Determinism Question - possibility of scientific explanations for human behaviour

disregardthat

I'm sorry, I deleted the post before I was about to edit it.

Answering your post: A probability is a degree of confidence, but a possibility is an event that could happen. Why is it wrong to say that I could lift my arms in the air? Is this not a possibility even if I choose not to? See that whether my actions are predetermined or not does not come into question. It is a psychological thing.

Again, why is physical causality a constrain on the will? What does it constrain?

Ryan_m_b

The problem is defining the terms. It is a possibility but whether or not you will or wont do it is determined. For example; I could eat something I don't like but if I'm offered a choice between my favourite meal and the one I detest the most In reality I'm never going to pick the last. So whilst it is feasible that I could eat the last it will never happen. It's the confusing part of this is the definition; what does possibility mean in a deterministic system? What does free mean in a deterministic system? What is will? What does free will mean in a random system?

Willowz

What is the will?

This coming down to he mind body distinction again. But, even if we were to say that the mind is the brain, then that wouldn't explain everything that goes on in the brain.

mathal

First, I would say that if one takes a purely deterministic point of view, the train of thought of a mind is just as determined as any other 'physical' thing. You strongly imply that thought is purely thought, as you put it a psychological thing.
There was an interresting series on BBC a few years ago on conciousness. I just dug up the dvd copy of the vcr I made of the one show I caught, which dates the show to more than 10 years ago.
In it Professor Susan Greenfield, hosting the show was hooked up with a 'cap' of measuring electrical activity in her brain. All she was required to do was make a decision and then follow through with this decision. In this case it was trying to randomly pick one of two keys on the keyboard and then decide the moment to actually press the keyboard. The 'moment' that she pressed the key was over 2 seconds after brain activity indicated preparation for muscular movement. Her 'decision' of when to press the key had already taken place. Dr. Patrick Haggard, University College, London conducted experiments of this type.
In another portion split brain subjects,-radical treatment for epilepsy, saw two different words- one by each eye. Only one set of words was 'seen' but when the subjects were asked to draw a picture of the word they invariably drew a picture that meshed the meaning of both words -for example "glass" was 'seen' but "hour" was 'not seen' but they drew an hourglass. When asked to explain why they drew the hourglass, they made no reference to it 'probably' being conected to the 'unseen' word, instead they explained that they remembered talking recently about time and their watch and the hourglass idea just 'came to mind'. Prof. Michel Gazzaniga, Dartmouth College New Hampshire, conducted these type of experiments.
Conciousness is predominantly just a story teller, making our world-view remain 'consistent' and manageable.
Concious control of actions inevitably get's in the way of any type of performance,be it an athlete, musician for example. The vast majority of our day to day life is predominantly unconcious.
Conciousness is directly asociated with the verbal side of the brain (the left hemisphere). This conversation could be said to involve concious behavior. In the end though, what makes any conversation 'interesting' for each individual are the ideas that 'come to mind'.
mathal

Ryan_m_b

This is called the Libert's delay and is an interesting example of epiphenomenalism.

disregardthat

Yes, I am familiar with the type of experiments which makes the observer capable of predicting behavior before the subject is aware of his choices. But in what sense is this capability of predicting the choice a constraint on the will of the subject? Why do we dismiss it as free? As I see it, the problem is the idea that the will is affected by physical causes. What is affected?

I do insist on that the idea of the will as free is problematic, but not because it is contradicted by physical causality.

The main points are these:
Can we imagine the will as free? Can we give an example of a free willed action? If not, what are we arguing against, and why does determinism matter?

Willowz

I don't understand the questions. We act as if we have a free will. Why not assume that it is.

disregardthat

If you believe

1) The mechanisms of the brain is the entire cause of behavior in human beings

and critically

2) This makes free will impossible

then the questions are perfectly valid.

If not, please explain why our will is free (I agree).

Willowz

That's a dishonest conclusion. Nobody yet knows the entire mechanisms of the brain. The conclusion is unwarranted.

disregardthat

This is not the place to throw out the "we can't know for certain" cliché. We know enough to conclude that it is indeed the mechanisms of the brain that causes all muscular movement for example.

Pythagorean

We don't need to know the "entire mehanism" of the brain, we just need to know that every mechanism so far (memory, perception, prediction) has followed the same rational course that every other scientific study has. Big surprise.

Willowz

I don't mean to be abrasive, but what do you mean by "rational course", that almost sounds like some scientific dogmatism.

Ryan_m_b

Er...what? Why do you think that rational investigation is dogma

disregardthat

Let's discuss determinism. And I'd first like an answer for proponents of determinism: What does it mean that something is determined? If an event A happens, why was A determined?

Ryan_m_b

Because of causality. The determinist principle is that cause and effect are absolute. Therefore everything that happens is contingent on the past, in other words every atom of your and your environment's existence is governed by physical laws through time. Considering this the determinist would argue that we have no "free will" because there is no such thing as choice. Instead everything that happens is inevitable. So for a determinist the idea of "choice" is moot.

Compatibilism takes a different stance by saying that even in a deterministic universe free will is still possible. This is because whilst our choices may be inevitable we still make them and we still have the concept of choice. In other words we have the free will to make choices even if the choices we make are ultimately determined.

At the other end of the spectrum is metaphysical libertarianism. There's many schools of thought here but ultimately the argument is that there is something about an intelligent agent that is not subject to the same rules as the everything else. Many metaphysical libertarian idea's stem from the idea that there is something more than the physical world and that having a mind means that human beings are exempt from cause and effect when it comes to free will. Obviously this view is the one most favoured by religionists.

Willowz

That's not what I meant. But, let me clarify.


Scientists have operated on the principle of sufficient reason as a sort of pragmatic "code of conduct" (no mysticism). I think, people interested in science happen to believe in this blindly (science as some sort of religion). But, the people who actually do science nowadays would know better.

Willowz

Let me go off the deep end here.

Say the mind operated on the quantum level in some respect. So, if quantum mechanics is not deterministic, then so isn't the mind and the resulting will. But, this is just speculation which I suspect won't be taken seriously.