseyourname

Feb10-05, 12:03 PM

The subjects of all the physical sciences are physical. All things physical are governed by the laws of physics. Two of the most basic princibles involved in all the physical subjects of scientific inquiry are efficiency and conservation. These two princibles apply to natural selection, evolution and all other observable phenomena. Correct me if I'm off here!

No, you're not off, but those two principles do not explain evolution. "Genes that result in phenotypes making an organism a better fit for whatever environmental niche it inhabits at any given time are selected for through differential reproductive success" better explains it.

There is also the problem of downward causation (http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DOWNCAUS.html), a case of strong emergence, in which the parts of a system are constrained by the nature of the system, rather than the other way around.

quantumcarl

Feb10-05, 07:15 PM

No, you're not off, but those two principles do not explain evolution. "Genes that result in phenotypes making an organism a better fit for whatever environmental niche it inhabits at any given time are selected for through differential reproductive success" better explains it.

There is also the problem of downward causation (http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DOWNCAUS.html), a case of strong emergence, in which the parts of a system are constrained by the nature of the system, rather than the other way around.

A gene is modified by the trials and errors that are inherent in its interaction with the environment. The modifications take place during the sequence of the gene's production, reproduction and subsequent resulting generations. The outcome is that only those modifications will survive in the gene that produce a survival trait or have a benign influence on an organism. Any other modifications will result in the supression or elimination of the gene.

This reminds me of the way wind can wear away at sand leaving a natural sculpture of slightly compressed sand.

selfAdjoint

Feb10-05, 08:05 PM

A gene is modified by the trials and errors that are inherent in its interaction with the environment. The modifications take place during the sequence of the gene's production, reproduction and subsequent resulting generations. The outcome is that only those modifications will survive in the gene that produce a survival trait or have a benign influence on an organism. Any other modifications will result in the supression or elimination of the gene.

This reminds me of the way wind can wear away at sand leaving a natural sculpture of slightly compressed sand.

No, no, no! The gene is not selectively modified by the environment. That is Lamarckism! The genes vary randomly, mostly by simple substitution of one of the four bases by its conjugate base (A <-> T, C <-> G, I believe, though I may have it backward :uhh: ). The resulting change in the genome can make a change in the offspring (although it need not, see neutral evolution). The change may make the offspring more likely to produce viable offspring of their own. If it does, that change will be carried on. Conversely, changes that cause the next generation to be less likely to produce viable offspring will be lost. The test that tells which is the interaction of the organism with the environment.

Philocrat

Feb10-05, 08:48 PM

I am not sure if you are refering to everything as in everything including the past of the universe. Right now there is a possibility that physics might explain it. To boldly state that it can is something that is highly questionable.

Well, even if physics is not making this claim itself, that's what the reductive activities tend towards. I been joining everyone and blindly debating with everyone up to this page without ever really thinking about the underlying value of 'reducing everything to physics', So, why? Well, there many good reasons for this:

Nanotechnology and the notion of Structural and functional Perfection. This is the claim that by rearranging atoms at the nano-structural level, we could improve the structural and functional qualities of things.

Genetic Engineering and the notion of structural perfection. This is the claim in biological science, which says that by genetically engineering things you can improve their structural and functional qualities. Eugenics or Race biology is a good example of this.

Costs naturally reduce if we know things and their relations to their finest details.

And so on. So, reductionism to the level of physics does have unigue intellectual and meterial advantages.

Our own perception toward things in the universe may hinder our explanations.

Yes, substantially so, but this does not rule out the possibility that we can explain and know things. It's just that some things naturally range over COP (Critical Observation Point). And I get very irritated when some scientists appear to abandon Logic at COP during routine observations and measurements in experiments. Yes, we are perceptually or visually limited, yet this is no licence for us to give up scientifically at points of difficulties.

If it includes the past, then if physics can prove that "something" can be produced by "nothing", then I would say yes it explains everything about the universe.

I am intellectually allegic to the term 'nothing' as I currently believe it has no conncetion to 'reality' or 'something'.

Doctordick

Feb10-05, 09:55 PM

What you have called ignorance could also be called indifference.Not really as the connotations of "indifference" and "ignorance" are quite different. "Indifference" expresses a lack of interest, whereas "ignorance" expresses a lack of knowledge. Now I know ignorance carries the idea that the information might be available if you went after it but that connotation is easily removed by using the adjective "enforced".
It is not the case that there is an origin around here somewhere but we don't know where it is; rather we can put the origin wherever we like and it won't make any difference to the physics.Oh, don't worry, I understand exactly what you are saying; however, in my opinion you have it exactly backwards. There is a very important philosophical point here: from your statement of the relationship you are required to make the assumption that "it won't make any difference to the physics". If your purpose is to establish the foundations on which to build physics, the defense of the assumption becomes circular. And secondly, from your perspective, you have thrown out the possibility that "there is an origin around here somewhere but we don't know where it is". Another assumption! Oh, I won't argue that you can't make some excellent arguments to defend your assumption but it violates my original purpose. I expressed my position on the scientific method (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=429253#post429253) and clarified that position with a post to "What is evidence?" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=447328#post447328)

And we can argue about the necessity of your comment #2 after you understand where I am going. That is the standard approach to the Noether argument and not the approach I am headed for. For the moment, what is important is the realization that "symmetry" is a statement defining a specific lack of information; a perspective on symmetry quite different from the standard. The important point is that the "ignorance" perspective is consistent with being scientifically objective:
What I am talking about is the importance of creating methods of attack which will keep one's options open.The perspective that "I am ignorant" is objective in that sense!

Have fun -- Dick

CronoSpark

Feb11-05, 07:53 AM

Well, even if physics is not making this claim itself, that's what the reductive activities tend towards. I been joining everyone and blindly debating with everyone up to this page without ever really thinking about the underlying value of 'reducing everything to physics', So, why? Well, there many good reasons for this:

Nanotechnology and the notion of Structural and functional Perfection. This is the claim that by rearranging atoms at the nano-structural level, we could improve the structural and functional qualities of things.

Genetic Engineering and the notion of structural perfection. This is the claim in biological science, which says that by genetically engineering things you can improve their structural and functional qualities. Eugenics or Race biology is a good example of this.

Costs naturally reduce if we know things and their relations to their finest details.

And so on. So, reductionism to the level of physics does have unigue intellectual and meterial advantages.

I can see that the reduction have advanced quite drastically over these past years, and may reduce even further in the future. Yet it still does not rule out that it is a possibility ATM.

Yes, substantially so, but this does not rule out the possibility that we can explain and know things. It's just that some things naturally range over COP (Critical Observation Point). And I get very irritated when some scientists appear to abandon Logic at COP during routine observations and measurements in experiments. Yes, we are perceptually or visually limited, yet this is no licence for us to give up scientifically at points of difficulties.

The world is flat. :biggrin:

I am intellectually allegic to the term 'nothing' as I currently believe it has no conncetion to 'reality' or 'something'.

It should not have any connection to "something". But I guess what I was implying was: where (how, why, when... who?) did "something" (or this "reality") come from?

quantumcarl

Feb12-05, 01:53 PM

No, no, no! The gene is not selectively modified by the environment. That is Lamarckism! The genes vary randomly, mostly by simple substitution of one of the four bases by its conjugate base (A <-> T, C <-> G, I believe, though I may have it backward :uhh: ). The resulting change in the genome can make a change in the offspring (although it need not, see neutral evolution). The change may make the offspring more likely to produce viable offspring of their own. If it does, that change will be carried on. Conversely, changes that cause the next generation to be less likely to produce viable offspring will be lost. The test that tells which is the interaction of the organism with the environment.

I'm not sure that I indicated a gene is "selectively" modified by its environment. A gene will selectively be expressed or repressed when conditions in the environment stimulate either function.

Believe me, in order to have "A" conjoined with "T" and "G" conjoined with "C" in a strong bond and diverse fashion you need certain elements in your diet. Diets are a type of environment. The diet requires certain minerals etc.. to arrive at a healthy mixture of neucliotides, amino acids etc... thus increasing the probablity of producing a functional gene.

If there are minerals missing in the diet that support the development of certain gene types, the gene type will go recessive or be elimantated. This scenario could be construed as environmental modification of a gene but not a "selective" or deliberate modification of a gene.

I am wrong here?!!?

selfAdjoint

Feb12-05, 05:52 PM

Believe me, in order to have "A" conjoined with "T" and "G" conjoined with "C" in a strong bond and diverse fashion you need certain elements in your diet. Diets are a type of environment. The diet requires certain minerals etc.. to arrive at a healthy mixture of neucliotides, amino acids etc... thus increasing the probablity of producing a functional gene.

This is absolutely wrong. Every cell in your body contains your DNA. Within that DNA are the bases A, C, T, and G in different triples coding for different proteins, plus other arrangements for control. They are connected by chemical bonds of different types, and as long as you are alive, indeed long after, they will continue to be. Random mutations apart, they and their sequence were established at your conception, and do not vary causally because of your diet or anything of that kind. Strong invasions of chemicals or radiation can modify the DNA in individual cells, but nothing short of dissolution will modify the DNA in ALL you cells.

You are talking about stuff you don't know anything about.

saviourmachine

Feb14-05, 11:14 AM

Symmetry & conserved quantities
The relationship between symmetries and conserved quantities was laid out in detail through a theorem proved by Emmy Noether (http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Noether_Emmy.html) sometime around 1915.Mmm, very interesting stuff. I did electronical engineering, so I didn't know this theory yet.

Symmetry & ignorance
What I would like to point out is that any symmetry is essentially an expression of a specific ignorance. For example, mirror symmetry means that there is no way to tell the difference between a given view of a problem and its mirror image: in effect you are in a state of enforced ignorance as to which view is being presented.I was thinking about this, this weekend. You extended my concept of symmetry, until now I thought only 1 & 2: Symmetry as a property of an entity; a predicate
Symmetry as non-informational overhead; reducable according Shannon's or Kolgomorov's definitions of 'information'
Symmetry as lack of knowledge about the difference between (a part of) an entity and it's symmetrical counterpart.Your definition - if I did state it well enough - does let it look as a perceptional quality (observing differences) and a conceptual quality (having to do with knowledge). Immediately does arise the question: "Does 'real' symmetry occur?"

[Question] Symmetry & (non-)existence of specific knowledge
And if symmetry is an expression of a specific ignorance; does this entail that there exist a specific knowledge about the very thing? Can we see symmetry as a lack of knowledge about differences, if there are no differences, and so knowledge about differences can not exist. I agree with you, although I don't know where you want it to use for yet. Are definitions as: "Groups denote lack of knowledge about the non-simularities of their elements." or "Edible are these things of which we are ignorant about its poisonous character." also valid? In what aspect do these sentences differ?

Information & ignorance
The above [conserved quantities] can be seen as a means of obtaining information from ignorance. This is why it is called the most powerful argument which can be made. But let's think about that for a moment. Noether's theorem is a mathematical result and, as such, cannot produce anything which is not contained in the axioms. Ignorance cannot be the true source of our result; it must be arising from some other source.I do not really understand you. There is a fundamental observation: symmetry, which denotes a lack of knowledge, what can be solved by using the concept 'conserved quantities'. In what way is such a concept not an axiom? An axiom like: there exists a thing as angular momentum. Or an axiom like: we don't know the centre of our universe.

I look forward to your other observations.

Paul Martin

Feb14-05, 07:03 PM

To whom it may concern,

I just received an email from Dr. Dick in which he asked me to do him a favor. To make sure I convey everything I know about his plight, here is the verbatim text he sent me:

"I am blocked off the Physics Forum
because of the required password change (long story
how that happened). At any rate, I can't get any of
the automatic e-mail answers from them so I can't seem
to get anything straighted out.

I have been posting on the "Metaphysics &
Epistemology" section to the "Can Everything be
Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. "saviormachine" has
just answered my last post and I would like to let him
know that I can't get on the forum. If you would drop
him a private note or post a comment as to my problem
on the thread, I would appreciate it a lot."

I hope someone can help him.

Paul

quantumcarl

Feb14-05, 07:08 PM

This is absolutely wrong. Every cell in your body contains your DNA. Within that DNA are the bases A, C, T, and G in different triples coding for different proteins, plus other arrangements for control. They are connected by chemical bonds of different types, and as long as you are alive, indeed long after, they will continue to be. Random mutations apart, they and their sequence were established at your conception, and do not vary causally because of your diet or anything of that kind. Strong invasions of chemicals or radiation can modify the DNA in individual cells, but nothing short of dissolution will modify the DNA in ALL you cells.

You are talking about stuff you don't know anything about.

Hi SelfAdjoint.

A diet for your genes

It comes as no surprise to hear that our diet can affect our general health, but the idea that different foods can influence health by targeting specific genes is more difficult to imagine. Yet scientists at the Institute of Food Research on the Norwich Research Park are setting out to find out how the food we eat might alter the activity of our genes. In the long-term they hope to be able to help the Government give better advice on how to improve our chances of a healthy life through the food we eat.

Our genes act as the blueprint that our bodies follow to develop and function properly. But not all of our thousands of genes are active at the same time, as genes are turned on and off at different stages in our growth and in different parts of our bodies. And the IFR scientists are wondering if our diet can also affect which of our genes are active. If they are right, it could pave the way for understanding exactly how diet can affect the health of our bodies.

From: http://www.nrp.org.uk/enews/edpgenomics.htm

Iron Deficiency Sends Cells Into Tailspin

THURSDAY, Jan. 13 (HealthDayNews) -- Iron deficiency forces cells to preserve what little iron they have and to maintain essential functions by dramatically reducing the activity of more than 80 different genes.
That's the conclusion of a Duke University Medical Center study in the Jan. 14 issue of Cell.

"We discovered that iron deprivation actually reprograms the metabolism of the entire cell. Literally hundreds of proteins require iron to carry out their proper function, so without this nutrient, there is a complete reorganization of how cellular processes occur," researcher Dennis J. Thiele, a professor of pharmacology and cancer biology, said in a prepared statement.

Some of the genes affected by iron deficiency are known to play important roles in generating energy, aging, protecting the cell from free radicals and copying the cell's genetic code. But the function of many of the affected genes is unknown, meaning that some side effects caused by iron deficiency may go unrecognized.

From: http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=41463

And on and on into about 283,000 matches to a search on “diet affecting genes” for your records.

I must admit I made a calculated guess with my statement but, it turns out that I know what I’m guessing about! :rofl: In actual fact I was only trying to define the environment of a gene and the effects the environment has on a gene. In the end the gene is the environment as well.

I know some of what I speak of because I have worked with world class geneticists and it has rubbed off.

It may even have altered my genes to a degree.

Bold statements like "you don't know what you're talking about" do not a mentor become. Try to take a more positive taque, at least when your mentoring the younger students, eh? :!!)

saviourmachine

Feb20-05, 08:25 AM

I am blocked off the Physics Forum because of the required password change (long story how that happened). At any rate, I can't get any of the automatic e-mail answers from them so I can't seem to get anything straighted out.

I have been posting on the "Metaphysics & Epistemology" section to the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. "saviormachine" has just answered my last post and I would like to let him know that I can't get on the forum. If you would drop him a private note or post a comment as to my problem on the thread, I would appreciate it a lot.Oh, take your time. I'll check every week or so. Maybe you can another pseudoniem, doctordick. Thanks for your time till now.

Doctordick

Feb20-05, 12:07 PM

Oh, take your time. I'll check every week or so. Maybe you can another pseudoniem, doctordick. Thanks for your time till now.
I have no idea why what happened happened. Computers are strange things sometimes: apparently it never reset my password or sent me an e-mail. I kept trying variations on what I thought I had used and suddenly one worked :blushing:

So: my response to "saviormachine"!
Mmm, very interesting stuff. I did electronical engineering, so I didn't know this theory yet. I think you should be aware of the difference between "a theorem" and "a theory". A "theorem" can be proved, a "theory" can not, it can only be defended. :biggrin:
2. Symmetry as non-informational overhead; reducable according Shannon's or Kolgomorov's definitions of 'information'
3. Symmetry as lack of knowledge about the difference between (a part of) an entity and it's symmetrical counterpart.Two and three are opposite sides of the same coin so to speak; one is entirely equivalent to the other. :approve:
I do not really understand you. There is a fundamental observation: symmetry, which denotes a lack of knowledge, what can be solved by using the concept 'conserved quantities'. In what way is such a concept not an axiom? An axiom like: there exists a thing as angular momentum. Or an axiom like: we don't know the centre of our universe.I could be wrong but it seems to me that you are confusing the two different issues: the symmetry (a representation of some particular mode ignorance – or indifference, per selfAdjoint's perspective) and the deduced conserved quantity required to enforce or accommodate that symmetry (a requirement established by internal self consistency). :confused:

I don't know that I would use the phrase "symmetry denotes a lack of knowledge"; I would rather express it as "symmetry can be seen as a lack of knowledge". But of course, my main complaint is the vagueness of English anyway so I am not really aware of what relationships are implied in your head when you use the phrase. Thus it is that anything I say on the actual meaning of your comment is no more than an opinion. The symmetry and the conserved quantity are related through the necessity of maintaining that "non-informational overhead" you referred to in #2 above. As you said, the representation must be reduceable and the mathematical constraint which provides that reduction is the conserved quantity. :cool:

Take for example, the consequences of not knowing the "center of our universe" (the origin of the coordinate system used to represent positions in our problem solving). If we don't know where the origin is, we don't know the particular value of any position. It follows that there is a different solution for every possible position of that origin. The other side of the coin is, if we are able to find a solution (say x as a function of t) we can clearly take that particular solution and deduce exactly where the origin was. :devil:

Since we now have information which was not available in the original problem given to us, something here is logically inconsistent. :bugeye: Conservation of momentum is a mathematical relationship on that solution which makes all the various solutions (the collection of solutions, each of which would independently allow deduction of a different origin) equivalent to one another. It is the relationship which provides the required reduction in information. What I am giving you is no more than a different perspective on Noether's theorem. :cool:

My purpose in stating things in such a strange way is to bring out the obvious inconsistencies implied by presuming we know things we cannot possibly know (setting up a coordinate axis when we don't know where the origin is). Remember, my sole purpose is to establish the parameters on my thoughts which will assure me that I am not inadvertently presuming information I do not have. Noether's theorem is an excellent example of how easy such a thing can happen and I don't think the common presentation brings the most important issue to the forefront.

The axiom is: we are ignorant of something. When we set up our coordinate system, that ignorance is not explicitly displayed: blind usage of the coordinate system ignores the embedded ignorance. It follows that we must have a constraint which will yield up that same ignorance in our final results. It is the relationship I am trying to bring to your attention, not the solution.

At the moment, let me list what I have presented to date: :wink:

1)The existence of "squirrel thought" (intuition, zen, fundamental knowledge) which is not a process amenable to logical analysis because of the extreme limits on logical analysis but, none the less appears to provide very effective solutions to very important problems. This is the only source of solutions to any conceivable problems and we must keep its failings in mind. :rofl:

2)The existence of "mathematics", a mental construct capable of extending logical relations far beyond what can be held consciously available for logical analysis. It constitutes a "very effective solution" (i.e., an intuitive construct) which has acquired far reaching agreement as to meaning and internal consistency. It is the only collection definitions which are accepted widely enough to provide anything close to "exact" communication. If a science wants to be exact, it must present its ideas with the same exactitude expected of mathematics. :devil:

3)That any representation of information in a mathematical form makes presumptions which must be carefully analyzed. We must make sure our ignorance is maintained in our analysis (we must not claim or imply that we know things we cannot know). :biggrin:

The next thing I would like to bring forth is apparently very difficult to communicate and I beg your indulgence. I tried to get people to think about this issue when I posted a simple question back in May of 2004. I totally failed and I am quite sure the fault was mine for not putting it in a form they could identify with. The original question was buried in a large post to Russell E. Rierson but is more easily discovered through a post on that thread by baffledMatt ( http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=212739#post212739). If you want to look at my earlier attempt, a quick perusal of that thread might be a place to start. The original question was, "how does one tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?" The point was that context is the single most important piece of information required to answer the question, a piece of information seldom even considered as significant. :cry:

In order for you to comprehend what I am getting at, consider the following steps. Your purpose is to examine an event which took place at the point in space referred to as (x,y,z,ict) (if we are to be exact, your approach must be general relativistically correct and we will use Einstein's picture). Your problem is to identify the object which was present at the event (for the fun of it we will make the answer to the question very simple; it was either an electron or a Volkswagen). :tongue: First, can you go and look at the event? Of course you cannot; to do so would require you to have a time machine. :bugeye: Exactly what information do you normally have to go by in the situation where such a question might arise? :confused:

It should be clear to you that what you really know (or at least presume to know) is the collection of events which immediately surround the event of interest. :cool: If the object were a Volkswagen, the significant surrounding events might include a road, a driver, maybe some trees or a building. If the object were an electron, a more reasonable set of surrounding events might include and "electron gun" or perhaps a wire or maybe a lab table. So the first step is to identify the most significant of these surrounding events. :uhh: But that is just a restatement of the original problem. Again, you can't go look; you must depend on what you already know. :grumpy: Fundamentally, you need to know the distribution of events in the vicinity of (x,y,z,ict). :approve:

For the moment, let us not worry about the process by which you come to know the existence of those events in the vicinity of (x,y,z,ict). What is important is the distribution of events themselves. What I am getting at is the fact that identification of any event is essentially a presumption of what distribution of surrounding events will be accepted as a valid set. :uhh: In other words, if I were to give you a specific distribution of events the distribution itself would express the identity of its various parts. :approve:

What is important here is that the presumptive necessity of identifying the fundamental entities making up a particular situation it totally erroneous. :devil: If I were to give you a mathematical expression (a function of many variables) which yielded the probability of finding a specific distribution of events as a function of time (that distribution being the collection of variables looked at as coordinates, [x,y,z,ict], of specific unnamed events) then that expression itself fundamentally characterizes the identity of all those events. :cool:

This is a very simple concept with very far reaching consequences; particularly if we wish to keep our minds open to all possibilities. As I said, identification of a particular event is paramount to establishing a very large set of acceptable and unacceptable peripheral events which are, in the final analysis, only vaguely specified. This is a very poor basis for "exact objective analysis". One should not label things first and then attempt to explain the labeled things behavior; one should examine and attempt to explain the behavior itself: when, where and under what circumstance the behavior occurs. "When" and "where" is coordinate specification and "under what circumstance" is a specification of associated behavior found at a related "when" and "where". o:)

Let me know if this perspective on the problem confronting scientific investigation makes any sense to you at all! :confused:

Have fun -- Dick

saviourmachine

Feb25-05, 07:23 AM

Hi DoctorDick, you're back again! New mind-boggling thoughts! :smile:

Ignorance
The axiom is: we are ignorant of something. When we set up our coordinate system, that ignorance is not explicitly displayed: blind usage of the coordinate system ignores the embedded ignorance. It follows that we must have a constraint which will yield up that same ignorance in our final results. It is the relationship I am trying to bring to your attention, not the solution.
...
3)That any representation of information in a mathematical form makes presumptions which must be carefully analyzed. We must make sure our ignorance is maintained in our analysis (we must not claim or imply that we know things we cannot know). :biggrin:I totally agree with you. Better to define, than to presume.

Identity
For the moment, let us not worry about the process by which you come to know the existence of those events in the vicinity of (x,y,z,ict). What is important is the distribution of events themselves. What I am getting at is the fact that identification of any event is essentially a presumption of what distribution of surrounding events will be accepted as a valid set. :uhh: In other words, if I were to give you a specific distribution of events the distribution itself would express the identity of its various parts. :approve:Question: Do you mean that the various parts do have there own identity ("the identity of its various parts")?

What is important here is that the presumptive necessity of identifying the fundamental entities making up a particular situation is totally erroneous. :devil: If I were to give you a mathematical expression (a function of many variables) which yielded the probability of finding a specific distribution of events as a function of time (that distribution being the collection of variables looked at as coordinates, [x,y,z,ict], of specific unnamed events) then that expression itself fundamentally characterizes the identity of all those events. :cool:And, there exist an infinite amount of mathematical expressions that will characterize this specific distribution...

Question: Do you mean, that with reductionism the identity of the whole will be destroyed ("identifying fundamental entities ... is totally erroneous")?

Off-topic?: In a particular situation we observe - no object but - for example "periodicity"; what for us - human - is a meaningful concept
what we - human - can observe in other particular situations tooI guess this concept [periodicity] can be seen as part of a specific distribution too, but not in the coordinate system of 'reality' [x,y,x,ict], but in the semantical world itself {constancy, periodicity, heterogeneity, variety, multiplicity, linearity, irregularity, complexity}. Can you point out the flaw in me identifying this (semantical) concept? I think that would clearify it a lot.

Understood: Identifying occurs by embedding 'something' in an acceptible set / distribution of surrounding events / concepts.

One should not label things first and then attempt to explain the labeled things behavior; one should examine and attempt to explain the behavior itself: when, where and under what circumstance the behavior occurs. "When" and "where" is coordinate specification and "under what circumstance" is a specification of associated behavior found at a related "when" and "where". o:) I agree.

Doctordick

Feb25-05, 08:31 PM

Hi Savior,

Glad to see you back. You seem to be the only person interested in my "crackpot" perspective. :!!) If you haven't seen it, I have a new "intellectual" adversary (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=469084#post469084): according to him, I am solving a pseudo problem and pseudo problems have many pseudo solutions. :tongue:
Better to define, than to presume.Very well put! I "squink" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=469169#post469169) you understand. :wink:
Question: Do you mean that the various parts do have there own identity ("the identity of its various parts")?Not really. What I mean is that if one is going to give identity (i.e., label in some way) the various collections of events which establish the identity sought for (i.e., the original label for the event at [x,y,z,ict]) then those identities are established in the exactly the same manner. That is, the significant collection must be looked at as a holistic entity. As I said earlier, the labels originally attached to these "events" are actually a presumed constraints as to what associated events are acceptable. All discussions essentially use definition as a mechanism to compartmentalize your thoughts. One can think of the identities of things as a shorthand for what is or is not the behavior under discussion. :redface:

As far as the behavior of "events" is concerned, in Einstein's perspective the concept is an oxymoron; events are a location in his space time. Events either exist or don't exist. It is the dynamic pattern of events (often called the time line of an entity) which gives meaning to the word "behavior". Now this "time line" can be seen as a collection of events related to the original event under scrutiny; and thus the "behavior" yields the identity of the event (and that behavior is a collection of events in the vicinity of the original event of interest). :devil:
Question: Do you mean, that with reductionism the identity of the whole will be destroyed ("identifying fundamental entities ... is totally erroneous")? No; what I meant was that the presumptive necessity of identifying the fundamental entities is erroneous. The current approach to physics is to think of the behavior of identified entities as the fundamental essence of reality. :yuck: I am pointing out that they have made a presumption that this identification is a necessary aspect of explaining reality. I am saying that, from the very structure of Einstein's space time continuum, this step is clearly unnecessary: i.e., this "presumptive necessity is in error". :uhh:

Now, I am not saying it is not a valuable assumption! Without that valuable shorthand, we could not bring the circumstances of interest to us into a form which can be analytically analyzed. :approve: That is what most all of physics is about: analyzing behavior of real or hypothesized entities. But, as I said way back when I started this discussion, I want to do my very best to assure that I do not preemptively shut out a possible solution. My only point is that identifying events is such an unnecessary preemptive assumption. :cool:
I guess this concept [periodicity] can be seen as part of a specific distribution too, but not in the coordinate system of 'reality' [x,y,x,ict], but in the semantical world itself {constancy, periodicity, heterogeneity, variety, multiplicity, linearity, irregularity, complexity}.There is no error in your identification. Definition can always be seen as a label identifying when and where usage of the label is acceptable. In fact, a dictionary entry can be seen as a specific description of the usage of the symbol (word, label, Idea, -- whatever you want to call it). In essence, words can be thought of as lossy data compression mechanism. This idea applies just as well to "real objects". :rolleyes:
Understood: Identifying occurs by embedding 'something' in an acceptable set / distribution of surrounding events / concepts.I wouldn't quite put it that way; in my head that sort of confuses the horse and the cart. Language is vague because of our limited ability to provide definitions. If we wish to be exact, we should do our best to avoid closing the door on exactly what these definitions should be. :frown: Essentially, I am suggesting we work with the holistic information itself and leave introducing identity until we fully understand the range of behavior possible and how it might be represented. o:)

This is actually a very abstract perspective and difficult for most people to follow. In my opinion the problem is that their interest is in finding easy methods of solving important questions. My answer to that interest is, just go with your intuition, "squink" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=469169#post469169) away at it; it's probably the best and easiest approach available to you. Presume all the authorities have already found the most convenient solutions and use them. My interest, on the other hand, is in understanding things at a fundamental level. :tongue2:

If all that is clear to you then I can step off to the next fundamental issue which should be examined carefully. That issue is also quite straight forward but seldom if ever discussed in detail. It has to do with what exists and what rules it obeys. The scientific community seems to hold that these two things are of great interest to them but they never seem to show any interest in the relationship between the two. When one looks at the big picture, especially with a historic perspective, it is quite evident that the two are intimately related. That is, changing the rules influences what must exist and changing what will be accepted as existing influences what the rules must be. There is most definitely a duality here. :bugeye:

It has been the practice of the authorities throughout history to hold that their understanding of one or the other of these two facets is correct and that the search should be constrained to the other. Either they know what exists and are searching for the rules or they know what the rules must be and they are searching for what exists. If you stick with me, I will show you that "what exists" and "what the rules are" are essentially orthogonal concepts and there is not a single possible correct answer but rather a relational answer (the rules are related to what exists and visa versa). For the moment, the only issue I want to get across to you is that the interdependence of these two is a fundamental issue worthy of thought; very like position and momentum or time and energy. :biggrin:

Have fun -- Dick

saviourmachine

Mar2-05, 11:03 AM

To identify => to relate
Not really. What I mean is that if one is going to give identity (i.e., label in some way) the various collections of events which establish the identity sought for (i.e., the original label for the event at [x,y,z,ict]) then those identities are established in the exactly the same manner.Yes, I agree; to identify is to relate (with events in same context).

Event - Location in space-time?
As far as the behavior of "events" is concerned, in Einstein's perspective the concept is an oxymoron; events are a location in his space time. Events either exist or don't exist. It is the dynamic pattern of events (often called the time line of an entity) which gives meaning to the word "behavior". Now this "time line" can be seen as a collection of events related to the original event under scrutiny; and thus the "behavior" yields the identity of the event (and that behavior is a collection of events in the vicinity of the original event of interest). :devil:Do you really mean that "event" and "location in (Einstein's) space-time" are equal? Does this mean e.g. that: "Locations in space time exist or don't exist"? Intuitively I would rather interchange "event" for "translocation" (in space time). Would that be fine for you, or do I miss the point?

Recap: An entity will 'endure' a pattern of (space time) translocations / events, called its "(space)time line", or its "behaviour". A specific event can be seen as exemplar of the whole set of events. Identification occurs by investigating a subset of this set (events in space time vicinity of event).

No; what I meant was that the presumptive necessity of identifying the fundamental entities is erroneous.I agree.

Circularity in defining prerequisites to call something 'existing'
If all that is clear to you then I can step off to the next fundamental issue which should be examined carefully. That issue is also quite straight forward but seldom if ever discussed in detail. It has to do with what exists and what rules it obeys. The scientific community seems to hold that these two things are of great interest to them but they never seem to show any interest in the relationship between the two. When one looks at the big picture, especially with a historic perspective, it is quite evident that the two are intimately related. That is, changing the rules influences what must exist and changing what will be accepted as existing, influences what the rules must be. There is most definitely a duality here. :bugeye:I am curious. :smile:

selfAdjoint

Mar2-05, 05:09 PM

Do you really mean that "event" and "location in (Einstein's) space-time" are equal? Does this mean e.g. that: "Locations in space time exist or don't exist"? Intuitively I would rather interchange "event" for "translocation" (in space time). Would that be fine for you, or do I miss the point?

A point in spacetime is specified by a spatial point (3 coordinates) and a time coordinate, thus "on the sidewalk under the Marshall Fields clock at 3:00 PM". It was traditional to call such a 4-D point, an event. Whether it corresponds to someone else's concept of an event is a question. Perhaps for this reason, the locution seems to have fallen out of favor during my lifetime.

saviourmachine

Mar3-05, 07:49 AM

A point in spacetime is specified by a spatial point (3 coordinates) and a time coordinate, thus "on the sidewalk under the Marshall Fields clock at 3:00 PM". It was traditional to call such a 4-D point, an event. Whether it corresponds to someone else's concept of an event is a question. Perhaps for this reason, the locution seems to have fallen out of favor during my lifetime.Aha, I understand. I thought of it, as "something that happens in a given place and time plane" in stead of "something that exists* at a given place and time".

Correction: It is location and no translocation.

Recap: An entity will 'follow' a pattern of (space time) locations / events, called its "(space)time line", or its "behaviour". A specific event can be seen as exemplar of the whole set of events. Identification occurs by investigating a subset of this set (events in space time vicinity of event).

* If it is about existence, than it's easy to mix up 'causation' with 'causation of existence'. If an object is defined as a pattern of events ([x,y,z,ict] locations), than I need help to define 'existence' and 'cause' in this context - and maybe some other concepts that become contra-intuitive.

selfAdjoint

Mar3-05, 11:37 AM

Recap: An entity will 'follow' a pattern of (space time) locations / events, called its "(space)time line", or its "behaviour". A specific event can be seen as exemplar of the whole set of events. Identification occurs by investigating a subset of this set (events in space time vicinity of event).

Yes, this is good, except that the term "space time line" is not used. It is universally called the world line of the object. Maybe in another post or thread we can discuss how causal structures work in relativity.

Doctordick

Mar3-05, 03:20 PM

It was traditional to call such a 4-D point, an event. Whether it corresponds to someone else's concept of an event is a question. Perhaps for this reason, the locution seems to have fallen out of favor during my lifetime.Shows one how far out of touch I am: I didn't know it had fallen out of favor. :blushing: However, in my head, an "event" existed: i.e., my mental picture was more analogous to saviormachine's "something that exists at a given place and time". That is, Einstein's space-time-continuum was a coordinate system within which one could identify locations where things existed. I guess the idea that the "space-time-continuum" was supposed to be "real" never really occurred to me. I always took it as intended to be a "valid" way of representing physical phenomena; not unnecessarily the only valid way. :redface:

Central to my current mental image of the situation is the fact that "infinity" is not a number (it is instead, a label for a process which cannot be completed). This means that the "time line" can not be a valid representation of our current knowledge at any time. Whatever means by which we came to "know" of that "time line", the fundamental information available to us can, at best, consist of a finite number of points in that space-time-continuum. That these points should be considered an entity (so identified and labeled) is an assumption and not a fact. What I am getting at here is that it cannot be a defendable fact as the defense would require proof of existence of an infinite number of points. On the other hand, the existence of a finite number of points could perhaps be defended (at least it seems reasonable that the validity of that issue is best laid aside for the moment).

It is the essence of my position that specification of the relevant space-time-continuum points is, at worst, equivalent to specification of a set of labeled identities and, in the final analysis, capable of representing any circumstance. From a physicalists perspective, the "universe" is referred to by simply making all events relevant; however, I will show later that the fundamental mode of representation goes far beyond physicalism.
Recap: An entity will 'endure' a pattern of (space time) translocations / events, called its "(space)time line", or its "behaviour". A specific event can be seen as exemplar of the whole set of events. Identification occurs by investigating a subset of this set (events in space time vicinity of event).I presume, from your response to selfAdjoint, that you understand what I mean when I say identification is equivalent to specification of behavior in a given context. What I would like to add to that is the fact that "behavior" of that identified (and/or labeled) entity is also equivalent to to specification of acceptable context. :rolleyes: Behavior is a statement of the expected path of that space-time-line given the space-time-paths of other relevant entities. The entire collection of information about the circumstance is embodied in the collection of space-time-points presumed relevant. :cool:

So let's stand back and look at the perspective I have just laid out. Our knowledge of the universe can be represented by a set of points in a four dimensional coordinate system. That representation represents both the existence of entities and the behavior of those entities. In addition to that, every bit of that "knowledge" available to us was gained in the past and we can't go back and change one iota of it. So, "what is" is "what is" and there doesn't seem to be any rules embedded in the perspective at all.

This brings me to the issue of rules. Exactly what do we mean when we think about "rules"? It seems to me that what we mean is that all possible distributions of "space-time-points" are not possible! That is, nameta9's "infinite-infinite" universe (also apparently known as the "Cosmic Universe of Complete Oblivion" :rofl:) is not an acceptable solution to the problem: "What is reality all about anyway?" :wink:

Thus it is that I come to the conclusion that "the rules of the universe" consist of a mechanism which will answer the question (regarding any specific distribution of space-time-points), "Is that particular distribution possible?" Or better yet, given what I "know" about reality, what is the probability that the specific distribution of space-time-points is a possible distribution? (I really can't presume the answer has to be either yes or no, since I have to include the possibility that I could be wrong :biggrin: )

Since the information (a specific distribution of space-time-points) is a set of numbers and the answer to the question is a probability (another number), it should be clear that it makes no difference what the rules are, they can be expressed by a mathematical function: i.e., you plug in the numbers which specify the distribution and the function yields the probability the distribution is a possibility. Note that I haven't made the claim that the function is easily represented by standard mathematics (it could be no more than a table of correct answers; that is, I could be God and simply "all-knowing" :rofl:).

What I have presented here is a very abstract representation of the problem. It clearly is not a very usable representation of reality but it is certainly rather universal; at least from a physicalist perspective: i.e., if what we know of reality can indeed be represented by that massive accumulation of numbers (the relevant space-time-points). Remember, I am trying to come up with an abstract representation of "the best that I can do" (knowing what I know) and am not making any claim that "the best that I can do" is ever the correct answer. However, tomorrow I may know something I don't know today but, even tomorrow, "the best I can do with what I know" will still be "the best I can do with what I know" so that at least will not change! o:)

Think a little about what I have said here and let me know if any part of it seems unreasonable. At this point, I admit it seems rather physicalist in outlook but, if you admit that their perspective covers a lot of valuable ground, I will show you how to expand it beyond the physicalist view.

Have fun -- Dick

Philocrat

Mar5-05, 09:03 AM

HOW PARAFUSES IN SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS AFFECT REDUCTIONISM (PART I)

The rate at which PARAFUSES (vagueness, confusions, misunderstandings) are plaguing scientific propositions is causing grave concerns, especially in mathematical and experimental physics. By this, I mean any scientific statements that appear on the surface as wholly true and conclusive but which in actual fact are vague or confused or grossly misunderstood. The devil (usually) is in the detail! There are many of them, but here are just two good examples:

1) A instantaneously reacts or responds to B, regardless of the space distance between them.

2) I experimentally create A and B from ‘Nothing’ (or ‘Nothingness’, if you like)

In Philosophy these two scientific statements would be held not only with utmost suspicion but also it would be confronted with utmost intellectual and analytical ruthlessness. The philosophers in the disciplines of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science would have not only a great deal to say about these two claims but also a great deal of very hard fundamental questions to ask about them. Now, to have a glimpse of what I am talking about here, let alone appreciate it, let us look at each of these two claims in turn.

A instantaneously reacts or responds to B, regardless of the space distance between them.

Quantitatively, there is the fundamental need to state at the very elementary level the Time Interval (TI) or Elapsed Time (ET) between A’s Action and B’s Response or Reaction. For example:

Let ‘AT’ stand for Action Time
Let ‘RT ‘stand for Response/Reaction Time
Let ‘TI/ET’ stand for Time Interval/Elapsed Time

Therefore the calculation would be;

TI/ET = RT – AT

Now, the quantitative implication of this carefully deduced formula is that the resulting TI/ET from the calculation could range between an absolute zero and an infinitely large numerical value. This is a very basic and well-understood formula and, as far as a two-way communication is concerned, it could be escalated to any level of complexity and sophistication by adding relevant parameters (for example, nonchronous (a type of communication that the signal is received but with no response), synchronous and asynchronous types of communication). Here we are not concerned with that. Infact, that level of complexity is better left to communication and computer engineers who design and implement communication protocols for Computer Network Systems and Telecommunication Equipments. Rather we are only interested in the metaphysical, epistemological and logical implications of the action-reaction scenario of which this basics formula is more than sufficient to drive the message home. Therefore, fundamentally, there are two things that metaphysicians, epistemologists and philosophy of science philosophers would like to know, as consequences flowing from this basic formula:

The first one is this:

Does ‘A instantaneously reacts to B’ imply TI/ET = 0? In other words, what are the metaphysical, epistemological and scientific or empirical consequences of TI/ET being equal to zero?

For a start, with regards to this, metaphysicians and epistemologists would be outraged by your claim because you have single-handedly created a completely new metaphysical and epistemological categories that need a new breed of human beings to look at them, recognise them and understand them obviously in a completely new light. Metaphysically, you have created a Timeless/Spaceless Category in the psychology of the perceiver with regards to time, space and action. Epistemologically you have undermined our previous understanding (at the fundamental level) of the notions of time, space and motion and their causal relations. While in one hand Metaphysicians and Epistemologists are jointly pondering over this, the philosophy of science philosophers and Epistemologists in the other hand would be jointly outraged and pondering over the step-by-step procedures and methodologies by which you derived at such a claim. What methods or procedures did you use to derive at such a claim? So, as you can see these three groups of philosophers all have a stake in the magic that you are performing.

The key issues they are interested are these: (1) the possibility of this new Timeless Metaphysical category, (2) if so, how is this new category to be perceived and understood, and (3) if so, what scientific method or methods are there for bringing about or creating such a category? They would all together argue that by creating this new metaphysical and epistemological category, by whatever scientific method or methods that may be available, you are categorically implying that it is possible (1) not only for a single moving object of a given size to instantaneously act and react to itself at TI/ET = 0 but also (2) for multiple or infinite number of moving entities to instantaneously act and react or respond to each other at TI/ET = 0, regardless of the space distance involved. This is the gravest and far-reaching connotational implication of this sort of scientific claim or statement.

Any scientist that does not understand this and henceforth take utmost caution when he or she is making this sort of claim should immediately return his or her PhD back to the university that issued it. For no university that sincerely aims at bringing the production of scientific knowledge to the next level should tolerate this kind parafuse in scientific thinking and reports.

The second thing that they would also like to know is this:

Does ‘A instantaneously reacts to B’ imply TI/ET > 0? In other words, what are the metaphysical, epistemological and scientific or empirical consequences of TI/ET being greater than zero? That is, something like:

0.01
0.00142
0.000001
0.000000000000000000000000000134
and so on.

With regards to this they will argue that absolute zero is a plain zero with no fractional parts, therefore any zero that takes on any fractional parts (regardless of if such fractional parts run into infinities) is metaphysically and epistemologically inconclusive. For example, if you scientifically reported that ‘A reacts to B at TI/ET = 0.000000000000000000000000000134 unit of time‘, surely you wouldn’t want anyone who reads your report to think and understand this as being identical or equivalent in meaning to ‘A reacts/responds to B at TI/ET=0 unit of time’? Would you? Well, if you said yes to this question, epistemologists and their colleagues in the related disciplines would argue that the latter is instantaneous and not the former in the strictest sense of the word. Ok, for argument sake, you might say “but in mathematics, I have always been taught from childhood to round up numbers with fractional parts to the nearest whole numbers!” Good for you, but what your teacher failed to remind you of is the fact that when you do so you are chopping off a significant part of a numerical value that has meaning and relevance in reality. Metaphysically and epistemologically, you have not escaped the fact that you were taught how to make approximations with numbers that do not directly amount to absolute numerical values. Approximations may be representative and simulative of certain facts but they are not absolute facts. For absolute facts is everything over and above approximations!

Ok, let’s say that you went ahead and started to chop things off from your resulting scientific calculations and experiments. In that case, Epistemologists and their colleagues in the philosophy of science discipline would ask you:

“Ok, you have been taught and permitted in your scientific reports to round things up to the nearest whole numbers, and you are now doing exactly that here, what actual or potential effects could or does this have on the truth or epistemological status of the objects or events under observation?”

In this very case, the question would be referring to the actual or potential effects on rounding TI/ET of 0.000000000000000000000000000134 unit of time to TI/ET of 0 unit of time. Well, for a start they would argue that you are doing magic and cheating by trying to turn a numerical value of physical importance and relevance to an absolute zero. In Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of science, this would be a non-starter. They will argue that you do not understand the physical consequences of what you are doing scientifically.

NOTE: No one would appreciate the implication of this argument until you cast your mind back to those days when many machines were embed with crude bivalent logic circuitries and could not handle physical mathematical values that range over, or even if they did, were rounding things up to whole numbers that ignored important and relevant fractional parts. Do you remember those days that people used to kick and vandalised telephone boots and food and drinks vending machines because they could not give change back from the costs prices of those goods and services? Well, this is precisely what this argument is all about, and I guess those of you who lived in those countries with this problem should realise that during the period that these machines were in operation people must have been short-changed and cheated out of millions of their hard-earned currencies. This is just a simple real example of the consequences of parafuses in scientific thinking, methodologies and reports, yet holistic examination of this shows that the problem is widespread across science disciplines.

Philocrat

Mar5-05, 09:05 AM

HOW PARAFUSES IN SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS AFFECT REDUCTIONISM (PART II)

I experimentally create A and B from ‘Nothing’ (or ‘Nothingness’, if you like)

This claim is by far the most metaphysically, epistemologically and empirically or scientifically problematic. Reducing ‘Nothing’ to something and ‘Something’ back to ‘Nothing’ is metaphysically, epistemologically and scientifically impossible. But not withstanding, a huge population of scholars still believe that this is possible. On this PF alone, there are many threads running in parallel trying to prove both mathematically and otherwise that this is a scientific possibility. Well, not quite. Instead it is more a parafuse in the scientific thinking and calculations than a scientific possibility. The scientific claim that microphysical particles of matter can magically and non-procedurally pop up from nothing or nothingness is frankly not only an abuse of logic but also an abuse of mathematics as well. Now, let us look at this claim more closely (or should I say give it philosophical treatment).

If you were a scientist observing a given object with your visual organs or in combination with their extensions (scientific instruments) and then suddenly say “ I have just experimentally created particles A and B from Nothing’, metaphysicians and epistemologist would be outraged by this sort of claim because (1) you have not only single-handedly created a new Metaphysical category in the realm of the human reality that requires a new epistemological maintenance in the perceiver’s head but also (2) you have mysteriously or perhaps scientifically instantiated and enforced a brand new CAUSAL RELATION between two fundamentally alien metaphysical categories. Epistemologists and their colleagues in the philosophy of science discipline would argue that you have created a brand new world or universe with a completely new set of laws of physics. They will then say to you “please table the methods and procedures by which you step-by-step but systematically created such a world so that we can look at and examine them ourselves to the finest grains of details”.

On the quantitative side of things, they will ask you:

“How much of the world do you see when you observe things and events, either with your naked visual organs or in combinations with their extensions (scientific instruments)?”

In response to this question, they would expect you to say something like:

“The nature of my visual organs and their complementary extensions is such that I can see n% of the world whenever I am observing”

They will then insist:

“How much in hard number is n%? Or simply, what percentage of the world do you always see with your visual organs and their extensions when you are scientifically observing?”

Of course, at this point you would know right away that they want you to epistemologically commit yourself to giving the exact percentage value of how much of the world you always see under scientific observation. This is your only ticket to convincing them that your original claim of creating something from nothing has any credence or substance in it, let alone being wholly proven to be true. Would you then answer, for example, that?:

‘n%’ = 0
‘n%’ = 0.01
‘n%’ = 0.0023
‘n%’ = 0.0000000000000000023
‘n%’ = 10
‘n%’ = 50
‘n%’ = 99.99
‘n%’ = 100

Surely, you would not expect these guys to expect n% < 100 in your answer. Of course, they will expect you to epistemologically commit yourself and confidently assert that each time you scientifically sniff around the world you always see 100% of all there is to be seen. Well, I can’t speak for any other discipline, but in philosophy, metaphysicians, epistemologists and their colleagues in the philosophy of science discipline would not accept anything less than 100% in your scientific report. Then if you dare to commit yourself to this 100% limit, they would want you to submit the method or methods by which you came by this value for further philosophical scrutiny or inspection.

A further question of epistemological and metaphysical significance would be that concerning the issue of rounding things up. Supposing you decided as we did in the action-response problem above to round 99.99% up to 100% in other to appear to the reader of your science report or thesis as if you are implying or asserting that you always see 100% of what you are observing? But they would ask you what happens to the missing 0.01% from your calculus? Where did you put this missing percentage value that you treat as scientifically and epistemologically insignificant? Or were you trying to cheat and mislead your reader in the process?

-------------------------------------
NOTE: Infact, it is not only philosophers that would be puzzled and triggered to scrutinise to the finest detail this sort claim and chopping off of significant numerical values. Ordinary lay people in the real world would be as much startled and likewise triggered to do the same. They would do this because they know that if you take £0.01 from
£1,000,000 what remains is £999,999.99 and therefore you are no longer a millionaire. You would be metaphysically and epistemologically recategorised or reclassified as a thousanaire. The same is true of you trying to buy something from a shop priced at £10 and you have only £9.99 in your pocket, the fact remains that you may encounter a very strict and awkward shopkeeper that would not sell you that thing until you produce the remaining £0.01. Well, don’t take this as strange because it does happen.
-----------------------------------------

The final most important question they will ask is this.

“Does the remainder (0.01% missing realm of the world that you cannot see during your routine scientific observation) epistemologically translate to ‘Nothing’ or ‘Nothingness’?

Epistemologists particularly would ask you:

“How do you know that what you cannot see is Nothing?”

This sort of question is not the sort that you would respond with such asnwer as:

"I may not see 0.01% of the world, but I am convinced and do know that whenever I create something from this very source it comes from nothing" or simply that "I know that 0.01% of invisible part of the world is nothing

Well, I leave this two-part piece of my personal observation with no conclusion. Search your consciencne and make your own conclusion!

Many thanks.

-------
Think Nature......Stay Green! Above all, think of how your action may affect the rest of nature! May the 'Book of Nature' serve you well and bring you all that is Good!

saviourmachine

Mar7-05, 04:24 AM

Behaviour
I presume, from your response to selfAdjoint, that you understand what I mean when I say identification is equivalent to specification of behavior in a given context. What I would like to add to that is the fact that "behavior" of that identified (and/or labeled) entity is also equivalent to to specification of acceptable context. :rolleyes: Behavior is a statement of the expected path of that space-time-line given the space-time-paths of other relevant entities. The entire collection of information about the circumstance is embodied in the collection of space-time-points presumed relevant. :cool: What will be seen as acceptable context, how we choose a subset (how important are e.g. the different coordinates [x,y,z,ict]?), is assumptive.

Rules
This brings me to the issue of rules. Exactly what do we mean when we think about "rules"? It seems to me that what we mean is that all possible distributions of "space-time-points" are not possible!Okay.

Thus it is that I come to the conclusion that "the rules of the universe" consist of a mechanism which will answer the question (regarding any specific distribution of space-time-points), "Is that particular distribution possible?" Or better yet, given what I "know" about reality, what is the probability that the specific distribution of space-time-points is a possible distribution? (I really can't presume the answer has to be either yes or no, since I have to include the possibility that I could be wrong :biggrin: )Okay, so its "pattern matching" regarding all kinds of simular sets.

Since the information (a specific distribution of space-time-points) is a set of numbers and the answer to the question is a probability (another number), it should be clear that it makes no difference what the rules are, they can be expressed by a mathematical function: i.e., you plug in the numbers which specify the distribution and the function yields the probability the distribution is a possibility. Note that I haven't made the claim that the function is easily represented by standard mathematics (it could be no more than a table of correct answers; that is, I could be God and simply "all-knowing" :rofl:).Doesn't that assume that: existence really is an on/off matter (existence is a boolean value that can be assigned to a 4D coordinate system)
there exists no randomness in the sets (what would have as consequence that each pattern does have the same probability :cry:).
every used resolution of the coordinate system does show the same patterns (no way to say when it is the real causal system)
Non-physicalist view
Think a little about what I have said here and let me know if any part of it seems unreasonable. At this point, I admit it seems rather physicalist in outlook but, if you admit that their perspective covers a lot of valuable ground, I will show you how to expand it beyond the physicalist view.I hope you can clearify these things, or expand you model a bit. :smile: I'm looking forward to your explanation of how this all doesn't entail a physicalist view.

Doctordick

Mar7-05, 07:45 PM

What will be seen as acceptable context, how we choose a subset (how important are e.g. the different coordinates [x,y,z,ict]?), is assumptive. Of course it is assumptive; but it reflects an assumption made in the analyzer's mind, not an assumption in my picture of the phenomena. You should be able to understand that "what is relevant" exists in the act of identity labeling itself, not in my representation of it.

The real problem here is that actual realization of what is relevant is quite vague under normal circumstances (people presume a lot). Educating a student is a process of delineating, through examples, exactly what phenomena are relevant. Think about explaining exactly what an electron is to a new student. The subtleties of this process go on all the way to graduate school. Learning anything is a process of refining the relevant information.
Doesn't that assume that:

1. existence really is an on/off matter (existence is a boolean value that can be assigned to a 4D coordinate system)Yes it does. :smile: However, your mistake is assigning that assumption to my analysis of the problem instead of assigning it to its rightful place: the decision process of the scientist deciding on the validity or invalidity of a rule. Though there may be some steps in his thought process which admit of alternate possibilities, in the final analysis, the foundation of the decision can usually be traced down to specific examples of distributions of space-time-points he holds as valid representations of reality (the physicalist's description of the facts behind his case). That is why I started with the physicalist viewpoint; essentially, the physicalist believes that nothing exists beyond what can be represented by these collections of four dimensional space-time-points and there exists a large volume of relevant discussion on the applicability of their perspective. :rofl:
2. there exists no randomness in the sets (what would have as consequence that each pattern does have the same probability :cry:).The past (the information the scientist bases his theories on) is fixed (at least as far as it is understood by most rational scientists). Randomness is an oxymoron if one specifies the past in terms of a collection four dimensional space-time-points. "What was" is "what was"; the rest is no more than how you see it. Randomness arises only when one begins to label the specific examples of the phenomena one wants to discuss. The specification of relevance establishes the nature of that associated randomness. Without identity labeling, all specific events in the history of the universe are different events and occur but once.
3. every used resolution of the coordinate system does show the same patterns (no way to say when it is the real causal system)You will have to make yourself a little clearer here as I do not understand what you are trying to say.

On the non-physicalist view, it's coming down the pike but there are still a few issues I have to get across before we can seriously discuss that issue. For the moment, the physicalist perspective makes it much easier to get the central nature of those subtle issues across.

I am not really sure you understood what I was saying about the relationship between the rules and what exists. Now, my statement that the two concepts are orthogonal is a different matter. That I will defend in detail further down the road. But meanwhile I want to make the relationships between the two as clear as I can. It isn't really a deep issue at all though I think it is a very very important one.

A simple example is the invention of the neutrino. The existence of the neutrino was originally based on the failure of observed reactions to conserve energy. So it is thus the rule that energy must be conserved which gave rise to the idea that the "neutrino" had to exist. Now, after its existence was proposed, other consequences of that existence were carefully thought out (under the assumption that the rules of physics were correct). And, by this means, its existence was further verified: that is to say, if the rules were valid, then the existence of neutrinos was verified. :devil:

Now, the issue I am bringing up here is not the logical decision that "neutrinos existed" but rather the fact that the conclusion was a consequence of acceptance of the rule that energy must be conserved (and then later by the acceptance of the general rules of physics as understood at the time). The issue here is the validity of the process itself, not the relationships put forth. If one is to maintain their objectivity, these relationships must be kept in mind. Fundamentally, the scientific community invents entities with the properties needed to explain the results of their experiments. If, by the rules they believe to be valid, the results of all experiments are consistent with the existence of those entities, then the entities are deemed to exist. On occasion, they will also alter the rules in some way if that process yields better agreement, but this act is usually rarer than invention of entities. (I think new rules are harder for them to think up than new entities. You have to understand and believe the rules, but you only have to believe in the entities and their actual definition and/or behavior is easier to keep vague! :rofl: )

Thus it is that the central issue of explaining reality is the inventing of entities which obey the rules presumed to be valid. In fact, it should be clear to everyone that, if the outcome of every experiment which can be performed is consistent with the deduced consequences of existence of an entity, then that fact is taken as prima facia evidence that the entity exists. My problem is that there is a fundamental presumption embedded in that statement: it is the assumption that there exists no alternate explanation which will satisfy that same constraint. If we are to be rational, we must keep that fact in mind. If we don't, we are once again pretending to know something which we cannot "know". :wink:

In the interest of maintaining recognition of that fact, please allow me to divide the body of "things that exist" into two quite different categories: things that "really" exist and things that don't "really" exist but are actually just figments of our imagination which happen to be wholly in alignment with the rules we believe are true. Now, let me make this perfectly clear, the difference between these two categories allows no mechanism to perform a separation one from the other and there can exist no way to know which is which, but that was not the purpose for which I made the division. I made the division in order to simplify my thinking as the two categories need to be thought about quite differently. :rolleyes:

Things that "really" exist are not dreamed up, they are reality itself and cannot be altered by our explanations. On the other hand, things that are figments of our imagination can be altered any way we choose so long as their existence is totally consistent with the rules being promulgated and all deduced consequences of those rules. It is thus possible, under this perspective, to see the universe as existing exactly as proposed by the current scientific community (nothing they have discovered is a figment of our imagination) or, equally easily as totally solipsistic (nothing "really" exists). The issue as to which of these perspectives is correct has, in the perspective I have just laid out, been made totally beside the point and need have no bearing on our analysis. What I am pointing out is that not knowing the answer to the question "what is really real" is no problem so long as we have a mental mechanism to allow exact analysis independent of the answer. And the division I propose gives us exactly that mechanism. It is subtly quite different from ignoring our ignorance, which is the standard attack on this difficulty, but has almost the same consequences (but not quite). :surprised

Another way to put it is to say that what really exists is what we need to explain. Whatever else we decide must exist must be part of the explanation. The single most important issue here is that, no matter what the rules are, both components must obey exactly the same rules. Think about it and let me know what part of what I have laid out you find unreasonable. :tongue2:

Have fun -- Dick

saviourmachine

Mar9-05, 10:54 AM

Assumptions
Of course it is assumptive; but it reflects an assumption made in the analyzer's mind, not an assumption in my picture of the phenomena. You should be able to understand that "what is relevant" exists in the act of identity labeling itself, not in my representation of it.Yes, I know. Actually, that time I was searching for a word without an additional flavour. I thought 'assumption' was a better word than 'presumption'. I speak English as a second language. We have to assume some things, or we can't identify. I agree with that. :smile:

Yes it does. :smile: However, your mistake is assigning that assumption to my analysis of the problem instead of assigning it to its rightful place: the decision process of the scientist deciding on the validity or invalidity of a rule.Sorry for that. :blushing:

Without identity labeling, all specific events in the history of the universe are different events and occur but once.Yes, that was what I wanted to say. In that way only different objects exist. And no law does exist that works at a global scale.

You will have to make yourself a little clearer here as I do not understand what you are trying to say.I was just listing some things that such a - physicalist - coordinate system presumes. And besides the two things of above, it assumes IMHO that [x,y,z,ict] is continuous or discrete.
If it is continuous no worldline is identical (with arising circularity in identifying - like you said), if it is discrete some kind of stepsize has to be taken (and after that we can observe patterns that maybe would alter if we had token - or had access to - a smaller stepsize). Continuity or a certain stepsize has to be assumed. It's our horizon.
If there is "causality" through time or space we can observe it, except if it falls out of our horizon (e.g. Brownian motion).

Hypothetical rules and particles
Thus it is that the central issue of explaining reality is the inventing of entities which obey the rules presumed to be valid. In fact, it should be clear to everyone that, if the outcome of every experiment which can be performed is consistent with the deduced consequences of existence of an entity, then that fact is taken as prima facia evidence that the entity exists. My problem is that there is a fundamental presumption embedded in that statement: it is the assumption that there exists no alternate explanation which will satisfy that same constraint. If we are to be rational, we must keep that fact in mind. If we don't, we are once again pretending to know something which we cannot "know". :wink:Yes I agree. I heard more often about a 'hypothetical particle' (tachyon, magnetic monopole, gluon, graviton) than a 'hypothetical law'. I also would say with Epictetus: "This also is a hypothetical law that we must accept what follows from the hypothesis."
I think that sometimes physicists propose a 'theoretical particle' in stead of a 'hypothetical particle' (e.g. a 'hole' as opposed to an 'electron'). Do you think that scientists often fail to notice this difference?

In the interest of maintaining recognition of that fact, please allow me to divide the body of "things that exist" into two quite different categories: things that "really" exist and things that don't "really" exist but are actually just figments of our imagination which happen to be wholly in alignment with the rules we believe are true.Do you have ideas about when we should call something 'real' and when 'theoretical' (like 'hole' vs 'electron' mentioned above)?

You lost me
What I am pointing out is that not knowing the answer to the question "what is really real" is no problem so long as we have a mental mechanism to allow exact analysis independent of the answer. And the division I propose gives us exactly that mechanism. It is subtly quite different from ignoring our ignorance, which is the standard attack on this difficulty, but has almost the same consequences (but not quite). :surprisedI'm not sure to which mechanism you're refering here. Sorry, I can't follow your reasoning in the last two paragraphs.

Doctordick

Mar11-05, 04:00 PM

Hi Savior,

Sorry about being slow in my response. I wanted to think about your comments and answer them in a manner which would make my thoughts as clear as possible.

At least you have a second language; as far as I can tell, you are doing a fine job. To get my Ph.D. I had to pass a "proficiency" exam in German and Russian. All I had to do was translate some scientific articles which talked about things I already knew; personally, I wouldn't exactly label my ability as "proficient". They even let me use German/Russian to English dictionaries while I performed the translation. I am afraid I don't speak anything but "American English" and I am not very proud of that.

I think you understand the lack of assumptions (other than that physicalist thing) in my approach. :smile:
And no law does exist that works at a global scale.Sorry about that, but I have one for you (down the road when you can better understand the relationship between "what exists" and "what the rules are").
I was just listing some things that such a - physicalist - coordinate system presumes. And besides the two things of above, it assumes IMHO that [x,y,z,ict] is continuous or discrete.I won't argue with you on those issues (what the physicalist assumes); however, I do not make exactly those assumptions. In particular, I agree with Zeno's argument against continuity (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=387017#post387017). I would however argue with you on the statement that one must either accept continuity or a certain step size. I have a third option for you.
If there is "causality" through time or space we can observe it, except if it falls out of our horizon (e.g. Brownian motion).I think you have to admit that "causality" can not be observed if every space-time-point is thought of as a unique occurrence."

I could be wrong, but you appear to skip over my comment:
My problem is that there is a fundamental presumption embedded in that statement: it is the assumption that there exists no alternate explanation which will satisfy that same constraint. I am not sure you understood what I meant. :confused:
I think that sometimes physicists propose a 'theoretical particle' in stead of a 'hypothetical particle' (e.g. a 'hole' as opposed to an 'electron'). Do you think that scientists often fail to notice this difference?In my head, there is no difference between a "hypothetical particle" and a "theoretical particle". People don't always put the same connotations on a word and assuming others comprehend what one means when one uses a word is a very dangerous step. In my opinion, the only way to support the contention that one understands something or is being understood by another is when the exchange of communication symbols become consistent with one's expectations (not a lot of surprises). When you understand someone, their reaction to your comments should be expected. Likewise, when you understand the universe, its reaction to your behavior should be expected.

Lack of surprise is the central sign of understanding and understanding is achieved through exchange of information. In that sense, understanding reality is completely equivalent to establishing coherent communications; that is why I responded to the issue of communications (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=448627#post448627) earlier in this thread.
Do you have ideas about when we should call something 'real' and when 'theoretical' (like 'hole' vs 'electron' mentioned above)?No, and I wouldn't try. You seem to have missed the central issue of my complaint expressed immediately above. I suspect that is probably where I lost you.

There was a Roman philosopher, sometime shortly after the time of Christ, (an official pagan, and not Christian) who said, "belief in the gods does not require that the gods exist". What he was talking about was, in a certain sense, exactly what I am talking about here. (He went on to clarify his position by pointing out that the central purpose of "belief" is to provide proper and successful rules of behavior.) I tried to find the quote I had seen but couldn't; it's somewhere in Thomas Hodgkin's "The Barbarian Invasions of the Roman Empire" (a little long to peruse in a few moments). Religion seems to have played a significant role in the collapse of the Roman Empire; at least all the historians I have read credit religious arguments as being the major force behind a lot of important events.

