Can Consciousness Be Defined or Explained Within Epistemological Limits?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Canute
  • Start date Start date
  • Tags Tags
    Consciousness
Click For Summary

Discussion Overview

The discussion centers on the nature of consciousness and its potential definitions or explanations within epistemological limits, particularly in relation to Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Participants explore whether consciousness can be fully explained or defined within any formal system or if it represents an undefined term that must be excluded from such explanations.

Discussion Character

  • Exploratory
  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants argue that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems imply that any formal explanation must leave out consciousness as a meta-system that cannot be included.
  • Others suggest that consciousness may be an undefined term that cannot be fully explained, even if its existence is acknowledged.
  • There is a viewpoint that any proof-based or observation-based explanation fails to account for the essence underlying matter and ultimate reality, which some propose is consciousness.
  • One participant challenges the characterization of Gödel's work, asserting that there are forms of reasoning that do not fall under his incompleteness results.
  • Another participant expresses skepticism about the applicability of Gödel's theorems to discussions of consciousness, advocating for a more rigorous treatment of the topic.
  • Some participants speculate on the relationship between consciousness and a more fundamental level of existence, suggesting that consciousness may not be the most basic state of being.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express a range of views, with no consensus on the implications of Gödel's theorems for consciousness or whether consciousness can be defined or explained within existing frameworks. The discussion remains unresolved, with competing interpretations and hypotheses presented.

Contextual Notes

Some limitations in the discussion include the dependence on interpretations of Gödel's theorems, the ambiguity surrounding the definitions of consciousness, and the unresolved nature of the arguments regarding the relationship between consciousness and fundamental existence.

  • #31
I agree. A wholly physical explanation is not a logical impossibility. It might prove to be inadequate, but it is premature to come to that conclusion now. That would be a lot like saying, ten years after Aristotle had written Physics, that atomic theory would never explain chemical reactions.
 
Physics news on Phys.org
  • #32
Canute said:
I don't think any neuoroscientist would agree with that.

I will quote Dr. Christof Koch, from The Quest for Consciousness:

Other philosophers assert that they don’t see how the physical brain can give rise to consciousness. Therefore, any scientific program to explore the physical basis of consciousness is doomed to failure. This is an argument from ignorance: The current absence of a compelling argument for a link between the brain and the conscious mind cannot be taken as evidence that such a link does not exist.

I could be wrong, but he doesn't seem too concerned about idealism being unfalsifiable.


The existence of consciousness cannot be proved, it can only be known.

Nothing in science can be "proven" beyond any doubt. We'll just have to accept that a test subject claiming to see "red" is telling the truth and indeed is having the same experience we do when we see "red." It isn't such a huge leap.


I don't see why. One just has to make a distinction between absolute and relative truths (between what is true and what is provable).

Then the only qualm you should have is that any physical theory of consciousness can never be truly "proven." Given that no scientific theory is, I don't see the issue.
 
  • #33
selfAdjoint said:
Does your version of idealism make the falsifiable assertion that no materialist(third person) account of consciousness is possible?
My point is this. If idealism is unfalsifiable then it is logically inevitable that no provable material account of consciousness is possible. This is not a falsifiable assertion. I'm surprised to have to defend it.

1. Logical deduction can only be made from premises, and the best logic in the world will be false if the premises are.
2. Falsifiability is not a logical thing but an empirical one. It is the test of a theory against nature. If nature says no, the theory is false.
I agree with both except that I'd say 2. is an oversimplification. You can't separate empiricism from deductive reasoning.
 
  • #34
loseyourname said:
I agree. A wholly physical explanation is not a logical impossibility.
It is provably a logical impossibility if idealism is provably unfalsifiable.

It might prove to be inadequate, but it is premature to come to that conclusion now. That would be a lot like saying, ten years after Aristotle had written Physics, that atomic theory would never explain chemical reactions.
Yeah, that's the old argument. I suppose I'd make it as well if I was a well paid neuroscientist. I can imagine it still being made in a thousand years time. However logical analysis suggests it does not hold water. This is partly for the reasons that Chalmers and others give, but also because a physical account would falsify idealism. If you can show that idealism is falsifiable then that changes everything, but it appears to be impossible to do that.
 
  • #35
Canute you continue to assert

It is provably a logical impossibility if idealism is provably unfalsifiable.

And I continue to say that if it is unfalsifiable then it makes no testable predictions, and so the development of a materialist (third-person) account of consciousness can not be ruled out by it - or any other empirically supported theory. Unfalsifiable means precisely that it doesn't couple to empirical investigation. I really think you are misunderstanding the term.

