Actually, I already presented the evidence that Penrose agrees with me-- the problem is that you have presented none that he agrees with you. As this is the crux of your entire position here, I think that is a serious flaw in your stance.
As I expected, you still cannot provide evidence that the Wiki article was wrong when it claimed that Penrose thinks MWI is consistent with current QM, but that current QM is missing something important, and so by implication MWI is missing something important. I agree with the Wiki, it completely checks with all the evidence presented in this thread, nor have you refuted it with a shred of evidence.
Yet again you are imagining something that never had anything to do with this thread. It is clear you have no idea what I'm saying every time you attempt to summarize it. You would actually do much better sticking with my words.
That has never been the source of the disagreement. Read my words again. The source of the disagreement is whether or not we can take it as a scientific fact that we do get "R". I have told you that this "fact" actually requires certain philosophical assumptions and priorities that are not required to adopt, and indeed MWI proponents generally do not, which is pretty much the entire point. There is no experiment that requires that R be part of the reality that QM postulates are trying to describe, there is just the observer perception, which as I said is not part of your theory, or any theory, of QM. Until that problem is fixed, if it can be fixed, the issue will always reduce to philosophical priorities-- largely around the role of rationalism and empiricism in asserting what a physics theory is trying to do.
That is also not the least bit relevant to this thread. The issue was not whether MWI could derive
R from U according to some set of laws (we should know that is impossible), it was simply whether or not MWI is a consistent interpretation with the fact that we perceive
R. That is entirely different-- for example, CI never makes any effort whatsoever to "derive R" from some deeper principles, yet obviously CI is consistent with R because it simply includes it as an ad hoc postulate (something Penrose sees as a big problem, and Hawking does not, both for philosophical reasons). Similarly, MWI includes the ad hoc postulate that R is perceived because of the action of the perceiver, and the fact that it has not succeeded in connecting that to any deeper principles seems to me like a perfectly obvious extension of the problem of having no theory of perceivers. Nor do you, nor does Penrose.
So given the absence of a theory of quantum gravity that can do what Penrose would like it to do, and given the absence of a theory of perceivers that can do what I am saying would be necessary to do, what these "proofs" actually accomplish is simply tracking the logical ramifications of the various philosophical priorities in concert with what has been experimentally established about quantum systems. That is what I have been trying to tell you all along.
That is also irrelevant
to the thread. Nowhere did I claim that MWI gives a mathematically closed accounting of the predictions of QM, I said it is an interpretation
that is consistent with those predictions. The predictions require nothing beyond the mathematics of how to do them, which there is no disagreement about. What there is disagreement about is how to find a set of postulates that put those predictions on a sound and rigorous mathematical footing, which simply does not exist
at present (because of the problem of no dynamical accounting of the perception of collapse). That's why Penrose, and others, are trying to create one! Why on Earth would they need to do that if one already existed?
Unfortunately you still have understood nothing I said. Pity, your inability to understand these nuances will continue.