What Defines the Essence of the Physical in Philosophy?

[aspect]

Why do we feel the need to preserve the physical in philosophical thinking when it is not immediate in the way first-person experience is? Is it because we feel sensory experience alone can not explain the world we perceive?

It seems to me that the movement from sensory experience to the identification of objects is one purely of (evolutionary) convenience and has no real foundation.

I am not denying the causative potential of 'something' that we class as physical. I am questioning the reality of the essence we ascribe to it by way of 'physical'.

I will go out on a limb and define the 'essence' of physical as persistent identity through time. I am happy to hear other suggestions, but note I am after a definition that warrants the inclusion of 'physical' as an ontological category. For example, one might suggest that the physical is actual because objects have 'substance' (though this would require further elaboration).

 

[LostInSpaceTime]

Why do we feel the need to preserve the physical in philosophical thinking
I am not denying the causative potential of 'something' that we class as physical. I am questioning the reality of the essence we ascribe to it by way of 'physical'.

What are you asking? That we take senses touch,smell,hearing...and choose to define the Physical by those standards. Then carry those standards over into philosophy where some of that may not apply. Like...though certain physical attributes define a certain object, are these attributes really the "essence" of it...so to speak? ie: how we FEEL about something as opposed how we VIEW it...am I close?

 

[aspect]

I want to find out if 'physical' has more than a scientific basis. I'm sure it does, as we all go through a period in childhood where we learn to associate things as objects, learn about space, etc. But what I'm wondering is if that basis contains an intuitive notion of what we mean by physical, for example as I said: "identity through time". Such a notion, if it exists, could be philosophically useful.

 

[wuliheron]

We are the belief makers, we give it all meaning and we do so because we want to do so. However, the physical is beyond mere desire and belief. It is the spontaneous natural world and when we too become spontaneous we become one with the physical. Thus it is more than the merely persistent, which encompasses beliefs as well. In addition, a simple blow to the head and an individual can loose their sense of smell or whatever. Persistence isn't all its cracked up to be.

 

[aspect]

However, the physical is beyond mere desire and belief. It is the spontaneous natural world and when we too become spontaneous we become one with the physical.QUOTE]

But why is the spontaneous natural world physical? One can believe in things apart from self without them actually being physical. After all, all we are talking about is the sense in which the natural world exists. What is the sense of physical?

If it has no sense, then I would argue we should not be so precious in trying to preserve the physical when attempting to solve philosophical problems that could be easier resolved without this metaphysic. I am especially thinking of the mind-body problem. Please do not let this thought distract you though. I am interested in ideas about the sense of what we mean by physical, if any.

 

[wuliheron]

I never claimed the physical world was separate from ourselves, after all, we are physical beings as much as anything else.

Of course, we can describe life, the universe, and everything any way you prefer. Nonetheless, the word "physical" has obvious usefulness in certain contexts. Whether or not it actually describes "reality" is besides the point.

 

[aspect]

I never claimed the physical world was separate from ourselves, after all, we are physical beings as much as anything else.

I never claimed that you claimed that. My point "One can believe in things apart from self without them actually being physical" is purely to emphasise there are various ways to interpret "the world" if you are not an idealist.

Of course, we can describe life, the universe, and everything any way you prefer. Nonetheless, the word "physical" has obvious usefulness in certain contexts. Whether or not it actually describes "reality" is besides the point.

That doesn't have anything to do with what this thread is about. If you don't think physical has any sense as I talked about then you should just say so rather than make a tired point.

 

[lllll]

What isn't physical? What is physical? Need it be proved?

We prove that we can not prove (any thing).

There is no proof for any thing and that is the only thing that can ever be proven and with that we have proven the validity of every thing through invalidity.

What is the proof of proof? There is no foundation and that is the ofness.

 

[wuliheron]

I never claimed that you claimed that. My point "One can believe in things apart from self without them actually being physical" is purely to emphasise there are various ways to interpret "the world" if you are not an idealist.

From my point of view, such things are better described as pretenses than interpretations. On some level we are all aware that our abstractions about the world around us are just that, abstractions. Of course, we'll go to our graves denying it at times... but that is just denial. Hence, the term "beliefs" is really short for make-believe.