The point here is that we want to understand reality and, while actually proving something is real is quite impossible (see any defense of Solipsism), no one actually believes all of reality is just a figment of their imagination. What is very important here is that belief in your answers does not require that they be true. What belief requires (to be an acceptable belief) is that it provides proper and successful rules of behavior for the universe you believe in. Gets rid of those surprises that screw up our plans. :rofl: :rofl:

Now I know that statement sounds awfully circular (I could have omitted "you believe in" and perhaps slipped the issue past you); however, embedded in that circle are two very different components. Any rational person knows full well that there are things he believes in which will probably turn out to be fictitious; on the other hand, the idea that "everything is fictitious" simply removes the usefulness of the concept "real" and we have nothing to "understand". Contrast this with advances in our understanding of reality over the last hundred thousand years. Apparently, to paraphrase the Roman philosopher mentioned above, understanding reality does not require knowing what is real. Now, don't quote me on that! :rofl: At least not until you have heard me out.

First, the fact that a particular entity is a fictitious creation of our minds is revealed only when experiments demonstrate that its existence is inconsistent with reality. Until that specific and very real event occurs, we are working with a collection of entities (some real and some fictitious) which are perfectly consistent with everything we know about the universe. One can cavil that what I just said presumes that consistency has been correctly thought out. That cavil turns out to be wrong and brings up some very interesting consequences which we can discuss only after you understand what I am presenting. So, for the time being, lay that cavil off with the physicalist perspective: i.e., something I will get back to later. (Is this fun or not? :biggrin: )

So, what we know about the universe consists of two very different things: that which is "really real" and that which we "only think is real". The only thing which changes as advances in our understanding occur is the things we "only think are real". Those things which are "really real" can never change! It should be clear to you that, no matter what intellectual advance is made, before it can explain the future it must first explain the past. It must explain the historical record; that means that something didn't change. If we want to be exact in our examination of reality, we must maintain the fact of that important duality in what we think we know.

It follows from the above that our understanding of reality is based on information which consists of data of two very different natures, Personally, I like to label these two different kinds of information and I have two labels I find intellectually convenient: "knowable" and unknowable. That which is really real is knowable in the sense that, if it is not "knowable" (in the common sense), how can we possibly "know" about it? If we can't "know" about it, what possible difference can it make? And secondly, every explanation which can ever be promulgated as valid must be consistent with the existence of this information as the explainer cannot claim that it "cannot be known", not if it is "really real" as it defines reality itself. And that part which we only think is real is "unknowable" in the sense that it is possible that it might be proved to be inconsistent with reality: i.e., we only think we know it and there cannot exist any proof that it is "really real"; you can't really know it is true.

Philosophers can't resist going off on silly "if you can't tell me how perform the classification, the classes are meaningless" cavil. The difference between these two kinds of information clearly is not anything which can be used to label any specific piece of information; however, as I said earlier, "understanding reality does not require knowing what is real". Understanding reality has to do with being able to explain what we know. What is important about the division I made is that what must be explained is the "knowable" data; the "unknowable" data is part of the explanation. When we think about the problem we are trying to solve, I will show that this division becomes a critical factor in establishing the range of possibilities for behavior. As I said, "It is subtly quite different from ignoring our ignorance, which is the standard attack on this difficulty, but has almost the same consequences (but not quite). :surprised "

So the mechanism I am referring to here is the process of arriving at the "best" explanation of reality. If we are going to look for the "best" possible explanation, it behooves us to make sure we leave out no possibilities. It is the development of that analysis which makes use of the knowable/unknowable aspects of the supposed information available to the assembly of possible explanations.

But, before I show you how to assemble a representation of the collection of all possible explanations, I need to tell you exactly what I mean by "an explanation". I will begin by pointing out that all "explanations" require something which is to be explained. Whatever it is that is to be explained, it can be thought of as information. It follows from that perspective that "an explanation" is something which is done to (or for) information. If we are to lay down an abstract representation of "an explanation" in general, we must first establish exactly what it is that an explanation does to (or for) information.

Let us presume we have some body of information we are interested in explaining. It seems quite clear to me that, if all of that information is known, any question about that information can be answered. That circumstance could, in fact, be regarded as defining what is meant by knowing. On the other hand, if the information is understood, then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the actual underlying information: i.e., one only needs to know limited subsets of the information. What I am saying is that understanding implies it is possible to predict expectations for information not known; the explanation of the information (that which yields the understanding) constitutes a method which provides one with those rational expectations for unknown information consistent with what is known.

Thus I define "an explanation", from the abstract perspective, to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. :smile: Just as an aside, notice that there is nothing in that definition which says anything about the qualities of the explanation. It defines what I mean by "an explanation" and it can be wrong, incorrect, useless or perhaps even true. It even includes nameta9's infinite-infinite universe. :rofl: :rofl: (And even qualia!) :biggrin:

Did I completely lose you there or do my machinations make a little sense to you? If it makes sense, I will shift out of the physicalist viewpoint in my next post; but I want to be as sure as possible that you are not confused by what I have said so far.

Have fun -- Dick

Telos

Mar16-05, 11:46 PM

Well, all I can say is, if everything can be reduced to pure physics alone, I'd sure want to know physics. :)

However, I don't presently see how physics can explain why my lucid dreams (non-random) can appear more real than reality - and how I make valid scientific observations within dreams as though they are reality, only to awaken and find that they were not "valid."

Doctordick

Mar17-05, 07:33 AM

However, I don't presently see how physics can explain why my lucid dreams (non-random) can appear more real than reality - and how I make valid scientific observations within dreams as though they are reality, only to awaken and find that they were not "valid."The problem is very simple. You are presuming I am saying something I am not saying. :rofl: You need to define exactly what you mean by "an explanation". Without a definition of what you are talking about, discussion of the subject is little more than emotional ramblings signifying nothing. :yuck:

I have taken the trouble to define what I mean by "an explanation" o:)
Thus I define "an explanation", from the abstract perspective, to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.Given that definition, I can show that all "explanations" can be examined in an exact manner. Thus it is that I can "prove" that exact analysis can explain anything which can be explained. Follow what I post here and you will understand that proof. :cool:

There are only three possibilities here. First, you might not like my definition. In that case, you should show me an explanation which does not conform to that definition or show me something which conforms to that definition which can not be thought of as an explanation. Second, you might find an error in my proof. In that case, you should take the trouble to point out the error. Or third, you will come understand why anything which can be explained can be explained in an exact manner fully compatible with the accepted constraints set forth as delimiting the field of physics. :biggrin:

Of course the above presumes you are intellectually capable of thinking things out in an exact manner. :devil:

Have fun -- Dick

Telos

Mar17-05, 08:49 AM

Wow, Dick. Thank you for exposing my intellectual sloth!

From my experience, and my known information, lucid dreams can summarily be explained as "experience driven by expectation." But what is expectation within the context of a dream, where one's memory potentially has been altered to accept the dream memory as primary and waking memory as periphery? When known information is altered, expectations are altered, and, thus, the experience is altered. It is quite a curious event, begging the question, "where does this 'new' information come from?"

In dreams there is probably no effective separation with the perceived phenomena and one's self, since the experience appears to be purely subjective and occurring entirely within one's imagination. But how do we explain phenomena within a lucid dreams that have no meaningful reference to waking phenomena? Stephen LaBerge forwarded the concept of schema, but we do not know how many schema's exist nor is it apparent that schemas have any necessary specificity. For example, LaBerge believes there is a "story schema" within the psyche that comes into play, making a dream appear as though it follows a narrative. However, one does not know how incredibly imprecise the notion of a story schema is until putting it into practice within a lucid dream. I have the feeling LaBerge held back on saying what he truly felt so as to not be completely ridiculed by the scientific community.

Yes, Dick, I am capable of thinking of things in an exact manner, which is precisely why I made the post that I did. Dreams tend to circumvent exact explanation.

Expectation regarding dreams is not exactly subject or object, but much closer to predicate. And there are new categories of phenomena that can be experienced after such a realization (e.g., the feeling of flying without the aid of device, the feeling of speaking without language, etc.)

I'd like to bring lucid dreams out of the status of protoscience. They truly are wonderful and useful experiences and we can know more about them if we apply the scientific method. However, I am incredulous about our ability to frame dreams into a model of causal exactitude. The causal reality of it is much simpler (nonlocal, if you will), where our explanations tend to define the experience instead the experience defining our explanation. (e.g., mystical or religious dreams tend to support the dreamer's individual religion).

Sorry if I offended you! If you want to experience what I'm talking about for yourself, please don't be afraid to apply the scientific method and write a diligent dream journal for about 2 weeks. You will undoubtedly lose some sleep, but if you can't handle it, I understand.

Doctordick

Mar17-05, 08:32 PM

Hi Telos,

I think you take my comments a little too personally. :biggrin: Just think of me as a cranky old man who says what he thinks and is pretty harmless otherwise. I have my own opinions on dreams but they wouldn't be understood without first understanding my perspective on reality so it's really a waste of time for me to talk about the subject. Personally, I love dreams and always have. Even as a child I enjoyed them all, even what one could call nightmares because it was so wonderful to discover the experience wasn't real. :wink: But that was when I was a child and didn't understand reality. :devil:
It is quite a curious event, begging the question, "where does this 'new' information come from?"Then you don't believe it could come from "reality"! :rofl: I think one has to understand reality before that decision should be made. :cool:
I have the feeling LaBerge held back on saying what he truly felt so as to not be completely ridiculed by the scientific community.I can believe that!
Yes, Dick, I am capable of thinking of things in an exact manner, which is precisely why I made the post that I did. Dreams tend to circumvent exact explanation.I am afraid nothing can circumvent exact explanation. As far as I know, no one save myself has ever even considered examining the nature of "exact explanation". Not an "exact examination" anyway. :rofl: :rofl:
Sorry if I offended you!Don't worry about it. I am quite difficult to offend. :smile: And I see no need of keeping a dream journal as I have made a major effort to remember my dreams since I was very young and remember almost as much of them as I do of my "real" life. :tongue2:

Have fun -- Dick

Telos

Mar17-05, 09:35 PM

Then you don't believe it could come from "reality"! I think one has to understand reality before that decision should be made.

Whoa, Doc. I never said that. It's an open ended question.

Wherever it comes from, I am skeptical that we will be able to explain its origin - whether you define it as "reality" or something else. (in my mind, there is no such thing as non-reality, only reality that hasn't been observed or created yet, so please don't drag me into those meandering qualia discussions lol).

I am quite literally talking about the origin of creation (driving personal creative ability) and you are certainly an exuberant old man to attempt to explain something such as that. Good luck. Hopefully you will have a better track record than theologians, philosophers, and shamans. And myself. ;) Just because I'm skeptical doesn't mean I've closed my mind to it. I am trying to learn the math of modern physics, after all.

And I see no need of keeping a dream journal as I have made a major effort to remember my dreams since I was very young and remember almost as much of them as I do of my "real" life

Ah! You are not uncommon. Everyone thinks they already know about their dreams - just because they can "remember" them.

Do you take an active role in them? Have you consciously mastered them to serve you? No - of course you haven't. Otherwise you'd be able to explain them. :yuck:

Your memory and perception of the experience changes when you put it on paper. The information literally travels from one side of your brain to the other. The language and reasoning centers of the brain are rarely ever active while the dream is occurring, so your memory of them is clouded by lack of explicitness. When you add language to them, you begin a process of association that widens your perspective. It gives you greater field of vision and influence. Each word is like brick over a path, giving you a platform to probe deeper.

Don't mistake the forrest for the trees, Doc!

Personally, I think you're just either scared or lazy. :wink:

<<<GUILLE>>>

Mar18-05, 04:09 AM

Doctordick

Mar19-05, 05:58 AM

Then you don't believe it could come from "reality"! I think one has to understand reality before that decision should be made.Whoa, Doc. I never said that. It's an open ended question.Oh is it now? It seems to me that you are very much presuming some answers without considering the lack of support for those answers. :frown:
I am quite literally talking about the origin of creation (driving personal creative ability) and you are certainly an exuberant old man to attempt to explain something such as that.I don't know about that. Again, you seem to be confidently asserting something without any supporting argument beyond your own belief. :devil:
Otherwise you'd be able to explain them. :yuck: I have a very strong opinion as to what they are; however, as I said earlier, comprehending my opinion will be beyond you so long as my perspective on reality is beyond you. :zzz:
The information literally travels from one side of your brain to the other.I don't believe you even begin to comprehend the volume of presumptions behind that statement alone. :grumpy: As I say, you are asserting answers without understanding the question. :yuck:
Don't mistake the forrest for the trees, Doc!I don't think you have managed to get past the bark. You should read my essay on thought here. (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763) And consider the vocabulary suggested in this thread. (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=469169#post469169) :cool: You are speaking of the power of "squat"! Or should that be "sqought"? :rofl: Honestrosewater has never answered me on that issue. :smile:

Have fun -- Dick

Telos

Mar19-05, 02:11 PM

It seems to me that you are very much presuming some answers without considering the lack of support for those answers.

This is ridiculous. I have presented only skepticism, not answers.

The question is "can everything be reduced to pure physics" and I have not settled on a yes or no. But I doubt that it can. My goodness, what's so difficult to understand?

Maybe I haven't done a very good job of presenting it. Feel free to quote the previous sentence and supply a pithy retort and a smilie.

And statements like "The information literally travels from one side of your brain to the other," are not intended to be definitive but simplifications for a very real phenomena. I have psychological literature with which to back up that statement, but I am not interested in writing a thesis for you.

I don't know about that. Again, you seem to be confidently asserting something without any supporting argument beyond your own belief.

Your ignorance of my skepticism about the origin of creativity notwithstanding, where/what do you think creativity comes from? It is becoming apparent to me that you do not have much experience with creative thought, and therefore the question is beyond your ken. I have challenged you to perform your own experiments and experience creativity more intimately, but you have categorically dismissed it as "squat." Fittingly, it is an unoriginal way to remain to ignorant.

I am not content with saying "creativity comes from dreams." If that's the way you read it, I apologize. I know even less about where dreams themselves come from. However, I am content with considering that dreams and creativity are related psychological phenomena, and I have my life experience to back it up. If you are interested, I wrote about it in the thread concerning the origin of creativity (http://physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=495484#post495484).

What's wrong with skepticism? How can you say I'm not thinking critically if I am thinking within the framework of skepticism?

I have a very strong opinion as to what they are; however, as I said earlier, comprehending my opinion will be beyond you so long as my perspective on reality is beyond you.

Small words from a mind of small curiosity and small vision, but from a big mouth.

I repeatedly suggested that you apply diligent critical thought to your dreams and you have ignorantly suggested that you don't need to. You do not seem interested in anything other than horseplay.

I can't say I blame you. If I was a retired theoretical physicist, finishing a long life of "thinking," that might be all I'd be interested in too. I have spoken at length with another retired theoretical physicist online, and he is much like you. But he has settled into a highly spiritual interpretation of quantum mechanics and has claimed his conclusions are "hard-nosed." I disagree with him mightily, not on his conclusions of spiritualism, but that they are "hard-nosed." Similarly, you are not hard-nosed either. Maybe it has something to do with an increasingly desperate desire for certainty as one, who has dedicated his life to searching for answers, careens downwards to an unknowable but necessarily answerable death! The telos of life isn't to be blissfully ignorant, is it?

I don't think you have managed to get past the bark.

Doc, I am so deep in the woods, there's no turning back for me.

saviourmachine

Mar21-05, 06:40 PM

I could be wrong, but you appear to skip over my comment:...My problem is that there is a fundamental presumption embedded in that statement: it is the assumption that there exists no alternate explanation which will satisfy that same constraint.I was merely stating that there are at least two different ways to think (as a physician); I called one 'hypothetical' and I called one 'theoretical'. My connotation with these terms is as follows: a 'hypothesis' has to do with testing - as if it is possible to know reality*; and a 'theory' with embedding in a knowledge system**.

Now I know that statement sounds awfully circular (I could have omitted "you believe in" and perhaps slipped the issue past you); however, embedded in that circle are two very different components. Any rational person knows full well that there are things he believes in which will probably turn out to be fictitious; on the other hand, the idea that "everything is fictitious" simply removes the usefulness of the concept "real" and we have nothing to "understand". Contrast this with advances in our understanding of reality over the last hundred thousand years. Apparently, to paraphrase the Roman philosopher mentioned above, understanding reality does not require knowing what is real. Now, don't quote me on that! :rofl: At least not until you have heard me out.I'll quote you. :smile: Understanding has to do with seeing (the different) possibilities, isn't it?

One can cavil that what I just said presumes that consistency has been correctly thought out.:smile: You said it yourself.

And that part which we only think is real is "unknowable" in the sense that it is possible that it might be proved to be inconsistent with reality: i.e., we only think we know it and there cannot exist any proof that it is "really real"; you can't really know it is true.The 'really real' is 'knowable' (if we can't know something, why should we call it real?) and that what we 'only think is real' is 'unknowable' (no proof, no solution, not decidable). Summarized: There are things that: are knowable and real
are unknowable and real [real becomes useless here: the unknowable can not be called real]
are knowable and thought of as real [likewise]
are unknowable and thought of as real And so we derive these propositions: There are things that: are knowable and real
are unknowable and thought of as realif all of that information is known, any question about that information can be answered. That circumstance could, in fact, be regarded as defining what is meant by knowing. On the other hand, if the information is understood, then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the actual underlying information: i.e., one only needs to know limited subsets of the information.
...
Thus I define "an explanation", from the abstract perspective, to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.Okay. Go on.

* not believing that "all of reality is just a figment of their imagination"
** "working with a collection of entities (some real and some fictitious) which are perfectly consistent with everything we know about the universe"

Doctordick

Mar22-05, 09:48 AM

This is ridiculous. I have presented only skepticism, not answers.That is what you think; however, you are making a serious error. You are, in fact, making some very serious undefended assumptions. From your response, I can only conclude that you did not even bother to read my reference (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763) from my previous post. :wink:
The question is "can everything be reduced to pure physics" and I have not settled on a yes or no. But I doubt that it can. My goodness, what's so difficult to understand?No problem understanding that, it's a pretty common perception. The problem is your complete failure to even consider the idea that you might be wrong. :smile:
Your ignorance of my skepticism about the origin of creativity notwithstanding, where/what do you think creativity comes from? It is becoming apparent to me that you do not have much experience with creative thought, and therefore the question is beyond your ken.Creative thought is great, but, in the absence of logical thought it is little more than entertainment. If you have no competence in analytical thought, creativity is perhaps a decent ego substitute for understanding but it is insufficient to unravel the mysteries of life. The probability of being wrong is far greater than is generally assumed. Very few people manage to "guess" correct solutions to complex problems.
...but you have categorically dismissed it as "squat." Fittingly, it is an unoriginal way to remain to ignorant.I gave you the source of my usage of that word but you apparently prefer the common interpretation. That's why I used it: it has connotations which upset people who don't listen, making them easy to identify. You've just missed the ball by a mile. I'll just call it "strike one". :wink:
You do not seem interested in anything other than horseplay.Another swing and a miss! Nothing I have said has penetrated has it? What I have been looking for is someone with enough brains to understand what I am talking about and a long enough attention span to get to the meat of the issue.
Doc, I am so deep in the woods, there's no turning back for me.I guess you got that one right :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

Telos

Mar22-05, 02:27 PM

Dick, have you been forgetting your medication?

But, seriously, how does it feel to be on my ignore list?

Those gears must be turning in your head! That's right, you can't tell me. Don't worry about it, though. I've already determined your answer's approximate uselessness with the help of inductive and deductive theoretical reasoning! Yes, I included your pleonastic reference (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763), which I read long before you mentioned it.

Thanks for nothing. But thank you for, ironically, being an anachronism. You are exactly what you hate most. And that is somewhat amusing, albeit kind of disgusting. :yuck:

Ta-Ta! :rofl:

Seafang

Mar22-05, 04:33 PM

I don't believe how there are 5 people that voted that religion can explain everything, if religion can't even explain religious topics..... not even the people that live for religion believe that religion explains everything.

I voted multi-disciplinary, physics would be the biggest supporter, but there is biology, filosiphy....

Well I think this thread has long outlived its usefulness, since it has descended into the realm of philosophy, and is now unconcerned with physics at all.

I'm quite satisfied that between Heisenberg and Godel we can be sure that physics cannot explain everything, and moreover there will always be things which can never be explained by any means.

So pull the feeding tube on this brain dead thread.

saviourmachine

Mar23-05, 04:45 AM

Hi DoctorDick! If this thread got closed I hope we can get space - open a new thread - to continue this discussion. Although others think it's a dead thread, I enjoyed many things, e.g. your explorations of the relation between: language & role of mathematics
squirrel though & logical thought
symmetry & conserved quantities
symmetry & ignorance
definitions & presumptions
to identify & to relate with
events & space time points
rules & pattern matching
reality & knowabilityI hope we are allowed to continue. :confused:

¡Hasta luego!

Doctordick

Mar23-05, 11:05 AM

If this thread got closed I hope we can get space - open a new thread - to continue this discussion. Yeah, I think we can pull that off. For the time being I have stayed here because the number of views continues to rise; which means people are still reading it. In spite of the people who don't want to think about what I am saying, it seems some are still interested. I suspect a lot of people here suffer from attention deficit syndrome. :wink: Again, I am usually slow to respond to your posts because I want to be careful.
I was merely stating that there are at least two different ways to think (as a physician); I called one 'hypothetical' and I called one 'theoretical'. My connotation with these terms is as follows: a 'hypothesis' has to do with testing - as if it is possible to know reality*; and a 'theory' with embedding in a knowledge system**.Communication is not nearly as easy as is generally presumed. When I spoke of "two modes of thinking", I was thinking of the difference between logical analysis and intuitive perception (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763). Both modes provide serious answers to complex problems and history is full of people contending that one or the other is the "correct" attack. In fact, the history of human belief systems can almost be seen as a pendulum swinging from support for one to support for the other. My position is that objective rational thought must encompass both at once.
I'll quote you. :smile: Understanding has to do with seeing (the different) possibilities, isn't it?Not quite. Later on in my post, I define what I mean by "understanding". If you "understand" something, it means that you have a mental mechanism which will provide you with answers to questions outside the actual data available to you. o:)

To put it another way, knowing is having facts available to you (the facts come from the past, not the future) and understanding allows discrimination between good and bad answers (facts you might expect to become available to you in the future). Now the human race has become quite good at this discrimination since all we living things first crawled out of the sea. We are the undoubted leaders in the realm of "understanding" the world around us. And yet no one has come up with a good argument to dismiss the Solipsist position. The fact that we have come so far without being able to prove what is and what is not real should make it clear to you that understanding reality can not possibly require knowing what is real. :approve: This is why every serious scientist (I except myself of course) has vociferously argued against any rational consideration of the question. Their position is: if we don't know what's real, how can we possibly dream of understanding reality. They hold that we must assume we know what's real. You can see that position promulgated all over this forum! Why do you think they label me a crackpot? :rofl:

Other than that, I get the distinct feeling that you understand what I have said so far. :!!)

When I started this line of discourse, I stated that language, though it is our only mechanism of communication, is inherently vague. Language can be seen as a collection of symbols to which we have attached meaning. As such, the problem of understanding a language contains exactly the same difficulty brought up above. There exists no way one can be absolutely sure they understand exactly what another person means when they use a particular word. If you are rational, you have to admit that the meanings you attach to these symbols may not be the meanings intended by the writer/speaker you are trying to understand (it is always possible they are using a code unknown to you). So the problem of understanding an explanation is completely equivalent to that of understanding the universe. :cool:

If you are trying to understand a person, you have the option of (interacting with them) asking about the things they have said which don't make sense to you. If you are trying to understand the universe, you have the option of interacting with it in a way which will provide clarification of things you don't understand (those things which don't make sense to you). If the two procedures are equivalent, let us examine how one might logically attack the first while maintaining complete openness to all the possibilities. (Please follow this carefully as the effect is considerably outside the physicalist outlook.)

We are trying to "understand" something thus we are looking for "an explanation", a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. The first thing we need is a totally general way to represent any body of information. Let "A" be what is to be explained and proceed with the primitive definition that A is a set! I want to leave the exact nature of A totally open and, from my knowledge of sets, A can pretty well represent anything. If anyone here can point out something which cannot be represented by the abstract concept of a set, please do so.

Now, the most serious problem confronting us is the fact that we do not know everything: i.e., A as defined is definitely not available to us. We must always presume there are aspects of A not yet available. We need another symbol for that portion of A which is available to us. Since what is available can change, we need a way of representing a change in that portion. For this reason, I begin construction of the portion of A available to us by defining the set B to be a finite unordered collection of elements taken from A. (This B will represent a change in our knowledge of A.) This allows me to define the set C to be a finite collection of sets B. It follows that any possible collection of information which can be used to construct our explanation can be represented by the set C: that is, the current state of our knowledge can be seen as a finite collections of changes since knowledge began to be aquired (whenever that was). It is the very definition of infinity which guarantees that the number of elements in both B and C are finite. Likewise, the same definition requires that we must consider the number of elements in A to be infinite. (I will explain that to anyone who does not understand.)

Since the number of sets B in C is finite, they may be counted and ordered and I may refer to the elements of C via the notation Bj. Since B was defined to be a finite collection of elements of A, I can refer to the elements of B as xi. It should be clear that, looked at as a communication, Bj, representing a change in our knowledge, can be seen as fundamentally representing a "message", where xi represents a label for a specific significant element of A and C represents the sum total of messages our understanding of the communication is to be based upon. (It is best here to look at the messages as being in a secret code as to do otherwise is to presume you already understand the meanings of the elements xi while, in fact, all that information must be a part of C.)

Thus it is that we can view the changes in information available to us, Bj, as a list of reference labels (xi). Likewise, all the messages available to us can be seen as the complete collection of all the lists we have received. If we are to understand and explain A based on nothing but C, we need to develop a procedure through which we may determine the acceptability of any specific set Bk which can be obtained from A. That procedure must be consistent with the distribution of Bj in C; as an absolute minimum, any explanation of A must be consistent with what is already known: i.e., C.

It is important to maintain a very important aspect of the problem not expressly stated in the previous paragraph. One must remember the fact that B was defined to be an unordered set of elements taken from A (if order between any two x's, is important they should be in different Bj's): i.e., clearly, if one occurs before the other, a change in information occurs between the two elements.)

A second important fact to take note of is the fact that our explanation explains C, not A. It is a presumption that an explanation of C (what we know of A) explains A. Since that is absolutely the best we can do, the assumption is not really unreasonable so long as we remember the fact of our assumption.

In effect, I have laid out a universal representation of the problem confronting us. It is quite abstract, but anyone who has any facility with mathematics at all should be able to comprehend the representation. If you find any difficulties, let me know and I will do my best to clarify the circumstance. If I think you are with me, I will lay out an exact analytical solution to the problem; that is, I will lay out a universal procedure for designing a constraint which will constrain the sets Bj to exactly the collection in C. Note that, as the number of elements in the sets Bj and C are finite, the procedure I will describe will be an exact finite procedure; however, if you actually attempt to implement it in something other than an extremely trivial case, you will find it complex beyond reasonable calculation. It turns out not to be the end of the problem (as it actually results in an infinite set of possibilities) but it does provide an insight which will yield a fundamental universal relationship which is quite valuable.

Let me know if anything I have said bothers you. And, anyone else is invited to make any comments that occur to them. :smile:

Have fun -- Dick

hypnagogue

Mar23-05, 11:54 AM

Let's keep the discussion civil, shall we? There is never any excuse to descend to the level of ad hominem insults.

Canute

Mar26-05, 05:49 AM

DoctorDick

The fact that we have come so far without being able to prove what is and what is not real should make it clear to you that understanding reality can not possibly require knowing what is real.
Is this your position? If so it's a very odd one imho. In what sense can one be said to understand something if one does not know whether it is real or not?

Doctordick

Mar27-05, 11:40 AM

To Canute on the notion of "understanding" reality. Yes, I would agree that my position is quite odd as I am aware of no one else who holds that position; however, IMHO this is strong evidence that they have not thought the issue through. o:)

As I said in an earlier essay (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763), intuition (or squirrel thought) is always your best bet on any serious issue. As such it must be taken as a serious contender for the basis of any argument; however, we have a power not supposed to be possessed by the squirrels. We can use conscious logical analysis. That is, so long as the problem to which are efforts are to be applied can be reduced to a small enough number of concepts that we can handle them on a conscious level. :devil:

It has come to be that we have all sqought (squat??) up these related concepts "real", "understanding" and "explaining". Clearly, as almost everyone sees these terms as very meaningful, they can be held up as very probably useful. It behooves us to make a serious effort to cleanse these concepts of implied relationships which can not be proved. Once we have done that, they become reasonable foundations for logical deduction. Now you are complaining about my statement that understanding reality does not require knowing what is and what is not real and you are quite right, the solution of the conundrum lies in the definition of understanding. :cool:

First of all, if you peruse the historic record, you will find a number of explanations based on the assumption something was real which is no longer held as real, phlogiston being my favorite example. The existence or reality of phlogiston was not what was being explained; what was being explained was the release of heat in circumstances which we now recognize as chemical reactions. It should be clear to you that thinking something is real is not equivalent to it being real. And secondly an explanation explains what one thinks they know not necessarily what is actually true. :tongue:

Ever notice how the idea of "truth" is avoided? Truth bears the same relationship with knowing as reality bears to your world view. One can no more prove they know the truth than they can prove their ontology is correct. But to conclude that requires there be no truth or no reality (the solipsist position) is also a rather undefendable position. The only defendable position is that we do not know anything for sure. If you make "knowing what is real" a prerequisite to explaining reality you will never be able to explain any aspect of reality. :yuck:

So I define an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us. Notice that the definition does not require the information be correct nor does it say those expectations are valid. This is entirely consistent with the common use of the terms explain and understand. How do you come to the conclusion that you understand something? Does that decision not arise when the thing no longer surprises you? :confused:

Take my writings for example, the great majority of the "authorities" on this forum have reached the conclusion that I am a crackpot. That is their explanation of my writings and, possessing that explanation, they feel that they understand me. They feel confident in their position because nothing I say surprises them (that is, from their perspective, what I say has no bearing on the issue other than the fact that it is something they would not say). So they find their expectations consistent with their experiences. :rolleyes:

On the other hand, if you are explaining something to someone else, how do you determine that they understand your explanation? Is that result not achieved by asking questions? When their answers are in alignment with the answers you would give to the same questions, do you not come to the conclusion that they understand what you are talking about? I think all of this is very strong evidence that the best definition of an explanation is that it is a mechanism for producing expectations. And understanding is achieved when surprise no longer occurs. We can talk about "good" explanations once we agree as to what qualifies as an explanation. :wink:

If you disagree, give me a better definition of explanation and/or understanding. :biggrin:

Have fun – Dick

Doctordick

Mar29-05, 11:22 AM

Is this your position? If so it's a very odd one imho. In what sense can one be said to understand something if one does not know whether it is real or not?And I responded with what I thought was a rational response which I ended with the comment,If you disagree, give me a better definition of explanation and/or understanding. :biggrin:I can only presume that either you do not disagree, cannot think of a better definition or have decided to accept the "crackpot opinion" and concluded nothing I say is worth listening to. It would be nice to know your position. Even if you have decided I am a crackpot, one would think you would have the civility to at least let me know. :smile:

Have fun – Dick

Daminc

Mar30-05, 07:01 AM

Daminc

Mar30-05, 07:33 AM

I defined infinity as:

'limits of perceivable quantities'

My person take on infinity is 'Beyond the limits of perceivable quanties'.

I hate the word when it is used to describe something in Physics:

e.g.
Infinite Universe
Infinite Density
etc

It's a cope out. Take the 'Big Bang' theory which supposedly starts of with a point of Infinite Mass of Infinite Density blah, blah.

1) If there was 'Infinite Density' then the gravitation forces would be so great that there never would be a 'Big Bang' and if there was 'Infinite Mass' and it did expand somehow then there would be no space anywhere because the 'mass' would fill everything.

Similarly, with 'Zero'. It is also a mathmatical concept not found in the Physical universe. Something is either there of not. If it is there, then it's value would be different than Zero.

I think the definition of Zero is the amount of elements in a 'Null Set' but I'm not quite sure.

Pensador

Mar30-05, 09:14 AM

In the past I have been described as "Mad" but I just reply "I'm not mad, I just think differently".
The only difference between a madman and a sane person who "thinks differently" is that mad people believe in themselves.

Feel free to explore the universe of ideas, but make sure you do all your businesses back home :wink:

Daminc

Mar30-05, 09:47 AM

but make sure you do all your businesses back home

And I'll sure I that I have enough toilet paper :rolleyes:

Pensador

Mar30-05, 10:26 AM

And I'll sure I that I have enough toilet paper :rolleyes:
This reminds me of a funny but also wise joke. The head of the physics department in a university was complaining that they didn't have enough money to buy all equipment necessary for their research. The president of the school asked him then, "why don't you do like the guys in the math deparment? They only need pens, paper, and waste baskets".

After thinking for a while he said, "even better, why don't you do like the guys in the philosophy department? They only need pens and paper!"

Philocrat

Mar31-05, 06:22 PM

I started reading this thread this morning because I've thought about this subject for a long time. At about page five figured that I'd just skip to the end so I appologise if anything I write has been covered to death.

A long time ago my friends and I used to discuss anything and everything and I put on the table the words "Reality is what we perceive it to be, and hence reality is subject to ones own perception". What resulted from that discussion is that it is very unlikely that we can ever explain our Universe by physics alone.

One of the reasons I came to that conclusion was based on the premise that everything is connected or relates with everything else. Therefore, to know something is absolutely True we would have to know everything that relates to it....which is Everything. Since this is not practically feasible then we cannot ever know anything is an absolute fact. We can only surmise based on current observation evidence (i.e. Best guess senario).

When I read about 'dark energy', 'dark matter' and the 'speed of light' I can think of viable alternatives to current speculations and theories that could fit observational evidence, but I have no way of varifing them, so I just play with the ideas in mental experiments.

Similarly, our current ideas with regards to Physics is just a 'best guess senario'. We do have only limited observational data, and it is highly unlikely that we will ever gather enough data to surpass that.

Well, the standard cosmology model says that the universe consists of:

(a) 70% of Dark Energy
(b) 25% of Dark Matter
(b) 5% of Normal Matter

where Baryons = Normal Matter
Baryons = (Hydrogen, Helium, Heavy Elements)
= (stars, planets, galaxies and gas)

Puzzle: What happens to 40 - 45% of the missing normal matter?

Source: NATURE vol 433, Feb. 2005, Pages 465 - 466

When physics claims to have explained the universe, the fundamanetal epistemological question is : How Much of the Universe has it successfully explained, let alone everything? Give it a concrete number: 10%? 25%?......100%?. To say that you can explain everything, is it not right that physics should advise the world on how much it has succesfully explained to date?

I won't put my ideas down about how this would relate to a 'God' as I found my views tend to upset those people who actually believe God exists in the form of an Metaphysical superbeing type entity.

God is logically not ruled out in the grand scale of things. It depends on which versions of Logic and Mathematics you are versed in. The current logic and mathematics account only for 'STAGNATION' and 'CIRCULARISM'.....they awfully fail to account for PROGRESS in the strictest sense of the word. CIRCULAR CONTINUITY is another name that I habitually call it and the logic and the mathematics that account for it create at the metaphysical level a 'FALSELY CONSTITUTED SENSE OF CONTINUITY, which in turn metaphysically and epistemologically enforces in our minds a 'FASELY CONSTITUTED SENSE OF NORMALITY.

The only Logic and matheamtics that can adequatly and materially describe the universe are the ones that take account of progress and not the ones that predict an 'ENDLESS SERIES OF BIG BANGS in a non-progressive way. As far as I am concerned the 'BIG BANG - BIG CRUNCH' model of the universe circularly continues and is metaphysically and epistemologically devoid of PROGRESS in the strictest sense of the word. This resembles fiction! Logic and mathaematics should not be fictionally attempting to explain a world that has been created, finished and in circularly continuous state, instead it should account for a world that is still being created and in progressively continuous state. They must account for progress. This is what the PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUING CAUSATION that I defined at the beginning of this thread is all about. Any logic and mathematics that cannot account for Progress proper is metaphysically and epistemologically useless.

In the past I have been described as "Mad" but I just reply "I'm not mad, I just think differently".

You are not a crack pot ....there is nothing wrong with you ...at worse your are 'parafused' .....and at worst you are 'paraceptic'!

---------------------------
Think Nature .......Stay Green! And above all, think of how your action may affect the rest of Nature. May the 'Book of Nature' serve you well and bring you all that is Good!

Philocrat

Mar31-05, 07:36 PM

My person take on infinity is 'Beyond the limits of perceivable quanties'.

I hate the word when it is used to describe something in Physics:

e.g.
Infinite Universe
Infinite Density
etc

It's a cope out. Take the 'Big Bang' theory which supposedly starts of with a point of Infinite Mass of Infinite Density blah, blah.

1) If there was 'Infinite Density' then the gravitation forces would be so great that there never would be a 'Big Bang' and if there was 'Infinite Mass' and it did expand somehow then there would be no space anywhere because the 'mass' would fill everything.

Similarly, with 'Zero'. It is also a mathmatical concept not found in the Physical universe. Something is either there of not. If it is there, then it's value would be different than Zero.

I think the definition of Zero is the amount of elements in a 'Null Set' but I'm not quite sure.

The Job of Metaphysics is to categorise things into fundamental types for every intellectual discipline so that they can be easily explained. But unfortunately, this process is currently not working well, partly because people do not even understand what metaphysics is, let alone know what the fundamental metaphysical categories are. Even physicists themselves do not even know that Metaphysics is also a tool for them too. Every time someone mentions it, the first thing that they cast their minds to is religion or philosophy. This problem dates back to Galileo in the 17th Century who, for example, dumped the so-called 'Secondary Qualities' for the scientifically convenient 'Primary Qaulities'. Since that time philosophy has been trying tirelessly to account for them and metaphysically reconcile them. Now, categorising the world into easily accountable or explainable fundamental categories is an issue that physics can no longer escape.

The point is that you cannot pick and choose fundamental metaphysical catories of the world. Well, they may be metaphysically vexing and epistemologically hitting us in the face, yet this is no license for us to escape them. We need to find a way of accommodating all of them in our explanatory projects. This is the very problem that physics is facing with the explantions of such categories as 'Nothing', 'Infinity', 'Finiteness', 'Something', etc. The problem is that some of these categories, even though we are aware of them, are difficult to explain because we do not want to be flexible about them in our categorisation process, let alone be prepared to take account of the natural limititions in the perceiver's frame of reference. This idea that we are physically fully equiped to sense and perceive everything accurately is fictitious. Yes, we can see and explain a wide range of things in the world, but we must equally be prepared to admit our physical limitations as well.

We therefore have to categorise things at the metaphysical level into those that can be known to the limit of our physical limitations and those that can be known if we change or scientifically eliminate our physical limitations. What I really meant by 'limits of perceivable quantities' is that infinity is knowable if we eliminate perceptual limitations in humans, which as you may have noticed neally every scientist believes that we do not have such limitations. This has been my battle ground to correct this misconception.

Doctordick

Mar31-05, 10:27 PM

The Job of Metaphysics is to categorise things into fundamental types for every intellectual discipline so that they can be easily explained.How can you expect to categorize things before you know their behavior? How can you know their behavior before you examine what you know? How can you know what you know you are able to categorize what you know? My impression is that I am the only person who has ever even seriously considered that problem objectively. Certainly those who have "developed" the field of metaphysics have made no effort to think seriously about it. No one will ever solve a problem they are unwilling to examine. :yuck:
The point is that you cannot pick and choose fundamental metaphysical catories of the world.Now I would certainly deny that assertion. That's about the only option we have. That act is the basis of language itself and without the establishment of categories we cannot even think on a conscious level. (You should at least make a careful read of my post on thought (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763).) :grumpy:
We need to find a way of accommodating all of them in our explanatory projects.I couldn't agree more and you should read the second post on the "knowledge..." thread. You are most obviously failing to recognize that the use of language itself is the first violation of your presumed objective approach. :devil:
What I really meant by 'limits of perceivable quantities' is that infinity is knowable if we eliminate perceptual limitations in humans, which as you may have noticed neally every scientist believes that we do not have such limitations.And, apparently, you suffer from exactly the same belief. I am the only person on Earth I know of who has proposed a scheme around that very difficulty.

Have fun -- Dick

Pensador

Apr1-05, 11:08 AM

The Job of Metaphysics is to categorise things into fundamental types for every intellectual discipline so that they can be easily explained. But unfortunately, this process is currently not working well, partly because people do not even understand what metaphysics is, let alone know what the fundamental metaphysical categories are.

It appears to me metaphysics was given a bad name because of its close relationship with mysticism. The problem is, there is no other way. It seems to me the modern denial of metaphysics comes out of fear of supporting a less materialistic worldview, rather than any intellectual reason per se. That is, we swung from dogmatic religion to dogmatic materialism, apparently as a result of social forces rather than scientific progress.

Even physicists themselves do not even know that Metaphysics is also a tool for them too. Every time someone mentions it, the first thing that they cast their minds to is religion or philosophy. This problem dates back to Galileo in the 17th Century who, for example, dumped the so-called 'Secondary Qualities' for the scientifically convenient 'Primary Qaulities'.

It's quite interesting to notice how physics is chock-full of metaphysics even as physicist deny it, simply because they arbitrarily chose which metaphysics concepts they are comfortable with, and discarded the rest.

The point is that you cannot pick and choose fundamental metaphysical catories of the world. Well, they may be metaphysically vexing and epistemologically hitting us in the face, yet this is no license for us to escape them.

Relating to your post on the other thread, I think it's just the (pseudo) formalists who do that. As, in my understanding, you pointed out, NL implies a certain view of the world which is far less problematic than those formalistic theories, and that view includes all those metaphysical entities missing in physics.

We need to find a way of accommodating all of them in our explanatory projects. This is the very problem that physics is facing with the explantions of such categories as 'Nothing', 'Infinity', 'Finiteness', 'Something', etc.

Surely, but how do you think those could be incorporated within the formalism of physics? Isn't formalism the whole problem to start with?

The problem, as I see it, is the notion that an explanation restricted to logic and mathematics can account for the whole of NL (as Doctordick seems to be proposing), even as, from an NL perspective, it can't since logic and math is but a subset of it. And of course from a formalist perspective, the formalist perspective itself cannot be justified other than by force. We sure live in dictatorial times.

moving finger

Apr8-05, 02:53 AM

Doctordick

Apr8-05, 10:47 AM

"Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we are trying to solve." Max Planck

If we can find some way of opening up physics so that it is not always constrained to an assumption of 3rd person objectivity, then we may have a better chance of explaining everything with physics.Think about those two comments for a moment. :devil: In my opinion they certainly make the assumption that our solution can not include "us". Objective inclusion of the observer in the analysis clearly solves the difficulty. It follows, "as the night the day" :rofl: , that the real problem is the assumption that we, the problem solvers, are not part of the problem to be solved: i.e., the assumption the thinker "knows what is being talked about. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl: A fundamental assumption that is being made in every post on this forum (except mine). o:)

There exists a way around that problem and I have been to the other side of the mountain. :approve: And any of you could go look too; if you would take the trouble to follow my thoughts. I had hoped saviormachine had the wherewithal to stick the issue through but he has apparently dropped out. I am looking forward to rudimentary interest in thinking things out logically. :zzz:

Have fun -- Dick

moving finger

Apr8-05, 11:33 AM

A fundamental assumption that is being made in every post on this forum (except mine). o:)
not in the least bit arrogant, are we? :biggrin:

I am looking forward to rudimentary interest in thinking things out logically. :zzz:
the "zzzzzzz" at the end suggests your comment that you are looking forward to interest may be less than genuine :yuck:

MF
:smile:

Doctordick

Apr9-05, 07:19 AM

not in the least bit arrogant, are we? :biggrin:arrogant: adj. [ME.; OFr.; L. arrogans, ppr of arrogare; see ARROGATE], full of or due to unwarranted pride and self-importance; overbearing; haughty.-- see SYN proud.

arrogate: v.t. [< arrogatus, ppr of arrogare, to claim < ad- to, for, + rogare, to ask], 1. to claim or seize without right; appropriate (to oneself) arrogantly. 2. to ascribe or attribute without reason.

I believe what you are putting forth is called an "adhominem" (latin for "to the man") argument. Thus it is invalid on the face of it. Secondly, I claim what I claim with very good reason and you would be well aware of that had you seriously read much of what I have said. :grumpy:
the "zzzzzzz" at the end suggests your comment that you are looking forward to interest may be less than genuine :yuck: No, I would rather suggest it represents my expectations of a rational response: I am not going to lose any sleep waiting for one. :tongue:

There does exist a quite simple way around the difficulty of including ourselves in the problem; but, apparently everyone here prefers to stew in the stalemate! :biggrin: I guess I shouldn't be surprised, I have always been told that ignorance is bliss. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr10-05, 09:45 AM

To Canute on the notion of "understanding" reality. Yes, I would agree that my position is quite odd as I am aware of no one else who holds that position; however, IMHO this is strong evidence that they have not thought the issue through. o:)
Maybe, but there is another possibility.

It has come to be that we have all sqought (squat??) up these related concepts "real", "understanding" and "explaining". Clearly, as almost everyone sees these terms as very meaningful, they can be held up as very probably useful. It behooves us to make a serious effort to cleanse these concepts of implied relationships which can not be proved. Once we have done that, they become reasonable foundations for logical deduction. Now you are complaining about my statement that understanding reality does not require knowing what is and what is not real and you are quite right, the solution of the conundrum lies in the definition of understanding. :cool:
True. It also depends on the definition of every other word you've used. So what is your defintion of understanding?

It should be clear to you that thinking something is real is not equivalent to it being real. And secondly an explanation explains what one thinks they know not necessarily what is actually true. :tongue:
That seems true.

Ever notice how the idea of "truth" is avoided? Truth bears the same relationship with knowing as reality bears to your world view. One can no more prove they know the truth than they can prove their ontology is correct. But to conclude that requires there be no truth or no reality (the solipsist position) is also a rather undefendable position. The only defendable position is that we do not know anything for sure. If you make "knowing what is real" a prerequisite to explaining reality you will never be able to explain any aspect of reality. :yuck:
There is a profound difference between understanding reality and explaining it. Explanations require the use of formal systems of symbols and rules. Thus to explain something one must symbolise it, and ones explanation is limited in its reach by the incompleteness theorems and so on. But to understand something does not necessarily require the use of symbols and rules. This is an issue that lies at the heart of the difference between scientific/philosophical approaches to knowledge and experiential/mystical approaches. It is perfectly possible to understand something that one cannot explain.

I agree that it is not possible to prove (demonstrate) that one knows something. But that has no bearing on whether it is possible to know it.

The view that the phenomenal universe (the universe of corporeal and mental phenomena) is (strictly speaking) not real, does not necessarily imply solipsism. It also implies Buddhism, Sufism, Taoism, Theosophy, Advaita and all equivalent cosmological doctrines.

So I define an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us. Notice that the definition does not require the information be correct nor does it say those expectations are valid. This is entirely consistent with the common use of the terms explain and understand. How do you come to the conclusion that you understand something? Does that decision not arise when the thing no longer surprises you? :confused:
Yes, that is one test. But I know precisely and exactly, can understand and explain, why prime numbers occur where and when they do, yet I have no way of predicting exactly where they will occur.

On the other hand, if you are explaining something to someone else, how do you determine that they understand your explanation? Is that result not achieved by asking questions? When their answers are in alignment with the answers you would give to the same questions, do you not come to the conclusion that they understand what you are talking about? I think all of this is very strong evidence that the best definition of an explanation is that it is a mechanism for producing expectations. And understanding is achieved when surprise no longer occurs. We can talk about "good" explanations once we agree as to what qualifies as an explanation. :wink:
I see roughly what you mean, but find it a strange way of defining an explanation.

If you disagree, give me a better definition of explanation and/or understanding. :biggrin:
If an explanation is a mechanism for producing expectations then a good explanation is one that produces correct expectations. This is ok by me as far as it goes, but it does not seem to go very far. All it says is that a good explanation is one that is in accord with what is the case. This seems a rather empty definition. On both explanation and understanding I'm happy to stick with what the dictionary gives as their meaning. Of course those definitions are woolly, but I don't think we should start changing the meaning of long used terms. If they are the wrong terms in some context it would be better to use different ones.

In this context, on the question of the ability of phsyics to explain everything, this seems a useful comment, and more in line with how I view explanations :

"What other properties should the physicalist’s relation of determinational dependence have? According to Kim, the relation involves not only ontological directionality but explanatory. "That upon which something depends is … explanatorily prior to … that which depends on it." The lower-level or base property on which the higher-level depends is explanatorily prior because a thing’s "having the relevant base property explains why it has the [higher level] property." It is because, or in virtue of the fact that, the thing has the base property that it has the higher level, supervenient property. Thus if properties of kind B determine those of kind A, then a thing’s having certain B-properties is that in virtue of which, is the sense of explaining why, it has certain A-properties."

L.C.Pereira and M. Wrigley
‘Is Supervenience Asymetric’

This says, rightly in my view, that when we explain things we do so by reference to things other than what it is we are explaining. When we are trying to explain everything we cannot do this, so cannot explain everything (except self-referentially or tautologically). However this has no bearing on what can or cannot be understood or known, since to understand or know something it is not necessary to be able to express an explanation of it.

Doctordick

Apr10-05, 05:34 PM

Hi again Canute,
Going by the time stamp on your posts, your answer on the other thread (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=524741#post524741) preceded your post here so I answered it first. You might read that one first.
Maybe, but there is another possibility.That may be but, if so, I am unaware of it. All I have to go on is the fact that they are still bothered by issues which in my paradigm are quite straight forward while all the issues they bring up to support their paradigm also support mine. :cool:
True. It also depends on the definition of every other word you've used. So what is your defintion of understanding?If you understand it, you can explain it. (See how I subtly shifted that over to another word :biggrin: ; one I feel is considerably more important and one we should do our best to define exactly.) Note that the dictionary listing for "understanding" is quite long. This implies the common definition is more vague than the average. Secondly, since there is no easy way to prove anyone understands anything (it's pretty well a qualia isn't it :rofl: ) there can't be much use for the term in an exact science, at least not at the moment. What I need to do in order to make my definition correct is to make sure that my definition of "explain" accommodates the vague implications of "understanding". As you say, if I don't do that then I should probably invent a new word and I really don't want to do that as my thoughts are abstract enough without it.
There is a profound difference between understanding reality and explaining it.I wouldn't put it that way. I would agree that "there is a profound difference between feeling you understand reality and explaining it. As I said above, understanding is often taken to be a very personal feeling and, as such is not really something which can be nailed down in an exact manner. However, in usage, it is very commonly used to express the idea that one can explain something and that issue is much easier to test. So I will leave "understanding" as a (currently anyway) vague term.
This is an issue that lies at the heart of the difference between scientific/philosophical approaches to knowledge and experiential/mystical approaches.I don't think that is true. I think it is at the heart of the difference between exact language and common language, but the idea that exactness of expression forever blocks one from philosophical analysis is an unwarranted assumption.
It is perfectly possible to understand something that one cannot explain.If you had said, "it is perfectly possible to feel one understands something that one cannot explain". I would have agreed with you directly; however, used alone, the word "understand" usually carries the connotation that the understanding is valid and we are deep into philosophical basics here and such connotations have to be questioned. Explanation, however, doesn't carry such strong connotations. In the common usage, we have all heard explanations which are far from valid (if you have ever had a child you have anyway :rofl: ). And explanations are very easy to examine; as you said they are communicable things.
I agree that it is not possible to prove (demonstrate) that one knows something. But that has no bearing on whether it is possible to know it.You are exactly correct and that is the very issue I hold to be central to an exact analysis of reality (or any isolated component of reality).
The view that the phenomenal universe (the universe of corporeal and mental phenomena) is (strictly speaking) not real, does not necessarily imply solipsism. It also implies Buddhism, Sufism, Taoism, Theosophy, Advaita and all equivalent cosmological doctrines.I think you are wrong there but I don't want to argue the issue as I know little of those doctrines. If they do hold that everything is a figment of your imagination then they are solipsistic doctrines. However, I think, for the most part, they are religions in that they hold things which they cannot prove are true. That is, in fact, the realist's position and the exact reason why academies tend towards becoming religions. :biggrin:
Yes, that is one test. But I know precisely and exactly, can understand and explain, why prime numbers occur where and when they do, yet I have no way of predicting exactly where they will occur.And tell me, does that surprise you? If not, then that fulfills exactly my definition of an explanation. You are confusing something which predicts your expectation (which are in fact, "you have no way of predicting exactly where they will occur") with the act of predicting where they will occur. I never said anything about what your expectations were. What I said was, "I define an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us." :tongue:
I see roughly what you mean, but find it a strange way of defining an explanation.If it is not exactly what you mean by an explanation, either give me an example of something you regard to be an explanation which does not fit the definition or give me an example of something which fits my definition which cannot be regarded as an explanation. I think that exhausts the possibilities doesn't it? The dictionary definitions are not "wrong"; they are simply inexact (or woolly as you say). If I am going to "explain" the universe, I just better have an exact idea of what my goal is. :rolleyes:
This seems a rather empty definition.And empty is good. Without making any assertions, I have a clear exact definition of what I am going to do. Having that, I can lay out a detailed procedure for reaching that goal without fear that I have made an unwarranted assumption. Without it, I am just stirring the pot of vague representations cast up to me by my subconscious mind hoping something of use might float to the top. :yuck:
On both explanation and understanding I'm happy to stick with what the dictionary gives as their meaning.I see utterly no difference between my definition and the dictionary. The only difference is that their's is vague and "wooly" and mine is exact. If this isn't the case, you need to give one of those examples sited above. :rolleyes:
In this context, on the question of the ability of phsyics to explain everything, this seems a useful comment, and more in line with how I view explanations :

"What other properties should the physicalist’s relation of determinational dependence have? According to Kim, the relation involves not only ontological directionality but explanatory. "That upon which something depends is … explanatorily prior to … that which depends on it." The lower-level or base property on which the higher-level depends is explanatorily prior because a thing’s "having the relevant base property explains why it has the [higher level] property." It is because, or in virtue of the fact that, the thing has the base property that it has the higher level, supervenient property. Thus if properties of kind B determine those of kind A, then a thing’s having certain B-properties is that in virtue of which, is the sense of explaining why, it has certain A-properties."

L.C.Pereira and M. Wrigley
‘Is Supervenience Asymetric’Talk about woolly? It certainly isn't empty. My problem with it is that it is so complex that it might very well contain internal relationships which have not yet been proved valid. But more important than that, can you prove that every possible explanation of reality is included under that definition: i.e, is the correct explanation included? What if Budda were correct, is his position included there or are you presuming he was wrong? I am afraid that I can come up with a lot of explanations which don't fit under that definition at all – it utterly fails the dictionary test! And as a final comment, it is clearly included in my definition. So why do you feel so strongly that my definition not be used? :confused:
This says, rightly in my view, that when we explain things we do so by reference to things other than what it is we are explaining. When we are trying to explain everything we cannot do this, so cannot explain everything (except self-referentially or tautologically).Then, by your own admission, an explanation constrained to your definition cannot explain the universe as nothing is outside. This certainly implies the correct explanation of reality is not included there. :confused:
However this has no bearing on what can or cannot be understood or known, since to understand or know something it is not necessary to be able to express an explanation of it.I would say very simply, if you feel you understand something which you cannot explain, it is certainly of no significance to me, my children, your children or anyone else for that matter. Why should I take any interest in it at all. If you want the feeling that you understand the universe, there are a great number of methods of achieving that goal; none of which are worth much to the rest of us. :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr11-05, 09:25 AM

Hi again Canute,
That may be but, if so, I am unaware of it.
I should have been more clear. The "other possibility" is that you might be wrong.

If you understand it, you can explain it.
Again you state this this with no supporting argument.

Secondly, since there is no easy way to prove anyone understands anything (it's pretty well a qualia isn't it :rofl: ) there can't be much use for the term in an exact science, at least not at the moment.
Here you have it. Understanding is qualia. This is why/how one can know a thing without necessarily being able to explain it.

I wouldn't put it that way. I would agree that "there is a profound difference between feeling you understand reality and explaining it. As I said above, understanding is often taken to be a very personal feeling and, as such is not really something which can be nailed down in an exact manner. However, in usage, it is very commonly used to express the idea that one can explain something and that issue is much easier to test. So I will leave "understanding" as a (currently anyway) vague term.
Fine. Understanding is certainly a vague term (as are so many terms that relate to consciousness). But you have argued for a strong link between understanding and explanation so must have a particular meaning in mind. Personally I feel that you're right when you suggest that understanding is a personal feeling that cannot be nailed down in an exact manner. However, this is not true of explanations.

I don't think that is true. I think it is at the heart of the difference between exact language and common language, but the idea that exactness of expression forever blocks one from philosophical analysis is an unwarranted assumption.
I'll stick by what I wrote. (I'm not sure what exactness of language has got to do with anything here, and a common language is not necessarily a different thing to an exact language).

If you had said, "it is perfectly possible to feel one understands something that one cannot explain". I would have agreed with you directly; however, used alone, the word "understand" usually carries the connotation that the understanding is valid and we are deep into philosophical basics here and such connotations have to be questioned.
The word 'feel' is superfluous. If you start down that road then you get into the endless regression of "feel I know I feel I know I know I feel ...", the equivalent of Goedel's regression of meta-systems. The truth is that we have no idea how we know things. This is related to the topic here because it is another aspect of the fact that we have no idea how we know what anything means. 'Knowing' is something to do with consciousness, and is therefore part of the 'problem of consciousness'.

To put this another way, in order to know what a word (or anything else) means, (or know that it has a meaning) we must be able to know. The only entities that can know anything are sentient beings. Thus sentience/consciousness/phenomenality seems a prerequisite for meaning.

It seems to me that you are muddling the concepts of knowledge, understanding and explanation. Although these things relate to each other in all sorts of interesting ways as words they have quite different meaning.

I think you are wrong there but I don't want to argue the issue as I know little of those doctrines. If they do hold that everything is a figment of your imagination then they are solipsistic doctrines. However, I think, for the most part, they are religions in that they hold things which they cannot prove are true.
Yes, they are solipsistic in a way, but not in a way that would make it correct to say that solipsism is what they are. And yes, of course practitioners of these disciplines hold things which they cannot prove are true. We all do. This is because it is possible to know things that one cannot prove to be true. Cogito ergo sum, for instance.

.... Without making any assertions, I have a clear exact definition of what I am going to do. Having that, I can lay out a detailed procedure for reaching that goal without fear that I have made an unwarranted assumption. Without it, I am just stirring the pot of vague representations cast up to me by my subconscious mind hoping something of use might float to the top. :yuck:
I can't follow that one. However one defines 'explanation' it is possible to make unwarranted assumptions.

Talk about woolly? It certainly isn't empty. My problem with it is that it is so complex that it might very well contain internal relationships which have not yet been proved valid. But more important than that, can you prove that every possible explanation of reality is included under that definition: i.e, is the correct explanation included? What if Budda were correct, is his position included there or are you presuming he was wrong? I am afraid that I can come up with a lot of explanations which don't fit under that definition at all – it utterly fails the dictionary test! And as a final comment, it is clearly included in my definition. So why do you feel so strongly that my definition not be used? :confused:
As I said, I feel your definition is ok as far as it goes. I'll go along with any definition you like for the purposes of this discussion. (As a point of interest the Buddhist etc. view is that there cannot be a complete and consistent explanation of reality, that it can only be understood first-hand).

Then, by your own admission, an explanation constrained to your definition cannot explain the universe as nothing is outside. This certainly implies the correct explanation of reality is not included there. :confused:
I said that I was happy with the dictionary definition, so don't know what leads you to talk about 'my' definition. The dictionary definition of the term 'explanation' covers all instances of explanations, it's defined as covering them all.

I would say very simply, if you feel you understand something which you cannot explain, it is certainly of no significance to me, my children, your children or anyone else for that matter. Why should I take any interest in it at all.
Whether you take an interest is entirely up to you, and not a relevant issue. I'm saying that we can know things that we cannot explain, not that you have to take an interest in what I know that I can't explain. To take a simple case, you know what 'red' looks like. Perhaps it would be right to say that you understand what red looks like. But you cannot explain what it looks like.

If you want the feeling that you understand the universe, there are a great number of methods of achieving that goal; none of which are worth much to the rest of us. :rofl:
Methods of understanding the universe are of no use to you? I don't think you meant to say that. They are worth a great deal to you, but only if it is you who is applying the method and doing the understanding. Of course it goes without saying that I cannot do the understanding for you, or you for me. As you say, understanding is a quale.

Doctordick

Apr11-05, 02:24 PM

I should have been more clear. The "other possibility" is that you might be wrong.I am sincerely bothered by the fact that you thought I was unaware of that possibility. It leaves me strongly questioning your intentions.
Again you state this this with no supporting argument.You didn't ask me for support; you asked me for my definition of "understanding". And I went on to explain that I held the word as rather vague and (at the moment) unimportant. I can conceive of little reason for you to be concerned about support for an issue I make clear I have no real intention of depending on. Again it leaves me strongly questioning your intentions.
This is why/how one can know a thing without necessarily being able to explain it.Back to more dogmatic statements about what you are confident you know. I am sorry but if you are so sure about these things, I don't think you are open to rational thought.
But you have argued for a strong link between understanding and explanation so must have a particular meaning in mind.I had just given you exactly what meaning I had in mind for understanding and I certainly did not make any argument for a strong link between understanding and explanation. I made it very clear that I regarded "understanding" to be a vague and uncommunicable term not worth using in an exact analysis. I can not understand your desire to waste our time on such trivial issues.
I'm not sure what exactness of language has got to do with anything here, and a common language is not necessarily a different thing to an exact language.If you believe the common language can be held as "exact" then you just haven't thought about the issue or don't understand the meaning of the term "exact" commonly held by the scientific community. And it has everything to do with this thread if this thread is concerned with the issue "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
The word 'feel' is superfluous.If it's superfluous than there is no difference between what you know to be true and what you think is true. I thought the Pope was the only infallible person around. ;rofl: :rofl: You certainly make it clear you don't want to discuss the issue of your own fallibility. Yeah, you could be wrong, but certainly not about that.
If you start down that road then you get into the endless regression of "feel I know I feel I know I know I feel ...", the equivalent of Goedel's regression of meta-systems.I don't! You only stick that excuse out there because you don't want to talk about the possibility that your beliefs are wrong. It's an intellectually dishonest position.
The truth is that we have no idea how we know things.Well, I am glad you admit there is something you don't know.
'Knowing' is something to do with consciousness, and is therefore part of the 'problem of consciousness'.but jump right back in with a dogmatic assertion. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't; I personally am going to leave the issue open. Go argue with someone else if your beliefs are that important to you.
Thus sentience/consciousness/phenomenality seems a prerequisite for meaning.I note the use of the word "seems" there! I have no interest in what "seems" to be true! What I am interested in is what "has" to be true.
It seems to me that you are muddling the concepts of knowledge, understanding and explanation.Now how can I be muddling these concepts when I want to avoid them entirely. To this point, I have put forth only a small number of definitions I would like to work with rationally . I have been attacking the seemingly impossible task of getting you to understand what I mean by these few terms. The first is the difference between what we really know and what we only think we know (categories which I have labeled "knowable" and "unknowable" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=488945#post488945)) and second is my abstract definition of an "explanation" (given several times directly above in this thread). You are apparently convinced that the first two are absolutely unnecessary abstractions and that the second does not agree with what you feel an explanation is. Sorry, if that's the end of the road, it's the end of the road; but it is a rather dogmatic method for ending the discussion.
I can't follow that one. However one defines 'explanation' it is possible to make unwarranted assumptions.I was referring to unwarranted assumptions embedded in the definition itself. How can you complain about a definition being "empty" and having the quality of "making unwarranted assumptions" simultaneously. If anyone here is trying to muddy the waters, I think it is you.
As I said, I feel your definition is ok as far as it goes.Well if it doesn't go far enough, please give me an example of a explanation which is not included: i.e., either not based on what is known or does not yield any expectations. Or give me something which fits my definition which can not be seen as an explanation. My arguments would be defeated right there and I would go quietly away, bowing to your superior intellect.
I said that I was happy with the dictionary definition, so don't know what leads you to talk about 'my' definition. Then what was that Pereira and Wrigley thing all about and why was it there?
Whether you take an interest is entirely up to you, and not a relevant issue. I'm saying that we can know things that we cannot explain, not that you have to take an interest in what I know that I can't explain.I don't think you payed any attention to what I said, "I would say very simply, if you feel you understand something which you cannot explain, it is certainly of no significance to me, my children, your children or anyone else for that matter". The issue is, if you can't communicate it, you can't communicate it! How can you worry about communicating something which cannot be communicated? The issue is a complete non issue. I suspect the fact is that you "feel" there are aspects of it which can be communicated and that is what you are trying to talk about: i.e., you are stirring that pot to see if something valuable floats up. :zzz:
Methods of understanding the universe are of no use to you?No, I said I wasn't interested in acquiring the "feeling" that I understood the universe. I am much more interested in being able to explain the universe. If you are not interested in being able to explain the universe then you cannot possibly have any interest in listening to what I have to say. I hope you at least have an inkling of what I am trying to get accross to you.

