Two retired Generals discuss withdrawal

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the implications of military withdrawal from Iraq, focusing on the potential consequences for various factions within the country and the broader geopolitical ramifications. Participants explore different strategies for managing the situation, including military presence and reconstruction efforts, while reflecting on historical context and current events.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Exploratory
  • Technical explanation

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants highlight that the Sunni population is likely to face severe consequences regardless of the withdrawal strategy, suggesting that the ramifications of the initial invasion were foreseeable.
  • There are contrasting views on whether staying in Iraq could stabilize the region or if it would lead to greater casualties among the local population.
  • One participant proposes a strategy of dividing Iraq into zones (white, grey, black) to manage insurgency and reconstruction efforts, arguing that a genuine effort to rebuild could change the dynamics of these zones.
  • Another participant questions the assumption that conditions in insurgent-abandoned areas will continuously worsen, suggesting that historical patterns indicate deterioration when areas are isolated.
  • Concerns are raised about the current Iraqi government potentially replicating the oppressive tactics of the previous regime, with references to human rights abuses and political violence.
  • Some participants argue that a better strategy, rather than sheer military force, is necessary to effectively combat insurgency and support reconstruction.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express a range of views on the effectiveness of military strategies and the potential outcomes of withdrawal. There is no clear consensus on the best approach or the implications of various scenarios discussed.

Contextual Notes

Participants acknowledge the complexity of the situation, including the historical context of Iraq's governance and the challenges of reconstruction efforts. The discussion reflects various assumptions about the motivations and behaviors of different factions within Iraq.

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Worth the watch.

Then, Suarez discusses Murtha's Iraq proposal with retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, who is co-authoring a book on the inside story of the Iraq war, and retired Army Lt. Gen. William Odom, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute

See
Monday, November 21, 2005
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/newshour_index.html
 
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I thought a few of the more interesting moments came when Odom stated that no matter how this works out, the Sunni's are going to be slaughtered by the Shiite; that this and many ramifications were "infinitely forseeable" before attacking, and finally, that most of these concerns were rendered unavoidable and academic from the moment that we attacked.
 
Great discussion.

Very informative.
 
the way it is painted in the interview, the scene is vary bleak. the first option is to try to make things better while staying in there, fighting an up-hill battle and the other option is stand back and let this frail state of affairs collapse and reconstruct it with a stable foundation. the former option will take a heavy toll on the american force in the region but that will be the brunt of the casualties (all things associated). the second option includes a significantly larger amount of bloodshed among the sunni population and to a lesser degree, also the shiites.

i foresee the blame panning out like this. if the amercians leave asap and all hell breaks loose it will be seen as they came in, threw order (for what its worth) out the window and left the region when they lost their appetite, making american forign policy look vary much less conducive to world peace then before the war. if they stay in there and somehow manage to stabilize the region before they leave, the american people will insist it was not the place of the usa to take the burdens of the region, whereas the rest of the world will consider the action noble although misguided. however, if the american force stays there for a few more years then decides to leave without stability after all, the american people will be even more upset and the rest of the world will think they screwed up in every way and are not only vary unpeacefull but also incompetent.

all 3 of these scenarios are considering no WMDs turn up. if they do turn up, there will be many big investigation into weather they were really found or if they are someone else's WMDs, if they are still the real deal then everyone will appologize for ever doubting and let's not play the blame game and let's move on.


the only way to win is to stay in and pull off a miracle
 
devil-fire said:
the way it is painted in the interview, the scene is vary bleak. the first option is to try to make things better while staying in there, fighting an up-hill battle and the other option is stand back and let this frail state of affairs collapse and reconstruct it with a stable foundation. the former option will take a heavy toll on the american force in the region but that will be the brunt of the casualties (all things associated). the second option includes a significantly larger amount of bloodshed among the sunni population and to a lesser degree, also the shiites.
i foresee the blame panning out like this. if the amercians leave asap and all hell breaks loose it will be seen as they came in, threw order (for what its worth) out the window and left the region when they lost their appetite, making american forign policy look vary much less conducive to world peace then before the war. if they stay in there and somehow manage to stabilize the region before they leave, the american people will insist it was not the place of the usa to take the burdens of the region, whereas the rest of the world will consider the action noble although misguided. however, if the american force stays there for a few more years then decides to leave without stability after all, the american people will be even more upset and the rest of the world will think they screwed up in every way and are not only vary unpeacefull but also incompetent.
all 3 of these scenarios are considering no WMDs turn up. if they do turn up, there will be many big investigation into weather they were really found or if they are someone else's WMDs, if they are still the real deal then everyone will appologize for ever doubting and let's not play the blame game and let's move on.
the only way to win is to stay in and pull off a miracle
It would not require a miracle. Just a better strategy.

You cannot beat an insurgency with force alone.

The most effective method has been to divide the country into zones.

White zones: Safe zones where reconstruction efforts can be directed. When those outside see how much better things are in white zones it undermines support for the insurgency.

Grey Zones: Zones that are contested militarily. Multiple patrols and military presence, active engagement with the insurgents.

Black zones: Areas that are abandoned to the insurgents and isolated. As conditions worsen for the people in the black zones support for the insurgency will erode.

As it is we have a green zone where the contractors who should be rebuilding the country are hiding using the contract money for security personnel instead of the reconstruction effort.

Of course had the administration listened to the military and gone in with a larger force. Had they turned over the reconstruction and occupation to a competent people. The insurgency would not be near what we are seeing today.

Of course if they had listened to the military, they would not have been able to rush in. It would have taken at least another 30-90 days to mobilize another 100-150 thousand troops. they could not have concealed their lies and exaggerations about intelligence for that long and they would not have had enough support to invade in the first place.
 
Skyhunter said:
Black zones: Areas that are abandoned to the insurgents and isolated. As conditions worsen for the people in the black zones support for the insurgency will erode.
You want to think this through a bit?
 
Yeah. Why are you assuming insurgent-abandoned areas will worsen continuously?
 
rachmaninoff said:
You want to think this through a bit?
With a genuine effort to rebuild the country, white zones will become stable and grey zones will become white zones. This will free up the military to change black zones into grey zones.

All of it depends on a genuine and also perceived genuine effort to help all of the people. Creating a capitalists paradise like the CPA tried to do in the beginning of the occupation will just fuel the hatred toward the occupiers.
 
Smurf said:
Yeah. Why are you assuming insurgent-abandoned areas will worsen continuously?
Historically when you isolate an area so it can receive little or no outside assistance, conditions deteriorate.
 
  • #10
It seems one cruel dictatorship in Iraq has now been replaced by another. It is possible that state terror will 'quieten' the insurrection as it did under Saddam but it can hardly be claimed to be the beacon of freedom and democracy that was promised following Saddam's removal.
In this new Iraqi democracy it appears the way for the gov't to win an election and maintain it's grip on power is to ensure all of it's opposing candidates are dead.
Abuse worse than under Saddam, says Iraqi leader
· Allawi in damning indictment of new regime
· Bush prepares way for US troop pull-out
Peter Beaumont, foreign affairs editor
Sunday November 27, 2005
The Observer
Human rights abuses in Iraq are now as bad as they were under Saddam Hussein and are even in danger of eclipsing his record, according to the country's first Prime Minister after the fall of Saddam's regime.
'People are doing the same as [in] Saddam's time and worse,' Ayad Allawi told The Observer. 'It is an appropriate comparison. People are remembering the days of Saddam. These were the precise reasons that we fought Saddam and now we are seeing the same things.'
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,1651789,00.html