How do atoms build thoughts and emotions?

[A.T.]

No it isn't objective proof that we have the same subjective perception, because our brains are not identical

Suppose that a complete theory of the mind did include some unmeasurable subjective aspects of consciousness. Suppose further that they serve as postulates from which the measurable aspects were derived. Then you might indeed consider such evidence to be objective proof of the subjective experience.

In the text you quoted I was talking about comparing subjective experiences of two different people. But you seem to talk about proof that subjective experiences exist.

 

[A.T.]

This is a matter of language, not of "different aspects of the same coin". In the German language, what PeroK wants to talk about is called "Selbstbewustsein".

The most specific term for subjective experiences I could find is: "apperception" (German: "Apperzeption"):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apperception
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apperzeption
And it seems to be generally regarded as a part of "consciousness" (German: "Bewusstsein"):

While @PeroK seems to be trying to reduce "consciousness" to "introspection" (German: "Selbstbeobachtung"):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introspection
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selbstbeobachtung
The term for it you mention: "Selbstbewustsein" might mean the same in academia, but is colloquially also used for "self-esteem" (German: "Selbstwert").

Anyway, I don't see the point in this reduction of the definition of "consciousness", because as I already said: It doesn't solve the "hard problem of consciousness". It just becomes the "hard problem of apperception".

 

[Dale]

In the text you quoted I was talking about comparing subjective experiences of two different people. But you seem to talk about proof that subjective experiences exist.

Both. If the model derived the measurable mind/brain state from a model of the unmeasurable subjective experience, and if you had two different people whose measurable state indicated the same unmeasurable experience, then you would indeed take that as objective evidence that they were having the same subjective experience.

 

[A.T.]

Both. If the model derived the measurable mind/brain state from a model of the unmeasurable subjective experience, and if you had two different people whose measurable state indicated the same unmeasurable experience, then you would indeed take that as objective evidence that they were having the same subjective experience.

Only if I trusted the model. But how would you ever validate such a model?

 

[Dale]

Only if I trusted the model. But how would you ever validate such a model?

The same way you validate any scientific model: by experiments.

 

[A.T.]

The same way you validate any scientific model: by experiments.

Describe the experiment you would do here.

 

[dextercioby]

Sorry for the interruption, but I marvel that one would ask a physicist: "What is conscience, what are thoughts, and emotions for a physicist?", when even a much more basic question is not answered (or maybe it is, but I am ignorant): "When do(es) a large collection of huge organic molecules become a living organism, in other words what is life for according to a physicist or a quantum chemist?"

 

[Zaciekawiony]

Answering such questions is difficult due to the ambiguous nature of the concepts involved. Our descriptions of self-awareness are primarily phenomenological, whereas descriptions of "thinking" or "emotion" rely on the single case accessible to us - human experience - even though similar processes undoubtedly occur in animals. We need generalizations that describe effects associated with the operation of complex nervous systems, within which what we call consciousness represents a special case.

The most common hypotheses contain significant gaps and lack precision. Discussion frequently centers on emergent processes—the appearance of new phenomena resulting from the activity of complex systems, phenomena not present in the individual constituent elements. The behavior of carbon atoms does not encode information about the appearance of a diamond, as certain optical properties only acquire physical meaning once the macroscopic phase has formed. Nor does the diamond’s existence inherently contain information about its market price. A similar logic applies to the conjecture that cognitive functions emerge from the complexity of interconnected neuronal systems: while consciousness and thought are among these cognitive functions, they cannot be deduced from the workings of a single cell. Ultimately, this amounts to an answer of "it happens somehow."

 

[gentzen]

"When do(es) a large collection of huge organic molecules become a living organism, in other words what is life for according to a physicist or a quantum chemist?"

You know https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Peter_Fischer ?
He will love to tell you the story of Niels Bohr urging physicists to venture into biology, Max Dellbrück taking up the challenge, Erwin Schrödinger popularizing Dellbrück‘s model in his book „What is life“, which later motivated Watson and Crick to propose the double helix.

I think others were motivated too to dive into those questions, like Heisenberg, but I only remember Schrödinger in sufficient detail. Life has to be able to store information and later read it again and interpret it correctly in its context. Therefore a virus is „adjacent“ to life, but not really alive. And todays LLMs are closer to a virus than to being alive or conscious, because they still have to rely too much on humans and our culture for storing and recalling information.

And as long as an unborn baby is not yet able to store its experiences in a form that it can later recall and interpret correctly, it is not yet fully self-aware.

 

[Dale]

Describe the experiment you would do here.

Surveys, EEG, fMRI, whatever measurable results the model predicts. Just the same as with any other scientific theory.

I am not suggesting anything unusual here. I am just suggesting that a hypothetical scientific theory of the mind should be treated the same as any other scientific theory.

 

[A.T.]

If the model derived the measurable mind/brain state from a model of the unmeasurable subjective experience, and if you had two different people whose measurable state indicated the same unmeasurable experience, then you would indeed take that as objective evidence that they were having the same subjective experience.

Only if I trusted the model. But how would you ever validate such a model?

Surveys, EEG, fMRI, whatever measurable results the model predicts.

What would you compare with what to validate that the "derivation" of measurable from unmeasurable by the model is correct?