That doesn't have anything to do with what this thread is about. If you don't think physical has any sense as I talked about then you should just say so rather than make a tired point.

My point is that words only have demonstrable meaning according to their function in a given context. The words material and non-material are relative terms, which alone makes it difficult to know what you mean when you use them. Add on top of that your vague references to life, the universe, and everything and they become virtually meaningless. Hence, all the confusion in my interpreting what you are talking about.

In philosophy, words are as important as mathematics are in physics.

 

[wuliheron]

What isn't physical? What is physical? Need it be proved?

We prove that we can not prove (any thing).

There is no proof for any thing and that is the only thing that can ever be proven and with that we have proven the validity of every thing through invalidity.

What is the proof of proof? There is no foundation and that is the ofness.

So eloquently put, you and aspect should have an interesting conversation.

 

[aspect]

Let me make this clear. This thread is not about proving anything. Whether you believe things can be proved or not is not under discussion. I would appreciate it if people who had nothing to contribute to the topic under consideration would stop hijacking this thread.

 

[Rade]

I want to find out if 'physical' has more than a scientific basis. I'm sure it does, as we all go through a period in childhood where we learn to associate things as objects, learn about space, etc. But what I'm wondering is if that basis contains an intuitive notion of what we mean by physical, for example as I said: "identity through time". Such a notion, if it exists, could be philosophically useful.

Suppose I have a thought of the essence or form of a thing of matter, call the essence E and the thing T. Next hold that both E and T have identity, that is E = E and T = T, thus both hold to Law of Identity. Now, it seems to me that based on your definition, the E would be physical since I can clearly have a persistent thought of the identity of E through time, at least as long as I have thought. However, I would suggest that the E is not physical, but it is the T that is physical--that is, that which is physical is the thing, that which is non physical is the thought of the essence or form of the thing. Now, the reason I hold that the essence is not physical is because I can find no motion within thought of essence itself, but all things do have such motion at least as potential. So, if my logic holds then I cannot agree with your definition of physical. So, here I offer another definition: That which is physical has a potential of motion within itself. Nice thread.

 

[JoeDawg]

Why do we feel the need to preserve the physical in philosophical thinking when it is not immediate in the way first-person experience is? Is it because we feel sensory experience alone can not explain the world we perceive?

Physicality, whether its a phenomenological understanding or an ontological one, is central to personal identity and it therefore has an impact on the very basics of any world view. People need a solid foundation both in terms of their philosophy and in terms of purely psychological needs. Not having your feet on solid ground can be, and is for many people, quite terrifying. This is why the dictates of religion draw people like flies.

Ascribing an essence to physical objects, or wishing to do so, is a very old idea, grounded in our evolutionary past. An object model is useful to us as hunter/gatherers. Of course with our bigger brains and higher understanding, it becomes clear that this has more to do with us, than 'the universe', which on the molecular, subatomic and cosmic scales is quite different. The idea of substance, although useful in a practical scientific sense, is an empty concept. We don't deal with substance directly, it is unknown.

 

[aspect]

So, here I offer another definition: That which is physical has a potential of motion within itself. Nice thread.

Thanks for posting Rade, I don't think your definition disagrees with mine though. I say identity through time, you say motion (which implies change=time) within (through) itself (identity). I could be more precise but let me see what you think.

 

[aspect]

The idea of substance, although useful in a practical scientific sense, is an empty concept. We don't deal with substance directly, it is unknown.

That does not mean we do not have an intuitive (albeit evolution driven) understanding of substance. It's not like when we are children playing with blocks we say "these are just empty concepts".

 

[JoeDawg]

That does not mean we do not have an intuitive (albeit evolution driven) understanding of substance. It's not like when we are children playing with blocks we say "these are just empty concepts".

Actually if you observe children, its quite like that. They don't make connections between 'things' like adults have learned to do.

Babies for instance have to learn to fear heights.
Babies don't understand depth perception, which is why peak-a-boo is so stimulating.

