Recognitions:

## Spontaneously broken gauge symmetry

I have read 2 arguments that a gauge symmetry cannot be spontaneously broken.

1. Wen's textbook says a gauge symmetry is a by definition a "do nothing" transformation, so it cannot be broken.

2. Elitzur's theorem, eg.http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-ph/9810302v1

The first argument seems sound and simple, while Elitzur's theorem needs some calculation. Is the notion of gauge symmetry the same in both arguments, or is Elitzur's theorem more powerful, covering cases where there is a local symmetry without a gauge redundancy?
 Recognitions: Science Advisor Gauge symmetry breaking can also be formulated in terms of gauge invariant properties only, e.g., as off diagonal long range order (ODLRO). As the article you cite shows, Elitzurs theorem only refers to local observables, but not, e.g. to Wilson loops.

Recognitions:
 Quote by DrDu Gauge symmetry breaking can also be formulated in terms of gauge invariant properties only, e.g., as off diagonal long range order (ODLRO). As the article you cite shows, Elitzurs theorem only refers to local observables, but not, e.g. to Wilson loops.
Could it be clearer to replace "gauge symmetry" with "local symmetry", since a gauge symmetry by definition cannot be spontaneously broken?

Recognitions:

## Spontaneously broken gauge symmetry

Maybe it is kind of a misnomer, but the current definition of a broken symmetry is that the generator of the symmetry operation cannot be represented as an operator in the Hilbert space. When you decide to work in a Hilbert space which supports the action of non-gauge invariant operators (like creation and anihilation operators for charged particles) the generator of gauge transformations is indeed not included in this space once the symmetry is broken.

Recognitions:
 Quote by DrDu Maybe it is kind of a misnomer, but the current definition of a broken symmetry is that the generator of the symmetry operation cannot be represented as an operator in the Hilbert space. When you decide to work in a Hilbert space which supports the action of non-gauge invariant operators (like creation and anihilation operators for charged particles) the generator of gauge transformations is indeed not included in this space once the symmetry is broken.
So under this definition, Wen's textbook would be wrong that a gauge symmetry can never be spontaneously broken?

I guess he's using a different definition of gauge symmetry?
 Recognitions: Science Advisor I must say that I was thinking in global gauge symmetries. I don't know the situation for local gauge symmetries very well.
 Recognitions: Science Advisor I find the following article quite interesting: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4664.pdf

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 Quote by DrDu I find the following article quite interesting: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.4664.pdf
 Quote by atyy Is electromagnetic gauge invariance spontaneously violated in superconductors?
 Quote by DrDu I don't consider Greiter's analysis to be correct. Namely he states that an arbitrary N particle ket is invariant under gauge transformations. This is not true. Rather we consider all kets which differ by only a phase as describing the same state.
 Quote by atyy Is it Greiter's Eq 13, 14 and the discussion immediately following that you think are wrong? BTW, thanks for the Friedrich reference in the other thread too, I'm slowly reading it.
 Quote by DrDu Yes, I think that is the point where he is wrong. Let's compare to another example: A fermionic ket is transformed into minus itself under a 360 deg rotation (i.e. a transformation corresponding to identity). This gives rise to the univalence superselection rule that we cannot observe superpositions of bosonic and fermionic particles. In the case of a gauge symmetry the change of phase of a ket under a gauge transformation implements the charge superselection rule. This has been nicely worked out long time ago by Roberts, Dopplicher and Haag.
I copied the discussion from http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=623786.

In Friedrich's example of spontaneous breaking of a global gauge symmetry using Bose-Einstein condensation of a non-relativistic free Bose gas at zero temperature, is the ground state degenerate? He says that there are an infinite number of pure ground states, and that they are physically equivalent. I guess the ground state should be degenerate, since I naively think of spontaneous symmetry breaking as requiring degenerate ground states. But if the ground state is degenerate, how can the different ground states be physically equivalent?

Is Greiter's claim that the ground state of a superconductor is degenerate right or wrong?

Recognitions:
 Quote by atyy Is Greiter's claim that the ground state of a superconductor is degenerate right or wrong?
Every ground state of an infinite system with finite particle density is degenerate, whether superconducting or not. We can add a finite number of particles to the system without changing the overall particle and energy density. The point is that we have to take this degeneracy into consideration in a superconductor, while it has no consequence in a normal metal.
This was brought out most clearly in the analysis by Haag:
 Recognitions: Science Advisor @DrDu, in the paper by Struyve you mentioned, there are two definitions of gauge symmetry. In his second definition (section 7), the gauge symmetry leads to non-unique time evolution. Is the global gauge symmetry that you or Haag are talking about not a gauge symmetry in the sense of Struyve's second definition?
 Recognitions: Science Advisor Haag exclusively talks about global gauge transformations, so the EOM are deterministic. I was speculating how his conclusions change when local transformations are taken into account. It may be that this induces some indeterminism. I would have to read Struyves article in depth.
 Recognitions: Science Advisor In Haag's section 2, "spontaneously broken global gauge symmetry" is due to degenerate ground states labelled by $\alpha$, while Greiter says that there is "spontaneously broken global phase symmetry" due to degenerate ground states labelled by $\lambda$ (Eq 98) or $\phi$ (Eq 106). Are Haag's $\alpha$-labelled states and Greiter's $\phi$-labelled states the same? If they are the same, is the following an acceptable explanation for why Haag calls these states 'gauge' while Greiter doesn't: Haag excludes observing the states with a second superconductor via the Josephson effect, so that all the $\alpha$-labelled states are observationally indistinguishable, while Greiter includes observing the states with a second superconductor so that the different $\phi$-labelled states are observationally distinguishable?
 Recognitions: Science Advisor As I said already I am convinced that Greiters argumentation is flawed from the very beginning. Therefore I do not bother too much about how his ground states are related to other ones.

Recognitions:
 Quote by DrDu As I said already I am convinced that Greiters argumentation is flawed from the very beginning. Therefore I do not bother too much about how his ground states are related to other ones.
Well, let me ask the question directly then - in what sense are the transformations in Haag 'global gauge symmetries', instead of being simply 'global symmetries'? Is Haag using Struyve's definition (p4, just after Eq 8) that "both the global and local symmetries can be regarded as gauge symmetries. They both connect observationally indistinguishable solutions"?

 Quote by atyy Well, let me ask the question directly then - in what sense are the transformations in Haag 'global gauge symmetries', instead of being simply 'global symmetries'? What is "gauge" about them?
Even though I don't have access to Haag's article I have often had that doubt , and haven't found a clear answer, hopefully some expert can clarify what distinguishes a global gauge from a global symmetry, is it just the possibility of restricting it to a local gauge?
 Recognitions: Science Advisor After Eq. 8, Struyve writes: "In the above examples, both the global and local symmetries can be regarded as gauge symmetries. They both connect observationally indistinguishable solutions (at least in a hypothetical world, where those classical field equations would hold). But while observational indistinguishability is necessary to label a symmetry as gauge, it is not sufficient. One could still regard observationally indistinguishable states or solutions as physically distinct (see [19] for a detailed discussion of such matters). This is the case, for the alternative notion of gauge symmetry which relates gauge symmetry to a failure of determinism, and which will be discussed in detail in sections 6 and 7. In the following sections, we will regard the global and local symmetries as gauge symmetries." So Struyve also calls global U(1) transformations gauge transformations. "Operational indistinguishability" is also what Haag had in mind. He talks explicitly of gauge transformations of the 1st kind (cf. eq. 21) which is synonymous to global gauge transformations.

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