Have fun -- Dick

George Prokos

Apr11-05, 11:22 PM

The study of history has shown that it was not so much man's logic that was in error but his limited grasp of the width, breadth, and sheer complexity of reality.A mathimatical formula can no longer encompass the full measure of reality than I.B.M.'s Balance Sheet can tell you everything there is to know about I.B.M. Formulas are a language, symbolism, they are not the actual thing in itself. The map is not the territory.I trust that some day we will see far clearer and we will have far better ways of classifing, categorizing, and integrating reality both experientially and cognitively. Until then let us strive not to show too much of our ignorance by trying to fit everything into one grand theory or formula and take a leap from doubt to dogmatic certitude.Besides all of this, I don't think man has evolved enough to contain ,percieve, and process the vastness of information inherent in the Universe.

Canute

Apr12-05, 05:50 AM

[quote] I hope you at least have an inkling of what I am trying to get accross to you.
I have no idea at all what you are trying to get across. I was trying to find out. No matter. As you likewise have no idea what I'm trying to get across let's call it quits.

saviourmachine

Apr12-05, 07:18 AM

There exists a way around that problem and I have been to the other side of the mountain. :approve: And any of you could go look too; if you would take the trouble to follow my thoughts. I had hoped saviormachine had the wherewithal to stick the issue through but he has apparently dropped out. I am looking forward to rudimentary interest in thinking things out logically.Sorry DoctorDick, it's difficult at the moment to find time for this topic. I'm busy with my master thesis, my girl-friend, deconversion from xianity, 'praeses' of a student society, and work as student assistent to make the money I need. I hope I can return to you some months later. The matter does interest me much.

Tournesol

Apr12-05, 10:37 AM

I don't think you payed any attention to what I said, "I would say very simply, if you feel you understand something which you cannot explain, it is certainly of no significance to me, my children, your children or anyone else for that matter". The issue is, if you can't communicate it, you can't communicate it! How can you worry about communicating something which cannot be communicated?

By commuicating the fact that you cannot communicate it.

moving finger

Apr13-05, 12:20 AM

arrogant: adj. [ME.; OFr.; L. arrogans, ppr of arrogare; see ARROGATE], full of or due to unwarranted pride and self-importance; overbearing; haughty.-- see SYN proud.
yep, as I said. Take an open-minded look at the content of your posts. And no need to be grumpy.

I believe what you are putting forth is called an "adhominem" (latin for "to the man") argument. Thus it is invalid on the face of it.
Nope, it's an observation, and very pertinent.

Secondly, I claim what I claim with very good reason and you would be well aware of that had you seriously read much of what I have said. :grumpy:
Most arrogant people do feel that way. Strange isn't it?

No, I would rather suggest it represents my expectations of a rational response: I am not going to lose any sleep waiting for one. :tongue:
That's good, because I didn't lose any sleep composing one (see below).

There does exist a quite simple way around the difficulty of including ourselves in the problem; but, apparently everyone here prefers to stew in the stalemate! :biggrin: I guess I shouldn't be surprised, I have always been told that ignorance is bliss. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:
And this is the kind of "rational comment" that you think is deserving of a rational response? Give me a break.
MF
:smile:

Doctordick

Apr13-05, 05:42 AM

If none of you can comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it, then you are beyond my intellectual reach.

Enjoy your games – Dick

Doctordick

Apr13-05, 05:55 AM

I don't think man has evolved enough to contain ,percieve, and process the vastness of information inherent in the Universe.And you think that is a good reason for not thinking about the problem?

Well have a ball not thinking about it -- Dick

Canute

Apr13-05, 06:25 AM

If none of you can comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it, then you are beyond my intellectual reach.

Enjoy your games – Dick

Please explain what you mean. Who has said that it is possible to "comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it". I'm not even sure what the sentence might mean.

I'm sorry you feel that we are beyond your intellectual reach. It may be because you are so quick to attempt to patronise anyone who disagrees with you that don't give yourself time to understand what they are saying.

Aurino

Apr13-05, 08:45 AM

I'm sorry you feel that we are beyond your intellectual reach. It may be because you are so quick to attempt to patronise anyone who disagrees with you that don't give yourself time to understand what they are saying.

Canute,

I've known this Doctordick for years and I can tell you he's not trying to patronize anyone; it's actually much worse than that.

What I gathered, after exchaning countless forum posts and about 100 emails with him, is that he has some sort of cognitive impairment. This causes him a great deal of frustration, yet the same impairment that makes it impossible for anyone to understand what he's talking about, also prevents him from understanding a single word anyone else says.

It's useless to scream at deaf people, and it's silly to blame them for not being able to hear. God knows why some people are born that way, but then there's nothing we can do about it, other than hope one day they'll clearly see what is second-nature to most people.

In his case, he appears to be able to communicate, for he writes a lot, but on a closer look it becomes obvious that he cannot say much that is intelligible, other than insults, and cannot understand most things he is told.

By the way, I don't post here but I like to follow some of the discussions. I find it really bad that Doctordick joined this forum, after being kicked out of the physics section, for he tends to dominate the debate. I hope my interference prevents this interesting forum from going the way other forums have gone, when he used to be a member of them.

(I also find it ironic that he seems to go wherever I go, or the other way around. I certainly don't look for him, yet I find him in the most unexpected places; must be a small world after all)

Doctordick

Apr13-05, 08:54 AM

Please explain what you mean. Who has said that it is possible to "comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it". I'm not even sure what the sentence might mean.

I'm sorry you feel that we are beyond your intellectual reach. It may be because you are so quick to attempt to patronise anyone who disagrees with you that don't give yourself time to understand what they are saying.That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.

I think it is a serious issue, not to be ignored -- Dick

medium

Apr13-05, 07:53 PM

On considering whether "everything can be reduced to pure physics", I have a question. Question: What if I had the power to create something from nothing. Well first there would be nothing, but say in further considering my options, I decided to use what was available to me in the physical world. So then what I would in essence be creating, is time and space. Seems to me though that this is what engineers do all the time. With the constant threat of deadlines and limited resources(smile). It occurs to me that if I were to believe in the question, it would be the one not yet asked. The one that would be worthy of making me stop and think. Does this make any sense?, Please comment>..............MEDIUM.............................>

moving finger

Apr14-05, 12:57 AM

On considering whether "everything can be reduced to pure physics", I have a question. Question: What if I had the power to create something from nothing.
Here is your problem :

You are assuming that the starting point is "nothing" and yet you still exist to create from nothing. Hence the starting point is not nothing. This problem underlies the common misconceptions of dualism and 3rd person objective science.

MF
:smile:

Canute

Apr14-05, 06:09 AM

That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.
There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true. However it is not the same sentence as the one you originally posted.

Canute

Apr14-05, 06:27 AM

Online somewhere is an essay by Stephen Hawkings called "The End of Physics". In it Hawkings argues that one consequence of the incompleteness theorem is that physics cannot be completed. That is, a complete and consistent description of the universe cannot be constructed by physicists (or indeed by anyone). Heisenberg argued the same, for related reasons (problems of self-reference). This is also the view of Buddhists and their like. It also seems true to me that any explanations of the universe must have at least one explanatory gap in it. If so then the question becomes one of whether this really is a gap or whether there is something in it. In other words, whether it is an epistemilogical or an ontological problem. In my view it is both.

Aurino - thanks. It takes all sorts, as they say.

metacristi

Apr14-05, 07:27 AM

It is conceivable that 'gaps' will ever exist (though I'd argue that we do not have yet sufficient reasons to think that a TOE cannot be complete-irrespective whether we will ever be able to prove this). After all we do not even have the definitive answers to such simple, common sense at first sight, questions like 'what is matter?' (the 'quantum field' approach is only the best existing model so far, having a fallible epistemological privilege, provisionally accepted as scientific knowledge).

But the first task of scientific quest is not to prove that our best existing theories are complete, as Popper put it well a scientist does not need to answer all questions in order to make sense of the observed facts (see his famous example with the 'dune').

There is no need for that as much as the theories prove to be very coherent and very successful and do not lead to internal contradictions. We begin with some basic assumptions, provisionally accepted, and together with empirical observations and other principles we build a net of statements having a high coherence, the so called scientific knowledge. Thus if we ever could achieve the same degree of coherence (and stability on long term) in the neurological field as that in physics we could say that science is overall on a good road. Using a too high standard (as those who are always complaining of the existence of 'gaps' do) would be at least non rational.

Moreover if we will ever find a very successful TOE (physical theory) + a very successful, stable and broad, theory of mind I would argue that we are even rationally entitled to say, provisionally, that this 'compund' theory is approximatively true. There might be further 'gaps' no one deny this (for example it is unlikely that we could ever prove clearly that all biology 'reduces' to that physical TOE), yet we would need much more reasons to think that the existing scientific knoweldge is not at least approximativley true.

Canute

Apr14-05, 12:02 PM

Yes I agree that we may as well continue to develop our theories. But those theories, and all current theories, inevitably have at least one gap in them. This is for reasons Hawkings gives, but also because in the last analysis all scientific theories rest on metaphysical assumptions. It is impossible to do science without doing metaphysics. This is not a criticism of science, just an observation as to its limits. Precisely the same limit applies to theological theories which use God or a divine miracle to fill the gap, or to those that use the 'Tao', 'Emptiness', 'Allah' or whatever to fill the gap. Mathematically speaking every formal system of terms and theorems must contain at least one undefined term, for the same reason that every dictionary must contain at least one.

loseyourname

Apr14-05, 02:52 PM

Could you find a link to either Hawking's or Heisenberg's argument on this point? Incompleteness theorem refers to formal systems. The axioms of the system cannot be proved from within the system and so the system is incomplete. In the case of physics, its axioms are the laws of physics (conservation of energy, E=mc^2, all that good stuff). These cannot be proven by the laws of physics, but they are proven by experiment. They are not really a formal system - they are a description of the way physical entities in the universe behave, confirmed through empirical investigation. They are not something to be 'proven' in any formal sense in the first place. It's hard to see how the incompleteness theorem could possibly apply here. Heck, it doesn't even apply to natural numbers or certain forms of geometry.

Canute

Apr15-05, 05:25 AM

Sure. Here are a few quotes supporting my post. I can't find the specific Heisenberg comment but have posted a quote from Max Planck instead which expresses the same view.

I've posted a few extracts that seem relevant to the topic since I had to search out the Hawking's reference and passed these on the way to it. They should all relate to the points you raise above.

*"…since every word in a dictionary is defined in terms of another word… The only way to avoid circular reasoning in a finite language would be to include some undefined terms in the dictionary. Today we must realise that mathematical systems too, must include undefined terms, and seek to include the minimum number necessary for the system to make sense."

Leonard Mlodinow
‘Euclid’s Window’

"Up to now, most people have implicitly assumed that there is an ultimate theory, that we will eventually discover. Indeed, I myself have suggested we might find it quite soon. However, M-theory has made me wonder if this is true. Maybe it is not possible to formulate the theory of the universe in a finite number of statements. This is very reminiscent of Goedel's theorem. This says that any finite system of axioms is not sufficient to prove every result in mathematics.

Stephen Hawking
'Goedel and The End of Physics'
Online

"Gödel, after all, proved that mathematics itself has its limits. In his famous incompleteness theorem, he showed that no logical system can be used to prove its own consistency. To do so, one has to step out of the system, pop up a level, and study it from a higher vantage point… But proving the consistency of that system requires popping up another level, and so on, ad infinitum… there is no highest vanyage point, no ultimate abstraction."

George Johnson
'Fire in the Mind'

"…as I explained in the first lecture, the way we have to describe Nature is generally incomprehensible to us."

Richard Feynman
QED - The Strange Theory of Light and Matter

"I do not think I am prejudiced against the importance that science has from the purely human point of view. But with all that, I cannot believe (and this is my first objection) - I cannot believe that [for example] the deep philosophical enquiry into the relation between subject and object and into the true meaning of the distinction between them depends on the quantative results of physical and chemical measurements with weighing scales, spectroscopes, microscopes, telescopes, with Geiger-Müller-counters, Wilson-chambers, photographic plates, arrangements for measuring the radioactive decay, and whatnot. It is not very easy to say why I do not believe it. I feel a certain incongruity between the applied means and the problem to be solved."

Erwin Schrödinger
'Why Not Talk Physics'

"… It is sometimes urged that the basal stuff of the world should be called "neutral stuff" rather than "mind-stuff," since it is to be such that both mind and matter originate from it. If this is intended to emphasise that only limited islands of it constitute actual minds, and that even in these islands that which is known mentally is not equivalent to a complete inventory of all that may be there, I agree. In fact, I should suppose that the self-knowledge of consciousness is mainly or wholly a knowledge which eludes the inventory method of description. The term "mind-stuff" might well be amended, but neutral stuff seems to be the wrong kind of amendment. It implies that we have two avenues of approach to an understanding of its nature. We have only one approach, namely, through our direct knowledge of mind. The supposed approach through the physical world leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world-stuff at all.

Sir Arthur Eddington
In Ken Wilbur - Quantum Questions

"It is difficult to decide where science ends and mysticism begins. As soon as we begin to make even the most elementary theories we are open to the charge of indulging in metaphysics. Yet theories, however provisional, are the very lifeblood of scientific progress. We simply cannot escape metaphysics, though we can perhaps over-indulge, as well as have too little."

Banesh Hoffmann
'The Strange Story of the Quantum'

"The elements of consciousness are particular thoughts and feelings; th eelements of the brain cell are atoms and electrons. But the two analyses do not run parallel to one another. Whilst, therefore, I contemplate a spiritual domain underlying the physical world as a whole, I do not think of it as distributed so that to each element of time and space there is a corresponding portion of the spiritual background. My conclusion is that, although for the most part our enquiry into the problem of experience ends in a veil of symbols, there is an immediate knowledge in the minds of conscious beings which lifts the veil in places; what we discern through these openings is of mental and spiritual nature. Elsewhere we see no more than the veil."

Sir Arthur Eddington
'Beyond the Veil of Physics'

"Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of relativity with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of quanta with its present apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the dissection of the atom with the resultant discovery that things are not what they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality. We are still imprisoned in our cave, with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall."

Sir James Jeans
The Mysterious Universe

"The symbolic nature of physics is generally recognised, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider."

Sir Arthur Eddington
Science and the Unseen World

"Formal self-reference in Goedel’s theorems has various features in common with self-reference in minds and computers. The theorems do not imply that there can be no formal computational models of the mind, but on the contrary, suggest the existence of such models within a conception of mind as subject to similar limitations as formal systems."

Damjan Bojadziez
Mind versus Goedel
In ‘Mind Versus Computer’,

What is the relation between Gödels theorem and whether we can formulate the theory of the universe in terms of a finite number of principles? One connection is obvious. According to the positivist philosophy of science a physical theory is a mathematical model. So if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted….

Stephen Hawking – Goedel and The End of Physics – net article (http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strtst/dirac/hawking/)

"Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve."

Max Planck
?

"It is important to realise that what we know as the ‘scientific worldview’ is an image of the universe that rests on a host of daring metaphyical assumptions. (!! -ed) These are often presented and seen as facts that have been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, while in reality they stand on very shaky ground, are controversial, or are inadequately supported by the evidence."

Stanislav Grof
The Cosmic Game

metacristi

Apr15-05, 05:50 AM

It might be mentioned here that the necessity of an infinity of axioms does not imply that such a system is necesarily incomplete. As a matter of fact a student of Godel (Gentzen if I remember well) proved that for infinite systems (infinite number of axioms) it is possible to avoid incompleteness. Our incapacity to propose such a system, to list the axioms in other words, does not prove that we cannot tend toward it, or that it is incomplete. We can never reach it of course so in this sense we could say that our theories (limited parts of that infinite system) are incomplete yet there is no reason to say that there is impossible to exist a (complete) infinite system describing Reality. But currently, in my view of course, there is no good reason to think that the universe is infinite and moreover that we need an infinity of axioms/postulates/laws to describe it. The problem, in my view, is still wide open, our incapacity to prove that a complete system is possible and to find it does not amount to say that such a system in an impossibility, the problem of consciousness included ('complete' imply here also the approximative truth of the system; otherwise if there exist false predictions the system cannot be complete, some axioms are false and have to be changed). Even for infinite systems.

moving finger

Apr15-05, 05:56 AM

Sure. Here are a few quotes supporting my post. I can't find the specific Heisenberg comment but have posted a quote from Max Planck instead which expresses the same view.

a couple more that I like :
Do not keep saying to yourself “But how can it be like that?” because you will go down the drain into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped
Feynman

Man is not born to solve the problems of the universe, but to find out where the problems begin, and then to take his stand within the limits of the intelligible
Goethe

The human mind is not capable of grasping the Universe. We are like a little child entering a huge library. The walls are covered to the ceilings with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written these books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. But the child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books---a mysterious order which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects.
Einstein

It’s up to us to make sense of Nature; it’s not Nature’s obligation to behave as we would like.
David Lindley/Where Does the Weirdness Go?

MF
:smile:

Doctordick

Apr15-05, 09:35 AM

If none of you can comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it, then you are beyond my intellectual reach.
That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.
That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true. However it is not the same sentence as the one you originally posted.The only difference between the first and the second that I can see is that, in the first I say that if you cannot comprehend the truth of the statement you are beyond my intellectual reach and in the second, I merely restate the statement. If you cannot understand the first and find the second obvious, I am at a complete loss to understand your mode of thinking.

However, laying that aside, if I have your agreement that, "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it", I will step off to the next thing I think has to be recognized as a truth of similar clarity: "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". If you will also accept that as a true statement, then it is my assertion is that these are important facts and they should be recognized as important issues in any chain of logical thought. I contend that the things that you are wrong about obey different rules than the things you are not wrong about and that the subtle difference yields astonishing consequences.

You should be well aware that, at times, extremely simple differences can yield far reaching consequences. For example look at the difference between asymmetric wave functions and symmetric wave function (nothing more than a simple difference in character of two possible solutions to exactly the same differential equation). One set of solutions yield collections of entities obeying Fermi statistics while the others obey Bose Einstein statistics; results which lead to far reaching differences in behavior of macroscopic entities.

If you are willing to listen, I will show you the consequences of the very simple difference between the rules obeyed by "what you are right about" and the rules obeyed by "what you are wrong about". And prove that consequences of these differences exist even when there is no way to discriminate between "what you are right about" and "what you are wrong about".

As to the rest of you, you sure seem to be able to come up with a lot of reasons not to think about things. I guess you are pretty well convinced there are no new intellectual breakthroughs to be made. I personally think that it is good that there are a few crackpots like me who doubt the absolute certainty of such proclamations.

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr15-05, 10:56 AM

I think in general people are not saying that they don't want to think about things, but rather that they don't agree with the way you think about things.

About that sentence. Yes. you're right. There are two ways of reading it and I read it the way you didn't mean it. My apologies.

Of course I would be willing to listen to your ideas on things we know and things we don't, but only after you've shown that we cannot tell the difference between them, which is your more basic claim. I find it confusing that you say we cannot know anything and then offer to explain to me what you know. To do this would entail that you can tell the difference between what you know and what you don't.

loseyourname

Apr15-05, 11:47 AM

Okay, it doesn't seem like any of those were arguments, just suggestions that physics might be inherently incomplete, with an analogy to Goedel. Thankfully, they aren't saying that their conjecture has anything to do with Goedel, because it doesn't.

By the way, I've always thought the same thing about languages, at least with regards to defining every term formally. Again, though, you escape the seeming circularity by defining certain terms empirically, by simple reference and sense to what they represent in the world. This gives you at least a semantic, if not a syntactic understanding, without circularity.

Edit: Let me be perfectly clear here before another argument starts. Physics may very well prove to be an incomplete system. I have absolutely no idea. I've already stated many times in this thread that I don't think it has full explanatory power. It, however, will never be incomplete in the sense that Canute seems to be intending, which is the incompleteness of certain formal mathematical systems according to Goedel's theorem. This theorem does not even apply to all formal mathematical systems, much less to empirical theories and laws.

Doctordick

Apr15-05, 09:32 PM

I think in general people are not saying that they don't want to think about things, but rather that they don't agree with the way you think about things.That has been obvious to me for well over forty years. That is the exact reason no one else (and that includes the entire physics community) has ever come across the relationship I have happened to have discovered. :rofl:
About that sentence. Yes. you're right. There are two ways of reading it and I read it the way you didn't mean it. My apologies.What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone? And secondly, will you allow me use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different cases: i.e., "knowable" refers to things which can be proved are correct and "unknowable" refers to things which can never be proved correct? :confused:
Of course I would be willing to listen to your ideas on things we know and things we don't, but only after you've shown that we cannot tell the difference between them, which is your more basic claim.First (things we know) and (things we don't know) are not exactly the categories I am referring to; it is rather, "things that you are right about" and "things that you are wrong about". Secondly, I am not making any such a claim at all; my presentation specifically allows for the possibility that there is someone out there who can tell exactly when they are right and when they are wrong; however, I have very strong doubts such a person really exists. If they could tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong, why would they ever choose to be wrong about anything? :biggrin: I can only conclude that such a person would be all knowing. :cool: That may be him, but it certainly is not me! :redface:

Yeah, but then there is the guy who tells me, "sure I could be wrong about something, but I will assure you, I am not wrong about this!" :rofl: I would rather not take his word for it, thank you. That could be a very dangerous intellectual presumption. :devil:
I find it confusing that you say we cannot know anything and then offer to explain to me what you know. To do this would entail that you can tell the difference between what you know and what you don't.First of all, you are misinterpreting what I am offering to you. All I want to do is show you the logical consequences which flow directly out of the fact that being right and being wrong lead to vastly different possibilities and that the existence of those possibilities have nothing at all to do with being able tell the difference between the two. In fact, if you follow my reasoning, you will find that those consequences resolve down to exactly the mechanisms required to differentiate between where you are wrong and where you are right, but not at all the way you expect. Consider this thought experiment: if no one could prove that something put forward was false, does that constitute proof that it is correct? In my opinion, only a madman would conclude something was right just because he couldn't prove it was wrong. :rolleyes:

Not as an argument but rather as a hand waving gesture to point towards the results I will achieve, let me point out that telling the difference between Bosons and Fermions does not depend at all on being able to confirm that their wave functions are symmetric or antisymmetric by inspection of the wave functions themselves but rather, it is the gross behavior of identified entity which is taken as conclusive evidence of the symmetry or asymmetry of the wave function. Logical arguments take precedence over examination if direct examination is impossible. :cool:

The next point in this argument is the issue of the definition of "an explanation". I have defined "an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us." I have further claimed that my definition includes every case of an explanation known to us and excludes every case which cannot be considered an explanation under common understanding. If that assertion is in error, you should be able to give me either an example of "an explanation" which fails to fulfill that definition or something which fulfills that definition which can not possibly be seen as an explanation. Sure it is abstract but, if it is not a valid abstraction, you should be able to explain to me where it fails. As I said earlier, show me that my abstract definition is unacceptable (i.e., differs from your personal usage) and I will go away quietly. :shy:

Looking forward to a rational response -- Dick

Canute

Apr17-05, 06:33 AM

Loseyourname

On what grounds do you say that the incompleteness theorem does not apply to physics, especially when many, including Hawkings, thinks it does? I thought the extracts I posted made a strong case that is does, and you haven't said what is wrong with that case.

What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone?
Of course. I doubt it's possible to be wrong about absolutely everything.

And secondly, will you allow me use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different cases: i.e., "knowable" refers to things which can be proved are correct and "unknowable" refers to things which can never be proved correct? :confused:
That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid. To prove something formally requires the use of logical and mathematical systems that are known to be produce only uncertain results. That is, if it is possible to prove something true within one formal system (from one axiom set) it is possible to prove it false in another (using a different axiom set). All such proofs produce only uncertain, realitive or contingent knowledge. Propositions are true or false only relative to ones axioms, or relative to other truths and falsities in the system. That is not certain knowledge.

However, things that are known directly and which therefore cannot be proved in this way, can be self-evident and thus can be known with certainty. To state this clearly, so that it is easy to object, I'd say that if a proposition can be formally proved to be true (i.e. proved by demonstration to be true) then it cannot be known for certain that it is true.

First (things we know) and (things we don't know) are not exactly the categories I am referring to; it is rather, "things that you are right about" and "things that you are wrong about". Secondly, I am not making any such a claim at all; my presentation specifically allows for the possibility that there is someone out there who can tell exactly when they are right and when they are wrong; however, I have very strong doubts such a person really exists.
A person who knows when he is right and when he is wrong would have to all-knowing. This is because there is no difference between knowing what is right and what is wriong, in that both require knowing. In my view it would be more true to say that for any individual some of his or her knowledge is certain and all the rest is uncertain.

If they could tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong, why would they ever choose to be wrong about anything? :biggrin: I can only conclude that such a person would be all knowing. :cool: That may be him, but it certainly is not me! :redface:
I agree. If one knows in full what is true and what is false then one is all-knowing.

Yeah, but then there is the guy who tells me, "sure I could be wrong about something, but I will assure you, I am not wrong about this!" :rofl: I would rather not take his word for it, thank you. That could be a very dangerous intellectual presumption. :devil:
I agree again. This is why I'm surprised you get so upset when people disagree with you.

First of all, you are misinterpreting what I am offering to you. All I want to do is show you the logical consequences which flow directly out of the fact that being right and being wrong lead to vastly different possibilities and that the existence of those possibilities have nothing at all to do with being able tell the difference between the two. In fact, if you follow my reasoning, you will find that those consequences resolve down to exactly the mechanisms required to differentiate between where you are wrong and where you are right, but not at all the way you expect. Consider this thought experiment: if no one could prove that something put forward was false, does that constitute proof that it is correct? In my opinion, only a madman would conclude something was right just because he couldn't prove it was wrong. :rolleyes:
Fine.

...let me point out that telling the difference between Bosons and Fermions does not depend at all on being able to confirm that their wave functions are symmetric or antisymmetric by inspection of the wave functions themselves but rather, it is the gross behavior of identified entity which is taken as conclusive evidence of the symmetry or asymmetry of the wave function. Logical arguments take precedence over examination if direct examination is impossible. :cool:
Of course. It seems to go without saying that if observation or measurement is impossible then we have to use some other method.

The next point in this argument is the issue of the definition of "an explanation". I have defined "an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us." I have further claimed that my definition includes every case of an explanation known to us and excludes every case which cannot be considered an explanation under common understanding. If that assertion is in error, you should be able to give me either an example of "an explanation" which fails to fulfill that definition or something which fulfills that definition which can not possibly be seen as an explanation. Sure it is abstract but, if it is not a valid abstraction, you should be able to explain to me where it fails. As I said earlier, show me that my abstract definition is unacceptable (i.e., differs from your personal usage) and I will go away quietly. :shy:
Let's just assume that your definition is correct and move on. What follows?

Looking forward to a rational response -- Dick
Damn it man, such comments do nothing but get people's backs up. Leave them out. "Looking forward to your response" would have done.

Doctordick

Apr17-05, 10:24 AM

Hi Canute,
Let me begin near the end. :rofl:
I agree again. This is why I'm surprised you get so upset when people disagree with you.I don't get upset when people disagree with me. I get dumbfounded by the extent with to which they will go to misconstrue what I am saying. And, having made that comment, let me go back to your response to my desire to use the words "knowable" and "unknowable" as representing the two central concepts of my presentation: "things you are right about" and "things you are wrong about". I would like to use those terms because I have used them before and it would save me a lot of typing. So, to your response:
That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid. To prove something formally requires the use of logical and mathematical systems that are known to be produce only uncertain results. That is, if it is possible to prove something true within one formal system (from one axiom set) it is possible to prove it false in another (using a different axiom set). All such proofs produce only uncertain, realitive or contingent knowledge. Propositions are true or false only relative to ones axioms, or relative to other truths and falsities in the system. That is not certain knowledge.You have concentrated on the word "prove" and presumed that I mean by "prove" exactly what you have decided is meant by the word. That is not at all what I mean. When I talk about the possibility of proving something, my comments are coming from my recognition and acceptance of my own complete ignorance. That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth).

This is in direct opposition to the case where you are wrong. If you are truly wrong about something I can be quite confident that, no matter how long mankind stirrs that pot of concepts they have created, it will never be correctly demonstrated that you are right about that particular thing. Thus it follows that I can absolutely never know that you are right on that fact (it can not be demonstrated or proved and is an absolutely "unknowable" fact, truth, idea???). And knowing how to differentiate between being right and being wrong has no bearing on this particular issue at all.

The significant difference between "knowable" and "unknowable" things as I have defined them is quite simple. If you are right, you are right (story is over); if you are wrong, there is utterly no limit on the ways you can be wrong (in fact, there may actually be some useful ways to be wrong).
Damn it man, such comments do nothing but get people's backs up. Leave them out. "Looking forward to your response" would have done.Sorry about that, I'll try to be more careful in the future. :blushing:

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr18-05, 08:13 AM

DrDick

Your post doesn't deal with my objection, but I have no problem with it except for this.

That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth).
My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth. That is, any proposition that can be demonstrated to be true might be false, and vice versa. This is because to demonstrate that a proposition is true or false requires the use of a formal axiomatic system, and it is never possible to demonstrate that the axioms of any such system are true. Aristotle said that the best we can do is make our axioms self-evident. This is fine, but knowledge that is self-evident to one person cannot be shown to be true or false to someone else, so no general or third-person proof can have self-evidently true axioms, except perhaps when the axiom can be agreed by everyone to be self-evident, as perhaps in the case of cogito ergo sum. But some people find even that axiom problematic.

This is why I prefer the term 'demonstrate', or 'prove by demonstration' to just 'prove'. What we usually call a proof is just a demonstration that some conclusion can be derived from some set of axioms. This method does not ever produce conclusions which can be known to be true or false. This is one reason that scientists never claim that their theories are true or false, and one reason that Russell and Whitehead failed to reach their goal.

This means that even if I can prove (by demonstration) that some proposition is true or false you will never be able to know that it is true or false, and neither will I, except in a relative way (relative to my axioms).

Because of this I can't agree with some of the things you say about knowing and not knowing. They appear to be based on false premises.

Doctordick

Apr18-05, 09:43 PM

Hi Canute,

Once again I face the problem of people misconstruing what I am saying. I think the problem is that they cannot conceive of proceeding without some additional assumptions so they make those assumptions, assuming I have made them, and then argue against them.
My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth.That cannot be your problem with what I said as I, at no time, implied that there was any necessity to make such a demonstration. You seem to miss the point that all I am doing is defining what I mean by the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" for the sole purpose of convenience. I have made much of the issue only so that you might be able to follow my reasoning without falling into extensive debate as to the correct meanings of the words. I am using them only to refer to two different types of things you, I or anyone else might think they know.

You made much of my comment "... the fact can perhaps be demonstrated ...". Why do you think the word "perhaps" is in there? All I am doing there is trying to explain to you why I like to use the words "knowable" and "unknowable" so that you could more easily tie them to my simple usage. Would you better understand what I meant if I had just omitted that sentence and left it with, "it is knowable in the sense that, with infinite time (time to discover all erroneous ideas), I could possibly come to "really and correctly know" that you are "truly right". On the other hand, with regard to things about which you are wrong the event of knowing them to be absolute truth of can not possibly ever occur (thus pointing me to the word unknowable)". This is the central critical issue.

At issue here, is not the possibility of discovering what is true but rather the apparent fact that false beliefs can on occasion be found false. I am saying that this is the difference between what is "knowable" and what is "unknowable" (by my definition which I have been trying to communicate) and it has important and far reaching consequences. Now I am sure there are enough cases in history to convince you that having been wrong does occur, at least for the rest of the world. (You should even have a few experiences of you own at becoming aware of the fact that you were wrong about something.)

It is clear from the rest of your post that you are looking for a way to tell the difference between these two classes of things before making a commitment to the significance of that difference. I am sure that you are aware of some things you were wrong about in the past. The point is that evidence that you are wrong can occur and, if it does ever occur, it will not turn out to be something you were right about. You will never discover you are right about something you were wrong about!

My point is that there are the things you are right about and things you are wrong about and they have very different fundamental characteristics. The single most important character of being right is that one will absolutely never find out they are wrong; this is almost the definition of being right. On the other hand, the history of mankind is ripe with cases where they were wrong.

Because of this I can't agree with some of the things you say about knowing and not knowing. They appear to be based on false premises.I am not talking about "knowing" and "not knowing". I am using the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to mean some very specific things. Easy reference to the two issues is central to my presentation and it serves no purpose to muddy up what I mean by those terms. The use of English words are so vague anyway that it shouldn't bother you that I want to put a specific exact meaning on my usage. All I want to do is, in my analysis, to have the easy power to refer to the two different categories; and I harbor no interest in being able to tell the difference between them.

In fact, in my presentation, I am going to do my very best to maintain the requirement that it is not possible to tell the difference. That has to be the single most important constraint on any proposed explanation of anything. The reason for maintaining that constraint is that, if it is ever violated, a mechanism exists to show the proposed explanation is false: i.e., evidence exists which will show that something thought to be true (under the explanation) is false and thus the proposed explanation fails.

Dick

Canute

Apr19-05, 07:06 AM

Doctordick

Apr19-05, 07:31 PM

I'm afraid I can't follow you. I agree that something that is not true (or false) is not knowable. Also I agree also that only what is true (or false) is knowable. (By true I presume we mean here 'what is the case'). Briefly put, you seem to be saying that it is impossible to know that a false fact is true or that a true fact is false. I suppose this translates as - only the truth can be known. I agree. It sounds like you understand me but I am not yet entirely convinced you really have a handle on what I am talking about here.
But I don't agree that it's never possible to tell the difference between what is knowable and what is unknowable, which is what you seem to saying.I did not say it was never possible. In fact, it is exactly the discovery that we are in error which leads to a change in what we think is true. However, that event always occurs in the future and not in the past. Our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before.
Your last para. hints at where you are heading, but it's a bit cryptic as it stands. What is it that you are suggesting?No explanation for anything will be deemed acceptable by a rational person if they know that the explanation is dependent on something which is wrong. This clearly requires that person accepting an argument either be absolutely correct with regard to every premise behind that explanation (in which case there is no element upon which to make such a judgment) or be unable to tell the difference between what is knowable and what is unknowable (i.e., where he is right and where he is wrong with regard to that explanation). This circumstance suggests a very important absolute constraint on any acceptable explanation. As I said,
The reason for maintaining that constraint is that, if it is ever violated, a mechanism exists to show the proposed explanation is false: i.e., evidence exists which will show that something thought to be true (under the explanation) is false and thus the proposed explanation fails. And it fails without the need to learn anything new; the reason it fails is because it is known to be based on invalid information.

The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of knowable and unknowable information (things we are right about and things we are wrong about). How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.

Notice that there are two very different ways in which we can be wrong about something: first, it is possible that we have simply made an error thinking the thing out and second, the information necessary to show we are wrong may not yet be available to us. The first I hold as not important as the only solution is to be more careful in ones analysis. (Experts in analysis should not be expected to make errors.) The second however can only be eliminated by further education (finding additional information) and thus becomes a fundamental constraint on any acceptable explanation.

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr20-05, 07:33 AM

It sounds like you understand me but I am not yet entirely convinced you really have a handle on what I am talking about here.
Nor me.

I did not say it was never possible. In fact, it is exactly the discovery that we are in error which leads to a change in what we think is true. However, that event always occurs in the future and not in the past. Our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before.
I can't make sense of the idea that an event can only happen in the future. To happen an event must be in the present, and a second later it is in the past. Is this not so?

No explanation for anything will be deemed acceptable by a rational person if they know that the explanation is dependent on something which is wrong.
Hmm. I'd rather say that all explanations are based on assumptions (axioms, premises) that might be false, and that for this reason it is not possible to know if an explanation is true by simply analysing the explanation. (Although it may be be possible to confirm the truth of an explanation by 'extra-explanatory' means).

The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of knowable and unknowable information (things we are right about and things we are wrong about). How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.
I'd say that there is no precise correlation between what is knowable or unknowable and what we are right or wrong about. After all, it's quite possible to be wrong about something that is knowable if you don't happen to know it, or right about something that is unknowable by accident.

I feel the problem here is your use of 'knowable'. If a fact is knowable then it is possible to know it. If a fact can only be known in the future, as you say, then it is not possible to know it in the present, and therefore not possible to know it. This appears to be a paradox.

Doctordick

Apr21-05, 06:32 AM

Well, it seems we are right back where we started from. I don't know if I have exceeded your attention span of if you just want to avoid thinking about what I am saying. Look back at my post on 4/14/05:
That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.You responded with,
There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true.And apologized for misconstruing what I had said.

I then asked about the second statement I had made:
What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone?To which you responded
Of course. I doubt it's possible to be wrong about absolutely everything.So I presumed you comprehended that, for any specific person, "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong" and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right". I further presumed you understood that these two categories had no intersection. (And, by the way, I never said that the two categories were complete, just it case you are presuming I implied they were.)

At any rate, I thought I made it clear that the existence of these two different kinds of presumed true facts were very central to my argument and asked you if you would "allow me use the terms "knowable" and "knowable" to refer to the two different cases". I made it quite clear that the only reason I wished to use those particular tags was because I have used them before and it would save me a lot of typing. To this you baulked because
That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid.I presumed that your complaint was that you found the suggested usage confusing not that you were unable to comprehend such a usage so I gave you a perspective which would consistently lead to the correct interpretation of my usage:
The significant difference between "knowable" and "unknowable" things as I have defined them is quite simple. If you are right, you are right (story is over); if you are wrong, there is utterly no limit on the ways you can be wrong (in fact, there may actually be some useful ways to be wrong).You seemed to accede to my wishes on that when you responded,
Your post doesn't deal with my objection, but I have no problem with it except for this.
That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth). My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth.A difficulty I thought we had dispensed with since I was making no claim that such a thing could always occur. I was thus led to the idea (wrong it seems) that you would allow me to use those words to denote those categories. But then you come along with this post,
I'd say that there is no precise correlation between what is knowable or unknowable and what we are right or wrong about. After all, it's quite possible to be wrong about something that is knowable if you don't happen to know it, or right about something that is unknowable by accident. Clearly using those words in their conventional vague interpretation. You should have simply told me that you would not allow me to use the words knowable and unknowable to refer to the categories. It will take more typing but I will use the phrases "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong".

I will comment on the rest of your post even thought I think we need to get the above difficulty settled before we can go on intelligently as making further comments may be a worthless endeavorer. Your complaints are entirely a consequence of misconstruing what I am trying to say.
I can't make sense of the idea that an event can only happen in the future. To happen an event must be in the present, and a second later it is in the past. Is this not so?What I said was, "our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before". The whole subject here is the difference between "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong". This whole thing refers to their current state of belief. However, peoples beliefs change; they change when they discover they are wrong about some aspect of their beliefs. The point here is that they discover that they are wrong in the present, not in the past. You do not have the power to change what you believed in the past. The past is over and done with and there is nothing you can do to change it. Your beliefs in the past were based on what you thought you knew then, not on what you think you know now. Change in knowledge is the central purpose of the concept of time.

I define the past to be what you know and I define the future to be what you don't know. I should be clear that, under that definition, the present constitutes a change in knowledge and no more. If you follow my presentation, I will show you that my definition resolves down to exactly what you think of as time (in every detail). This is not a simple assertion, it is a direct consequence of changing knowledge and you must understand that change in order to understand time. And there is no way you can comprehend change in knowledge unless you first comprehend the difference between "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong".
Hmm. I'd rather say that all explanations are based on assumptions (axioms, premises) that might be false, and that for this reason it is not possible to know if an explanation is true by simply analysing the explanation. (Although it may be be possible to confirm the truth of an explanation by 'extra-explanatory' means).Again, you are looking at an issue which has utterly no bearing on what I am presenting. I have no interest in whether or not an explanation is true. My only interest is what constitutes an explanation and what makes a given explanation acceptable.
The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of ["things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong"]. How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.Clearly, if that information were available to us, we would change our perspective and no longer find the explanation acceptable.
If a fact can only be known in the future, as you say, then it is not possible to know it in the present, and therefore not possible to know it. This appears to be a paradox.It appears to be a paradox because you are putting unwarranted baggage into the concept of time. I defined time in the following manner: the past is what you know and the future is what you do not yet know. The present is the boundary between the two and time serves no purpose beyond handling that change in knowledge. Your statement is an explicit inference that change cannot occur thus essentially says you are going to simply refuse to handle the problem of the existence of change.

If what I have just said confuses you just forget I said it and pretend I quit writing when I got to the end of the "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong" kinds of information and let me know if you think you understand what I am talking about there.

Have fun -- Dick

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr21-05, 09:44 PM

Philocrat

Apr21-05, 10:11 PM

no, not everything can. Can physics describe why? no!, it can only describe how. Physics can only describe part of everything, not everything.

Why did Stevie wonder use a harmonic minor scale to bridge between a dorian contecedant melody, and a locrian anticedant melody in one of his songs?
"the best answer to that question lies in the field of physics." <--- huh? now that just doesn't make sense.

Welcome to the deabte, Jonny! What you are saying here hits at the very heart of Reductionism. This "R-Word" is now the centrepiece of all explanations. It is whereever you look! It is an issue that cuts across every discipline. There are just too many multi-layered issues involved. However, one issue stands out the most.

(1) Do we reduce A to B in order to eliminate A?

or;

(2) Do we reduce A to B to retain both?

and;

(3) What about reducing a Set of things to another set of things to eliminate one set or retain both sets?

Ok, for an argument's sake would the choice of (1) make things easier even if we opted for it? Eqaully, how doe we know that everything is of the form that can be eliminatively reduced to something else? Supposing there are things that cannot be eliminated in this way?

Equally questionable is the choice of (2) and the second part of (3). If you reduce something to another thing, what is the wisdom in retaining both?Why not deal with one thing or one set of things to which the previous is reduced? For example, if we succeed in reducing Biologiy to Chemistry and subsequently to physics, should we shape how naturally language, communicate everything to each other, and understand things within the bounds of physics? That is, kiss goodbye to chemistry and biology altogether? I have already given a fewy useful reasons or pueposes for this sort of reductionism a few pages back. Of course, there are more reasons. What are those extra reasons that we really need to justify reductionism?

Can you think of some?

Philocrat

Apr21-05, 10:18 PM

MATTER ON A METAPHYSICAL SCALE:Is Matter reducible to matter only?

Metaphysically, it is not very clear what the exact ‘NATURE’ of matter is. In a flash it dawned on me that all there is to matter is matter. All that matters is matter. And the spook begins for it seems that “MATTER IS IRREDICIBLE TO NO OTHER THING BUT ITSELF”. For it seems that whatever can be said about matter (whether quantitatively, narratively, or metaphysically) one always ends up with matter.

1) Matter adds matter to matter and what results is matter
2) Matter subtracts matter from matter and what results is matter
3) Matter divides matter to inumerabable bits what results is a set of matters
4) Matter multiplies matter by matter and the result is matter
5) Matter impregnates matter and out comes nothing else but matter
6) Matter eats matter and excretes matter
7) Matter swims in matter
8) Matter walks on matter
9) Matter flies on matter
10) Matter flies matter on matter
11) Matter drives matter on matter
12) Matter sits on matter
13) Matter leans on matter
14) Matter runs on matter
15) Matter sweats matter
16) Matter heats and cools matter
17) Matter fuels matter
18) Matter fights matter
19) Matter kills matter
20) Matter heals matter
21) Matter infects matter
22) Matter screams matter at matter
23) Matter contains matter
24) Matter moves matter
25) Matter lifts matter up and places matter on matter
26) Matter lifts matter up and places it in matter
27) Matter jumps into matter
28) Matter jumps over matter
29) Matter dives into matter
30) Matter melts into matter
31) Matter dissolves in matter
32) Matter throws matter into matter
33) Matter explodes into matter
34) Matter implodes into matter
35) Matter cuts matter with matter
36) Matter duplicates matter to matter 1, matter 2, matter 3…….to…..matter n
37) Matter! Matter!! Matter!!!

If you were to dare ask such questions as:

38) “What makes John different from Grace?” or “what distinguishes John from Grace?”, you would be implying “What makes matter different from Matter” or “What distinguishes matter from Matter?
39) “Why is a VW Beetle faster than a Bus?”, You would be implying “Why is matter faster than matter?
40) “Why is the cup on top of the table?” or “Why is Lucy next to a dust bin?”, we would be equivalently implying “ Why is matter on top of matter?” or “Why is Matter next to matter?”
41) And so on.

And when we move to simple statements of facts or standard propositions, things just get spookier. Now consider the following statements:

42) “The Big Ben is London” metaphysically implies “Matter is in matter”
43) “The Earth is in the Milky way” equivalently implies “Matter is in matter”
44) “That is John’s Book” metaphysically implies “That is Matter’ matter”
45) “The sausage inside sausage insides sausage …ad infinituum” equivalently implies “The matter inside matter inside matter ….ad infinituum”
46) “Andy is driving a car” equivalently implies “Matter is driving matter”

QUESTION: If Matter is irreducible to something else, at least at the metaphysical level, how can it be reduced to other spooky metaphysical categories as “Nothing”, “Nothingness”, or “Consciousness”?

Well, the next set of postings updates the progress of all the related debates to date. As the topics shows, it is almost like there is nothing that we can think about that has no reductive implications.

Philocrat

Apr21-05, 10:44 PM

TYPES OF REDUCTIONISM

So far we have all been debating, and saying what we all think we know about reductionism. Ok, as Les once advised us above, let us now look at what the prfessionals in the industry say about the subject. Perhaps, from here onward, it would be a good idea for us to start basing all our arguments on what the professionals say, especially those arguments and topics that directly concern philosophy and science. Below are the standard definitions, arguments and counter arguments on Reductionism. You are free to argue for or against any parts of the contents of these links.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism (An introductory explanation of of different forms of reductionism from Wikipedia, the largest online encyclopaedia).

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Reductionism in philosophy describes a number of related, contentious theories that hold, very roughly, that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (explained by) simpler or more fundamental things. This is said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings. The term is often used to criticize an imagined position rather than to describe a real one.
· Ontological reductionism is the idea that everything that exists is made from a small number of basic substances that behave in regular ways. Compare to monism.
· Methodological reductionism is the idea that explanations of things, such as scientific explanations, ought to be continually reduced to the very simplest entities possible (but no simpler!). Occam's Razor forms the basis of this type of reductionism.
· Theoretical reductionism is the idea that older theories or explanations are not generally replaced outright by new ones, but that new theories are refinements or reductions of the old theory in greater detail.
· Scientific reductionism has been used to describe all of the above ideas as they relate to science, but is most often used to describe the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.
· Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described in a language with a limited number of core concepts, and combinations of those concepts. (See Basic English and the constructed language Toki Pona).
· The term "greedy reductionism" was coined by Daniel Dennett to condemn those forms of reductionism that try to explain too much with too little.
· Analytical reductionism as used in [[1] (http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/phibalas/dialogue2001/Contribute/Reductionism%20UPI2203.htm)]"is the underlying a priori of ontological reductionism".

Dictionary Reductionism: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/reductionism

Scientific reductionism: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Scientific%20reductionism

Reduction of Consciousness to Chemistry (http://www.nih.gov/news/NIH-Record/06_27_2000/story01.htm )

The Cartesian reductionism: By Gerald L. Smith, Sewanee, Tennessee http://smith2.sewanee.edu/texts/Ecology/OnReductionism.html

Arguments against Reductionism:

http://home.btclick.com/scimah/materialism.htm

http://home.btclick.com/scimah/AI.htm

Arguments against Buddhism
In order to understand the strengths of a philosophy one should attempt to refute it.

Qualia - Subjective versus objective experience
'...The Buddhist does not doubt that the brain does some very sophisticated ordering of its incoming nerve impulses into the datastructures which are the objects of knowledge. But when all is said and done, those data structures remain as objects. They are not themselves knowledge, neither are they that which performs the function of knowing.
A datastructure by its very nature must have form. But according to Buddhist beliefs, the mind is formless and is capable of grasping any object of knowledge, including facts about the mind itself, which then become objects of knowledge in their own right. Consequently the mind is potentially unbounded...'

Algorithms and datastructures

'...All systems subject to the laws of physics can be simulated by algorithms. Hence any system which cannot in principle be simulated by an algorithm must have a non-physical component. The ability to demonstrate any non-algorithmic function of the mind would be evidence that some of the mind's activities have a non-physical basis...'

Emergence

'...The mind cannot be an emergent property of the brain or any other physical system, since emergent properties and emergent phenomena are psychological in origin, and require the pre-existence of an observer's mind in order to become manifest...'

The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in science and engineering

'...So we are left with something of a mystery. According to the physicalist worldview, the mind (including mathematicians' minds) is an epiphenomenon of matter which has evolved solely to ensure the survival of the selfish genes which code for it. Why should this 'top-level' phenomenon have such intimate access to the 'bottom level' phenomena such as quantum physics? After all, the two levels are supposedly separated by less well-understood (in some cases) explanatory layers such as evolutionary psychology, neurology, cell biology, genetics, molecular biology, and chemistry...'

The very subtle mind

'...The mind is neither physical, nor a by-product of purely physical processes, but a formless continuum that is a separate entity from the body. When the body disintegrates at death, the mind does not cease. Although our superficial conscious mind ceases, it does so by dissolving into a deeper level of consciousness, called 'the very subtle mind'. The continuum of our very subtle mind has no beginning and no end....'

Non-algorithmic phenomena

'..The great difficulty in talking about non-algorithmic phenomena is that although we can say in general terms what they do, it is impossible by their very nature to describe how they do it. (If we could describe in a stepwise manner what was going on, then the phenomenon would be algorithmic)...'
Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow
A Reply to Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind
by Roger Penrose

Minds, Machines and Mathematics
by David J. Chalmers
- Sean Robsville

All these types of reductionism need to be looked at relatively and the arguments that we provide for or against any of them should build a systematic but clear picture of how they all fit together or simply how they are related. How they all fit together should suggest from the emerging picture how it is possible to reduce from one type to the next.

Philocrat

Apr21-05, 11:47 PM

REDUCTIONISM IN COMPUTING

Computers do not understand TEXTS, ALPHABETIC CHARACTERS, GRAPHYCS SYMBOLS, PICTURES, PSEUDO CODES or even Numbers in the sense that we humans do. Everything we see and read on the computer screens needs to be sytematically unpacked and reduced to zeros and ones and further into pure electrical pulses of ons and offs. In fact, from the point of view of practicality, computing is the best starting point to learn very useful things about the whole notion of Reductionsim. And I guess those of you who understand computers from the Software User-level to programming level up to the electronic level would appreciate precisely what am talking about here. As most of you already know, the whole idea behind Upward Reductionism and Downward Reductionism in computing, from one scale or level to the next, is to make life easier for different classes of users. In this very sense, Reductionism hides multi-layered complexities from the users. Many classes of users benefit greatly from this, including computer programmers and different sets of software and hardware engineers.

For those of you who are interested in Reductionism in computing, perhaps it would be a good idea to pick any topic that you know about and demonstrate how it reduces from one level to the next level. At the so-called Electronics level, you need to demonstrate the FIRMWARE/ELECTRONICS INTERFACE. That is, the reductive rules governing the BIOS/HARDWARE interface. At the OPERATING SYSTEM LEVEL (DOS, UNIX, WINDOWS, LINUX etc), you may explain how the operating system interfaces between the Firmware/BIOS and the SOFWARE PACKAGES AND UTILITIES on top at the user level. For propgrammers, you may discuss the relationships between the Low Level and High Level Programming languages and how they interface with their built-in interpreters, compilers and the operating systems. Network Engineers you may discuss how one communications protocol level reduces to the next (software or/and hardware, whichever one you are versed in). All these are undisputedly reductive entities in computing. There are so many levels of reduction from scale to scale that those involved in different parts of this industry would immediately recognise and appreciate precisely what I am talking about here

For those of you who are not familier with the Number System reductionism, I have painstakingly complied a conversion set of tools for you to play around with. It includes pre-programmed online converstion tools and links to manual methodologies for converting from one number system to the next. This demostrates how computer is reductively guided to the level of physics where it can understand us humans.

NUMBER SYSTEM CONVERSION TOOLS

Online Numbers System Converter (Automatic)

Conversion from one number system to another (http://www.cstc.org/data/resources/60/convtop.html) This link allows you to convert from decimal to any numbers system using their base values (base 2 to 16, to be precise) and from one number system back to decimal. There is also an option to obtain full schematic explanation of how each conversion type was done or achieved.

Base Converter (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/binary.shtml ) This link includes the formula for manual conversion and an online tool for simultaneous conversion into all the standard number systems. You enter a number into a cell representing a given number system and it is automatically converted into the rest of the number systems at once.

Another Online Number System Converter (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/electronic/number4.html)

An Extended online Number System Converter (http://number.webmasters.sk/numerical.php) This converter gives extended number system format. Give it a try.

Manual Number System Conversion Methodology

Methods for converting from one number system to another (http://www.cstc.org/data/resources/60/convexp.html) This links shows you how to manually convert from one numbers system to another using well developed standard methodologies.

Conversion Tables, ASCII and HTML Character sets

Number System Conversion tables (http://www.ascii.cl/conversion.htm) This table shows the conversions table for Dec, Hex, Oct and Binary numbers.

ASCII Character Sets (http://www.ascii.cl/index.htm) The ASCII character sets in Hex and Dec, including characters that are not shown on the keyboard.

The HTML Character Set in extended format (http://www.ascii.cl/htmlcodes.htm) This table shows the extended character sets for the HTML system. The associated codes can be used in your web applications to generate the extended characters shown. There some reserved empty undefined codes that can be defined by the user in web applications.

Character entity references for ISO 8859-1 characters (http://www.w3.org/TR/html401/sgml/entities.html) The W3C Character set specification for HTML 4.

NOTE: Physics is currently examining the possibility of QUANTUM COMPUTING (or is it NANOCOMPUTING) with the hope of subsequently outfoxing and ultematly replacing the current binary electronic system. This is another example of how physics is reductively attempting to move computing power a level down the scale. Fingers crossed. Let us just wish physics goodluck on this!

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr22-05, 10:07 AM

I don't get it, the answer is no! physics can't ever be able to describe the "why" because you can always ask why ad infinitum.

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr22-05, 10:07 AM

why is this thread so long? can physics answer that?

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr22-05, 10:10 AM

note: ideas are part of everything

Doctordick

Apr22-05, 10:20 AM

Computers do not understand TEXTS, ALPHABETIC CHARACTERS, GRAPHYCS SYMBOLS, PICTURES, PSEUDO CODES or even Numbers in the sense that we humans do.An unsupported assertion. In order to defend that assertion, one is required to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can not be simulated on a computer, not just at emotional impression that such is the case.
Everything we see and read on the computer screens needs to be sytematically unpacked and reduced to zeros and ones and further into pure electrical pulses of ons and offs.If this is here to support your above assertion, please explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is not systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity withing a human brain (a completely analogous statement).

Have fun -- Dick

Canute

Apr24-05, 06:02 AM

Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.

Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.

Doctordick

Apr24-05, 07:09 PM

Canute, I find it very difficult to understand you. Many of your posts seem to indicate that you are a very intelligent person but I am confused by some of your posts. This post is a clear example of what confuses me. On first reading, you seem to be supporting my comments to Philcrat: i.e., assertions should not be made without a substantial argument that those assertions represent a valid position which can be defended. But, if that interpretation is taken, then your posts serve no purpose.
Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.This is exactly what I was saying and I could not understand your restatement of exactly the same complaint without adding anything of interest. The only difference between what I said and what you said was your comment that "Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time", which I presumed you meant reflected the current position on the issue which is clearly true. On rereading, the only consistent interpretation of your comment which I could come up with was that you are agreeing with Philcrat's assertion and didn't think it needs any support. At that point, your final comment,
Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.seemed to only make sense if it were directed to me and not to Philcrat. But that interpretation requires that you think I am making an assertion in opposition to Philcrat's. This is not at all the case. I have made no assertions at all; I have merely pointed out the fact that assertions are a poor way to begin any discussion. It seems that the whole of the discussion going on here has to do with people making assertions and others arguing against those assertions. I have no intention of making any assertions at all.

It appears to me that you have a very strong impulse to presume that I am making assertions above and beyond the statements upon which I had thought agreement had been obtained. I am doing no such thing. With regard to agreement, I had taken that we had achieved agreement on only two points:
[There exists] "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong" All I desire is an easy way to refer to these two different kinds of things one thinks are true. It seems to me that you are presuming I am trying to say something far more sweeping than that. If that is the case, your presumptions are very much in error. Instead of reacting emotionally to what I say, I would appreciate a little serious thought. Without serious thought, we will never communicate.

I am sorry and I don't want ot upset you, but I would really like a rational response -- Dick

Canute

Apr25-05, 07:14 AM

Philocrat wrote that computers cannot understand things in the way that humans do. You wrote that this is an unsupported assumption. I find that very odd. It's like saying that it's an unsuported assumption to say that there is not a teapot in orbit around Mars. Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.

It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious. It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.

You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't. Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do. There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain. There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.

What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?

Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.

Doctordick

Apr25-05, 10:23 PM

Hi Canute; it is nice to know that you are still willing to talk to me. I agree with almost everything you say but differ as to the central import of the issues.
Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.Yes, and "getting that picky about it" is the very essence of exact science. This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes; which I qualified some time earlier by the statement that "physics" should really be replaced with "exact science" as the field of physics seems to me to be degenerating into a religion. But, with that proviso, I believe I can do an excellent job of demonstrating that every possible acceptable explanation of anything can be spelled out in an exact manner consistent with the ideals of an exact science. To do that in an exact manner, I must first establish communications which can be said to be exact in the same sense. To date, I have failed to effect that step.
It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious.What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".
It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.I have no idea as to whether it is right or wrong and, as far as I am concerned, the only sensible thing to do is to not worry about the issue. "Seems to be a fact" is quite a vague statement. Certainly the first thing one should desire to do, before wasting much time, it to at least provide an approach which would settle the question.
You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't.The whole issue seems to me to be based on thousands upon thousands of preconceived assumptions. There was once no evidence that chemistry reduced to physics but QED certainly cleared that issue up. Today, a lot of chemical investigations come down to budget decisions: the cost of actually doing the chemistry compared to the cost in time and money to calculate the answer with computers. There is no doubt in the accuracy of the theory.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.
Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do.Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure. If you ever manage to follow me through, that subject will come up again from a vastly different perspective. :smile:
There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain.Most people are not very bright and, for the most part, very few people are capable of comprehending the actual extent of their limitations.
There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.I can if I hold that most of that supposed support arises from other assumptions. You have your opinions and I have my opinions; these issues are not worthy of serious discussion. I am not going to argue who is right and who is wrong about any of this. My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.
What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.
Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same. There is a troll on this forum who has managed to express the attitude of the scientific community pretty succinctly (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=469900#post469900).
I further agree that I cannot prove that causality does not exist; however, I can certainly show that the evidence for causality in reality is non-existentThis is nonsense.Exactly the standard reaction of anyone throughly indoctrinated in the current scientific dogma. Notice that I have specifically asserted that I can show the evidence is non-existent and that his reaction is not at all to listen to my argument.
A thousand teatrises on the evidence against causality go down the drain when faced with simple empirical facts. Paper (and now computer screens) can take any rubbish.No one has ever proved it before, that obviously implies it can not possibly be true.
There is another view only slightly askew of your position but so far from your paradigm that it would absolutely never occur to you.I have read your posts but all I can say is that your view is not only far from my paradigm, it's also mistaken. As a matter of logic, no one can possibly conclude anything true starting from the premises you start.Notice the explicit forgone conclusion there?
It should be clear to anyone that dualism is a figment of our imagination, that reality is by definition a monistic entity, because also by definition there exists only one reality. Anyone who starts out with the notion that an explanation of reality is not part of reality itself is doomed to failure. The real challenge is to come up with an explanation that includes itself without ending up in infinite regression. I believe it's possible but I have never seen anyone do it.First, I have never stated that I had an explanation of reality which was not a part of reality itself and second, I have discovered an attack which does not end up in an infinite regression. So he believes it's possible but certainly not the way I do it. And he doesn't need to think about it; nobody ever does.

I will not present the entire deduction in one fell swoop, though I could, because it is my experience that people invariably look first to my conclusions and on those grounds alone conclude that I am a crackpot and that's the end of it. No one ever makes an attempt to follow my reasoning. There are a number of blocks that I have seen on several occasions (by blocks I mean issues people use to justify their refusal to go any further in my reasoning). That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong. I make that division because the two categories obey very different rules. If it is a thing you are right about then it will still be a thing to be explained (or understood as I admit the issue here is a bit vague here) no matter how long we wait for a solution to the problem of understanding or explaining the universe. The point is that it does not change or go away. The other side of the coin is the things you are wrong about. Those certainly have the possibility of changing. In fact, it could be said that there are an infinite number of ways to be wrong. My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.

Have fun – Dick

Canute

Apr26-05, 06:04 AM

This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes;
Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".
Consciousness is usually defined as 'what it is like' in the scientific and Western philosophical literature. Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition, although clearly physics cannot reduce 'what it is like' to anything else or prove that it exists. Many people, Crick for insatance, would like to redefine it, but nobody has come up with anything better yet.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.
As you say, opinions are cheap and common.

Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure.
How do you figure that? The unfalsifiability of solipsism does not entail that we cannot know anything.

My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.
About what?

I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.
The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin is an extremely important one and medieval scholars were well aware of this. They were not fools. The question concerns the fabric of reality and whether it is quantised or a continuum (among other things). It's a question worth pondering in some depth. As for consciousness, it is generally defined as 'what it is like'. Of course this is not a scientific definition but as yet there is no evidence that consciousness can be given a scientific defintion.

I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same.
I can't react one way or the other since I don't know yet what you're suggesting.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong.
This is a misuse of the term 'knowledge'. A piece of knowledge that is false is not knowledge, it is a false assumption. But I know what you mean.

My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.
If we cannot tell the difference between what we know and what we don't know, or between which of our beliefs are true and which false, then knowledge is impossible. It is incoherent to suggest that we have knowledge that is false. If a statement is false then one cannot know it is true.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".

saviourmachine

Apr26-05, 09:37 AM

That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say. :smile:
If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.Go ahead.

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr26-05, 02:45 PM

I apologize for being such a hot-head. I needed to cool off for a bit; viewing my previous additions to this subject is kind of embarassing...

here is my reasoning:

When confronted with the world we live in, and when we choose to only understand objectively, we notice many patterns/characteristics that seem to pervade into almost every discrete "system" that catches our interest. We can measure some general things that we observe like mass, charge, heat capacity, electrical conductivity, length, temperature, color, etc. These things are the product of reducing any system into more general components that depend on each other. This is a tantalizing beckoner of the idea that possibly everything can be reduced to pure physics. The general rules we define start our investigation into more general rules that may or may not fully determine the outcome of the rules above them. Science won't accept any explaination that may not be correct, unless it's the best known explaination for that particular discrete system of interest. Ultimately, as we seek to reduce all known physical processes to the most basic and general explainations we can, physics directs our curiosity towards the final say: the four fundamental forces. These forces are how every physical process evolves. So the question "can everything be reduced to pure physics?" depends on your definition of everything, and it also depends on your willingness to accept that there is nothing more general than the four fundamental forces. If you define everything as everything but consciousness and personal experiance, and you willingly accept that there is nothing more general driving the final say in physics (the four fundamental forces), then yes, "everything" can be reduced to "pure physics".

