Recent content by Morbert

Different subsystems will have different dynamics, so the choice of division into subsystems will yield different subsystems and hence different dynamics models. For example if we include all degrees of freedom, then we are concerning ourselves with the unistochastic dynamics of the entire...

Assuming the Wigner superobserver performs some recoherent operation analogous to a quantum eraser experiment: If by "Does a division event happen?" you mean "Do the subsystem dynamics ##\Gamma(t)## factorize at some time ##t'##?", then the answer is "If the dynamics concern the stochastic...

@JesseM Division events are nomolgical. They are features of dynamical laws. Supernatural entities like the Wigner superobserver don't change what actually occurred when Wigner's friend made their measurement. But they do change the dynamics of Wigner's friend. The dynamical laws of Wigner's...

This amounts to a choice of subsystem to model. Like in textbook QM, you can decide what subsystem to model, but it isn't an issue* in Barandes's formalism. If you choose to model a subsystem ##\mathcal{S}## as distinct from its environment ##\mathcal{E}##, you will end up with potentially...

Section 3.7 in https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.10778 outlines how. It is very closely related: If a system has become correlated with its environment (equation 45), then marginalizing over the environment (equation 50), which is like tracing over the environment in the QM formalism, will reveal a...

Division events fall out of the formalism, and nothing in the formalism depends on a choice of realizer.

Basically yes.

Assertions like "stochastically switching until measured" or "switching with frequency X" aren't addressed by the formalism because they don't have any empirical distinction. What the formalism gives us is the standalone probabilities p(t) and not probabilities over trajectories with different...

Here's what Barandes says specifically: "Given just the minimalist ingredients that define a given indivisible stochastic process, there will generically exist a large or infinite number of ways of choosing a complete Kolmogorov tower consistent with those ingredients. Each such choice of...

Yes in the narrow sense that the dynamics do not supply the conditional probabilities needed to say whether or not such a transition can occur.

Yes, the configuration space in the papers is the space of spatial arrangements. I think this is the same as in Bohmian mechanics but I don't know for sure. The notion of an indivisible stochastic process involves a sample space. A sample space does not necessarily have to be this configuration...

David Wallace, an established many-worlds champion, draws heavily from the decoherent histories formalism to sketch the notion of a history. (See section 2.3 in https://arxiv.org/pdf/0712.0149 ) Histories don't make up an additional ontological ingredient in the many-worlds interpretation. They...

Unless I am misunderstanding, take some configuration ##i##: ##p_i(t) = \sum_j \Gamma_{ij}(t\leftarrow t_0)p_j(t_0)##. This is equation (4) in the correspondence paper.

Griffiths CH is the most explicitly realist version of CH among the developers of the formalism. His writings on it are also the most pedagogical. His book "Consistent Quantum Theory" and Omnes's "Understanding Quantum Mechanics" make a strong foundation if you want to understand the formalism...

So what is meant by "The non-Markovianity in Barandes' correspondence comes from projecting this onto particle-configuration variables"?