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Oct2-11, 08:12 PM
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apeiron's Avatar
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Quote Quote by bohm2 View Post
So Strawson is guilty of that same kind of error he accuses his opponents of making:

For, as we have seen, Strawson insists on 2, and 2 is the claim that no non-experiential fact is intrinsically such as to yield an experiential fact. When we ask what grounds this insistence, however, all we seem to find is that we know enough to know.
So what changes? This is the standard charge against the Hard Problem.

Those who believe there is a problem will say "I see no convincing tale of micro-causes".

Those who argue against wiil say reply, well, that does not prove that such a tale does not exist. And if a tale does exist, then we only have a regular "easy" problem.

So the hard problem needs to be bolstered in the face of this reasonable sounding doubt by further conceivability tests, such as the zombie argument, or Mary's "knowing everything about colour" argument.

People can argue about how convincing they find that.