Jonny_trigonometry

Apr26-05, 04:46 PM

I just noticed something else; to answer yes or no is to make an unfalsifiable statement (with our current understanding). To answer the question based on different definitions of "everything" and "pure physics" than the definitions of the questioner is unscientific, and should be completely resolved first. When you mean, "everything" do you also mean ideas(things that don't exist within the universe, ie. don't take up space or time)? Was this whole question devised to trick people into trying to prove an unfalsifiable statement?

Billy T

Apr26-05, 06:08 PM

Added later by edit - Sorry I did not see the thread title, only the poll question, so first part of original post tht was here has now been removed. I had complained about the use of word "everything", but remainder of post below is still ok and shows how hard it is to use words to express ideas which have various definitions in use. For expample what constitutes "ownership" etc. in the case of the car thief discussed below. - end of edit.

There has also been considerable discussion about beliefs that are false (Ok concept on first consideration) and about knowledge that is false (not OK as would not be “knowledge,“ if false)

On the first - Consider a thief who believes he is stealing a car (because he has just broken in and hot wired the ignition as he does several times each month to support himself). But let us suppose that the car belonged to a man who recently died with a yet unread will that gives the car to anyone who would take it from the garage, which the thief has already done. Is the thief’s belief that he has successfully stolen another car true or false? Would the dog eating the unread will change your answer? What if it just was not found till 50 years later when the house was torn down?

On the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.

I guess my point is lets not be too “picky,” think that facts or beliefs are by necessity either true or false nor rewrite a question others have already voted on.

saviourmachine

Apr27-05, 05:15 AM

n the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?

Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world? :smile:

moving finger

Apr27-05, 06:09 AM

What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?

Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world? :smile:
Reminds me of the joke :

I used to be indecisive - now I'm not so sure.

I think the point Billy T is making is that our supposed "certain knowledge" about anything and everything is based on assumptions and axioms. Take away the assumptions and axioms and we have "certain knowledge" of..... nothing.

Of course I cannot be certain about the truth of that, since I can be certain about nothing.

MF
:smile:

Canute

Apr28-05, 08:51 AM

This is not right. Sure, we cannot be certain of the veracity of the evidence of our senses, or of our reasoning. But this does not mean we cannot have certain knowledge. There is such a thing as direct knowledge, or non-intuitive immediate knowledge. I just came across this essay and I'd say it's worth a read in this context

http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm

moving finger

Apr28-05, 02:41 PM

This is not right.
What is not right?

Sure, we cannot be certain of the veracity of the evidence of our senses, or of our reasoning.

But this does not mean we cannot have certain knowledge.
How does one come to obtain such knowledge if not via senses or reasoning?

There is such a thing as direct knowledge, or non-intuitive immediate knowledge.
Please explain what you mean by “direct knowledge”? How is this knowledge imparted to us?

I just came across this essay and I'd say it's worth a read in this context

http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm
With respect, a very long and IMHO a very boring and obscure text. Can you summarise the message?

MF

(BTW - Did I tell you that I KNOW there are fairies at the bottom of my garden?)

Canute

Apr29-05, 10:16 AM

What is not right?
Your comment that you can be certain about nothing.

How does one come to obtain such knowledge if not via senses or reasoning?
What one can be sure of knowing is what one is, once one has dug underneath what one appears to be. This is to say no more than that you know what state your consciousness is in. This is what is meant by 'non-intuitive immediate knowledge'. This can be understood in terms of Aristotle's observation that true knowledge is identical with its object. In more mystical terms this can be restated as saying that certainty entails 'becoming' ones knowledge rather than standing apart from it, and thus doing away with any mediation between oneself and ones knowledge. In more Buddhist terms it can be restated as saying that certain knowledge is knowledge attained by means of non-conceptual experience.

With respect, a very long and IMHO a very boring and obscure text. Can you summarise the message?
Urgh. In a word, no. It is neither boring nor obscure in my opinion, but I agree that it is not easy reading. To some extent it is an argument that Aristotle was right about knowledge, that only unmediated knowledge can be certain. Also it argues that immediate knowledge is not the same thing as intuitive knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, by the everyday usage of 'intuitive', is not certain and therefore not knowledge. Best I can do without doing a days work on it I'm afraid.

(BTW - Did I tell you that I KNOW there are fairies at the bottom of my garden?)
Really? No, you didn't mention it. I suspect you're lying, especially since in your last post you said that you didn't know anything. if so then this entails that there might be fairies at the bottom of your garden, since you do not know that there aren't any. But it is impossible to know that there are fairies at the bottom of your garden, since it is impossible for you to know that your garden exists.

Philocrat

Apr29-05, 10:02 PM

METAPHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS

To make an explantory statement, we need to include the EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS (ES) of the explainer in the statemtent. Infact, even if we fail to do so as is typically or usually the case in all our reports and conversations, it is still fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed. Don't feel irritated by this, guys, for that is unfortunately the case. Consider for example the following statements:

(1) I am alive
(2) The sun is shining
(3) The grass is green
(4) If I am sitting then, I am neither standing nor lying down
(5) The sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow
(6) All politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar

And so on. What I am saying here is that although none of these statements mentions or declares the epistemological status of its speaker or reporter or maker, yet such epistemological status is fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed in it. This means that when the epistemological status of a given maker of any statement of fact is not mentioned, it is still passively so. When such statements are recast as follows, then this immediately renders the epistemological status of the speaker relevant in the overall analysis and derivation of their truth values. In other words the epistomological status of the speaker or reporter metaphysicallly contributes to the semantic and truth values of a given statement of fact or proposition.

(1) I can know everything, therefore I am 100% certain that I am alive
Or, alternatively, "If the Epiistemoloical status of my being is such that I can know every, then it is impossible for it to be false that I am alive.

(2) If the ES of my being is such that I can never fall into error of judgement, then I am 100% catainn that the sun is shining.

(3) The ES of my being is such that I am sometimes wrong in my judgement, therefore it is likely or possibly true that The grass is green

(4) If the ES of my being is such that I can only do one of three things at a time and not all three at once, then if I am sitting, I am neither standing nor lying down.

(5) The ES of my being is such that I always, and not sometimes, see the sun shine. Then I am 100% certain that the sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow.

(6) The ES of my being is such that I always know everything: Then I am 100% certain that "all politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar" is true.

And so on. Of course, these recast statements metaphysically force you to commit yourself to the inevitable inclusion of the ES of their reporters or speakers in your analytical derivation of their semantic values and truth values. Without this metaphysical enforcement, some of these statements (if not all of them) are as good as being semantically meaningless and epistemologically truth-valueless.

NOTE: The metaphysical contribution of the ES of the reporter or speaker to the semantic value and the truth-vlaue of a given proposition or statement of fact is an issue that, even if we wanted to, we can no longer avoid reductively. Science must now fully address and take charge of this fact.

Philocrat

Apr29-05, 11:26 PM

UPDATE: what does the current result of the survey tell us?

By Physics alone? --------------------> 94 ---->47.72%
By Religion alone?---------------------> 7------>3.55%
By any other discipline?---------------> 9 ------>4.57%
By Multi-disciplinary efforts? ----------> 87----->44.16%

Does this result suggest anything significant, or are the data from this result rigged or fictitious? For a start the explanatory capacities of Physics and Multidisciplinary tend to run head to head. This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.

IMPORTANT QUESTION

Even if Physics can arguably explain everything, can it also succeed in writing off other disciplines completely?

Well, that is the question. For explaining the world in its entirity is one thing, and getting rid of the remaining explanatory layers of the world (obviously done through other existing disciplines) is another thing. It seems to me to be almost impossible to do this. Or if it is possibe at all, this would kick-start a chain of events that would adversely interfer and completely change the human nature and the way we relate to the wider world. Infact, the "PHYSICS OF MAN' would experience a fundamental intervention and overhauling.

NOTE: From the result of this survey, it is no longer clear whether we are anticipating or advocating a form of "ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM" or a NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM. Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics? If physics succeeds in doing this, does this render all other explanations in other disciplines WHOLLY redundant? Note also that "Non-eliminative Reductionism" under normal circumstances is supposed to acknowledge and retain all the explainable layers of the world as formulated and set forth by their corresponding disciplines. Should this be the norm or the case, it is therefore peculiar and strange that we even bother with the whole notion of reductionism in the first place. Physics must therefore make clear, at least at this metaphysical level, which of these two fundamental categories of reductionism that it is advocating.

metacristi

Apr30-05, 05:26 AM

This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.

It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).

The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).

This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).

Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.

Philocrat

May1-05, 04:12 AM

It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).

The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).

This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).

Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.

Yes, this is a fair summary of the problem as faced both by science and by philosophy. But as I have already pointed out somehwere above, TOE only makes sense if we have a clear and worthwhile reason (or reasons) for it. So, the key question still remains: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING EVERYTHING TO PHYSICS? I have made an attempt to make sense of the possible answer to this question by suggesting a few useful reasons for the whole notion of reductionism in the first place.

BIOLOGY: That by reductively rearranging or reprogramming genes in the living organisms we can structurally and functionally improve them. Enhance their functionality, extend their lifespans and make them live longer, reduce or eliminate decaying etc.

PHYSICS: That by reducing things to smaller and smaller scales we may be able to see what we could not see at the macroscale. For example, nanoscale rearrangement of things could improve their structures and functions. We may create self-sufficient, super-sized, super-structured, super-functioning entities. Supper-activities such as inter-state migration, teleportation, time travel etc, may be rendered possible in the forseeable future.

COSTS: By understanding the world to ever smaller and smaller scale we can reduce costs of things, make higher quality things for less money. This would help the human race create and sustain a more progressive society? Is this true?

MANAGABILITY: That the world is easier to manage if we understand it at every explainable or reducible layer. For every layer that is successfully explained or reduced, we are better off knowledgewise. It is to the human advantage to understand the world at every level. Makes sense, but reducibility and its possibility is another matter.

Well, there are hundreds of other reasons that may be given for reductionism, but these are just a few ones that are currently being suggested. Valid or not valid, but the standard assumption is that we do have worthwhile reasons for reducing everything to physics.

THE POSSIBILITY OF TOE

The standard assumption is that everything can be reduced to physics. If we can do this, reduce every layer of the world or discipline to pure physics, what happens to each of this reduced layer or discipline? Would the reductive process itself involve physical reorganisation or rearangement of each reduced layer or discipline? Or perhaps total re-engineering of things in world? I distinguished between ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (ER) and NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (NER) as the two main fundamental metaphysical categories of the whole notion of reductionism. Personally, I am not quite sure which of these two types that Physics is advocating. What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?

Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?

I personally do not rule out its possibility and I retain this position in a rather optimistic way and I think it would be a total disaster to view it otherwise. For all the reasons given and ungiven, TOE is essential if the whole notion of "HUMAN PROGRESS" is to be entertained at all. We just need to know these things if we are to move an inch on the path of progress. Who knows, the whole human survival may very well depend on it.
------------------------
Save our world from destruction........Stay GREEN!

saviourmachine

May2-05, 03:22 AM

I think the point Billy T is making is that our supposed "certain knowledge" about anything and everything is based on assumptions and axioms. Take away the assumptions and axioms and we have "certain knowledge" of..... nothing. :smile: It's semantics indeed. Like DoctorDick's comparison with a dictionary. "Certain knowledge" is defined in other terms from the dictionary, so it does mean what it means because it means that to us. That doesn't say anything about its "existential state". Whatever that is! Because I also said now something limited to our "verbal world".

<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code. :smile: Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. :smile: It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.

Does anybody feel that the same way?

metacristi

May2-05, 06:17 AM

What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?

Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?

Nice post philocrat. Certainly, at least for the moment, the main view in the scientific community is that of ER, this based on the previous success of the actual scientific methodology (nonwithstanding that minimal). The fact that the components and processes of this universe can be isolated and profitably analyzed in isolation (that is reductionism) has proved to be too successful in the past to be abandoned at once. Besides there is a widespread acceptance among scientists that science (the actual methodology) is always objective and can surely lead us to the truth.

So even if scientists could not prove in a clear way that everything can be reduced to physics (to a certain TOE in physics for example) that would not discourage them to try further to reduce all higher level sciences to that TOE (possibly by adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, that it by extending the physical theory). Of course for all our practical purposes scientists will use the models provided by the higher level sciences, for example now chemistry is doing very well though there are enough reasons to think that it can be reduced entirely at physics (the best existing physical theory, QM). This is valid even if full reduction would be achieved (for simplicity reasons, exactly as we still use Newtonian mechanics for the majority of our practical purposes).

Neither will it be easily accepted in the scientific community that the goal of science is socially dependent, dependent on scientists finally. For this would imply that scientists have to recognize that we do not know that science really lead us to the truth, that high coherence and simplicity of theories + the practical successes of science do not also involve that science approaches truth (see the problem of 'success' of science, hotly debated in the philosophy of science; unfortunately, in spite of what many scientists believe now, we do not have yet sufficient reasons, beyond all reasonable doubt, to think that 'empirical success' involve approaching truth, in absolute).

The only way to really shaken the belief in reductionism were its failure at the level of physics itself. Something still possible, in quantum physics we already accept that the distinction perceiver-percieved is not so clear, the contextual approaches are much more valued now (the measurement device does influence the object under 'scrutiny'), basically there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s. Sure this does not automatically mean that all higher level sciences cannot be reduced, at least in theory, for example, to the 'quantum fields' approach but certainly this would have an impact, scientists would be forced to recognize at least that full reduction might be impossible.

Canute

May2-05, 07:03 AM

Philocrat

May2-05, 05:16 PM

metacristi, could you be kind enough to expand upon the following items:

(1).... adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, ........by extending the physical theory.

Would this include (a) The Eperimenter-Experiment Relations, (b) Secondary qualities (smell, taste, qualia, etc), (c) Forms, (d) Scale of Reference, (e) Observer-Object Relations, etc.? Will such an extended system embrace Metaphysics as viable tool of Explanation and Disambiguation?

(2) ......there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s.

Sorry that I am not aware of this holistic conept. I am aware of the PARTS-WHOLE Relations that I have exhaustivelly examined over the years, both programtically and naratively. What I uncovered in those examinations just sent a chill down my spine. This is what forced me to make the fundamental distinction between (a) Open System, (2) Semi-closed/Semi-open system and (3) Closed system a few pages above on this thread. I summarised it as guidelines for mathematicians and logicians so that we don't risk falling into the metaphysical trap of making another Category Mistake with regards to this notion of Parts-Whole Relation. So, the lesson to learn here is that anyone who takes upon him or herself to embark upon the critical examination of this relation, must pay absolute attention to these three fundamental metaphysical categories involved. Our current world tends to occupy a range between (1) and (2) and I am not quite sure whether the current mathematics and logic clearly account for them. This is still within the scope of debate. However, (3) is ruthlessly diffcult to comprehend. The more I think about it, the more it seems mathematically and logically far removed from reality. It is as metaphysically and epistemologically hair-raising as it can get. This is one issue that I would not mind at all being enlightened on by anyone who knows it any better.

Pardon me that I have not read anything about what you are refering to. Please let me know whether hollistic implies a methology for a complete description of the Parts-Whole Relations.

Philocrat

May2-05, 06:35 PM

One small point. The association of physics with reductionism does not seem to be a necessary one, so the failure of one does not necessarily entail the failure of the other. In my view it doesn't matter whether one analyses the universe reductively or holistically. The answers come out the same in the end. There's a New Age idea floating around that reductionism is to be avoided. Its supporters seem to have missed the fact that most 'mystical religions' adopt very reductionist methods of analysis, and Buddhist analysis is far more reductionist than science in this respect, albeit that it is also more holistic.

Canute, I remember that you tried once somewhere on this PF to educate me on the Buddhist Reductive System. Could you be kind enough to give it another go and expand upon the following item:

------------
....Buddhism is reductionist while being holistic....
------------

It just sounds redically paradigmatic in scope. Is it REDUCTIVE MONISM, or perhaps a sort of methodology for eliminatiing parts from a whole? I can at least appreciate and deal with the notion of CAUSAL RELATIONS of things and the multidisciplinary attempts to schematically explain them. Is the holistic approach a methodology for completely weaving these causal relations together?

----------
Save our Planet from Destruction ......... Stay GREEN!

Bobby R

May3-05, 02:19 PM

(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?

Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

Consciousness is usually defined as 'what it is like' in the scientific and Western philosophical literature. Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition, although clearly physics cannot reduce 'what it is like' to anything else or prove that it exists. Many people, Crick for insatance, would like to redefine it, but nobody has come up with anything better yet.

As you say, opinions are cheap and common.

How do you figure that? The unfalsifiability of solipsism does not entail that we cannot know anything.

About what?

The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin is an extremely important one and medieval scholars were well aware of this. They were not fools. The question concerns the fabric of reality and whether it is quantised or a continuum (among other things). It's a question worth pondering in some depth. As for consciousness, it is generally defined as 'what it is like'. Of course this is not a scientific definition but as yet there is no evidence that consciousness can be given a scientific defintion.

I can't react one way or the other since I don't know yet what you're suggesting.

This is a misuse of the term 'knowledge'. A piece of knowledge that is false is not knowledge, it is a false assumption. But I know what you mean.

If we cannot tell the difference between what we know and what we don't know, or between which of our beliefs are true and which false, then knowledge is impossible. It is incoherent to suggest that we have knowledge that is false. If a statement is false then one cannot know it is true.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".

Doctordick

May5-05, 09:55 PM

I apologize to anyone who has been following this thread. I have taken a few weeks off because it is clear to me that no one on this forum has any comprehension of what I am trying to communicate. Everyone on this forum and I are operating on totally different levels.
It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.Without even looking, I know the truth of that comment depends on the meanings of the words making up the comment and thus is not an exact statement in any sense at all. I am interested in "exact analysis", a concept apparently foreign to the perspective of everyone posting on this forum.
Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition...If you had been reading my posts carefully you would have realized by now that I am not happy with any definitions except the very few I have decided are essential. It is my opinion that if one goes forth presuming they understand any human language correctly they have left exact science in their wake. The only human language which even approaches the status of exact is the language of mathematics and even that language has some subtle problems. From my perspective anyone who is "happy" with any definition has failed to look at the problem of definition carefully.
If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".And here we arrive at the crux of your post. You would rather stir that pot of vague terms than think about the issue I have brought up. It seems that you would rather keep the issue of a difference between "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong" and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right" as insignificant as possible. I think you do this because to admit that the issue is significant would require you to think about it and that is one thing you want to avoid at all costs. I would say that you think you know a lot of things that you don't really know but you would rather muddy the issue than admit there could be any truth to that idea. As I said earlier, you have a habit of taking very dogmatic positions.

At this point I also have become convinced that your real reason for refusing to allow me to use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different kinds of presumed true facts because the usage is too short and difficult to stir into confusion. As I said earlier, I will use the adjective "knowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, something which is real in the sense that no acceptable explanation can ever fail to include it: i.e., any explanation will be deemed false if the "knowable" thing is denied by the explanation. I will use the adjective "unknowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, a figment of our imagination: i.e, one of those things we think we know but we are wrong about. When I use those two terms, that is exactly what I mean. You have said that you understand the fact that these two possibilities exist and if you cannot consistently convert those two terms (when I use them) to those two categories, then we will just call the conversation off.
That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say. :smile:
If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.Go ahead.
Thank you saviormachine, I will try to stay focused. On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=502046#post502046), which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time. But don't let that bother you; we can always get back on track later. I will try to communicate to Canute on that step.

My definition of an explanation, that it is a defined method of establishing expectations based on known information, is stated the way it is because the definition does not require the known information be defined and thus avoids the issue of the vagueness of the language used to express that information. I can use the simple concept of a set to refer to "what is to be explained". What is to be explained is "A" and "A" can be any set of elements and the elements can be anything. The central issue in a real explanation is that the known information can change thus, as we are not all knowing, "A" , in general, can never be assumed to be completely known. We need to be able to refer to exactly what we know (or think we know) and we need a way to refer to changes in what we know (or think we know) without actually defining either. That is the essence of my definitions of sets "B" and "C" in the complex post (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=502046#post502046).

Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four. But this problem becomes far more difficult when the number of elements involved become far in excess of number you can think of simultaneously on a conscious level. It is my intention to lay out an analytical method of achieving that result which can be extended to any finite number of elements.

What is important here is to come up with a method of establishing expectations without specifically defining the elements of A. Definitions are very seldom well though out as they are almost always arrived at intuitively. No one knows how intuition manages to achieve the results it does and the process cannot be analytically defended in any detail at all. Defining things before we have any idea as to the rules which determine what elements will occur is a very dangerous intellectual step. On the other hand, we need to have some way of referring to these elements or we cannot think about them at all. So we need a labeling method which does not establish any definition of these elements. I propose that attaching a numerical label to each element of interest is an easy solution. There are an infinite number of such labels and none of the labels need carry any implications as to what it is that is being labeled.

However, establishing such a set of numerical labels does provide one with a list of numbers which maps directly into a referenced set "B" above. Likewise "C" becomes a collection of such lists. This allows one to express the problem to be solved in a very simple manner: if your expectations can be expressed as yes, I expected that "B" or no, that "B" was a surprise or any probabilistic range between the two, then the method used to generate that expectation can be seen as a mathematical function. That is, the set of numbers which constitute the list labeling that "B" are the arguments of the function and the value of the function is your expectation. Since the number of elements in "B" is finite and the number of "B"s in "C" is finite, the function can be seen as a tabular function with a finite number of entries.

Knowing that function (writing down the lists for each "B" you were given) constitutes an explanation per the definition I have put forth. It amounts to the explanation, "it's in the list so I expect to see it". It is at least an exact explanation of the elements you have been given. The tabular function can be thought of as the rule which determines whether or not a particular "B" is possible; some one asks you if you expect to see a certain "B" all you have to do is assign the numerical labels (in what ever way you assigned them) and then check to see if that set is in your table. Now I am not proposing this procedure as a reasonable way to solve a real problem, I am putting it forth to point out an interesting facet of the representation.

Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?

Think about that question for a while. The correct answer is very enlightening.

Have fun – Doctor Dick

Tournesol

May6-05, 10:14 AM

Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

If you are referring to the issue of universals , bare particulars, etc, it does nothing of the kind.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. ".

If you stipulate that knowledge means certainty, it turns out that we don't know anyhthing. Which is a bit drastic.

Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".

If 'know' is stipulated to mean 'best available hypothesis' that is entirely consistent.

Bobby R

May10-05, 03:03 PM

(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?
[Quote="As you say, opinions are cheap and common!"]
In July of 2004 “Philocrat” asked a reasonable question about whether Physics could explain everything in the whole universe. I’ve watched this thread and made a few comments myself. Each time I see those who cannot respond without using some negative slur toward those to whom they are unable to respond or understand. I wonder about their own ability to think. I especially focus on the “Common” remark. Books, quotes from the intellect and personal experimentation are sources used by knowledge seekers. However, even the smartest of the smart will blend information with “Common Sense” to formulate an opinion. It is wise to remember, those who choose to degrade the common may expose their own ignorance. Further, the only cheap opinion would be the one without thought. …Bobby R.

Daminc

May11-05, 07:45 AM

I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)

One of the questions/debates, whatever you want to call it, referred to the meaning of certain words, one of which was 'understanding'.

I've found this definition through a previous research regarding 'communication':

“The creation of shared understanding through interaction among two or more agents. Communication depends upon interpretation of some message by the listener. Shared understanding is constructed through the detection and repair of misunderstandings (as opposed to a one-way transmission of data). The understanding created through communication can never be absolute or complete, but instead is an interactive and ongoing process in which common ground, i.e., assumed mutual beliefs and mutual knowledge, is accumulated and updated.”[

This, in my opinion, is something that DoctorDick (as well as many other people including myself) has to think about.

eNathan

May11-05, 07:52 AM

If so, we have no free will :surprised

Faust

May11-05, 08:47 AM

It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication. Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. Just thinking about the question from a few different perspectives revealed the potential for confusion, which probably explains why this is the longest running thread here.

Let's start with "can". "Can" everything be reduced to pure physics? Possibly so. "Can" everything be reduced to dogmatic religion? Certainly so. "Can" the whole world be an illusion? Some people say so. The real point for me is, so what? What if something "can" be represented or misinterpreted as being something else? What does that really mean? "Can" the greatest romantic novel, the most profound philosophical teatrise, the most exact scientific theory, be reduced to a collection of the 26 letters of the English alphabet? Of course it can, but the question remains: so what?

I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean, whether it must be limited to our sensory perceptions of the world or also include abstract ideas such as logic, commonsense, intuition, morals, aesthetics. Or what "reduced" means, whether it means the establishment of a cognitive model for sensory perceptions or the unification of the various academic disciplines. Or what "pure physics" means, whether it is just a bunch of mathematical symbols entirely devoid of meaning in any natural language, such as English, or whether those symbols require an interpretation in terms as vague as "uncertainty", "duality", "relative", which are so often used by modern physicists.

All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.

Doctordick

May11-05, 01:52 PM

I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)Well, I am certainly sorry that I p*ss you off; it was never my intention!
“The creation of shared understanding through interaction among two or more agents. Communication depends upon interpretation of some message by the listener. Shared understanding is constructed through the detection and repair of misunderstandings (as opposed to a one-way transmission of data). The understanding created through communication can never be absolute or complete, but instead is an interactive and ongoing process in which common ground, i.e., assumed mutual beliefs and mutual knowledge, is accumulated and updated.”And it is exactly that process which interests me. Two things appear to be true: first, the process must begin with no common ground and secondly it appears that at least some understanding can be achieved. As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.
It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication. Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.
All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.The other side of the coin is, "the first step in finding an answer is asking the right question!" By the way, as physics is often held to be "the mother of all exact science", I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science" which must be the intention if one is to allow what is included in "physics" to change. (If you don't allow advances, the answer is clearly "no!") :biggrin:

Have fun -- Dick

Faust

May11-05, 03:01 PM

Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.

I don't know which issue you are talking about, and reading your previous posts hasn't helped me much. In any case, I was only pointing at the vagueness of the question. I think a better-phrased question would have raised a more interesting debate. But that's just my opinion.

I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science"...

I interpret "pure physics" to mean "the study of the movement of particles through space and time". I still think the question needs rephrasing.

Les Sleeth

May11-05, 06:12 PM

It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication.

In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.

Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. . . . Let's start with "can" . . . I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean . . . Or what "reduced" means . . . Or what "pure physics" means . . . All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.

I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was. It might have degenerated into a semantics battle, but up front I think most everyone was clear that:

"Can" meant is it provable.

"Everything" meant all that exists.

"Reduced" meant, can all that exists be accounted for at this time . . .

"Pure physics" meant physical principles only.

My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it. Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.

My mother didn't raise a dummy, so I ain't buyin' physicalist propaganda. I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence. Further, I doubt that they will EVER account for reality (with proof) in the future, but that's just my personal, unproven opinion. If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth :cry: of physicalism.

Faust

May11-05, 08:38 PM

In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.

Wouldn't that be analytic philosophy?

I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was.

That may be the case, but it doesn't change the fact that the discussion did degenerate into a debate on communication.

My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it.

It couldn't be different, given that you just stated what defines "physicalists" and "honest physicalists". Sorry for the little digression into semantics :smile:

I see a more important aspect to the debate though. The point is, over time physicalists have consistently triumphed over their opponents. If physicalists get a little arrogant sometimes, we must understand them, after all history is on their side.

Can you recall a single case where a physicalist account for a real phenomenon has been proven false? I wish I could remember one, but I can't.

Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.

It probably is for them. And even though I'm not an enthusiast of physicalism, I do envy the fantastic success of their doctrine. I certainly wish we could have even a fraction of that success using different approaches; it would make for a far more interesting world but alas, hasn't happened so far.

I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence.

You are probably right, but I fail to see what the relevant consequences of that are. Besides the brawls between people in different philosophical camps, what can a neutral observer expect from the physicalist/anti-physicalist debate?

In other words, think of a person who's not into philosophy but is eagerly awaiting for the experts in their fields to find out truths about the universe: what would the failure of physicalism entail to that person? The possibility of miracles? Eternal life? Peace on earth?

I honestly fail to see what the fuss is all about. I would certainly be happy if everything could be reduced to pure physics if pure physics could give me happiness and eternal life in one way or another. Who cares if it's angels or subatomic particles? The ends justify the means.

If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth of physicalism.

What is that ugly truth? It's an honest question.

I believe in many things whose existence is denied by physicalists, but I don't see how those things are at odds with physicalism per se. Whereas some (not all) physicalists say "miracles can't possibly happen", I see physicalism as saying "if miracles do happen, then they can be explained". I find that a rather sensible position and, why not, even beautiful.

Of couse, I may be missing the point of physicalism for not being a physicalist :smile:

Les Sleeth

May11-05, 11:25 PM

Wouldn't that be analytic philosophy?

No. Rationalism would be thinking without sufficient reference to observed facts. It assumes truth can be had by reason alone. Empiricism changed all that by requiring that what one supposes to be true has to be confirmed by experience/observation. So my point was that since rationalists feel little need to actually look at what they are philosophizing about, they tend to over-emphasize the language used in a debate.

That may be the case, but it doesn't change the fact that the discussion did degenerate into a debate on communication.

A thread isn't just the end . . . it is all of it. You can pick some spot in almost any thread and point out how it's off topic. I was trying to suggest what most of the participants recognized as the issue here.

The point is, over time physicalists have consistently triumphed over their opponents. If physicalists get a little arrogant sometimes, we must understand them, after all history is on their side.

Can you recall a single case where a physicalist account for a real phenomenon has been proven false? I wish I could remember one, but I can't.

That seems like a rather one sided view. Physicalists have not triumphed over anything outside their realm. What they have triumphed over is ignorant beliefs about the physical nature of the universe. They have not understood anything I know of about the meaning of life, how to be happy, how to realize the deeper things. Your admiration is like giving a golf pro all the credit for explaining a great athelete because he understands the principles of proper form. Physics explains mechanics, it explains form, it explains processes. Physics doesn't make one wise, loving, compassionate. . . but I suppose it all boils down to what one values most doesn't it.

It probably is for them. And even though I'm not an enthusiast of physicalism, I do envy the fantastic success of their doctrine. I certainly wish we could have even a fraction of that success using different approaches; it would make for a far more interesting world but alas, hasn't happened so far.

I don't get your "envy." I have absolutely no hesitation acknowledging science as the best avenue for studying physical things. Where I balk is when those studying physicalness start to proclaim that's all there is. Well, is it really is a mystery when you look only at physicalness and then wonder why that's all you ever see?

Personally, I've had lots of success meditating. It doesn't stop me from being physical, but I do value the inner me more than anything I've ever done physically. I think it is more lasting, and far more satisfying. I can't see a single reason to envy anyone, but if someone has achieved deeper and more constant happiness than I have, then I hope he/she teaches me how to do it for myself. However, I don't see physicalists as instructive in this respect.

You are probably right, but I fail to see what the relevant consequences of that are. Besides the brawls between people in different philosophical camps, what can a neutral observer expect from the physicalist/anti-physicalist debate?

Sincerity?

In other words, think of a person who's not into philosophy but is eagerly awaiting for the experts in their fields to find out truths about the universe: what would the failure of physicalism entail to that person? The possibility of miracles? Eternal life? Peace on earth?

Personally? I am interested in how I can be fulfilled realistically and NOW. I couldn't possibly care less about miracles or eternal life.

I honestly fail to see what the fuss is all about. I would certainly be happy if everything could be reduced to pure physics if pure physics could give me happiness and eternal life in one way or another. Who cares if it's angels or subatomic particles? The ends justify the means.

I don't think it's about what turns out to be true. The truth is the truth, I have no problem with that. But imagine you find yourself in a world run by accountants, and who insist all philosophy be accountant philosophy. Everything has to add up, everything has to balance, everything has to be fiscally sound . . . Is that an accurate, full representation of reality? Or is the accountants' worldview limited and molded by their particular focus and priorities?

What is that ugly truth? It's an honest question.

The ugly truth is -- a life without feeling, or at least enough of it. Just the mechanics, er facts, ma'am.

I believe in many things whose existence is denied by physicalists, but I don't see how those things are at odds with physicalism per se. Whereas some (not all) physicalists say "miracles can't possibly happen", I see physicalism as saying "if miracles do happen, then they can be explained". I find that a rather sensible position and, why not, even beautiful.

It seems to me you are confusing science and physicalism. They are not the same.

But let's see if we can agree. I love science, totally. I can't get enough of it. I am only disputing the claim that physicalness is all there is to reality. If there weren't reasons to doubt that claim, then I'd be fine with it. But I believe there are glaring exceptions which those committed to physicalism tend to ignore, dismiss, gloss over and generally pretend are just little glitches in their theory when really they are major problems. I say, that a priori commitment to their belief system so biases their view they can't debate objectively.

And me? I am free to accept whatever is true since I'm not committed to anything except discovering the secrets to wisdom and a happy existence.

Daminc

May12-05, 03:30 AM

As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.

I've been seriously thinking about it since 1991 (when I was 20 :rolleyes: )

Lets take this statement to be true for a moment "Everything CAN be explained by pure physics".

Without the ability to communicate and/or understand the the answer (I've been reliably informed that the answer is 42 :wink: ) then the answer is meaningless.

Also, I believe it is impossible to accurately communicate between 2 humans due to the subjective nature of how we perceive things. We could get really close, but every single person has a unique perception of the world around them and a unique background, combined with a unique genetic makeup, to interperate that perception.

Any answer that has a chance of being correct would have to be calculated by objective reasoning and observation which, I think, would have to be done by computers. Then we can use our subjective reasoning to interperate the answer by a common source of reference (the objective answer).

That way, we can go through the process of communication and attempt to reach understanding.

Faust

May12-05, 10:05 AM

Rationalism would be thinking without sufficient reference to observed facts. It assumes truth can be had by reason alone. Empiricism changed all that by requiring that what one supposes to be true has to be confirmed by experience/observation. So my point was that since rationalists feel little need to actually look at what they are philosophizing about, they tend to over-emphasize the language used in a debate.

The problem is that empiricism cannot be applied to most philosophical questions, certainly not to metaphysics. So when you look at philosophical claims, what else do you have to go by other than the words themselves? Sure, there are the ideas behind the words, but perhaps we haven't been paying enough attention to the words themselves. I don't agree that everything is about language, but I do think there's more to language than we are willing to acknowledge. It's a fact that many of our utterances, when looked at from an analytic perspective, turn out to be no more than tautologies. Not enough attention has been paid to that fact, in my opinion, but then again one can pay too much attention to it.

Physicalists have not triumphed over anything outside their realm. What they have triumphed over is ignorant beliefs about the physical nature of the universe.

That is what I meant anyway. The problem is that those ignorant beliefs were often not recognized as such. And that was my point; I didn't suggest physicalism was closer to the truth, I only pointed out the fact that physicalist arguments are quite powerful. I will give you an example further down.

They have not understood anything I know of about the meaning of life, how to be happy, how to realize the deeper things.

I'm not really sure about this. Clearly our existence has many purposes, but the two most obvious are survival and reproduction. As a result of that, we in the West came to understand that sex is not a sin. I consider that a major triumph over non-physicalist views, and it has everything to do with being happy, the realization of deeper things, etc.

I think it's wrong to portray physicalists as heartless monsters bent on destroying feeling and emotion. I really don't get that from them.

Your admiration is like giving a golf pro all the credit for explaining a great athelete because he understands the principles of proper form.

I do not admire physicalists, I'm just trying to look at all the different philosophical currents from a neutral perspective. I don't really root for one camp or another, I have grown out of the whole debate. I reached a perspective from which it all appears as irrelevant, although I still enjoy talking about it, like someone who likes a sport but is not attached to any particular team.

Physics explains mechanics, it explains form, it explains processes. Physics doesn't make one wise, loving, compassionate. . .

Certainly not, but what does?

I don't get your "envy."

It was just a figure of speech.

Personally, I've had lots of success meditating.

I'm sure you've had. As for me, meditation doesn't seem to offer the things I want. (by the way, neither does physicalism or any brand of philosophy)

It doesn't stop me from being physical, but I do value the inner me more than anything I've ever done physically. I think it is more lasting, and far more satisfying. I can't see a single reason to envy anyone, but if someone has achieved deeper and more constant happiness than I have, then I hope he/she teaches me how to do it for myself.

Well, I don't see my life as a pursuit for happiness, so knowing that a specific doctrine has made someone happy doesn't entice my curiosity.

I don't think it's about what turns out to be true. The truth is the truth, I have no problem with that. But imagine you find yourself in a world run by accountants, and who insist all philosophy be accountant philosophy. Everything has to add up, everything has to balance, everything has to be fiscally sound . . . Is that an accurate, full representation of reality? Or is the accountants' worldview limited and molded by their particular focus and priorities?

Well, nobody likes accountants, but I think it's mostly because what they say cannot be disputed. It has nothing to do with the accountants' worldview itself, but more to do with the fact that you have to agree with what an accountant says even if you're not an accountant yourself.

Same with physicalism. You may not like it, you may think physicalists are heartless nerds, but the fact remains that they're pretty hard to beat at any game, not only their own.

The ugly truth is -- a life without feeling, or at least enough of it. Just the mechanics

You mean physicalists don't have feelings, or enough of them? They don't enjoy nature, appreciate the arts, fall in love, have ideals? That sounds preposterous to me, I'm sure I misunderstood you.

It seems to me you are confusing science and physicalism. They are not the same.

Of course not, but physicalism is the basis of science. You can't have the latter without the former. Three milennia of meditation may have revealed truths about the mind, but only physicalist science is capable of treating epilepsy, schizophrenia, impotence. That is not to say physicalism is a true account of the mind, but it does ring more true than the alternatives.

But let's see if we can agree. I love science, totally. I can't get enough of it. I am only disputing the claim that physicalness is all there is to reality. If there weren't reasons to doubt that claim, then I'd be fine with it. But I believe there are glaring exceptions which those committed to physicalism tend to ignore, dismiss, gloss over and generally pretend are just little glitches in their theory when really they are major problems. I say, that a priori commitment to their belief system so biases their view they can't debate objectively.

I don't think we disagree at all, I just think you're battling a windmill. Nothing is being endangered, nothing is being profaned, the world is not becoming a worse place. There's nothing wrong with the world, nothing wrong with the people in it that can be fixed by changing our philosophies. That is how I see it anyway, and apparently it's the only point of contention between us: you think the world can be a better place if only we thought about it differently, I think that doesn't matter at all.

I am free to accept whatever is true since I'm not committed to anything except discovering the secrets to wisdom and a happy existence.

Well, you do seem committed to a certain worldview which implies some truths about meditation. I am of the opinion that meditation is useless - europeans didn't know about it for centuries, and their lives were not the worse for it. But that's my commitment. No one is free to accept whatever is true, we all have commitments.

Les Sleeth

May12-05, 11:03 AM

You mean physicalists don't have feelings, or enough of them? They don't enjoy nature, appreciate the arts, fall in love, have ideals? That sounds preposterous to me, I'm sure I misunderstood you.

I meant as a philosophy, it tends to describe humans heartlessly.

Of course not, but physicalism is the basis of science. You can't have the latter without the former.

We have to disagree on this. Physicalism is the belief that all existence is physical or the result of physicalness. Science is the study of the physical universe. One doesn't have to believe all existence is physical in order to study and appreciate the physical aspects of existence.

Three milennia of meditation may have revealed truths about the mind, but only physicalist science is capable of treating epilepsy, schizophrenia, impotence. That is not to say physicalism is a true account of the mind, but it does ring more true than the alternatives.

To not confuse things, it would be better if you'd said "three millennia of contemplation" rather than meditation, which is something different.

In any case, it isn't physicalism that has been successful, it is scientists. The physical account of the mind is the physical part. Just because there is physicalness there doesn't mean that's all there is. Again, I have to say that I see the problem as one of researchers not really knowing themselves. I don't see how one can understand consciousness if one never stops, sits down, and experiences its nature within one's own realm.

If all you do is look at processes, and in looking at processes all you do is be a processing device yourself, then you are not going to find or experience anything but processes. That is exactly why physicalists believe we are nothing but a bunch of physical processes.

. . . I just think you're battling a windmill. Nothing is being endangered, nothing is being profaned, the world is not becoming a worse place. There's nothing wrong with the world, nothing wrong with the people in it that can be fixed by changing our philosophies. That is how I see it anyway, and apparently it's the only point of contention between us: you think the world can be a better place if only we thought about it differently, I think that doesn't matter at all.

Do you really believe it makes no different what people think? I can't remember the name of the tribe I studied years ago in an anthropology class, but in this tribe the main goal of life was to kill people in other tribes. Children were taught this way of thinking and were generally ignored until they were old enough to participate in killing. It was not a nice place to live.

Right now in this world there are some pretty destructive philosophies. That spot in New York where the World Trade Center used to be is the result of someone's philosophy. Obviously physicalism isn't in that league of evil, but I see it as an evil nonetheless. Why? Because it portrays us as "things," and that philosophy is a step toward heartlessness when, IMO, what humanity needs is to step toward the heart.

Yes we are embodied in a thing, which evolved out of a universe of things . . . but is consciousness a thing? That belief, I say, is counterproductive to the further evolution of consciousness because it prioritizes the various aspects of a human incorrectly. The more we accept we are first and foremost a thing, the more we are going to do little more than study things.

Well, you do seem committed to a certain worldview which implies some truths about meditation.

There's no worldview needed for meditation, not for me anyway. I've done it daily for over thirty years because I love how it stills my consciousness, allows me to think better when I decide to think, and because I like the heightened awareness that results. If there is any effect on my "view" it is simple clarity.

I am of the opinion that meditation is useless - europeans didn't know about it for centuries, and their lives were not the worse for it. But that's my commitment. No one is free to accept whatever is true, we all have commitments.

It doesn't sound like you know anything about it, so I'm not sure why you have such an opinion. If you think Europeans haven't known about it, you are quite uninformed. They've practiced it, mostly in monasteries, for nearly 2000 years. I suggest you read Evelyn Underhill's classic "Mysticism" to see just how extensively turning inward has been practiced. Or try the Greek Orthodox collection of writings known as the "Philokalia."

saviourmachine

May12-05, 05:02 PM

Understanding
On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=502046#post502046), which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time.You got me! Sorry! :rofl: I've printed your last two posts addressing me.

Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples? Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A? Excuse me for the layman approach. The discovery of the concept "temperature" would than belong to category B. The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj. Both would me members of C. No, I'm at a loss. What's xi exactly in this context? I definitely need a concreet example. This is too abstract for me. :cry:

B \subset A or B \equiv \{A_{some}, A_{other}, ..., A_{another}\}
C \subset A and C \equiv \{\{B_{some}\}, \{B_{other}\}, ..., \{B_{another}\}\}
C is finite, but not "stable".

Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.

Numeric example
Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four.So a set "B" is in this case "one number" and represents a change in my knowledge of A... So, "B" can be seen as an "sensorial vector", an observation. Based on "C" - that formed my pattern recognition system - I am able to use the new information "B" to adjust my predictions. The labels are assigned to the observed elements of A: numbers.
With B1 = {3, 7}, B2 = {5, 9}, B3 = {7, 11} the difference between the messages (sets Bj) and the labels {3, 7, 9, 11} is clear. Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?

Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?

Predicting an element in a set "B"
Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise. :devil:

Extrapolation
If the first message is from Newton, and the second is from Einstein, I don't know what the third will be. I'm at a loss what you're exactly extrapolating. :smile:

I hope you don't mind to explain it a bit more. Thanks for your time!

Doctordick

May15-05, 06:55 PM

Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples?Sure, anytime you catagoize something, give it a name, you are thinking of a "set". The elements of the set constitutes the entire collection of things which you have decided are included under that name. Lastly, coming up with a name for the set is not required; at least not in the abstract. I like the following comment on the issue of "abstract" from Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler in the "Gateway to the Great Books": "If you have learned to add two and five without asking "Two and five what?" you already have both feet off the ground--higher than you think. You are now air-born. The rest is just a matter of gaining altitude."
Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A?Sure; however, if you do then membership in the set would be anything which you would consider satisfying what you mean by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. I am not at all sure what you would wish to call 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. A coat??? A smoldering fire??? A friendly girl??? Since I defined B to be a finite collection of elements of A, "the discovery of the concept "temperature" would not belong to B unless you would include "the discovery of the concept 'temperature'" as an example of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Why would you include this particular discovery as an example of 'warmth' - with all kind of properties?
The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj.Not with any meaning of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties I would consider reasonable. Under your example Bj would be a change in the specifc set of things you catagorize as 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Your mother bought you some warm cloths or some hot (if 'warmth' – with all kind of properties included "hot") girls walked in the room. That is, the collection of things which you regarded to be in that set 'warmth' – with all kind of properties would change. C is the end result of all changes to date and would be everything you currently regard to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties.

B is not a subset of A, B is a finite collection of elements taken from A. The significant difference is that it is possible for an element which appears only once in A could appear multiple times in B. A subtly which has profound consequences which I won't get into for a while. Likewise, C also being a finite collection of sets B need not be a subset of A.
Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.C is the collection of information available to you (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above). The elements of C are changes in that information (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above) which arrive via the addition of new elements to that set C which are labeled Bj. Message just seemed to be a good reference label to put on "change in information". I have no idea what you meant by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. You could have meant "putting a coat on" as an example of an element of A. B was a collection of elements: perhaps putting a coat on together with three warm girls named susie, joan and kate in front of a low fire in a fireplace. Call it an experience if you wish.

The real problem here is that the moment you begin to put meaningfull labels on these elements, you are proposing a solution (i.e., you know what you are talking about) and not examing the problem (trying to understand what you are talking about). Read my post to Les (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=567820#post567820) on the "Are Qualia Real" thread.
Numeric example
...
Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?I really didn't understand what you were getting at. I don't think you understand why I am talking about sets. Given any problem concievable, C constitutes the information available to you to solve the problem. C is not A because we can not know for sure that all the information is available to us even though it is assumed that A is what we are trying to understand. And the set Bis required to provide for the possibility of change. That's really all there is to it.
Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?"Gravity" and "temperature" are meaningfull labels of concepts essential to the modern solution to all those environmental problems ordinararly referred to as "physics". Their very existence means that one is working with a solution, not with the problem. One could ask, what was the problem which lead to that solution? That would be the history of physics or maybe the history of science or perhaps the history of man. At any rate, the path to that solution is far beyond what I could write. What I am trying to do is to look at the fundamental nature of all problems themselves.
The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise. :devil: I think you misunderstood what I was asking. First, I was talking about a representation of C (that upon which your solution is to be based). What I had pointed out to you was that, since C was a finite collection of sets B (which I had labeled as Bj) and every B constituted a finite collection of elements of A (by definition) I could put arbitary numerical labels on each element of every B and then have a specific list of all B in C. Possessing this list I could answer the question, "is this specific B (specific in the sense that I have a set of numerical labels which specify the B I am talking about) in the complete set C?"

I should comment about this circumstance. Essentially I have not given those numeric labels any meaning at all and yet I can answer a very specific question; however, my ability to answer that question depends on those numerical labels I have assigned. Again, you need to recognize that meaningfull labels are part of a solution and not a mere formality. As soon as I give two elements somewhere in this set the same label (numerical or otherwise), I am fundamentally asserting they are the same element. How in the world did I know they were the same? For the moment, let us just say I guessed and maybe I guessed right and maybe I guessed wrong. Later I will point out some interesting aspects of having the freedom to label things anyway I wish. At the moment, in order to avoid making presumptions, I must assure that, whenever I make an assertion about C, that the assertion must be true no matter what labeling proceedure was used.

But meanwhile, you have a list of every B you have ever seen (in the problem so far) and, having labeled them, can refer to any specific one via the list of labels assigned to it. Against that backdrop I asked, "suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you the labels of all the elements but one from some B and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given." Your answer, "the next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise", presumes we are talking about a new message. We are not, we are talking about answering questions about the C which is available to you.

There is a very simple proceedure which will create a set of lists from the lists you have prepared where this second list will asnswer the above question. First, take each list you had to start with and, for any two lists which are identical, add a label which does not exist on any list (since we are using numerical labels and the number of elements already labeled is finite, there exist a plentyful quantity of unused labels). Now, for each of these altered lists, make every list possible which is identical to that list except for the absense of one element. Now repeat the first step above, eliminating any duplicate lists created in step two, Finally, replace the labels which were removed in step two.

The result has a very curious property. That is the fact that no matter what list you choose of the finished collection, you can remove any element and there will be no list in the remainder of the lists which have the same set of numbers you are looking at. This property is achieved no matter what the original label assignment was. Given this new set of lists, if someone gives you the labels of all the elements but one, there is only one possible missing element so the question asked above may be answered.

I suspect you are questioning what value lies in the above performance. The value arrises when you realize that the collection of lists you have constructed can be seen as a mathematical function. The numerical result (the missing label) is given by the table of all lists missing one element (it is not a continuous function as it is only defined for the arguments in the table). It is a function of many variables (the list of B labels missing one element) which results in the label which is missing. Mathematically this can be written:

x_n=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})

If that is true, then it implies there exists a function F, defined by

F(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})-x_n

where the rule which tells you whether a particular list is valid is given by F=0, a very simple rule. This result was achieved by imagining the existence of some elements which were not part of A: i.e., they were totally made up in order to achieve that simple rule. What I have shown is that the existance or non-existence of any finite collection of elements can be constrained to exactly what has been seen (no matter what that collection is) by the simple rule F=0 and the introduction of imaginary or make believe elements.

Now what does this have to do with reality? Throughout history, scientific hypothicies have consisted of invented entities and invented rules. The rules are supposedly invented to explain what we see and the invented entities are then invented to correct for the problems in what we see. Every time we are able to prove that what we see is consistent with the entities and the rules (we think are true) we consider it proof that that they both exist. If you are going to give me the freedom to invent any entities I want and the freedom to propose any rules I want, you have given me more freedom than I need to explain everything which is known (since "everything which is known" is finite). I can construct a very simple universe based on that simple rule F=0 which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.

Have fun -- Dick

Daminc

May16-05, 09:53 AM

which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.
I'm sorry, but this highlights why I'm not interested in what you have to write. You imply that if I don't find it interesting then I don't think :bugeye:

I think all the time. Sometimes it becomes bad for my health because I cannot turn my mind of even though my body is crying out for sleep. You have to be one of the most self-centered, egocentric individuals I have come across on the Web.

If your intention was to be listened to then the smart thing to do would be not to alienate your target audience which is something you obviously haven't figured out yet.

I'll read your stuff when you learn a bit of modesty :wink:

saviourmachine

May16-05, 11:06 AM

Labels
The real problem here is that the moment you begin to put meaningfull labels on these elements, you are proposing a solution (i.e., you know what you are talking about) and not examing the problem (trying to understand what you are talking about). Read my post to Les (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=567820#post567820) on the "Are Qualia Real" thread.Yes, I understand. A message can be a composition/mixture of e.g. {3, red} or {2309.23 €, "bkkkpoi", banana-taste}. To label the elements '3' and 'red' is unwanted and unjustified 'labelism'.

The nature of a 'message'
I don't think you understand why I am talking about sets. Given any problem concievable, C constitutes the information available to you to solve the problem.Does a message / obervation embed it's whole context {time, place, etcetera}? However, I think your representation is still that abstract that it can account for problem solving in general. I was confused because I'm thinking of neural nets, in which e.g. the order in which messages are received can be important. The elements of the message are unordered, but the messages itself are ordered, are they?

Question: 1 missing label
"suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you the labels of all the elements but one from some B and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given."
...
we are talking about answering questions about the C which is available to you.That is very simple indeed. I was confused by your use of the word list. That denotes one message in this case.

Look for all B in C, compare every Bj with the Basked and if there is only one that does match, than it's the one.

Basked = {red}

B0 = {5, 2}
B1 = {red, 2}
B2 = {apple, red}
B3 = {apple, 5}
B4 = {red, 2}

Here it is nr. 1, nr. 2 and nr. 4.

Simple procedure
There is a very simple proceedure which will create a set of lists from the lists you have prepared where this second list will answer the above question. 1. First, take each list you had to start with and, for any two lists which are identical. 2. Add a label which does not exist on any list (since we are using numerical labels and the number of elements already labeled is finite, there exist a plentyful quantity of unused labels). 3. Now, for each of these altered lists, make every list possible which is identical to that list except for the absense of one element. 4. Now repeat the first step above, eliminating any duplicate lists created in step two. 5. Finally, replace the labels which were removed in step two.Odd way. It's amazing how you can obscure a very simple procedure. :blushing: Can you write some programming code please? "5 ... removed in step two?"
It's just providing every entree in the table with an unique keyword / identifier isn't it?

Removing element
The result has a very curious property. That is the fact that no matter what list you choose of the finished collection, you can remove any element and there will be no list in the remainder of the lists which have the same set of numbers you are looking at. This property is achieved no matter what the original label assignment was.Of course. Even removing the identifier does not lead to another entree (with - still - its own identifier).

The messages are coded
Given this new set of lists, if someone gives you the labels of all the elements but one, there is only one possible missing element so the question asked above may be answered. Of course, if the messages are coded (and received) that way.

Valid lists
Mathematically this can be written:

x_n=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})

If that is true, then it implies there exists a function F, defined by

F(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})-x_n

where the rule which tells you whether a particular list is valid is given by F=0, a very simple rule.Okay, assigning xi numeric value.

Universe
I can construct a very simple universe based on that simple rule F=0 which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.I'm curious.

Doctordick

May17-05, 09:56 AM

Hi "saviormachine", it's nice to hear from you.
Yes, I understand. A message can be a composition/mixture of e.g. {3, red} or {2309.23 €, "bkkkpoi", banana-taste}. To label the elements '3' and 'red' is unwanted and unjustified 'labelism'.I am not entirely sure what you have in mind when you use the phrase "unjustified 'labelism'". I suspect you are commenting about my statement, "At the moment, in order to avoid making presumptions, I must assure that, whenever I make an assertion about C, that the assertion must be true no matter what labeling procedure was used." I don't know that I would use the word "unjustified"; what I want you to be aware of is the fact that the very act of labeling introduces a constraint on the interpretations which are possible. The act is essentially the creation of a language and the language itself implies constraints. Constraints are essentially the elimination of possibilities and I have no desire to do that. At the same time, in the final analysis, a real solution requires that we find a set of labels consistent with the information embedded in those "messages", "experiences", "tokens of change" or whatever one wants to call them. For the moment they are no more than the members of the sets Bj which make up C (that which we wish to understand).
However, I think your representation is still that abstract that it can account for problem solving in general.That is exactly my contention. If you notice any reason at all that my presentation is not totally general, please point it out to me as, if such a difficulty exists, it constitutes a serious flaw in my work.
I was confused because I'm thinking of neural nets, in which e.g. the order in which messages are received can be important. The elements of the message are unordered, but the messages itself are ordered, are they?Not really; and that is another serious issue with far reaching consequences. The sets B were created to make it possible to represent change in the set C and were created for that reason only. The concept of time is seriously embedded in our understanding of anything (particularly in our understanding of anything involving change). In my general representation the fact that B represents a change in C can not be taken to imply there is any order in that change. C constitutes all the information you have to work with. In a general problem you cannot assume you and another were given the information in the same order even if, at the moment you compare your solutions, you have exactly the same C available to you.

What I am getting at here is that the "j" label attached to that Bj is just another label attached by you. There are some subtle consequences of that fact that won't be evident for quite a while so let's lay the issue of order aside for the moment as any individual certainly has a specific order in mind: the order with which he became aware of the new information. That order is certainly important to him and can have a serious impact on his expectations.
Look for all B in C, compare every Bj with the Basked and if there is only one that does match, than it's the one.Exactly correct and your example is excellent except for two issues. First, I specified we were going to use numerical labels and you have decided to use "red" and "apple". That is not a serious issue at all as we are only talking about arbitrary labels but it might somewhat confuse the issue of "mathematical functions of those labels". I am presuming you are sufficiently intelligent as to understand that there is no real problem here. Some people might find the concept of something being a functions of words too abstract to comprehend.

The other issue is a little more serious. It has to do with determining the equality of sets B. In your example, you assume the asked set {red} is equal to the observed sets {red, 2}, {apple, red} and {red, 2} ( j = 1, 2, and 4). Under my definitions (as I intended them), you never received the set {red} (that would be "red" in the absence of any other elements). Also, as order is of no significance, your example might be better if you either included {2, red} or explicitly stated that order in your defined sets was not significant (a small issue but it might be confusing to some; the central issue is to avoid any misinterpretation of the instructions). Both these issues are quite trivial and I strongly suspect you have an excellent grasp of what I am talking about.
It's amazing how you can obscure a very simple procedure. :blush: Can you write some programming code please? "5 ... removed in step two?" Sorry about that, in my head the steps you list as 1. and 2. were a single step. That makes your step 3. correspond to my step two (the step where elements were removed which created the possibility of duplicate lists). I apologize sincerely for not expressing the steps clearly. From your further comments I get the impression you understood what I was describing. Thank you for your indulgence.
It's just providing every entry in the table with an unique keyword / identifier isn't it?That is exactly what it is. The only important issue is that these "invented" elements need to be seen as utterly no different from any other element in B when it comes to solving our problem. They essentially stand as "hypothetical" elements; if we find a usable solution, then we can certainly hold that these "invented" elements need to be there (at least with regard to that solution we found). That is the reason I described it the way I did: that is, I didn't want to use the words "keyword" or "identifier" as that implies a specific status to the entry. I want you to simply regard it as an imagined entry. (What I have called "unknowable data" elsewhere.) The fundamental issue is that there must be no way of differentiating between these imagined entries and the entries derived from "A". Once you include them, they are presumed elements of the Bj in any of your analysis. (Again, any assertion I make about C must be true for any possible "keyword", "identifier" or "unknowable" whatever you want to call this entry.)

I am very sorry that I obscured a very simple procedure. I could write some programming code but it would be pretty worthless as, although the number of elements to be included in any reasonable problem are finite, their number can be expected to be astronomical and there are other much more important issues to be discussed first. Actually, with the memory and speed of modern computers, I think it might be very valuable to write such a program. (Another project for another day.)
Of course. Even removing the identifier does not lead to another entry (with - still - its own identifier).I think you understand. There is only one point I might make: when you are looking for the Bj (which corresponds to the Basked with an element missing) you must look through the entire list of all B's you have created from the original B's with every possible omission. This expands the problem considerably (though it is still a finite problem).

What I want you to keep in mind is the fact that I have just proved that, so long as the number of elements in C are finite, it is always possible to add "unknowable data" (imaginary information) which will allow a rule F=0 to constrain the elements to exactly what was observed no matter what was observed (by "observed", I mean the specific elements in the B's which make up C).

To continue, we need a universal abstract way of expressing an explanation in order to describe the universe I am going to create. So, the first step is to define an abstract definition of an explanation. I tried (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=557150#post557150) to express this definition to Canute a while ago but I don't think he has much interest in exact science. I define "an explanation", from the abstract perspective, to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. It should be clear to you that the "known information" is the collection of Bjs which go to make up C. If we use numerical labels for the elements of B, then every B can be seen as a collection of numbers. From these numbers (the numbers which define what B we are looking at) we are to supposed to express our expectations. What else are our expectations if they are not the probability that we expect to see that particular B just referred to? It follows that "our explanation" constitutes knowing that probability as a function of those arguments.

If follows that we can express our explanation with the notation:

P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)

If we can discover that function, we know our expectations and thus have an explanation of C. The first thing of interest to us is that our explanation should be consistent with all the B_j (x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) that go to make up C (it doesn't explain C otherwise). Notice that we are actually talking about the collection of all those B_j and the probability of seeing a particular one can not be a function of our labeling procedure as we were free to label things anyway we please (our labels are fundamentally meaningless). It should be obvious that, in most cases, any change in the labeling procedure will most likely confuse us as to which B's we were talking about before and after the relabeling (the form of that function is very dependent upon the labeling). None the less, there do exist relabeling procedures which will not confuse that identification. Any relabeling procedure which does not confuse the identification of B_j must yield exactly the same expectations after the relabeling as it did before. If it doesn't, the explanation is inconsistent with C.

It is the expectations for the B's which interest us; not the arbitrary labels we happen to put to those B's. Those labels exist for the sole purpose of allowing us to refer to the elements of B. (That is exactly what language is all about.)

I will leave it there for the moment because I want to be sure you understand exactly what I have said. Meanwhile, when I was looking up that post to Canute above, I ran across a post by you which I had apparently missed.
<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code. :smile: Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. :smile: It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.I am very impressed with the fact that you picked up on that. I would say that my "definition density" is as close to minimal as one can get and your use of the metaphor "assembly code" is very apt. I would also comment that there are other similarities. The problem with the high-level language is that you can only express things which have already been prepared for in the design of the language while, in assembly code, you can express anything. However, expressing simple things in "assembly code" can easily get quite long compared to the same thing in a high-level language. I think I tend to exceed most peoples attention span very quickly. I hope you have the patience to follow my arguments through; the arguments themselves are actually quite simple.

Looking for your response -- Dick

saviourmachine

May18-05, 03:33 AM

That is exactly my contention. If you notice any reason at all that my presentation is not totally general, please point it out to me as, if such a difficulty exists, it constitutes a serious flaw in my work.As problem solving your presentation is general enough. However, like somebody pointed out in another thread, considering the problem of the origin of the apparatus that receives and distinguish as such the messages Bj, and that can contain memory (set C), I don't see how it can account for that. How evolution works is sending indirect messages by destroying the 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The idea of mutations in combination with natural selection doesn't fall into this scope. Or, if you have any idea how it does fall into this scope, I appreciate to hear that.

Coded messages
The other issue is a little more serious. It has to do with determining the equality of sets B. In your example, you assume the asked set {red} is equal to the observed sets {red, 2}, {apple, red} and {red, 2} ( j = 1, 2, and 4). Under my definitions (as I intended them), you never received the set {red} (that would be "red" in the absence of any other elements).But how can you make sure that your messages are in the form you need? If you assign an arbitrary label, you can 'calculate' as if every message is coded like that, but 'at the end' it's possible to 'calculate' without this proposed construction, isn't it?

Order & numbers
Also, as order is of no significance, your example might be better if you either included {2, red}Therefore I added B2 = {apple, red}. I agree with using only numbers, so B2 = {8088, 3945} is fine for me too.

Word 'identifier'
That is exactly what it is. The only important issue is that these "invented" elements need to be seen as utterly no different from any other element in B when it comes to solving our problem.Yes, you're right. That went also through my mind when I wrote 'identifier', because the way your tabel is coded, every label [column] can be called 'identifier' (whatever element is deleted, the entry [row] is still unique). It's like adding an 'error bit' to make sure the amount of 'ones' in a binary message is even and subsequently not having to know which bit the error bit exactly is.

Hypothetical
They essentially stand as "hypothetical" elements; if we find a usable solution, then we can certainly hold that these "invented" elements need to be there (at least with regard to that solution we found). That is the reason I described it the way I did: that is, I didn't want to use the words "keyword" or "identifier" as that implies a specific status to the entry. I want you to simply regard it as an imagined entry. (What I have called "unknowable data" elsewhere.)Yes, this is the clue, exactly the doubt I uttered in 'Coded messages'. I'm curious how handy these hypothetical elements will turn out to be. I agree that if there is 'unknowable data', that there is no point to dismiss beforehand the possibility that these hypothetical elements exist.

Expectation
If follows that we can express our explanation with the notation:
P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)Agreed.

It should be obvious that, in most cases, any change in the labeling procedure will most likely confuse us as to which B's we were talking about before and after the relabeling (the form of that function is very dependent upon the labeling).Aha! The message are received in code, or there is a 'relabeling' procedure. I thought the label was artificial, but inherently bounded to each message. So, there wouldn't be a 'behore' and 'after'.

It is the expectations for the B's which interest us; not the arbitrary labels we happen to put to those B's. Those labels exist for the sole purpose of allowing us to refer to the elements of B. (That is exactly what language is all about.)Agreed.

