Plato said:
There is no difference in logic & set theory.
All set theory concepts are stated in terms of logic.
UNION is simply the same as OR.
INTERSECTION is simply the same as AND.
COMPLIMENT is simply the same as NOT.
I don't quite agree with this. To me, it's like saying there is no difference between the set of natural numbers $\Bbb N$, and the set of rational numbers:
{0/1,1/1,2/1,3/1,...}
Now, philosophically, I lean towards structuralism, I'm fine with things being "equal up to isomorphism", but "what things actually *are*" seems to me to be a matter of context, and sometimes context *matters*.
To be more specific: propositions have "truth-values", whereas sets are "constructions" (entities). It doesn't make sense to me to say:
$A \cap B = $ true.
But, yes, there are certain obvious "parallel constructions":
$x \in A \iff P(x)$, where $P$ is the property that defines $A$.
$A \subset B \iff P(x) \implies Q(x)$ where $P,Q$ are defined analogously to above.
$x \in A \cup B \iff P(x) \vee Q(x)$
$x \in A \cap B \iff P(x) \wedge Q(x)$
$x \in A^c \iff \neg P(x)$
some of these parallels depend on some "background set of discourse", which in the "general case" gets a bit murky...there is, after all, no universal "set of all sets", so we usually are talking about some "background universe" (our sets are subsets of some power set). Because of this, I have no idea what a set is, although I know that several things are sets.
When I look at foundational material on sets, the axioms are usually stated in terms of a first- or second-order propositional calculus. When I try to delve deeper into what a predicate logic is, I often encounter statements like:
"L consists of a set $\Sigma$, called the alphabet..." which seems a bit unfair. I feel like a snake trying to eat his own tail...