We certainly have instincts, but even understanding that the square object can fit in the square hole, must be learned. Babies chew, push, pull and taste everything. We must literally learn to map form onto our world. That form is the way we interact with the world, not the substance of that world itself.

You can also see this quite clearly with our inability to understand microscopic and cosmic level 'things'. We try and treat them the way, our understanding of, objects work on our level. But it doesn't work, we literally have to unlearn our understanding of 'things'.

 

[aspect]

Joe:

You misunderstand. I'm aware that children learn a way of interacting with the world. I'm interested in what this learned experience amounts to, from a philosophical perspective. Even if it has no bearing on reality, the experience becomes so ingrained that it is deployed in all our thinking, it becomes an essence. What is the architecture of this essence?

 

[JoeDawg]

Joe:

You misunderstand. I'm aware that children learn a way of interacting with the world. I'm interested in what this learned experience amounts to, from a philosophical perspective. Even if it has no bearing on reality, the experience becomes so ingrained that it is deployed in all our thinking, it becomes an essence. What is the architecture of this essence?

Its what philosopher's have called phenomenology. Essense and substance are exactly the wrong words to use because in the philosophical tradition they are synonymous with the 'thing in itself', not experience, what some would call the 'objective' nature of that thing. That is not what children learn, nor does it address the sphere of our evolutionary past.

This essense or substance of the world, assuming it exists, is entirely separate from our 'map' of the world, which is the 'implied' function of our interaction. Its an old philosophical problem. Ontology always breaks down with the observer issue.

 

[minorwork]

Architecture. The cell wall separates, draws a distinction that metabolism and regeneration occurs. A physical body, made from the physical world. Emotion body, made from a world of emotions. Memory body, from a world of memories. Personal computer type mind body from a cause/effect world. All to protect the experiencer. The creator/perceiver.

That kind of architecture?

 

[aspect]

Its what philosopher's have called phenomenology. Essense and substance are exactly the wrong words to use because in the philosophical tradition they are synonymous with the 'thing in itself', not experience, what some would call the 'objective' nature of that thing. That is not what children learn, nor does it address the sphere of our evolutionary past.

We should always be aware of the context in which words are used in order to make our meanings. This is clearly not an exercise in phenomenology. But instead of essence I'll use "architecture of belief" which will hopefully resolve any ambiguity. Now I will put that into a sentence: Rade and I have already theorized what the "architecture of belief" might be.

 

[aspect]

Actually I was looking back on your post Rade and it seems our definitions do differ.

I say identity through time.
You seem to say (correct me if I'm wrong) time within identity.

Maybe we look at ourselves and think "I am persisting", then attribute this to things in the world that look like they persist - mountains, cars etc, thereby granting them identity?

 

[minorwork]

"Architecture of belief." Faith must be considered as a level of belief. Commonly considered as "willing to believe without proof." And yet another level so;

If someone tells me if I look at a video pattern for a minute then at my arm, that I will see what a person on LSD sees. Well, on faith I'll do my best to follow the directions to the best of my ability. Likewise, on faith I'll eat spinach till I'm green and hope for Popeye arms. And I'll pray my dog Snoopy will get better after mom's car squashed him.

The video was a definite temporary success. My arms got tired from opening cans. Poor Snoopy.

Willing to act on belief without proof. Faith.

Heraclitus called change the only constant. The Logos.

Does our physics describe the physical or just our ideas of the physical? Is the physical the arbiter of belief?

 

[JoeDawg]

We should always be aware of the context in which words are used in order to make our meanings. This is clearly not an exercise in phenomenology. But instead of essence I'll use "architecture of belief" which will hopefully resolve any ambiguity. Now I will put that into a sentence: Rade and I have already theorized what the "architecture of belief" might be.

This is starting to sound like Epistemology.

 

[aspect]

This is starting to sound like Epistemology.

What else would it be?

 

[JoeDawg]

What else would it be?

Some of what you say seems along those lines, but you're throwing in other stuff as well, or like I said it may be a problem with the use of words that have other recognized philosophical connotations. When you are discussing physicality, what this thread is supposed to be about, you are generally in the realm of either ontology or phenomenology, not epistemology. Or maybe you're just continuing another conversation from a different thread. In any case, I'm not sure what you're saying anymore.