Looking forward for more. :smile:

Doctordick

May18-05, 09:39 PM

As problem solving your presentation is general enough. However, like somebody pointed out in another thread, considering the problem of the origin of the apparatus that receives and distinguish as such the messages Bj, and that can contain memory (set C), I don't see how it can account for that.I don't account for that. I think you have a very slight misunderstanding of what I am doing. The issue is that we have come from nothing except the universe itself. Somehow, having begun with totally undefined information (what we have come to call the universe or reality) which was delivered to us via a totally undefined mechanism (what we have come to call our senses) we have constructed a very sophisticated mental model of reality which seems to be quite valid (our expectations are pretty much in line with what happens). I take that as evidence that the problem (creating a valid model of a collection of totally undefined information transformed by a totally undefined mechanism) is a solvable problem.

That is the problem I have attacked. I am not claiming that I know how "we" (human beings) did it, I am simply claiming it can be done. That is, it is a problem which can be solved. I analytically solved it over twenty years ago. And I find my solution both very reasonable and very interesting. In fact, my single greatest interest is in talking to someone about the implied consequences of that solution. You are one of the very few people who has had the patience to get this far and I am actually astounded by how well you have managed to comprehend what I am saying. Most everyone else fails to even comprehend there is a problem here. How can one explain a solution to a problem which they refuse to admit exists?
How evolution works is sending indirect messages by destroying the 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The idea of mutations in combination with natural selection doesn't fall into this scope. Or, if you have any idea how it does fall into this scope, I appreciate to hear that.I wouldn't say evolution destroys 'owners' of a set C less adapted to their environment. The set C possessed by a rock is probably quite minimal if it exists at all and the rock isn't "destroyed"; it just lays there. What was C again anyway? All the information about the universe it has to work with wasn't it? Or at least that which "it" can "remember". I guess for a rock that would be the collection of interactions it has had with the rest of the universe and it's memory would be in the vibrations and/or make up of the chemicals which are part of it. Really, I think this aspect of the problem is better left to later, after you understand the solution I have discovered.
But how can you make sure that your messages are in the form you need? I can't. Again this is a simple consequence of your slight misinterpretation of what I am doing. I am solving a very specific problem, not theorizing about how we do it. The problem is to start with totally undefined information and develop a model (or an explanation if you will) which will yield expectations in perfect alignment with the information you have. (I tried to interest the military in this problem about fifteen years ago but got the "quack" response. I actually have a letter from the pentagon signed by a "Captain Nasty" if you can believe that!) The problem is actually a very complex decoding problem.
If you assign an arbitrary label, you can 'calculate' as if every message is coded like that, but 'at the end' it's possible to 'calculate' without this proposed construction, isn't it?At the end, everything that is possible will be possible; but, for the moment, being able to use mathematics is very valuable tool. As Feynman once said, "mathematics is the distilled essence of logic". My solution is analytic and not at all intuitive. Everything I say could be put into pure logic terms but you have already complained that following me is like following assembly code. I would like a little higher level language. Mathematics is actually little more than a language which has been constrained to internally consistent constructs which have achieved a high degree of acceptance. When I tell you to perform a procedure in mathematics I can be pretty confident you will understand exactly what that procedure is. Actually, in metaphor, it's a little like going from machine language to assembly language.
It's like adding an 'error bit' to make sure the amount of 'ones' in a binary message is even and subsequently not having to know which bit the error bit exactly is.I think you understand the phenomena exactly. I only comment because I want you to know that I am again impressed with your ability to see the essence of these steps.
I'm curious how handy these hypothetical elements will turn out to be.They are the essence of understanding itself. Think about the proof that any arbitrary collection can be made the only possibility by requiring F=0. The hypothetical elements were central in bring about that result. I think it will be a lot clearer later.
Aha! The message are received in code, or there is a 'relabeling' procedure. I thought the label was artificial, but inherently bounded to each message. So, there wouldn't be a 'behore' and 'after'.I am not exactly sure I understand this comment. The labeling procedure is the first step to creating a language capable of expressing the relationships between the elements. I would also comment that "reductionism" is the process of reducing the number of "fundamental" things (labels) required: i.e., once you get to the minimum number of labels required, other important concepts can be explained in terms of those fundamental labels. But you shouldn't worry about that now; it is an issue which arises after the analytical solution is obtained. My process does not require reductionism as it implicitly sets up the minimum number of labels required and we will set up those labels as we proceed.

As I said in my previous post, "any relabeling procedure which does not confuse the identification of B_j must yield exactly the same expectations after the relabeling as it did before". There are two very simple relabeling procedures with very significant consequences: since I am using numerical labels, I can either add some given number to every label in any given B or multiply every given label by an arbitrary number. If the label sets were unique before the labeling they will be unique afterwards. This means that I can write the following equations:

P(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = P(x_1+a, x_2+a,\cdots, x_n+a) = P(x_1+b, x_2+b,\cdots, x_n+b)

P(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = P(a*x_1, a*x_2,\cdots, a*x_n) = P(b*x_1, b*x_2,\cdots, b*x_n)

The consequences of the second will arise later in the presentation. The consequences of the first are important now. Look at what it says if I set b=a+\Delta a . Since the labels refer to exactly the same B_j in all three expressions we know that the correct solution to the original problem (that function P(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)) must yield the same probability(we haven't changed the B_j, we have only changed the labeling). Thus we know,

\frac{d}{da} P(x_1+a, x_2+a, \cdots, x_n+a) =

\lim_{\Delta a \rightarrow 0}
\frac {P(x_1+a+\Delta a, x_2+a+\Delta a,\cdots, x_n+a+\Delta a) - P(x_1+a, x_2+a,\cdots, x_n+a)}{\Delta a}=0.

Note that the equation is true even when \Delta a is far from zero; the limit is only there to satisfy the definition of a differential. This is a pure consequence of the arbitrariness of the labeling and places utterly no constraint on the actual solution. It can be thought of as the consequence of the fact that the solution can be expressed in different languages; this is just a very specific and very subtle change in language (specific labels) not easily expressed in term of the ordinary concepts used in the translation between human languages I am aware of (other than secret codes that is).

At any rate, we can use that fact to create another very valuable expression. Since what we have above is a well defined mathematical expression, we can also see the addition of a as a simple change of variables z_i = x_i + a . Then we take the well known method of extracting a differential of a function with regard to a variable embedded in the arguments of that function. That is, replace P(x_1+a, x_2+a , \cdots, x_n+a) with P(z_1, z_2 , \cdots, z_n). We can then write

\frac{d}{da}P(z_1,z_2, \cdots, z_n)=\sum_i \frac {dz_i}
{da}\frac{\partial}{\partial z_i}P(z_1,z_2,\cdots,z_n)

But \frac{dz_i}{da} = 1 for all values of i. It follows as the night the day that

\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial z_i}P(z_1,z_2,\cdots,z_n)=0.

We cannot change that fact by changing the variable from z to x (they are just numerical labels) so it follows that we may write

\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)=0.

The only reason I changed the variable back to x was to be consistent with my earlier notation. What is above is nothing more than a consequence of the Noether theorem. That is why I brought up her theorem earlier and emphasized the ignorance aspect of symetry. The symetry here (or the ignorance) is the fact that we are free to label things any way we want and that fact has real consequences.

Please, think that all over a little and let me know if you have any problems with it.

Have fun -- Dick

saviourmachine

May23-05, 10:24 AM

Derivation
There are two very simple relabeling procedures with very significant consequences: since I am using numerical labels, I can either add some given number to every label in any given B or multiply every given label by an arbitrary number.Yes, how cool! Using numeric labels, adding as well as multiplying is possible.

Adding a number to every label in every B doesn't change the probability P. That's right. P(x1+b, ..., xn+b) should have the same outcome. Differentiating to b (or a) results in zero. I also agree with the ultimate equation [1]:
\sum_i \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)=0.

Symmetry, Noether's theorem, equation [1]
The only reason I changed the variable back to x was to be consistent with my earlier notation. What is above is nothing more than a consequence of the Noether theorem. That is why I brought up her theorem earlier and emphasized the ignorance aspect of symetry. The symetry here (or the ignorance) is the fact that we are free to label things any way we want and that fact has real consequences.Sorry, this is too fast for me. It's difficult for me to connect these two themes: this formula and Noether's theorem. Can you recapitulate shortly?

Doctordick

May23-05, 04:05 PM

Yes, how cool!My feelings exactly. I will never forget the first time I ever saw it. It is utterly astonishing that no one noticed that prior to the twentieth century. Think of all the math done prior to her discovery. It just goes to convince one that everything has not yet been done (even some mighty simple things).
Symmetry, Noether's theorem, equation [1]
Sorry, this is too fast for me. It's difficult for me to connect these two themes: this formula and Noether's theorem. Can you recapitulate shortly?It shouldn't be. You seem to understand exactly what I did and that is the very essence of Noether's theorem. The central issue is the relationship between symmetry (which I see as a particular kind of ignorance) and conserved quantities. A "conserved" quantity is something which doesn't change. In mathematics, change is represented by differentials so, "a conserved quantity" means that there is a differential which does not change. If we can show that a symmetry leads to a differential of something which must be zero, then we have an example of Noether's theorem. John Baez (who I think is a member of this forum) has an excellent discussion of Noether's theorem (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html) on his web site (from the purely conventional perspective).

I admit my view is a bit askew of the norm but it might be worth while for you to review my original post to you (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458593#post458593) on this subject together with selfAdjoint's response (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458627#post458627) and my response to him (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=459227#post459227). I got no further complaint from him so I presume he had no further argument with what I said.

As I said in the post you are responding to:
It can be thought of as the consequence of the fact that the solution can be expressed in different languages; this is just a very specific and very subtle change in language (specific labels) not easily expressed in term of the ordinary concepts used in the translation between human languages I am aware of (other than secret codes that is).I am pretty sure you have a decent idea of what is going on here because of your "Cool" comment above. It is very much the sign of that little light going on.

Exactly the same relationship can be used to generate a conserved quantity related to that "j" we attached to those B's which represent a change in C. The universe we are trying to explain (with that function which is going to yield our expectations) is derived from all the information embedded in the set C. Certainly no one will argue that the order with which we receive that information is an unimportant aspect of solutions we might propose; however, in the general case, that cannot be a fundamental issue. Remember, it is A we are trying to explain and the only thing we have to go on is C. Again, in the general case, we cannot presume that order is significant. Not unless the fact of that order is implicitly embedded in the data itself. We can assure that is the case by adding "unknowable" data which explicitly sets that order. Since we have already made sure (by adding imaginary entries in the B's we are working with – unknowable data) that all B's are different, we can simply add a numerical label which is to have a different value in every B and will indicate the order significant to the solution.

Now (having added that new label) our solution to the problem contains another (totally imaginary component) numerical label which I will call "time" and represent with the letter t. Again, multiplying that label by a constant or adding a constant to all t cannot alter the order and we once again have a fundamental symmetry in our representation. The fact that we can add any number to that t label yields another conserved quantity represented by the differential expression:

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)=0.

Once again, the critical issue is that the particular B being referred to does not change nor does the order of those sets. These facts are true, no matter what order the information was received in. Since this is an ordering parameter on received changes B, this leads me to some very simple definitions. A particular value of t will be called "the present". Any t less than that particular t will be called "the past" and any t greater than that particular value of t will be called the future. This is the simplest definition of time which can be made and, in the end, I will show that it is also sufficient to all usages known. Since B represents a change in the information we have to work with, the "past" constitutes what we have to work with and the "future" constitutes what is not yet known.

Note that P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t) is the probability of B being (x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t) when t was the present: i.e., if nothing was known about about any B's beyond the one referred to by that "t". Note that "time" as here presented is nothing but a parameter indicating the order in which you came to know things. Note also that "time travel" is pretty well a ridiculous concept under this picture as it amounts to going from knowing what we know to knowing less (the common idea of time travel is to "go into the past" and still know what you know).

If anything I have said confuses you, let me know. I will be happy to clarify anything.

Have fun -- Dick

saviourmachine

Jun7-05, 05:44 PM

In mathematics, change is represented by differentials so, "a conserved quantity" means that there is a differential which does not change. If we can show that a symmetry leads to a differential of something which must be zero, then we have an example of Noether's theorem.Aha, it's that simple!

Not unless the fact of that order is implicitly embedded in the data itself. We can assure that is the case by adding "unknowable" data which explicitly sets that order.Aha, that makes some things clear.

Now (having added that new label) our solution to the problem contains another (totally imaginary component) numerical label which I will call "time" and represent with the letter t. Again, multiplying that label by a constant or adding a constant to all t cannot alter the order and we once again have a fundamental symmetry in our representation. The fact that we can add any number to that t label yields another conserved quantity represented by the differential expression:

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)=0. That's straightforward.

Note that "time" as here presented is nothing but a parameter indicating the order in which you came to know things. Note also that "time travel" is pretty well a ridiculous concept under this picture as it amounts to going from knowing what we know to knowing less (the common idea of time travel is to "go into the past" and still know what you know).Yes, that makes sense. Providing the items in reversed order is still in order.

Looking forward, :smile:

Andy

Doctordick

Jun12-05, 10:35 AM

Hi Andy, it's nice to hear from you. You seem to think about the things I say without getting your ego involved. You are a very rare bird indeed and I appreciate the opportunity to communicate with you. (Note, I have been having a very bad time with the latex interpreter; I think it has some bugs in it. I have been trying various work arounds.)
Aha, it's that simple!
Aha, that makes some things clear.
That's straightforward.
Yes, that makes sense. Providing the items in reversed order is still in order.
Looking forward, :smile:
I always tell people it's simple but they always want to complicate things. The math is not difficult at all. With regard to the issue of mathematics and simplicity, do you have any knowledge of matrix mechanics or matrix multiplication? I am wondering if I will have to teach you the subject as it comes up pretty quickly from where we are at the moment.

Meanwhile, there are three significant steps yet to be undertaken. Again, they are not really difficult but they are rather askew of the typical perspective. The first one has to do with the representation of probability. Probability, when viewed as the output of a mathematical function, constrains that function to have some very specific properties. These constraints come directly from the definition of probability. (Just as an aside, there is an individual out there who has some major difficulties with probability theory and is getting a reception roughly equivalent to the one I manage to generate with authorities. I have a strong suspicion his complaints are very rational.) But that is beside the point as I use none of the sophisticated aspects of probability theory he is referring to.

The first fundamental property of probability is that it cannot be negative and the second is that the sum (or integral if the number of possibilities become infinite) over all possibilities can not exceed unity. If you have been following the details of my approach you should have at least an inkling of the central motivation behind that approach. I have made every effort possible to insure that my representation imposes no constraints whatsoever on the possibilities which can be represented. I want my conclusions to be absolutely general without any presumptions as to where and how success (that explanation we are seeking) is to be found. Since we have established that our solution to any problem can be seen as finding the proper algorithm to apply to the set of numbers representing our knowledge, it is in our interest to remove constraints imposed by issues outside the information itself without making any constraint on the range of algorithms available to our analysis. The fact that probability must be a number between zero and one is just such a constraint. The need to satisfy this superfluous constraint may be removed from consideration via a very simple procedure.

A function can be seen as consisting of two components: the "argument" of the function (the input) and the "value" of the function (the output). Both of these components can be represented by a set of numbers (I think we have already discussed that issue). It follows directly that absolutely any function can be represented by the following shorthand notation.

\vec{G}(\vec{x},t)
\equiv \left {{}G_1(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t), G_2(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t),\cdots, G_k(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n,t) \right{}}

(Without this shorthand, the size of the equations which will soon appear will be far to complex to write out in full.) In the interest of obtaining a very specific representation, I will constrain the arguments, x_i, to be taken from the set of real numbers and the results of the algorithm, G_j, to be taken from the set of complex numbers. Note that the common meaning of such an expression, that G rotates like a vector in the space of x is specifically not to be the intended interpretation. Note further that there is no implied relationship between n and k: that is, the number of elements in the two sets is held to be a completely open issue.

Given this totally general representation of an arbitrary functional relationship, we can define (for any specific function) what is called its adjoint function and written \vec{G}^\dagger (\vec{x},t). The adjoint is defined to be exactly the same as the original function except that each and every G_i (the specific complex numbers defining the function) would be replaced with its complex conjugate (G_i = (a+ib) goes directly to G_i ^\dagger = (a-ib) ). The central issue is of course the fact that G_i ^\dagger * G_i = a^2 + b^2 , a positive definite real number. (If b = 0 then the adjoint is identical to the original which of course means that "self-adjoint" means real; which I suspect everyone here knows.)

Now add to the above the standard definition of a "dot" product of vectors (seen as a definition of a procedure) and the notation \vec{G}^\dagger \cdot \vec{G} results in a sum over a collection of positive real numbers which must be positive definite. Lastly, the sum over all possibilities (or the integral if the number of possibilities is infinite) must be greater than any sum (or integral) over any sub set of possibilities. It follows that

1 \geq
\frac{ { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} }{ { { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} } }
\geq 0

so long as the denominator is summed (or integrated) over all possibilities. That also brings up another shorthand notation I would like to use.

\oint f(\vec{x}) dv \equiv \int \int \cdots \int f(\vec{x}) d^n x

Ordinarily \oint would denote a line integral but, since I have no need for line integrals in my work, there should be no confusion. If I knew how to do it, I might very well put a capital "V" in the circle to denote that I want a volume integral over the entire represented abstract volume. Meanwhile, I will just hope that anyone who reads this has the attention span to remember that identification.

If follows that, if one defines the function \vec{\Psi} via

\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t) \equiv \frac{ \vec{G}(\vec{x},t) }{ { \sqrt{ \oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} dv} } }

we can "define" the probability of the B_j to be given by

P(\vec{x},t) = \vec{\Psi}^\dagger(\vec{x},t)\cdot\vec{\Psi}(\vec{ x},t)dv

where dv \equiv d^n x .

The really important issue here is that \vec{\Psi} is an absolutely unconstrained functional relationship; absolutely any possible function can serve the roll of \vec{\Psi} as it is identical to \vec{G} except for the numerical factor \sqrt{\oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G}dv}. There is to be no constraint on \vec{\Psi} other than the fact that the probability generated by the definition given above be a correct representation of our expectations. If our expectations can be generated, \vec{G}, must be a member of the set of "all possible algorithms".

Two possible problems might exist. Both involve extreme values of that numerical factor \sqrt{\oint \vec{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G}dv}. The case where the factor is zero (and division would be undefined) is trivial. In that case, \vec{G} will serve the purpose of \vec{\Psi} and the division is unnecessary. The second case, where the factor is infinite is a little more problematical. In that case, the defined probability becomes zero. This case obviously occurs when the number of possibilities become infinite and the probability of any specific B becomes zero. This becomes a very real possibility as we will soon be dealing with the limit as n approaches infinity; however, in this case also, the division once again becomes immaterial. In this second case, our interest will be in comparing probabilities of various collections of B's and the ratios of those probabilities are the important factor (the denominator being the same in all cases, the division is immaterial).

The only factor of interest is that the output obtained from the definition can be interpreted as a probability.

The net effect of all this is that, in order to keep the representation totally open, we want to work with \vec{\Psi} instead of working directly with the probabilities defined by \vec{\Psi}. If I can make it clear one more time, the set up I have arranged makes utterly no restrictions on the form or character of the method of arriving at expectations. The only constraint being put on the method is that it must yield satisfactory results; an issue not to be discussed until the notation is fully proscribed.

Finally, since we want to work with \vec{\Psi}, we need to re-express the relationships developed earlier in terms of the probability. The relationships already written may be rewritten as

\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, i \kappa \vec{\Psi}\,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, im\vec{\Psi}

This can be proved quite simply. The complex conjugates of the above expressions are,

\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -i \kappa \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -im\vec{\Psi}^\dagger .

This, together with the chain rule of calculus guarantees that any \vec{\Psi} which satisfies the above relations also satisfies the relation on the probability stated earlier. In the interest of saving space, I will show the result explicitly for the time derivative (the derivatives with respect to the arguments x_i go through exactly the same.

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(\vec{x},t)

=\,\, \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \right) \cdot \vec{\Psi}+\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot
\left( {\frac{ \partial}{ \partial t}} \vec{\Psi} \right)

=\,\, -im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}+im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}\,\,=\,\,0.

If you have any questions about anything I have put down, please let me know. If all this makes sense to you, I will establish the final two steps and then state the ultimate conclusion.

I hope I have not run you off – Dick

selfAdjoint

Jun12-05, 01:42 PM

This seems OK to me, although I have a couple of questions.
1. Can you justify your basic assumption of functions: Rn -> Ck?

2 Your definition of adjoint is pretty limited, in agreement with your generality concerns. As you undoubtedly know, the output variables could be a matrix algebra, in which case the adjoint would involve a transpose as well as conjugation, or it might be a general algebra of linear transformations over the complexes, in which case adjointness would have a definition involving the outer product (which in your general plan you have not required). In any case it would be prudent to call your operation conjugation rather than adjoint, to avoid misunderstanding.

Doctordick

Jun13-05, 10:48 AM

This seems OK to me, although I have a couple of questions.
1.Can you justify your basic assumption of functions: Rn -> Ck?Maybe you could make your question a little clearer. I don't believe I have "made an assumption" here; I have made a statement about the representation I prefer. A "function" is a statement of a relationship. When one says there is a functional relationship between two things, it generally means that what is accepted as the "subject under discussion" depends on something else, what is usually termed the "the argument of the function". There is utterly no need for the "subject under discussion" and the "argument of the function" to be chosen from similar sets. ("My investment decisions are a function of what I read in the newspaper" is just as much a statement of a functional relationship as is y=x^2. ) People tend to omit "tabular" functions as valid representations. People our age used a lot of tabular functions when they were young; I suspect a lot of current students have never seen a log table much less thought about the concept of interpolation.

Certainly the collection of all possibilities for "the subject under discussion" can be mapped into a set of numbers. Likewise, the collection of all possibilities for "the argument of the function" can also be mapped into a set of numbers. Clearly, those statements are not made false by allowing one to be the set of real numbers and the other to be the set of complex numbers. This is nothing more than a choice of representation.

If you think there is more to it than that, please give me an example of something which cannot be represented in either set of labels. Note that, in my presentation, these numbers are merely used as a set of labels for arbitrary members of sets of interest.
2 Your definition of adjoint is pretty limited, in agreement with your generality concerns. As you undoubtedly know, the output variables could be a matrix algebra, in which case the adjoint would involve a transpose as well as conjugation, or it might be a general algebra of linear transformations over the complexes, in which case adjointness would have a definition involving the outer product (which in your general plan you have not required). In any case it would be prudent to call your operation conjugation rather than adjoint, to avoid misunderstanding.Yes, that is true and your criticism is well founded; however, since I don't actually make any use of those additional properties of the "adjoint", the use of the word is not actually "wrong". One could just as well "conjugate" a real number (do nothing to it). Consider it little more than a personal preference. It actually serves no purpose beyond making my notation look like common quanta mechanics notation; an issue which only comes to bear further down the road.

I certainly appreciate hearing from you as I respect your judgment on issues like this. I also appreciate the latitude you are allowing me. Perhaps I have not chosen the best notation for my ideas but it is the notation I have chosen. The biggest problem I have is people trying to read between the lines. If the reader is so habituated to the standard expectations that they cannot remember my definitions then I don't think they really have the capability of following me anyway. I kind of see it as a way of getting those who don't want to think out of the picture. Notice that you, as opposed to others here, were driven to make some intelligent comments. At least I know you are following what I am saying.

Have fun -- Dick

selfAdjoint

Jun13-05, 04:05 PM

My first question was addressed to the fact that you represent inputs by real numbers and outputs by complex numbers. Can you express group relations this way? Do you contemplate using different algebras (quaternions, matrix algebras, von Neumann algebras, etc.) for the values of your outputs? Does your general functional notation encapsulate such structure, or do you not need them?

Doctordick

Jun13-05, 09:25 PM

My first question was addressed to the fact that you represent inputs by real numbers and outputs by complex numbers. Can you express group relations this way?I don't quite understand what you mean by the question, "Can you express group relations this way? Absolutely anything can be expressed by a set of references to concepts. These under normal circumstances would be words whose definition is presumed understood; but, in actual fact, any symbolic label will suffice. I have merely chosen numerical labels because it is easy to express a certain kind of possible shift in meaning of those symbols which must exist in any possible set (just more difficult to express). I chose real numbers in one place and complex numbers in another for the simple reason that I like the form of the resulting expressions.

What I am presenting is not a theory; it is a very specific method of organizing information. It is no more a theory than is the Dewey Decimal system. The important point is that any set of significant concepts can be so labeled and so organized. There is only one constraint on my approach, that would be the fact that any possible information can be laid out for examination in such a manner. If you can show me a set of references to concepts which cannot be so laid out, then you have found a flaw in my organizational procedure. Or, if you can show me a flaw in the deductions based on such a layout, you have found a flaw in my deductions and my results are not supported. However, baring those two factors, I am free to lay out the information any way I wish. Think of it as a layout of coded data where no key to the decoding exists. All information available to us must be retrieved from that information itself a very strange problem indeed.

It is very important that I do not claim to be able to say anything about reality at all. All I am talking about is the consequence of laying data out in such a manner. Those consequences are very surprising in view of the fact that I am making utterly no constraint on the information being analyzed. In fact, it is the position of the scientific community that I could deduce absolutely nothing of significance. Either I have made a subtle error or what I do has very significant and far reaching consequences. If you can point out a significant error (see the above two factors), I would appreciate it very much.
Do you contemplate using different algebras (quaternions, matrix algebras, von Neumann algebras, etc.) for the values of your outputs? Does your general functional notation encapsulate such structure, or do you not need them?Not for the outputs of my generalized functions \vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t). However, I will make direct use of matrix algebra quite soon. And down the road, some of the results I will obtain can quite likely be expressed through some of the other mathematical methods you refer to but I won't be using them directly. Actually everything I do is pretty simple and straight forward considering the consequences.

I hope my comments are clear to you -- Dick

selfAdjoint

Jun14-05, 08:57 AM

Paul Martin

Jun14-05, 10:02 AM

Since we do not observe complex valued quantities in our experience, do you plan to translate the complex variables back into reals some way? With all due respect, can you give me a single example of an observation of a real valued quantity in our experience where the real value is not also a rational value?

Paul

zeithief

Jun15-05, 01:56 AM

hmm... after reading so many pages of this thread i've come to this conclusion : Our brain (or whatever that is causing us to think ) isnt 'powerful' enough to solve the many questions that we ask eg. How did the universe start? Now, i think even if there are creatures or aliens who is more intelligent then us (please do not tell me to define intelligence) who can answer this question 'How did the universe start?' there will be more questions like 'Why did it start?' 'What causes it'.
Btw, even IF we can decribe everything using mathematics, how can we know that our mathematics is accurate to decribe it? Therefore, we need something to prove our maths. BUT we need another 'thing' to prove the thing that proves our math. Therefore, we end up questioning and proving forever. I like (with no scientific evidences) to think that the world that we observe (however wrong our observation might be) can be explained by physics(mathematics) (however wrong our maths and physics might be) as long as our observations matches with our equations, we should be happy.
My 2cents worth

Doctordick

Jun16-05, 07:31 PM

Yes, thanks. So I think you contemplate possible math structure between your real variable inputs and your complex variable outputs. Now I have another dumb question. Since we do not observe complex valued quantities in our experience, do you plan to translate the complex variables back into reals some way? Of course you recall that this was a big deal in quantum mechanics where Born interpreted the square of the complex wave function, \psi\psi^* as a real probability.Oh yes, I am going to show the existence of what one would call a "math structure" between the "real" arguments and those complex outputs. But that issue is still down the line a little way.

And I am well aware of Born's interpretation; however, I am sort of developing it from the opposite direction. (You should be pretty well aware of the fact that I tend to look at things from the other direction. :biggrin:) By the way, with regard to the issue of "ignorance" vs "indifference" in the Noether theorem, suppose the universe contained a special point somewhere out there (call it God's survey point; which mankind might someday discover) and that the "correct" solution to the universe depended on where you were relative to that point. Certainly, until we discovered where that point was, any solution to any problem involving that fact would still be governed by Noether's theorem. Yet you really couldn't say we were "indifferent" to its existence.

In my definition of "an explanation", the explanation must yield one's expectations. One's expectations must be expressible as probabilities of possible outcomes. And, finally, the fact that any probability relationship can be represented via Born's "square of a complex wave function" completes the definition of a universal representation of our expectations. (Note that the word "wave" is not necessary to my presentation and you should keep in mind that tabular relationships are valid members of the collection of possible functions.) I take the issue of avoiding constraints on my "Dewey Decimal" type procedure very seriously.

The central issue of my attack is that there exists no problem which cannot be so represented. I do not believe this is exactly what Born had in mind at the time. I am pretty sure that his idea developed from the structure of the solution space for mechanical problems expressed in Hamilton-Jocobi mechanics. At least, that was the way I was introduced to the founding of quantum theory. The text we used when I was a graduate student was Classical Mechanics by Herbert Goldstein, sixth edition, 1959. I still have my copy and think it is one of the best discussions of classical mechanics extant. I used to know everything in there, but I have noticed over the last twenty years that my abilities to remember stuff has declined significantly (I am glad I kept the book).

I am enjoying talking to you.

Have fun -- Dick

Doctordick

Jun16-05, 07:50 PM

hmm... after reading so many pages of this thread i've come to this conclusion : Our brain (or whatever that is causing us to think ) isnt 'powerful' enough to solve the many questions that we ask eg. Well, perhaps not logically; but I think I would actually differ with you on that issue too! Meanwhile, I certainly think it is "powerful" enough (when one allows those illogical intuitive solutions I call squinking (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=222763#post222763)) to come up with a possible solution to almost anything.
How did the universe start? Now, i think even if there are creatures or aliens who is more intelligent then us (please do not tell me to define intelligence) who can answer this question 'How did the universe start?' there will be more questions like 'Why did it start?' 'What causes it'.Well, a lot of people out there think (or should I say squink) that "God" just thought it up. Prove that answer is wrong if you can. :rofl: :rofl:
Btw, even IF we can decribe everything using mathematics, how can we know that our mathematics is accurate to decribe it? Therefore, we need something to prove our maths. BUT we need another 'thing' to prove the thing that proves our math. Therefore, we end up questioning and proving forever. I like (with no scientific evidences) to think that the world that we observe (however wrong our observation might be) can be explained by physics(mathematics) (however wrong our maths and physics might be) as long as our observations matches with our equations, we should be happy.
My 2cents worthSo, you apparently put a high value on internal consistency and logic. Are you willing to lay aside your intuition (when you do exact science) or not? :biggrin: We have to establish our priorities here!

Have fun -- Dick

digiflux

Jun21-05, 10:57 AM

"Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
_____________________

Everything, with the exception of the mystifying mass fluctuations of Oprah's butt.

Philocrat

Jul26-05, 08:26 AM

"Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
_____________________

Everything, with the exception of the mystifying mass fluctuations of Oprah's butt.

Oprah's butt is no exception to the rule. If we know about it, then it's explainable. Oprahs butt may fluctuate (infact as radically as it may seem) but at least it is still matter......and within the explanatory realm of physics. In fact, the standard assumption is that if it is matter, then physics should be able to explain it! As you can see the thread is getting more and more mathematical (thanks to Dr. Dick). May be you should ask him to subject the fluctauting part of Oprah's butt to pure mathematical examination or description. As you may well remember, I started this thread with a complete distrust of probabilistic explanations.....eg. "OPRAH'S BUTT IS AN APPROXIMATION OF A BUTT!" or "I AM AN APPROXIMATION OF A MAN!" ...... and so on. Of course, everything seems to fluctutate or have an aspect that fluctuates, hence creating an impression that there is some sort of deficit in the structure and function of it. In terms of Oprah's butt, it is not clear what deficit needs to be added to it to generate or give a 'Real' butt.

NOTE: The issue is not about what is out there, or what we are aware of or not aware of, but soley about whether we can explain everything humanly conceivable purely from the point of view of physics. But so far the debate seems to suggest that not everything that we are aware of is explainable by pure physics such as the human minds, angels, gods, souls,etc. There is another fundamental problem: we do not even know how many catigories of things are there in the universe, let alone the claim of explaining them in a single leap of fate! Well, on this one your guess is as good as mine!

selfAdjoint

Jul26-05, 08:57 AM

But so far the debate seems to suggest that not everything that we are aware of is explainable by pure physics such as the human minds, angels, gods, souls,etc.

Minds I will accept, but those others you mention are not agreed to exist, nor have any good evidence for their existence been posted.

And of coourse whether minds can possibly, eventually, be explained by physics is the subject of a number of threads on these philosophy subforums.

Philocrat

Jul26-05, 09:59 AM

Minds I will accept, but those others you mention are not agreed to exist, nor have any good evidence for their existence been posted.

And of coourse whether minds can possibly, eventually, be explained by physics is the subject of a number of threads on these philosophy subforums.

Would you be prepared to accept the Mind as a Fundamental Metaphysical Catigory, given that Matter is irreducible to nothing else but itself? I raised this issue of irreduciblility of matter to anything else but itself earlier on and no one seems to respond to it, perhaps everyone is agreeing with me about it. If so, good for them. But there is now an urgent need to state and agree on other existing metaphysical catigories, if any, namely (1) Nothing, (2) Mind, (3) Person etc.

Metaphysically, matter is self-standing and self-identifying as a fundamental metaphysical catigory, despite its spooky multi-status nature. That is, matter may multiply into many things or forms, yet it forever remains what it is - Matter! The pressing question now is: how does matter fundamentally relate to other metpahysical catigories, if such catigories really exist in the first place? This is a priceless question that demands an immediate answer. If for an argument's sake that you'er right about non-existence of other such catigories as angels, ghosts, gods etc, are you prepared to admit the mind that you most favour as a self-standing, self-dentifying metaphysical catigory? If so, how does it relate structurally and functionally to its counterpart metaphysical catigory - matter? You see, we are back to square one, almost!

selfAdjoint

Jul26-05, 03:37 PM

Would you be prepared to accept the Mind as a Fundamental Metaphysical Catigory, given that Matter is irreducible to nothing else but itself?

Matter can be regarded as a derived concept, since its commonly accepted properties (localization, mass, etc.) are now seen as either special circumstances of quantum fields or the result of interactions between fields. So I think that the current scientific candidate for a basic physical category is the quantum field. In the formal metaphysics of academic philosophy, "mind" may be a separate category from anything physical, but I don't accept this as constraining my own beliefs. I think that consciousness including mystical experiences will yet be shown to be completely reducible to brain chemistry and physics, and the hard problem will turn out to be a "category error".

vanesch

Jul26-05, 11:45 PM

I think that consciousness including mystical experiences will yet be shown to be completely reducible to brain chemistry and physics, and the hard problem will turn out to be a "category error".

I think that the *behavioural aspects* (and hence all that is experimentally measurable about it) will indeed be completely reducible to brain chemistry and physics ; but I don't see how this will solve any issue concerning the hard problem.
Let us imagine that we have superduper biophysical technology, and that you can now transpose "I-experiences" from one person to another, interchange them etc...
So you exchange them between two persons (or, for that matter, between a person and an elephant). After the experiment, the person who did the "mind travelling" tells you about all the weird observations, the strange sensation of being an elephant, he correctly tells you stuff only the elephant knew (namely how he remembers being badly treated when he was a young animal etc...).
Now, does that tell you much about his consciousness, or even WHETHER the person has a consciousness ? No, it just tells you things about the complicated relationship between the chemistry and physics in his brain, connected to the machine and the brain of the elephant, his nerves and muscles of his vocal chords which uttered the words he's been telling you. And if you know all of the necessary chemistry and physics, you could even predict this, voice intonations included (or at least explain it amongst different possibilities). So you are just observing a complicated physical construction which has some behavior you understand. And you STILL don't know if it is conscious or not. You assume it is, by analogy. And that's all you can do.
The only thing you can do is to connect YOURSELF to the machine, and live the weird experience of being an elephant yourself. And now YOU remember stuff of being an elephant, experiences which strongly resemble what the other person told you. And you say, that's normal because my consciousness being associated with the physical structure which is my brain, observes similar physical processes as what happened to the brain of the other person. As you now know how those brains function physically, it explains you your experiences. Because you know you are conscious yourself, you can thus relate the physics of your brain to your consciousness which observes your brain passively. But you can only know things about the physical brain of others, not about their consciousness (which might very well not exist). You can learn about how other brains relate to what their bodies tell you afterwards, and you can observe for yourself that you have similar experiences. But that still doesn't indicate whether those other persons have a consciousness. The hard problem remains intact.

Now, of course as long as we take on the working hypothesis that living persons are "just as conscious as I am" by analogy, we might have the illusion that we know what we are talking about.
The real issue will come up when we will start to make very complicated machines that have conscious-like behavior build into them. Are they, or aren't they conscious ? No way to know ! Ever. You (as many disciplines do!) can get out of the riddle by just redefining what you mean by "consciousness" of course - like behaviouralists do, and like neurologists do. But the "I think therefor I am" kind of consciousness can never behaviorally be determined in something else but yourself - it is a passive observer which doesn't influence any physical process. So how do you know whether a physical construction is being "passively observed by a consciousness" or not ?

EDIT: to push this into a carricatural example, I could claim that polycrystaline granite blocks of more than 2 kg, which are not too damaged, are also conscious. They feel pain each time that a crystal is broken (just as a neurologist could tell us that "the brain feels pain if these neurons in that corner fire"). How are you going to contradict this ?

selfAdjoint

Jul27-05, 10:45 AM

vanesch

Jul27-05, 11:17 AM

I don't think your examples are very relevant. Suppose they had a machine they could hook up to you and make you conscious of whatever they set the machine to, and did many double blind experiements to verify that yes, their machine settings did agree with what you reported being conscious of, including whatever aspects of the "flavor" of the experience could be reported. Then that would convince me they understood consciouness, and I would regard demurs about "what it was like" to be just quibbles.

It wouldn't convince me. It would convince me that they perfectly know how human brains work, as physical devices. But what is the difference between setting up a machine that couples to a human brain and makes the human say things about what he experiences, and between programming a computer and make the computer say things about "what he experiences" ? This, to me, indicates only that the programmer knows well his computer. It doesn't indicate to me that the computer is conscious. Now, you can say, ok, they don't know anything about consciousness _in general_ but they now do know something about _human_ consciousness.
Ok, then, so "doing things to a human body" and "know what the human will experience" is a proof that you know about human consciousness ? Does that mean that when I tell you: "look at that movie on the screen" and you then say afterwards "gee, I saw a nice movie" that I "know about human consciousness" ??
You'll object that that is not sophisticated enough. Ok, I guess that all neural coupling to the senses is not good enough, because it is just neurology of the senses, and not yet of consciousness. So, if I could give you some stuff that makes you DRUNK, does that mean that I know about consciousness ?
No, you still mean more sophisticated. If I can make a contact to your brain so that I can read your memory, does that mean I know about consciousness ? No, I just know about the memory function of the brain. I could even CHANGE your memories (cfr "total recall" :-) and that just shows I know about the memory function of your brain.
If I could visualise on a screen what you are thinking, I still don't master your "consciousness" but your cortex processing ; I could even ALTER what you are thinking and I still do not have anything to do with your consciousness.
The only thing you learn from this is that I know very well how your brain physically works, and WHAT ASPECTS OF IT are experienced by your consciousness. But I can still not find out if a piece of granite is conscious or not, and whether it hurts when I break it.

To put it differently, can your machine also be used to couple to a computer's consciousness, to make it happy or sad ? And how do you know ? Or is the computer just running its program and by analysing the code, you "understand" how it works ?

selfAdjoint

Jul27-05, 04:32 PM

They already have software that interprets a monkey's visual experiences sufficiently well that the monkey can learn to use it to direct his arm to a target. So I think in the future they will have the kind of capability I mentioned.

The machine I mentioned does not force the subject to say anything. Calibration would have to deal with all the variables of human interaction, including lying, fantasy, etc. Did you see where I said double blind? The experimenters would not know, nor would the subjects, what settings had been chosen. Only after the interaction would the subject's responses be compared to the settings.

vanesch

Jul27-05, 04:57 PM

The machine I mentioned does not force the subject to say anything. Calibration would have to deal with all the variables of human interaction, including lying, fantasy, etc. Did you see where I said double blind? The experimenters would not know, nor would the subjects, what settings had been chosen. Only after the interaction would the subject's responses be compared to the settings.

Yes, fascinating stuff all this. But it is physics and chemistry of the brain. Nothing to do with consciousness. Imagine that we know EVERYTHING about all the neurons in a typical human brain, and that we have identified that when THIS neuron fires, the subject feels sad, when THAT neuron fires, he sees a red flash in the upper right corner of his left eye, when such a neuron fires, he thinks about "additivity", when that other neuron fires, he feels pain in his left foot...
With all this detailed knowledge, I can build your machine.
What do we know now about consciousness ?

vanesch

Jul27-05, 11:53 PM

To give the discussion another twist, if you say that studying the brain enough so that we can "pilot" someone's conscious experience for instance, does that mean that what constitutes consciousness is a classical property of the brain ? I mean, do you think that consciousness (I'm not talking about intelligence, memory, sensory capacity etc...) as you think it can be described, is fully described by a classical theory of the brain, and that you do not fundamentally need to refer to its quantum state ? (meaning: concentrations of chemicals at different points, given by a finite but big number of reals etc...)
If so, I'd argue in the following way: is it the specific topology of the phase space of that classical brain that makes it "conscious" ? If so, are OTHER classical devices with a phase space with very similar (or identical) topology conscious ?

loseyourname

Jul30-05, 04:23 AM

If so, are OTHER classical devices with a phase space with very similar (or identical) topology conscious ?

That seems to be what the popular writers around here think (Dennett and Chalmers most explicitly) and of course its the idea behind a lot of science fiction involving conscious machines.

Philocrat

Aug9-05, 02:56 PM

Matter can be regarded as a derived concept, since its commonly accepted properties (localization, mass, etc.) are now seen as either special circumstances of quantum fields or the result of interactions between fields. So I think that the current scientific candidate for a basic physical category is the quantum field. In the formal metaphysics of academic philosophy, "mind" may be a separate category from anything physical, but I don't accept this as constraining my own beliefs. I think that consciousness including mystical experiences will yet be shown to be completely reducible to brain chemistry and physics, and the hard problem will turn out to be a "category error".

Yes, "category error" indeed it shall be! Worst stiil, it would be an absolute disgrace to suddenly dawn on all those involved that all there is to the notion of a "person" is matter playing very notorious tricks on the entire human perception. That all there is to a person is matter "multiply self-catogorising" into several of the same kind without in actuality manifesting into fundamental metaphisical catigories that may be construed as self-standing and self-identifying! Pure fiction, that is! There will be a voice from the crowed crying "So we were machines all along without knowing!"

NOTE: One thing self-categorising into several forms of the same kind is a possibility that cannot be easily rulled out. As spooky as this may outwardly seem, matter tends to possess this spooky aspect. I guess the sooner we admit this, the earlier we would make a headstart and home in on the heart of the matter. Or is it?

Philocrat

Aug9-05, 03:19 PM

I think that the *behavioural aspects* (and hence all that is experimentally measurable about it) will indeed be completely reducible to brain chemistry and physics ; but I don't see how this will solve any issue concerning the hard problem.
Let us imagine that we have superduper biophysical technology, and that you can now transpose "I-experiences" from one person to another, interchange them etc...
So you exchange them between two persons (or, for that matter, between a person and an elephant). After the experiment, the person who did the "mind travelling" tells you about all the weird observations, the strange sensation of being an elephant, he correctly tells you stuff only the elephant knew (namely how he remembers being badly treated when he was a young animal etc...).
Now, does that tell you much about his consciousness, or even WHETHER the person has a consciousness ? No, it just tells you things about the complicated relationship between the chemistry and physics in his brain, connected to the machine and the brain of the elephant, his nerves and muscles of his vocal chords which uttered the words he's been telling you. And if you know all of the necessary chemistry and physics, you could even predict this, voice intonations included (or at least explain it amongst different possibilities). So you are just observing a complicated physical construction which has some behavior you understand. And you STILL don't know if it is conscious or not. You assume it is, by analogy. And that's all you can do.
The only thing you can do is to connect YOURSELF to the machine, and live the weird experience of being an elephant yourself. And now YOU remember stuff of being an elephant, experiences which strongly resemble what the other person told you. And you say, that's normal because my consciousness being associated with the physical structure which is my brain, observes similar physical processes as what happened to the brain of the other person. As you now know how those brains function physically, it explains you your experiences. Because you know you are conscious yourself, you can thus relate the physics of your brain to your consciousness which observes your brain passively. But you can only know things about the physical brain of others, not about their consciousness (which might very well not exist). You can learn about how other brains relate to what their bodies tell you afterwards, and you can observe for yourself that you have similar experiences. But that still doesn't indicate whether those other persons have a consciousness. The hard problem remains intact.

Now, of course as long as we take on the working hypothesis that living persons are "just as conscious as I am" by analogy, we might have the illusion that we know what we are talking about.
The real issue will come up when we will start to make very complicated machines that have conscious-like behavior build into them. Are they, or aren't they conscious ? No way to know ! Ever. You (as many disciplines do!) can get out of the riddle by just redefining what you mean by "consciousness" of course - like behaviouralists do, and like neurologists do. But the "I think therefor I am" kind of consciousness can never behaviorally be determined in something else but yourself - it is a passive observer which doesn't influence any physical process. So how do you know whether a physical construction is being "passively observed by a consciousness" or not ?

EDIT: to push this into a carricatural example, I could claim that polycrystaline granite blocks of more than 2 kg, which are not too damaged, are also conscious. They feel pain each time that a crystal is broken (just as a neurologist could tell us that "the brain feels pain if these neurons in that corner fire"). How are you going to contradict this ?

Your analysis seems to decisively write off the mind as a fundamental metaphysical category, even while you are still generously hanging on to the "hard-problem" spectre. Equally, don't forget that far back in the history of philosophy there are some philosophers that have thought of the mind as a different form of matter, possibly governed by completely different set of laws of physics. If this were to be true, this could very well be the same matter self-catigorising again into an extremely decisive form.... a very peculiar one, that is. In other words, mind is decisively matter! Or is it?

outsider

Aug9-05, 09:39 PM

2 + 2 = 4. What does this mathematical equation tell us? It tells me that the author does not know mathematics. I am interpreting this using base 3. Aren't you? If not, how would we know? Mathematics must be interpreted. Such interpretation is not within the math, but is beyond the math. Mathematics is a tool, not an end in itself.

checkmate :smile:

outsider

Aug9-05, 09:49 PM

Philocrat

Aug10-05, 11:54 AM

can physics explain the posts on this thread? how do we quantify these thoughts and arguments?

Where do these thoughts lead to in the physical world? To all physical actions there must first be a mental aspect triggered from a previous influence (physical / mental).

There are far too many posts for me to read on this thread... but that's my POV.

There is a close resemblance between your thought and your name......"An outsider looking in". Or am I wrong?. Anyway, there is a substantial elements of truth in your thought. Quantifying the contents of this thread is one thing and loggically reconciling them in a coherent way is another. There are many mathemticians on this forum who can piece all the texts on this thread together, but the tricky bit is logically reconciling all the underlying and related thoughts to derive at a generally acceptable conclusion.

As you may well have noticed, all the thoughts so far generated on this thread are multi-disciplinary in scope and in substance, hence precisely why it is even more difficult to reconcile them, let alone come to a common conclusion. The underlying tasks in this discuss are undisputedly immense. The problem gets even worse when there is a huge divisionism between disciplines. Look at the result of th survey to at least get a glimpse of what I am getting at here. Until all the disciplines involved begin to accept the fact that there is no significant difference in what they are trying to explain at their specific scale or layer of reference, then we should all kiss goodbye to any form of progress in this project!

What I am trying to say here is that if there is any difference whatsoever between disciplines, it is only by layer or scale of reference. Therefore, whatever conclusions that they derive at in their overall explantions of this same subject matter must inevitably reconcile both quantitatively and logically. There ought to be neither a metaphysically vexing remainder nor a quantitativelly and logically irreconcilable deficit in a mutidisciplinarily derived explanation of this subject matter. That would be the day!

saviourmachine

Aug11-05, 10:50 AM

Matrix mechanics
With regard to the issue of mathematics and simplicity, do you have any knowledge of matrix mechanics or matrix multiplication? I am wondering if I will have to teach you the subject as it comes up pretty quickly from where we are at the moment.Aah. The basic concepts about matrix multiplication etc, I know. I did my bachelor electrical engineering (e.m. waves etc). I'll say it, if something is too difficult for me. I don't know a thing about Heisenberg's matrix mechanics. I forgot a lot about Schrödinger's equation. It was thrown at me in a course about semiconductor physics. :cry:

Probability theory
(Just as an aside, there is an individual out there who has some major difficulties with probability theory and is getting a reception roughly equivalent to the one I manage to generate with authorities. I have a strong suspicion his complaints are very rational.)Interesting. And that's not Stephen Jay Gould in "Full house" I guess... :smile: Who is it? What is his/her message?

Dot product
Now add to the above the standard definition of a "dot" product of vectors (seen as a definition of a procedure) and the notation \vec{G}^\dagger \cdot \vec{G} results in a sum over a collection of positive real numbers which must be positive definite. Lastly, the sum over all possibilities (or the integral if the number of possibilities is infinite) must be greater than any sum (or integral) over any sub set of possibilities. It follows that

1 \geq
\frac{ { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} }{ { { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} } }
\geq 0

so long as the denominator is summed (or integrated) over all possibilities.I am clueless about what you're doing overhere. You defined an universal function: G, linking a list input numbers with a list results. You defined it's adjoint. Okay. And now you're defining a dot product of these functions. Does that have any meaning? And subsequently taking a volume integral. Does that mean anything? Or are that conventional mathematical tricks that always apply?
Recapitulation. Taken into consideration the tabel C we talked about. G does map the B's in that tabel to another tabel with a same amount of entries, but with only two columns (the real and imaginary part). The dot product between G and \vec{G}^\dagger does lead us to another tabel with one column. This column is integrated n times, each time over one of his (n) elements.

Psi function
If follows that, if one defines the function \vec{\Psi} via

\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t) \equiv \frac{ \vec{G}(\vec{x},t) }{ { \sqrt{ \oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} dv} } }

we can "define" the probability of the B_j to be given by

P(\vec{x},t) = \vec{\Psi}^\dagger(\vec{x},t)\cdot\vec{\Psi}(\vec{ x},t)dv

where dv \equiv d^n x .Ah, there we have our old familiar P again. I don't know how you did achieve that. :eek: It's pretty if it's right. It's like Euler's formula connecting pi, e, and i in some magical way. o:) Can you explain why you did take a square root? Can you explain why the probability P is given by \vec{\Psi} and its adjoint? What kind of value is the denominator?

Rewriting the psi function
Finally, since we want to work with \vec{\Psi}, we need to re-express the relationships developed earlier in terms of the probability. The relationships already written may be rewritten as

\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, i \kappa \vec{\Psi}\,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}\,=\, im\vec{\Psi}

This can be proved quite simply. The complex conjugates of the above expressions are,

\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -i \kappa \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \,\,\,and\,\,\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger\,=\, -im\vec{\Psi}^\dagger .
And this is quite difficult for me too. Is this matrix mechanics?

Result
This, together with the chain rule of calculus guarantees that any \vec{\Psi} which satisfies the above relations also satisfies the relation on the probability stated earlier. In the interest of saving space, I will show the result explicitly for the time derivative (the derivatives with respect to the arguments x_i go through exactly the same.

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}P(\vec{x},t)

=\,\, \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \right) \cdot \vec{\Psi}+\vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot
\left( {\frac{ \partial}{ \partial t}} \vec{\Psi} \right)

=\,\, -im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}+im \vec{\Psi}^\dagger \cdot \vec{\Psi}\,\,=\,\,0.And, yes, the result is that the derivative of P with respect to t is zero. And I trust you that the others will be zero as well. :smile: It's difficult for me to follow this, but I hope that I lack only a few basic physical or mathematical concepts. If you're not disappointed I hope you'll continue your lectures. :biggrin: See you soon!

Andy

Doctordick

Aug12-05, 09:20 PM

The tricky bit is logically reconciling all the underlying and related thoughts to derive at a generally acceptable conclusion.Reconciling all the underlying and related thoughts? Isn't that "internal self consistency"?
... let alone come to a common conclusion.We have lots of common conclusions; what is necessary is to expand that commonality. Find and expand agreements which are applicable to that underlying immense task.
The problem gets even worse when there is a huge divisionism between disciplines.What you are talking about here is the extremely closed minded approach taken be all. Everyone wants their point of view to be the perspective in which the solution is to be expressed. (That doesn't require them to understand others.) :rofl:
Until all the disciplines involved begin to accept the fact that there is no significant difference in what they are trying to explain at their specific scale or layer of reference, then we should all kiss goodbye to any form of progress in this project!I could not agree more; and you might as well kiss the idea of progress goodbye. All we have going on here is a bunch of people stirring that pot of confused and ill defined concepts with the forlorn hope that some great solution will float to the top. They need to carefully examine those concepts and define exactly what they are trying to express. They might begin to see some of the problems with their ideas.
...whatever conclusions that they derive at in their overall explanations of this same subject matter must inevitably reconcile both quantitatively and logically. Again, I agree with you completely.
There ought to be neither a metaphysically vexing remainder nor a quantitatively and logically irreconcilable deficit in a multidisciplinary derived explanation of this subject matter. That would be the day!And the day could be at hand if egos could be laid aside and a little serious thought put into the problem. The problem with the reconciliation is the fundamental failure of these people to communicate. I say it has to do with the vagueness of the language they use and they all deny they are being vague and refuse to worry about the issue of definition at all. They all know there personal concepts are as clear as glass; why should they bother with definition?

They are all, within their own private "disciplines", attempting to find explanations of the things that interest them. So, if we are looking for multidisciplinary agreement, shouldn't our first concern be, "exactly what do you mean by 'an explanation'"? Apparently not. Everybody here seems to believe that they "know" exactly what is and is not an acceptable explanation". If they are correct, how come there is so much argument over the acceptability of each others "explanations"?

I have proposed an abstract mathematically exact definition of "an explanation" (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm) in an attempt to expand that commonality in thought required and received not the first interest in examining the consequences of that definition. Do I get any discussion? No, what I get is, "That's not the correct definition!" (I wouldn't really mind if they gave me a good definition of what they think they are talking about; but they don't.) If the issue of explanation is not approached, how can anyone expect to achieve a multidisciplinary explanation of anything? I would like to talk about it if you are interested.

And, Andy, it is good to hear from you. I had about given up hope. You have asked some very good questions (with deeper significance than what might appear on the surface) and I want to think them over carefully as I answer. I will post a reply within the week.

Have fun -- Dick

Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

coanacl

Aug13-05, 11:29 PM

If you mean physics in it's present form that answer is absolutely not! But since physics is a growing discipline (it alters itself as new realities become apparent), you have to say that eventually the science will gain ground on the new realities.

But you have to wonder if it has any chance in some realms.

For example, do you remember the old hypothetical 2 dimensional world "Planeverse"? How could their science ever hope to describe our world, not to mention a 9th dimensional world.

Paul Martin

Aug14-05, 11:08 AM

For example, do you remember the old hypothetical 2 dimensional world "Planeverse"? How could their science ever hope to describe our world, not to mention a 9th dimensional world.The answer to your question seems pretty clear to me. The answer is by mathematics and imagination.

First of all, if their "Planeverse" were curved so that the Pythagorean Theorem didn't apply everywhere, such as if part of their Planeverse was part of the surface of a 3D sphere, they would be able to detect this fact by 2D measurements of features of their world. This should give them the hint that there might be extra spatial dimensions that are inaccessible to them. Then they could use mathematics to deduce what type of 3D structures might be possible in a 3D world and how those structures might behave according to laws of physics that could also be inferred from mathematics.

I think this scenario should also apply to us. We know from direct measurements of our universe that it is curved. This should give us the hint that there might be extra inaccessible spatial dimensions (and I know of no cogent reason why those extra dimensions must be "curled up".) Next, I think we could make some progress if we investigated the constraints and possiblities for hyper-dimensional structures and processes using mathematics, and then looking for manifestations of those structures and processes that might be evident in our 3D world. This might be analogous, for example, to an inaccessible 3D object casting a shadow on the Planeverse which might be detectable by its inhabitants and which might reveal something about the 3D object.

Nine dimensions would be a lot harder, but we could start with four and proceed to five and work our way up. Or we could use suggestive features revealed by mathematics, such as the classification of finite groups, to suggest what might be a more fruitful approach.

coanacl

Aug14-05, 12:09 PM

The answer to your question seems pretty clear to me. The answer is by mathematics and imagination.

As I understand, it was Newton's imagination that first led him to consider the effects of gravity.

I agree that Planeverse residents would likely use their 2 dimensional mathematics to descibe the phemonena that they were observing, but it will likely be their inability to imagine the 3rd dimension that will limit the application of their science.

Doctordick

Aug15-05, 02:27 PM

Aah. The basic concepts about matrix multiplication etc, I know.Good, that's all you really need to know. If you know that, then everything else is really nothing more than logic (you can write out and look at the details of that multiplication). The really important aspect of matrix multiplication (in so far as physics is concerned: i.e., the reason we will want to use them) is that it is possible to construct "anti-commutating" matrices. Anti-commutation (a*b=-b*a) allows us to establish a very valuable "logical" relationships: i.e., we can define an expression (a symbol for something) consistent with the concept of multiplication where (ab-ba) is not zero. The true value of being able to do that is that it allows us to write some very complex relationships in a manner which appears to be simple. I don't know; could that be called the essence of "reductionism"? :rofl: :rofl: It seems to me that, if "reductionism" is expressing complex phenomena in simple terms, that is exactly what using "anti-commutation" is all about. I will make that clear a little further down the road.

Actually, when Dirac showed that "matrix mechanics" and "wave mechanics" were equivalent (leading to the notion that Dirac's "bra"-"ket" notation {this, < |, is a "bra" and this, | >, is a "ket"} expressed something fundamental about reality), the real essence of the thing is the ability to encompass mathematical expression of the phenomena (ab-ba) not being zero. In Dirac's notation that would be (|a><b| - <b|a>) not being zero. In his case, the symbols look quite different and confusion with ordinary "numbers" is impossible. But, as my interest is with the difference between what "really exists" and what "we presume exists", it is the relationship and the essence of reductionism which is important, not the notation.

That brings up mathematics. Mathematics is a language just like any other language (except for the care with which mathematicians have stripped it of inconsistencies). It has its grammar, syntax and vocabulary. The importance of a mathematical expression is the wide extent of rather exact communication. One should always remember that specialists in any field have a bad habit of developing "jargon" only understood by insiders (I think it's a ego protective measure) and specialty use of mathematics is as full of "jargon" as is any language. The "proper" notation is "jargon" and learning the proper "jargon" of a field is a waste of time if one fails to comprehend the essence of the concepts which gave rise to that "jargon". Sounding like you understand things is not equivalent to understanding them.
I did my bachelor electrical engineering (e.m. waves etc). I'll say it, if something is too difficult for me. I don't know a thing about Heisenberg's matrix mechanics. I forgot a lot about Schrödinger's equation. It was thrown at me in a course about semiconductor physics. :cry:The details of Heisenberg's matrix mechanics are not important at all unless one is interested in how the ideas of quantum mechanics arose historically. True relationships are seldom recognized by accident. One is usually led to them through examination of complex representations of things already known to be true. Once one begins to comprehend the structure of some complex representation, that structure itself often turns out to be a consequence of some simple ideas (reductionism again :rofl: ).

Newtonian mechanics and calculus led to a long history of problem solving techniques and it was the attempt to standardize those techniques which eventually led to quantum mechanics. Just following that sequence and how ideas lead to other ideas is a fascinating study in itself. Every serious student should be taken through that development in detail just to understand how simplicity arises from complexity.
Probability theoryJust as an aside, there is an individual out there who has some major difficulties with probability theory and is getting a reception roughly equivalent to the one I manage to generate with authorities. I have a strong suspicion his complaints are very rational.Interesting. And that's not Stephen Jay Gould in "Full house" I guess... :smile: Who is it? What is his/her message?His name is ThinhVanTran (http://www.thinhtran.com/). I ran across him when I was surfing the web; I believe it was a post he made on one of the scientific forums hosted by Yahoo but I could be wrong as it was quite a while ago. He has a web site at the link above. Since my work is a direct consequence of careful examinations of the process of obtaining valid expectations, I wanted to know exactly what his complaint was. After all, my work is essentially making an accurate estimate of probabilities (expectations) based on information without any knowledge of what the information represents (since "what it means" has to be derived from it and nothing else). So I took the trouble to get in touch with him.

He sent me a copy of his book and I corresponded with him for a while. I read his book very carefully and came to the conclusion that he may have something. I told him that his approach was wrong and that, if he wants to get his ideas published, he should lean on the experimental data and not worry about why it's wrong. Just show the details of his calculations and his assumptions and how the results differ from reality. Finish with the correction factor as a simple phenomenological correction. If others are having the same problem, the existence of the problem will become evident and others will use the correction factor. (He might tell them in an appendix how he came up with the correction but don't make a claim that it's the only explanation.) But he has already decided he knows where the problem is and wants everyone to recognize that he is right and they are wrong (actually, that sort of sounds like what people think I am doing :rolf:).

After reading his thesis, I was satisfied that it has no bearing on my work. Essentially what he says is that there is a constraint on the calculations which the professionals are not taking into account (having to do with the finite nature of reality). That constraint is that the probability calculations must agree with the historical results. Since the universe is finite, the historical results cannot contain some of those very very improbable possibilities. This fact skews the "correct" results away from the standard probability calculations. That is, the very probable events must be slightly more probable than probability theory says they are. He has created a correction factor based on that analysis and his calculated results agree with experience. The problem is that his correction looks too much like a phenomenological correction factor for some element being left out of his calculations and that is precisely the explanation the authorities jump to.

That doesn't bother me in the least as my whole attack is to find the consequences of requiring a "theory" to be consistent with the known information on a probabilistic basis. That is almost exactly the problem he is talking about. At any rate, I have been unable to sway him and his stuff will probably never be published. They won't publish him, instead they just tell him he is not doing his calculations correctly and that the distributions will never be exactly what he calculates anyway as that is the nature of probability. That is, "he's not an authority and can't possibly be correct". :biggrin:
Dot product
I am clueless about what you're doing overhere. You defined an universal function: G, linking a list input numbers with a list results.No, I didn't define any function at all. What I am doing is defining a way of representing a function (a notation or a symbol for a function). The central issue being that any and all conceivable functions can be so represented. The notation puts no constraint whatsoever on the function under discussion; the function itself is undefined, it is an unknown. "A is a function of B" means nothing more or less than the fact that, if B is known, A is known. Since anything can be represented by a set of numbers (a set of labels), both A and B can be seen as a set of numbers no matter what they are. In order to represent something significant, they must be properly defined; but, what is important here is that by approaching the issue in an abstract manner, we can put off the definition until later. The function is nothing except the answer to the question: if I have a specific B, what A do I have? The function (that specific answer) is "an unknown"; something we would like to know. It is thus a valid abstract representation of any question and its answer. Now don't confuse the words "valid" and "useful"; I said it was valid but I didn't say anything about its usefulness other than the accuracy of the abstract concept itself.
You defined it's adjoint. Okay. And now you're defining a dot product of these functions. Does that have any meaning?The process I am describing has only one purpose. The purpose is to define a universal representation of a procedure which will convert any arbitrary function into a function where A (the result) is a positive definite number. I do that because I want to express "expectations" (what I expect to be true). The point is that my expectations constitute something which can be represented by a probability: a positive definite number between zero and one. Except for magnitude (which is just a measure of size) the dot product I have defined always qualifies.

What I have shown is that any specific answer to any question which can be answered via a probability weighted yes/no answer can be represented by the dot product of \vec{\Psi} with its complex conjugate. That is, if a method of obtaining the answer exists, that method is a member of the set of all possible function. Obviously, if it isn't a member of the set of all possible functions, the method doesn't exist. If a method of answering the question doesn't exist, the question cannot be answered via any attack. What we are talking about is the problem of selecting the correct answer from the collection of all possible answers.
And subsequently taking a volume integral.

