Can Idealism Be Falsified Without External Consciousness?

[Les Sleeth]

If proof were the only source of knowledge, then mathematicians would have a monopoly on truth. But my position is that experience is the only source of knowledge and I include math and logic because they are dependent on the mind. I know, more epistemology.

I am not sure why "being dependent on the mind" qualifies them as knowledge givers. I am guessing you mean that if the premises are correct, and the logic is correct, then the conclusion must be correct.

Of course, you'd probably agree that even after you achieve a math/logic proof, and assuming the proof represents some aspect of reality, what one "knows" about reality through that representation is still a matter of faith (in the logic/math process and its results) until one has experienced it.

 

[Canute]

Of course, you'd probably agree that even after you achieve a math/logic proof, and assuming the proof represents some aspect of reality, what one "knows" about reality through that representation is still a matter of faith (in the logic/math process and its results) until one has experienced it.

I agree but would put it more strongly. It is impossible to prove anything about reality, one can only know it. This is provable. Therefore there is no contest between reason and experience. Experience has greater 'explanatory reach' than reason, and all proofs are relative and depend on having faith in ones axioms. It follows that anything that can be proved is not certain knowledge. This is why idealism is unprovable. If it was provable then it immediately become disprovable.

 

[heusdens]

Idealism is the opposite of Materialism.
The difference between Idealism and materialism is that they disagree on what is primary: matter or consciousness.

If Idealism were true then some or other form of consciousness would exist, which would be independend of matter.
But how could that be falsified?

The point is of course that it is impossible to define any form of consciousness, where there is no material existence. How can there be consciousness when there is not something to be consciouss of?

 

[Canute]

The point is of course that it is impossible to define any form of consciousness, where there is no material existence. How can there be consciousness when there is not something to be consciouss of?

What we are conscious of is the contents of consciousness. So your question is really the 'set of all sets/empty set' problem in disguise.

If you take away all the contents of consciousness then what becomes of the container? If the container is not the contents of the container then does it exist separately to the contents or not? Does the set of all sets contain itself? Does the empty set exist? You're asking a deep question here, awash with problems of self-reference and infinities.

Some people would phrase it as 'how can there be something to be conscious of when there is nothing to be conscious of it?'. David Bohm, for instance, asks it this way around.

 

[heusdens]

What we are conscious of is the contents of consciousness. So your question is really the 'set of all sets/empty set' problem in disguise.

If you take away all the contents of consciousness then what becomes of the container? If the container is not the contents of the container then does it exist separately to the contents or not? Does the set of all sets contain itself? Does the empty set exist? You're asking a deep question here, awash with problems of self-reference and infinities.

Some people would phrase it as 'how can there be something to be conscious of when there is nothing to be conscious of it?'. David Bohm, for instance, asks it this way around.

The content of our consciousness has been formed by expererience based o the outside material world.