verty said:
I think if people have a question in mind that irks them or is interesting to them, they will look for the answer. For example, Descartes was interested in the question, how do I know anything at all? And he looked for the answer and came up with an idea called rationalism. But I for example am not interested in the question of how we know stuff. We learn it, that's good enough for me.
That question belongs to metaphysics, i.e. philosophy proper and not philosophy of science and therefore not answerable by sociological means.
verty said:
I just don't see how you could study this beyond some sort of questionaire: have you sought answers to any of these questions? How does the soul control the body, etc. I mean, it's just silly, isn't it, to be concerned about such stuff.
You seem to be confusing ill-defined questions with philosophy of science questions. In the philosophy of science, a philosophy means a point of view, for example the belief that Newtonian dynamics is valid at all scales, the belief that the Gaussian distribution is the most common distribution occurring in nature and the belief that quantum theory is more fundamental than general relativity.
To put it more explicit: scientific theories, both verified and unverified ones, together with their related mathematical machinery, experimental predictions, psychological imagery, unquestioned assumptions and practically the entire academic school of thought associated with the practitioners of the thepry are philosophies. From the point of view of philosophy of science, special relativity represents a philosophy, so does Newtonian mechanics, aether theory, string theory, axiomatic quantum field theory and real analysis. These philosophies are more general classes of the theories that represent them.
All scientists hold onto one or more philosophies; what may be a good philosophy in one domain may be hopelessly inadequate in another. The problem is it often isn't that obvious when a good idea turns into a bad one and when to stop relying on it. If a certain subset, domain or specialization in a science is stagnant and the respective scientists cannot solve it themselves, a good place to look is to analyze that groups philosophy in order to precisely identify the problem in order to tackle it better. Theoretical physics for example is plagued by the issues of being stagnant and having many inadequate tools and has been for over 40 years now.
verty said:
But scientific questions, why does this lichen fossil seem to lack certain traits that modern lichens have? This is much more interesting, I think. So I guess what I'm trying to say is, society is not that interested in what philosophers think about, and I don't think that will change. So studying what philosophies people have so that one can reformulate one's own view is a philosophical endeavour, IMHO. It's not sociology, I wouldn't think, because we just aren't interested in it.
The type of question asked by philosophy of science is precisely analogous to your definition of a scientific question.
Examples: why do most contemporary physicists seem to have no regard for formal proofs whatsoever while contemporary pure mathematicians are practically obsessed with it? Why do contemporary mathematicians hold such views? When did holding such views become the norm in the mathematics community?
Why do specialists in different branches of physics tend to have such opposite views of what is fundamental?
Why do practicing physicists hold group theoretical notions such as symmetry as necessarily fundamental in physics? When did this start occurring and for what reasons?
Why do physicists hold conservation laws in such high regard? Was this always the case? Has the attitude w.r.t. conservation changed substantially? When and why?
Why do successful physics theories such as Newtonian mechanics end up getting modified? When does this modification tend to occur? What are key mathematical aspects of such modifications?
All of these questions are answerable by sociological methodology and moreover, depending on the specific questions and answers, they are capable of identifying key factors (whether these be historical, mathematical, psychological, social, financial, etc), biases and assumptions among scientists which explain the data better than what scientists claim to answer for themselves, or even worse, answer for their colleagues.
These answers have consequences for entire syllabi, education systems, research programmes, amount of specialists needed in some domain, etc. Needless to say, most of this philosophy of science research is carried out by authorative scientists who have been active for decades in their respective fields.
verty said:
If he is interested in philosophy at all, that is.
Is not having a particular interest in philosophy a problem? What if "live and let live" is the philosophy, is that good enough?
I won't comment on the rest of Autodidact's post because I don't know about those theories that he mentions.
Practically everyone is interested in some philosophy, do not try to kid yourself that you and/or others are completely aphilosophical by artificially introducing boundaries of thought; this doesn't just limit yourself but also tends to limit others as they will consciously or unconsciously copy such behavior for whatever reasons (group identity, conflict avoidance, ideological conviction, etc).
I don't want to go into your post too much as this is straying from the topic of philosophy of science to the topic of philosophy itself, which is as others have said here, a whole other discussion altogether wherein most people, especially scientists, tend to lack the necessary academic sophistication required to say anything useful at all. I will however say the following, as it is and has been the point of view of many, including prominent scientists such as Einstein and Feynman.
Science, especially physics, is so enticing to many people precisely because it is capable of answering certain particular philosophical questions using the precision of mathematical frameworks, i.e. giving accurate but uncertain empirically based answers to certain questions. Even stronger, physics tends to entice both the public and scientists more than the other sciences because it literally is the philosophy of nature, written in a highly mathematicized form and based on previously gained empirical data. It is a common misunderstanding of both physics and philosophy to view the two as completely separate disciplines.
What is space? What is time? What is energy? Make no mistake, these are purely philosophical questions. Fundamental physics questions are deeply philosophical, because in the hierarchy of the natural sciences, physics has practically subsumed all other sciences and so become capable of answering most if not all of their deep questions itself without any recourse to philosophy per se. Not having or trying to not rely on a philosophy at all when doing science is a philosophy as well; in philosophy of science as well as in physics this position is called instrumentalism and it is a characteristic philosophy of many late 20th century physicists.
Many people go into science because they find some phenomena fascinating. Others go into it because they have a knack for solving simple scientific problems and they realize that they would do well at this as a job. These aren't sttict criteria, one could go into science for entirely different reasons for why one ends up staying in science. The point is, having knowledge is worthy in itself, not because it might lead to some technological applications; understanding the physics of some phenomenon is recognizing that something is already a naturally occurring application of physics.