1 \geq
\frac{ { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} }{ { { \int \int \cdots \int \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} \, d^n x} } }
\geq 0Note that the structure of the numerator and the denominator are exactly the same. The only thing which makes them different is the comment; "so long as the denominator is summed (or integrated) over all possibilities. What range the numerator is to be summed (or integrated) over is left open. Since the dot product is positive definite, the sum (or integral) is monotonically increasing real number no matter how the sum (or integral) is done. The expression can be interpreted as a probability of various "B's" (that collection of labels which define a specific answer). If that sum (or integral) is over all possibilities, the result is exactly one (the standard constraint on "probability").
Does that mean anything? Or are they conventional mathematical tricks that always apply?Not really. What I am doing is laying out a specific procedure for creating a functional relationship which can always be interpreted as a probability. What is important here is that no constraints of any kind have been placed on the underlying functional relationship (that unknown \vec{\Psi}). Again, if a method for obtaining those expectations exists, then a \vec{\Psi} which will yield them must exist. Actually, what I have just given you is not really a proof of that assertion; however, it is not difficult to construct a proof that the assertion is true. If you want the proof, let me know and I will lay it out for you in detail.
Recapitulation. Taken into consideration the table C we talked about. G does map the B's in that table to another table with a same amount of entries, but with only two columns (the real and imaginary part). The dot product between G and \vec{G}^\dagger does lead us to another table with one column. This column is integrated n times, each time over one of his (n) elements.I have a suspicion that you are a little confused. I am talking about two very different things here. The set C and its members B constitute what we want to explain. What I want to avoid doing is defining the elements of B as I want those definitions to be the best possible in light of that explanation which I do not yet have. That is why I am working in the abstract. I want to use numerical labels for those elements because I have a lot of those labels and they don't necessarily carry any inherent meaning. Notice that any meaning attached to the elements of B must be communicated via C anyway so there exists no reason to preemptively assign any meanings. Assigning a meaning is tantamount to claiming you know what you are talking about. Until you think you understand the problem and have some kinds of expectations, definition is pretty much a waste of time.

On the other hand, mathematics is a fairly well defined language. I can lay out specific procedures for manipulating numbers with a very strong assurance that the reader will obtain exactly the same results from that manipulation which I do. If knowledge of C (which is, by definition, a finite collection of B's) provides us with the information necessary to specify our expectations for any specific B then that knowledge will allow us to obtain those expectations from the labels which specify that B. That is, a function exists which will yield that result. That function must be a member of "all possible functions" so it must be representable by that unknown expression we are referring to as \vec{\Psi}.

Psi functionIf follows that, if one defines the function \vec{\Psi} via

\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t) \equiv \frac{ \vec{G}(\vec{x},t) }{ { \sqrt{ \oint \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} dv} } }

we can "define" the probability of the B_j to be given by

P(\vec{x},t) = \vec{\Psi}^\dagger(\vec{x},t)\cdot\vec{\Psi}(\vec{ x},t)dv

where dv \equiv d^n x . Ah, there we have our old familiar P again. I don't know how you did achieve that.It is nothing more or less than exactly what I said above. \vec{\Psi} is a magnitude adjusted version of \vec{G}, our unknown function. The dot product changes that into a simple positive definite number and the division by the sum (or integral) over \vector{G}^\dagger \cdot \vector{G} guarantees that, when we sum (or integrate) our probability over all possibilities (that is, sum or integrate the numerator), we get exactly one. You have to take a square root because the factor come into the calculation of probability twice: once from the \vec{\Psi}(\vec{x},t) and a second time from the \vec{\Psi}^\dagger(\vec{x},t).
What kind of value is the denominator?The denominator is an unknown number. It cannot be known until we establish exactly what that unknown G is. Remember, the output of G is defined to be a list of numbers and the dot product is defined to be the sum of the members of that list multiplied by their complex conjugate (which guarantees the result will be a sum of positive numbers which is a number). Since G can be any function, problems could possibly arise with the fact that the resultant number could be zero or infinity, but these are easily argued away as not really causing any difficulties at all. Again, if you need to have that demonstrated, I will do so in detail.

Rewriting the psi function

And this is quite difficult for me too. Is this matrix mechanics? No, it is just simple calculus. I am merely asserting that the solutions I quote are completely equivalent to the relationships developed earlier in terms of the probability. I then prove that statement by substituting the dot product for the probability and work out the differential via the chain rule. In order to do that, I have to know what the differential of the complex conjugate is. That is why I wrote them down specifically. The definition of the complex conjugate is nothing more than the original expression where all appearances of the imaginary number i is replaced with -i. Since the solutions I am asserting are complex entities, I need to know what the complex conjugate of the expressions are. The issue here is that requiring the differential of the probability to be zero is equivalent to requiring the differential of \vec{\Psi} to be proportional to i times the original function. When the chain rule is expanded out, the added terms cancel out.
It's difficult for me to follow this, but I hope that I lack only a few basic physical or mathematical concepts.I suspect that the biggest problem is that you are unfamiliar with the expressions I am writing down and you think there is supposed to be more than the obvious: i.e., you don't understand where I am going so the steps don't seem to be meaningful. If you still have questions about anything I have put down, please let me know. If all this makes sense to you, I will establish the final two steps and then pull all the diverse threads together.

I hope I have not run you off – Dick

Rob55

Aug17-05, 01:01 AM

I’ve got trouble with first principles of math and physics. I can't imagine physics without math - but I guess they did something like it long ago in Greece. I can imagine zero but I can’t find it in the real world. The same goes for infinity – is forever really something? And as for 1, I can hold, taste and see things that are similar but I’ve never found anything that is identical to something else. So you can see that I also have problems with 2 and equals and on and on…
However, my real problem is not how I can create an elaborate mathematics based on my creativity, but it’s when I impose these imaginary concepts on the real world, for some mysterious reason they seem to fit so well. In fact, my enthusiasm peaks every time I see a fractial fern leaf and it makes me ponder, that with hard work, it may be possible to describe everything with pure physics. But then I remember the essence of the leaf, its quality, and the old saying that existence precedes essence.

Doctordick

Aug17-05, 01:37 PM

I’ve got trouble with first principles of math and physics.First principles of mathematics is an extremely esoteric subject. A lot of it is well beyond my understanding but I have managed to pull down an overall viewpoint which makes (to me at least) sense of their approach and their results (their jargon is often beyond my comprehension). I have come to define mathematics as the invention and study of internally consistent systems (systems being any collection of "things" together with set of rules involving those "things"). That definition is a statement of what I mean when I refer to mathematics. I only make that comment because I have found it impossible to achieve agreement on this forum. Everyone else seems to think that is not the definition of mathematics but none of them have told me what they think mathematics is so I am left holding the bag.

What I think most everybody misses (particularly people ignorant of mathematics) is that numbers are mere symbols for things and that the operations (addition, multiplication, integration, ...) are just sets of rules which have been shown to establish internally consistent systems.
I can't imagine physics without math - but I guess they did something like it long ago in Greece.Well, physics is the study of reality. An attempt to explain our experiences. Now an internally inconsistent explanation is a pretty worthless thing. By definition, an internally inconsistent explanation is one which gives different answers depending on the specific path taken through the logic (that would be the supposed rules presumed by the explanation). In that case, it doesn't provide an answer so its purpose is defeated. :yuck:

Now nobody wants an inconsistent explanation of anything but we none the less use them all the time. That's because it is often very difficult to prove an explanation is internally consistent. (You should note that, if you can prove it is an internally consistent structure, mathematicians will accept it as a branch of mathematics! Think about why Newton is credited with the invention of calculus.) It follows, as the night the day, that any field which can reduce its arguments to mathematics can establish at least some real support to the idea that their explanations are at least internally self consistent. One of the problems with modern physics is that a lot of it is compartmentalized. The individual fields may be internally consistent within the field of interest but it is often very difficult to make those different fields consistent with one another. The prime example of that difficulty is the conflict between quantum and general relativity. :wink:

The conflict between quantum and general relativity rears its ugly head in tachyons, collapse of the wave function, and the fundamental inability of the physics community to set off a correct general relativistic version of quantum mechanics. What I am trying to point out to you is the fact that there are still a lot of internally inconsistent explanations in physics: i.e., it is still not possible to reduce the whole to mathematics (an internally self consistent system).

The issue I am trying to get attention to is the fact that a self consistent explanation of anything can be seen as mathematics. If physics is an explanation of reality and anything which can be explained with an internally consistent set of rules (mathematics) will be absorbed into physics (as was electricity and magnetism, which was once thought to be inexplicable) then it follows that anything which can be explained can be explained by physics. Case closed, question answered. :cool:

It is the requirement that all explanations must be internally self consistent which needs to be examined carefully. I have done that and found some very interesting consequences which are apparently of little interest to anyone. You are new to the forum and I thought I would try to make myself clear. :smile:

Have fun -- Dick

Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

Chronos

Aug18-05, 01:17 AM

It is the requirement that all explanations must be internally self consistent which needs to be examined carefully. I have done that and found some very interesting consequences which are apparently of little interest to anyone. The evidence appears to be mounting that all our models of this universe are not necessarily internally self consistent... e.g., cpt violations.

selfAdjoint

Aug18-05, 10:38 AM

The evidence appears to be mounting that all our models of this universe are not necessarily internally self consistent... e.g., cpt violations.

Experimentalists are of course eagerly looking for CPT violations, just as they eagerly look for any evidence beyond current theory. That's part of their job. But could you cite any reliable result where they have detected full CPT violation? I check the phenomenology section of the arxiv pretty frequently and I haven't seen anything. I mean here full CPT violation, not CP, which is old news ("parity violation") dating back to the 1950's with kaons and a great many observations recently with B particles (mesons containing a bottom quark).

Doctordick

Aug18-05, 09:33 PM

Hi selfAdjoint,

Note that, if their space time continuum hypothesis is erroneous, full CPT violation might be a possibility. In any case internal inconsistency is the death knell of any theory. The scientists generally avoid that particular consequence by compartmentalizing their theories. Thus they can say their theories are valid so long as you remain within the defining boundaries of the theory. A necessary cop-out as to refuse to accept anything but the final correct solution leaves them with nothing. A method of reckoning things is certain special conditions is a very valuable result; however, it's still a cop-out of a full valid explanation of what is going on. :tongue:

And Chronus, you are absolutely right. :smile: That is essentially what is meant by a TOE: an internally self consistent theory which is valid in all circumstances. And there are people who think we are close. -But they still won't pay any attention to me. - I just got a response from another "professional physicist" I managed to contact.
I am very sorry, but after a look at the second website
you mentioned (Explain) I have to tell you that there is
certainly nobody with a degree in physics who could make
sense out of this.
To give you just one technical remark: It is easily possible
to write down the general solution of your four constraints
for the function Psi: it is Psi=0.

Besides this, your attempts are much more concerned
with the Philosophy of Science than with theoretical
physics. Therefore I would urge you to please study
Karl Popper's treatise on "The Logic of Scientific Discovery".

Best wishes,
Rainer Dickhttp://physics.usask.ca/~dick/rainer.htm

Psi=0 is indeed a solution but it is certainly not a general solution by any stretch of imagination. :yuck:

Competent is not a word I would use to describe him. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl: And I am sorry if I am insensitive. :blushing:

Have fun -- Dick

Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

Bobby R

Aug23-05, 03:49 AM

Doctor D, I appreciate your comments as they make sense. Maybe you could help me on my poser:
Interestingly, our Sun oscillates in and out of the plane of the galaxy (up and down) every 70 million years (approx.). Which means we pass through the Galactic mid-plane about every 35 million years. The number of cosmic rays which hit the Earth increases during the near hundred thousand years we are closest to the Galactic plane. What happens to Earth’s temperature during this transition through the mid-plane? Could one assume influence on Earth’s magnetic field as well?
Our Sun is located in a small spiral arm we call the Orion arm (or local arm) which is really a connection between the two nearest major spiral arms (Sagittarius and Perseus). We pass through a major spiral arm about every 100 million years taking about 10 million years to go through. During the transit, there would be a higher rate of ’nearby’ supernova and possible other ’environmental stresses’ which could alter the climate of Earth.
Simply put, as our Solar System travels in Galactic orbit there are many potential stresses we can speculate ‘cause and effect’ from. Along with our Sun there are approx. 400 billion other celestial bodies in the Milky way.
One Galactic orbit of our Solar System lasts between 220 and 240 million years (very approx.) There are so many variables anything is possible! I am spacifically interested in magnetic reversal and global warming. ...Bob sends...:-)

Doctordick

Aug23-05, 04:45 PM

GSMichaels

Aug30-05, 12:52 PM

microtech

Aug30-05, 10:51 PM

Did some recent finding invalidate Gödel's incompleteness theorem?

Philocrat

Sep3-05, 11:18 AM

This is simply an age old debate famously argued by Neil Bohr and Einstein. I believe the quote was god does not "play dice." If string theory proves to have any validity then perhaps we will be able to break down the universe into mathimatical equations. The difficulty with such theories is they are very difficult to test experimentally. Although they do have plans to do so when the Large Hadron Collider is completed in France.

"God does not Play Dice with the universe" metaphysically implies (1) the Originating (Creative) States, (2) the Intermediate (Transportational) States and (3) the Destinational (Perfect) States of reality or things are qauntitatively and logically equivalent regardless of time duration within and between states, regardless of how much fluctuations exist within and between states, and regardless of the variations or differences in the sum totality of all the laws involved. In other words: ORDER IS DECISIVELY CHAOS!

Dr.Yes

Sep3-05, 07:45 PM

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone? How realistic is this claim? Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim? Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?

I'm going to revert to a statement I made on my thread "What is a law?" where I said something like "without the physical properties of a heart pumping blood to the brain and without the physical properties of the brain, there would be absolutely no "everything" to explain. Therefore, it is with great glee that I chime-in with those who voted for the premise that "everything can be explained with physics".

Whether or not the physics we speak of is explained in the language of mathematics or by way of actual physical examples or in layman's terms, physics and the laws of physics are the best way to explain everything we experience in the physical universe.

Besides, we are physical beings using our physical attributes to perceive a physcial state. Any attempt to understand the meta or non-physical states is done so with the physical attributes we have been born with... so... we still explain the "non-physical" or "spiritual" or "metaphyscial" states by way of physics and the laws held therein. We are somewhat bound to this state of physicalness by our own physical nature.

There are physics formula for Karma by some Russian physics dude. There is a wonderful physics formula for Ethics by John Adams.

I believe, wholeheartedly, that the most accurate method of describing or explaining a phenomenon and/or event/result is by way of physics for reasons I have already laid out here, in this thread.

saviourmachine

Sep4-05, 09:59 AM

Anti-commutation, Dirac, probability
Good, that's all you really need to know. If you know that, then everything else is really nothing more than logic (you can write out and look at the details of that multiplication). The really important aspect of matrix multiplication (in so far as physics is concerned: i.e., the reason we will want to use them) is that it is possible to construct "anti-commutating" matrices. Anti-commutation (a*b=-b*a) allows us to establish a very valuable "logical" relationships: i.e., we can define an expression (a symbol for something) consistent with the concept of multiplication where (ab-ba) is not zero.
...
Actually, when Dirac showed that "matrix mechanics" and "wave mechanics" were equivalent (leading to the notion that Dirac's "bra"-"ket" notation {this, < |, is a "bra" and this, | >, is a "ket"} expressed something fundamental about reality), the real essence of the thing is the ability to encompass mathematical expression of the phenomena (ab-ba) not being zero.
...
His name is ThinhVanTran (http://www.thinhtran.com/).Hi Doctordick, you do have a revealing way of describing things. The way you're talking about it, I "squink" that anti-commutation is a form of symmetry breaking.
I read just about Dirac's notation in "The Emperor's New Mind" by Penrose. I took a quick look for Van Tran's website, but the main introductionary article "Logic for the End of Probability (http://www.thinhtran.com/probability.html)" isn't online yet. By the way, it seems like he followed your advice: For communication-related reasons, I have de-emphasized my common-sense double book "The End of Probability and the New Meaning of Quantum Physics", in favor of a new edition, titled "Symmetry and the End of Probability", which is focused only on my analysis against the probability theory.
The notation :biggrin:
No, I didn't define any function at all. What I am doing is defining a way of representing a function (a notation or a symbol for a function). The central issue being that any and all conceivable functions can be so represented.I beg you pardon. Indeed G is a notation for a function, and not a function in itself. Sorry, for my sloppiness. I agree with you that if you take G and its complex conjugate and subsequently the normalized volume integral, a probability factor between zero and one results.

I need a demonstration, but not about abstract details. It will help me very much if you could give a numerical example until the output of G: a list of numbers. And maybe even until the results of \vec{\Psi} and P. It doesn't matter for me that these numbers doesn't signify anything now, I only want to be sure that I understand the mathematics. I want to see the numbers and functions at work. When I read your texts it's like a description of a watch, without being able to see it at work. Please, can you do that for me?

See you next time!

Philocrat

Sep5-05, 09:54 AM

I'm going to revert to a statement I made on my thread "What is a law?" where I said something like "without the physical properties of a heart pumping blood to the brain and without the physical properties of the brain, there would be absolutely no "everything" to explain. Therefore, it is with great glee that I chime-in with those who voted for the premise that "everything can be explained with physics".

Whether or not the physics we speak of is explained in the language of mathematics or by way of actual physical examples or in layman's terms, physics and the laws of physics are the best way to explain everything we experience in the physical universe.

Besides, we are physical beings using our physical attributes to perceive a physcial state. Any attempt to understand the meta or non-physical states is done so with the physical attributes we have been born with... so... we still explain the "non-physical" or "spiritual" or "metaphyscial" states by way of physics and the laws held therein. We are somewhat bound to this state of physicalness by our own physical nature.

There are physics formula for Karma by some Russian physics dude. There is a wonderful physics formula for Ethics by John Adams.

I believe, wholeheartedly, that the most accurate method of describing or explaining a phenomenon and/or event/result is by way of physics for reasons I have already laid out here, in this thread.

But there are those who would argue (and quite rightly so) that even Cosmic Debris, let alone larger cosmological objects such as planets, comets and galaxies, are obeying comological laws of some sort. However, equally, that there are certain properties of the mind that do not exhibit or exemplify physical laws......that if at all there is a glimpse of luck that the mind is matter or a physical entity, certain properties of it lack physical exhibits.

The standard argument therefore is that if the Mind were a physical entity then all its properties, however mysterious, ought to be all reducible to physical, or at least pass a physical explanation. But as you may have observed so far on this thread (if you have had enough time to go throught it) several postings or arguments and counter-arguments clearly suggest that this is not really the case. There is a metaphysically vexing remainder still plaguing its explanation from one discipline to the next. You need to overthrow all these disputes with a coherent but generally accpetable argument.

NOTE: Remember, most importantly, that laws operate in all disciplines and the overall implication of this is that all the operating laws in each discipline ought to be analytically or explanatorily compatible with those in another discipline as one moves from one scale of reference or explanatory layer to the next. No half-measures or incomparirbility of any sort would surfice!

Dr.Yes

Sep5-05, 12:27 PM

But there are those who would argue (and quite rightly so) that even Cosmic Debris, let alone larger cosmological objects such as planets, comets and galaxies, are obeying comological laws of some sort. However, equally, that there are certain properties of the mind that do not exhibit or exemplify physical laws......that if at all there is a glimpse of luck that the mind is matter or a physical entity, certain properties of it lack physical exhibits.

The standard argument therefore is that if the Mind were a physical entity then all its properties, however mysterious, ought to be all reducible to physical, or at least pass a physical explanation. But as you may have observed so far on this thread (if you have had enough time to go throught it) several postings or arguments and counter-arguments clearly suggest that this is not really the case. There is a metaphysically vexing remainder still plaguing its explanation from one discipline to the next. You need to overthrow all these disputes with a coherent but generally accpetable argument.

NOTE: Remember, most importantly, that laws operate in all disciplines and the overall implication of this is that all the operating laws in each discipline ought to be analytically or explanatorily compatible with those in another discipline as one moves from one scale of reference or explanatory layer to the next. No half-measures or incomparirbility of any sort would surfice!

Ah, thank you Philocrat. I must remember to adhere to protocol and to the scientific method even when I point out the obvious!

Several neurophysicists were summoned by the Pope and by the Dali Lama to explain the difference between the "mind" and the "brain".

The collection of international neurophysicists told these ambassadors (Dali and the late Pope) to the unknown, unseen and unfelt realms beyond the physical world that there is no difference between the mind and the brain.

What is true is that the brain is a collection of various, semi-plastic regions that deal with as many functions as are necessary to survive as a social and physical entity within the physical universe.

What was noted by the group of neuropsych, neuroscience and neurophysicists was that when you have a collection of anything, there is another, less discernable region that will develop that is often refered to as "the sum of the parts".

The sum of the parts appears mysterious and non-familiar to us because its roots come from many different regions and areas of disimilar function. The sum of the parts of the brain becomes the "mind" and its "thoughts".

I'm not sure what "metaphysically vexing remainder" the people discussing this question about "reducing everything to pure physics" are talking about, but, my guess is that it is this very thing that the Pope and the Lama were asking about. And, I calculate that it is simply the sum of the parts.

I maintain my position which is that, as a physically existant entity, I am unable to ascertain or understand anything beyond the physical universe... and so, therefore, I am, furthermore, bound to explain my experience by reducing everything to pure physics.

Part of the human condition is the bias and falacy of being physical .

Dr.Yes

Sep5-05, 01:35 PM

A Law Runs Through It

Philocrat adds a "NOTE: Remember, most importantly, that laws operate in all disciplines and the overall implication of this is that all the operating laws in each discipline ought to be analytically or explanatorily compatible with those in another discipline as one moves from one scale of reference or explanatory layer to the next. No half-measures or incomparirbility of any sort would surfice!"

This is an "ought" statement. The reality is, (though no one has spent much time studying the reality), all law does run through all scale and layers of existence, they are sometimes unrecognizable as the same laws because of juxtopposing viewpoints ie: relative observations and the many matrixs through which the laws pass, gathering refinement and constantly changing (which is one of the more observable laws on any scale or level. eg. constant change).

Doctordick

Sep5-05, 04:49 PM

Anti-commutation, Dirac, probability
Hi Doctordick, you do have a revealing way of describing things. The way you're talking about it, I "squink" that anti-commutation is a form of symmetry breaking.I would need a much clearer discourse on what relationships you have in mind before I could address that issue. The question in my head is, what kind of symmetry are you speaking of? Remember, I have taken a somewhat abstract definition of symmetry which associates the symmetry with ignorance (symmetry breaking is then the removal of that ignorance). Here, if one wants to view anti-commutation as a symmetry breaking thing, the ignorance being removed must clearly be ignorance of the order of operation. I had never thought of it that way but I certainly think one could.

However, in my case I use it as a mathematical trick. I can use the fact of anti-commutation to make something quite complex look as if it is simple. Mathematically, it allows a quick bridge over complications which cannot otherwise be expressed succinctly. How that works will be quite clear to you when I get to it. I'll just let it lay for the moment.
By the way, it seems like he followed your advice:My last contact with him was in 2003 so I don't know what he is doing.
I need a demonstration, but not about abstract details. It will help me very much if you could give a numerical example until the output of G: a list of numbers. And maybe even until the results of \vec{\Psi} and P. It doesn't matter for me that these numbers doesn't signify anything now, I only want to be sure that I understand the mathematics. I want to see the numbers and functions at work. When I read your texts it's like a description of a watch, without being able to see it at work. Please, can you do that for me?Well, we are working in the abstract for the very simple reason that the abstract can cover very easily a range of things which cannot even be conceived in the particular. First, my purpose in writing G as I did (a given set of numbers producing a second set of numbers), is that absolutely any "functional relationship" can be so expressed. I do not want my notation to place any constraints on what G is.

Let us for the sake of argument (and I am sure this one will create some arguments :biggrin: ) an example of the following kind. One might say that, "the kind of woman a man might fall in love with" is a function of "his ancestry, his culture, his experiences, his social standing, his wealth, his education, his circumstance and maybe a few more things I can't think of at the moment". Now, if it is possible to establish that such a relationship (that is, if a way of determining the answer) exists, then it can be expressed by my notation of G.

All one has to do is make a table (quite a big table admittedly) in the following manner. First, one has to establish the argument of the function! We begin with an exact description of every man on earth ("his ancestry, his culture, his experiences, his social standing, his wealth, his education, his circumstance and maybe a few more things I can't think of at the moment"). Now convert every element of that description into numbers (for the fun of it, use the binary representation of the Internet packets necessary to communicate the information). We now have the argument of G as a list of numbers.

The next step is get a relevant description of every possible woman on earth. We then establish a library of those descriptions, giving each description a unique library number.

Now we can make that table. Down the left side of the table is the complete list of those exact descriptions we created (all possible arguments of G), each particular entry being a set of numbers (the description itself).

Now we go to the person who knows how to find the answer (remember I said, "if a way of determining the answer exists") and ask them what the answer is for each man on earth and enter the library numbers which identify the girls that man might fall in love with. When we finish filling out the table, our G is defined (at least for all the men that actually exist).

The point being that any relationship which can be described can be so represented. Even if we cannot do it, we know that if it is ever done, the result can be represented by my notation. The notation is absolutely general and no functional relationship is omitted.

So let's step off in the direction of that probability. Instead of asking for the list of women he might fall in love with, let us ask the probability of two people falling in love. Now the argument of G becomes the descriptions of the two people we are asking about and the entry of the table is the probability. We go to the person who knows how to find the answer and make an entry for that probability. When we finish the table, we have the probability function we were looking for.

Our problem in this case is that the notation is not absolutely general. In our analysis of the problem (since we are working in the abstract) we need to get rid of the problem of making sure the collection of functions we go to examine do indeed satisfy that constraint that they be real and bounded by zero and one. Certainly the "absolutely general" G is not properly limited (there exist a whole lot of G's which can't possibly be right because the end result of using them yields something else). However, the normalization method I showed (of the internal or "dot" product) guarantees the final result will be interpretable as a probability. This means that either the correct G exists in the set of all G's or, if it doesn't, the answer can not be found by any method.

I am off to China and won't be back until October so you can all think this over while I am gone.

Have fun -- Dick

Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

Philocrat

Sep6-05, 12:04 PM

Ah, thank you Philocrat. I must remember to adhere to protocol and to the scientific method even when I point out the obvious!

Several neurophysicists were summoned by the Pope and by the Dali Lama to explain the difference between the "mind" and the "brain".

The collection of international neurophysicists told these ambassadors (Dali and the late Pope) to the unknown, unseen and unfelt realms beyond the physical world that there is no difference between the mind and the brain.

What is true is that the brain is a collection of various, semi-plastic regions that deal with as many functions as are necessary to survive as a social and physical entity within the physical universe.

What was noted by the group of neuropsych, neuroscience and neurophysicists was that when you have a collection of anything, there is another, less discernable region that will develop that is often refered to as "the sum of the parts".

The sum of the parts appears mysterious and non-familiar to us because its roots come from many different regions and areas of disimilar function. The sum of the parts of the brain becomes the "mind" and its "thoughts".

I'm not sure what "metaphysically vexing remainder" the people discussing this question about "reducing everything to pure physics" are talking about, but, my guess is that it is this very thing that the Pope and the Lama were asking about. And, I calculate that it is simply the sum of the parts.

I maintain my position which is that, as a physically existant entity, I am unable to ascertain or understand anything beyond the physical universe... and so, therefore, I am, furthermore, bound to explain my experience by reducing everything to pure physics.

Part of the human condition is the bias and falacy of being physical .

Yes, you are substantially right in some of your observations. You hit it right on the head by rasing a very fundamental metaphysical problem, which in the process chain-reacts into epistemological, logical and quantitative problems. Metaphysically, the "sum of parts" is treated as a single, self-standing and self-identifying category that should never at any point in our overall calculus confuse with its equally underlying self-accountable parts. In many disciplines, people tend to muddle things up when they are trying to shift or reduce from parts to a whole. What I have come to realise and notice over the years is that a 'PART-WHOLE Reductionism' naturally manifests into multiple-layer of reductionism. If you turn into mathematics, you could look at it as sets within sets in a downward movement from larger scales to ever smaller scale.

Ok, to appreciate a glimpse of what I am trying to explain here, ask the following experts in their respective disciplines to define the term "PERSON":

1) A Biologist

2) A Chemist

3) A Physicist

How would these experts define it without running into what is generally known in Metaphysics as 'Category Error'. Yes, I do agree with those who define this sort of term in their own disciplines with all the relevant or governing laws applied. But the fact remains that they must also think about how the same term would be defined in another discipline down the explanatory scale. The content of this thread so far seems to suggest that physics has the last word in every definable term or subject matter. Do you accpet this as wholly true? Or do you take the whole project as beyond the realm of physics as is often suggested in some of the disciplines? Are all definitions of a given term or subject matter compatible in all disciplines? Is the notion of a person in physics compatible with the notion of a person in, say, Biology, Chemistry, Psychology or Religion? Do we have a multi-disciplinarily derived definion of a Person?

Dr.Yes

Sep6-05, 12:43 PM

Yes, you are substantially right in some of your observations. You hit it right on the head by rasing a very fundamental metaphysical problem, which in the process chain-reacts into epistemological, logical and quantitative problems. Metaphysically, the "sum of parts" is treated as a single, self-standing and self-identifying category that should never at any point in our overall calculus confuse with its equally underlying self-accountable parts. In many disciplines, people tend to muddle things up when they are trying to shift or reduce from parts to a whole. What I have come to realise and notice over the years is that a 'PART-WHOLE Reductionism' naturally manifests into multiple-layer of reductionism. If you turn into mathematics, you could look at it as sets within sets in a downward movement from larger scales to ever smaller scale.

Ok, to appreciate a glimpse of what I am trying to explain here, ask the following experts in their respective disciplines to define the term "PERSON":

1) A Biologist

2) A Chemist

3) A Physicist

How would these experts define it without running into what is generally known in Metaphysics as 'Category Error'. Yes, I do agree with those who define this sort of term in their own disciplines with all the relevant or governing laws applied. But the fact remains that they must also think about how the same term would be defined in another discipline down the explanatory scale. The content of this thread so far seems to suggest that physics has the last word in every definable term or subject matter. Do you accpet this as wholly true? Or do you take the whole project as beyond the realm of physics as is often suggested in some of the disciplines? Are all definitions of a given term or subject matter compatible in all disciplines? Is the notion of a person in physics compatible with the notion of a person in, say, Biology, Chemistry, Psychology or Religion? Do we have a multi-disciplinarily derived definion of a Person?

Hello Philocrat,

thank you for your effort to understand my position concerning the explaination of all phenomena by way of the laws and properties of physics (pure or not!). It must have been quite an effort since I am a rambling idiot when it comes to physics who does his best to avoid oppoprium and inappropriate use of inappropriate language... in other words, I should just keep my mouth shut... most of the time!.:devil:

The definition of any word is of the uttmost importance to any discussion. It must be agreed upon by all parties concerned. The root of the word must be exposed and thouroghly agreed upon as well. This can take years of research or, with any luck, the word will have been studied already by linguists and already documented with regard to where the word hails from.

"Person" is a patriarchial term describing a succession of sons per son per son... if I'm not mistaken. I don't think any daughters on the team of those responding to the question about the word would or should appreciate any other definition of the word.

But, that is the physical origin of the word. That is explaining the word by way of its physical origin.

What it means to each person from each discipline is insignificant and trivial and the fodder of drama-queens.

Personally I would immediately steer the multidisciplinary committee toward the word "people" and hope there would be a more universal origin for this word rather than the utterings of one gender's group of scallywags!

I look forward to further discussion on this topic.

What's more is, as a physical being... being physical... there's no way in hell my bias will allow me to understand anything beyond the physical. The sum of my physical parts will only add up to a notion that could be right or could be wrong.... 50/50 odds do not a right make. That's called leaving it to chance. Very unscientific. Very misleading. Exploration is the key but, hey, Columbus thought he made it to China.

Philocrat

Sep6-05, 01:37 PM

Dr.Yes

Sep6-05, 08:31 PM

Dr. Yes, I find you discussion very interesting. Your texts are touching an angle that many people tend to ignore: 'Inter-disciplinary Definitition of terms of reality'. Your last posting raises two fundamental questions:

(1) Is every discipline's definition of a given term of reality as good as any?

(2) Should every discipline be content with its own definition and altogether steer clear of other disciplines? What goes on elswhere is not my stew!

Ask me whether I know the answers to these questions and I would immediately reply :"your guess is as good as mine!". Yes, I don't know the answers, yet these are serious unavoidable questions that must be confronted head on with utmost rigour and honesty. I find it difficult to disagree with those who stay content with definitions of these terms in their respective disciplines. Do you contemplate or see otherwise?

The word definition:

A definition of 'definition'

Suppose we have decided to define a certain word or a concept associated with that word. Suppose also that we have identified which sense of the word we are interested in, and we have noted clear cases, some unclear cases, and some borderline cases of the application of the word. The question then is: how can this word be defined? What is desired here is a description of the intension of the word: that is, an account of the set of properties that characterizes all and only members of the extension. In that case, it seems the following is a serviceable account of the meaning of '(intensional) definition':

The definition of a concept, or of (a given sense of) a word or phrase, is a description of its intension--that is, the set of properties that characterizes all and only members of the extension of the word; the extension is all the things that the concept, word, or phrase applies to.

Some philosophers have criticisms of this sort of definition of the word 'definition'; or perhaps it would be better to say that some philosophers think that it is, for various reasons, impossible to give exhaustively exact definitions of most concepts, words, and phrases. Two prominent critics are Wittgenstein and Quine. Still most philosophers still acknowledge that in philosophy something similar to giving definitions of important philosophical concepts is necessary.
[edit]

Quote

Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach on the province of grammarians, and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. — David Hume

I'll have to leave you with this for now... I'd like to continue my interpretation later.

Dr.Yes

Sep7-05, 08:04 PM

(1) Is every discipline's definition of a given term of reality as good as any?

(2) Should every discipline be content with its own definition and altogether steer clear of other disciplines? What goes on elswhere is not my stew!

(3) I find it difficult to disagree with those who stay content with definitions of these terms in their respective disciplines. Do you contemplate or see otherwise?

1) It would be best if each definition of a word were universal and any dialectic useage remained as a regional use or one of novelty and for research purposes. Otherwise its a lot of unecessary work to communicate properly and that kind of work leads away from the goal of most discussions.

I realize there are a myraid of components that can belong to just one word. As the on-line dictionary I quoted points out, the definition of a word must, by all means and costs, be defined by both the origin of the word and the roots of the word that lay outside of a single, use of the word. I haven't quoted it properly here. It is a daunting task to arrive at a quorum with respect to the definitive definition of a word. But it can be done.

2)"What goes on elsewhere is not my stew"? There's an ethical law here that is eluding me. On one hand there is a group of people incorrectly defining a word like "Aspertame" and thinking the definition is that aspertame is better than sugar. There is the uninvited but ethical intervention where you tell them the true definition of aspertame (as described by research doctors around the world regarding neurotoxic effects etc...). The people using aspertaime haven't asked for help or questioned its definition because their ignorance of the substance and associated dangers keeps them from doing so.

Adhering to Ethical Laws ensures less expenditure of energy, over time, in every case. The person who uses the faulty definition of a substance and ends up in the hospital or a mental health facility or on the street will end up causing the overall society to spend more of its energy or resources because of an unethical choice concerning the proper definition of a word. A small minority (usually the perpetrators using a fraudulent definition of a word to reap a profit) will profit from the lack of a definition but, in the long run, there results a catastrophic expenditure of energy and the perp is rendered ineffective by way ethical/physical laws. (I maintain that ethics is a part of "pure physics" and can be used to explain why certain physical events take place but....... perhaps not why "everything" takes place.

3) Its only when people ask for your help with definitions that you can, in someway, influence a more cohesive understanding of a word or definition.

Thank you!

NB: Furthermore to define something means to make it more visable and/or discernable as in easier to see or understand. There are some words that have remained simple to define like "tree" or "cut" and so on.... and there are other, more widely adopted, popularized and commercialized words that have lost all definition... such as "love" or "god".

Philocrat

Sep16-05, 12:19 PM

1) It would be best if each definition of a word were universal and any dialectic useage remained as a regional use or one of novelty and for research purposes. Otherwise its a lot of unecessary work to communicate properly and that kind of work leads away from the goal of most discussions.

I realize there are a myraid of components that can belong to just one word. As the on-line dictionary I quoted points out, the definition of a word must, by all means and costs, be defined by both the origin of the word and the roots of the word that lay outside of a single, use of the word. I haven't quoted it properly here. It is a daunting task to arrive at a quorum with respect to the definitive definition of a word. But it can be done.

2)"What goes on elsewhere is not my stew"? There's an ethical law here that is eluding me. On one hand there is a group of people incorrectly defining a word like "Aspertame" and thinking the definition is that aspertame is better than sugar. There is the uninvited but ethical intervention where you tell them the true definition of aspertame (as described by research doctors around the world regarding neurotoxic effects etc...). The people using aspertaime haven't asked for help or questioned its definition because their ignorance of the substance and associated dangers keeps them from doing so.

Adhering to Ethical Laws ensures less expenditure of energy, over time, in every case. The person who uses the faulty definition of a substance and ends up in the hospital or a mental health facility or on the street will end up causing the overall society to spend more of its energy or resources because of an unethical choice concerning the proper definition of a word. A small minority (usually the perpetrators using a fraudulent definition of a word to reap a profit) will profit from the lack of a definition but, in the long run, there results a catastrophic expenditure of energy and the perp is rendered ineffective by way ethical/physical laws. (I maintain that ethics is a part of "pure physics" and can be used to explain why certain physical events take place but....... perhaps not why "everything" takes place.

3) Its only when people ask for your help with definitions that you can, in someway, influence a more cohesive understanding of a word or definition.

Thank you!

NB: Furthermore to define something means to make it more visable and/or discernable as in easier to see or understand. There are some words that have remained simple to define like "tree" or "cut" and so on.... and there are other, more widely adopted, popularized and commercialized words that have lost all definition... such as "love" or "god".

Dr. Yes, your assessment has as several aspects:

GENUINE IGNORANCE & DEFINITION

Defining something and being satisfied with it even where we are totally ignorant of its underlying implications. In philosophy this is very problematic as it affects many disciplines, including epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of langauge, philoso[hy of science, logic etc. Many philosophers, espicially the so-called analytical philosophers have drawn our attention time and time again to this problem. A typical example of this is Peter Strawsons' Presuppositions (making propsitions that are epistemologically packed or loaded with underlying presupposed meanings or definitions.) Consider, for example, such terms as:

a) I do not exist!
b) Nothing exists!
c) I am dead!
d) Have you stopped beating your wife?

Now, just consider all other underlying propositions that these terms may imply or presuppose.

Ok, what about other singular terms such as:

1) Something?
2) Nothing?
3) Matter?
4) Mind?
5) Person?
6) God?
7) Unicorn?
8) Pegasus?

How do you satisfactorily define these terms - a multi-disciplinarily acceptable definition for that matter?

MORALITY & DEFINITION

It is currently not clear whether science as a whole is PRODUCTIVE and PROGRESSIVE. If it is, the standard assumption should be that all moral statments are reducible to scientific statments and vice versa. The current problem is to assume that morality can be defined in isolation from science. This is not only metaphysically wrong, but also epistemologically, quantitativelly and logically wrong. It is just not possible. For the very seat of morality is the very thing or being that we force it upon. While it is not a bad thing for the moralist to define and enact moral laws, it is equally of utmost importance (and infact unvoidable) that science must reconcile such laws with its own fundamental laws.

REDUCTIONISM & INFINIT REGRESS

The project of reducing a given term of reality from one scale of reference to the next is substantially regressive in scope and in substance. Up or down the reductive scale, things just get either ever bigger or ever smaller ad infinituum! It is not clear whether the definition of a given term of reality in each scale of reference is epistemologically sufficient. Is the knowledge that we obtain from the definition of a given term of reality within each reductive scale of reference sufficient?

Dr.Yes

Sep16-05, 11:21 PM

Is the knowledge that we obtain from the definition of a given term of reality within each reductive scale of reference sufficient?

Only if we've done our research really well!

This would include updates "ad infinitum" as you say.

Nice exposé Philocrat. I'd say a large percentage of discussions, perhaps as high as 98%, cannot come to an agreement or a conclusion or a solution because of the scandalously wreckless use of words that have been defined only by threads of information picked out of hearsay and gossip by the discussion's participants.

selfAdjoint

Sep19-05, 02:26 PM

Did some recent finding invalidate Gödel's incompleteness theorem?

I just saw this.

Goedel's theorem is valid but you have to be very careful about what it actually says. It is about formal systems that have in them the proof of arithmetic, including all the theorems of number theory. Necessarily such formal systems will include universal quantifiers (for all x in whatever, Y is true of x), Existential quantifiers (there exists an x in whatever for which Y is true), and mathematical induction (if Y is true for some integer n0, and whenever Y is true of an integer n it is also true of the successor of n, then Y is true for all n > n0). Indeed Goedel's proof uses the existance of these functions to construct his numbering scheme which is at the heart of his proof.

There are logical systems which do not use these functions, and Goedel's theorem does not apply to them. Tarski showed that the quantifiers can be eliminated from geometical proofs and mathematical induction is not used in them anyway. So geometry and measure theory are not affected by Goedel's theorem or its extensions. Roughly, formal systems of digital processes are goedelable, but formal systems of analog processes are not.

zelldot

Sep22-05, 06:06 PM

Philocrat

Sep23-05, 11:32 AM

Physics alone cannot create a guide to everything, physics was created by humans, and humans can only see from a humans point of view, can physics tell us why we are able to walk into an empty room after an arguement and feel tense without knowing the arguement ever happened only to find out later on, or why some people are able to tell something bad is going to happen just before they do?

There are several problems to this observation:

1) THE NEED TO EXPLAIN THINGS SO THAT WE CAN COMMUNICATE THEM TO OTHERS IN THE WAY THAT THEY CAN UNDERSTAND US.

The questions therefore are (a) 'What are the methods of explanations', (a) Do people understand us at all when we explain anything to them?, (c) If they do at all, how much of what we pupport to explain do they understand (what is the percentage)?, and (d) Ultemately, what is the purpose of Communication, if any? Some people, without much thought may give very simple and staightforward answers to these questions, possibly claiming that we do manage to explain enough for us to understand each other, even in the presence of occasional errors and deviations in scope and in substance. But philosophy thinks and presumes otherwise: that either we explain and understand absolutely nothing or what we pupport to explain and understand are substantially vague. So, you can quite rightly say that 'VAGUENESS' is what keeps philosophy in business. The whole notion of philosophy is to explain things in the clearest and consistent way possible. But is this really the case?

2) THE NOTION OF EXPLANATION, EXPLAINER AND SELF-EXPLANATION

Serious question arises as to whether the explainer can explain both other things and his or herself, given that the explainer did not give rise to him or herself. If you neither create youself nor anyting else in the world, how could you possibly explain anything, let alone yourself? Is there a bootstrap mechanism in the universal process that permits this to happen? The standard philosophical headache is that if I created myself or anything else, then I should have in my possession some sort of blue-print or master-plan of the entire process. Or should I not? That is, self-created entities can explain themselves and everything else that they are responssible for. It is therefore not clear whether things or beings that are ignorant of their origins can self-explain!

The human race is not yet open minded enough to take in the fact that there maybe more than just atoms and energy. i like to think of things on many layers, the same universe but different dimentions, think of it like this, when you see a map in a game there are different ways of viewing the map, wireframe, solid, textured and so on.

The problem of thinking about/of things in terms of layers is that you are immediately committed to the notion of 'INTER-LAYER EXPLANATION OR REDUCTIONISM? I have already pointed this out above in several places. Not only must you explain things as they are or perceived in each layer but also how they are from one layer to the next up or down the exlplantory or reductive layer. As you may have noticed above, I sometimes refer to this as 'Reductive Scale'. Here I am taking them to be one and the same thing, presumably. Or is it not? So, the biggest problem now is that all the explanations in all these layers must ultemately in the end reconcile both quantitatively and logically, let alone metaphysically!

NOTE: Note that this thread so far tends to suggest that ONLY physics has the last word in everything explainable! Is this correct, given the current resuslt of the related survey? What about inter-disciplinary explanation that your posting and many other postings on this thread tend to point at?

Dr.Yes

Sep26-05, 07:37 PM

NOTE: Note that this thread so far tends to suggest that ONLY physics has the last word in everything explainable! Is this correct, given the current resuslt of the related survey? What about inter-disciplinary explanation that your posting and many other postings on this thread tend to point at?

All disciplines are disciplines rooted in physics and the physical universe. They study the phenomena created by a physcial universe. The most amorphic topic can be traced to having roots in physics and the physical world. If the topic is truely detached from the physical world then the act of observing the subject is a physical act and firmly rooted in a physicallity.

All topics would benefit greatly through being explained by pure physics.

Castlegate

Sep26-05, 09:10 PM

NOTE: Note that this thread so far tends to suggest that ONLY physics has the last word in everything explainable! Is this correct, given the current resuslt of the related survey? What about inter-disciplinary explanation that your posting and many other postings on this thread tend to point at? If the universe is exclusively a physical entity, there is no doubt that it can only be explained by physics (Case closed), and it would seem that most people agree with this. I consider the universe to be entirely conceptual, but there is no room to be heard above the din in a thread full of physics junkies. It is acceptable to make what is termed a physical observation as far as I am concerned. I just mark it as if there were an asterisk by conforming it to a purely conceptual enterprise. Physicality to me is no more than an illusion once the trick be known.

Daminc

Sep27-05, 02:39 AM

Physicality to me is no more than an illusion once the trick be known.
Why would you think this?

Is it just your gut feeling? A twist of percerption based on a personal philosophy? Or something else?

Philocrat

Sep27-05, 01:48 PM

All disciplines are disciplines rooted in physics and the physical universe. They study the phenomena created by a physcial universe. The most amorphic topic can be traced to having roots in physics and the physical world. If the topic is truely detached from the physical world then the act of observing the subject is a physical act and firmly rooted in a physicallity.

All topics would benefit greatly through being explained by pure physics.

Yes, Dr. Yes, you'r substantially right, if not wholly so! And many people on this PF would equally agree with you, despite the current controversy over the 'UNEXPLAINABLE REMAINDER' heavily contested and implied on this very thread.

But philosophy has started to ask some very serious metaphysical and epistemological questions about this. Now, here are the problems:

1) NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM

The following staments suggest 'Non-eliminative realism':

(a) Water is H2O
(b) Man is matter

As argued by some philosophers, these reductive statments or propositions are non-elimnative in scope and in substance. This has the logical structure 'A is B'. That is, B does not pre-suppose the elimination of A, even after A has been reduced to B in the propostion.

2) ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM

The following statements or propositions seem to suggest 'Eliminative Realism:

(b) Evil Demons are Viruses or Diseases
(b) Mind is Matter

On the other side of the argument it is argued that these reductive statments are eliminative in scope and in substance. Logically and quantitativelly, 'As are Bs' implies we can reductively do away with 'As', leaving in our reality only Bs. The same is true of 'A is B'. The question now is, why did we epistemologically venture into the notion of 'As' or 'A', when all there is to the human reality is the notion of 'Bs' or 'B'? Are we being metaphysically deceived into this epistemological pitfall? How did we get ourselves into this position in the first place?

NOTE: Note also that the problem with (1) is that it also pushes a prospective truth-tracker into the bottomless pit of Inter-scale or Inter-layer Reductionism that I mentioned in my previous posting above. If as you said 'All topics would benefit greatly through being explained by pure physics', if follows that a prospective truth-tracker must somehow track all the truths of a given term of reality accross all layers or scales of reference or explanation. Up or down the pathway, he or she must grasp the language and logic of explanation in each layer or scale as he/she moves from one layer or scale to the next? Should everyone therefore learn physics (or the language of physics) as the last layer of explanation?

Philocrat

Sep27-05, 02:12 PM

If the universe is exclusively a physical entity, there is no doubt that it can only be explained by physics (Case closed), and it would seem that most people agree with this. I consider the universe to be entirely conceptual, but there is no room to be heard above the din in a thread full of physics junkies. It is acceptable to make what is termed a physical observation as far as I am concerned. I just mark it as if there were an asterisk by conforming it to a purely conceptual enterprise. Physicality to me is no more than an illusion once the trick be known.

What about the notion of 'Essential Propperty or Substance' of a given term or entity of reality?

Dr.Yes

Sep27-05, 05:13 PM

If the universe is exclusively a physical entity, there is no doubt that it can only be explained by physics (Case closed), and it would seem that most people agree with this. I consider the universe to be entirely conceptual, but there is no room to be heard above the din in a thread full of physics junkies. It is acceptable to make what is termed a physical observation as far as I am concerned. I just mark it as if there were an asterisk by conforming it to a purely conceptual enterprise. Physicality to me is no more than an illusion once the trick be known.

One has to remember that an illusion can only happen if you have a brain. This denotes a binding dependance on the physical as a frame of reference for your illusions. This definition of illusion uses biophysics, physics and common sense in its explaination.

Using pure physics to explain an illusion could very well produce quite a beautiful equasion, as far as equasions go.

Dr.Yes

Sep27-05, 05:35 PM

Yes, Dr. Yes, you'r substantially right, if not wholly so! And many people on this PF would equally agree with you, despite the current controversy over the 'UNEXPLAINABLE REMAINDER' heavily contested and implied on this very thread.

But philosophy has started to ask some very serious metaphysical and epistemological questions about this. Now, here are the problems:

1) NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM

The following staments suggest 'Non-eliminative realism':

(a) Water is H2O
(b) Man is matter

As argued by some philosophers, these reductive statments or propositions are non-elimnative in scope and in substance. This has the logical structure 'A is B'. That is, B does not pre-suppose the elimination of A, even after A has been reduced to B in the propostion.

2) ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM

The following statements or propositions seem to suggest 'Eliminative Realism:

(b) Evil Demons are Viruses or Diseases
(b) Mind is Matter

On the other side of the argument it is argued that these reductive statments are eliminative in scope and in substance. Logically and quantitativelly, 'As are Bs' implies we can reductively do away with 'As', leaving in our reality only Bs. The same is true of 'A is B'. The question now is, why did we epistemologically venture into the notion of 'As' or 'A', when all there is to the human reality is the notion of 'Bs' or 'B'? Are we being metaphysically deceived into this epistemological pitfall? How did we get ourselves into this position in the first place?

NOTE: Note also that the problem with (1) is that it also pushes a prospective truth-tracker into the bottomless pit of Inter-scale or Inter-layer Reductionism that I mentioned in my previous posting above. If as you said 'All topics would benefit greatly through being explained by pure physics', if follows that a prospective truth-tracker must somehow track all the truths of a given term of reality accross all layers or scales of reference or explanation. Up or down the pathway, he or she must grasp the language and logic of explanation in each layer or scale as he/she moves from one layer or scale to the next? Should everyone therefore learn physics (or the language of physics) as the last layer of explanation?

The reason I think using physics as a base explaination and reductive definition of all things is because I've seen and heard so many people explain subjects with the "fear of god" or "karma" or "lordy lordy" and other explainations that reek of the hormones of fear and exhaltation etc.... the influence of their physiology has clouded their response to the wonders of this universe.

Without physics to use as a reference point, everything really is an illusion and can become whatever one decides it is with whatever reserves of adrenilin or endomorphines, acetecholine, seritonin or dopamines they have that haven't already transformed and left their body through entropy etc....

Physics is simply one aspect from which to view the way things are. "Pure physics" is but one degree on an infinite compass of vantage points from which to study this universe.

When we say Man = Matter..... we can also separate this equasion, as is promoted in Fractal Physics and we can look at the components and find an infinite variety of potentials in each of these. Matter has the potential to become "Man" and Man has the potential to fly like a bird and operate a linear accelerator... among many other options.

Anyone stupid enough to consider discarding either of the subjects in an equasion suchas "A is B" deserves the loss of the component so that they can appreciate it in its absence.

When its said that "Mind = Matter" its preferable to remember the old addage of "Mind over Matter" because it seems to have happened that the mind can go beyond the perception of matter toward the construct and concept of the amorphic fields.

Whether or not the amorphic fields etc... are just an illusion or not, remains something that may be provable through physics... or perhaps already has been proven... but... let's remember the opposite of reductionist theory when we read these simple words.......

....."sum of the parts". Can physics wholey explain this concept? Probably with a very long equasion.

But, most humans can't read really long equasions so, will it be a valid explaination if the physicists explain "the sum of the parts" with one... or even two unimaginably long formuli?

Dr.Yes

Sep27-05, 07:57 PM

If we find the root definition of "explaination" or "explain" we run into problems with the question put forth by this thread.

An adequate explaination requires that the people communicating ideas and explainations are able to understand them. If everything were explained by pure physics I believe that would encompass about .0005 percent of the population of the globe that would "get" the explaination.

Castlegate

Sep27-05, 08:14 PM

Why would you think this?

Is it just your gut feeling? A twist of percerption based on a personal philosophy? Or something else?
I no longer consider this a gut feeling, although I can't prove that which can't be proven. It can only be accepted through logical procedure.

In the process of inquiry of what the universe is, one takes on as many possibilities as one can conceive, and the possibility that all of reality is conceptually oriented was given its chance to rise or fall on it's own merits. So far I haven't regretted taking this avenue of approach, nor the ride that ensued. I'm still on that path with no major accidents as of yet.

The consideration here is that the universe begins from nothing. and nothing is a concept only. I.E. No physical representation whatsoever. There really is only one road available, that of conceptual reality through geometric representation.

Castlegate

Sep27-05, 08:36 PM

What about the notion of 'Essential Propperty or Substance' of a given term or entity of reality? In a conceptual universe no substance is required, a geometric form will do nicely without the need to have something to sink your teeth in.

Dr.Yes

Sep28-05, 02:04 AM

The consideration here is that the universe begins from nothing. and nothing is a concept only. I.E. No physical representation whatsoever. There really is only one road available, that of conceptual reality through geometric representation.

Geometry thrives on the construct of "nothing". Without "nothing" the "illusion" of the universe would be too crowded to make out any specific geometry. A "cat's cradle" would be impossible to achieve without the concept, construct and existence of "nothing".

Simple parallel lines could not exist without "nothing" contrasting and identifying where a line is and where there is "no line"....ie "no-thing".

Dr.Yes

Sep28-05, 02:10 AM

The physical world can be explained by physics in terms of how is it here?, when was/is/will it be here? and where can we find it?.

Why is the physical world here? is a question that physics - pure, semi-pure, slightly dirty or down right corrupt, can not answer except to say that:

the physical world is here to support physicists and their claims all over the world... and, no doubt, elsewhere.

(Eyes roll-up) Physicists are in the process of building a physical universe for all of humanity. They're not using hammers and nails but they employ illusionary techniques by spouting equasions and ideas about distance and physical property.

Every time a physicist uses their perceptive powers a new law of physics is projected by their drive to out-do Newton and Einstein in halucenogenic, illusionary prowess. They're not observing anything, really, they're projecting biogenetically programed and excreted holograms and they're fooling everyone on the planet. See that hot, round, white thing in the sky? See it move from horizon to horizon? That's really just Akenaten Moses' left-over illusion still stimulating your collective unconsciousness and making you believe there is a sun.

etc...

Castlegate

Sep28-05, 08:37 AM

Geometry thrives on the construct of "nothing". Without "nothing" the "illusion" of the universe would be too crowded to make out any specific geometry. A "cat's cradle" would be impossible to achieve without the concept, construct and existence of "nothing".

Simple parallel lines could not exist without "nothing" contrasting and identifying where a line is and where there is "no line"....ie "no-thing".
I think you,re missing what I'm trying to get across. Simple lines can exist without the physicality. It is the very nature of a conceptual geometric construct, and it can never get to crowded if the geometries are shared., thats how you can take a trillion galaxies and put them into something the size of a pinhead. There is no upperbound limit on shared geometry in a non-physical conceptual reality.

Dr.Yes

Sep28-05, 11:15 PM

I think you,re missing what I'm trying to get across. Simple lines can exist without the physicality. It is the very nature of a conceptual geometric construct, and it can never get to crowded if the geometries are shared., thats how you can take a trillion galaxies and put them into something the size of a pinhead. There is no upperbound limit on shared geometry in a non-physical conceptual reality.

That's an interesting view of geometry. I always go off when I see the word "nothing". I'm still arriving at a definitive definition of that word. Don't mind me.

I agree that geometry is a conceptual construct (which [as far as I know] requires an actual physical brain to be aware of it). Geometry is a process or invention that has come into being in a manner similar to how any language might do so. Geometry is used to describe what we think we see or what we have derived from life while being alive, with a brain. Much like any language.

Perhaps what I'm saying is that all explainations of all things can be reduced to pure language(s). Because every discipline concerning the study of every phenomenon has a unique language of its own. Each of these languages is used to convey specific information about what it has discovered from its vantage point in the universe.

The languages of each of all the disciplines at first seem very different from each other. But, each discipline slowly begins to borrow data from the next and the languages progressively begin to meld. Soon you get these explainations of certain phenomena that sound like Creole or Pidgeon because they have a smattering of medical physics, kineticphysics, psyhoanylitics and neurolinguistic terminology. Chheers.

Castlegate

Sep29-05, 10:34 PM

I agree that geometry is a conceptual construct (which [as far as I know] requires an actual physical brain to be aware of it).My contention would be that our brains are not physical, nor anything else that exist. We see signs of this in the quantum arena. If we break down a human to fundamental constituents and I do consider that fundamental units do exist, what could possibly be known about them other than conceptual understanding? They will not show signs of any physical existence ...... they can't. The fundamental level is the end of the line, and if these fundies can't be understood by any means other than conceptual comprehension, we are forced to accept that the entire panoply is conceptual in nature.

Paul Martin

Sep30-05, 10:41 AM

The fundamental level is the end of the line, and if these fundies can't be understood by any means other than conceptual comprehension, we are forced to accept that the entire panoply is conceptual in nature.
And,...taking the next step, aren't we forced to accept that there must exist some sort of fundamental mind or consciousness in which these concepts are (were) conceived? After all I don't think concepts can exist apart from their conception, can they?

Paul

Castlegate

Sep30-05, 07:28 PM

And,...taking the next step, aren't we forced to accept that there must exist some sort of fundamental mind or consciousness in which these concepts are (were) conceived? After all I don't think concepts can exist apart from their conception, can they?

PaulI would say that the use of the word mind is a bit misleading, as if to say something on the order of contemplation takes place. I would argue that there is a first geometric concept by which it is different from all others in that there are no other concepts by which it can interact. The first concept essentially interacts with itself, and this is the cause by which all other concepts are conceived.

Dr.Yes

Sep30-05, 08:46 PM

My contention would be that our brains are not physical, nor anything else that exist. We see signs of this in the quantum arena. If we break down a human to fundamental constituents and I do consider that fundamental units do exist, what could possibly be known about them other than conceptual understanding? They will not show signs of any physical existence ...... they can't. The fundamental level is the end of the line, and if these fundies can't be understood by any means other than conceptual comprehension, we are forced to accept that the entire panoply is conceptual in nature.

The illusion is an illusion.

In your illusionary world is there anything to compare it to such as "no illusion" or "illusion free zones"?

If the illusion is all there is in that world, with nothing other than illusion to be compared to.... the grand illusion singularity... then the illusion must be real or what is often termed "reality".

Furthermore, in this equasion, if/when the illusion is real then it must be true that the many sights and sounds we see and hear every day are real sights and sounds. The sensations from the 5 or six senses we have are real and feelings of hunger and puking are real........ if everything is an illusion and its the only game you got going it might as well be real because there's no other option.

Paul Martin

Sep30-05, 09:57 PM

I would say that the use of the word mind is a bit misleading,I agree. And I would say that all other words we use are also a bit misleading, 'mind' being no moreso. as if to say something on the order of contemplation takes place. I would say that something on the order of contemplation definitely takes place any time a concept is conceived or pondered. If you consider a concept is still a concept after it has been reduced to language and written, say, on paper, then in those cases concepts might exist apart from contemplation. But to be conceived in the first place, or to be thought about, some kind of contemplative capability is necessary.I would argue that there is a first geometric concept by which it is different from all others in that there are no other concepts by which it can interact. I think that's a good guess. I would suggest that another possibility for the first concept might be audible rather than visual or tactile like geometric concepts. That way, the very beginning, as I think Pythagoras suggested, might have been music, starting with basic clicks, and progressing to tones, rhythms, melodies, harmonies, etc. In any case, I agree with you that whatever it was, the beginning of physical reality was nothing but concepts.The first concept essentially interacts with itself, and this is the cause by which all other concepts are conceived.I think there are only two ways in which concepts can interact. One is within that contemplative mind we talked about, in which the thinker (i.e. the owner/operator of the mind) imagines the concepts to interact. The other is if the concepts are rendered into something permanent like a physical structure (the paper I mentioned earlier) and the phsical embodiments of the concepts interact physically, e.g. balls rolling down a plane in a gravitational field.

What I am trying to say is that I don't see how the first concept can interact with itself. I think it requires a mind to do the interaction or it requires some kind of implementation which in turn requres a mind to pull off.

Those are just my humble opinions.

Paul

Castlegate

Sep30-05, 10:04 PM

In your illusionary world is there anything to compare it to such as "no illusion" or "illusion free zones"?I would say that most people, and not necessarily the scientific community would use something like a rock up against air, or matter to space as a means by which we percieve or indentify that which exist. In a purely conceptual universe I would describe a fundamental conceptual unit like this - Consider a balloon and for the sake of discussion consider that there is nothing within the balloon and nothing outside it. The material of the balloon isn't a material at all, and has no thickness. It is the concept (thought). For comparison sake the balloon is the same as (one) up against (nothing), and this is the means by which identity is understood for all things big and small that exist. What makes any one thing different from any other thing is the form of the concept.

If the illusion is all there is in that world, with nothing other than illusion to be compared to.... the grand illusion singularity... then the illusion must be real or what is often termed "reality". The only reality in this world is the Reality of Non-Existence (Remember this world of mine comes from nothing). The balloon (concept) or otherwise known as a conceptual geometric amounts to in some other words (A thought of (one) nothing). These geometries (thoughts) are in effect conscious to the extent of what they are, and act in accordance with universal laws.

Furthermore, in this equasion, if/when the illusion is real then it must be true that the many sights and sounds we see and hear every day are real sights and sounds. The sensations from the 5 or six senses we have are real and feelings of hunger and puking are real........ if everything is an illusion and its the only game you got going it might as well be real because there's no other option. Your senses are quite real and in my opinion conceptually real. I just can't buy the hammering of the nail analogy to reality anymore. Rather than things banging into each other ... I prefer to think of things acting on one another to whatever effect.

Dr.Yes

Oct1-05, 01:00 PM

I would say that most people, and not necessarily the scientific community would use something like a rock up against air, or matter to space as a means by which we percieve or indentify that which exist. In a purely conceptual universe I would describe a fundamental conceptual unit like this - Consider a balloon and for the sake of discussion consider that there is nothing within the balloon and nothing outside it. The material of the balloon isn't a material at all, and has no thickness. It is the concept (thought). For comparison sake the balloon is the same as (one) up against (nothing), and this is the means by which identity is understood for all things big and small that exist. What makes any one thing different from any other thing is the form of the concept.

Using the words "concept" and "thought" like they were a universally occuring phenomena is confusing to me (there are places where thoughts do not exist). One requires the "illusion" of a brain to generate them. I believe your reasoning is in reverse where you have to use physical examples to explain the "illusion" of your reality.

I'll agree that.... as the universe evolves, expands, slows in its expansion or whatever, our brain must make adjustments to the changes in its environment... in order to maintain a brief survival.

The only reality in this world is the Reality of Non-Existence (Remember this world of mine comes from nothing). The balloon (concept) or otherwise known as a conceptual geometric amounts to in some other words (A thought of (one) nothing). These geometries (thoughts) are in effect conscious to the extent of what they are, and act in accordance with universal laws.

First the illusion of everything is a reality... now the illusion of nothing is a reality. Through all of this illusion, thoughts happen by themselves, with no physical brain generating them.

I beg to differ. Our brain adapts to the congruencies and consistencies it derives from the surrounding, very real, physical environment. Adaptation is a result of the interaction between a physical brain and its physical environment... no "banging of heads". "Geometry" is simply another language (like physics, math, Hungarian and carpentry etc.....) by which our brain describes its environment to itself and others. Our many languages are simply our derived explaination of observed interactions and juxtoppositions. We are rarely correct in our observations because everything keeps changing. (ie: change = universal law)

Your senses are quite real and in my opinion conceptually real. I just can't buy the hammering of the nail analogy to reality anymore. Rather than things banging into each other ... I prefer to think of things acting on one another to whatever effect.

The way things influence one another bespeaks of the nature of physcial reality... that there is separation that there are separate elements.

