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are "benevolent autocrats" good for economic development?
As for example, Tom Friedman states:
One-party autocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened
group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages. That one party can just
impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward
in the 21st century.
William Easterly attacks the idea here
http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/benevolent-autocrats-easterly-2nd-draft.pdf
he outlines the common cognitive biases that lend people to this conclusion, which is interesting as it touches upon basic epistemological issues in regards to any discussion of economic policies
a) reversing conditional probabilities - the fact that several growth success stories had autocratic leadership (South Korea, Singapore, China, etc) misses the fact that while 90% of the growth success stories were autocracies, only 10% of all the autocracies were growth success stories
b) availablilty heuristic - big success is greatly over-reported relative to big failures
c) leadership attribution bias - "A large literature on the “fundamental attribution error” finds that test subjects tend to attribute an outcome too much to individual personality, intentions, and skill and not enough to situational factors." The exaggerated importance of US Presidents, Corporate CEOs and athletic coaches is another example
d) "hot hand" fallacy - attributing a random streak to some sort of special skill
e) law of small numbers - too small a sample size to draw meaningful conclusions
f) action bias - "technocratic views of development give action-oriented experts much more of an active role.
However, if experts already know the answer, then there is not much room left for democratic
determination of economic policy. Hence, anyone who considers themselves as an expert advisor may
have a bias towards autocrats. As James Buchanan said, policy-oriented economists and other public
intellectuals may prefer to be “proffering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot.”"
Easterly concludes:
"This paper has suggested a number of cautions about jumping too quickly to benevolent autocrat
explanations of growth successes. Formal theory and evidence provides little or no basis on which to
believe the benevolent autocrat story. The benevolent autocrat story has been around for a long time and
has proved very adaptable to many different political motivations. The interaction between well-known
cognitive biases and stylized facts would predict beliefs in benevolent autocrats even if they did not exist.
This paper has repeatedly cautioned that these arguments do not automatically disprove the benevolent
autocrat story. People who have certain political motivations and cognitive biases are likely to believe in
benevolent autocrats. It does not follow that people who believe in benevolent autocrats have political
motivations and cognitive biases. (Equating the two is itself the reversing conditional probabilities
cognitive bias.)
The benevolent autocrat story for any ONE autocrat and growth outcome is ultimately non-falsifiable:
there is just one observation and many possible stories. Those with strong priors in favor of benevolent
autocrats are still likely to go with that story.
The point of this paper is that such strong priors exist for many bad reasons as well as good ones, and that
economists should retain their traditional skepticism for stories that have little good theory or empirics to
support them."
As for example, Tom Friedman states:
One-party autocracy certainly has its drawbacks. But when it is led by a reasonably enlightened
group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages. That one party can just
impose the politically difficult but critically important policies needed to move a society forward
in the 21st century.
William Easterly attacks the idea here
http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/benevolent-autocrats-easterly-2nd-draft.pdf
“Benevolent autocrat” is a perpetually popular concept in development policy discussions. This paper suggests this popularity is not solely explained by academic theory and evidence. The history of the concept shows the role of political motivations for embracing the concept. The literature on cognitive biases shows multiple biases that would lead to beliefs in benevolent autocrats even if they did not exist, especially as these interact with stylized facts about autocracy and growth. Neither political motivations nor cognitive biases imply disproof of the concept, but they do suggest the need for even more rigorous scrutiny. The theory implied by a benevolent autocrat story is naïve relative to modern theories of autocracy, and it presumes an implausible level of knowledge by autocrats. The evidence underlying “benevolent autocrat” interpretations has equally plausible – or more plausible -- alternative explanations. The well-known “leaders matter” results of Jones and Olken (2005, 2009) do not demonstrate that intentions and actions of individual autocrats affect growth. Since democratic rights are an end in themselves, the burden of proof is on autocrats to show that they provide material payoffs that offer a trade-off with such rights. This paper argues they fail to meet that burden of proof.
he outlines the common cognitive biases that lend people to this conclusion, which is interesting as it touches upon basic epistemological issues in regards to any discussion of economic policies
a) reversing conditional probabilities - the fact that several growth success stories had autocratic leadership (South Korea, Singapore, China, etc) misses the fact that while 90% of the growth success stories were autocracies, only 10% of all the autocracies were growth success stories
b) availablilty heuristic - big success is greatly over-reported relative to big failures
c) leadership attribution bias - "A large literature on the “fundamental attribution error” finds that test subjects tend to attribute an outcome too much to individual personality, intentions, and skill and not enough to situational factors." The exaggerated importance of US Presidents, Corporate CEOs and athletic coaches is another example
d) "hot hand" fallacy - attributing a random streak to some sort of special skill
e) law of small numbers - too small a sample size to draw meaningful conclusions
f) action bias - "technocratic views of development give action-oriented experts much more of an active role.
However, if experts already know the answer, then there is not much room left for democratic
determination of economic policy. Hence, anyone who considers themselves as an expert advisor may
have a bias towards autocrats. As James Buchanan said, policy-oriented economists and other public
intellectuals may prefer to be “proffering policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent despot.”"
Easterly concludes:
"This paper has suggested a number of cautions about jumping too quickly to benevolent autocrat
explanations of growth successes. Formal theory and evidence provides little or no basis on which to
believe the benevolent autocrat story. The benevolent autocrat story has been around for a long time and
has proved very adaptable to many different political motivations. The interaction between well-known
cognitive biases and stylized facts would predict beliefs in benevolent autocrats even if they did not exist.
This paper has repeatedly cautioned that these arguments do not automatically disprove the benevolent
autocrat story. People who have certain political motivations and cognitive biases are likely to believe in
benevolent autocrats. It does not follow that people who believe in benevolent autocrats have political
motivations and cognitive biases. (Equating the two is itself the reversing conditional probabilities
cognitive bias.)
The benevolent autocrat story for any ONE autocrat and growth outcome is ultimately non-falsifiable:
there is just one observation and many possible stories. Those with strong priors in favor of benevolent
autocrats are still likely to go with that story.
The point of this paper is that such strong priors exist for many bad reasons as well as good ones, and that
economists should retain their traditional skepticism for stories that have little good theory or empirics to
support them."
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