Suppose a complete materialistic account of consciousness is achieved. Idealism is not thereby falsified so long as it doesn't make a prediction that such an account is impossible. Supposing it doesn't, then idealist philosophers can continue to assert that all of empirical science is missing the point, just as they have been doing for centuries.

It's only the falsifiable subtheory of idealism that asserts consciousness is beyond materialistic explanation that is falsified by the existence of what it denies.
 
  • #36
Canute said:
It is provably a logical impossibility if idealism is provably unfalsifiable.

I have a hypothesis. I believe that clock hands go around the clock because they are being pushed by invisible, immaterial gremlins that can only be known through my faith. They cannot be detected empirically. This is an unfalsifiable hypothesis. Does it make any material explanation of the clock (you know, gears, electricity, gravity and such) a logical impossibility?


Yeah, that's the old argument. I suppose I'd make it as well if I was a well paid neuroscientist. I can imagine it still being made in a thousand years time. However logical analysis suggests it does not hold water. This is partly for the reasons that Chalmers and others give, but also because a physical account would falsify idealism. If you can show that idealism is falsifiable then that changes everything, but it appears to be impossible to do that.

The reason it is ignored by neuroscience is because an unfalsifiable hypothesis is considered an invalid hypothesis by scientific standards. A true hypothesis must be testable somehow and must accept negative evidence. This is why theists and dualists will never go away, because even if a completely physical explanation of all phenomena observed in our universe is achieved, they can simply continue to assert that there is more to it. However, for the sake of parsimony (commonly known as Occam's razor) we discard hypotheses like the one about gremlins in clocks because they are superfluous. A clock can be understood on purely physical terms. So might human consciousness. Idealism has no bearing on this; it is a factually meaningless hypothesis and I'm surprised that you continue to cling to it.
 
  • #37
loseyourname said:
I have a hypothesis. I believe that clock hands go around the clock because they are being pushed by invisible, immaterial gremlins that can only be known through my faith. They cannot be detected empirically. This is an unfalsifiable hypothesis. Does it make any material explanation of the clock (you know, gears, electricity, gravity and such) a logical impossibility?
What's this got to do with anything?

The reason it is ignored by neuroscience is because an unfalsifiable hypothesis is considered an invalid hypothesis by scientific standards.
So what? Idealism is unfalsifiable whether neuroscientists like it or not. They can choose to turn a blind eye if they want but it doesn' change anything.

hypothesis must be testable somehow and must accept negative evidence.
Idealism is unfalsifiable. It is not a hypothesis it is a fact derived from the empirical evidence.

This is why theists and dualists will never go away, because even if a completely physical explanation of all phenomena observed in our universe is achieved, they can simply continue to assert that there is more to it.
There is more to it, we know that for certain. However it is not necessary to be a dualist or a theist because of it. There are more sophisticated explanations.

However, for the sake of parsimony (commonly known as Occam's razor) we discard hypotheses like the one about gremlins in clocks because they are superfluous. A clock can be understood on purely physical terms. So might human consciousness. Idealism has no bearing on this; it is a factually meaningless hypothesis and I'm surprised that you continue to cling to it.
We have no choice but to cling to it, it's unfalsifiable. This entails that it might be true. It is only science that defines it as unfalsifiable. It's not unverifiable.

These undecidable metaphysical questions derive from the assumptions of science so of course science can't solve them. However such paradoxes and problems don't exist in more sophisticated view of the world.

You seem to be arguing that idealism is false because it's not scientifically testable. This is not a rational point of view. Science is defined in such a way that the question of idealism is undecidable and untestable. That doesn't mean it isn't true or that we can't know whether it's true. It just means that a priori we can't do this by using only the scientific method, and certainly not by adopting the same assumptions as science.

If you stick to facts and forget about defending science or refuting religion then the issues are actually fairly straightforward. This is the situation.

It is possible to know that idealism is true (if it is)
It is not possible to prove that idealism is true.
It is not possible to prove that idealism is false.
It is not possible to know that idealism is false.
It is possible to know that materialism is false (if it is)
It is not possible to prove that materialism is false.
It is not possible to prove that materialism is true.
It is not possible to know that materialism is true.

Which ones don't you agree with?
 
Last edited:

Similar threads

Replies
5
Views
3K
  • · Replies 21 ·
Replies
21
Views
6K
  • · Replies 135 ·
5
Replies
135
Views
24K
  • · Replies 212 ·
8
Replies
212
Views
45K
  • · Replies 24 ·
Replies
24
Views
5K
  • · Replies 3 ·
Replies
3
Views
3K
  • · Replies 36 ·
2
Replies
36
Views
6K
Replies
7
Views
7K
  • · Replies 2 ·
Replies
2
Views
2K
  • · Replies 30 ·
2
Replies
30
Views
3K