Quantum reality, as simultaneious as it may be, acts similarily where there is influence from various regions but, the influences are simultanieous and are non-local. By region I mean within each element exists all other elements and they are all influencing one another... at the same time. Otherwise, the universe would pop in an explosion of disunity and disonance! Its like having dual carbs on a motor. If they're not properly scoped and in sync, the motor becomes disfunctional and quits, quickly.

Dr.Yes

Oct1-05, 01:38 PM

Definitions of illusion (need I say more?):

* an erroneous mental representation
* something many people believe that is false; "they have the illusion that I am very wealthy"
* delusion: the act of deluding; deception by creating illusory ideas
* magic trick: an illusory feat; considered magical by naive observers
wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn
* An illusion is a distortion of a sensory perception. Each of the human senses can be deceived by illusions, but visual illusions are the most well known. Some illusions are subjective; different people may experience an illusion differently, or not at all.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illusion
* An illusion is something that tricks your eyes. impact crater Impact craters are the remains of collisions between an asteroid or meteorite and the Earth. imp An imp is a mischievous child. impala The impala is a high-jumping, lightly-built antelope from southern Africa. in The bird is in the cage.
www.enchantedlearning.com/Iisfor.shtml
* Fibre: Silk. Weave: Gauze or made on bobbinet machine or knotted. Characteristics: A very fine, all-silk tulle which originated in France. It has a cobweb appearance. Hexagonal open mesh. Made in 52 inch and 72 inch widths. Uses: Veilings, particularly for weddings, trimmings. Back To Top
www.ntgi.net/ICCF&D/silk.htm
* In Occultism everything finite (such as the Universe and all in it) is called Illusion or Maya.
www.theosociety.org/pasadena/key/key-glo2.htm
* A perception, as of visual stimuli, that represents what is perceived in a way different from the way it is in reality. Elizabeth has the illusion that Zeely is a Watutsi queen. See the excerpts from Hamilton's article on "Illusion and Reality."
theliterarylink.com/definitions.html
* A gown with a yoke of sheer net and an often ornately decorated satin band, fitting snugly on the neck creating a choker effect.
www.weddingchannel.com/ui/buildArticle.action
* The deceit of the bodily eye by false or unreal appearances, or the mental eye by false prospects, statements; something that deceives or deludes by producing a false impression; an inaccurate perception, misinterpretation of sensory impressions; in memory, a subjective falsification by addition, omission or substitution in recall of a past experience; a fixed illusion is a delusion; the misrepresentation of reality by individuals or personalities.
miriams-well.org/Glossary/
* presentation of a false or misleading idea, as in: The magician gave the illusion of sawing the woman in half.
www.business-words.com/dictionary/E.html
* the experience resulting from negative polarity imbalance. A fragmented experience of reality which is based on duality and separation.
www.synchronicity.org/Glossaryp.html
* a misinterpreted perception that is caused by mistaking something present for something it is not. Illusions commonly occur with information that is seen or heard. For example, a common illusion is misinterpreting the noise made by wind for a voice. By contrast, a hallucination is a strong sensory perception that one has of an object or event while awake, when no such object or event exists. Whereas illusions involve misperceptions, hallucinations do not. Thus, an example of a hallucination would be hearing voices that are not really there and are not misinterpretation of the wind or any other noises.
www.dbs-stn.org/glossary2.asp
* A Very Fine Sheer Fabric Usually Of Nylon Or Silk.
www.justsaywhen.com/Vintage-101-Glossary.htm
* A misperception or misinterpretation of a real external stimulus, such as hearing the rustling of leaves as the sound of voices. See also hallucination.
suicideandmentalhealthassociationinternational.org/mhglossary2.html
* modified or wrong interpretation of the outer world, which the individual accepts as reality; it may affect one or more senses
library.thinkquest.org/C0115926/glosary.htm
* An (intentional or unintentional) element of an entity only present as a perception by an observer.
ceh.kitoba.com/glossary.html
* Everything finite (like the Universe and all in it) is called Illusion or Maya. All that which is subject to change through decay and death, and which therefore has a beginning and an end, is regarded as illusion. That alone which is Changeless and Eternal is called "Reality". Illusion is primarily the characteristic of a distorted attitude of mind.
www.revelation37.freeserve.co.uk/contents/glossary.htm
* A false interpretation of an external sensory stimulus, usually seen or heard, such as a mirage in the desert or voices on the wind.
yourmedicalsource.com/library/schizophrenia/SCH_glossary.html
* 1.)A semi-sheer net-type fabric, Illusion is often used for skirts and in some veils. It may also be called Net or Tulle. 2.) Any style neckline which is covered with chiffon or netting.
www1.bridesave.com/glossary.cfm
* A distorted perception, such as interpreting shadows to be an intruder; common in delirium.
www.ohiohealth.com/healthreference/reference/DF34B32F-6F85-45E0-8FE85ECACDD48CC0.htm
* is a distorted perception of reality.
www.a2zpsychology.com/psychology_guide/mental_illness_terminology.htm
* something false taken to be true. Usually applied to the difference between being materially identified and spiritually directed. The impermanent or material is considered illusive as it is doomed to change while the management of the form, the spirit resulting from alignment with the soul, and the soul itself is considered eternal as it refers to the invariance of selfawareness and the reality of change, time itself.
www.theorderoftime.com/ned/spiritueel/terms.html
* An unreal image; A deceptive appearance HOME This site was created by Lisa Marini. Last Modified: May 15, 1997. If there are any problems with this site, or if you have any comments, please send them to: lmarin1@tiger.towson.edu
www.towson.edu/~sallen/COURSES/SURREAL/STUDENTS/MARINI/Glossary.html

Castlegate

Oct1-05, 08:49 PM

the beginning of physical reality was nothing but concepts. If I can't get you to understand that there is no physical reality .... I can't get you to believe that there is no chance for everything to be explained through physics. The idea that I'm trying to get acrosss is that the fundamental building blocks that make the universe what it is, are nothing more than conceptual geometric forms. These fundamental units are more than capable of the universe we see today. The premise here is to make a universe from nothing, without some form of magic act. A universe made of something other than nothing constitutes a magic act from my perspective. The only concievable way to make a universe from nothing that I can tell of, is by conceptual means. Fundamental conceptual geometric forms of nothing are more than adequate to serve as building blocks for anything within this universe. We can come to understanding of this grist mill through observation of the interactions.
I think there are only two ways in which concepts can interact. I'd be more interested in what you think a thought is.

I consider this postulate in regards to anything that exist.

{All that exist must have form}

Since I cannot deny the existence of thought ...... I (must) assume it has form. Can you tell me your idea of what form thought takes?

Castlegate

Oct1-05, 09:35 PM

I believe your reasoning is in reverse where you have to use physical examples to explain the "illusion" of your reality.The use of a balloon to explain a fundamental conceptual unit was only to coax you to the form of it. You can note that the balloon is removed, whereby only the form is left. This is a Non-physical entity I'm trying to explain, hence it can't be interacted with by physical means. Interaction between two fundamental conceptual units must occur by conceptual means, such as yes verses no, or positive verses negative. If for instance a fundamental geometrical unit is positive within the form, and negative exterior of it, we can come to an understanding of possible interactions.

First the illusion of everything is a reality... now the illusion of nothing is a reality.My first post I believe stated that the illusion was that the world was physical. Nothing is not an illusion to me, it comes to you in forms, otherwise known as The Reality Of Non-Existence. It has nothing to hide (a play on words).

Les Sleeth

Oct2-05, 09:51 AM

If I can't get you to understand that there is no physical reality .... I can't get you to believe that there is no chance for everything to be explained through physics. The idea that I'm trying to get acrosss is that the fundamental building blocks that make the universe what it is, are nothing more than conceptual geometric forms. These fundamental units are more than capable of the universe we see today. The premise here is to make a universe from nothing, without some form of magic act. A universe made of something other than nothing constitutes a magic act from my perspective. The only concievable way to make a universe from nothing that I can tell of, is by conceptual means.

You've not solved anything yet. A thought doesn't get a free ride when it comes to requiring "something" to compose it. What is the composition of a thought? The geometry imagined, as the theme of a concept, may escape having substance, but the concept itself requires something essential to be.

I consider this postulate in regards to anything that exist.

{All that exist must have form}

Not so. In fact, the very essence of existence could be some type of formless "stuff" that was never created, cannot NOT exist, and is the ground state condition of all we see. For more ideas on this (neutral substance monism), check out this thread:

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=76897

Since I cannot deny the existence of thought ...... I (must) assume it has form. Can you tell me your idea of what form thought takes?

Thoughts are not all conscious is, and form is not all that existence is. Since I am a relatively successful meditator, I can state uncategorically that if you can stop thinking, you are still fully conscious (I would say in fact more conscious than when you can't stop thinking). If all is thought, then shouldn't I cease to exist when my thoughts cease?

When I listen to beautiful music, there are two things going on (consciousness -wise). There is recognition of the forms shaping the music, but there is also my appreciation which I believe is formless. My wife is the form, the love I feel is formless. My thoughts about a subject are forms, my understanding is formless. Consciousness for humans is both the ability to think and the ability to feel.

Dr.Yes

Oct2-05, 02:31 PM

There is recognition of the forms shaping the music, but there is also my appreciation which I believe is formless.

My wife is the form, the love I feel is formless.

My thoughts about a subject are forms, my understanding is formless. Consciousness for humans is both the ability to think and the ability to feel.

Love/Appreciation/Understanding is/are the sum of the parts that are involved in adrenal, testosterone, estrogen and other hormonal release plus neurotransmitters being released because of stimulus that is either memory (chemical and genetic configurations representing stored information about external stimulus) induced or because of external stimulus in real time. It also involves the evolution of a species and the maturation of an individual among many other "parts".

Love/Appreciation and Understanding are each composed of a lot of physical parts. I'm not sure if because they are a result of so many physical conditions... it makes these "feelings" or "conditions" physical... or if they are "above" physical in that they are "the sum of the parts".

Les Sleeth

Oct2-05, 02:41 PM

Love/Appreciation/Understanding is/are the sum of the parts that are involved in adrenal, testosterone, estrogen and other hormonal release plus neurotransmitters being released because of stimulus that is either memory (chemical and genetic configurations representing stored information about external stimulus) induced or because of external stimulus in real time. It also involves the evolution of a species and the maturation of an individual among many other "parts".

Love/Appreciation and Understanding are each composed of a lot of physical parts. I'm not sure if because they are a result of so many physical conditions... it makes these "feelings" or "conditions" physical... or if they are "above" physical in that they are "the sum of the parts".

Well, that's your physicalist theory. I couldn't disagree more. I experience love, understanding, and appreciation as something singular. It is not part-dependent even if what leads to the experience has been preceded by numerous steps. But you are certainly free to think of yourself as the result of chemicals and brain physiology.

I dropped out of this thread a long time ago because the physicalists think one day they will fully account for human consciousness with the brain, and I (among others) are quite certain we experience something inside which is brain-independent. The physicalists can't prove their theory, and the subjective certainty of the introspectionist can't be made available for objective evaluation by others. So really it seems the discussion is destined to go nowhere.

I stepped in for my last post just to challenge Castegate's notion that a universe which is only thoughts somehow gets around the something-from-nothing dilemma.

Dr.Yes

Oct2-05, 04:51 PM

Well, that's your physicalist theory. I couldn't disagree more. I experience love, understanding, and appreciation as something singular. It is not part-dependent even if what leads to the experience has been preceded by numerous steps. But you are certainly free to think of yourself as the result of chemicals and brain physiology.

I dropped out of this thread a long time ago because the physicalists think one day they will fully account for human consciousness with the brain, and I (among others) are quite certain we experience something inside which is brain-independent. The physicalists can't prove their theory, and the subjective certainty of the introspectionist can't be made available for objective evaluation by others. So really it seems the discussion is destined to go nowhere.

I stepped in for my last post just to challenge Castegate's notion that a universe which is only thoughts somehow gets around the something-from-nothing dilemma.

Well, that's your introspectionistic theory for you. It is an illusion (as in ill-conceived notion... as in ignorant of all the facts) to imagine love, whatever and whatever as singular and separate from the chemicals from which they are spawned.

But, for a collection of rocks that can talk, you're not doing too badly with your (deluded) powers of reasoning.

Castlegate

Oct2-05, 06:40 PM

You've not solved anything yet. A thought doesn't get a free ride when it comes to requiring "something" to compose it. What is the composition of a thought? A thought or thoughts would be composed of a form of nothing.
The geometry imagined, as the theme of a concept, may escape having substance, but the concept itself requires something essential to be. I fail to see why from my perspective. Are you saying something physical is an absolute requirement?

As far as essentials go, all that is necessary is nothing and the concept of it. In fact - From the link you posted, I coulndn't help thinking your requirements for Esse fit nothing to a T.

When I listen to beautiful music, there are two things going on (consciousness -wise). There is recognition of the forms shaping the music, but there is also my appreciation which I believe is formless. My wife is the form, the love I feel is formless. My thoughts about a subject are forms, my understanding is formless. Consciousness for humans is both the ability to think and the ability to feel.
__________________
I disagree with this completely. Pain, pleasure, love, hate, you name it will be recognized in some form or another, just as a hat, dog, red, and Pez dispensers come to you in a form. Form is the fundamental base to all things that exist. Perhaps you can explain how it is you feel, without of course some sort of mystical explanatory expression.

Les Sleeth

Oct3-05, 01:26 PM

Are you saying something physical is an absolute requirement?

Not something physical, just something.

As far as essentials go, all that is necessary is nothing and the concept of it. In fact - From the link you posted, I coulndn't help thinking your requirements for Esse fit nothing to a T.

I don't see how. Let's say all that exists is water. When resting peacefully as an ocean you call it nothing, but when it freezes into "forms" like icebergs then you call that something. But how can you call water "nothing" just because it is in an unformed condition?

If nothing else, the formless condition is absolute potentiality, and that's hardly "nothing." Forms have to be composed of "something."

I disagree with this completely. Pain, pleasure, love, hate, you name it will be recognized in some form or another, just as a hat, dog, red, and Pez dispensers come to you in a form. Form is the fundamental base to all things that exist. Perhaps you can explain how it is you feel, without of course some sort of mystical explanatory expression.

From what you said, I don't see how we disagree yet. I didn't say the feelings you list come unattached to form, I said there is 1) the form, and there is 2) the feeling that comes with the form . . . that feeling is formless. It's like the musical note C can be mentally identified by its place on a structured scale, but the experience of C is something different, it's structureless.

Les Sleeth

Oct3-05, 01:37 PM

Well, that's your introspectionistic theory for you. It is an illusion (as in ill-conceived notion... as in ignorant of all the facts) to imagine love, whatever and whatever as singular and separate from the chemicals from which they are spawned.

But, for a collection of rocks that can talk, you're not doing too badly with your (deluded) powers of reasoning.

I was resisting your abrupt way of saying "this is how it is," rather than explaining it as merely your opinion.

What determines our opinions? If you had lived in a desert all your life and didn't know there was any other sort of landscape, then your opinion of what planet Earth is like will reflect the extent of your experience. I can accept that, based the life experience you've had, it seems reasonable to assume you are chemistry and brain physiology.

I also have all my life experiences under my belt, and mine have given me a different view of what I, as consciousness, am at the core. I am not "ignorant of the facts" of my life in a physical body. I simply have had experiences which have convinced me I am not my body, but rather am entwined in it.

I don't ask you to accept my view as the truth . . . only to be aware that people might have experiences you don't and therefore different opinions than you.

Dr.Yes

Oct3-05, 05:16 PM

I was resisting your abrupt way of saying "this is how it is," rather than explaining it as merely your opinion.

What determines our opinions? If you had lived in a desert all your life and didn't know there was any other sort of landscape, then your opinion of what planet Earth is like will reflect the extent of your experience. I can accept that, based the life experience you've had, it seems reasonable to assume you are chemistry and brain physiology.

I also have all my life experiences under my belt, and mine have given me a different view of what I, as consciousness, am at the core. I am not "ignorant of the facts" of my life in a physical body. I simply have had experiences which have convinced me I am not my body, but rather am entwined in it.

I don't ask you to accept my view as the truth . . . only to be aware that people might have experiences you don't and therefore different opinions than you.

I don't mean for you to take what I've said as an abrupt statement. That sort of interpretation is left up to the audience. I expect people to read what I say as my opinion and as a repository of my experience rather than as a megalomaniacle decree of the land. What else could what I say be other than my opinion?

Now you're entwined in your body.

Your body isn't you and you aren't your body... but you two are entwined. How about someone else's body? Would that figure in the entwinement? How about the freeway outside the window... is that intertwining along with the body and the you?

If by entwined you mean that these states, "you" and "body" etc... are influencing one another I certainly agree. However, only one component of the two is fully dependent on the other. The body can exist with out the you... but the you cannot exist without a body.

This brings me to my opinion, as it were, that "source" is a large part of explaining all things (in keeping with the thread and topic). When researching the cause of an emotion or a motive or a word or anything we examine its source.This is a form of reductive reasoning that often ends up in the realm of physics.

However, I don't believe everything can be reduced to pure physics because it would be completely useless to do so. Eg.

Someone asks why apples always fall down. You tell them its because the apples have become heavier as they ripen and their stem eventually lets them fall. You can tell them the fallen fruit also helps nourish the apple tree through the winter. You can tell them the fruit carries the seed of the tree so it can be reproduced, elsewhere.

If someone asks why an apple just flew out of that tree and you give them Newton's modified idea of gravity ie: F = G- m1 m2 over r2 no one is wiser but you feel as though you've explained everything there is to be explained about an apple falling out of a tree.

What's missing in Newton's or anyone's mathematical approach to explaining a function is the research into how the function every came into being in the first place. Researching the sources and resources involved in the creation of "the you" or the falling apple demands that we stray from the fundimental physics of a subject, and look closer at the conditions that have given rise to the subject and related functions, etc..

Castlegate

Oct3-05, 09:04 PM

I don't see how. Let's say all that exists is water. When resting peacefully as an ocean you call it nothing, but when it freezes into "forms" like icebergs then you call that something. But how can you call water "nothing" just because it is in an unformed condition?

If nothing else, the formless condition is absolute potentiality, and that's hardly "nothing." Forms have to be composed of "something."

Now let me cover this ground from my perspective, within my conceptual model. First off you don't say {Let's say all that exists is water.} and follow with {When resting peacefully as an ocean you call it nothing} and then this comes about {but when it freezes into "forms" like icebergs then you call that something. But how can you call water "nothing" just because it is in an unformed condition? }

The problem here is that you are stuck on your model trying to explain your understanding of mine with yours. It would seem you are trying to use a context that you figure I would use (and you got that wrong), and also in actuality you slip in some of your own. Let me fill in the blanks for greater understanding.

So when you say {Let's say all that exists is water.} I assume this is what you figure is my start gun. Let me replace that by pulling the trigger with this {Non-Existence}. Not only are we not on the same page, but far from the same book. I can't expect you to follow the reason of my logic if your eye isn't on the bullet.

At any rate I am bone tired. Thats because I've been up and down ladders all day, and I ain't no spring chicken no mo. My head is screwed on with stripped threads at the moment, because it's been gettin screwed since 2am. So I'll pick this up at a later time. I feelin a little grumpy. Can you tell?

Les Sleeth

Oct3-05, 10:16 PM

Now let me cover this ground from my perspective, within my conceptual model. First off you don't say {Let's say all that exists is water.} and follow with {When resting peacefully as an ocean you call it nothing} and then this comes about {but when it freezes into "forms" like icebergs then you call that something. But how can you call water "nothing" just because it is in an unformed condition? }

The problem here is that you are stuck on your model trying to explain your understanding of mine with yours. It would seem you are trying to use a context that you figure I would use (and you got that wrong), and also in actuality you slip in some of your own. Let me fill in the blanks for greater understanding.

So when you say {Let's say all that exists is water.} I assume this is what you figure is my start gun. Let me replace that by pulling the trigger with this {Non-Existence}. Not only are we not on the same page, but far from the same book. I can't expect you to follow the reason of my logic if your eye isn't on the bullet.

At any rate I am bone tired. Thats because I've been up and down ladders all day, and I ain't no spring chicken no mo. My head is screwed on with stripped threads at the moment, because it's been gettin screwed since 2am. So I'll pick this up at a later time. I feelin a little grumpy. Can you tell?

All I can say is . . .
:rofl: :biggrin: :smile: :!!) o:) :cool: :tongue: :tongue2:

Great post even though it didn't make a lick of sense to me. Have a beer, eat some pizza, love your wife (or signficant other). Welcome to PF!

Les Sleeth

Oct3-05, 10:21 PM

Paul Martin

Oct4-05, 11:16 AM

The body can exist with out the you... but the you cannot exist without a body. I happen to doubt both of these assertions. Can you give me any support for either one of them which you think is compelling? Before you do, though, I would like you to tell me your definition of 'you'. We also need to understand the definition of 'body' but I think this is less of a problem. I suspect we both agree on what 'body' means.

Bobby R

Oct4-05, 10:02 PM

I've watched this forum. Would someone first define Physics. I thought mathematics was one of many working tools but not necessarily on par with physics.
We’re mixing apples and oranges again. One example of representing ‘A’ as H2O and ‘B’ as Man omits content of each. And even if you look at composition can you explain away thought as a function of physics.
Explain why an elm tree does not possess a single leaf of average size and shape to its other leaves. We like to put square pegs in square holes which is good, but sometimes it is not necessary to explain everything with physics.
Abstract comes from thought and often lends itself to explaining the unknown. For example, why stop at our Universe? What about our galaxy? There are millions of galaxies out there which I suspect are not alike. A good analogy would be to pour a bucket of pain in a big bowl and drop a bowling ball in it. Freeze the result at maximum expansion and do it again a million or so times and you will have a pretty good representation of outer-space with all the galaxies. I’d like to know what our galaxy is rotating around. Is it rotating around something? Mathematic Reasoning and physics suggests it should.
Bobby R Sends

Dr.Yes

Oct5-05, 01:31 AM

You're all entitled to your wonderful opinions, however... I'm right.

Now I won't continue to bore you all because I've been up late with two twisted twin sisters who raised their own brother who has to deal with FAS and ADS and who can't seem to make it on his own.

Whoop whoop whoop whoop, as Dr. Zoiberg would say.

quantumcarl

Oct7-05, 07:57 PM

Whoop whoop whoop whoop, as Dr. Zoiberg would say.

I've always wanted to quote myself... you see, PF wants me to be quantumcarl for some reason... so, I am reverting to my very old name from god knows when it started....something like 2000, pre-reichstat housen berning.

Now, since Carl Sagan has become a quantum entity, like he always has been... and saturated my Dr. Yes potential with his self directed way of explaining the universe... I'd better get on to plasma physics and simplified calculus etc.... however, philosophy always seems to have enough gravity to drag me back here.... thank you....

quantumcarl

Oct8-05, 03:26 PM

I don't mean for you to take what I've said as an abrupt statement. That sort of interpretation is left up to the audience. I expect people to read what I say as my opinion and as a repository of my experience rather than as a megalomaniacle decree of the land. What else could what I say be other than my opinion?

Now you're entwined in your body.

Your body isn't you and you aren't your body... but you two are entwined. How about someone else's body? Would that figure in the entwinement? How about the freeway outside the window... is that intertwining along with the body and the you?

If by entwined you mean that these states, "you" and "body" etc... are influencing one another I certainly agree. However, only one component of the two is fully dependent on the other. The body can exist with out the you... but the you cannot exist without a body.

This brings me to my opinion, as it were, that "source" is a large part of explaining all things (in keeping with the thread and topic). When researching the cause of an emotion or a motive or a word or anything we examine its source.This is a form of reductive reasoning that often ends up in the realm of physics.

However, I don't believe everything can be reduced to pure physics because it would be completely useless to do so. Eg.

Someone asks why apples always fall down. You tell them its because the apples have become heavier as they ripen and their stem eventually lets them fall. You can tell them the fallen fruit also helps nourish the apple tree through the winter. You can tell them the fruit carries the seed of the tree so it can be reproduced, elsewhere.

If someone asks why an apple just flew out of that tree and you give them Newton's modified idea of gravity ie: F = G- m1 m2 over r2 no one is wiser but you feel as though you've explained everything there is to be explained about an apple falling out of a tree.

What's missing in Newton's or anyone's mathematical approach to explaining a function is the research into how the function every came into being in the first place. Researching the sources and resources involved in the creation of "the you" or the falling apple demands that we stray from the fundimental physics of a subject, and look closer at the conditions that have given rise to the subject and related functions, etc..

I totally agree.

moving finger

Oct8-05, 04:22 PM

Now you're entwined in your body.
This already implies a dualistic perspective. May be incorrect.

Your body isn't you and you aren't your body...
Why not?

How about someone else's body? Would that figure in the entwinement? How about the freeway outside the window... is that intertwining along with the body and the you?
Irrelevant, since I do not accept your first statement.

If by entwined you mean that these states, "you" and "body" etc... are influencing one another I certainly agree. However, only one component of the two is fully dependent on the other. The body can exist with out the you... but the you cannot exist without a body.
Disagree. The body creates (is one with) the you. The body (in its entirety) can no more exist without you than you can exist without the body.
Someone asks why apples always fall down. You tell them its because the apples have become heavier as they ripen and their stem eventually lets them fall. You can tell them the fallen fruit also helps nourish the apple tree through the winter. You can tell them the fruit carries the seed of the tree so it can be reproduced, elsewhere.
The latter two are not "reasons why" the apple falls down (unless one believes in teleology).

If someone asks why an apple just flew out of that tree and you give them Newton's modified idea of gravity ie: F = G- m1 m2 over r2 no one is wiser but you feel as though you've explained everything there is to be explained about an apple falling out of a tree.
"no one is wiser"? - I disagree. What is it that you expect from an explanation? It seems that you are seeking "reasons" and not simple a functional explanation (ie you demand to know "why does an apple obey Newton's laws?")

What's missing in Newton's or anyone's mathematical approach to explaining a function is the research into how the function every came into being in the first place. Researching the sources and resources involved in the creation of "the you" or the falling apple demands that we stray from the fundimental physics of a subject, and look closer at the conditions that have given rise to the subject and related functions, etc..
There is something to be answered here.

"What is it that breathes fire into the equations?"

MF

quantumcarl

Oct12-05, 05:52 PM

This already implies a dualistic perspective. May be incorrect.
Why not?
Irrelevant, since I do not accept your first statement.
Disagree. The body creates (is one with) the you. The body (in its entirety) can no more exist without you than you can exist without the body.
The latter two are not "reasons why" the apple falls down (unless one believes in teleology).
"no one is wiser"? - I disagree. What is it that you expect from an explanation? It seems that you are seeking "reasons" and not simple a functional explanation (ie you demand to know "why does an apple obey Newton's laws?")
There is something to be answered here.
"What is it that breathes fire into the equations?"
MF

There is context missing in the quote I took from myself, in that the quote is in answer to another post and it questions the premise in the post that a body and "you" can be entwined etc......

I'm sort of out of this discussion as it is.

In answer to someone who asked for a definition of a "you" I'd say a "you" is that composite of neuronal response and stimulus set off by the experiences associated with the internal environment of a body as well as its external environment.

moving finger

Oct15-05, 06:22 AM

In answer to someone who asked for a definition of a "you" I'd say a "you" is that composite of neuronal response and stimulus set off by the experiences associated with the internal environment of a body as well as its external environment.
yes, I would tend to agree with this, but also would suggest that the definition of "you" is context-dependent. An example is Searle's infamous Chinese Room, in the version where Searle "internalises" all of the room's rulebooks etc. In this case, the entity "Searle" can process Chinese questions and respond with rational Chinese answers (and hence it can be argued there is a part of Searle which understands Chinese) but at the same time the conscious entity that calls itself "Searle" is not conscious of any understanding of Chinese. It is important in this context to distinguish between the conscious agent which calls itself Searle and the rest of the physical embodiment of the agent which is Searle.
MF

Philocrat

Oct22-05, 10:42 AM

The reason I think using physics as a base explaination and reductive definition of all things is because I've seen and heard so many people explain subjects with the "fear of god" or "karma" or "lordy lordy" and other explainations that reek of the hormones of fear and exhaltation etc.... the influence of their physiology has clouded their response to the wonders of this universe.
Without physics to use as a reference point, everything really is an illusion and can become whatever one decides it is with whatever reserves of adrenilin or endomorphines, acetecholine, seritonin or dopamines they have that haven't already transformed and left their body through entropy etc....
Physics is simply one aspect from which to view the way things are. "Pure physics" is but one degree on an infinite compass of vantage points from which to study this universe

yes, in this sense physics does serve unique purpose......of determining a reference point. But it seems that this only accounts for or deals with the epistemological content of one single layer down the explanatory pathway or scale - that of physics. It corresponds to what most people are saying that not only does physics fix the reference point of things for epistemological purpose, but also the reference point which epistemologically signals to a prospective truth-tracker of the end of a given explanation. But what about other disciplines in other explanatory layers? For example the notion of a man for a physicist, as your equation shows, is different from the notion of a man for a biologist or psycholgist or a bishop or a guru? What if a biologist for example comes up with its own equation and say, for example, ' Man = Physiology', or a Psychologist with 'Man = Ego' etc.? Some of these disciplines would in hind sight wish that their equations are 'Non-eliminative' in scope as defined above. They are presumably non-eliminative if they so believe. The question is whether all these disciplines with their specific equations or reductions should merely be construed as a window of explanation that epistomologically services and satisfies each of those disciplines? Should the significance or importance of 'Inter-scale explanation' as previously defined be abandoned altogether?
.
When we say Man = Matter..... we can also separate this equasion, as is promoted in Fractal Physics and we can look at the components and find an infinite variety of potentials in each of these. Matter has the potential to become "Man" and Man has the potential to fly like a bird and operate a linear accelerator... among many other options.

So physics tells us. Reasonably so, at least to give it a benefit of doubt. Non-eliminative realism says we should retain both sides of the eqaution regardless. Well, some people might naively think that this is of our own making. Not quite ..... for it seems to be of Nature's (or Creator's ) making. For the purpose of epistemology we are naturally predisposed or forcibly inclined to retain the epistemological contents of both sides of the equation. As I always ask, can we scientifically intervene to eliminate these predispositions? That is, if you start talking about a man in the language of physics, such as 'Man is a field of atomic particles', but ouside physics you still find this entity ("that you can sink your teeth into", to borrow someone's phrase) standing in front of you. Of course as a physicist you may be fully licensed to ingnore this metaphysical and epistemological fact ( however wrong you may later turn out to be), but the immdiate presence of this 'Man' cannot be ignored at least by a biologist, a bishop, or a lay-native speaker of NL (natural language). This in my opinion is what makes both sides of the equation non-eliminative within the explanatory scale.

Anyone stupid enough to consider discarding either of the subjects in an equasion suchas "A is B" deserves the loss of the component so that they can appreciate it in its absence.
When its said that "Mind = Matter" its preferable to remember the old addage of "Mind over Matter" because it seems to have happened that the mind can go beyond the perception of matter toward the construct and concept of the amorphic fields.

But recent philosophy arguments are attempting to do away with one part of this equation - 'Mind'. This makes reduction in the equation eliminative. If the proponents of this theory succeed, this would mean a reduction of matter to a purely mechanical entity. So, 'Mind is Matter' would be metaphysically and epistemologically equivalent to 'Matter is Matter'. Or would it not?

Whether or not the amorphic fields etc... are just an illusion or not, remains something that may be provable through physics... or perhaps already has been proven... but... let's remember the opposite of reductionist theory when we read these simple words.......
....."sum of the parts". Can physics wholey explain this concept? Probably with a very long equasion.
But, most humans can't read really long equasions so, will it be a valid explaination if the physicists explain "the sum of the parts" with one... or even two unimaginably long formuli?

The propblem of the 'Sum of the parts', as I have indicated above and elsewhere is metaphysically and epistemologically problematic. The problem of infinite regress is not only when you are reducing from a whole to its underlying parts, but also when you are reducing from whole to whole and to different combinant relations. Things get even more problematic when a given whole is reduced to a part of another whole. Metaphysically, this looks as if every whole is two-natured. That is, every whole has two natures - that of being a whole and equally that of possessing the natural potential at any given time of becoming a part. You may not be necessarily wrong if you hypothesise that 'Everything is both a whole and a part!'

moving finger

Oct23-05, 11:54 AM

'Everything is both a whole and a part!'
Very deep, and very illuminating.

MF

quantumcarl

Oct27-05, 05:44 PM

The question is whether all these disciplines with their specific equations or reductions should merely be construed as a window of explanation that epistomologically services and satisfies each of those disciplines? Should the significance or importance of 'Inter-scale explanation' as previously defined be abandoned altogether?

Emphatic no. Each point of view (and this includes each and every discipline) serves to further all disciplines in their studies and in how they use language to create efficiency, progress and communication. New methods, concepts and ideas are the beneficial result of a diversity of points of views.
.
[QUOTE=Philocrat]'Mind is Matter' would be metaphysically and epistemologically equivalent to 'Matter is Matter'. Or would it not?

No. As I've said, I believe and it has been demonstrated throughout history that a diverse vocabulary and the ideas that were instrumental in spawning such a diverse vocabulary will always offer new ideas that will help guide progress toward the efficiency of any project. It somewhat resembles how nature nourishes a diversity of species and elements to support a healthy, natural selection.

Philocrat

Nov4-05, 11:14 AM

Very deep, and very illuminating.
MF

Moving Finger, welcome to the debate! Yes, very deep it is, especially now that we are entering that part of the debate where we begin to discuss inter-scale or inter-layer or inter-discipline Explanation. In case people are still wondering what all this means, 'INTER-SCALE EXPLANATION' simply means the total and complete explanation of a given object of perception across multiple scales or frames of reference.

Funny enough, our NL (natural language) is so rich and flexible that it allows us to attempt to do this by uniting one explanatory scale with another, which is equivalent to implying 'linking one or more disciplines with another' in NL constructs such as:

Man is matter
Man is physiology
Man is a field of atomic particles
Man is ego
Man is mind

and so on. However, fundamental questions of metaphysical and epistomlogical natures still remain as to:

A) Why do this in the first place - what is the point of it all?

B) If we have any point at all for inter-scale explanation, how much are we really succeeding in doing so.

C) What in future awaits the consequences of such an epic explanatory project, if any?

Finally, it seems to me that it is not really clear why things are the way they are and what we are attempting to achieve in the process, at least from the human point of view, or is there?

Philocrat

Nov4-05, 12:33 PM

Emphatic no. Each point of view (and this includes each and every discipline) serves to further all disciplines in their studies and in how they use language to create efficiency, progress and communication. New methods, concepts and ideas are the beneficial result of a diversity of points of views.

Yes, substantially so and no one is denying the fact that each discipline must explain things as they appear to them or as they appear to function in that very discipline. The question is whether there is any need for any reduction of one thing in each discipline to another. If as the content of this thread suggest, physics can explain everything, at least metaphysically (if not epistemologically so), it does appear as if we have to do away with the declaratory and explanatory contents of all other disciplines, or is it not? This in fact is the reason why a raised the issue of the Eliminative and Non-eliminative natures of the entire process (espcially when we use NL (natural language) to construct interdiscipline equations such as those I mentioned earlier).

Ok, let me put the question again in the clearest and simplest terms:

Is the claim that physics can explain everything eliminative in the the process? Or if physics can explain everything, does this make all the explanations of a given term of reality in all other disciplines metaphysically and epistemologically redundant?

These are the questions that need some hard-headed answers that are inter-disciplinarily satisfactory.

quantumcarl

Nov5-05, 02:40 AM

Ok, let me put the question again in the clearest and simplest terms:
Is the claim that physics can explain everything eliminative in the the process? Or if physics can explain everything, does this make all the explanations of a given term of reality in all other disciplines metaphysically and epistemologically redundant?
These are the questions that need some hard-headed answers that are inter-disciplinarily satisfactory.

Everything can be explained by everything... and that would include the discipline of physics and its language.

Everthing can be explained by squirrels and the way they hide the acorns.

Everything can be explained by the beer in the fridge.

Physics has an expert way of explaining everything physical. But... physics can't explain gravity and a number of other things.

In fact the number of things anyone can explain... physicist, baker or builder all put together... amounts to a dent in a thimble's worth of understanding with regard to the nature of existence.

How am I doing so far!?

Philocrat

Nov6-05, 11:04 AM

Everything can be explained by everything... and that would include the discipline of physics and its language.
Everthing can be explained by squirrels and the way they hide the acorns.
Everything can be explained by the beer in the fridge.
Physics has an expert way of explaining everything physical. But... physics can't explain gravity and a number of other things.
In fact the number of things anyone can explain... physicist, baker or builder all put together... amounts to a dent in a thimble's worth of understanding with regard to the nature of existence.
How am I doing so far!?

Well, if that is true, it follows that Physics is a mere scale of reference, one amongst many down the explanatory pathway. It also follows that physics does not have the last say about anything, or would this not be the case? Anyway, let me explain what I mean by physics being a mere scale of reference, just in case people start to wonder.

It is my belief that, when it comes to the whole notion of explanation of a given term or object of reality, every discipline stands as a mere reference point up or down the explanatory pathway of multiple scales of reference. Of course, as you suggested in your earlier posting, each scale of reference or discipline would have something that is epistemologically valuable and unique to it. But metaphysically, things get problematic when we attempt inter-scale or cross-discipline reductionimism or explanation. You encounter not only potential redundancy of information but also the notoriously metaphysically vexing infinite regress that extends both ways up and down the explanatory pathway. And as I said earlier, if your hypothesis is right that physics has outstanding issues to explain, it makes physics a mere member of the unfinished show.

The claim that physics can explain everything is a paradigm of epic scale. It is a very serious claim that both scientists and philosophers are not going to take very lightly for a very long time to come.

Doctordick

Nov6-05, 12:26 PM

The claim that physics can explain everything is a paradigm of epic scale. It is a very serious claim that both scientists and philosophers are not going to take very lightly for a very long time to come.This depends entirely on what one means by the term "physics". :devil: If one means the field commonly taught under that title in colleges and universities, the answer is of course NO! :rofl: However, if one is speaking of the idea that physics is "natural philosophy", the attempt to explain things from fundamental supportable axioms, then the answer has nothing to do with what physics can currently explain. :wink: We are speaking instead of deducing the rules which are required in order to explain the universe. o:) As such (under that interpretation of "physics") it is the fundamental science behind all sciences and anything "physics" cannot explain, can not be explained. :grumpy: The answer to the question is nothing more than opinion concerning what one is talking about when one talks about physics: i.e., is "physics" the distilled result of "exact science" or is it just another field? :biggrin:
Have fun -- Dick
Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

WarrenPlatts

Nov10-05, 02:23 PM

Philocrat

Nov11-05, 11:23 AM

This depends entirely on what one means by the term "physics". :devil: If one means the field commonly taught under that title in colleges and universities, the answer is of course NO! :rofl: However, if one is speaking of the idea that physics is "natural philosophy", the attempt to explain things from fundamental supportable axioms, then the answer has nothing to do with what physics can currently explain. :wink: We are speaking instead of deducing the rules which are required in order to explain the universe. o:) As such (under that interpretation of "physics") it is the fundamental science behind all sciences and anything "physics" cannot explain, can not be explained. :grumpy: The answer to the question is nothing more than opinion concerning what one is talking about when one talks about physics: i.e., is "physics" the distilled result of "exact science" or is it just another field? :biggrin:
Have fun -- Dick
Knowledge is Power
and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

Yes, 'Natural Philosophy' it used to be termed and known. But People like Davive Chalmer (http://consc.net/chalmers/) who came into philosophy from physics should be the authority on this issue. They should clarify whether this distiction that you are now making should hold. Unfortunately, this distinction that you are making is buried under a notoriously vague topic: 'Philosophy of Science'. Some of your stuff could pass for 'Natural Philosophy' if the distinction that you are making holds or ever comes to be accepted.

Question:

Should 'Theoretical Physics' be given a well-deserved home in Philosophy?

This would well be worth it as it will clearly distinguish 'Goods-Producing Physics' from what I prefer to call 'Analytical Physics' which comprises of Mathematical Physics, Theoretical Physics and Natural Philosophy terminologies).

Philocrat

Nov11-05, 11:56 AM

The claim that everything is explainable by "physics", is really the claim that naturalism is true. That is, there is no need to invoke a 5th element in addition to space, matter, energy, and time (e.g., mind, souls, God, consciousness, karma, spirit, etc.). This does not deny that emergent properties are real. The ingredients of a bomb are by themselves relatively harmless--it is only when they are combined in a certain way do they become dangerous. Even additive systems have non-linear effects: you pile straw on top of a camel one at a time until BAM!, the camel's back breaks.

Yes, if the 5th element will/should disappear into matter.......and my prophesy of 'Multiply Self-categorising Matter' will come to pass! And so will Naturalism itself become a permanent and indubitable norm or fact of the human reality. But unfortunately, this 5th element is the centrepiece of this thread as it has been ruthlessly contested and in effect resulted into this metaphysically vexing notion of 'the unexplainable remainder'.

If a remainder exists as it is being suggested and argued everywhere on this forum, then Matter has a partner causally and relationally explainable, and naturalism has a hole in it. If there is no such remainder, then matter is nothing more than a mysterious but multiply self-categorising entity. Such mystry and this multipartite nature of matter should not undermine naturalism and many other physicalist notions on record.

Question: How much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the overall analysis of reality?

I have asked this question on several places above on this thread and elsewhere. People tend to have systematically avoided answering it. What do you think of the information content of the perceiver in any project of explaining reality? Should it be included or rulled out as it's often the case in many explanations of the relevant disciplines?

Doctordick

Nov12-05, 01:47 PM

Question: How much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the overall analysis of reality?
I have asked this question on several places above on this thread and elsewhere. People tend to have systematically avoided answering it. What do you think of the information content of the perceiver in any project of explaining reality? Should it be included or rulled out as it's often the case in many explanations of the relevant disciplines?I think, by your statement of the question, that you misunderstand the problem. The first question I would have is, what is your definition of reality? My definition would be "my memories of the past" but I am afraid the subtle consequences of that definition might very well elude you. "My memories of the past" constitutes a succinct statement of exactly the entirety of what I know of the universe, the "universe" being "everything. You specifically mention "relevant disciplines" which implies your analysis consists of two parts: one, outside the "relevant discipline", which you must be presuming to be either understood or immaterial to the relevant discipline. Either presumption is a unsupportable constraint on your analysis. :devil:
The problem here (of explaining anything) is one of constructing a rational model of a totally unknown universe given nothing but a totally undefined stream of data which has been transcribed by a totally undefined process (you must begin without answers). The scientific community regards that problem as obviously insolvable and, from their perspective, no one but a complete idiot (me???) would look there. :rofl: :rofl:
What bugs me is that this position is held by everyone in spite of the fact that, in their own model of the universe, the problem is solved daily by millions of children (they begin as eggs with no mental concepts at all and, within a few short years they have developed complex ideas and theories beyond reckoning). No one really thinks about it. Actually, I can show that it is "the freedom to define the data transcription" which allows a solution to the problem. If you don't understand that, I will explain it to you.:wink:
Have fun -- Dick
"The simplest and most necessary truths are the very last to be believed."
by Anonymous -- (He wrote a lot of stuff.)

quantumcarl

Nov13-05, 02:19 PM

Question:
How much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the overall analysis of reality?

What do you think of the information content of the perceiver in any project of explaining reality? Should it be included or rulled out as it's often the case in many explanations of the relevant disciplines?
The only information content of a perceiver that has any bearing on reality is the information the perceiver holds individually and apart from other perceivers.

You ask "how much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the over all analysis of reality".
In the first place there is no way that there can be an overall consensis regarding reality. Unless we are able to cram every consciousness of every conscious being into one brain, we are completely unable to arrive at a universal.... shall we say.... quantum.... definition of reality.

Just because my initials, QC, could be construed to mean "quantum constant" doesn't mean I hold the quantum constant with regard to reality.

Reality (much like "time") is a concept that was constructed to pacify our rampant acknowlegement of our physicallity in a universe that is comprised of much much more than the physical plateau we all know and love so much.

Doctordick

Jan12-06, 02:42 PM

The only information content of a perceiver that has any bearing on reality is the information the perceiver holds individually and apart from other perceivers.Essentially I believe you are saying that we each live in a universe of our own creation constructed from "information the perceiver holds individually". I agree with that statement one hundred percent; what the others (and I hope that does not include you) fail to realize is that communication from "other perceivers" is just more "information the perceiver holds individually". In the final analysis, we are all alone inside our own heads. :biggrin:
You ask "how much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the over all analysis of reality".
In the first place there is no way that there can be an overall consensis regarding reality. Unless we are able to cram every consciousness of every conscious being into one brain, we are completely unable to arrive at a universal.... shall we say.... quantum.... definition of reality.Without cramming every consciousness of every conscious being into one brain, what is wrong with defining "reality" to be that part of our mental image which we would be right about if we thought it was reality? Think about it for a moment. That sentence defines "reality" without requiring anyone to know what is right. Instead, it gives us something to reach for as our mental image changes. Looking at the history of thought, the only thing which really proves "what we thought was right was actually wrong" is a discovered inconsistency in "what we thought". So internal consistency seems to be a basic property of "reality". :wink:
Reality (much like "time") is a concept that was constructed to pacify our rampant acknowlegement of our physicallity in a universe that is comprised of much much more than the physical plateau we all know and love so much.I don't know, I would tend to just call them both "worthwhile concepts" expressing valuable ideas essential to explaining what we, as individuals, perceive. :tongue2:
Have fun – Dick
Yes, I do still occasionally read this forum and still have a fond hope up waking up some interest in thinking about things.:rolleyes:

quantumcarl

Mar1-06, 09:28 PM

Essentially I believe you are saying that we each live in a universe of our own creation constructed from "information the perceiver holds individually". I agree with that statement one hundred percent; what the others (and I hope that does not include you) fail to realize is that communication from "other perceivers" is just more "information the perceiver holds individually". In the final analysis, we are all alone inside our own heads. :biggrin:
Without cramming every consciousness of every conscious being into one brain, what is wrong with defining "reality" to be that part of our mental image which we would be right about if we thought it was reality? Think about it for a moment. That sentence defines "reality" without requiring anyone to know what is right. Instead, it gives us something to reach for as our mental image changes. Looking at the history of thought, the only thing which really proves "what we thought was right was actually wrong" is a discovered inconsistency in "what we thought". So internal consistency seems to be a basic property of "reality". :wink:
I don't know, I would tend to just call them both "worthwhile concepts" expressing valuable ideas essential to explaining what we, as individuals, perceive. :tongue2:
Have fun – Dick
Yes, I do still occasionally read this forum and still have a fond hope up waking up some interest in thinking about things.:rolleyes:

I am in agreement with most of your replys to my post here.

Looking at the history of thought, the only thing which really proves "what we thought was right was actually wrong" is a discovered inconsistency in "what we thought". So internal consistency seems to be a basic property of "reality". :wink:

This statement makes me think that, during our history, as we find more and more out about the environment in which we find ourselves, our perception of what is real has changed drastically from year to year, century to century ad on infinitum.

Its really difficult to know if it is our able awareness that shapes our reality or... if it is our reality shaping our awareness and concept of a consistent reality.

Apparently reality doesn't change as much as our perception does.. in fact, one would imagine it to be very consistent over time. It may be that it is our progressive ability to percieve our environment... aka nature... that allows us a glimpse of what is truely real or... reality. Thank you for the very groovy thoughts on the matter (no pun here).

Doctordick

Mar6-06, 01:01 PM

I haven't been over here on physicsforums for quite a while and was somewhat surprised to receive an e-mail about your post. It would be nice to know how much mathematics you understand as knowing what you will understand is quite difficult when your background is an open question. Comprehending complex logic is not a trivial issue. With regard to my post and what I was trying to point out as compared to your response, it is pretty clear to me that you overlooked a subtle issue which it seems everyone here has failed to comprehend. :frown:
... what the others (and I hope that does not include you) fail to realize is that communication from "other perceivers" is just more "information the perceiver holds individually". In the final analysis, we are all alone inside our own heads. :biggrin:The point being that absolutely everything we know constitutes our understanding of what we have experienced in our own lifetime and in our own heads so to speak.
This statement makes me think that, during our history, as we find more and more out about the environment in which we find ourselves, our perception of what is real has changed drastically from year to year, century to century ad on infinitum.Unless you are a lot older than me, the change in your perception of what is real has not spanned centuries. :wink:
Its really difficult to know if it is our able awareness that shapes our reality or... if it is our reality shaping our awareness and concept of a consistent reality.In my life I have heard the comment, "all I know for sure is that I know absolutely nothing for sure", so many times that I could not estimate the number. And that comment is usually followed by a long treatise on what they know. Absolutely no one has ever even suggested that we are working with unknowns here. In fact it seems to be a common flaw of philosophers that they can not comprehend working with something without knowing what it is they are working with: i.e., it seems that the concept of unknowns is totally outside their comprehension. I suppose I shouldn't be surprised, considering their total aversion to mathematics. :biggrin:
Apparently reality doesn't change as much as our perception does.. in fact, one would imagine it to be very consistent over time. It may be that it is our progressive ability to percieve our environment... aka nature... that allows us a glimpse of what is truely real or... reality. Thank you for the very groovy thoughts on the matter (no pun here).Clearly, "reality is an unknown: nobody "knows" what it is. However, that does not mean we cannot think about it. Back in the 1700's Imanual Kant defined what he called analytic truth. One current definition of analytic proposition is that it is one the negation of which is self-contradictory: essentially, "if you deny a true analytic proposition, you always get a self-contradictory proposition". We can make a few statements about "reality" which can be seen as analytic truths. One of these "analytic truths" is "reality is" what "reality is": i.e., its nature does not ever change; any "real" change is part and parcel of "reality" itself. Your "glimpse of what is truly real or... reality" is nothing more or less than your current explanation of what reality is and inconsistency is the only flaw in that explanation which will force a change in your perception.
Looking at the history of thought, the only thing which really proves "what we thought was right was actually wrong" is a discovered inconsistency in "what we thought". So internal consistency seems to be a basic property of "reality". :wink: Another analytical truth! I have posted a paper on the web which elucidates a very straight forward consequence (an analytic truth) which can be deduced from the definition of "an explanation" (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm). So far no one seems to comprehend either the logic contained therein or the consequences of the truth of the conclusion. You might try to read it. I am full well ready to answer any questions concerning what I have presented there if you have any interest in understanding it. :smile:

The final equation, which I call the fundamental equation of the universe is valid as an analytical truth. Essentially, the fundamental elements of any explanation of anything must obey that equation. Examination of the solutions of that equation reveals that all of physics is essentially solutions to that equation. Three very fundamental conclusions may be drawn directly from that fact. First, physics works so well because it has to (if it doesn't it isn't consistent); second, that equation is a TOE (or would be if it were a theory and not an "analytical truth") and finally, physics (if physics is deemed to be the collection of solutions to that equation) can explain absolutely anything which can be explained. Which was of course explicitly answers the original question posed in this thread. :tongue:

Actually, the fact that no one cares to argue with me seems to indicate rather little interest in answering any of the questions posed in Philosophy. Most people on this forum remind me of the cartoon character Charlie Brown. Note a recent statement concerning his interest in precise thought: "I'm at my best in something where the answers are mostly a matter of opinion!" :rofl: :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

"The simplest and most necessary truths are the very last to be believed."
by Anonymous

toasty

Mar11-06, 07:33 PM

Following this thread for a long time, I cant help but wonder how far into Philosophy people go before they realize or know what they are about.

Next the enormous wealth of learning and talent of the posters amazes one such as I, indeed much of what passes as common knowledge here is way over my head.

Nonetheless I feel compelled to ask what is the point of involking the Arguement From Ignorance in a Scientific debate? Surely the possibility of other so far unknown entities, e.g. G_d, begs the question and is no help at all. Next, and to me an obstinate Einstein critic, absudity piled miles high in such silly traps as personal sensual relativity. In that case nobody shares anything at all with the rest of sentient society, since there is no test to establish we are seeing the same color let alone the same substance of a material object, and here ther is simply no room at all for action/s.

In the worst of all scenarios we inhabit different universes and only by the
grace of G_d can we communicate at all. But isn't this exactly what the likes of Bishop Berkeley proposed?

Ok, we do live in a sensory world but it's the SAME sensory world, i.e. what you see is as late as what I see, C is constant or so we are told.

And the particulate nature of reality as far as we know is just electrons, neutrons, protons; furthermore, byond that level of seeing into nature, we continue to share the SAME late minute world. To then inquire if there is some so far unseen 'black magic' is futile since there is no way to proceed further.

Or am I mistaking the intent of the discussion?

To me it seems as if asking any other question is a waste of time IF we want to learn something usefull, but not to turn away from other things such as those interesting, Aliens, G_d, the real size of the Universe, when it all began etc etc.

quantumcarl

Mar13-06, 07:22 PM

"The simplest and most necessary truths are the very last to be believed."
by Anonymous

Simple truth. That's what physics is trying to discover. The science goes well beyond the outward appearances of everyday occurances and quarries into the very foundations of these events, studying their motions and their constitutions.... and, tirelessly, physicists then examine the motions and constitutions of those motions and constitutions with the same determination... etc...

But then, we could say that all the numbers and wieghts, measurements and algebraic geometry that go into physics are simply another method of arriving at the same conclusions as any other discipline. For instance, Piccasso doubtlessly, and perhaps unawares, employed all of the above to arrive at equations that we commoner-lay-people percieve as simple symbols that describe the human condition.

Similar analogy could be used in the case of great authors. Their product and contribution is a physics equation of letters and words, punctuation and storylines. These elements work for the author to descibe everything and anything... as can also be demonstrated with the language and sciences of physics.

Therefore, without further tedious metaphores and analogies, my opinion remains the same in that.... because physics seeks to describe everything, it appears that everything can be reduced to pure physics.

Yet, when Van Gogh did his best to describe everything, it appeared (to him) that everything could be reduced to pure colour.
To diffuse this opposition we need only remember "its all relative". Which on the surface sounds like I'm reducing everything to pure physics... mind you, I'm told that the pedestrian meaning of "relative" has little to do with Einstein's use of the word.

Paul Martin

Mar14-06, 10:36 AM

Hi quantumcarl,

IMHO you are too charitable to Picasso and Van Gogh. I am more inclined to agree with Socrates' assessment of artists. I think they produce random mumbo-jumbo and somehow convince people that there is deep embedded meaning, or even "truth". The people who believe that search for the meaning, and through their own efforts, find some hints, or allegories, or patterns, which they then interpret as being profound. People who don't do that are deemed to be imperceptive hicks. People who do, contribute to the fortune of the "artists" who in turn stroke them with praise for their perception and insight. I think it's all a sham.

By contrast, physics arrives at close enough approximations to truth as to allow for the enormously impressive technology which we now take for granted. The "Arts" have produced nothing close to this achievement.

Just my opinion, but as you say, everything is relative.

Paul

quantumcarl

Mar14-06, 08:32 PM

selfAdjoint

Mar14-06, 10:16 PM

Sure. But, as we say, everything is quantum... (sorry Zapper... I mean that in a pedestrian context)... and the Piccassos and the Braches and the Gertrude Steins and Cezzans all managed to arrive at the idea of a quantum state when they invented Cubism... the idea of simultanious event horizons.

In what way is the analytical cubism of Picasso and Braque, decomposition and reconstruction of common images like pipes, guitars and newspaper pages, in any way representative of what a physicist would understand by the term "quantum state"?

For that matter, how does Cezanne's painting relate to analytical cubism, except for being "modern" or "post-impressionist"?

quantumcarl

Mar15-06, 11:00 AM

In what way is the analytical cubism of Picasso and Braque, decomposition and reconstruction of common images like pipes, guitars and newspaper pages, in any way representative of what a physicist would understand by the term "quantum state"?

For that matter, how does Cezanne's painting relate to analytical cubism, except for being "modern" or "post-impressionist"?

Cezanne is credited with his unaware invention of Cubism. His method of painting Mt. Victoria in France was to pick up his canvas and brushes and move 20 feet every hour or so. The differing points of view combined to produce the foundation of Cubist representation.

Cubism is a technique in Fine Art that proports to be able to illustrate every surface and event taking place on an object or in an event, from mulitple angles and from every perspective, emotionally, physically and so forth... all on a 2 dimensional surface.

Gertrude Stein's contribution is what tipped off Braque and others... right up to Marcel DuChampes to the extraordinary idea of Cubism. The general public didn't get the inside story and descriptions such as the"exploding shingle factory" were often the only reviews for these works of art, at the time of production. All these artists portrayed the universe as a collection of simultaneious events, all happening without sequence. Their 2 dimensional attempts at describing the non-location or super-positions of objects and ideas is what I would classify as an interpretation of aspects of quantum studies.... without the math.

This is why I am proposing that, as far back as the late 1800s, super-position and non-location were being studied under a name other than quantum phyics... and perhaps these artistic studies inspired the initial studies into such concepts.

Gertrude steins poem "A rose is a rose" seems to have kicked off the movement. In her poem she describes a rose simply by repeating how "a rose is a rose is a rose is a rose"... etc... and this description denotes the fact that there are many ways and many angles and more aspects to a rose than the one Point of View often seen in 2 dimensional depictions of the flower.

It is generally thought that Stein and Braque etc... began to work on the idea of simultanious events and points of view because of the advent of the telegraph and the telephone. They found emense fascination in the fact that while they were composing a sentence in the morning in Paris their voice or their text was, for all practical purposes, being read or heard in New York, where it was the preceeding evening.

Here are the top google choices the search "the philosophy of cubism".

Cubistro
Applied cubism does not embrace these phenomena as any sort of active philosophy. Applied cubism is neither optimism, nor cassandrism. Rather it uses cubism ...
www.cubistro.com/appCubism.html

Pioneering Cubism
... explaining that the progression towards subjectivity which culminated in Cubism corresponds with the course of Occidental philosophy. ...
www.jasonkaufman.com/articles/picasso_and_braque.htm

Cubism. Cubists
Cubism. Cubist artists. A web directory. ... Music, News, Painting, Periods in art, Philosophy, Photography, Printing, Sculpture, Theatre, Women's Art ...
www.zeroland.co.nz/cubism_art.html

Paul Martin

Mar20-06, 10:20 AM

Cezanne is credited with his unaware invention of Cubism.Let's see.... "unaware invention" sounds like a euphemism for 'dumb luck'. And, do those who stumble upon a discovery by dumb luck deserve credit? Well they certainly deserve, or at least get, commercial credit. A lot of money has been made by selling things purported to be art, just as a lot of money is being made by selling tap water in clear plastic bottles for prices higher than that of gasoline.

But in my opinion, it is still a sham, and all the talk of how wonderful the art or the water is, it only serves to convince people to keep paying the high prices and has nothing to do with intrinsic value or truth.

Paul

selfAdjoint

Mar21-06, 09:25 PM

fuzzyfelt

Mar22-06, 01:54 PM

I haven’t read the whole of this, the last few posts caught my attention, so please disregard this if I’m hijacking.

I really appreciate the lesson in QM with musical and Hegelian analogies, thankyou. I don’t understand however, how analytical (c1907-1912) and especially synthetic (c.1912-1920) cubism doesn’t adequately connect with these concepts of synthesis. Wouldn’t an emphasis placed on harmoniously unifying such counterpoints as an object’s inner and outer features, combining positive and negative space to create positive/ negative space eg (I know its not cubist or Picasso, but a good isolated example of this) http://www.rubylane.com/shops/portable-assets/item/451, combining spacial dimensions simultaneously, various planes, flat space/pictorial space, combining real and painted phenomena,… these sorts of things, be such a synthesis? Or was it because Quantumcarl didn’t mention this feature of cubism?

Also, I might take the opportunity while the analogy is still here to ask another question- which would be a more adequate connection in a relative state interpretation – synthesis or multiplicity?

selfAdjoint

Mar22-06, 05:16 PM

I don't have an answer on cubism as superposition. I have studied cubism and am aware of all those issues, but none of them says superposition to me. Perhaps because my (and I think the cubist's) relation to "image" is already too complex and subtle to evoke in me the straighforward purity of the concept.

As to your last question, vanesch would be a better person to ask, but my thought is that the relational view of QM involves both synthesis and multiplicity. Superposition, which I have compared to synthesis, is present in the wavefunction, which in the RI is regarded as physical, and multiplicity in the separate "worlds" in which the eigenvalues of the observation are actualized.

fuzzyfelt

Mar23-06, 01:02 PM

Your knowledge amazes me, thankyou for sharing more of it. If you were saying its not possible for an image to achieve the purity that music or the concept of superposition can, that is an understandable opinion, but I’d like to disagree. I take your point that cubist paintings themselves don’t express the purity you speak of. And, yes its my understanding the cubists found the complexity of their earlier work was in fact actually defeating their purposes of analysing perception, necessarily prompting alternative measures!
And luckily, paintings need not be entirely theoretically consistent to be good – that offers me some hope at least!

Philocrat

Mar25-06, 10:59 AM

The only information content of a perceiver that has any bearing on reality is the information the perceiver holds individually and apart from other perceivers.

You ask "how much information regarding the perceiver do we include in the over all analysis of reality".
In the first place there is no way that there can be an overall consensis regarding reality. Unless we are able to cram every consciousness of every conscious being into one brain, we are completely unable to arrive at a universal.... shall we say.... quantum.... definition of reality.

Just because my initials, QC, could be construed to mean "quantum constant" doesn't mean I hold the quantum constant with regard to reality.

Reality (much like "time") is a concept that was constructed to pacify our rampant acknowlegement of our physicallity in a universe that is comprised of much much more than the physical plateau we all know and love so much.

If Physicalism is anyway near to being true, then the "Information Content" of one perceiver ought to be (both in Logic and in Quantity) relative to the "Information content" of another perceiver within the 'same' space and time locality, and ultemately we ought to be able to construct a fairly sensible reality from the resulting relative information. Or ought we not?

From my resposnses to date you may have deduced from now that I do not subscribe to "every entity to its world" principle, which in a way seems to rule out the 'Principle of Relative Construction of Reality' in a presumably populated spacetime. It would be twice as spooky to even think about " I am everything or everyone" Realism.

If I am everything or everyone, then I am 'multiply self-categorising' in an incomprehensibly spooky way. I would be multiply structured, functioned and referenced in the most hair-splitting manner. Would you subscribe to such a spooky explanation or construct of reality?

Philocrat

Mar25-06, 11:12 AM

Paul Martin

Mar25-06, 12:35 PM

Would you subscribe to such a spooky explanation or construct of reality?Haven't people throughout history been forced to accept spooky explanations for reality? From the primitive spooky explanations for the sun's transit, to Newton's spooky action at a distance, to quantum entanglement and non-locality, we don't seem to be able to avoid spookiness when we get down to fundamental questions. So, I suggest that we not rule out any possible explanation just because it might seem spooky.
If I am everything or everyone...I applaud you on your boldness in considering this premise. As anyone who has read my posts will know, I suspect that by starting with this premise and drawing inferences from it, we may be able to find more fruitful explanations for the role of consciousness in reality than if we deny the premise.
If I am everything or everyone, then I am 'multiply self-categorising' in an incomprehensibly spooky way.Yes, incomprehensible and spooky at the moment only because no one has yet worked out an explanation based on this premise that makes it comprehensible. That is not without precedent and shouldn't bother us or hold us back at all. Think of how incomprehensible and spooky Relativity and QM were at the outset. Now the principles are taught in High School.
I am 'multiply self-categorising' in an incomprehensibly spooky way. I would be multiply structured, functioned and referenced in the most hair-splitting manner.Here again I applaud you for making a first step in deducing an implication of that "all is one" premise. I agree with your deduction.

In order to keep focused on our premise that "I am everything or everyone" instead of using a pronoun like 'I' or 'you' let's use the term 'one' as a synonym for 'I', 'you', 'we', 'everything', and 'everyone'. One frequently finds this usage in literature anyway, so one shouldn't find it unacceptable or strange. (I will continue to use the term 'I' where one means the physical body sitting at this keyboard composing this post.)

In an attempt to make sense of a multiply self-categorizing and multiply structured, functioning, and referenced "one", one would think it would be useful to think of familiar analogies, even though one realizes that is bad science. Here is a three-part analogy which might help.