 

[Herman Trivilino]

For example, I love my wife and I love my job. And the love I feel for my wife is greater than the love I feel for my job. So it seems possible that love could be quantified.

Perhaps. But isn't there more to it than magnitude? The way I love a significant other is different from the way I love my children, or siblings, or parents, etc. And the way I love people is different from the way I love things.

 

[Dale]

What would you compare with what to validate that the "derivation" of measurable from unmeasurable by the model is correct?

For that you would have to look at the particulars of the derivation itself. Just like any other theory.

Since this is a hypothetical theory the hypothetical derivation is hypothetically correct.

Again, this is perfectly standard and what is already done with mainstream physics theories. You take an unmeasurable postulate, like the one way speed of light being $c$, and you derive the testable consequences. You make measurements and if they agree then you can take that as evidence supporting the unmeasurable postulate. All while being aware that the postulate itself is unmeasurable. And that is all OK.

 

[A.T.]

Again, this is perfectly standard and what is already done with mainstream physics theories. You take an unmeasurable postulate, like the one way speed of light being c, and you derive the testable consequences. You make measurements and if they agree then you can take that as evidence supporting the unmeasurable postulate. All while being aware that the postulate itself is unmeasurable.

The first issue I see here is: In what language would you formulate those postulates about subjective experiences? The main problem with comparing subjective experiences is from the inability to objectively describe them.

But assuming you solve the above issue somehow, the next issue is: The subjective experiences might not be objectively measurable, but they are subjectively observable by everybody. So you are not postulating something that nobody can probe directly. What if people disagree with what you postulated about their subjective experiences, even though you derived the correct objective brain states from your postulates?

 

[Dale]

The subjective experiences might not be objectively measurable, but they are subjectively observable by everybody. So you are not postulating something that nobody can probe directly

I don’t think this matters scientifically. If they can probe it in a way that could falsify the theory then it is measurable (and hence not part of the “subjective experience” as you mean it). If it is not measurable then whatever “subjective probing” is done cannot falsify the theory. So scientifically it is moot.

What if people disagree with what you postulated about their subjective experiences

Then they would not accept the theory. This is exactly what happens with theories. Historically, not everyone accepts any given theory. But if experiments continually validate it, then the community as a whole accepts it and moves on.

 

[256bits]

And as long as an unborn baby is not yet able to store its experiences in a form that it can later recall and interpret correctly, it is not yet fully self-aware.

A great sentence!
For an odd 70 years ( life span ) someone is presumed 'conscious'. At the end, does the 'consciousness' vanish, or continue in some other state not attached to physical mass, other than in the memory of other select 'conscious' humans. For animals and other life forms with lessor quality of consciousness, is it not, or should it not be, of the same aspect, or is there only at when a certain level is crossed that the situation does apply?

The assembly of atoms has to explain,
- a return to ourselves when we awake after being 'unconscious' ( sleep, coma, ... )
- a return to ourselves after induced 'unconscious; state ( chloroform, ... )
- degenerate disease that effects the mind ( dementia, ... )
- mind altering drugs that affect personality ( alcohol, LSD, ... )
- traumatic experience affecting personal outlook and response ( blow to skull, PTSD, stroke, ... )
- sex differences of the mind ( male, female, ... )
- level of maturity ( nature vs nurture ie learned or reflex or perception )
- etc

I am sure there are others situations needed to be explained for other than a healthy state.
With a mix of the colloquial consciousness ( Lawyer: Was the deceased still living when you arrived at the scene, and in a state of being conscious or unconscious? ), and some other definition, the ability for the speaker and the audience to be on the same wavelength as to what is being discussed can be stressed.

 

[A.T.]

I don’t think this matters scientifically. If they can probe it in a way that could falsify the theory then it is measurable (and hence not part of the “subjective experience” as you mean it). If it is not measurable then whatever “subjective probing” is done cannot falsify the theory. So scientifically it is moot.

So what the people actually experience subjectively doesn't matter at all in that model?

If the model derived the measurable mind/brain state from a model of the unmeasurable subjective experience, and if you had two different people whose measurable state indicated the same unmeasurable experience, then you would indeed take that as objective evidence that they were having the same subjective experience.

I don't see how you can infer anything about the actual subjective experiences from a model in which the actual subjective experiences are irrelevant.

As far I can see, all you have done is introducing an extra layer between objective measurements and subjective experiences. But that extra layer isn't related to the subjective experiences any more strongly than the objective measurements, so I don't really see the point of it.

 

[Dale]

So what the people actually experience subjectively doesn't matter at all in that model?

It might matter in the model, but not scientifically. It would be a part of the model that cannot be experimentally verified or falsified. It would be similar to the one way speed of light in special relativity.

I don't see how you can infer anything about the actual subjective experiences from a model in which the actual subjective experiences are irrelevant.

Same as you would with the one way speed of light in relativity.

As far I can see, all you have done is introducing an extra layer between objective measurements and subjective experiences. But that extra layer isn't related to the subjective experiences any more strongly than the objective measurements, so I don't really see the point of it

I think that is because you are far too focused on the subjective experience. It is really trivial, scientifically-speaking. The scientifically interesting portion of such a model is its experimental predictions. The subjective experience would only be useful insofar as it simplifies the predictions or the derivation. Just like the one way speed of light in relativity.