 

[aspect]

Some of what you say seems along those lines, but you're throwing in other stuff as well, or like I said it may be a problem with the use of words that have other recognized philosophical connotations. When you are discussing physicality, what this thread is supposed to be about, you are generally in the realm of either ontology or phenomenology, not epistemology. Or maybe you're just continuing another conversation from a different thread. In any case, I'm not sure what you're saying anymore.

Maybe if you stop trying to apply labels you'll get to what I'm saying. Labels can be dead ends for discussion anyway.

 

[JoeDawg]

Maybe if you stop trying to apply labels you'll get to what I'm saying. Labels can be dead ends for discussion anyway.

Well yeah maybe, but on the other hand, if you can't describe your position in terms of what are basic concepts in philosophy, that's a pretty dead end too.

The term 'essense' is generally not used with regards to 'objects of perception', which I think is what you are talking about. And if you wish to discuss objects of perception in terms of what can be known, then this is really not a discussion of 'physical' objects, per se. Any discussion of the epistemology of objects of perception, what are sometimes called 'qualia', invariably reduces to subjective experience. Its certainly a valid discussion, but framing it correctly is very important to avoid confusion.

 

[aspect]

Well yeah maybe, but on the other hand, if you can't describe your position in terms of what are basic concepts in philosophy, that's a pretty dead end too.

I think I made it clear from the outset that this thread was not about the ontology of physical objects. Concepts have their utility, obviously, however the problem here is that your assumptions were off.

The term 'essense' is generally not used with regards to 'objects of perception', which I think is what you are talking about.

No. This thread is attempting to define the essence/architecture of belief in 'objects of perception'. Not the objects themselves - of which we remain agnostic.

And if you wish to discuss objects of perception in terms of what can be known, then this is really not a discussion of 'physical' objects, per se.

That's right!

Any discussion of the epistemology of objects of perception, what are sometimes called 'qualia', invariably reduces to subjective experience. Its certainly a valid discussion, but framing it correctly is very important to avoid confusion.

Philosophical debates are never framed perfectly. In fact, most (I would say the entirety) of philosophical discussion consists of deciding what the right questions to ask are. We shouldn't be too caught up in "framing the issues" as this can lead to intractable positions. I think the discussion has been adequately framed.

 

[JoeDawg]

I think I made it clear from the outset that this thread was not about the ontology of physical objects.

Hmmm. What did you mean by this then?

"I am happy to hear other suggestions, but note I am after a definition that warrants the inclusion of 'physical' as an ontological category. For example, one might suggest that the physical is actual because objects have 'substance' (though this would require further elaboration)."

Again, I think you are using words badly, not just addressing difficult philosophical concepts. You seem to be doing this either intentionally, although I can't see the reason why, or carelessly, as if you don't know or care about their standard philosophical contexts. That seems counterproductive... eh...but its your free time.

 

[aspect]

Hmmm. What did you mean by this then?

"I am happy to hear other suggestions, but note I am after a definition that warrants the inclusion of 'physical' as an ontological category. For example, one might suggest that the physical is actual because objects have 'substance' (though this would require further elaboration)."

Again, I think you are using words badly, not just addressing difficult philosophical concepts. You seem to be doing this either intentionally, although I can't see the reason why, or carelessly, as if you don't know or care about their standard philosophical contexts. That seems counterproductive... eh...but its your free time.

You need to look at it in context. I said in the same post: "It seems to me that the movement from sensory experience to the identification of objects is one purely of (evolutionary) convenience and has no real foundation." Why do you ignore this?

Of course the belief in the physical or "architecture of belief" will be of an ontological nature. The belief requires it. But I am not looking to prove the reality of the belief. Do you understand?

I'm getting sick of this "gotcha" game. You don't want to discuss things. You want an argument, or to prove something. You have now just accused me of intentionally trying to mislead you when I have been replying to you all this time trying to correct you. It is my free time and I'll stop.