Originally Posted by marianiiina
It has a looong way to go... why does it seem to never get it right? Models in economics appear to be a better tool for abstraction/education but for (a decent level of) prediction?
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I'm not economist, but the general reasoning behind in game theory is generally very intuitive, but I think the regular descriptions are very idealistic, so it's not mature yet IMO. In particular the idea that there exists objective measures of rationality or objective rules of the game.
At first, one may think w/o objective measures we loose predictability, but that's not true. It just means that predictions are relative, and justified relative to each player. I think each player has his own idea of the game. And the only way to compare the views are for the players to interact and the objectivity is IMO only emergent as a resulting negotiation.
But I mean the general framework of "game theoretic" thinking, is IMO much more natural to me at least, than the geometric thinking or other abstractions. That's what I like about it, but I agree that there is alot yet to complete.
To predict a global economy is clearly not an easy task. We can't even predict the global weather :)
But in the game theoretic angle, I think part of the point is that there IS no perfect predictions, this is why the modelling itself is part of the game. This is my view.
I personally think the game theoretic view should be combined with an evolutionary view, where the rules of the game itself is changing. My view is that the rules of the game are relative and encoded in each player, so tha the population of the players encodes the variety of the rules. So the ambition to have objective rules, or observer independent laws of physics, only makes sense when considering a population in equilibrium. A changing population, indicates that at some level there is an evolution of the game. It's like a negotiated democracy defining the rules.
But even if we understand this better, predicting everything is imopssible. I think this abstraction implies that part of the evolution is unpredictable, and we simply have to act on the feedback the future gives. I think this is also the key to explain the action of some systems, as it's indifferent to information that it doesn't see. The rationality measure must scale with the scale of the player.
A player might occure irrational or "stupid" relative to another player, but where in fact, the problem might be that the problem is tha the second player tries to impose HIS measure of rationality to another player - which is wrong.
Edit: my point in this last comment is that the scientists trying to do the game theoretic inferences here are not external observers juding the game, they are themselves just players in the same game!
/Fredrik