First, if one posits that the essential nature of the "everything" that one is is pure consciousness, then one can do an exercise which (at least seems to) involve nothing but pure consciousness (forgetting for the moment the biological mechanism which most people would say is the cause of this exercise). The exercise is to imagine a tic-tac-toe diagram and then imagine several games of tic-tac-toe progressing from start to finish. This takes some concentration but it can be done. Of course most scientists today would be quick to say that the game configurations were all represented in physical brain states, but let's not jump to that conclusion so quickly. Instead let's just stick with the premise and accept nothing more than the experience one has in doing the exercise as part of the explanation. It seems that one can conclude from this first part is that consciousness (whatever it is) might possibly be necessary and sufficient for the playing out of algorithms. If it were, it doesn't seem so terribly incomprehensible or spooky. After all, one can experience it happening in that exercise.

Second, given that there is a method of imagining and then playing out algorithms by the one, it might be possible that this method might be instantiated in some way which does not require the conscious attention of the one. The familiar analogy for this is the programming of computers. Here, the algorithms are definitely originated in one's imagination, but they are soon represented by marks on paper or a pattern of closing of switches on keyboards. Purely physical (algorithmic) processes then transfer translations of these representations into computer memories, and from there, the computer is able to play out the algorithms completely unattended by the one who came up with the program. Now, if one were to have explained this to Newton, it would no doubt have sounded unacceptably spooky to him. But from a modern vantage point, one finds nothing spooky or incomprehensible about this second analogy at all.

Third, given one's ability to imagine algorithms, and some sort of capability for one to implement those algorithms in such a way that the algorithms can be played out unattended by the one, it might be possible to imagine and implement an algorithm that would be "multiply self-categorising, ... multiply structured, [multiply] function[al] and [multiply] referenced in the most hair-splitting manner." One such analogy would be this Internet complex we have which seems to fit that description exactly. And, again, to someone in Newton's time, it would seem incomprehensible and spooky.

So I, for one, see no reason to be timid in exploring the consequences of the premise of the existence of only a single consciousness. Let's open our minds and have a look.

Paul

Edit: Ooops! One meant, "let's open our mind".

Paul Martin

Mar25-06, 12:57 PM

RELATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY requires the fundamental notion of 'Multiplicity of Reference' (at least from the perspective of the actor-observer relations). But serious metaphysical and epistemological questions arise where one claims to be 'everything' or 'everyone', or simply where the notion of 'everyone to its world' is invoked in one's explanation of reality. This is where I need some education from the best informed!I don't think I can help educate you, but you can help me. I'd like to know what those "serious metaphysical and epistemological questions" are. Would you please list the top five or six of them? Maybe we can talk about them and make some sense of them.

Paul

Paul Martin

Mar25-06, 01:14 PM

If Physicalism is anyway near to being trueIn this premise, you seem to be open to a rather loose interpretation of "being true". If so, you might be open to accepting the notion that the objects and environments within a VR game are "true". After all, they "really" do exist in some sense, in particular in the senses of the players of the VR game. So let me assume that you accept the "true physical reality" of the virtual world in the VR game.
If Physicalism is anyway near to being true, then the "Information Content" of one perceiver ought to be (both in Logic and in Quantity) relative to the "Information content" of another perceiver within the 'same' space and time localityUsing the VR analogy (I apologize for my analogies, but being the lay person that I am, I use them as crutches), the information content of the virtual world is indeed relative to the various perceivers, which are, of course, the players of the game. Better yet, one could imagine a single player acting as each of several players taking turns or multiplexing among them in some manner. In this case, there would only be the one perceiver but still there would be many perspectives with different views of the virtual world.

Space and time would need to be clarified. There is the space and time of the virtual world, which corresponds to Physical Reality in the analogy, but there is also the space and time in which the player(s) are interacting with the game, and in which the mechanism for the playing out of the game's algorithms exists. Those are obviously not the same and they could be very different.

ultemately we ought to be able to construct a fairly sensible reality from the resulting relative information. Or ought we not? Yes, I think so. I think the analogy I have just given shows that a completely sensible explanation is possible.

Paul

Philocrat

Mar26-06, 03:36 PM

Paul, thank you for your surgical analysis of my text and your analogies used to illuminate my thoughts in it.

Similar analogies exist in philosophy. Depending on how far back in history you are prepared to travel, you we'll pick up along the way different versions of it. Whatever version you encounter along the way, they equivalently argue likewise. From the Cartesian evil demon argument, to the updated brain in the vat version and to the latest one contained in your 'virtual reality' analogy; all tend to show that our external world reality could be very easily undermined in all these ways.

One of the fundamental epistemological arguments is that these deceptive or simulated states of reality are epistemologically indistinguishable from the external world reality that we are all used to. As a result we are left without a sufficient (let alone a guaranteed) knowledge of our real existence. That what we see and think to be real at first instance may not be real after all.

The metaphysical problem is that concerning the configuration or structure of things in existence. From this point of view, your analogy does not quite answer the question as to why one thing is capable of being everything. Self-categorising in a metaphysical sense is:

1) The ability to self-manifest or self-procreate without the interference of any external creative agencies.
2) The ability to self-categorise into logically and quantitatively identifiable parts (be all things while being one thing).
3) Ability to self-actualise and self-refer with all the spatio-temporal components or dimensions fully intact.

Yes, I am not denying that many thinkers, logicians and mathematicians, have got a few tricks up their sleeves to show how some or all of these are logically and quantitatively possible. But from the point of epistemology within the context of lay native speaker of our NL (Natural language), reality as we ordinarily know it begins to break down. Such notions as time, space, dimensions, communications etc., begin to take on new meanings while logic and maths laugh endlessly in boundless continuum!

Philocrat

Mar26-06, 04:14 PM

Paul Martin

Mar26-06, 06:00 PM

Dear Philocrat,

Thank you for your most excellent response. You have an obvious advantage over me in your knowledge of and familiarity with this subject. But I view that advantage as accruing to me since it puts me in a good position to learn from you. Please be patient with me as I try to work through the ideas you have presented.

Similar analogies exist in philosophy. Depending on how far back in history you are prepared to travel, you we'll pick up along the way different versions of it.Yes, I agree. But it seems there are some lessons we might learn from this fact. One, which I tried to illustrate in my previous posts, is that the more modern analogies are richer in possibilities for the deception and offer explanations that would be inconceivable (and seem spooky) to earlier thinkers. This would suggest that we should think in terms of the most modern analogies available and that we should be open to the possibility that reality might be incomprehensibly more complex even beyond what those modern analogies might be able to explain.
all tend to show that our external world reality could be very easily undermined in all these ways.I am hesitant to agree with you here. It doesn't seem to me that unless "our external world reality" is clearly expressed, it can't really be undermined. And, in spite of the sophisticated and accurate theories of science, they really do not say much about reality. External reality is not clearly expressed in these theories. They only tell us how to predict certain phenomena by use of certain algorithms. Since there is no necessary real foundation for the physical theories, I don't see how it could be undermined. You can't attack or remove something that isn't there in the first place.
One of the fundamental epistemological arguments is that these deceptive or simulated states of reality are epistemologically indistinguishable from the external world reality that we are all used to.Hold on; you're going too fast. Let me take this slowly.

First, you refer to "we" when you say "the external world reality that we are all used to." I'm sure by 'we' you mean we human beings who communicate among ourselves here on earth. That is probably consistent with the use of the term 'epistemology' which I suppose has to do with human knowledge. That's fine, because that is an appropriate and interesting arena, but it does ignore, if not preclude, the possibility of other seats of knowledge besides human beings. It also drags with it the implicit assumption that human beings (meaning their bodies including brains) are indeed a seat of knowledge. I know that these possibilities cannot even be entertained by scientists without running afoul of their established doctrines, but nonetheless, it seems to me that we should be open to considering all possibilities, especially looking back through history and seeing how often the paradigms of science have shifted, almost always toward a more complex and previously mystifying scenario.

Second, your wording suggests that the reality we are all used to is not deceptive or simulated. If reality really were deceptive and/or simulated, then there would not be any problem with the fact that it is indistinguishable from a deceptive or simulated state. So on what basis can we have any confidence that reality is not ultimately deceptive and/or simulated?

Third, considering deception and/or simulation as processes by themselves, doesn't there necessarily need to be some perceiver who is deceived or who is aware of the simulation results for there to even be such a thing as deception or simulation? And if so, who or what could that perceiver be? Of course we human beings are one obvious candidate, if indeed we have the ability to perceive. But if we are open to all possibilities, it could be that perception occurs somewhere outside the brain. This would, for example, seem to be necessary if the premise "I am everyone" is true.

So, to summarize my view of this point, I don't think there is any problem with the fact that deception and/or simulation may be going on between whatever is ontologically fundamental and whoever, or whatever actually ends up doing the perceiving. In fact, just looking at the biological system of our human bodies, we see that happening in all sensory perception, e.g. our vision system presents (what we think is) a three-dimensional world as a two-dimensional image which is then perceived as three-dimensional.
As a result we are left without a sufficient (let alone a guaranteed) knowledge of our real existence.I agree that we are left without sufficient knowledge, but not as a result of any deception and/or simulation. I think our knowledge is lacking simply because we lack sufficient information, and that may even be temporary. (I am the ultimate optimist.)
That what we see and think to be real at first instance may not be real after all.I think this is simply a semantic problem in that we cannot define the word 'real' without knowing what is going on. And as we have just discussed, we simply don't know what is going on.
The metaphysical problem is that concerning the configuration or structure of things in existence. From this point of view, your analogy does not quite answer the question as to why one thing is capable of being everything.Well, to tell the truth, I have to agree with you. I recognize that there is a piece still missing in my explanation, and you may have spotted this same missing piece. If you are thinking of something different, please let me know.

In my three-part analogy I think I took care of everything required to explain the configuration and structure of everything in existence except for one thing. That one missing thing is some method of storing information which does not require the attention of the one single consciousness. The one single consciousness, as you may recall, is the posited starting point of my explanation, and in my explanation, it is the only thing that really exists. It is the "one", which you claim is inconsistent with multiple identifiable parts. Roughly, my way around this problem is that there is only one knower, but the information that is known (i.e. knowledge) is multiply separable and identifiable.

Back to the problem of storing information which needn't be attended to. (I am sitting here at my keyboard in a quandary as to whether to go into detail about my thoughts on this problem. I have decided not to. I would be happy to discuss it if you are interested, but I'll let you ask.) Suffice it to say that we humans have devised many ways of implementing algorithms using physical systems that run unattended. (Think of ignition systems on cars, or computers executing programs.) Any of these could provide analogies that might explain what might be going on in the bigger picture.

So, except for this problem, I think my three-part analogy explains why one thing is capable of being everything. The one thing is "the ability to know", or "the conscious ability to think". If, as Berkeley proposed, everything else is nothing but subsets of thoughts, or knowledge, of that one thing, then in that sense, that one thing is everything. I think it is splitting semantic hairs to debate whether a consciousness with n thoughts is one thing, n things, or n+1 things. However you count it, it is everything.
Self-categorising in a metaphysical sense is:

1) The ability to self-manifest or self-procreate without the interference of any external creative agencies.In my scheme, the one consciousness can self-manifest simply by imagining new information. Self-procreation is a bit more difficult in my scheme. It is done by first constructing a physical world strictly by imagining and choosing a set of information, including algorithms (laws of physics) and letting it play. Then within that world, constructing (by whatever means) configurations of what we would call material vehicles or devices which could collect, store, and transform information from that physical (really virtual) environment, and present the results in some fashion for the one consciousness to perceive. From the perspective of the physical world, this device or vehicle would exhibit characteristics which would make it appear that the device itself was conscious. Again from this point of view, it would appear as if the one consciousness had self-procreated. But in reality, the self-procreation is only an illusion (as mystics have long held). N.B. this illusion occurs only to the one consciousness, since that one is the only thing that exists, and in particular, the only thing able to perceive, conceive, or be decieved.
2) The ability to self-categorise into logically and quantitatively identifiable parts (be all things while being one thing).I dealt with this two quotes back. The idea is that the multiplicity comes only in the thoughts or bits of knowledge while the knower remains one.
3) Ability to self-actualise and self-refer with all the spatio-temporal components or dimensions fully intact.I'm not exactly sure what you are concerned about here. But, as I said in an earlier post, the space-time of the physical (virtual) reality are completely separate and distinct from any space-time in which the one consciousness acts. This may be going into more detail than I should here, but I see ultimate reality as a series of levels, each consisting of a triad of Penrose's three worlds: the mental, the physical, and the ideal. These levels are arranged in a logical helix where the ultimate starting point, or bottom of the helix, is the purely mental world of the one consciousness. From that starting point, an ideal world of information and algorithms is constructed simply from the imagination and thoughts of that one. Some of the information and algorithms are used to construct a physical world (exactly what the substrate for that very first one is the problem I mentioned earlier). Within the physical world, vehicles of the type I described can appear to create, or at least present the illusion of, a mental world existing in that physical world. From that mental world (it is really the one vicariously operating in that "VR game"), physical structures can be configured to store information and algorithms, and also to play out the algorithms without attention. (The problem I mentioned occurs only at the very first turn of the helix. From there on, the previous physical worlds provide adequate information storage and algorithmic instantiation capabilities.)

Now, I am not sure what you mean by keeping "all the spatio-temporal components or dimensions fully intact", but I think it is clear that in my scheme, all such components could reasonably be kept intact as long as we don't mix up and confuse which components belong in which "world".
Yes, I am not denying that many thinkers, logicians and mathematicians, have got a few tricks up their sleeves to show how some or all of these are logically and quantitatively possible. But from the point of epistemology within the context of lay native speaker of our NL (Natural language), reality as we ordinarily know it begins to break down.Yes, I agree. But I maintain that the breakdown only occurs because of inadequate analogical examples. After all, NL is nothing but analogies. Definitions of words are nothing more than analogies pointing out how the concept represented by a particular word is something like a more familiar concept. To fix the problem, or at least to push the boundaries out further, we only need a richer set of analogies.
Such notions as time, space, dimensions, communications etc., begin to take on new meaningsExactly. That is exactly what I meant by pushing out the boundaries. And that is good. It increases our knowledge and understanding.
while logic and maths laugh endlessly in boundless continuum!If so, I think the laughter rings hollow. I have a strong personal opinion that there is no boundless continuum in reality. And, I believe that the acceptance of a boundless continuum in mathematics and logic has led to nothing but trouble and confusion. I would be delighted to elaborate on this position if anyone is interested in discussing it.

My sincere thanks to any who have read this far. I am not sure my opinions are worth all this space I am taking up, but I am unable to express them any more concisely.

It's been fun talking with you again, Philocrat.

Paul

Paul Martin

Mar26-06, 07:13 PM

PART-WHOLE RELATION

This on its own is the biggest headache and the centre piece of this thread. It concerns the notion of REDUCTIONISM - that is, the reduction of a whole to clearly accountable parts and vice versa. The problem with this is that from the point of view of the ONLOOKER or OBJECT-OBERSERVER relations, the process of reduction can very immediately run into infinite regress, either from a whole to parts or otherwise.Let me offer this aspirin for your headache. If, as I am convinced, nothing in reality is infinite, then infinite regress is impossible for anything real. If you examine a set of Russian dolls for the first time, you might be surprised at how deeply they are nested. But, in reality, there must be an end to the sequence. I think anything physical which seems to lead to infinite regress will be finite just as the Russian dolls must be.

In logic and mathematics, I am of the firm opinion that in the controversy between Cantor/Hilbert and Kronecker/Brouwer over the issue of infinities in mathematics, Kronecker should have had the day even though historically he lost the decision. As a result, mathematicians have adopted and accepted Cantor's definitions of infinite sets, in spite of the immediate inconsistencies which resulted. Rather than use these inconsistencies as reasons to reject the notion of infinity, mathematicians dodged the issue by declaring certain types of sets to be off limits so that the bothersome paradoxes wouldn't show up. IMHO, Goedel's theorem should have been seen as the coup de grace to completely discredit the acceptance of infinities, in particular an infinite set of natural numbers. But, now that Kronecker has been dead for over a hundred years his views don't seem to be taken seriously any more.

So let me ask you to give a single example of a situation in which you think infinite regress appears, and let's discuss it.
If something is fully self-categorising in the metaphysical sense, then such a thing ought to possess a complete blue print of its entire being...How so? Ought? By whose rules or what logic? Is it because you included the adverb 'fully'? If so, why are you compelled to demand that the self-categorising be complete? My point is that we have no basis for insisting that anything be complete or perfect, in spite of philosophers' and theologians' long history of doing so. It is conceivable to me, in the scheme I have described earlier here, that the one consciousness could have started out with extremely rudimentary and limited knowledge and then gradually increased that knowledge thus "causing" the existence of an increasingly complex reality, without ever being in a state of having complete or perfect knowledge of all of reality. I am sure that you can't find an airplane or a building that has a complete and true blueprint, nor does the DNA of an organism contain a complete blueprint of its entire being. I'd venture to say that everything real is imperfect and incomplete to some extent and that your condition for self-categorising is too strong.
...and regardless of the number of things it is metaphysically categorised into, must it not be necessary that it knows in full all there is to be known about itself? I see no reason why this must be the case.
Question: If I am self-categorising in the correct metaphysical sense, how much do I know about myself (my whole self, let alone my enumerable reducible parts)?Of course this depends on what you mean by "correct". Who is making the rules? If we let the metaphysicians of antiquity establish the rules, with their notions of perfection and infinity, then we have a problem. But I claim that self-categorization, the way it really is, is limited and imperfect. My answer to your question is that you know some, but not nearly all, about yourself and your parts.
The information content of myself in the full analysis of my world and my reality should by all accounts be complete.Not by all accounts. Only by those who insist on a "full" analysis, which IMHO does not exist.
But I am now confessing to you all that as I write this very line, I only see and comprehend 0.0000000000000000000000000000001% of my being!I'd say that's in the ballpark of anyone's knowledge of anything at all.

Paul

quantumcarl

Mar27-06, 09:11 AM

I don't think that "multiple viewpoints" adequately connects to quantum superposition. Superposition is different from multiplicity; the point is not A and B nor A or B; It is a new reality in which A and B are partial aspects.

An analogy that works for some people is a musical chord. Music theory is rightly taught with counterpoint separated from harmony. It is entirely possible in counterpoint that the notes C, G, and E might sound together as different melodic lines cross. But strike the same three notes together on the piano and you get a different phenomenon; the major triad, which is perceived as a unity, not as the three notes. Actually the sound wave for the triad is the true superposition of the pure sound waves for the three notes, and this acoustic superposition was studied in the nineteenth century long before Shroedinger applied existing wave theory to quantum mechanics.

The thinker who anticipated all this best was Hegel; you can express pure state A, pure state B, and their superposition, mixed state AB, in his categories: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

I think Fi has pointed out the similarities between music, visual art and physics. Harmonies, counterpoint and all other aspects of music are all simply human expressions of the mulitvarious and simultaneous positions and events found in nature.

Since we're all expressing our opinions and perceptions on the matter... mine is that there is really no difference between a math formula and physics experiment, a musical score and performance or a synthesis of line, colour and planes when it comes to humanity expressing their understanding and comprehension of nature.

To paraphrase Dr. Bohr, a famous physicist..... science music and visual art are only what we can say about nature, not what the actual reality of nature is.

As far as my opinion goes, "everything" (as in: nature) can be (and is) reduced (by humans) to pure expression... in whatever form it may occur.

Dichter

Apr19-06, 03:04 PM

From the Cartesian evil demon argument, to the updated brain in the vat version and to the latest one contained in your 'virtual reality' analogy; all tend to show that our external world reality could be very easily undermined in all these ways.

Interesting debate. From my perspective, the history of metaphysics is mostly a history of mistakes. The mistakes keep reappearing in different guises because the concepts we think about change, but the misconceptions do not.

In this particular case, it's clear to me that "external world reality" is a misconceived notion. Such a thing cannot possibly exist. In an analogy with language, the notion is akin to "external meaning of words", as if words could have meaning apart from what individual speakers think they mean.

That is not to say we imagine the world. The trouble, however, is that we do imagine a world existing beyond our perceptions. In a funny twist, "external reality" is thought of as something we only know about through our imagination. How did something like that ended up being called "external"???

One of the fundamental epistemological arguments is that these deceptive or simulated states of reality are epistemologically indistinguishable from the external world reality that we are all used to.

If two words have exactly the same meaning and can be interchanged in any sentence without changing the meaning of the sentence, would anyone say the words represent two different things? Of course not!

If "different states of reality" produce no difference in perception, not even in principle, then they are the same thing called by different names. No need to get confused over pseudo-problems.

As a result we are left without a sufficient (let alone a guaranteed) knowledge of our real existence. That what we see and think to be real at first instance may not be real after all.

I think we have to be careful with this problem. Surely we experience illusions, but it can be demonstrated that one needs to be in possession of a lot of truths before one can experience an illusion. That is, our conception of reality may, and probably is, slightly wrong, but as a matter of logic it cannot possibly be completely wrong.

Again the analogy with language holds. It is possible that we don't fully know the meaning of some words in our vocabulary, but it is not possible that we ignore the correct meaning of every single word. If we did, we would not be able to understand anything expressed in language. The equivalent to our perception is that, if everything we see were an illusion, we would not be able to see at all.

The metaphysical problem is that concerning the configuration or structure of things in existence. From this point of view, your analogy does not quite answer the question as to why one thing is capable of being everything.

Even though I'm not sure what's being debated here, I'd like to point out that all things have something in common: they are all "things"! So at least on some level all things are the same; not "the same thing" but "the same" - subtle but important difference.

The thing is (no pun intended), on what level is everything "the same"? And the answer is clear: on a level in which categorization stops (or has not started). In other words, in a pre- or post-linguistic level.

Isn't that why so many mystics claim reality cannot be described in words?

octelcogopod

Apr19-06, 03:39 PM

It ended up being called external because that's the way we are born to see it.
Naturally, the categorization that our minds are seperate from reality, exists in our heads only.
We have not fully realized yet that we are completely bound to the universe.
I think we would all agree that we are not the apple we eat, or the car we drive, or the house we live in.
We are seperate from those things.
But on a tiny quantum level, we are exactly the same "stuff" as our car or our apple.
The differentiation and categorization of these levels exists arguably only in our heads.

But therein lies the problem, because how can we seperate what we perceive and think, from what the universe actually is?
And even more so how can we do that when all we have is our mind and our senses?

The problem is that even if there were no perceivers in the universe, a tree would still be a tree, I mean mathematically the proportions of a tree would be comparable to those of a planet, as such there exists some absolute truths in nature.
One could argue that physical reality is one absolute truth in itself(even without perceivers.)

But quite frankly, I believe all this is just made up in our heads, the real problem lies with the hard problem of consciousness, how does physical reality spawn consciousness, does physical nature control the mind? How do we puzzle this together from a scientific point of view?

Dichter

Apr20-06, 09:05 AM

It ended up being called external because that's the way we are born to see it.

That's not really what I was talking about. I was referring to what people call "ultimate reality", that which is supposed to exist behind the world of our perceptions.

The objects of our perceptions are certainly external in any sense of the word.

The problem is that even if there were no perceivers in the universe, a tree would still be a tree

If observers did not exist many things would still exist, but they could not be called "trees" or "universe". Those are human categorizations.

there exists some absolute truths in nature.

How can you have truths if you don't have a language? Without humans around nothing can be true.

Notice that the concept of "truth" only applies to linguistic statements. The only things that can be true are relationships that we establish between concepts. For instance, "the moon exists" can be true (or false) because it establishes a relationship between "the moon" and "the set of things that exist"; such relationship can be verified. "The moon" itself, or "the set of all things that exist", those cannot be "true".

One could argue that physical reality is one absolute truth in itself(even without perceivers.)

If you say that, then you must be ready to accept that language has an absolute reality, that it existed even before the first human uttered the first word.

(by the way, I think the bible says something along those lines)

nrqed

May1-06, 01:09 PM

Cezanne is credited with his unaware invention of Cubism. His method of painting Mt. Victoria in France was to pick up his canvas and brushes and move 20 feet every hour or so. The differing points of view combined to produce the foundation of Cubist representation.

Cubism is a technique in Fine Art that proports to be able to illustrate every surface and event taking place on an object or in an event, from mulitple angles and from every perspective, emotionally, physically and so forth... all on a 2 dimensional surface.

To a physicist, this sounds closer in spirit to the idea of a hologram...so should we conclude that holography (the concept) was first discovered by artists?

Gertrude Stein's contribution is what tipped off Braque and others... right up to Marcel DuChampes to the extraordinary idea of Cubism. The general public didn't get the inside story and descriptions such as the"exploding shingle factory" were often the only reviews for these works of art, at the time of production. All these artists portrayed the universe as a collection of simultaneious events, all happening without sequence. Their 2 dimensional attempts at describing the non-location or super-positions of objects and ideas is what I would classify as an interpretation of aspects of quantum studies.... without the math.

This is why I am proposing that, as far back as the late 1800s, super-position and non-location were being studied under a name other than quantum phyics... and perhaps these artistic studies inspired the initial studies into such concepts.

To me, this is in no way different than reading the quatrains of Nostradamus and making them fit with events after the fact ("postdictions"). Actually, the principle of superposition is already present in any wave phenomenon (and not just at a qualitative level...the mathematical formalism used to describe the vibrations of a string instrument or of the surface of a drum are the same equations used to described some quantum systems but with some terms having different meaning). So we could say that quantum physics was "discovered" by the first humans who blew into air pipes to produce music! We could even push it further and say that they already had essentially uncovered the fundamental concepts of quantum field theory and all of particle physics since wave superposition is at the core of these theories!

This is not different than saying that eastern philosophers had already perceived the quantum nature of the universe centuries ago.

If you let enough people enough time to develop philosophical/religious/artistic concepts and you look hard enough after the facts, you can always "find" connections that have no factual basis. It is really not unlike the "postdictions" of the fans of Nostradamus or Percival Lowell who was convinced that he had seen canals on Mars.

Doctordick

May6-06, 12:59 PM

If you let enough people enough time to develop philosophical/religious/artistic concepts and you look hard enough after the facts, you can always "find" connections that have no factual basis.Personally, I think this a very deep and profound statement with consequences far beyond what is ordinarily comprehended. I would add science to that list: i.e., philosophical/religious/artistic => scientific/philosophical/religious/artistic. I am afraid scientists are not near as immune to the phenomena as they would like to believe. Think about phlogiston and canals on Mars. :rolleyes:

You seem to be a rational person with a more than average interest in fundamental issues. How about taking a look at my paper, "A Universal Analytical Model of Explanation Itself" (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm), and see if we can establish communications on the subject. :smile:

Thanks -- Dick

nrqed

May6-06, 09:13 PM

Personally, I think this a very deep and profound statement with consequences far beyond what is ordinarily comprehended. I would add science to that list: i.e., philosophical/religious/artistic => scientific/philosophical/religious/artistic. I am afraid scientists are not near as immune to the phenomena as they would like to believe. Think about phlogiston and canals on Mars. :rolleyes:

The *big* difference I see is the following: yes, in science there may be some ''phenomena'' discovered which are then revealed to be misinterpretations/wishful thinking/judgement errors, etc. *BUT* these ''mistakes'' are always fairly rapidly discredited. Because they *can* discredited. On the other hand, the idea that eastern philosophers had ''pedicted'' the quantum nature of the universe is probably decades old and will probably still be discussed seriously by some in one hundred years, as will the ''predictions'' of Nostradamus. Those ideas are not falsifiable and because of that are not of any more value as a subject of debate than, say, whether a pattern on a certain potato is really the portrait of the Christ.

You seem to be a rational person with a more than average interest in fundamental issues. How about taking a look at my paper, "A Universal Analytical Model of Explanation Itself" (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm), and see if we can establish communications on the subject. :smile:

Thanks -- Dick
I cerrtainly will as soon as classes end. I have also bookmarked your site on your ideas of time (btw, you end with the statement that your ideas would lead to predictions different than GR in some cases. I have to admit that I am a bit skeptical, but I just want to point out that if this true, then whether this is a more fundamental depiction of what time is is clearly not longer a philosphical issue (as you seem to have said yourself) but a scientific issue).

Regards

Patrick

quantumcarl

May6-06, 10:33 PM

To a physicist, this sounds closer in spirit to the idea of a hologram...so should we conclude that holography (the concept) was first discovered by artists?

To me, this is in no way different than reading the quatrains of Nostradamus and making them fit with events after the fact ("postdictions"). Actually, the principle of superposition is already present in any wave phenomenon (and not just at a qualitative level...the mathematical formalism used to describe the vibrations of a string instrument or of the surface of a drum are the same equations used to described some quantum systems but with some terms having different meaning). So we could say that quantum physics was "discovered" by the first humans who blew into air pipes to produce music! We could even push it further and say that they already had essentially uncovered the fundamental concepts of quantum field theory and all of particle physics since wave superposition is at the core of these theories!

This is not different than saying that eastern philosophers had already perceived the quantum nature of the universe centuries ago.

If you let enough people enough time to develop philosophical/religious/artistic concepts and you look hard enough after the facts, you can always "find" connections that have no factual basis. It is really not unlike the "postdictions" of the fans of Nostradamus or Percival Lowell who was convinced that he had seen canals on Mars.

Most of what you have pointed out about my post supports my proposed answer to the question "Can everything be reduced to pure physics?".

My proposal includes the idea that all forms of expression, including the study of physics, can be used to explain "everything". Not just one science... such as physics.

I agree, mind you, with your ascertation that under, ideal conditions, science is quick to catch its own errors and widely publish these findings while correcting them. In reality, science is as wrapped up in bureaucracy and high finance as any other reporting agency and what is reported is often slanted in the direction of the bureaucracy or the money. Artists and philosophers may not be as quick to report errors in their work. And they are as suseptable to corruption as anyone.

But, its not the reports or the results we're talking about, its the act of exploring nature, by whatever means. And that's why the answer to the question about pure physics and does it explain everything is yes and no. Physics is not the only "pure" study that everything can be reduced to.

I'm not saying anyone predicted super-position or non-location. I'm saying that discoveries happen in unsuspected and non-pre-concieved moments.

The idea to observe mars, closely, with a telescope (seeing canals or whatever) was the act and the expession of interest that spurred countless of other observations... and more recently turned mars into a parking lot for some rovers. The idea of the canals and the conclusions based on early use of a telescope seem obsurd and useless today. However it was the acts of the first person to make the observations and the preparations to do so that can be credited with inspiring many people and many subsequent discoveries.
This is how I view some of the inovations that have been, perhaps, inspirational to the way of thinking that arrives at formulas and ideas of super-position and non-location.

quantumcarl

May6-06, 10:51 PM

I'd also like to ask any physicists to reduce literature to pure physics.

Literature has been reduced to pure movies, action figures, music and visual art, dance, war and a number of other "pure" studies.

If there were a physics equation for literature, and all its implications, I'd like to see it.:bugeye:

moving finger

May16-06, 04:34 AM

I'd also like to ask any physicists to reduce literature to pure physics.
......
If there were a physics equation for literature, and all its implications, I'd like to see it.:bugeye:
A piece of literature (a book for example), taken literally in complete isolation from all of our concepts of the world, has no meaning whatsoever. The meaning (if any) is generated entirely by combining that piece of literature with a multitude of other concepts with which we associate the otherwise meaningless "squiggles" in the book.

Thus to ask that a piece of literature, and all its implications, be reduced to a physical equation is asking for all of our worldly concepts to be included also in the equation. Not impossible, but formidable.

MF

If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple. (Stuart Burns)

quantumcarl

May17-06, 10:19 PM

A piece of literature (a book for example), taken literally in complete isolation from all of our concepts of the world, has no meaning whatsoever. The meaning (if any) is generated entirely by combining that piece of literature with a multitude of other concepts with which we associate the otherwise meaningless "squiggles" in the book.

I am not asking for the meaning of squiggles in a book. I'm asking for a physics equation that illustrates everything that takes place between and including the motivation to write literature to the end results created by that piece of literature. Its that simple.

I'm asking for a study of energy transformation. This would fall into the realm of CHAOS theory... maybe. The equation would map and track energy transforming from the microscopic field of a "concept" to the macroscopic "mega" "reducing" of these literary efforts to results such as those of war, dance, film, music, social order, politics, etc.... and, perhaps even...physics.

Thus to ask that a piece of literature, and all its implications, be reduced to a physical equation is asking for all of our worldly concepts to be included also in the equation. Not impossible, but formidable.

Thank you for your reply. My point is that, all though everything can be reduced to physics, "everything" can also be reduced to other forms of "expression".

moving finger

May18-06, 12:20 AM

I'm asking for a physics equation that illustrates everything that takes place between and including the motivation to write literature to the end results created by that piece of literature. Its that simple.
That's the whole point - it is not that simple. The question may be simple, but the subject and the answer are exceedingly complex. John Searle managed to fool a lot of people into believing that an algorithmic machine could not "understand" by means of a "simple" thought experiment called the Chinese Room - but his argument plays on the fact that most people intuitively underestimate the complexity involved in understanding.

The "equation" (or better said algorithm) which describes everything you want is very easy to ask for, but in practice it would be an unimaginably complex algorithm. So unimaginable, in fact, that most people refuse to grasp the possibility and simply deny it.

Best Regards

MF

Humans put constraints on what they can achieve more often by their limited imaginations than by any limitations in the laws of physics (Alex Christie)

quantumcarl

May18-06, 10:09 PM

That's the whole point - it is not that simple. The question may be simple, but the subject and the answer are exceedingly complex. John Searle managed to fool a lot of people into believing that an algorithmic machine could not "understand" by means of a "simple" thought experiment called the Chinese Room - but his argument plays on the fact that most people intuitively underestimate the complexity involved in understanding.

The "equation" (or better said algorithm) which describes everything you want is very easy to ask for, but in practice it would be an unimaginably complex algorithm. So unimaginable, in fact, that most people refuse to grasp the possibility and simply deny it.

Best Regards

MF

Humans put constraints on what they can achieve more often by their limited imaginations than by any limitations in the laws of physics (Alex Christie)

By the time the algorithm I'm asking for was written there might be no universe.

In the long run, the equation/algorithm is evident in the form of many historic moments, present day situations and future potentials.

This illustrates my point about "reducing everything to pure physics". Physics represents another person's way of expressing their view of nature, like a billion other methods, and it works very well, according to the reports and observations... so far!

moving finger

May19-06, 05:18 AM

Physics represents another person's way of expressing their view of nature, like a billion other methods, and it works very well, according to the reports and observations... so far!
Best game in town as far as I can see :smile:

Of course that does not mean it will necessarily always be the best game in town, but as Goethe said :

Man is not born to solve the problems of the universe, but to find out where the problems begin, and then to take his stand within the limits of the intelligible

Physics currently represents the rational stand within the limits of the intelligible.

Best Regards

MF

quantumcarl

May20-06, 12:47 PM

Best game in town as far as I can see :smile:

Of course that does not mean it will necessarily always be the best game in town, but as Goethe said :

Physics currently represents the rational stand within the limits of the intelligible.

Best Regards

MF

Your quote from Goethe fits perfectly with what I am asking in the Quantum Physics forum. If its ok I am going to borrow it.

I am asking "what is energy made of and where does it come from".

Its like asking..."what are the origins of nature"...when, so far, the only answer is "nature is the origin of nature".

I'm going to use your quote because it will contribute a 'calm' to what I'm asking. Thank you.

moving finger

May21-06, 01:49 AM

Your quote from Goethe fits perfectly with what I am asking in the Quantum Physics forum. If its ok I am going to borrow it.

I am asking "what is energy made of and where does it come from".

Its like asking..."what are the origins of nature"...when, so far, the only answer is "nature is the origin of nature".

I'm going to use your quote because it will contribute a 'calm' to what I'm asking. Thank you.
I am happy I could be of help.

The answer to your question "what is energy made of......" is maybe one of those things which is outside the limits of the intelligible.

Best Regards

MF

Paul Martin

May26-06, 06:36 PM

The answer to your question "what is energy made of......" is maybe one of those things which is outside the limits of the intelligible. Maybe ... but then again, maybe not. I have given the question a little thought lately and I think some sense might be made of it.

I have begun to sketch out my ideas in an as-yet-unfinished essay which you can find at http://paulandellen.com/essays/essay146.htm .

I apologize for its unfinished state, but if you have the time and the inclination to read it, I would love to discuss it. It would also give me the impetus to finish it.

In short, it is a proposal to enhance Shannon's definition of 'information' and to extend the laws of Thermodynamics. The extension and enhancement would include consciousness as a part of the theory in addition to matter and energy.

Warm regards,

Paul

moving finger

May28-06, 02:06 AM

I apologize for its unfinished state, but if you have the time and the inclination to read it, I would love to discuss it. It would also give me the impetus to finish it.
I'll take a look.

But I've already revised my answer to the above question.

The question is meaningless. Energy is not a physical "thing", it is a property of the physical world. To ask "what is energy made of?" is like asking "what is length made of?". It's a simple example of a category error.

Best Regards

MF

moving finger

May28-06, 03:49 AM

Hi Paul

I have begun to sketch out my ideas in an as-yet-unfinished essay which you can find at http://paulandellen.com/essays/essay146.htm .

I'm afraid the ideas developed in here are in a completely different direction to my own thoughts, so much so that I cannot really connect with them.

imho information is purely subjective. It has no meaning in absence of a "perspective" (an observer). Whether a perfectly ordered deck of cards carries more information than any other "apparently random" ordering of the cards depends on the subjective perspective of the agent making the judgement. One particular ordering of cards may contain relevant information (it may spell out a person's birthdate for example) to one person, whilst appearing random to another.

Subjectivity is also something inherent to conscious experience. There is simply no way that we can use our objective scientific method to "deconstruct" the subjective experience of one person and re-represent it in a form understandable by another person. Subjective conscious experience is a private "world" which is not simply connected with the objective world.

I guess that doesn't help much!

Best Regards

MF

Lars Laborious

May29-06, 08:37 AM

Subjective conscious experience is a private "world" which is not simply connected with the objective world.
Do you belive in such a “world”? If so, what kind of world is it?

octelcogopod

May29-06, 02:54 PM

Hi Paul
imho information is purely subjective. It has no meaning in absence of a "perspective" (an observer). Whether a perfectly ordered deck of cards carries more information than any other "apparently random" ordering of the cards depends on the subjective perspective of the agent making the judgement. One particular ordering of cards may contain relevant information (it may spell out a person's birthdate for example) to one person, whilst appearing random to another.

Best Regards

MF

So, let's say we have a date written on a piece of paper, and that this date is the birthday of a person somewhere on the globe.
Without any observers, this would be just a random object with no meaning.
However, if a consciousness were to arise, and read these numbers on the paper, and then be told that they are the birthday of someone else, then the numbers would be connected to the paper, and the person reading it connected to both the person who had the birthday AND the paper.

These connections exist inside the conscious sphere of the person, they do not exist physically (other than memories / brain activity.)
Furthermore, it seems like everything is connected quite densely, as we all live in eachothers conscious spheres, and objects in the world are shared.
It's like one big consciousness really.

Furthermore, it seems like the values these objects have, is agreed upon by several if not all observers.
For example a car engine.
A car engine has a specific function, it is physically built that way.
The car engines function is a direct emergent property of physics.
Physics alone, can give arise to emergent systems that must work in a logical and fundamental way.
What if conscious experience and qualia, is actually just an emergent property of the physicality of things?

Humans create a duality by default, they seperate themselves from the physical world.
The "self" is not the "world."
What if this is some sort of defense mechanism for the organism to evolve a conscious experience?
What if conscious experience is simply the brains ability to seperate itself from the world itself. (Coupled with the eyes, body and 5 senses + memories)
One could also argue that the brain was an "accident", and that the universe just "stumbled upon" consciousness when the physical particles bound into a dense mesh of matter and energy.

moving finger

May30-06, 02:08 AM

Subjective conscious experience is a private "world" which is not simply connected with the objective world.
Do you belive in such a “world”? If so, what kind of world is it?
Imho conscious experience is a “world” which is created by a particular kind of information processing (a kind that we commonly call consciousness), and which is inhabited by virtual entities (the ‘self’ and “qualia”). There is no “simple connection” between these virtual entities and the external objective physical world, in pretty much the same way as there is no simple connection between the external objective physical world and the virtual objects which are constructed within computer games. The “buildings”, the “cars”, the “inhabitants” in SIM city (for example) have no physical existence as the actual objects represented, they are pure information, entirely virtual, created within an information processing system. Though the information processing is a very real physical phenomenon, the “world” that is "inhabited" by these virtual objects is a virtual world, created by and within the system.

Best Regards

MF

moving finger

May30-06, 02:41 AM

let's say we have a date written on a piece of paper, and that this date is the birthday of a person somewhere on the globe.
Without any observers, this would be just a random object with no meaning.
Agreed. To transform data into useful information, in other words to give meaning to that data, requires interpretation. Interpretation requires an agent to do the interpretation.

However, if a consciousness were to arise, and read these numbers on the paper, and then be told that they are the birthday of someone else, then the numbers would be connected to the paper, and the person reading it connected to both the person who had the birthday AND the paper.
Agreed. This is consistent with what I have said above. But I would qualify this by saying that only an interpretive agent (ie an agent capable of interpreting) is required to turn data into information (consciousness is not strictly necessary).

These connections exist inside the conscious sphere of the person, they do not exist physically (other than memories / brain activity.)
The connections exist as information within the interpretive agent. To be effectual in the physical world, all information, including the information within the interpretive agent, must be encoded as patterns on some physical substrate.

Furthermore, it seems like everything is connected quite densely, as we all live in eachothers conscious spheres, and objects in the world are shared.
It's like one big consciousness really.
This does not follow. All of our empirical evidence suggests that individual conscious experiences are actually very private and isolated. What evidence or reason do you have for thinking “it’s one big consciousness”?

Furthermore, it seems like the values these objects have, is agreed upon by several if not all observers.
For example a car engine.
A car engine has a specific function, it is physically built that way.
The car engines function is a direct emergent property of physics.
I disagree. The “function of a car engine” (to my way of thinking) is the way it is designed, and that design takes into account both the purpose of the designer and the properties of the physical world.

Physics alone, can give arise to emergent systems that must work in a logical and fundamental way.
What if conscious experience and qualia, is actually just an emergent property of the physicality of things?
I think they indeed are. Consciousness is simply a particular form of information processing, and qualia are virtual entities created within that information processing. To be effectual in the physical world, information processing requires a physical substrate (abstract information processing in absence of a physical substrate has no effect on the physical world). Thus both consciousness and qualia are indeed emergent phenomena. But there is nothing magical about this. Imho all emergent phenomena have reductive explanations (ie the source of the emergence), its just that these explanations may not be very simple or straightforward.

Humans create a duality by default, they seperate themselves from the physical world.
The "self" is not the "world."
Agreed – I think this dualism is created through the illusion that the conscious self is a real entity (as opposed to a virtual entity). Accept that both “self’ and “qualia” are virtual, crearted by information processing, and the dualism disappears.

What if this is some sort of defense mechanism for the organism to evolve a conscious experience?
There is no doubt in my mind that consciousness has evolved in some agents because it provided competitive advantage. It is easy to see why – it is very difficult for a non-conscious biological agent to make detailed, complex and long-term plans to achieve goals. In short, it is very difficult for evolution to evolve intelligence without evolving consciousness first – I believe intelligence emerges out of consciousness. BUT I also believe that non-conscious agents can be intelligent (it’s just that it’s an extremely unlikely chain of events that would lead to a biological evolutionary path whereby very intelligent but non-conscious agents would evolve).

What if conscious experience is simply the brains ability to seperate itself from the world itself. (Coupled with the eyes, body and 5 senses + memories)
It is (imho). Consciousness “creates” the virtual self, and in so doing it creates within the agent the illusion that the agent is somehow acting as a “free agent” within but at the same time somehow detached from the world. It is this illusion which baffles many people and leads them to notions of dualism.

One could also argue that the brain was an "accident", and that the universe just "stumbled upon" consciousness when the physical particles bound into a dense mesh of matter and energy.
Precisely. This is my philosophy. Everything is “an accident”, in the sense of there is no teleological purpose. We are not “here for a reason”, we are simply the products of blind evolution.

Many people find this idea abhorrent, and therefore they create imagined purposes for existence (the most common being god). I have no need for such an hypothesis.

Best Regards

MF

octelcogopod

May30-06, 02:52 AM

Very insightful post.
I must say things are starting to get very clear for me now.

This does not follow. All of our empirical evidence suggests that individual conscious experiences are actually very private and isolated. What evidence or reason do you have for thinking “it’s one big consciousness”?

I actually very much like the idea that subjective conscious experience is private and isolated.
But what I originally meant was that we do not exist solely as our bodies + consciousness, when someone else thinks of us, or we interact with other people, then we "exist" in their minds as well.

It was a moot point I realize now though, but I just like the idea of not being /completely/ alone.

moving finger

May30-06, 11:04 PM

But what I originally meant was that we do not exist solely as our bodies + consciousness, when someone else thinks of us, or we interact with other people, then we "exist" in their minds as well.
Ah yes I see. We "exist" as representations within their minds.

But as Kant observed, we never know the "ding an sich" (thing in itself). All we can ever know is some kind of representation of that thing.

Best Regards

MF

gptejms

Jun1-06, 09:07 AM

I avoid such discussions,but can't resist myself saying this:-put a man in a cannon and fire,the man will follow a parabolic trajectory!Beyond this,I don't think physics can say anything about a man's(or even an ant's) behaviour.So,can everything be reduced to pure physics--my answer is first start predicting based on pure physics a bacteria's behaviour,start manufacturing life in laboratories from pure chemicals--until then you don't even have a right to comment.

Ernies

Jun2-06, 02:27 PM

Like gptejems, bitter experience usually makes me avoid such threads.
The various tracks are confused and confusing, largely, I think by concentration in abstraction The last message rightly calls it back to materiality. There are many, actually an infinity, of ways of accounting for an array of 'facts'.
But let us take two. The lamp-post outside my house can be desribed as
a: a concrete post 20ft.high with a sodium vapour........
b. a device for providing light during the night.
The first might be called descriptive only, and the second in a crude way 'explanatory'. The word 'for' implies a 'purpose' , thus bringing in something other than the lamp.
The question is then 'can physics ever use the word 'for'?' If ever, can it always?
I agree with gpjtems. Perhaps he'll let me know whether--annus mirabilis-- he agrees with me.

ernies

gptejms

Jun3-06, 11:33 AM

Agree with you on this :smile:
Can't think of exceptions i.e. the use of word 'for' in physics right away--may be there are none.

moving finger

Jun4-06, 12:31 AM

I don't think physics can say anything about a man's(or even an ant's) behaviour.So,can everything be reduced to pure physics--my answer is first start predicting based on pure physics a bacteria's behaviour,start manufacturing life in laboratories from pure chemicals--until then you don't even have a right to comment.
Explanation does not entail Predictability.

Just because we cannot predict everything it does not follow that we cannot come up with a rational and coherent explanation for everything.

To claim that "you don't have a right to comment" simply because we can never know anything with certainty is an intellectual dead-end.

Best Regards

Ernies

Jun4-06, 04:12 AM

Explanation does not entail Predictability.

Just because we cannot predict everything it does not follow that we cannot come up with a rational and coherent explanation for everything.

To claim that "you don't have a right to comment" simply because we can never know anything with certainty is an intellectual dead-end.

Best Regards

You seem to have missed the point in my note (or perhaps you had not read it). 'Explanation' is different from mere 'description'. I do not recall anyone saying 'simply because we can never know anything with certainty'. We can never describe anything with perfect accuracy on current theories, but that seems irrelevant.
I am not at all clear what you mean by 'explanation'-- or 'rational'. Co-herent I take to mean 'with no overt self-contradiction'.

Ernies

gptejms

Jun4-06, 02:15 PM

Explanation does not entail Predictability.

Just because we cannot predict everything it does not follow that we cannot come up with a rational and coherent explanation for everything.

Apart from the fact that an explanation is different from description,I have this to say:-How do you lend credibilty to a theory or hypotheseis--by its ability to predict(or describe)to a reasonable accuracy the evolution of a system.Even if one is dealing with a quantum system,one at least predicts an interference pattern(though not exactly where a particle is going to hit).

I understand real systems are much more complex and it's difficult to describe them,but if you make a statement claiming that everything can be reduced to pure physics then the onus is on you to prove it.Otherwise it's just a matter of belief that it can be.

To claim that "you don't have a right to comment" simply because we can never know anything with certainty is an intellectual dead-end.

Not being able to prove something and believing in it is also a dead end.

moving finger

Jun4-06, 11:45 PM

Apart from the fact that an explanation is different from description,
I have never claimed that an explanation is the same as a description.
But fundamentally, all explanations are based on descriptions.
An explanation is simply an interpretation or description of one set of ideas or concepts in terms of another set of ideas or concepts. All explanations are based on models, and all models are based on descriptions.
We “explain” the atom by saying it is composed of electrons, protons, neutrons; and we “explain” some of these particles in terms of other particles, and maybe one day we will be able to “explain” all of these particles in terms of strings. But all we are doing is replacing one “description” of X in terms of Y by another “description” of X in terms of Y in terms of Z.

How do you lend credibilty to a theory or hypotheseis--by its ability to predict(or describe)to a reasonable accuracy the evolution of a system.Even if one is dealing with a quantum system,one at least predicts an interference pattern(though not exactly where a particle is going to hit).
I did not say that explanations never make predictions; I said explanation does not entail predictability.
The quantum world seems to be inherently uncertain, in most cases all we can do is to provide a certain probability that a given quantum event will happen in a certain timeframe, but in most cases we cannot provide a firm “yes/no” type prediction. This is the limit of our predictive ability.

if you make a statement claiming that everything can be reduced to pure physics then the onus is on you to prove it.Otherwise it's just a matter of belief that it can be.
I never made such a statement, thus with respect there’s no “onus on me” to prove any such thing.
I could however counter your argument by saying "the hypothesis that everything can be reduced to pure physics seems to fit the facts". The "onus" is then on anyone who thinks that such an hypothesis is incorrect to actually come up with evidence to show that it is incorrect. That is the scientific method.

To claim that "you don't have a right to comment" simply because we can never know anything with certainty is an intellectual dead-end.
Not being able to prove something and believing in it is also a dead end.
All we can ever have is explanations which seem to fit observations. But that is never “proof” that such explanations are correct.
Or are you perhaps claiming that we can know anything with certainty?
Would you like to give an example?

Best Regards

gptejms

Jun5-06, 07:17 AM

I never made such a statement, thus with respect there’s no “onus on me” to prove any such thing.
I could however counter your argument by saying "the hypothesis that everything can be reduced to pure physics seems to fit the facts". The "onus" is then on anyone who thinks that such an hypothesis is incorrect to actually come up with evidence to show that it is incorrect. That is the scientific method.

If you never made a statement of the sort 'everything can be reduced to pure physics' then you need to make your position clear--otherwise I don't know what we are discussing.

I knew that the transfer of onus was going to happen!I do not believe that the hypothesis is incorrect,but limited to whatever it's able to describe--which doesen't include all the facts.Until it's able to do that, one can only say 'I don't know'.But 'I tend to believe' that everything can not be reduced to pure physics just as you believe(?) that it can be.

Ernies

Jun5-06, 10:37 AM

Moving finger said, on the one hand
"I have never claimed that an explanation is the same as a description..........." and on the other "An explanation is simply an interpretation or description .....".
He contradicts himself in one breath.
Then he says "we explain the atom.....".
Indeed I, a theoretical physicist, most emphatically do not. I describe it in ways which have developed over the last 50-odd years of my career.

All of this stems from confusing the uses of the words "Why", "Explain", "describe" and "reason". The question "Why is the window broken?" has two anwers: first that a stone impacted on it, and second that I threw the stone because I disliked the person behind it. These are fundamentally different in kind, yet the discussion has often flipped from one meaning of "Why" to the other apparently without reason or even notice by the disputants.

Ernies

gptejms

Jun5-06, 01:42 PM

Then he says "we explain the atom.....".
Indeed I, a theoretical physicist, most emphatically do not. I describe it in ways which have developed over the last 50-odd years of my career.

I don't know what 'explain an atom' really means.One can only describe an atom.

All of this stems from confusing the uses of the words "Why", "Explain", "describe" and "reason". The question "Why is the window broken?" has two anwers: first that a stone impacted on it, and second that I threw the stone because I disliked the person behind it. These are fundamentally different in kind, yet the discussion has often flipped from one meaning of "Why" to the other apparently without reason or even notice by the disputants.

I agree that the two why's are completely different(the latter has a 'for' i.e. purpose attached with it) yet it's easy to get lost between the two why's.Just as a comment on this case:-the dislike(i.e. the 'for' in this case) may be looked upon as some physico chemical activity in the brain.The subjective understanding/feeling of that dislike,however, is something only you would know.

Ernies

Jun5-06, 02:45 PM

<Quote>Just as a comment on this case:-the dislike(i.e. the 'for' in this case) may be looked upon as some physico chemical activity in the brain.The subjective understanding/feeling of that dislike,however, is something only you would know.<end>
In some cases it may be caused by (e.g. the smell of isocyanides) and well may always be accompanied by (or result in, depending on which way you are looking) such activity but in my view does not 'explain' it.

Ernies

moving finger

Jun6-06, 12:54 AM

I knew that the transfer of onus was going to happen!
Of course you did - as I said, that is correct scientific method. Propose an hypothesis, then attempt to show that the hypothesis is incorrect. The onus is clearly on anyone who disagrees with an hypothesis to show why they disagree:wink:

I do not believe that the hypothesis is incorrect,but limited to whatever it's able to describe--which doesen't include all the facts.
Which “facts” do you believe it is unable to describe?

Best Regards

moving finger

Jun6-06, 01:01 AM

He contradicts himself in one breath.

No contradiction at all.

If I say that “A is a subset of B”, does it follow from this that all Bs are As? No, it doesn’t

In the same way, all explanations can be forms of descriptions, but it does not follow from this that all descriptions are explanations, hence an explanation is not the same as a description.

Best Regards

moving finger

Jun6-06, 01:05 AM

I don't know what 'explain an atom' really means.One can only describe an atom."
I agree completely - that is why in my original post I put "explain" in quotation marks, which Ernies chose to delete. An "explanation" is nothing more nor less than a particular form of description.

Best Regards

gptejms

Jun6-06, 11:56 AM

In some cases it may be caused by (e.g. the smell of isocyanides) and well may always be accompanied by (or result in, depending on which way you are looking) such activity but in my view does not 'explain' it.

Ernies

Note that the 'explain' here has no 'for' attached with it.

Anyway--
(I agree with you) but one may ask what more is left to be explained--it (the dislike) is a response of the body to a certain stimulus.I think it's only the subjective experience of the individual i.e. the 'feeling' of dislike that can not be explained.

gptejms

Jun6-06, 12:19 PM

moving finger,

I give a reply here to all of your three posts above.Explanation as defined by Ernies is not a subset of description--at best they can be two intersecting sets.

The onus is on the one who propounds a hypothesis not on others.

Putting explain in quotation marks in no way makes it equal to describe!

gptejms

Jun6-06, 01:18 PM

Which “facts” do you believe it is unable to describe?

Best Regards

Missed answering this in my last post.Before I make a list,understand this:-whatever you describe does not explain(irrespective of whether the laws are deterministic or probabilistic,&. irrespective of your computing power i.e. your ability to predict)--at best you run partially into the 'set' of explanation.

I don't know if Ernies would give you even that much latitude i.e. the use of the word partial(ly) in the last sentence!

moving finger

Jun6-06, 11:06 PM

The onus is on the one who propounds a hypothesis not on others.
The onus to do what?
Which hypothesis are you talking about here?

Putting explain in quotation marks in no way makes it equal to describe!
I never said that it did. I quite clearly said above that “explanation” is NOT equal to “description”.

Which “facts” do you believe it is unable to describe?
Missed answering this in my last post.Before I make a list,understand this:-whatever you describe does not explain(irrespective of whether the laws are deterministic or probabilistic,&. irrespective of your computing power i.e. your ability to predict)--at best you run partially into the 'set' of explanation.
Is this supposed to be an answer to the question :
Which “facts” do you believe it is unable to describe?

Best Regards

Ernies

Jun11-06, 11:45 AM

No contradiction at all.

If I say that “A is a subset of B”, does it follow from this that all Bs are As? No, it doesn’t

In the same way, all explanations can be forms of descriptions, but it does not follow from this that all descriptions are explanations, hence an explanation is not the same as a description.

But in an earlier post he said
"I have never claimed that an explanation is the same as a description..........." and on the other "An explanation is simply an interpretation or description .....".

Now surely these two sentences cannot be put together in a way consistent with the later post which in effect claims that explanations can be a subset of descriptions. The use of the word "can" merely confuses the issue. Is moving finger claiming that they 'are' or simply suggesting a possibility? If the latter I do not see its relevance. If the first, then there is a contradiction.

Doctordick

Jul2-06, 09:55 PM

The correct answer is that everything can be reduced to physics. The issue is clearly expressed in my post to "A Dualist Phoenix" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=1025559#post1025559)

Have fun -- Dick

octelcogopod

Jul2-06, 09:59 PM

octelcogopod

Jul2-06, 10:18 PM

Btw, here's just a wild theory I'm throwing out for the fun of it.

Take for instance art, a painting.
Physically a painting is just paint on a canvas arranged in certain forms, but to the observer it is much more.

Like Lars said in another thread, everything we sense is qualia, and qualia is basically our own perceived version of the universe/world.
So what I'm wondering is how do we scientifically measure and predict this qualia/perceived world?

If we follow moving-fingers theory that these are virtual entities, then the problem is that this doesn't stop the virtual entities for being "real" to the observers.
Thus, any virtual element can not be perceived directly in nature, you need an actual observer to perceive them.

How does all this tie in with how everything is physical?

Doctordick

Jul3-06, 01:59 PM

Heh, well that's quite a bold thing to say.Yes it is and it mostly generates ridicule (particularly from authorities); however, it is true none the less.
How does all this tie in with how everything is physical?I did not say everything is physical; what I said was that any internally self consistent explanation of anything must be built of fundamental entities which can be interpreted as obeying what we call the laws of physics. This means that whatever you are talking about is either fundamental and has a behavior normally referred to as the "laws of physics" or it is not fundamental and is based on the behavior of complex collections of fundamental entities: i.e., it is what is normally referred to as an "emergent phenomena", a consequence of coherent behavior of complex structures.

The best approach to the phenomena you refer to seems to me is being currently broached by Thomas Metzinger (http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/precis.pdf). There has been some discussion of him on this forum.

Have fun -- Dick

octelcogopod

Jul4-06, 12:52 AM

Oh.

Well, does that really help?
Sure it may be true that we can reduce everything to physics, however, when one can't explain the beauty of a sunrise with it, how does it help us?

There exists, literally, trillions, of human moments, thoughts and emotions, fleeting ones, that nobody, not even the "creator" knows about.
They are just.. Entities, that, when absorbed and understood, gets a life.

I think this clouds the issue somewhat, because, the whole subjective/qualia side of things is what people focus on.
And they have to, because there's nothing else for them to experience or talk about.

So I ask you, how can you prove that reality exists?
If solipsism is indeed unfalsifiable, how can I tell my peers in a coherent way that everything can be reduced to physics?

Also, while you may have an argument there, it seems to me that it is based on the assumption that the physical world actually exists.

Please correct me if I'm wrong there.

By the way; the problem is I haven't read your plethora of posts, because they are somewhat confusing.
I'm asking this simple question because I'm trying to understand what it is you have discovered, in the simplest terms.
If you can explain it in layman terms I'd be happy.

edit: also, if you feel you have discovered and can prove something as fundamental as this, why not release a paper to the professional science scene?

Doctordick

Jul4-06, 01:40 PM

I think I might be able to clear things up a bit. First you might read a post I just made this morning on the thread "Causality in the subjective world" (http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=1026930#post1026930). It might clear up that issue of "how does it help us?" Fundamentally it doesn't; however, it does explain some very interesting things about the universe.
There exists, literally, trillions, of human moments, thoughts and emotions, fleeting ones, that nobody, not even the "creator" knows about.Too many to logically explain as the number of steps to the logic is beyond comprehension; however, mathematics (which Feynman called the distilled essence of logic) does provide us with a subtle respite to that constraint. For example, the number of terms in my fundamental equation (see my paper, A Universal Analytical Model of Explanation Itself (http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm)) fully includes all the trillions upon trillions of human moments you speak of. Oh, the solutions are still too complex to express in detail; however, mathematics does allow us to pull down some subtle facts about those solutions. But you need to have a decent understanding of partial differential equations in order to follow those deductions. The field of Physics is one of them.
I think this clouds the issue somewhat, because, the whole subjective/qualia side of things is what people focus on. And they have to, because there's nothing else for them to experience or talk about.And why do they need to talk about things? For the same reason dogs bark and birds sing; it gives them pleasure. It is very short sighted to think any real result will be achieved.
So I ask you, how can you prove that reality exists?Well, I thought that the word "reality" was a label for "what exists". Are you telling me that it's not?
If solipsism is indeed unfalsifiable, how can I tell my peers in a coherent way that everything can be reduced to physics?Oh that ones easy. Physics is merely a description of some of the experiences you should expect based on the experiences you have already had. It has nothing to do with what those experiences are based on; Solipsism is the idea that they are based on nothing. You have no way of determining what is and what is not a figment of your imagination. In fact, the central issue of my work is, if you want your explanation to be internally self consistent, what can you say about the behavior of the fundamental elements of that explanation. It turns out that any explanation of anything, if it is to be internally self consistent, must be based on fundamental elements which obey the laws of physics.
Also, while you may have an argument there, it seems to me that it is based on the assumption that the physical world actually exists.No, it's based on the assumption that your explanation is internally consistent.
By the way; the problem is I haven't read your plethora of posts, because they are somewhat confusing. I'm asking this simple question because I'm trying to understand what it is you have discovered, in the simplest terms. If you can explain it in layman terms I'd be happy.The difficulty I have is that arises because what I have found is so original that it is essentially beyond the conception of most everyone (for varying reasons). I have made a great many posts but most of them have been a learning experience concerning what people incorrectly read into what I say. From a philosophical perspective, there is a great problem in understanding the universe expressed by philosophers with their division between ontological and epistemological issues. Ontological refers to "what really exists" and "epistemological" refers to the behavior or rules governing what exists.

What I do is eliminate the issue of ontology by simply examining the range of possibilities which exist if the ontological issues are intentionally left totally open and undefined. The ontology of my arguments are entirely expressed in the undefined sets A, B(t), C and D. Even the ontological issue time is undefined by using t to merely denote an arbitrary order in the elements of C. (If you haven't, you need to read my paper on explanations carefully.) I then work out a specific epistemology which will provide an explanation of absolutely any set C; you might think of it as a Dewey decimal system for specifying what expectations would be consistent with what is known (B(t)) no matter what that might be. That is what I call my fundamental equation.

The astonishing fact (which one can only understand if they can follow my development of solutions to that equation) is that I can find no law of physics which I cannot show to be a solution to that equation. This has far flung philosophical implications. Which are of course meaningless if you cannot understand the equation.
edit: also, if you feel you have discovered and can prove something as fundamental as this, why not release a paper to the professional science scene?Oh, I tried to get it published twenty five years ago but received nothing but ridicule. If you want to see a typical professional reaction to it, take a look at this thread (http://www.scienceforums.net/forums/showthread.php?p=282543#post282543). Severian is, or at least claims to be, a professor of graduate physics at some prominent university. He may very well hold such a position as his response is, in fact, quite consistent with other responses I have received from professional authorities.

At the expense of being thought abusive I will give you my opinion of professional authorities. Our educational system has no way of checking how well people are able to think but it is quite simple to check how much information they have learned. There are people out in the world who find memorizing information relatively easy but find using that knowledge very difficult. In the extreme, such people are called "idiot savants". I know that idiot savants posse an advantage when the information to be learned becomes complex and I suspect that a great number of the people high up in our learned academies are in fact idiot savants. Why else would it be that almost every major break through in the scientific fields has made by young new initiates, and not by their teachers who certainly "knew" a lot more about the subject than their students. It seems to me that the authorities have very little ability to think about what they know.

At any rate, I find myself between a rock and a hard place. Either the people I am talking to are insufficiently educated to follow the math or they are too educated to comprehend something new. I think that has been true throughout history and it will be true long after I am dead. As you said, "what good is it?" The honest answer is, well it certainly won't get you in bed with a babe tonight now will it. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick